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 | FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XVIII Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964-67 Department of State |
 260. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, December 29, 1965, 4 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL ARAB-ISR. Secret. Drafted by Gamon and approved in S on January 5, 1966. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS Ambassador Harman said that during his recent visit to Israel Prime Minister Eshkol and other senior Israeli officials had discussed with him recent developments affecting the area that were causing the Government of Israel serious concern. In this connection the Prime Minister told him that he had to take exception to the following erroneous concepts that were current abroad: (1) Arab Summit meetings were becoming more moderate; (2) Israel is militarily superior to the Arab States; and (3) Israel's Arab neighbors were rearming merely to catch up with Israel. As the Prime Minister saw things, the U.A.R. had been able to play on the common Arab desire to destroy Israel and had succeeded in rallying the Arab states behind the Unified Arab Command. Ambassador Harman then gave the Secretary the two attached documents ("Liabilities Imposed by Arab Summits" and "Arab Summit Budgets")/2/ and read from them to show how the Arabs were busily preparing themselves for the time when they would attack Israel. He dwelt at some length on the UAC plans for the rearmament of Jordan, Syria and Lebanon stating that their task would be to pin down Israeli forces in the north while the U.A.R. mounted the main attack. Once the refugees in the Gaza Strip were organized into an effective Palestine Liberation Army Nasser would have the option of letting them conduct Fedayeen-type operations or a "liberation war" as a cover for his own aggressive designs. /2/The attachments are not printed. The U.A.R. was giving top priority to its armament while cutting back on economic and social programs. It had acquired 60 new MIG-21's, was getting 20-30 Sukhoi low-level attack planes, additional TU-16 bombers and helicopters, and the first of a large number of T-55 tanks had arrived. There was every indication that the U.A.R. was organizing a third armored division and that some of the Yemen veterans would be kept in the regular army rather than be placed on reserve status. In this context the resumption of a food program for the U.A.R. was causing Israel concern, particularly because the United States was apparently not taking up with Nasser the things he was doing to undermine Israel. Although the United States had assured Israel that the primary purpose of the Saudi armament deal was to provide that country with an adequate air defense package, Israel could not gloss over the fact that the Saudis had an airfield only 200 kilometers from Eilat and that the process of arming Saudi Arabia would breed a new class of military in that country. A second subject that was causing the Israelis concern was the status of U.S.-Israeli understandings on Israel's defense needs. During the discussions in March 1965, it had been agreed that Jordan had no need for a military build-up but that it would be preferable for Jordan to have Western rather than Soviet arms. The United States had made good Israel's tank deficiencies and had recognized that it would be in the interest of both countries for Israel to have modern aircraft. The Israelis were disappointed that, despite this commitment and Israel's repeated unsuccessful efforts to find planes in France, the United States was unwilling to set a date for a resumption of aircraft talks. The Prime Minister was under the impression that the United States would never supply Israel with aircraft, even if it were demonstrated that there was no alternative source. Israel had welcomed American assurance that there would be no direct U.S. aid to Jordan for its aircraft acquisitions. However, Israel had learned that the United States was supplying Jordan with some 100 tanks beyond those about which the United States had informed Israel, although the United States had agreed to keep Israel informed of tank deliveries to Jordan. [On August 21, 1965, Mr. Rodger P. Davies informed Minister Evron that the U.S. had supplied Jordan with 96 M-48 tanks under MAP in 1964-65 and would be selling Jordan 100 M-48's under a special arrangement in 1966.]/3/ /3/Brackets in the source text. Finally, the Israelis were disappointed that the United States had not responded to their request for economic assistance. As far back as 1960 the U.S. had told Israel that economic assistance to Israel would take into consideration the latter's defense burden. The Secretary said that he would have the Department study the assessment presented by the Ambassador as well as past U.S.-Israeli military discussions and would be in touch with him soon. With regard to economic aid, the Secretary said that the Israeli request was under study. This would have to take into account Israel's whole economic position./4/ /4/Hare met with Harman on January 13 to respond to the points he had made. He stated that no decision had been made concerning the question of aircraft sales and that the Israeli request for economic assistance was under high-level consideration. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF ISR)
261. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, January 12, 1966, 11 a.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 18. Secret. Filed with a January 12 covering memorandum from Bundy to the President noting that it replaced a memorandum that he and Komer had sent earlier and expressing disappointment that the Israelis were "still trying to use the Feldman/Feinberg channel for serious business." Our Israeli Affairs. Mike Feldman says he hopes to see you in the next few days, probably to pass on a complaint about how poorly we're treating Israel. In fact, I wouldn't be surprised if you got a letter from Eshkol shortly. Such gambits are part of a standard Israeli effort to put pressure on us for more military and economic help. I've been through them before and, as I wrote you,/2/ the best response is to play a little hard to get ourselves (and make clear we won't be muscled) before coming through. We end up spending less this way. Thus we've held up informing Israel of your economic aid decision just yet; we're also waiting till we can propose to you a solution on planes for Jordan and Israel. /2/A January 5 memorandum from Komer to the President noted several items that Komer attributed to an Israeli effort to put public pressure on the United States for more aid. He recommended telling the Israelis that "we simply refuse to do business this way." A note from Bundy on the memorandum endorsed Komer's recommendation. Johnson