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 | FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XVIII Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964-67 Department of State |
 230. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson/1/ Washington, July 29, 1965, 4 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Komer, Vol. I. Secret. Israeli Tanks. I have the honor to inform you that we finally closed the Israeli tank sale on the original basis approved by you./2/ After about five months of trying to enrich the deal, they finally conceded and are very happy to boot. /2/The agreement was embodied in a July 29 exchange of letters between Solbert and Zvi Dinstein, Special Assistant to the Israeli Defense Minister. (Ibid., Files of Robert W. Komer, Israel Security, Tanks (1965)) They amended the November 15, 1964, exchange of letters between Solbert and Colonel Ron; see footnote 6, Document 99. They'll get (a) 110 M48A2C medium tanks to replace the German ones; (b) 100 M48A1 tanks to match those sold to Jordan; (c) conversion kits to upgun these plus the 40 Bonn did deliver to 105 mm. guns; and (d) ammo and spares. Total sale would amount to around $42 million in dollars over two years or more. I might add that Israelis have been very good at keeping mum to date, and we have a cancellation clause in case they leak later. Now we'll start arguing about the twenty-four combat planes we said we'd help get from US or European sources. Rusk is strong against any US sale so we'll stall for a while and try to shift them to Europe. We can always concede in the end, but it's good to have leverage on the Israelis because we don't like their threats to attack the Arab water diversion works (now it's Lebanon). We're also still very suspicious they might go nuclear. R. W. Komer
231. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel/1/ Washington, July 30, 1965, 8:06 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, AE 11-2 ISR. Secret; Exdis/Tan. Drafted by Anton N. Nyerges; cleared by Talbot, Spain, Scoville, Komer, Symmes, Thomas, Colonel Haynes in DOD, and Wolle; and approved and initialed by Rusk. 91. Embtel 75./2/ President keenly disappointed in Primin's reply to his letter on May 21 on IAEA safeguards. You should seek appointment with Primin soonest after Thursday July 29 (date for signing supplementary tank agreement) to convey President's disappointment. As stated in presidential letter, we are aware Primin's problems with forthcoming parliamentary elections and are therefore willing refrain from insistence now on commitment. In our view special relationship between US and Israel and friendship between Primin and President provide basis for greater reassurance than appeared in letter. We are so confident Primin's showing in elections we would be satisfied at this juncture with his assurance if he remains in office following November elections he will do all he can to advance acceptance by GOI of IAEA safeguards for all Israeli reactors. Without such assurance we fear shadow creeping over our relationships while we wait for GOI reply. He should understand USG and US people feel deeply about non-proliferation and this could become point of issue between us later if no progress made./3/ /2/Telegram 75 from Tel Aviv, July 26, transmitted the text of Eshkol's reply to Johnson's May 21 letter. Eshkol's letter stated that Israel's position on any subject related to its security was necessarily influenced by the unabated hostility of its neighbors and suggested deferring discussion of the matter until after the Israeli election. The telegram reported that Barbour expressed regret at the reply and stressed the importance that President Johnson attached to the problem. Eshkol called attention to a recent statement by UAR Vice President Amer referring to plans for development of nonconventional weapons. (Ibid.) The letter is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, Israel--Prime Minister Eshkol Correspondence. /3/Barbour reported in telegram 116 from Tel Aviv, August 10, that he told Eshkol of the President's disappointment. (Ibid., Country File, Israel, Vol. IV) At same meeting but without overt linkage to foregoing you should tactfully inform Primin that while we are pleased at the successful conclusion of the tank arrangements, he should be aware, however, that we continue adhere to our position against use of force by Israel against its neighbors. Military strikes by Israel against its neighbors would force us reconsider proceeding with the deliveries. You should note Talbot has made similar point to Ambassador Harman and Mr. Dinstein at July 29 signing of supplement to the November 15, 1964, tank agreement./4/ /4/Barbour reported in telegram 127 from Tel Aviv, August 13, that he did not make this point on August 10 but sent word to Eshkol that Talbot's July 29 remark was not an off-hand aside but represented a determined U.S. Government position. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 32-1 ISR-LEB) FYI: Uncertainty over tank negotiations may have served as deterrent to Israel's carrying out its threats to strike militarily at Lebanon's water diversion activities. By threatening to make continued deliveries contingent on no preemptive strikes we hope continue keep Israel in line. End FYI. Rusk
232. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, August 3 and 10, 1965. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL UAR-US. Secret. Drafted by Davies. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS The Ambassador "briefed" Mr. Davies on developments through July during the latter's leave. He recounted details of his luncheon at the White House with Messrs. Valenti and Hand during which the President appeared,/2/ and his two meetings with Secretary Rusk./3/ He was immensely pleased with the results of these meetings and said that he had sent details of his discussions to President Nasser. He thought a trend toward improvement in U.S.-U.A.R. relations was definitely observable. There were dangers, however, in such things as the frustration of the army with the stalemate in Yemen, the growing belief in U.A.R. circles that the U.S. was contributing to the difficulties in Yemen through Saudi Arabia and Iran, and the Odell case which tended to confirm suspicions that the U.S.G. or CIA was attempting to overturn Nasser's regime./4/ /2/The luncheon took place on July 23. (Telegram 591 to Cairo, July 26; ibid.) No record of the discussion has been found. /3/See Document 229. /4/Symmes wrote to Battle on July 27 that Department officials had been seeking a convincing explanation of what lay behind the UAR arrest of Amin and the linking of Odell and the CIA with it. They were trying to determine the policy implications of the affair and its lessons for future dealings [text not declassified]. Symmes stated that "we are quite concerned by evidence that the U.A.R. may believe (whether rightly or wrongly) that there has been a basic disagreement about U.A.R. policy within the U.S.G. [1 line of source text not declassified]." He noted that officers in NEA "have never felt certain that we have had a full picture" of [text not declassified] activities and stated that if the basic assumptions underlying U.S. policies toward the UAR were valid, "we cannot afford in the coming months the risk of having misleading signals transmitted to the U.A.R. by witting or unwitting policy deviations [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]." (Filed as an attachment to a July 31 letter from Charge David G. Nes in Cairo to Symmes; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 29 UAR) Mr. Davies provided the Ambassador with that portion of the transcript of the Secretary's press conference of August 2 which related to U.S.-U.A.R. relations. He noted that there was a genuine desire for improved relations with the U.A.R. within the United States government and that there was only one policy within the U.S.G. This was recommended by the Secretary of State, approved by the President, and was binding on all agencies and individual officials of the Government. The exaggerated accounts of CIA influence as pedalled in such books as "The Invisible Government" should not be taken at face value. The Ambassador in Cairo was the President's personal representative and led a country team for whose actions he was directly responsible. If the UARG had any suspicions that an agency or an individual was not acting in accord with our stated policy, it should go to the Ambassador for reassurance. He would be pleased at any time to investigate and satisfy any question the UARG might have. Mr. Davies said he could state categorically that no element of the USG was attempting to subvert the Nasser regime. Mr. Davies said the arrest of Mustafa Amin and charges against him were cause for concern. Amin was known to favor close U.S.-Egyptian relations, knew and saw many Americans, and had conducted his contacts openly. It raised the problem touched on by Mr. Symmes earlier as to who spoke for the U.A.R. We thought Amin reflected President Nasser's views just as we think Hassanein Haykal reflects them in his current talks with Ambassador Battle. Will U.A.R. intelligence pick up Haykal one day because of these contacts? Ambassador Battle has continually made clear to Haykal that he cannot consider him an official channel. If the UARG, however, wishes us to use an Amin, Haykal or Sharaf as a channel of communication, it should so indicate. However, we repose complete confidence in our Ambassador and in the integrity and accuracy of Ambassador Kamel. We would prefer to accelerate the dialogue between our governments through them to the Foreign Ministry and Presidency. Ambassador Kamel indicated his complete accord with these views and said he would convey them with his endorsement discreetly to President Nasser. Mr. Davies noted that in January he had expressed concern to the Ambassador over indications that the Soviets were planting false intelligence with the UARG. Almost intuitively he felt that this process was a fact and that the Soviets were poisoning the well of U.S.-U.A.R. relations. He had seen the Soviets in action in Iraq under Kassem and, although the UARG was far more sophisticated, he felt the Soviets were succeeding in creating suspicion. In January he had mentioned specifically the Sudan where the Soviets sought to involve the U.S. in the southern dissidents movements. He felt that allegations made both by the Yemeni and the U.A.R. officials in Yemen that the U.S. was in fact encouraging Saudi and Iranian help to the Royalists stemmed from Soviet activities. Similarly, the alleged feeling in Cairo that the U.S. was operating against the Nasser regime was stimulated by the Soviets. The U.S.G. was not in any way operating against the U.A.R. and the record would show that we had consistently sought to be helpful in facilitating a solution to the Yemen problem. The Ambassador said Nasser's departure for Moscow August 28 could have dangerous consequences if Nasser at that time felt that there was "no hope for further U.S. PL 480 assistance." He urged some kind of forward motion on negotiations. Mr. Davies replied that while the administration