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 | FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XVIII Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964-67 Department of State |
 240. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ SecDel/MC/18 New York, October 6, 1965, 11 a.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 347, CF 2547. Confidential. Drafted by Officer in Charge of Multilateral Organization Affairs in NR Daniel O. Newberry and approved in S on October 14. The meeting was held at USUN. The memorandum is marked Part V of V; the other four memoranda of conversation are ibid. SECRETARY'S DELEGATION TO THE TWENTIETH SESSION OF SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS U.S. Foreign The Foreign Minister cited the agreements entered into by the Lebanese Government and by other Arab states. He stated that Lebanon stood by those agreements. He went on to emphasize that the agreements were directed largely to the use of waters arising in Lebanon. Syria, he said, was a riparian of the lower Hasbani for only a few miles of the river's length. Referring to other aspects of Syrian plans for water diversion, the Foreign Minister explained that this part of the project had been stopped because the projected canals in Syria came too close to the frontier of Israel. Lebanon for its part, the Foreign Minister said, saw no use in going on with canal construction to link up with Syria because there would be no canal on the Syrian side for several years. The Minister recalled that the Johnston Plan had allocated very little water to Lebanon. He said that today Lebanon's own needs are such as to require more accessible water within its borders. The Minister spoke of a 25-year plan for development of the southern half of the country which would require enormous quantities of water. He added that the city of Beirut would also need some of the Litani River waters. The Secretary asked the Foreign Minister what time factors the Minister had in mind in contemplating the water development plans; he very much feared that a first-class crisis was in prospect when the take-off of water reached substantial quantities. The Foreign Minister, without answering specifically, alluded to a span of ten years. The Foreign Minister expressed the hope that the United States would agree with Lebanon's view that a primary use of water should be enjoyed by the people of the area adjacent to the water sources. The Secretary responded that such would not be an altogether accurate interpretation of our position because the United States in general supports the Johnston scheme. The Secretary again emphasized that he saw the elements of a major crisis in the Arab approach to water utilization. The Secretary expressed the hope that the interested states would not rush ahead with their plans without allowing time for the development of other ways to solve the water problems. The Secretary noted that the quantities of water in question were small in relation to the overall requirements of the populations in the area. The Foreign Minister responded that the Arab plans would take some time to bring to realization, but he asked that we not lose sight of the fact that Israel had gone ahead. Indeed, the Minister remarked, Israel was not using water just for the basin in the area but was diverting important quantities to the Negev. The Foreign Minister stated that Lebanon would insist on its rights and was ready to take the risks involved. The Secretary reiterated that he could see only trouble ahead as matters were proceeding now. He emphasized the need for the United States and Lebanese Governments to keep in touch, and he expressed the hope that there would be an indefinite delay in any plan aimed at changing the basic structure of the Johnston scheme. The Secretary asked the Foreign Minister to consider frankly the question of whether the true character of the problem was one of finding the most efficient way to get the water or whether the objective was to devise a method to keep Israel from getting it. The Foreign Minister replied that, even though the question had been at the beginning a political one, it had now become a real problem for Lebanon in the search for the water requirements of its own population.
241. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan/1/ Washington, October 8, 1965, 5:35 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 32-1 ISR-JORDAN. Confidential. Drafted by Wolle and Nyerges, cleared by Symmes, and approved by Raymond A. Hare. Also sent to Tel Aviv and repeated to Jerusalem and USUN and pouched to London. 151. Fatah raids from Jordan were major topic discussion in Ambassador Harman's courtesy call on Assistant Secretary Hare October 7. Harman said Fatah raids are a pressing security matter in Israel where the situation is becoming increasingly difficult. Originally Israel had concentrated on the longer range danger posed by UAC but this attitude has changed since Fatah operations have acquired character of grave regularity, central planning and expertise reminiscent of 1955-56. Fatah striking deep into Israeli territory. People are unable sleep nights. Armed forces are being diverted from essential training to night patrol duties and wartime atmosphere created in border villages. GOI appreciates what US doing in Amman but worried and would not like to draw practical deductions from its analysis of situation. It is afraid King will not be able seize hold of situation. He should know Fatah his enemy as well as Israel's. Important for him to take real action. Ambassador Hare responded we appreciate Israel's concern over this type penetration. We have been in frequent touch with Jordanians, most recently with King on October 4 and 5 and Prime Minister on October 7. We convinced any doubts King may have had about seriousness matter are dispelled. He came out October 4 publicly about Fatah. Press conference by Prime Minister is to follow. Military are alerted. Jordanians have arrested individuals although guiding apparatus still intact. King has stated he is at wit's end to know what more he can do. If Israel thinking in terms of retaliatory raid Israel should remember King is not responsible but is trying to contain situation. Retaliatory raid would hit Jordan not real offender and would favor those Arab elements who want to accelerate long term animosity toward Israel. Raid would be grist for Shuqairy's mill. US understands Israel's concern and is doing its best. Jordan is also trying. Restraint on Israel's part necessary. Foregoing is distillation of our most careful thought and collective thinking. Ambassador Harman responded Israel has shown extraordinary patience due to desire give Hussein time. But now appears Israeli restraint and a less than active King have contributed to Fatah's feeding on its own success. The King gives no sign of making all-out security push and Jordanians in lower echelons including IJMAC uncooperative. While Israel appreciates US efforts with Jordan GOI is in vulnerable position on this issue particularly in view of elections. Israel cannot take too much more risk. King should not miscalculate Israel can indefinitely ignore situation. Ambassador Hare said we prepared if Israel authorized convey to GOJ seriousness with which Israel regards situation. We would urge Israel take no action that does not fit with progress we have made. Ambassador Harman replied he assumed we thought US actions of October 4, 5 and 7 should be allowed time to have effect. Ambassador Hare agreed. Ambassador Harman said he thought would be helpful if US would reinforce its concern to Amman. Symmes (NE) noted that 1) we have information, already imparted to Israel Embassy, that word is getting down to lower Jordanian levels, 2) it is in Israeli and US interest King and other decision makers stay in power, and 3) these decision makers have been back in Jordan only one week and therefore need time to intensify control. In separate conversation Department passed Israel Embassy (Yinon) substance King's and PriMin's comments on Fatah reported Amman's 198 and 201/2/ (omitting King's speculation GOI might be behind Fatah, also numbered paras 1 and 5 of Amman's 201). Stated we appreciative intelligence given us by GOI in past on Fatah activities outside Jordan and would welcome receipt additional such info in future. Pointed out that greater our total store of knowledge, better able we were to pass GOJ key intelligence of possible value its anti-Fatah efforts. Re GOI accusation lower levels GOJ not cooperating King's directives, suggested Israelis produce in IJMAC any evidence supporting this charge keeping us informed also. Yinon doubted utility MAC channel, claiming GOJ lacked confidence SJD Daoud, but opined might be feasible pass such evidence through UNTSO Chief of Staff for direct transmission King or PriMin. /2/Telegram 198 from Amman, October 6, reported a conversation with King Hussein the day before on the subject of Fatah. Telegram 201 from Amman, October 7, reported a conversation that day with the Prime Minister on the same subject. (Both ibid.) Ball
242. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State/1/ Cairo, October 9, 1965. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, AID (US) 15-4 UAR. Confidential; Limdis. The telegram does not indicate the time of transmission; it was received at 10:23 a.m. 980. Embtel 940./2/ We are now at major watershed in US-UAR relations and actions next few days will have continuing and far-reaching effect those relations next few years. /2/Telegram 940 from Cairo, October 5, commented on the question of whether a new P.L. 480 agreement with the UAR should be based in whole or in part on Title IV of P.L. 480. Battle recommended a combination of Title I and Title IV, with Title IV not to exceed 25 percent in the first year. (Ibid.) Since my return from consultation many of my diplomatic colleagues, including representatives states not particularly friendly toward Nasser, such as British and Ethiopians, have expressed to me hope we will be able resume substantial PL 480 assistance to UAR. Most of them predict serious economic difficulties, not to say chaos, if we do not do so. They feel this would be tragic not only for Egyptian people but for Western interests here and that best interest US and its allies served by our keeping our hand in and maintaining position influence. They also believe UAR has made real effort remove causes irritation and that installation new Muhieddin Cabinet, although done for reasons internal administration, should lead to substantial improvement our relations providing we can meet UAR half way with aid. Belief our relations now normalized also current among official Egyptians whom I have seen informally in recent days. Although not expressed in quite those terms by them, they indicate belief Muhieddin Cabinet signals new era US-UAR relations. This regard we are impressed with pragmatic attitude new govt taking on economic and administrative problems and its apparent intent concentrate on internal matters. This not to say Egyptians have abandoned adventure, but rather it looks to us as though Muhieddin will be considerably easier to live and cooperate with than Ali Sabri govt. In these circumstances, and in view progress we have made on all matters we have raised with Egyptians since last spring, I sincerely hope we can avoid disappointing UAR now. Specifically, I hope that when Secretary sees Kaissouni on October 12 he will be able give him definite offer PL 480 aid, preferably on terms suggested Embtel 940 and at least as favorable as those we have given such countries as Yugoslavia. I am fully aware difficulties this may pose, but we estimate Egyptians have only enough flour to last until January and no alternative source supply in sight. In order avoid human suffering as well as for sake Western position here, we should act now when we have unusual opportunity to establish US-UAR cooperation on new footing. Cannot emphasize too strongly my belief delay in decision inevitably will mean loss that opportunity. Battle
243. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson/1/ Washington, October 11, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Arab Republic, UAR Memos, Vol. IV. Secret. A handwritten date of 10/8/65(?) appears on the memorandum, but the Department of State copy is stamped October 11. A handwritten note on that copy states that Secretary Rusk took the memorandum to the President on October 11. That copy also indicates the memorandum was drafted by Sterner. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, AID (US) 15-4 UAR) SUBJECT Recommendation: That you authorize our Ambassador in Cairo to enter negotiations with the U.A.R. Government for a new short-term PL-480 agreement. Our willingness to enter into the new agreement could be conveyed when I meet with the U.A.R. Deputy Prime Minister for Economic and Financial Affairs on October 12./2/ /2/The memorandum bears no indication of the President's approval or disapproval. Discussion: For the past nine months we have used a suspension of our aid to press the U.A.R. toward policies and courses of action which conform more closely to U.S. interests. We have met with some success. Present U.A.R. attitudes toward the Congo, Yemen, Vietnam and the Palestine question indicate an increased respect on Nasser's part for U.S. interests and a heightened sense of his need to get along with the United States. In addition, there has been encouraging recent progress on settling private U.S. claims (reduced from $15 million to less than $5 million), and the U.A.R. has promised to pay restitution for damages to U.S. property (our library reopened October 3). A newly-installed cabinet offers hope that more resources and energy will be directed toward economic development; the new Prime Minister (Muhyadin) is believed more pro-Western than his predecessor (Ali Sabri). We have derived all the benefits we can expect to get from a continued suspension of aid. There is now risk that further pressure, without a demonstration of willingness on our part to help with the U.A.R.'s pressing food problems, will damage rather than promote our policy objectives with the U.A.R. We estimate current food stocks will carry the U.A.R. through the end of the year, perhaps a little beyond. With this critical supply situation the time is fast approaching when Nasser will have to seek alternative sources of food if he concludes that the U.S. does not intend to resume its aid. In order to assure himself of such alternative sources, he may be forced to make far-reaching political decisions that will fundamentally alter U.S.