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 | FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XVIII Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964-67 Department of State |
 Washington, February 11, 1966, 11:46 a.m.-1:12 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Komer Memos, Vol. II. Secret. The time of the meeting is taken from the President's Daily Diary, which also lists McNaughton and Hoopes among those present. (Ibid.) The memorandum is dated February 12. SUBJECT PRESENT 1. Plane Sales to Israel/Jordan. Secretary Rusk described the proposal being recommended, i.e., sale of 48 aircraft to Israel. He saw dangers even in selling the A-4E, but much stronger political as well as military arguments against selling the A-6 which the Israelis now wanted. There was also the nuclear angle. At the same time, it was proposed that we offer Jordan 36 F-104s or F-5s. Secretary McNamara felt that we could not even consider the A-6. It was an extremely complicated aircraft, and the bugs hadn't even been worked out yet. We had only one squadron. There were security problems with its electronics. Its price was four times as expensive as the A-4E. There was a shortage in our own supply for Vietnam. Selling the A-6 would also inflame the Middle East arms race, in particular scaring the Arabs about Israeli nuclear capabilities, since it was designed as a nuclear weapons carrier. The President asked Secretary McNamara to take on the job of dealing with the Israelis on this matter. He noted the pressure he was under from the Congress on Israeli matters. He had already had to talk with twelve Congressmen, plus Foreign Minister Eban. So McNamara should call Eban back here and tell him we couldn't possibly sell A-6s, for the reasons McNamara had given. McNamara should find out if Israel was willing to have us sell to Jordan. He should tell the Israelis that we would sell them "X" aircraft and give them "X" dollars in aid if they would sew up everyone in Congress to keep quiet about our Jordan and Israeli sales. McNamara should say that our proposition was a final one; all the pressure in the world would not change it. 2. After a brief discussion of economic aid to Israel, the President agreed that perhaps it was better to hold off telling the Israelis how much economic aid we could give in 1966 until we settle the plane matter. 3. On desalting, Bell and McNamara suggested that we should not help the Israelis on any plant that was uneconomic. We should help out with loans at the normal rate for the investment required, but there should be no subsidies. As to the Israeli proposal for creating a two-man committee, the President agreed that we should work out first what we could do financially on the project before we agreed to set up such a committee. Here follows discussion of unrelated matters. RWK
271. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ I-35235/66 Washington, February 12, 1966. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL ISR-US. Top Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Hoopes on February 15. Copies were sent to, among others, Rusk, McNamara, General Wheeler, McGeorge Bundy, Komer, and McNaughton. Briefing material prepared for the meeting is filed with a February 12 memorandum from Hoopes to McNamara. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 70 A 1266, Israel 452) SUBJECT ISRAELI PARTICIPANTS U.S. PARTICIPANTS After the usual amenities, the Secretary opened the meeting by saying the US is operating in the Middle East "on very slender margins" and that there are accordingly several things we definitely cannot do: (1) we cannot be a major arms supplier to Israel or any Arab country; (2) we cannot sell to any country a sophisticated airplane like the A-6; and (3) we cannot sell supersonics of any kind to Jordan unless Israel concurs in the sale and effectively supports it among its friends in the United States, both in and outside of Congress. He stressed the point that, in the absence of Israeli concurrence and support, the US would not sell aircraft to Jordan. The Secretary said that, if Israel can meet that basic condition and certain others, the US is prepared to sell Israel 24 A-4Es and to give it an option to buy an additional 24, either now or later. The Secretary said the cost of such airplanes would be approximately $26 million for 24 and that credit terms would be the same as those which governed the Hawk purchase (10% down; 3-1/2% interest; and a 10-year repayment). He said that four additional conditions would attach to our willingness to make this sale: (1) that Israel agree to continue to look to Europe for the bulk of its aircraft requirements and not regard the US as a major arms supplier; (2) that Israel reiterate its undertaking not to be the first power in the Middle East to manufacture nuclear weapons, and its acceptance of periodic inspection of Dimona; (3) that Israel agree not to use any US-supplied aircraft as a nuclear weapons carrier; and (4) that Israel agree to full secrecy on all matters until the USG decides when and how to publicize. Mr. Eban said he could respond immediately to certain of the conditions, but would have to consult his Government on others. He agreed fully that Israel should not ask the US to be a major supplier of arms; indeed he had encountered an "obverse problem" in Paris, where the French had expressed concern that Israel might be turning to the United States as its major supplier of aircraft. He said that Israel desires to maintain its French link. He said that Israel does not intend to build nuclear weapons, "so we will not use your aircraft to carry weapons we haven't got and hope we will never have." Regarding Israeli acquiescence in and support of the proposed US sale to Jordan, he asked what this would mean in terms of action by Israel. He said that public statements approving a Jordanian sale would be difficult; on the other hand, if either there were no publicity about either sale, or equal publicity about both, he was reasonably sanguine that Israel could accept and privately support a Jordan sale. Secretary McNamara said the US had received unwarranted pressure from Israeli supporters on the tank arrangements, and did not want a