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 | FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XVIII Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964-67 Department of State |
 250. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) and Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson/1/ Washington, November 8, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Arab Republic, Vol. IV. Secret. Received at the LBJ Ranch on November 9 at 5 p.m. Food for the UAR. Rusk's new package/2/ seems to meet the criteria you gave him at the ranch./3/ In fact, it is tough enough that Nasser may insist on arguing about it, even though our Embassy says he's by now almost desperate enough to grasp at any straw. /2/An attached memorandum of November 8 from Rusk to the President recommended a P.L. 480 package totaling $109.5 million for the UAR. /3/See Document 247. It is also tough enough (far less than the UAR asked, or than we've previously given) to be politically defensible here. If it works, we can point to the lower quantities, tougher terms, dollar returns, and rice for Vietnam. Since State/AID now seem to be talking the right tune, we recommend you go ahead. It's possible to design an even tougher package (e.g. six months' instead of a year) but doubt that we could hang on it such conditions as free rice for Vietnam./4/ /4/Johnson wrote at the bottom of the memorandum: "I want to talk to Rusk & Bundy about this Thursday. L." Thursday was November 11. R. W. Komer
251. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State/1/ Tel Aviv, November 10, 1965. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 32-1 ISR-JORDAN. Confidential. No time of transmission is given on the telegram, which was received at 5:55 a.m. Repeated to Amman, Beirut, Jerusalem, and USUN. 498. Fatah. Embtel 485, 488, 493./2/ /2/Telegrams 485, 488, and 493 from Tel Aviv, November 7, 8, and 9, respectively, reported on a November 7 explosion near the Jordanian border and the discovery on November 8 of an explosive charge under the railway to Jerusalem near the Jordanian border. (All ibid.) 1. Saying she had reserved most important point for last of several she raised with me yesterday (reported separately), Mrs. Meir referred to U.S. public statement re Israeli Lebanon exchanges over Fatah incursions./3/ She described statement as "a plague on both your houses" and reiterated complaint that we had not singled out Fatah as cause of whole trouble. She said other govts had diplomatically expressed opposition to Israeli raids but U.S. only one to do so publicly. She went on to note two subsequent Jordanian Fatah incidents (house at Givtat Yeshayahu and mining of railway) in which by miracle no one had been hurt, and asked what we would suggest GOI do about them. She contended that evenhandedness of U.S. statement on Lebanon had encouraged Fatah to latter incursions and that, regardless whether Jordan and Lebanon trying to supress organization, U.S. equating incursions with Israeli countermeasures tended make Fatah believe U.S. sympathetic. /3/Reference is apparently to a November 1 statement by the Department of State, made in response to press inquiries about the Israeli retaliatory raid of October 28-29 against Lebanon, which reads in part: "We deplore the resort to force by any party whether by private groups or by governments." (Ibid., POL 32-1 ISR-LEB) 2. I said I had no suggestions other than increased police measures and use established international machinery. I added continued Jordanian incidents confirmed our view that GOI warning reprisals not effective. I said further that such reprisals removed Israel from status of injured party and made broad U.S. statements inevitable. She replied that she not interested in being injured party, she did not wish to be injured at all. She remarked that railway incident further instance of lack of Jordanian cooperation in that Jordanians declined follow investigation beyond border although detonator wires led forty yards into Jordan. 3. Finally, she said PM Eshkol before leaving for vacation today had asked her to call me in to make foregoing points. She described him as much disturbed by this further Fatah activity and by the potential consequences of blowing up a passenger train which this time averted by accidental discovery of explosives. Barbour
252. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic/1/ Washington, November 17, 1965, 7 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, AID (US) 15-4 UAR. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Drafted by Russell and James H. Bahti of NE on November 16; cleared by Symmes, Davies, Hare, Macomber, and Komer; and approved by Ball. 2807. For Ambassador. 1. You should inform Kaissouni earliest that USG pleased accede to UAR request for new PL-480 agreement. FYI: In our view preferable you inform Kaissouni rather than Nasser of broad outlines new agreement we willing negotiate. Kaissouni not only in position better understand implications new agreement but less likely react emotionally about possible "strings" or penalties. Quid pro quo aspects of new agreement would be clearly outlined to Kaissouni and others and passed by them to Nasser. On assumption Kaissouni reaction to new proposals will be favorable, we anticipate you would seek early meeting with Nasser, not to discuss details of PL-480 agreement, but to review against background our willingness negotiate new agreement broad spectrum US-UAR relations and areas of possible cooperation including: a. Normalization UK-UAR relations and cessation terrorism in Aden. b. Birth control. c. Economic management and planning in UAR. d. IAEA and avoidance of nuclear proliferation. e. Near East arms race. End FYI. 2. Suggest your presentation include following points: a. US-UAR relations suffered unfortunate strains in past months, but we have noted indications lessened strain. b. President Johnson appreciated President Nasser's recent message expressing his desire for good relations with US. c. We hope climate our relations will continue improve. Important, however, that UAR understand problems we face in marshalling domestic support essential for success our foreign policies, and fact that future of PL-480 program will be directly related to climate US-UAR relations. Believe continuing frank exchanges offer best chance keeping incipient problems manageable. d. Several weeks intensive discussion among interested USG agencies were required develop program responsive to UAR request. While certain technical details--including third country consultations on usual marketing requirements--must still be worked out, main features proposed program (same described Deptel 2751/2/) as follows: /2/Telegram 2751 to Cairo, November 12, requested comments on a package proposal discussed at the LBJ Ranch on November 11 for a P.L. 480 agreement with the UAR with a total commodity value of $54.75 million. (Ibid.) 1) Duration six months. 2) "Mix" of 75% Title I and 25% Title IV. Title IV terms generous. Shift to increasing use Title IV part of worldwide trend. 3) Program will include wheat, vegetable oil, tobacco, and poultry (number of items requested by UAR no longer available for PL-480 programming) in amounts indicated Deptel 2751. 4) UAR will be expected substantially increase commercial food purchases from US. Program also provides for option US purchase rice for pounds. e. Negotiating instructions now being prepared and should be completed early December. We will not be able discuss specifics until that time. Begin FYI. We doubt that any of above desiderata can be significantly eased so we should not let Egyptians think that much bargaining is feasible. End FYI. 3. Department will make parallel presentation to UAR Ambassador Kamel upon receipt info re timing your meeting with Kaissouni. Please advise immediate. 4. There should be no public statements at this time. You should stress to Kaissouni that it is essential there be no publicity or speculation in UAR at this stage./3/ /3/Battle reported in telegram 1260 from Cairo, November 19, that he informed Kaissouni of the substance of telegram 2807. Kaissouni expressed great pleasure but also concern at the terms of the offer. (Ibid.) Ball
253. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State/1/ Cairo, November 24, 1965. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, AID (US) 15-4 UAR. Secret; Limdis. No time of transmission is given on the telegram, which was received at 5:44 p.m. 1311. Re Deptel 2807./2/ Have just completed 55 minute conversation President Nasser. I conveyed President Johnson's pleasure at receipt Nasser's message and assured him US desire reciprocate his hope for good relations. Made points in reftel re period of strain, our desire for even relations and hope continue frank exchange of views. /2/Document 252. I then stated, as he was aware, US had taken decision offer P.L. 480 agreement. While terms do not include all UAR wanted, agreement reflects requirements world food situation and US policies toward other recipients as well as UAR. Discussed in some detail general problem of food and then urged we look upon new agreement as major new beginning between us and make every effort build on new foundation in the future. I reviewed US problem of obtaining Congressional and public support for foreign policies and stated our ability proceed directly related climate US-UAR relations. I suggested three areas concern. First, we should try to solve existing problems. Second, we should anticipate new ones and try to prevent them from arising. And, third, we must look for new areas of cooperation. In latter category I mentioned population control and great problem we had in assuring our food did not indirectly encourage population increase. President nodded pleasantly but made no