-U.A.R. relations and throw him into an unwanted dependence on the Communist states. A resumption of PL-480 aid will not solve all our problems with the U.A.R. We will continue to have policy differences. But Nasser, unlike many other Afro-Asian leaders, has demonstrated some willingness and capability to adjust U.A.R. policies and actions to accommodate us. PL-480 sales, granted on a short-term basis and flexibly administered in terms of amounts, offer the best means to maintain the leverage we need to contain and reduce our differences. We therefore propose that we indicate to the U.A.R. that we are prepared to enter into negotiations for a new short-term PL-480 agreement. The conditions of the new agreement would be harder than our previous agreement with the U.A.R. Two possible proposals are outlined in the enclosure./3/ Both would be for an agreement of not more than one year duration. We believe any new agreement should reflect a shift toward Title IV sales which are repayable in dollars. We would also incorporate a provision for periodic review of the amounts being supplied so as to give us flexibility for upward or downward revision depending on the overall climate of U.S.-U.A.R. relations. There would also be a provision for termination by either party. /3/The enclosure, unsigned and undated, is entitled "Range of Possible PL-480 Arrangements With the U.A.R." Proposal A was for a Title I agreement and a Title IV agreement, each worth $70 million, both for 1 year but subject to review after 6 months. Proposal B was for a 1-year Title IV agreement for $98 million, also subject to review after 6 months. Rusk noted in the margin that he preferred Proposal A. A resumption of PL-480 sales on a short-term basis will satisfy our policy requirements for the time being. We would not recommend any lending activities over and above this for the present. We need to come to a decision in principle about a new PL-480 agreement soon. We will begin to lose advantages when Nasser gets the idea we are trying to back him up against his own supply deadline in order to squeeze further political concessions from him. I am seeing the U.A.R. Deputy Prime Minister for Economic and Financial Affairs on October 12. He leaves for Cairo the next day. In my opinion the time is now right to proceed, and we will gain maximum impact if I am able to indicate our willingness to enter negotiations for a new agreement at this meeting. Detailed negotiating instructions can be sent to Ambassador Battle later. Dean Rusk
244. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic/1/ Washington, October 13, 1965, 11:42 a.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, AID (US) 15 UAR. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted and approved by Rusk and cleared by Handley. 2129. Eyes only for Ambassador from the Secretary. After full discussion with the President, I told Kaissouni that the President wished him to know that PL 480 question was before the President personally, that the President had asked for certain additional information relating not only to Egypt but to other countries where large PL 480 arrangements had existed and that the President would not be able to bring this matter to a conclusion while he is still in the hospital. I told Kaissouni that we would try to get word to him as quickly as possible./2/ /2/A memorandum of Rusk's meeting with Kaissouni on October 12 is ibid., AID (US) 15-4 UAR. FYI. Principal problem here is not the political issues with Egypt, which have improved in important ways, but certain policy questions regarding PL 480 as a whole on which President wishes to be clearer. For example, the policy of sending large quantities of PL 480 food on extraordinarily generous terms to countries who are themselves food exporters or to countries who use their own foreign exchange to buy food in other markets needs clarification. My talk with Kaissouni was friendly and, although he was disappointed at not having an immediate yes, he recognized that he was not getting a no. My suggestion to you is that you simply state that you are awaiting further word from Washington which you hope to have without undue delay under the circumstances./3/ /3/Battle reported in telegram 1070 from Cairo, October 20, that Kaissouni told him that morning that he had conveyed Johnson's message to Nasser, who asked him to convey to President Johnson his appreciation for the message, his pleasure that political problems had abated, and his hope that U.S.-UAR relations could proceed normally and build on the improvement already begun. (Ibid., AID (US) 15 UAR) Rusk
245. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State/1/ Amman, October 20, 1965, 1302Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 32-1 ISR-JORDAN. Confidential; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, London, and USUN. 223. Deptel 164/2/--Fatah. Conveyed Israeli points as outlined first para reftel and in Deptel 160/3/ to PriMin Tell Oct 19 making clear I was simply transmitting message and not endorsing various points. Tell reacted with extreme irritation, saying he had about reached limit of his patience in having "those people" tell him how to do his job and not do anything themselves. Borders were joint responsibility with both sides responsible for taking reasonable security measures. He thought Jordan had commendable record of arrests and regardless of what was said about full moon, he felt record of past three weeks indicated considerable progress had been made. He had authorized us to pass factual information to GOI and this should convince them of GOJ sincerity. What was Israel doing on its side to clear up this activity? /2/Telegram 164 to Amman, October 18, summarized a conversation that day between Hare and Harman, who reiterated Israeli concern about Fatah. He said the Israeli Government attributed the absence of incidents in the past fortnight to the cycle of the moon and was apprehensive about what would happen when the nights were dark again. The government believed the Jordanians were not taking Fatah seriously enough and should "crack down hard." He asked that the U.S. Government convey this assessment to the Jordanians and reiterate that it would be a grave miscalculation to think Israel could take more terrorist raids. Telegram 164 instructed Barnes to convey these points to the Jordanians and at first opportunity urge upon the King the "most vigorous possible prosecution" of Fatah. (Ibid.) /3/Telegram 160 to Amman, October 16, summarized points made to a Department officer that day by Israeli Minister Evron. He suggested direct contact between Israeli and Jordanian commanders in certain boundary areas and imposition of a night curfew in certain parts of the border. (Ibid.) Tell said we could report that it would also be grave miscalculation to assume Jordan would not respond to another retaliatory raid. As for contact between local commanders this could serve no useful purpose and was obviously designed embarrass Jordan with other Arabs. To extent either army encountered Fatah he assumed they would take action. Problem arose in those areas where it was impossible fully to cover frontier. No direct contact would obviate this problem and he had no intention of getting into position where Israeli commander would try to control disposition of Jordanian forces. Curfew also not feasible unless they able fully patrol area in question and to extent they could do this curfew not necessary. Re approaches to other governments, these had been most disappointing and indicated no disposition to help. Trip of security officer to Kuwait postponed since he too busy rounding up suspects but would be made later. Contact with Syria so far only through local Embassy and indicated complete disinterest. However Queen Mother would raise subject during her visit to Damascus next week. This attitude on part of neighbors explained GOJ inability to penetrate main apparatus which was operating outside Jordan. He felt financial center probably Kuwait but operating center Syria. Comment: Asking us to pass message such as that in reftel embarrassing since it appears we are questioning factual information GOJ has given us. I think we need to remember GOI has no Mission here and all their information re GOJ activity obviously comes from spies. We on other hand have reasonably good direct contacts with local officials who have been most cooperative in providing facts and authorizing us to pass them to Israelis. We are satisfied GOJ is trying and is making progress and in face of evidence we have, it looks silly to constantly reiterate Tel Aviv line that "you are doing nothing" and "we are going to attack you for it." Barnes
246. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson/1/ Washington, October 25, 1965, 6:30 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Komer Memos, Vol. II. Secret. Planes for Israel. Now that Israel has a good tank sale under its belt (which nets us dollars), it is predictably focussing on planes. You'll recall that last March we promised that if Israel would lie low on Jordan arms, we'd sell some tanks and "up to 24 combat aircraft" if they couldn't get them anywhere else. Again predictably, the Israelis have made a blue sky opening bid--not for just 24 but for 210 new fighter bombers. Their air chief of staff was just here proposing in effect that we take over the modernization of the whole Israeli air force, on the grounds that neither France nor the UK--the only other suppliers--can provide the planes./2/ /2/Discussions held October 12-13 between an Israeli delegation chaired by Ambassador Harman, with Chief of the Israel Air Force General Ezer Weizman as the chief Israeli spokesman, and a joint State-Defense U.S. delegation chaired by Hare, with Hoopes as the chief U.S. spokesman, are summarized in an October 14 memorandum from Kitchen to Thompson. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL ISR-US) State and DOD told him that he'd better go back to the French and British, and that selling 210 planes--even for dollars over several years--was out of the question. Nonetheless, it is true that we produce far better aircraft for the money, and that France and the UK probably can't meet Israel's total need (in fact the Israelis are already back in, claiming that a new approach in Paris produced nothing). We'll keep stalling the Israelis along, making clear that we simply can't talk about becoming their chief suppliers but not slamming the door on a small sale in 1966. State remains adamant against any combat aircraft, but some of us are coming to wonder whether State doesn't overestimate the adverse Arab reaction (as it did on Hawks and then tanks). Moreover, the Israelis are eager enough that they'd even let us sell planes for dollars to Jordan too (if necessary to block a MIG deal). Israel is happy enough about tanks and is asking enough other things from us--a desalting plant, 1966 economic aid, PL 480--that we can play hard to get on planes for a few months yet. But we'd recommend keeping the option open if you approve./3/ /3/The memorandum bears no indication of Johnson's approval or disapproval. R. W. Komer