repetition of this. He said Israeli acquiescence is the crux of the US sale to Jordan, and we would have to have assurances that the Government of Israel would prevent its American friends, both in and outside of Congress, from making emotional charges. Mr. Eban turned to Ambassador Harman to ask what arrangements had governed the tank deal (March 1965). Ambassador Harman said that, at the conclusion of US-Israeli negotiations in Tel Aviv, he was instructed to inform "a limited number of Israeli friends in the US" of Israel's acquiescence in the sale of US tanks to Jordan. He explained that the trouble came only when the sale of tanks to Jordan was inadvertently disclosed through an official American publication. Because the Israeli sale was not similarly disclosed, there resulted a disparity in public knowledge which made it difficult to restrain Israeli supporters in this country. Mr. Eban said once more that if the publicity or non-publicity were symmetrical, he would see no serious problems about Israeli acquiescence. He went on to say that, on technical and military grounds, Israel had concluded that the two tank deals produced a good net result for Israel. He could not say whether 48 A-4Es as against 36 F-104s would add up to a similar net benefit for Israel, but he would like to put that question to his Government. He continued that Israel had wanted the A-6 because of its far greater range, and he spoke of the vulnerability of the Israeli Air Force owing to its limited number of airfields. The Secretary said that in this age every air force is partly vulnerable, and that total security from surprise attack is not attainable. Colonel Ron said the Israeli Air Force desires the A-6 because it can carry three times the bomb load of the A-4. He added that the A-4 was, after all, an unsophisticated airplane and would be more so by 1970. Mr. Hoopes interjected that General Weizman last October argued at great length that he wanted the A-4 precisely because it was unsophisticated. The Secretary said he understood the A-4 had been the primary object of the Israeli efforts. The Secretary said that the United States needs a prompt answer to its offer. He said that Israel can, if it likes, defer a decision on the second 24 aircraft, or take all 48 at one time. Mr. Eban asked what the delivery dates would be if the original order were for 48. The Secretary said he would have to examine this question, but that the first 24 could be delivered in calendar 1968, with the balance perhaps in 1969 or 1970. Mr. Eban asked what the terms of the Jordan sale would be; the Secretary replied "cash on the barrelhead." Ambassador Harman asked about proposed deliveries of the F-104s to Jordan. The Secretary said this would be slower, in the 1968-71 time frame, and would depend on the availability of UAC cash. Mr. Eban said he would have the details of the meeting cabled to his Government at once, and that he would see his Prime Minister on Thursday (17 February). Discussion was then concluded on the aircraft question, and there ensued a short informal discussion of the situation in Vietnam. The meeting was convened at approximately 4:40 p.m. and was terminated at 5:10 p.m. Townsend Hoopes
272. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, February 17, 1966. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 12-5 UAR. Secret. Drafted by Thompson and approved in S/AL on February 17. A February 14 memorandum from Komer to the President requested his approval for a low-key probe to see if the Soviets were interested in a freeze on arms shipments to the Middle East. The memorandum states that Rusk proposed this as part of the Israel-Jordan aircraft package and that none of the President's advisers thought the Soviets would be receptive but thought it would be useful for the record. Johnson approved. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 20) SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS I lunched with the Soviet Ambassador today at his invitation. In the course of the conversation, I said that as he probably knew, the United States had followed a policy of not becoming a major supplier of arms to Israel and the Arab countries. I said, however, that we were under constant pressure to furnish or sell arms to the countries of this area and I said that speaking quite frankly the Soviet supply of arms, particularly to the UAR, added to our problem. I said I supposed it was impossible to shut off the sale of arms completely to any area in the world, but we had been wondering, in our Government, whether or not it would be possible to at least hold down the arms race in the Middle East by some understanding between the arms supplying countries to limit the sale of arms on a qualitative basis. I suggested, for example, that it might be possible to agree not to sell supersonic planes or rockets to the countries of this area. I said I thought that the Secretary had raised this matter with Mr. Gromyko last autumn. Dobrynin said that he recalled this conversation but that not much had come of it. On the question of rockets, he said he understood that we had furnished some Hawk missiles to Israel or to some other country in the area. I said I was not sure, but thought this was possible. However, I pointed out that I was thinking of surface-to-surface missiles and not surface-to-air. Dobrynin asked if I had intended that he take this matter up with his Government. I said I did and that what I was saying was a very informal probe to see whether or not there was any interest on the part of the Soviet Union. Dobrynin asked what about other countries and inquired specifically if we had discussed this with the French or British. I said that I did not think there had been any specific discussion, although our general position on the sale of arms was well known. I said I thought that there was little point in pursuing it with other governments unless the Soviet Union was interested, but that if such an arrangement were worked out, it would have to cover the principal suppliers of arms. I thought that if the more important countries agreed, there would be little difficulty with smaller countries, such as Sweden or Switzerland. Dobrynin said that he would inform his Government.
273. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, February 22, 1966, 6 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. 5. Secret. Our tactic of sicking McNamara on the Israelis seems to have worked. I got Eban down here on the 12th and McNamara dusted him off in twenty no-nonsense minutes. As predicted, the Israelis have come back essentially settling for our terms./2/ They've added enough oral caveats, however, that we think we'll insist on the terms in writing. /2/A memorandum of the February 19 conversation between Harman and Hoopes is attached to a February 21 memorandum from Hoopes to Hare and Komer. (Ibid., Files of Robert W. Komer, Israel Security, Arms/Aircraft, 1966) In short, we'll sell Israel 48 A4Es (about $50 million), and they will undertake in return to: (1) quietly support our sale of 36 secondhand F-104s to Jordan; (2) reaffirm their promises not to go nuclear unless others do; (3) keep the whole matter quiet until we decide how to publicize it; and (4) not bother us any further on planes for the next several years. Meanwhile King Hussein has replied to your oral message/3/ asking him to sit tight for a few more weeks. He again appeals for help, saying that otherwise when the Arab leaders meet on 14 March he'll have to give in and take MIGs. King Feisal is also in, appealing that you help out Hussein. We are now able to get Hussein off the hook by offering him the secondhand F-104s in three increments of 12 a year beginning in 1968. We'll charge cash (it should net us about $50 million too) because the oil-rich Arabs are footing the bill. Once we are satisfied with the Israeli commitments, may we go ahead with the Jordan sale? We'll get some criticism, no matter what we do, but in my judgement, the risk is now less one of Zionist complaints (though we'll get some) than of the Arabs doing something foolish. If we play our hand skillfully, however, we believe we can handle this. /3/Johnson's oral message was transmitted in telegram 379 to Amman, February 14. It assured the King that it remained U.S. policy to "support the integrity and progress of Jordan to the fullest extent" but that Jordan's request for supersonic aircraft raised grave problems for the United States. It stated that Johnson had asked for an urgent and searching re-examination of how the problem could best be met. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 12-5 JORDAN) The text of the King's oral response was transmitted in telegram 496 from Amman, February 17. (Ibid.) R. W. Komer
/4/This option is checked. The President indicated his approval on a February 25 memorandum from Komer to the President, filed with this memorandum, which states that the Departments of State and Defense believed it urgent to move promptly on the sale to Jordan.
274. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, February 23, 1966, 11:30 a.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL UAR-US. Secret. Drafted by Sterner on February 24 and approved in the White House on March 1. The meeting was held at the White House. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS His Excellency Anwar al-Sadat, President of the U.A.R. National Assembly The President In reply to the President's warm greeting, Sadat expressed his deep appreciation for the reception he had received from all quarters since his arrival. He said he had a message from President Nasser to President Johnson which he wished to read. (Text attached.)/2/ /2/The text of the message, undated, is attached but not printed. It introduced Sadat and observed that his visit came at a time of "marked improvement" in U.S.-UAR relations, of which the recent economic agreement was an example. The President thanked Mr. Sadat for President Nasser's message and promised that he would send an appropriate reply. The President said he had been encouraged by indication of a more mature understanding of the problems between our two countries. A lot of these difficulties were public relations problems. The President said he knew some of the public relations problems that Mr. Sadat's government faced. By the same token he hoped the leaders of the U.A.R. could occasionally put themselves in his shoes. He was in a goldfish bowl being watched by 200 million people. That was the character of American democracy. He was now asking Congress to provide him with the wherewithal for a foreign aid program which he considered very important. He hoped Mr. Sadat would appreciate that he wouldn't stand much of a chance getting that money if he started calling Congressmen names at the very time he was urging them to pass the bill. The President thought the foreign aid bill would pass, but it would take a lot of trouble. By all rights the President thought U.S.-U.A.R. relations should be of the best. The U.S. has contributed more than $1 billion of aid to the U.A.R. over the years. We wouldn't have given the U.A.R. that much money if we hadn't been deeply interested in the welfare and security of that country. Yet in spite of this there were bad moments between us. Differences were perhaps inevitable in the affairs of two independent countries, but they didn't have to be compounded by public relations problems. Whatever difficulties we faced the President hoped they could be discussed quietly among ourselves and not announced to the public over loudspeakers. The President said he faced many public relations problems within the U.S. itself. People were always saying hard things about him and always hoping he would react, but he rarely gave them that pleasure. The President expressed his admiration and personal liking for Ambassador Kamel. "When your government has something to say to us, you just tell Ambassador Kamel to put on his hat and come on down here. Let's not talk about it in public." The President said he wished to comment on a few specific aspects of U.S.-U.A.R. relations. He was most appreciative of the U.A.R.'s efforts to be helpful on Vietnam. He had had a first-hand report about this from Governor Harriman./3/ He wanted Mr. Sadat's government to understand exactly what our position was there. We wanted peace, but we weren't going to allow the other side to take over South Vietnam. /3/Harriman met with Nasser in Cairo on January 4 in the course of a trip to various capitals for discussions concerning Vietnam. He reported his conversation with Nasser in telegram 1677 from Cairo, January 5. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Arab Republic, Vol. IV) We were not as alarmist as the Egyptians on the subject of possible acquisition of nuclear weapons by Israel. We were watching the situation closely. The U.S. would be against such a development because of our firm policy against the proliferation of nuclear weapons. We hoped there was still a chance for a settlement in Yemen. We had been sorry to see that recently there was some slowdown in the progress that was being made last summer. Couldn't both the Egyptians and Saudis get together and talk about their difficulties? Ambassador Hare said we had been urging just this on both the Egyptians and Saudis for some time. The President asked Ambassador Hare to look into anything further the U.S.G. could do along these lines. President Johnson said that the U.S.G. was impressed by the self-help measures the U.A.R. Government had recently adopted. We hoped this trend would continue. In summary, the President said we thought there was a sound basis for excellent relations between the U.S. and the U.A.R. The U.A.R. could depend on the U.S. doing its part. He repeated that he personally was grateful for the U.A.R.'s good offices on Vietnam and asked that Mr. Sadat convey his very best regards to President Nasser. Mr. Sadat said, first of all, he wished to express the gratitude of his government and his nation for all the help the U.S. had given the U.A.R. More than this, Egyptians were grateful for the special attention President Johnson had personally given to U.S.-U.A.R. relations during periods when he had many other things on his mind. One problem seemed to be worrisome for the U.A.R.G. at the moment--Yemen. Following the Jidda Agreement last year,/4/ Nasser had declared that the U.A.R. wanted nothing further out of Yemen and that it was ready to evacuate its forces. Unfortunately, the U.A.R. had been running into some misinterpretations of the Jidda Agreement on the Saudi side. Both before and after the Haradh Conference President Nasser had asked to meet with King Faisal to sort out these differing views. These offers had been evaded with polite rejections. In Mr. Sadat's opinion, Faisal apparently thought the U.A.R. was desperate and "begging for peace" in Yemen. Mr. Sadat wished there to be no misunderstanding on this point. The U.A.R. was not begging for peace. But it was ready to make every reasonable effort to arrive at a peace that would be honorable for both sides. The U.A.R. could not get out of Yemen without leaving behind some form of viable government. This was what the U.A.R. wanted to talk about with Faisal but in view of his unwillingness to talk the U.A.R. frankly did not know what more it could do. The President asked whether another Nasser-Faisal meeting of the type they had last summer was out of the question. Mr. Sadat indicated this was exactly what his government was trying to bring about. /4/Reference is to an agreement between the UAR and Saudi Arabia signed at Jidda, August 24, 1965. The text is printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965, pp. 623-624. President Johnson repeated his desire for good relations with the U.A.R. as well as his hopes that differences between the two countries could be kept out of the public forum. On the present meeting, he hoped they could just leave it that "mutual problems" had been discussed without any mention of specifics. Both Mr. Sadat and Ambassador Kamel indicated their agreement.
275. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan/1/ Washington, February 23, 1966, 7:13 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 23-9 SYR. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Marshall W. Wiley of NEA/NE; cleared by Symmes, Russell, and Davies; and approved by Hare. 393. Your 504./2/ Syrian Coup. /2/Telegram 504 from Amman, February 23, reported Barnes' meeting with King Hussein and Prime Minister Tell about the coup that had taken place that morning in Syria, which, according to Jordanian information, was Communist-oriented. The King told Barnes that either a Communist takeover or civil strife resulting in chaos in Syria would threaten Jordan's security and might force him to consider limited intervention. (Ibid.) 1. Please convey following at appropriate level: A. We have no evidence Communist involvement February 23 coup. Information available to us indicates coup result of inter-Baath party rivalries growing out of recent governmental changes. B. We would strongly advise against any intervention by Jordan, particularly intervention armed forces. C. We keeping situation under close scrutiny and endorse idea of full exchange of information on continuing basis. Rusk
276. Telegram From the Department State to the Embassy in Jordan/1/ Washington, February 26, 1966, 3:57 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 12-5 JORDAN. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by Symmes on February 24; cleared by Davies, Colonel Byrd, Meyers, and Komer, in draft by Stoddart, and in substance by Hoopes; and approved by Hare. 404. Your 496./2/ /2/Not printed. (Ibid.) 1. Request you deliver following oral message to King from President: "After full and careful consideration of the problems you face, I have decided we should make a special effort on a one time basis to meet your request for supersonic defensive aircraft. You are already aware of the many reasons for our reluctance to make this decision. These reasons still exist. Our decision to proceed despite them takes into account the special relationship between our two countries and the extreme pressures that you have felt. The proposals that I have authorized Ambassador Barnes to deliver to you represent a maximum stretching of our policy, and I therefore earnestly hope that you will find them acceptable." 2. You will receive by separate message further instructions regarding proposal you should present to King./3/ /3/Telegram 405 to Amman, February 26, conveyed instructions for Barnes' detailed presentation. It authorized him to offer up to 36 rehabilitated F-104 A/B series supersonic interceptors in three equal increments. If the first increment, for delivery in calendar year 1968, did not create "unmanageable problems," Jordan would have the option of purchasing 24 additional F-104As or Bs. It also set forth U.S. requirements: Jordan should reconfirm its previous undertaking to make no arms purchases from the Soviet bloc, the delivery of the last 24 aircraft would be keyed to the phase out of Jordanian Hawker Hunters, and Jordan would continue to take all necessary steps to minimize budgetary costs of modernizing its armed forces. The offer was contingent on UAC provision of funds, and no credit would be extended. (Ibid.) 3. If King should remark on absence any reference in President's oral messages to his complaints about aid program or other sections of his letter, you may state you informed full letter under study and that appropriate responses will be forthcoming. Dept would welcome any comments you have in that connection./4/ /4/Barnes reported in telegram 525 from Amman, March 1, that he had made the presentation to the King. (Ibid.) Rusk
277. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic/1/ Washington, February 28, 1966, 8:33 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 12-5 NEAR E. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Russell, cleared by Symmes, and approved by Hare. 4851. 1. Following summary based on uncleared memcons FYI, Noforn, and subject to revision upon review. 2. Secretary discussed Near East arms race with President UAR National Assembly Sadat February 25. a. Said US deeply concerned and had tried not become directly or heavily involved. Believed, however, overall area security better served by absence fear resulting from arms imbalance. Wished make informal comments for UAR consideration. 1) Before Vietnam crisis became acute US and USSR were able by "mutual example" turn arms production curve downward. Vietnam, however, forced heavy additional arms expenditures. 