comment. I mentioned need for increasing food production and again he made no comment. I expressed pleasure economic planning and management under new government and noted with satisfaction new UAR attitude towards US business which led us anticipate increased US business activity with cooperative attitude and helpful approval UAR. President then expressed his very great gratitude to the President of the United States for the resumption of aid. He expressed great thanks to me for my objectivity and help over recent months and stated UAR wanted very much maintain good relations us. "We have nothing to gain from bad relations your country and we will do everything possible to improve them." He stated he had wished include something in his speech tomorrow to National Assembly expressing appreciation for new aid but would take my advice and omit any reference even though he must deal with Russian aid and had hoped for balance in statement. I suggested he express gratitude for cooperation in past and pleasure at improved relations between our two countries. He nodded and appeared to agree do so. I then turned to more difficult problems mentioning first Aden and my hope that this area of contention could be diminished as source of concern to those of us who wanted peaceful Middle East. I expressed hope UAR could normalize its relations with UK and would use its great influence bring about cessation terrorism in Aden. I stated British committed to independence by 1968 and expressed doubt any other solution available before then that would serve anyone's interest, including UAR's. Chaos would result from a precipitate British withdrawal and doubtful urban elements who have UAR sympathies would emerge victorious in that situation. "What can we give the Front?" he asked. "They are not my agents." I replied, "I never said they were your agents, but your influence over them and in area very great and your influence might be decisive in this delicate situation." He ranted for a moment or two and I finally said, "What can you suggest that is constructive in this situation?" He said, "Next move is up to the British. We agreed to deal with Aden problem when Thomson came to Cairo and this was impossible." He then stated British efforts bring about solution in London meetings totally unproductive but somewhere in this direction British must move again. Assuming the Yemen problem is settled the key moment will be toward end of Egyptian presence. As Egyptians withdraw leaders Liberation Front will become deeply concerned removal Egyptian strength from area. Key moment for British to make move is in three or four months assuming Yemen agreement to be implemented. I asked how President viewed chances Yemen agreement being implemented. He replied that three or four days ago he had been pessimistic but things looked somewhat better. Saudis wished proceed although were confusing things by asking for understandings not in basic agreement, such as requiring 4/5 majority on votes at Harad conference when Nasser had anticipated need for only a simple majority. Nevertheless Saudis wanted settlement and he wanted settlement. The only ones who did not were the Yemen Republicans. He said, "I am having as much trouble with them as with the Royalists. I don't really care who is in charge there as long as the Hamid ad-Din family is not involved. One group is the same as the other to me except for the family. That was no real revolution in Yemen. It was only a plot. But I just found that out lately." At this point I laughed uproariously and so did he. I stated US strongly hoped for settlement Yemen question as it had for some time. He stated he too wanted settlement and that issue had been most difficult one for him. "Do you know we have had over 70,000 troops there?" I replied that this was more than I had estimated. He stated military had wanted him expand conflict to Saudi Arabia and that just prior to talks in Alexandria (sic) troop strength had been increased to between 70,000 and 75,000 men in anticipation expanded war (although fewer there now). He stated he had held off military pressure and had attempted political settlement against advice some of his top advisers. Many of them had opposed his going Jidda ("but the world applauded," I said) and he had in brief conversation been able to do what military could not have done through force--settled problem with King Feisal. President asked me to carry message to US that it must keep close touch Feisal during this delicate period. Although every evidence Feisal wanted agreement, we must do all possible keep anything from going wrong. I assured him of our continuing interest and of our intention assist where we could. I then brought up arms control problem in general, stating world must find solution arms race. I mentioned US hope UAR could accept IAEA safeguards, saying that we were not, as he had previously stated, singling UAR out