247. Memorandum by Secretary of State Rusk/1/ LBJ Ranch, Texas, October 27, 1965. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, AID (US) 15 UAR. Confidential; Nodis. Drafted by Rusk. The President agreed/2/ that we should try to put together a food arrangement with Egypt combining four elements (1) the procurement of rice from Egypt which we ourselves need in Viet Nam (2) Egyptian purchases of agricultural products in the American market on the usual commercial basis (3) dollar repayable food shipments under Title IV of P.L. 480 and (4) food shipments under Title I repayable in local currency. /2/Rusk met with the President at the LBJ Ranch on October 27. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary) A memorandum of that date from Komer to Bundy describes the proposal Rusk took to the Ranch, apparently his October 11 memorandum. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Arab Republic, Vol. IV) The President was not asked to approve any particular mix of these four elements. Nevertheless, it should be emphasized that the total package should be one which is in our interest as well as in Egypt's interest--beyond the mere proposition that what is good for Egypt is good for the United States. We should not approach this particular combination in terms of how best to put together a large subsidy to economic development in Egypt but rather a reasonable, mutually beneficial combined transaction which will be realistic in terms of our own abilities, Egyptian market operations in foodstuffs (both export and import) and other elements affecting trade and assistance in food itself.
248. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel/1/ Washington, October 30, 1965, 2:02 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 32-1 ISR-LEB. Secret. Drafted by Wolle, cleared by Symmes, and approved by Hare. Repeated to Beirut, Amman, Cairo, Damascus, USUN, Jerusalem, and London. 375. Tel Aviv's 450./2/ /2/Telegram 450 from Tel Aviv, October 29, reported that at the conclusion of a meeting that morning with Foreign Minister Meir, Barbour raised the subject of Israel's raid into Lebanon the night before, reminding Meir of the long-standing U.S. opposition to such unilateral action. (Ibid.) 1. Israel Ambassador Harman called at Department afternoon October 29 at request Assistant Secretary Hare to discuss GOI cross-border raid into Lebanon. Hare referred to Meir-Barbour conversation reftel and recalled GOI well aware from numerous past talks of strong USG opposition to raids across ADL. Said we see retaliatory raids as disturbing rather than positive factor. First, they disrupt armistice agreements. Hare noted that in MAC context there is difference between identifying transgression performed by Fatah or other thugs and official action for which one side takes full credit. Second, USG honestly and seriously believes such IDF actions contrary to Israel's long-term interests. 2. Re specifics October 28-29 raid, Hare made following points: A. This amounts to triumph for Fatah. If irresponsibles by wrong doing can provoke acknowledged action by responsible government that is feather in their cap. B. We understand there only three incursions from Lebanon in past five months. After first one GOI expressed itself as quite satisfied with GOL cooperation in MAC and actions outside it to check saboteurs. Therefore present raid does not have aura of understandable action. C. Also Lebanon is, after all, somewhat different in position and attitude from other Israeli neighbors. Furthermore, present GOL having its internal troubles and this raid could make things difficult for it. D. Primin Eshkol in election speech only matter of hours before raid had mentioned Fatah and Lebanon in sense of warning them. Juxtaposition speech and raid just does not look good. E. Finally, and Hare termed this as marginal consideration but one we felt should be mentioned and in fact had been by Amb. Barbour to Mrs. Meir, there are other matters USG and GOI have talked about together. Things such as present raid can be bothersome to atmosphere such discussions and certainly don't improve it. 3. Hare emphasized he hoped Harman and GOI understand degree of USG concern this situation directly related to our concern for Israel's basic security and welfare. Was for this reason we felt it essential discuss situation with GOI without delay. 