wrote "See me" on the memorandum. (Ibid., Country File, Israel, Vol. 5) Bundy stated in the January 12 memorandum cited in footnote 1 above that he had not done so because of the press of other business. One development has infuriated the Israelis. To counter all the public criticism they generated about US aid to Nasser and arms to other Arabs, somebody in the Pentagon defensively leaked that the Israelis were secretly buying fancy missiles from France. We haven't made them feel any better by pointing out that, while we deplore the leak, it serves them right. Although Israel will complain about a crisis of confidence, this is par for the course. So is sending Feldman and Feinberg in to harry you. Thus, I'd see merit in telling Feldman to pass back word that we naturally bridle when Israel tells us how to run our business and that, if Israel expects help from us, it must be a two-way street. We could well afford to hold the line for another few weeks before easing up. If you feel that we are trying to play too cozy a game, however, we can ease up. We can short-circuit most Zionist criticism by leaking the tank deal to Israel (even though this risks flak from Arabs, especially Nasser). We could also go ahead with the economic aid package, and then with the planes. In sum, we have more than enough goodies in hand to stem any tide of criticism. The only real issue is whether to play hard to get a bit longer as a lesson, or to begin caving now. R. W. Komer
/3/Neither option is checked.
262. Draft Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk and Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Johnson/1/ Washington, undated. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 70 A 1266, Israel 452. Secret; Limdis. Filed as an attachment to a January 18 memorandum from John T. McNaughton to McNamara, a notation on which indicates that McNamara signed the draft memorandum to the President on January 19. A February 10 memorandum from Hoopes to Vance states that Rusk allowed the draft memorandum to go forward to the White House without his express approval. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 70 A 1266, Israel 452) SUBJECT Recommendation We recommend you authorize us to proceed with a sale of American military aircraft to Israel and Jordan along the lines of proposals in Enclosure 1: (a) up to 24 U.S. A4's to Israel on MAP credit terms, with an option for Israel to buy 24 more at a later date, and (b) up to 36 F-5's or F-104 A/B's, or a mix of the two, to Jordan in increments of 12 for cash allocated to Jordan by other Arab states./2/ /2/There is no indication of the President's approval or disapproval. The enclosures are not attached. Discussion We have reviewed the options available to us in meeting Jordan's requirement for supersonic military aircraft (Enclosure 2) and conclude we must agree to sell up to 36 American aircraft if we are going to preclude King Hussein's accepting MIG's under pressure from the United Arab Command (UAC). The UAC has offered Jordan Soviet MIG's, but has allocated funds to Jordan to purchase 36 aircraft from Western sources in lieu thereof. Since the King feels he has already obtained the maximum numerical concessions at the last Arab Summit (from 60 to 36 aircraft), we believe an offer of less than 36 would not obviate the risk of his accepting MIG's. In making our offer, however, we would not relate it to the UAC requirements as such. (Enclosure 3 is a chronology of developments leading up to the present situation.) This course is distasteful, but less so than the probable results of other courses of action. We agree with Ambassador Barnes' assessment that Hussein cannot put off a decision much beyond mid-January. MIG's in Jordan could precipitate a chain of events that would seriously damage our interests not only in Jordan but elsewhere in the Near East. A subsidy for the purchase of more expensive French or British aircraft would have balance of payments disadvantages and would put us in a position of indirectly fueling the Near East arms race without the compensating advantage of control we would gain from a U.S. sale. We have been under considerable pressure from Israel to sell U.S. aircraft regardless of what we may do for Jordan. If we sell to Jordan there would have to be a compensating sale to Israel. Without the sale to Jordan we might be able to stall the Israelis for a time. However, particularly if we believe that eventually we must provide some aircraft to Israel, a sale now to Jordan would have a number of advantages. It would protect the considerable U.S. investment in that country, would enable us to exert continued influence for stability in the area and, by preempting the Soviets in Jordan, would prevent a major step toward an East-West polarization of arms supply to the area. At the same time, an offer to sell to Israel would make a sale to Jordan more acceptable to circles in which criticism of such a sale could be expected. Our agreement to sell U.S. supersonics to Jordan, to which we are convinced there is no feasible alternative, could be incorporated in the same kind of Israel-Jordan package arrangement developed for the ground equipment sales last March. (Enclosure 4 is a summary of U.S. aircraft cost and availability data.) We recognize that the course of action recommended will not put an end for all time to either Jordanian or Israeli pressures on us for military sales of supersonic aircraft and other military equipment. The threat of Soviet equipment in Jordan will remain to be invoked in the future. Soviet supplies to the U.A.R., Syria, and Iraq will create continued Israeli pressures for deterrent equipment. Some sort of agreement with the U.S.S.R. would therefore appear to offer the best hope of ultimately checking the arms race in the Near East. The Soviets have been probed a number of times on this subject, most recently by Secretary Rusk on October 1, 1965, but our efforts have not been fruitful (Enclosure 5). We are now studying possibilities for a further effort to explore Soviet attitudes in this regard./3/ /3/Rusk raised this subject with Gromyko during an October 1 conversation in New York which covered a number of subjects. He stated that he thought it might be possible to reach an informal understanding to bring pressure on Israel and Egypt to limit their arms buildup and that some day it might be possible for the United States and the Soviet Union to jointly declare that they would not tolerate the use of force to resolve disputes in the Near East. Gromyko brought the conversation back to U.S.-Soviet efforts at arms control. The relevant portion of the memorandum of conversation is printed in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XI, Document 97. Dean Rusk /4/Printed from a copy that bears Rusk's typed signature and McNamara's handwritten signature.
263. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/ Washington, January 21, 1966. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. V. Secret. Mac: I am putting my talk today with Israeli Minister Evron in the form of a memo to you, because of the sensitivity of the matters discussed. He said that Harman will be leaving no later than July. Evron either didn't know or wouldn't say who would replace Harman. He also broached the question of an Eshkol visit this year. My first instinct was to counsel waiting till 1967 but then I reflected that it's an election year and the President might be interested. So I was noncommittal, except for saying that a visit would be a lot easier if our other business had been satisfactorily settled beforehand so that no one felt that Eshkol would be coming with a shopping list. After I gently reproved Evron (who is the soft salesman of the Israeli Embassy) for the press and pressure campaign of recent vintage, we got down to cases. He thought that Golda Meir's replacement by Eban would greatly decrease the decibel level of Israeli diplomacy and make things easier all around. On planes, I told him that Israel had made a grievous error in trying to take a whole arm when we extended a hand. When we grudgingly said last March that up to 24 planes might just be feasible as a bonus if none were available in Europe, the Israeli response was the Weizman approach asking us in effect to take over supply of the whole Israeli airforce--with an initial commitment of 210 planes. This had led us to draw right back into our shells. If they wanted to increase the chance of a helpful response, I would advise them to inform us officially as soon as possible (preferably before Eban got here) that, while they still thought the Weizman proposal was the most sensible, they now recognized our reluctance to become the prime Israeli airforce supplier. Therefore, they would continue to seek primarily European sources. However, they did have a much smaller requirement for low-level intruders which they hoped we would supply. They should also tell us that they recognized (as they had on tanks last year) the importance of forestalling Soviet supply of aircraft to Jordan by a sale of our own. I could make no promises as to whether an approach along these lines would unfreeze the aircraft matter, but in my view it was the only promising way to get us to take a second look. I also said that, were I an Israeli, I would not ask for more than the 24 aircraft mentioned last March, and simply express hope that we might later make a further sale of like magnitude. I think he got the drift. Then I pointed out that if Mr. Eban wanted to have a constructive visit, instead of being put on the defensive about Israel's nuclear posture, it would be highly desirable to give us an affirmative answer on the next Dimona inspection before Eban arrived. Otherwise, as Barbour had told Eban, this would be No. 1 on the agenda of everyone to whom Eban spoke./2/ Evron and I agreed that another inspection was inevitable, and that it would be more sensible to agree on it now than to go through the usual series of acrimonious high-level exchanges. However, he pled Eshkol's problem with the new faces in his cabinet, plus Eshkol's worries about Peres. These problems might force a brief delay, until Eshkol could bring his cabinet around. I replied that Peres should be no problem since he and BG were the very ones who originally set up the inspection arrangements. Nor could I help but feel that renewed pleas about Eshkol's political difficulties were largely evasions. After all, we had just given him a year's grace on these grounds. If, however, Eshkol did have a short-term political problem, he would be wise to acquiesce right now in an inspection within a month or so, and candidly explain why he asked for this brief delay. /2/Barbour told Eban on January 18 that the most important matter on the agenda was arranging the next U.S. visit to Dimona. (Telegram 716 from Tel Aviv, January 19; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, AE 11-2 ISR) Evron advised that we keep a close eye on Israel Galili, new Minister without portfolio from Mapai's coalition partner Ahdut Avoda. Eshkol had wanted to make him Defense Minister, and in Evron's opinion he might well be the next PM. Evron asked about economic aid. I indicated that this was a difficult decision for us, because of the President's desire to cut back wherever possible in order to finance Vietnam and the Great Society at the same time. Many in the USG argued strongly that Israel could not justify any economic aid. But I hoped that, if the Israelis would relax, we might be able to come at least part way toward them. I deliberately took the above tack on planes and Dimona, because in my judgment circumstances will probably demand that we end up selling some aircraft to the Israelis. If so, it is far wiser for us to soften them up on certain conditions precedent (on proliferation, on not making us prime suppliers, and on not expecting too much economic aid) than to give way piecemeal and end up getting less than otherwise. If I'm wrong, no harm has been done. RWK