for attention in this field but that we had in fact discussed question safeguards with a great many countries in hope of encouraging general acceptance this requirement. He said, "I told Talbot our position when you and he talked with me." I said I was aware Egyptian endorsement safeguards system but what was needed was formal adherence IAEA safeguards for its own country. "Have the Israelis accepted?" he asked. "No, but someone has to begin and we are in consultation with them with hope safeguards can become area wide. Someone must begin this vital step." I then brought up conventional armaments and expressed hope we could over coming months have searching exploration these problems. He said, "You contribute to it by selling arms to Israel." I said, "You contribute to it in other ways but that is not for discussion this evening. The only things I want to register are our continuing concern for the problem, our hope that together we might find a solution, and our desire to continue discussions with you on this very difficult problem." He said, "How many tanks have the Israelis obtained--300, 400, 500?" I said I did not know but I thought his figures highly exaggerated but suggested we deal with basic issues and not numbers any one specific armament. He said, "If you sell planes to Israel, we will buy planes. If you sell tanks to Israel, we will buy tanks." I said this reinforced my argument we must find some way to call a halt to resources going into unproductive activity at time they are desperately needed for more important things involving human survival. I stopped him from extreme emotionalism which built up very readily on this issue, which I have not discussed with him for many months. (Perhaps a detailed presentation should be prepared for my use with him in the near future.) In conclusion, he repeated again his deep gratitude for US willingness enter into new agreement and his earnest desire to assist in improving relations between us. I remarked rather delicately I would look forward to his speech tomorrow night. Comment: The meeting was extremely cordial and embarrassingly friendly, with renewed apologies for speech of last December 23 which I told him now part of history. Obviously he wishes desperately get back in good graces with us and will I believe try in his own way to do his part. Battle
254. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan/1/ Washington, November 29, 1965, 1:36 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 12-5 JORDAN. Secret. Drafted by Officer in Charge of Iraq-Jordan Affairs Lee F. Dinsmore and J.D. Stoddart of DOD/ISA; cleared by Symmes, Meyers, Macomber, Hoopes, Davies, and Komer and in substance by B.W. Byrd of NEA/NR; and approved by U. Alexis Johnson. Repeated to Beirut, Cairo, London, Paris, Tel Aviv, and POLAD CINCSTRIKE. 246. Joint State-Defense. London's 2350 and 2358 to Department; Deptel 2598 to London./2/ If King or Khammash approach Embassy re supersonics, you should be guided by following: /2/Telegrams 2350 and 2358 from London, November 22 and 23 respectively. (Ibid.) Telegram 2598 to London, November 15, set forth the response that the Department of State planned to make to a British Embassy query concerning possible U.S. financial support or guaranty for the purchase of British aircraft by Jordan. The Department wanted to avoid any commitment of U.S. funds to enable Jordan to comply with UAC demands, especially on supersonics, and thought the British and Jordanians should continue to explore how Jordan might satisfy UAC demands within the available UAC funds. (Ibid.) 1. French and British have made offers to sell supersonics to Jordan. From reports available seems clear costs are beyond current GOJ funding from UAC. 2. If Jordan has exhausted bargaining for lower cost and improved terms for aircraft with UK and France, it is our view that their next step should be to seek UAC concurrence to proposition that (a) either UAC provide more funds for Jordan's purchase of Western European aircraft, or (b) UAC reduce its demands re number of planes (see Para F Deptel 219 to Amman)./3/ /3/Telegram 2598 to London, cited in footnote 2 above, was repeated to Amman as telegram 219. 3. USG believes UAR fully aware nature US-Jordanian relationship and recognizes difficulties posed by UAC's strict alternative of MIG's or Western aircraft at same price. (FYI: Foregoing points were made to UAR presidential advisor Hassan Sabri al-Khouli recently during private visit Washington. Airgram CA 5637 pouched Amman./4/ End FYI.) Showdown this issue could force undesirable decisions on USG, effects of which could introduce unmanageable instability in area. /4/Circular airgram CA-5637, November 24. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 UAR) 4. Finally, USG has no intention provide either direct or indirect funding Jordanian purchase French or British supersonics. Nor is sale US supersonics contemplated at present reading./5/ /5/Telegram 322 from Amman, December 1, reported a conversation on November 30 with Prime Minister Tell and Court Minister Sa'd Juma in which Barnes set forth the U.S. position along the lines of telegram 246. (Ibid., DEF 12-5 JORDAN) Telegram 355 from Amman, December 16, reported a December 15 conversation along the same lines with King Hussein, who declared there was no hope of obtaining French or British planes at an acceptable price and no hope of getting more money from the UAC. He thought the only alternative left was to buy MIGs. (Ibid.) 5. For London: In view favorable reports from Jidda to effect Saudis have opted for mixed package, what are prospects for pressing UK make Lightning offer to Jordan more attractive? Davies and Hoopes would like discuss this question with appropriate Embassy and UK officials next week. Rusk
255. Special Report Prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency/1/ SC No. 00699/65A Washington, December 3, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. V. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. Prepared in the Office of Current Intelligence. ISRAEL, THE ARAB STATES, AND PALESTINE The frustrations of more than a million Arab refugees from Israel are leading to new efforts, both peaceful and violent, dedicated to the "liberation" of Palestine. Formation of the Palestine Liberation Organization is the latest of several attempts to provide a political focus for the refugees, and it has the nominal backing of the Arab League. At the same time, however, two independent terrorist groups seem to be trying to trigger incidents which would bring the Arab states into military action against Israel. Jordanian King Husayn opposes either approach to eliminating Israeli rule because his country is the Arab state most exposed to any Israeli reprisal. Moreover, Jordan includes part of Palestine and is the haven for half of the refugees, and Husayn is wary of pro-Nasir subversion among Jordan's Palestinians. Syria, on the other hand, whose support of the terrorism offers greater provocation to the Israelis, enjoys the advantage of being more difficult to retaliate against. Although Nasir, like Husayn, seems anxious to avoid any escalation of the sporadic border incidents, these Palestine-Arab activities could, with little advance notice, lead to the largest Arab-Israeli clashes since Suez. [Here follows detailed discussion of the refugee problem the Palestine Liberation Organization, Jordan and the PLO, and Fatah.]
256. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel/1/ Washington, December 9, 1965, 7:21 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, REF 3 UNRWA. Confidential. Drafted by Campbell; cleared by Symmes and in draft by UNP Director Elizabeth Ann Brown and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs David H. Popper; and approved by Davies. Repeated to Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Jerusalem, and USUN. 494. UNRWA. In view of developments on UNRWA item in UNGA/2/ and especially in light of GOI attitude toward them as expressed by Amb Comay (USUN 2590)/3/ and Bitan (Embtel 608),/4/ Ambassador should seek appointment with Mrs. Meir to convey message along following lines: /2/A U.S. draft resolution introduced in the Special Political Committee on November 9 called on all governments to make the most generous effort possible to meet UNRWA's anticipated needs, directed the Commissioner General to take necessary measures, including rectification of the relief rolls, to assure the most equitable distribution of relief based on need, called on the UN Conciliation Commission for Palestine to continue its efforts for the implementation of paragraph 11 of Resolution 194, and extended UNRWA's mandate until June 30, 1969. (UN document A/SPC/L.113) On November 17, the Special Political Committee approved three amendments introduced by Pakistan and Somalia (UN document A/SPC/L.114) by a vote of 43 to 39, with 23 abstentions, and approved the draft resolution as amended by a vote of 47 to 31 with 17 abstentions. The United States and Israel voted against the amendments and against the draft resolution as amended. /3/Telegram 2590 from USUN, December 8, reported that U.S. and Arab representatives had agreed on the text of a draft resolution, which they would try to get Nigeria to sponsor, but that Israeli Representative Comay opposed it. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, REF 3 UNRWA) Telegram 1403 to USUN, December 4, instructed the U.S. Delegation to try to reach agreement on the basis of the Committee-approved draft resolution with some modifications. (Ibid.) /4/Telegram 608 from Tel Aviv, December 9, reported that Bitan said Israel would vote against the resolution. (Ibid.) 1. Dept regrets GOI is unable to go along with UNRWA res which we have worked out over past six weeks, especially GOI's feeling that US failed to "stand pat" on our original resolution. This connection we believe we made clear from beginning that we considered our text non-negotiable as to substance, but as Amb Goldberg told Comay Nov 5 "this did not mean we would not consider any proposed changes in wording if they did not affect substance." (USUN 1831)/5/ We adhered loyally to our commitment to Israel to oppose all amendments as long as it tactically possible to do so and to keep Israel closely advised of our moves. Willingness to consult closely was not fully reciprocated by Israel and resulted in additional tactical disadvantage for us as we approached vote in Committee. /5/Dated November 5. (Ibid.) 2. Every step of way we have kept Israel's interest clearly in mind; this is borne out in strong effort to block PLO; in forthright statement in Committee; in effort we have made to assure that Committee approved res was cut back so much it bears little resemblance to original. We have worked long and hard to obtain this result. 3. Our judgment of tactical situation is different from that of GOI. It is composed following elements: (a) majority dels do not feel strongly about amendments; (b) there is among many dels real measure of humanitarian concern about refugees which influences their position; (c) many of Israel's usual friends (notably Italy) were weak-kneed; (d) Arab amendments were approved in Committee; (e) even if two-thirds not available for all amendments, two-thirds was there for many of them, including some dangerous ones. Our vote count tended to bear this out clearly, and we had no evidence to support Israeli contention that there no need for compromise if we used our full influence (this connection you will recall Amb Comay declined invitation to compare vote counts). Clear choice was between accepting a few non-substantive changes or running risk of res with number of really troublesome amendments. 4. Given these tactical difficulties, we believe US del has conducted negotiations skillfully and emerged with very satisfactory result. In summary, del managed to (a) get Arabs to drop four or five references to para 11; (b) knock out para approving Nine Points with all its serious political implications; (c) eliminate call on PCC to report directly to GA; (d) change "without prejudice to refugee rights . . ." to vaguer "without prejudice to para 11." Only additional element was acceptance of time limits on PCC report (which overdue anyway). 5. As for resolution's effect on problem, we do not believe it makes any essential change in situation. No new element has been added; some real and potentially dangerous factors have been successfully beaten back: recognition of PLO/6/ (Mrs. Meir expressed pleasure of outcome this question in Tel Aviv's 453),/7/ GA sponsorship of Nine Points, most of Arab amendments on para 11 and "rights," and property custodian res, etc. /6/The Special Political Committee on October 20 adopted a resolution proposed by Costa Rica and El Salvador authorizing the persons constituting the delegation of the "Palestine Liberation Organization" to speak in the Committee, without such authorization implying recognition of the PLO. (UN document A/SPC/L.112 and Rev. 1) /7/Dated October 29. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, UN 3 GA) 6. With or without this res, Arabs will continue to push refugee issue in GA and we must anticipate increasing difficulties. As Amb Goldberg said "UNRWA question must be taken at UN in light of situation developing here" and "many positions including some of our own being eroded and elements of support shifting." 7. We fully understand Israel's disappointment that it not possible to make some progress toward eroding para 11, and we regret some concessions (in language but not in substance) had to be made to Arab viewpoint. 8. But these tactical considerations aside, the main point is: we have over years given fullest possible support to Israeli position on refugee and other Arab-Israel issues. Our position remains the same. We will continue to try to find solution which fully protects Israel's sovereignty and security, and we will oppose proposals which endanger its welfare and interests. 9. Finally as Ambassador Goldberg told Comay we will prepare statement for GA to effect we do not regard res as departure in substance or principle from our position./8/ /8/On December 15, the General Assembly adopted a draft resolution proposed by Nigeria as Resolution 2052 (XX). The vote was 91, including the United States, to 1 (Israel) with 7 abstentions. The resolution included the main points of the original U.S. draft resolution, with some, but not all, of the modifications made by the Special Political Committee. A statement made at that time by a U.S. representative is summarized in U.S. Participation in the UN: A Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1965, p. 80. Dept will make similar presentation to Israeli Embassy./9/ /9/Telegram 497 to Tel Aviv, December 10, summarized Davies' conversation with Evron that day. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, REF 3 UNRWA) Telegram 612 from Tel Aviv, December 12, reported Barbour's conversation with Meir. (Ibid.) Rusk