was anxious to improve relations he would be less than frank if he led the Ambassador to believe that the climate prevailing in the Congress would permit action leading to a new agreement. This did not mean that an agreement would not be possible in the future, provided some outstanding political differences could be resolved. Until this improvement could be demonstrated, however, he could not see any move toward new assistance. August 10, 1965 Ambassador Kamel praised highly the August 9 televised interview with Secretaries Rusk and McNamara on Viet-Nam. He had sent a summary of points made to his government, which was extremely anxious to have full information on the U.S. position. Ambassador Kamel said he sent a full report of his last conversation with Mr. Davies to the Presidency. He had made the points concerning the unity of U.S. policy and the need for the UARG to discuss frankly any suspicions it might have of U.S. intentions with Ambassador Battle, the desirability of defining more clearly the channels of communication between our governments, the U.S. concerns over possible U.A.R. pressure on Saudi Arabia, and the U.S.G. desire to see an improvement in relations. He had just received a reply on the question of U.A.R.-Saudi relations. He was instructed to assure his colleagues in the Department of the UARG desire to see peace restored in Yemen and for amicable relations with Saudi Arabia. President Nasser had dispatched Hassan Sabri al-Kholi to urge King Faisal to meet with President Nasser in order to determine conditions for peace in Yemen. As of the date of the telegram, Faisal had not responded. The UARG hoped that the U.S. would use its influence in Jidda to encourage Faisal to meet with the President. In the meantime, reports of alleged U.A.R. intentions of attacks on Saudi Arabia were false. The Ambassador again raised the possibility of closer Soviet-U.A.R. relations if Nasser is not assured of U.S. interest in the U.A.R.'s future. He said the PL 480 program had been the basis on which U.S.-U.A.R. relations were conducted. The provision of foodstuff in fact had enabled the U.A.R. to pursue a non-aligned policy. Its termination could completely change the orientation of U.A.R. policy to the disadvantage of the West. Mr. Davies said he could only repeat that the climate in Congress toward aid to the U.A.R. precluded any steps in this direction by the Administration. It was important first to clean up any irregularities in the carrying out of the past agreements. The U.S.G. position on this had been formulated and we would soon be discussing these matters in Cairo. Before the Administration could even discuss the possibility of a new agreement, it had to be protected from charges that it had failed to ensure compliance with provisions of the old agreement. He saw no possibility of assurances to Nasser of favorable consideration of a new agreement prior to August 28. He would recommend to his superiors, however, prior to Nasser's departure, of an indication to him of our desire to have a full scale review of our relations either on his return from Moscow or on completion of the September Arab Summit Meeting. Hopefully, during the course of this period the situation would evolve so that the Yemen problem would be on its way to solution and the complex of Israeli problems could be put back on ice. One disturbing factor influencing Congressional attitudes was the U.A.R. press. Mr. Davies' impression was that it was worse now than any time since November. He feared that the installation of Khalid Muhyi al Din in a position of influence had permitted him to staff most of the press with pro-Communists. The Ambassador interjected that he was certain that the situation was not as bad as described and he was certain that President Nasser was giving these people enough rope to hang themselves. He again lamented the practice of Embassies of sending summaries of unfavorable comment since the reporting itself distorted the picture. Mr. Davies noted that U.A.R. editorials and news stories were transmitted by the wire services and provided the ammunition used by the Congressional opponents of policy. If the UARG wished an improvement in climate, it would have to solve this problem. Mr. Davies said that a further black cloud might be the situation in the Sudan. He noted allegations by the pro-U.A.R. and pro-Communist press in Khartoum that the "imperialists--U.S.-U.K.-Belgium-Israel and Tshombe" had promoted the uprising in the south and had armed it. This was a canard. The U.S.G. supported the integrity of Sudan and did not believe that the secession of the south was in its or anyone else's interest. The brutal fact was that the arms in the south were supplied by the courtesy of the U.A.R. and Algeria. Some were siphoned off during the airlift to the Congo rebels and others were taken from the Simba as they were forced out of the Congo by the Nationalist army. Quite obviously unfriendly sources, most probably the Soviets, were encouraging the Sudanese to use the U.S. as a scapegoat. The fact that Soviet and U.A.R. propaganda coincided on this issue was indeed disturbing. Ambassador Kamel said he had been following the news in al Ahram and had seen nothing of this and was certain that this allegation would not be supported by his government. The Ambassador said he had a long letter from Kaissouni on the urgency for the need of U.S. assistance. Although it was confidential, he would make available a copy for the Department. He closed the conversation with renewed appeal for action to assure continued U.S. economic support for the U.A.R.
233. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State/1/ Cairo, August 18, 1965. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, AID (US) 15 UAR. Secret; Limdis. No time of transmission is given on the telegram, which was received at 8:20 a.m. 517. As the UAR's economic situation remains difficult as result its foreign exchange position, our staunchest friends here (such as Kaissouny) are urging us strongly give some early indication that new food agreement of some size will be possible by end of year, assuming no major additional irritants in our relations. They specifically urge that we do so before President Nasser departs for Moscow August 27. I assume this timing impossible in view current status aid legislation and climate Congressional opinion, but we must give UAR some fairly definite sign of our intentions by early October because it must begin then to plan for additional wheat supplies needed in January. An affirmative decision will not guarantee a new honeymoon in US-UAR relations. It would be an important step however in rebuilding our influence to the levels enjoyed in 1962-63 and in protecting our essential interests in the area. We would envisage a series of short term agreements for specific products beginning with tobacco. Wheat in particular I would limit to amounts to be augmented by later agreements in the light of prevailing relationships realistically appraised. If our decision is negative or we continue to be evasive for many more months, I am convinced we can expect progressive and fairly rapid decline in our position here and substantial harm to some of our interests elsewhere in area. I would expect the Embassy's effectiveness to be reduced to roughly that of British at present, i.e., little useful contact with UAR authorities and little or no influence on such matters as UAR policies on Palestine, the Arabian Peninsula or Libya. We have much to lose here in terms of a position of influence. We should take hard look at realities of situation before permitting further decline in Western influence at a critical time in this area. In view importance decisions involved, believe I should return on consultation at a time when Dept thinks my presence in Washington would be most useful in reassessing and redefining US policy towards UAR. As noted above, decision should be reached by early October and as far as local factors concerned mid-September would appear most suitable time for consultation./2/ /2/Telegram 1126 to Cairo, August 20, authorized Battle to plan to return for consultations in mid-September. It stated that the Department was not prepared to give the UAR Government a commitment on a new P.L. 480 agreement at that time and that it envisaged a meeting between Battle and Nasser after his consultations to explore areas of possible improvement in U.S.-UAR relations. (Ibid.) Battle
Washington, August 26, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Komer Memos, Vol. I. Secret. Copies were sent to the Department of State and to Deputy Director for Central Intelligence Richard Helms. Messrs. Bundy and Komer saw UAR Ambassador Kamel briefly, as Bundy had promised during the Presidential party for Middle East ambassadors on the Sequoia the night before./2/ /2/Kamel told Davies on August 27 that he had sat next to the President for an hour during the August 25 Sequoia cruise and presented the case for renewed aid to the UAR. He said the President displayed "keen interest" and finally asked him to continue the conversation with "his boss," Bundy. (Memorandum of conversation; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL UAR-US) Bundy said that following Kamel's appeal (and Kamel's own talk with the President on board the Sequoia) he had discussed the UAR problem with the President. The President and the Secretary of State were going to undertake a "careful review" of our relations with the UAR. More than this we couldn't say at the present time. As the President himself had mentioned the previous evening, we wanted good relations with key countries like the UAR. But these had to be founded solidly on mutual respect. Aside from saying how hopeful we were about developments in Yemen, Bundy did not go into any specifics. In return he got an abbreviated version of the now famous Kamel speech. The US had to provide food to the UAR to balance Soviet aid so that Nasser's "stabilizing influence in the Middle East" would not disappear. Despite regrettable incidents, no basic US interests in the Middle East had been harmed; the Israeli problem was in the icebox, etc. But we were at a crucial crossroads. The diplomatic corps here was full of rumors that the US was switching to a tough policy of "tit for tat." But this policy never worked. Great powers must be more magnanimous and less emotional than small ones if they were to preserve their vital interests, etc. For example, Nasser felt humiliated by the way we had turned off aid. Whether rightly or wrongly, Nasser also thought CIA was trying to cause trouble for him in Egypt. Mr. Bundy reminded Kamel that he had dismissed the CIA canard the previous evening and assured him that we too sought friendly understanding. He was sure the Ambassador realized, however, that this must be a two way street. RWK