264. Memorandum for the Record/1/ Washington, January 24, 1966. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. V. Secret. Filed as an attachment to a January 25 memorandum from Komer to Bundy that states, "Our side exercise to bring the Israelis in line seems to be going well." Israeli Minister Evron came in briefly at his request today to say that Jerusalem was most responsive to my private suggestions of 21 January as to what ought to be done if Israel wanted to maximize its chances of purchasing aircraft from the US. However, they were worried about one particular point. What kind of planes would we supply Jordan, if we felt that we had to go ahead with Jordan too? I reminded him of Weizman's view, later confirmed by Harman, that the Israelis would be most unhappy with the Mirage, somewhat less unhappy with the Lightning, and least unhappy with F-104's. We had in fact been holding off the Jordanians for a long time, as he undoubtedly knew. If we decided that it was the way of wisdom (in Israel's interest even more than ours) to meet Hussein's minimum demands, we had in mind only a defensive interceptor-type aircraft. In fact, we were thinking of some old F-104's which had a purely air defense configuration. Therefore, I doubted that Israel would have cause for concern on this score (I infer that Jerusalem was worried lest we sell Jordan the same kind of plane we might sell Israel).
Jerusalem's only other worry, he said, was that if Israel reduced its request to say 45 intruders (interestingly, the figure Feldman mentioned to the President), would the US then consider this just a bargaining figure and proceed to cut the number down even further. I replied that this would be in the lap of the gods. But if we made a decision to sell aircraft, a number like 45 did not seem to me unreasonable. I stressed, however, that we might prefer to meet initially only the conditional commitment I had been authorized to make last March, i.e. 24 aircraft on this sale; in this case I saw a possibility that we would agree to Israel's coming back the following year for an additional tranche of the same size (in saying this I had in mind that State/Defense are recommending we sell 36 interceptors to Jordan, though I favor only 24. If we do sell 36 we will be totally unable to hold the Israelis to less than 48 or so). I again emphasized to Evron that I was discussing this matter with them privately and wholly ad referendum, in an effort to create the kind of climate in which a US sale might just become possible. As he knew, however, it would still be an uphill fight. So if Israel was eager for planes, an approach along the lines I suggested would at least increase the prospects of success. I also told him that the President had agreed to see Abba Eban. He was delighted. I urged that if the appointment was on the record Eban be most careful not to contribute to our difficulties, but say to the press afterwards that aid to Egypt or Israel's arms need had not been discussed. The visit should be billed as purely a courtesy call at which no requests were made by him./2/ /2/Komer's memorandum to Bundy cited in footnote 1 above states that if his approach to Evron on plane terms worked, "we'll in effect have pre-negotiated the conditions of sale, a much better way to do business than the pain and strain of last year." Bundy wrote in the margin, "Good work." Rusk
265. Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Fisher) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/ Washington, January 27, 1966. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 12-5 JORDAN. Secret; Limdis. SUBJECT In connection with the memorandum to you and the Secretary of Defense on the scale of U.S. supersonic aircraft to Jordan and Israel,/2/ I am in general in agreement with the views expressed in the AID dissenting memorandum,/3/ particularly with respect to blackmail by Jordan. I understand that nearly all concerned within the Government are unhappy about the proposed course of action, even those who are supporting it. It is, of course, also unnecessary to point out the charge of inconsistency that could be levelled at the United States in the event of public disclosure of the aircraft sales in the light of the seventh point (regarding regional arms races) in the President's message to the ENDC. /2/Reference is apparently to a January 17 memorandum from Hare and Hoopes to Rusk and McNamara, enclosing the draft memorandum to the President (Document 262) and recommending that they sign it. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 12-5 JORDAN) /3/Attached to the January 17 memorandum cited in footnote 2 above, but not printed. My preference, and I am sure this view is shared by Bill Foster, would be for the United States to make further effort to hold the line on Near Eastern arms., for I do not believe a convincing case has been made by Israel or Jordan. Should, however, it not prove possible for us to forego the implementation of the recommendations in the memorandum, ACDA strongly supports the recommendation that we make a concurrent approach at the highest level to the Soviet Union, urging that a joint effort be made to halt the spiral in the Near East. I would also urge that, concurrent with approval of the memorandum, you direct the interested agencies and bureaus to develop on an urgent basis a proposed U.S. program of action with respect to arms limitation in the Near East. For various reasons past efforts to develop a program have languished and come to naught. If we must go ahead with the present sale, we should make sure that the time we buy is used to better effect in the future. Adrian S. Fisher
266. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations/1/ Washington, February 7, 1966, 7 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, REF 3 UNRWA. Confidential. Drafted by Campbell, cleared by Brown and Symmes, and approved by Sisco. Repeated to Tel Aviv and pouched to Amman, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, London, Ottawa, Paris, Ankara, and Jerusalem. 1890. Eban-Sisco meeting. Following main points of discussion of refugee issue between Formin Eban and Asst Secty Sisco: 1. Sisco noted US concern over refugee debate, pointing out signs of diminishing support for US and Israeli positions, citing restiveness of contributors, and stating we foresee even more difficult problems this year than last. He expressed opinion ways must be found to firm up support for weakening positions. 2. Eban expressed appreciation for US effort last year and agreed experience should be warning to us. He suggested earlier planning and said GOI task force will meet in February, develop its ideas by March, and would wish to confer with Dept in spring. Early planning especially necessary, he said, to allow time for full diplomatic efforts with other governments. 3. Ideally in future, Eban said, GA should approach question on reasonable basis, disposing of budgetary and other technical matters without rehearsing over again in familiar terms whole political situation. Only way to achieve this is to make debate less attractive to Arabs. He cited Arab-Israel border situation and declared that since Arabs have learned they cannot have own way they have stopped making trouble. He implied that similar measures in UN could halt refugee debate. 4. Eban also suggested PCC should "intensify" its efforts, not by attempting any new initiatives, but simply by going through motions and reporting that views of two sides far apart. 5. Sisco agreed it useful try to de-politicize refugee item and if possible omit it entirely from proceedings, but doubted this feasible. He then went on to note issue at GA depends greatly on what goes on in area, and asked if there not something Israel could do which would not only help refugee problem, but also have favorable impact on debate. He cited various ideas: Israeli contributions to UNRWA; broader family reunion plan; and especially compensation plan. 6. Eban said Israeli efforts such as agreeing to separate refugee question from overall settlement and un-blocking bank accounts had drawn no response from Arabs, but admitted such gestures gave Israel tactical advantage and agreed GOI would have look at suggestion. 7. Sisco noted US concern over Rossides proposal. He expressed our understanding GOI opposition, but noted there not many negative noises against plan when introduced last GA. 8. Eban then insisted strongly that emphasis should not be on what Israel might do to improve position but "what we can all do together" to line up GA behind GOI position. What can US do to hold line or reinforce our position, he asked, and suggested time may have come for USG to state more explicitly its views on resettlement as solution to problem as he claimed US did in early 1950's. You should get others to say it with you, he said, and added it will be shock, but we must confront Arabs with international opinion. 9. Sisco noted that UN in early 1950's was very different and much less difficult organization. He agreed however on need for early planning and expressed gratification Israel recognized last GA debate as warning. 10. Eban also expressed gratitude for US position on Nine Points and rectification and Sisco pointed out our friends and Israel's were very wobbly on this. 11. Eban concluded discussion refugee question by insisting that instead of making our position softer, we should make it harder--on rectification of rolls, on solving 3rd generation problem outside political context (i.e., without going into juridical status of refugees), etc. Sisco noted GOI should work on "all our friends--not just Africans." Comment: We unable discern any indication Eban any more flexible on refugee issue than predecessor. Nor did we get impression GOI will take very sympathetic look at possible gestures it might make either to improve basic problem or its own image. But discussion served very useful function of making clear to new Formin that while we continue to be sympathetic to GOI problem and wish continue work with Israel USG influence at GA not unlimited on this issue and GOI must take lead own defense. We intend to continue to take this line as set by Amb Goldberg in NY. Ball
267. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, February 8, 1966, 11:30 a.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Komer Memos, Vol. II. Secret. Filed as an attachment to a February 10 memorandum from Komer to the President, which notes that it is a copy of a memorandum sent to him previously. Komer's February 10 memorandum suggests three agenda items for a meeting the next day on Israel-Jordan: jets for Israel and Jordan, economic aid for Israel, and a desalting plant for Israel. A notation on it in Johnson's handwriting reads, "Put on my desk. L." Planes for Israel and Jordan. We've held off the meeting you wanted till the agencies could sort out this key matter first. As you know, we've stalled Jordan from buying cut-rate MIGs for almost two years now, and stalled the Israelis too for over a year. But King Hussein now pleads that he can't hold off Arab pressures any longer; he may cave momentarily and buy MIGs. Israel is also getting hot under the collar. So we've finally reached