4. Responding, Harman outlined three elements in GOI view situation. First, GOI can acknowledge no difference at all between type incursions from Lebanon and Israeli action of October 28/29. Armistice agreement very explicit on this. It disapproves both irregular and official incursions. Arabs must understand border crossing is two way business. Said GOI hopes USG will not press this point with it. If it becomes point of public controversy Israeli border residents will endeavor take law into own hands, and this GOI will not allow. Second, Israel had noted October 27 incident took place despite GOL assurances after first two incursions that forceful measures being taken against violators and despite fact mukhtar of al-Huleh and other GOL officials could easily detect new Palestinian faces in village and draw conclusion they were up to no good (since Palestinians do not normally live and move close to border areas in Lebanon, unlike case in Jordan). Third and "most serious," there no connection with Israeli elections. GOI reaction would be identical November 3 or any other post-election date. Main point this episode was that October 27 incursion was attack against occupied village. Israel cannot and will not live this way, and GOI considers its elementary duty is to enable its people go to sleep at night. IDF cannot be spread thin and pinned down to patrol every few yards along border. Either Arab Governments must take responsibility controlling border violators or GOI must act as it does to provide security. 5. Harman said IDF personnel were given strict orders guard against human casualties and to his knowledge no life had been lost nor a single shot fired. He painted sober picture of mood pervading Israel's population. It had lived 17 long years under Arab threats and bombast of every type. Every family had some member in armed forces and constant cause worry about personal and national security. Emphasis on military content Israel's Independence Day parades was essential GOI tactic to assure populace its defenses at the ready. He knew of no country anywhere whose citizens would take relaxed philosophical view of bombs exploding under their homes. Concluded by hoping we would take all this into account, and stressed that when GOI views these matters from standpoint its own long-term security is convinced it must act as it does. Present government has been as cautious as any government could possibly be. 6. Hare assured Ambassador we minimized neither these factors nor wanton character of Fatah incursions, but reiterated our strongly held belief that retaliatory raids not the answer. Further, we were not pronouncing USG conclusion present raid connected with forthcoming elections though wanted mention that facts of situation might lead some to such interpretation. 7. Israel Minister Evron sounded final notes. Said Eshkol in other recent speeches had promised exploit to limit all diplomatic and other peaceful means achieve border security, using force only as last resort. His speeches should be taken together, not separately. Urged we consider, on other hand, King Hussein's October 28 speech, which GOI viewed as one of most belligerent it had ever read and was itself flagrant violation of armistice agreement. Rusk
249. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan/1/ Washington, November 4, 1965, 10:35 a.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 12-4 ISR. Secret. Drafted by Wolle on October 29; cleared by George D. Monk of INR/RES, John P. Trevithick of SCI, Beam, Symmes, and Davies; and approved by Rusk. Repeated to Tel Aviv. 197. Amman's 241,/2/ last paragraph. /2/Telegram 241 from Amman, October 25, reported a conversation with Foreign Minister Nuseibeh in which Nuseibeh referred to his meeting with Rusk at the UN General Assembly in New York and expressed the hope that in due course Barnes would have a message for him concerning this. (Ibid., REF 3 UNRWA) Memoranda of the conversation between Rusk and Nuseibeh are ibid., Conference Files: Lot 66 D 347, CF 2548. 1. FonMin Nuseibeh during October 6 talk with Secretary said GOJ convinced Israel had already attained capability producing nuclear bomb, also predicted Israel's rocket program had advanced to point GOI by March 1966 would demonstrate capability firing rockets that could carry nuclear warheads. Copies relevant memcons being pouched. Embassy should convey following orally to Nuseibeh: 2. Secretary Rusk has asked me tell you USG continues watch very closely possible nuclear weapons capability and acquisition by Near Eastern countries. We are most strongly opposed to idea nuclear proliferation in Near East as elsewhere. We have no evidence that Israel or any other Near Eastern state is in position to develop nuclear weapons in near future or that they have decided develop or otherwise acquire them. USG vigilance this matter will continue as will our efforts secure effective worldwide nuclear non-proliferation agreement. Meanwhile Arab Governments particularly UAR could take very important step toward elimination danger nuclear spread in Near East by undertaking accept IAEA safeguards on existing and future nuclear facilities since this would clearly put pressure on Israel do likewise. Rusk [Continue with the next documents] Volume XVIII Index | Foreign Relations Online | Historian's Office | Department of State | Secretary of State |