257. Telegram From the Embassy in Syria to the Department of State/1/ Damascus, December 11, 1965, 1120Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL SYR-US. Confidential. Repeated to Amman, Aleppo, Baghdad, Beirut, Bonn, Cairo, London, Paris, and Tel Aviv. 184. US-Syria. Deptel 115./2/ /2/Telegram 115 to Damascus, December 8, noted that Embassy reports suggested high officials in the new Syrian Government might wish for better U.S.-Syrian working relations, which the Department of State would favor, and set forth points for discussion with the Syrian Foreign Minister. (Ibid.) 1) FonMin Makhus received Amb with Earle Russell (NEA/NE) Dec 9 for two and half hours discussion US-Syrian relations. Meeting had positive accent. Makhus seemed to want lengthy exchange to give latitude for mutual effort "to clear the air." He obviously hopes US will ponder and understand SARG's positions better; we hope Makhus will use his political influence to get others in leadership group thinking about better relations with US. 2) Amb commented on Baath's distorted concepts of US aims and policies, laying special stress on regrettable fact that SARG/Baath media have nothing but vitriol for US and fawning praise for Commie camp. Referring to recent Baath theme that imperialism led by US is plotting SARG downfall, Amb declared allegations of US involvement in such activities completely false and requested Makhus to notify him if SARG ever had evidence it believed supported such suspicion. Amb also explained SARG very mistaken if it expects it can kick US and at same time get US sympathy re Palestine and economic cooperation. 3) Makhus made intense presentation of Baath's broad criticisms of US Palestine policy and US use of its power vis-a-vis small countries. 4) He also kept probing lightly re US intentions toward Syria in economic field. According to some quarters, Makhus stated, US A) is putting economic pressure on Syria, B) will not make available to Syria significant assistance, C) is keeping West Germany from moving ahead on Euphrates Dam project. Main thrust of his comments was that SARG would favor moving ahead on economic cooperation (memcon by pouch). Comment: In sum Makhus position seemed to be that expanded Syro-US economic relations are possible and desirable within some rigid limitations of Baath principles. Makhus statements also suggest to us that even some "principles" might be pushed aside if inducement were great enough. We will continue explore opening which has been created. In another round with FonMin Amb plans to trace past and present US activities in econ and commercial field and what we prepared to do. Appreciate Dept's consideration possible aid to Syrian hospitals. We envisage any new US "assistance" to Syria's economic development as being on business basis. Smythe
258. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) to President Johnson in Texas/1/ Washington, December 28, 1965, 3:30 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 17. Secret. Received at the LBJ Ranch at 10:30 a.m. on December 29. The PL 480 negotiations with the UAR have gone better than expected, and we've struck a pretty tough bargain. They've bought all the conditions you laid down--an option for us to buy rice for Vietnam, increased commercial purchases in the US and a 75-25 split between Titles I and IV. We also arranged to convert enough local currency to pay Suez Canal tolls for USG ships. Now the UAR is eager to sign as soon as possible. The political atmosphere has been relatively quiet. Nasser has made a couple of grateful comments about our aid. Ali Sabri, who has pushed the radical line in the past, is now out of the picture, and the new government looks as if it's going to pay more attention to its economic problems. Egypt still seems sincere in trying to pull out of Yemen, although that's going slowly because of bickering among the Yemenis themselves. The one sour note is the trial [less than 1 line of source text not declassified],/2/ but that got started quietly and went into closed session. /2/Mustafa Amin was indicted for espionage on November 30. (Telegram 3531 to Cairo, December 26; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 29 UAR) Since we've already taken our Congressional flack as a result of the decision to go ahead, and since the UAR has met our stiff terms, to hold any longer would tend to defeat the purpose of the exercise. It also makes sense to go ahead before Congress comes back. So we recommend you sign the attached determination./3/ /3/On December 29, the President signed a memorandum to Rusk determining that it was essential to U.S. national interest to finance export sales of surplus agricultural commodities to the United Arab Republic under Title I of P.L. 480. For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965, pp. 622-623. Two agreements providing for the sale of agricultural commodities under Title I and Title IV of P.L. 480 were effected by an exchange of notes signed at Cairo on January 3; for text, see 17 UST 6 and 17. R. W. Komer
259. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) to President Johnson in Texas/1/ Washington, December 28, 1965, 4 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 17. Confidential. Received at the LBJ Ranch on December 31 at 11:45 p.m. I've held off as long as I could bothering you with this year's Israeli aid package. We have Israeli requests for $39 million in development loans (nearly double the FY'64 and '65 levels) and for two years of PL 480 Title I, starting with $34 million this year ($32m. FY'65, $23m. FY'63 and '64). However, I see this as strictly a bargaining position. In economic terms there's no justification for either AID loans or Title I food. Israel is doing far better than several other countries where we've already shifted from concessional AID and Title I terms to Ex-Im Bank and Title IV. Bell again recommends we make that shift in Israel this year, and Mann agrees. They argue that failure to do so soon in Israel undercuts the credibility of our worldwide effort to get out of the aid business once a country is really moving, and makes it tough to cut back in other places. Moreover, past Title I programs have banked us excess Israeli currency, so Title IV dollar sales would make more sense. In general, the harder the line we take the more favorable the balance of payments effects. Of course, State and AID recognize that the case for Israeli aid is basically political, so each year they buck the decision to the White House. The Israelis claim that economic need is not the real test; they have since 1959 regarded our aid, with some justice, as a defense subsidy in compensation for our reluctance to give them grant military aid or a public defense guarantee. Finally, there is the domestic political factor, especially at a time when we are resuming food to Nasser. Nonetheless, I think that our Israeli relationship is in good enough shape to sustain some cut in aid and stiffening of our loan terms. We are now selling Israel hardware on concessional loan terms, which weakens its argument for a defense subsidy. Moreover, on the horizon is our contribution to a nuclear desalting plant (though this is more likely an FY 67 or 68 matter) and possibly some jets. Our aid to Israel has averaged around $80 million per annum 1961-65. Last year we gave $83.6 million ($20 million in DL, $4m. Ex-Im, $32m. in Title I and $27.6 million in a MAP credit for tanks). This year we'd all favor cutting to about $65 million, but the big issue is over loan terms. I'd see three basic choices: A. The Bell/Mann hard line of shifting Israel to all Ex-Im loans ($20 million) and Title IV ($30 million), plus the $14.4 million in MAP credits already given. This would generate a strong Israeli beef. B. A soft line, essentially repeating last year's performance of $20 million DL and $32 million in Title I. The Israelis would probably be quite happy with this. C. Splitting the difference by going for $10 million DL and $10 million Ex-Im, and insisting that Israel take one-fourth of the $32 million PL 480 under Title IV (the same proportion as for Nasser). This option makes a start toward shifting Israel on to harder terms, but cushions the transition. It would generate plenty of Israeli complaints, but not too much to live with so long as Israel sees hope for planes and desalting (State will probably recommend shortly that we sell jets to Israel and Jordan--a repeat of last winter's tank deal). I'd favor this last as making the most political sense. I've also tried it out on Harriman, who agrees that it's the least we can do. We ought to put it hard to the Israelis as our best offer, but could always retreat if they scream too loudly. Moving pronto on this will also soften Israeli complaints about food for Nasser. R. W. Komer/2/ /2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. Bundy initialed below the typed signature.
/3/This option is checked. A memorandum of April 13, 1966, from Komer to the President requesting his authorization to inform the Israelis about the FY 1966 aid levels states that with Johnson's approval, they had delayed informing them "in order to strengthen our hand during the aircraft negotiations." Johnson approved, and a memorandum for the record by Komer indicates that he informed Harman on April 19. (Both in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. V) [Continue with the next documents] Volume XVIII Index | Foreign Relations Online | Historian's Office | Department of State | Secretary of State |