the point where we have to fish or cut bait. There is no good solution, only another painful choice among evils. McNamara and most of the key State people, as well as Bundy and I, have come reluctantly to conclude that controlled sales best serve the US interest. However, Secretary Rusk quite rightly worries lest we're accused of fuelling both sides of an arms race. He wants a discussion before you first. I. The Argument Against. At first glance, we'd all concede that the US should not get further enmeshed in another dilemma of selling arms to both sides. Much better to get the Soviets and other suppliers to agree that none of us will fuel an Arab/Israeli arms race. More to the point of US domestic criticism, how can the US keep selling arms to Arabs who are sworn to do in Israel? Given the way the United Arab Command is calling for a joint anti-Israeli buildup, it looks as though this is precisely what we're doing. This is the gist of the heavy Congressional--73 Congressmen just wrote Rusk--mail we've been getting (though what they are really saying is that if we sell to Arabs why won't we sell to Israel too?). II. The Facts of Life. In reality, do we have any better option than to back our friends--Arab as well as Israeli--if we are to prevent a blowup in the Near East? We have managed to prevent one ever since Suez by doing just that, however superficially foolish it may seem. A. We didn't start the Near East competition--Soviets did. And they've been forcing the pace ever since. Since 1955, Moscow has shipped almost $2 billion in cut-rate arms to the UAR, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. We and our European friends have been forced to respond by providing some deterrent capability to Israel and friendly Arabs, lest they become highly vulnerable. It is generally arms imbalances (not balances) which most directly lead to trouble. B. Isn't arms control a better solution? Amen. The US/UK have tried for years to get a Soviet response. But the USSR sees much more advantage in using its arms surplus to gain influence with the Arab nationalists and to undermine the US/UK position. When Rusk again raised the question with Gromyko this October, we were again ignored. We've also been at Nasser and Israel, arguing against the senseless waste of resources, but haven't gotten to first base. Over time we may be able to reach some at least tacit understandings, but this will depend largely on our first convincing the Soviets and UAR that they will not be allowed to create an arms imbalance in the Near East. C. So maintaining an arms balance may be the best way of moving toward arms controls, and of forestalling trouble in the meantime. The Saudis really want arms, not against Israel, but to protect themselves against Nasser over Yemen. Tiny Jordan knows that it would be suicide to attack Israel, but Hussein (2/3 of whose people are Palestinians) must appear to them as a good Arab and keep his army happy (it's his base of power). We have no independent stake in Jordan; it has no oil or bases. The main reason why we've spent some $500 million to keep Jordan independent is to prevent the closing of a hostile Arab ring around Israel. The Israelis themselves recognize that our subsidizing King Hussein is worth its weight in gold to them, and play up US arms sales to Arabs mainly to get us to sell to Israel as well. III. Should the US now sell combat planes to Israel? We've come a long way over the past four years toward becoming one of Israel's arms suppliers, and the net effect has been to help stabilize the area, without creating as much Arab backlash as we'd feared. Indeed, it is remarkable that we've managed all these years to be Israel's chief backer, without it costing us our influence in the Arab world. This has been no mean trick, and is still feasible if we don't get spooked by Arab, Israeli, or uninformed US Zionist criticism. From 1948-61 we managed to avoid becoming a major arms supplier by indirectly subsidizing Israeli purchases in Europe. But the drying up of Israel's regular European sources (they just don't produce the right items any more--and Bonn opted out entirely) forced us to become direct suppliers--first Hawks and then tanks. Since our own deep commitment to Israel's security would almost force us to intervene if there were another major Arab-Israeli flareup, it is in our interest to help Israel maintain a sufficient deterrent edge to warn off Nasser and other eager beavers. And the more secure Israel feels, the less likely it is to strike first, as at Suez. So maintaining a reasonable Arab/Israeli arms balance helps limit the chances of our being drawn into a Near East crisis. A. But does Israel really need US planes? Not as much as it did tanks, but it has a good case. Soviet MIGs and bombers are still flowing to the UAR and Syria. We committed ourselves last year to help out with "up to 24 combat aircraft", if they were not available in Europe. If we want to be legalistic, we can argue that French Mirage interceptors are unavailable, but the Israelis want and can best use an intruder-type. B. Will selling planes to Israel spook the Arabs? Our Arab experts so warned before we sold Hawks in 1962, then again before we sold tanks. But actual experience shows far less reaction than we feared. Unless revealing the tank deal creates unforeseen Arab troubles, it's a good bet that quiet, limited aircraft supply to Israel will not upset our applecart in the Arab world. C. Can