2) Could reciprocal restraint serve flatten Near East arms spiral? If not, difficult foresee sane future for Near East. b. Sadat feared little could be done about Near East arms race. He reviewed history past ten years including 1) UAR arms acquisitions to guard against Israeli military attacks which repeatedly followed public professions of peaceful intent, 2) violation of 1950 Tripartite Declaration/2/ by Franco-British invasion 1956, and 3) Ben-Gurion statement Sinai integral part Israel. Clearly Israel not to be trusted. Israel now stronger and backed by UK which also untrustworthy. Only assurance for UAR against attack was to be armed to teeth. Small size Israel plus policy encouraging Jewish immigration made expansion inevitable. UAR hated spend scarce foreign exchange on arms, but did not want become nation refugees like Palestine. /2/The text of the Tripartite Declaration, a statement issued by the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France on May 25, 1950, is printed in Department of State Bulletin, June 5, 1950, p. 886, and in American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955: Basic Documents, Vol. II, p. 2237. c. Secretary asked whether fear Israeli expansion or existence Israel that governed UAR attitude. Sadat said both. Secretary observed if former something might be done, if latter not so sure. d. Secretary stressed unalterable US commitment oppose proliferation nuclear weapons. Applied world-wide to all countries. Injection nuclear weapons into Near East arms race would cause US react very harshly. Sadat replied UAR felt equal concern and would be forced launch preventive war if Israel acquired bomb. Secretary hoped for effective preventive measures short of war. e. Secretary confirmed US commitment applied equally to imported or indigenously produced weapons. f. Secretary assured Sadat Israel under no illusions about US stand on nuclear weapons proliferation. Desired widest possible acceptance IAEA safeguards. Sadat said UAR suspected Israel had turned down US try for safeguard for Dimona. While avoiding detailed reply Secretary said he would not take that as conclusion. Sadat said "very good." g. UAR Under Secretary al-Feqi noted UAR had said at Vienna it would accept safeguards. On other hand French had acknowledged to UAR that Israel with France's help probably could now produce plutonium on its own. Secretary suggested UAR recheck this since he understood Franco-Israeli agreement for nuclear cooperation provided for no leave-behind nuclear materials. h. Secretary said if USSR were to push idea nuclear free zone in Near East, excluding Turkey, we could see advantages to it. i. In response Secretary's hope UAR would give intense thought to arms problem, Sadat assured him UAR would never act, only react. Secretary considered this important assurance, but problem was getting Israel to believe it. j. Secretary asked Sadat whether he believed US could ever support Israel in attempt expand its territory. Sadat replied yes, he could under possible future circumstances of poor US-UAR relations. Secretary said inconceivable US would ever support Israeli attempt territorial expansion, but appreciated Sadat's frankness. k. Secretary described UAR economic reforms as best means achieve respect necessary for UAR play leading international role commensurate its potential. This objective posed no problems for US-UAR relations. Sadat interjected Israel only real problem. Might not be solved this generation, but time had also solved problem 80-year Crusader occupation Egypt. 1. Secretary cautioned about US public sensitivity. President Johnson believed deeply leaders of states interested improving relations should not engage in polemics. Secretary assured Sadat President Johnson would not allow him make speeches attacking President Nasser. Sadat smiling said he understood. 3. UAR Ambassador Kamel reporting foregoing to Cairo as well as other Sadat conversations with senior US officials. Rusk
278. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts/1/ Washington, March 4, 1966, 10:08 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 16 SYR. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Alfred L. Atherton, Jr., and John T. Wheelock of NE; cleared by Symms, Wehmeyer, and Morris J. Amitay of EUR; and approved by Hare. Sent for action to Damascus and repeated to Beirut, Amman, Jidda, Taiz, Baghdad, Cairo, London, Paris, Tel Aviv, and Kuwait. 1677. 1. As routine matter Department planning deliver two circular diplomatic notes to Syrian Charge d'Affaires here on March 7. 2. Such conduct of formal diplomatic business normally implies that sending Government recognizes Government of addressee. 3. Department on February 26, 1966, was handed note from Syrian Charge/2/ stating in effect a) present Syrian government considers itself legitimate successor past Baath governments and b) therefore no further recognition necessary from friendly states. /2/The note is ibid., POL 15 SYR. 4. Given origin, uncertain nature and cloudy future of present SARG, we see merit in avoiding situations which would require us either give special signal of support or indicate non-recognition of new government. Therefore seems in our best interest quietly accept Syrian government's thesis that no new declaration of recognition required. Routine delivery of diplomatic notes in question is consistent with this approach in that it will signify without highlighting our continued recognition of SARG. 5. Embassy Damascus should not take initiative discuss recognition question with Syrian officials but if latter raise matter after delivery of notes, Embassy officers may in low key cite this action as indication we are continuing normal diplomatic relations. Rusk
279. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts/1/ Washington, March 9, 1966, 12:47 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 12-5 NEAR E. Confidential. Drafted by Gamon; cleared by Symmes, Davies, Hare, Officer in Charge of Libyan Affairs Hugh Campbell, Deputy Director of the Office of Northern African Affairs Matthew J. Looram, and Trevithick, and in draft by Officer in Charge of Moroccan Affairs Robert Chase and Meyers; and approved by Rusk. Sent to Amman, Algiers, Beirut, Baida, Baghdad, Cairo, Damascus, Tel Aviv, Rabat, Tripoli, Kuwait, Tunis, Jidda, Taiz, and Khartoum. 1709. 1. Moroccan Ambassador called on Secretary March 7 and inquired about arms situation in Near East. Expressed particular interest in facts behind recent stories of US deliveries to Israel, explaining his Government wished exert traditional moderating influence during forthcoming Cairo FonMin meeting. 2. Secretary reviewed US Near East arms policy as set forth Department's February 5 press statement/2/ and correspondence to interested Congressmen (CFR No. 6 February 9)./3/ In particular made following points: (1) USG did not wish become major arms supplier to area; (2) large-scale Soviet deliveries had created fears not only on part of Israel but also certain Arab States; (3) in line our interest help friendly states meet defense needs we had agreed supply limited number Patton tanks to Jordan and Israel and ground-to-air missiles to Saudi Arabia and Israel; (4) while we did not propose discuss details of deliveries, tanks furnished Jordan and Israel were in very modest amounts when compared to armaments UAR had received; (5) Secretary had proposed at Geneva that efforts be made to slow down arms races not related to East-West issues; (6) maybe Morocco, exercising its moderating influence, could ease not only Israel-Arab difficulties but inter-Arab tensions as well. /2/The text is in telegram 360 to Amman, February 5. (Ibid.) It is printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965, p. 512. /3/Reference is to Current Foreign Relations, a classified Department of State publication. 3. Rabat. You may use above in addition to Deptel 465/4/ in conversations with GOM officials, should you consider it appropriate and likely to be helpful. /4/Telegram 465 to Rabat, March 2, provided guidance similar to that in circular telegram 1709. It also noted that inter-Arab tensions as well as the Israel-Arab dispute affected the arms situation in the Near East and that Arab public statements calling for the liquidation of Israel contributed to pressure for Israeli defensive arms. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 12-5 MOR) 4. Tripoli and Baida. You may draw from above in conversations with Bishti and his private secretary, noting additional guidance below. With further reference to Embtel 775,/5/ you should avoid giving impression USG entering into field as supplier arms in major quantities but that it merely reacting, to minimum extent consistent with defensive and replacement needs our friends, to Soviet sales that have amounted to $2 billion over past ten years. /5/Telegram 775 from Tripoli, March 5, requested guidance concerning U.S. arms sales to Israel. (Ibid., POL 7 UAR) 5. All addressees. You may use above as you see fit if appropriate occasion should arise to discuss Near East arms situation with host government, particularly if you believe you can count on receptive attitude. However, we do not seek to stimulate Arab reactions and any such approaches you deem advisable should be handled so as to avoid creating impression USG attempting mount campaign to influence Arab thinking. For this reason posts other than Rabat should not mention Moroccan approach. You should not bring up subject of Israel's nuclear program. If subject should arise, you may say USG watching situation in area carefully and we have no indication GOI developing nuclear weapons. As we have made clear on number of occasions we are adamantly opposed to nuclear proliferation in Near East. We believe if all countries in area having nuclear potential were to accept IAEA safeguards, helpful step this direction would have been taken. Meanwhile, any USG cooperation in projects this area involving nuclear energy must be accompanied by such safeguards for those projects. Rusk [Continue with the next documents] Volume XVIII Index | Foreign Relations Online | Historian's Office | Department of State | Secretary of State |