we use planes as a lever to keep Israel from going nuclear? Desperation is what would most likely drive Israel to this choice, should it come to feel that the conventional balance was turning against it. So judicious US arms supply, aimed at maintaining a deterrent balance, is as good an inhibitor as we've got. D. In the last analysis, can we avoid selling planes to Israel sooner or later? Given continued Soviet shipments to the UAR and Syria--which are Israel's real worry--Hill and other pressure is growing to the point where we probably won't have a defensible case much longer. We could argue that we won't sell planes to either Israel or the Arabs, but does this stand up when (1) the Soviets keep shovelling arms to the wrong Arabs; (2) we've already sold Israel tanks and missiles so why not planes; and (3) it is our friends, not our enemies who will suffer if we refuse to sell arms. Moreover, the more Hill and Zionist criticism we get, the more it interferes with our ability to carry out a sensible Arab policy. So if we're going to be badgered into selling planes anyway sooner or later, we can gain more and will risk less by doing so now when we can drive a hard bargain. IV. Should we sell to Jordan too? If we refuse planes to Israel, we can't get away with Jordan sales without a storm of domestic US protest. But if we deny Hussein's request he may feel compelled to risk our wrath by caving to UAC demands that he buy MIGs (in which case the Israelis would have an additional powerful argument for getting us to sell them planes). The only way to stop him would be to tell him flatly that if he bought Soviet planes we'd cut off his annual $50 million subsidy. Some of us think Hussein would back down. But should we take the risk? Hussein's ability to stay on his uneasy throne depends critically on his not appearing to be a US or Israeli stooge (his grandfather was assassinated for this reason). We've already stalled Hussein to the point of no return--in his judgment and that of our Ambassador. Jordan's independence is important enough to us, and to Israel, that we should not risk jeopardizing it short of over-riding reasons. Thus there is a compelling case for selling planes to Jordan as well as Israel. In fact, the basic rationale is to protect Israel itself. Entry of Soviet arms into Jordan would start a trend which could seriously upset the Arab-Israeli arms balance, and put us under great Israeli pressure. As with tanks last year, if we sell to one the same logic suggests we sell to both. Otherwise, it's hard to avoid an even worse box. V. Conclusions. In sum, painful as it is, there seems no better option than minimum, carefully controlled plane sales to both. Selling to neither is not a real option if the facts of life will probably force us to sell to Israel sooner or later. So there's advantage in doing so now when we can get Israel to acquiesce in our helping Jordan too. The one real issue is whether such sales would over-expose us to criticism for "fuelling both sides of an arms race". But most of this heat (especially on the Hill) is from those who really object to our arming only Arabs and not Israelis. We might be able to cope with this problem by requiring the Israelis themselves quietly to warn off their Hill lobbyists. This wouldn't be foolproof, but should reduce the flak to tolerable limits. To meet the argument that we ought to be promoting arms control instead of arms races, we could refer to our frequent efforts to do just this--and protect our flank by yet another Soviet probe (via Dobrynin). However, none of your Sovietologists believe the Soviets will bite. If we decide to sell Israel aircraft, we can only get what we want in return by providing a low-level intruder. There's no point in offering an interceptor if Israel doesn't want one (and could buy from France if it did). It wants the fancy A-6 (at least $62 million for 24 stripped down versions), but we could probably get it to settle for the smaller, cheaper A-4E (around $24 million for same number). VI. Recommendations. Offer Israel now (on the same MAP credit terms as tanks) up to 24 intruder-type aircraft, with an option to purchase 24 more next year, provided that Israel will in return: (1) continue buying most of its aircraft in Europe so we don't become prime supplier--thus outraging the Arabs; (2) actively, if quietly, support controlled US arms sales to Jordan as being in Israel's interest just as much as ours; (3) not use our aircraft as nuclear weapons carriers; (4) maintain full secrecy till we decide when and how to publicize all such arms deals. Offer Jordan up to 36 F-104 A/B's (a secondhand interceptor) or F-5s in increments of 12 per year delivered beginning in 1968 for cash on the line, if Jordan will in return: (1) purchase no Soviet equipment of any kind; (2) keep the deal secret till we decide to publicize; (3) keep mum about US sales to Israel; (4) renew its undertaking not to increase its own arms budget at the expense of our own budget support program. Despite the length of this memo, it still doesn't cover all the ins and outs of such a tricky and complex matter. So it is well worth a half hour's discussion with your key advisers--hopefully as soon as feasible. We may have held off Hussein well past the zero hour from doing something foolish which could compromise our whole Arab/Israeli policy. R. W. Komer/2/ /2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
/3/Neither option is checked.
268. Memorandum for the Record/1/ Washington, February 9, 1966. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. V. Secret. According to the President's Daily Diary, the meeting took place from 11:15 to 11:35 a.m. at the White House. Evron was also present. (Ibid.) SUBJECT PRESENT The President warmly congratulated Eban on his assumption of the Foreign Ministry. He recalled their friendly association when Eban was Ambassador in Washington, and looked forward to a close future relationship. The President then discussed at length our current position on Vietnam in the light of the Honolulu meeting. He made clear that in helping the GVN we were showing how we would live up to our commitments to small countries as well as large. Israel would rightly be the first to be frightened if the U.S. were to "cut and run in Vietnam." Eban strongly agreed, saying that small states like Israel had an obligation to stay strong and stable enough that they would not become Vietnams, and thus create special problems for the United States. He went on to say that if it were not for Israel's security problem--created primarily by Soviet arms--Israel would no longer need U.S. aid. Because of its special situation, however, Israel still hoped it could rely on the United States. Eban then raised Israel's current concerns over aircraft, 1966 economic and food assistance, and the desalting matter. He hoped that some of these matters would come to a head soon. He emphasized that Israel would still place the bulk of its arms orders in Europe. But sometimes it had needs which the Europeans could not meet, as in the case of intruder-type aircraft. Israel needed about 45 of these. In asking for them, Israel was not "changing gears" and trying to make the U.S. its chief arms or plane supplier. On economic aid, Eban cited Israel's pride in its economic progress; it only needed aid because of its security burden. He noted that all this aid was on a loan basis. As to desalting, Eban reminded the President of the latter's own great interest in the matter. However, all that Israel was suggesting for the moment was the procedural step of appointing one high-level official from each Government to look at the tricky financial problems of how to finance the nuclear desalting plant. The President assured Eban that we would try to evolve something satisfactory on these scores. He wanted to do everything he reasonably could for Israel. In fact we didn't even want to subsidize Jordan, except that this helped Israel. We had no desire to be arms salesman to Israel either, but he didn't want the Israelis to feel insecure. It might be that a balance of arms was after all the best way to avoid unrest in the area. We would also look at economic aid. The President added that he was as anxious as the Israelis on the desalting matter. However, he had been up to his ears on Vietnam and with the new Congress. He would try, nonetheless, to come up with specifics shortly. The President concluded by telling Eban that he looked forward to very close relations with him personally, and with Israel. He wanted to do everything he could, consistent with our national interest. "Let's deal frankly and freely with each other on top of the table" and keep from batting issues around in the newspapers. He added that we always seemed to have a problem with well-meaning friends of Israel who attempted to help our relations along. He asked Eban to tell them "to stop coming in the back door, or writing, or sending telegrams, or talking to the newspapers." We and the Israeli Government together could handle these matters. The President said he had great confidence in Prime Minister Eshkol and saw nothing that was going to disturb our relations. Eban replied that his Prime Minister had had complete trust in the President ever since their meeting in June 1964; he heartily reciprocated the President's sentiments. The President then took the Foreign Minister out to be photographed by the press. RWK
269. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, February 9, 1966, 4:30 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL ISR-US. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Gamon on February 12 and approved in S on February 15. The memorandum is Part II of IV. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS After telling Foreign Minister Eban that the President wanted to reach an early decision on Israel's aircraft and economic aid requests, the Secretary said that the only major question that could have a disastrous effect on U.S.-Israeli relations was Israel's attitude on proliferation. Israel was apparently following a policy designed to create ambiguity in the Arab world. This also created ambiguity in Washington. Israel should expect the U.S. to be extremely clear and utterly harsh on the matter of non-proliferation. He urged the Foreign Minister not to underestimate the total involvement of U.S.-Israel relations in this matter. Mr. Eban said he understood the importance of this question and that the two countries need not fall apart on this. The Government of Israel stood by Prime Minister Ben-Gurion's undertaking in 1961 for periodic visits. The subject had become much more difficult over the last year because of publicity and because Israel had undertaken to accept these visits without full consultation of Parliament. There were delicate but not insuperable internal domestic complications involved. Censorship with a questionable legal basis had been imposed to prevent discussion on the merits of U.S. visits. A full parliamentary debate on the matter had been asked by an opposition party. This could probably be avoided. The alternatives were to have a secret visit or one after the matter had been discussed with the various political parties. With regard to IAEA safeguards, Israel preferred a bilateral arrangement because of the increasingly weak position of Israel in the IAEA and the growing strength of the Arabs in that body. The Foreign Minister said that his Government attached full weight to the undertaking given to Governor Harriman that Israel would not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the Arab-Israel area. The Secretary observed that this undertaking might not prevent the development of a precarious situation somewhat akin to eight months of pregnancy. He stressed that the U.S. could not be silent on its attitude toward proliferation. With regard to visits, he said that the request for secrecy assurances would have to be looked into. What he was interested in was something that would serve as a public assurance. Private assurances were of limited value. The Foreign Minister said that as soon as he got back to Israel he would help in lobbying for a U.S. visit and would also turn his attention to the matter of IAEA safeguards. [Continue with the next documents] Volume XVIII Index | Foreign Relations Online | Historian's Office | Department of State | Secretary of State |