The Foreign Assistance Act of 1965 (P.L. 89-171) was approved September 6, 1965. Section 401 amended Section 107 of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954 (P.L. 480) to provide that no sale should be made under Title I of P.L. 480 to the United Arab Republic unless the President determined that it was essential to U.S. national interest, that no sale should be based on UAR requirements for more than one fiscal year, and that the President should keep the Foreign Relations Committee and Appropriations Committee of the Senate and the Speaker of the House fully informed with respect to sales made to the United Arab Republic under Title I. The text of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1965 (79 Stat. 653) is also printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965, pages 1137-1145.
236. Action Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Handley) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/ Washington, September 8, 1965. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 12-5 ISR. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Nyerges; cleared by Officer in Charge of Politico-Military Affairs in NR Lieutenant Colonel Billy W. Byrd, Davies, Evans in DOD/ISA, Meyers, and in substance by Townsend W. Hoopes in DOD/ISA. SUBJECT Israel has long sought access to U.S. supply of arms. Currently, the GOI is mounting a strong effort to acquire United States supersonic fighters and/or light bombers. Its objective is as much to identify the United States with support of a deterrent offensive air strike capability against UAR targets as the acquisition of the latest equipment at a cost substantially less than European supply. The acquisition of modern supersonic aircraft by the Israel defense forces is recognized as in our mutual interest of maintaining Israel's defensive strength. This is evident from the fact that in the March 10, 1965 memorandum of understanding we agreed to "ensure an opportunity for Israel to purchase a certain number of combat aircraft, if not from Western [European]/2/ sources, then from the United States." (This was later understood to mean 24 aircraft, if provided by the United States, to be delivered after December 31, 1966.) The agreement emphasizes our policy need to avoid provision of offensive or sophisticated weapons when these are available in Western Europe even if it is ultimately necessary to provide a token quantity of United States aircraft. Israel is seeking, however, to interpret the agreement as a commitment for United States aircraft, regardless of European availabilities. /2/Brackets in the source text. We do not wish to sell high-performance aircraft either to Israel or Jordan because the provision of these highly sophisticated and clearly offensive weapons would spell an end to our arms policy. Though tattered and torn, this policy has been a major factor in keeping us out of the Near East arms race and protecting the United States from the political damage that would result from a policy of uncontrolled military sales. However, we have used our facilitative services with the French and British for both countries, and in the case of Israel we have also offered the French the use of a U.S.-designed engine. The next major Israeli push will take place during the visit by Air Force General Ezer Weizman, scheduled to arrive in Washington October 11 to request U.S. aircraft. Our basic position is that we have determined Israeli aircraft needs can clearly be met from French or British sources. Therefore, we will have discharged our commitment under the memorandum of understanding by locating and assisting toward acquisition of suitable non-U.S. military aircraft. We will continue to refuse to provide information on characteristics and performance, price and availability of United States aircraft inasmuch as we do not plan to provide such aircraft. Recommendation That you approve the basic position that: 1) in our judgment French or British aircraft should meet Israel's needs, 2) we are prepared to discuss performance, suitability, and availability of European aircraft, and 3) we are not prepared to discuss suitability and availability of United States aircraft./3/ /3/Rusk initialed his approval on September 20.
237. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson/1/ Washington, September 24, 1965, 12:30 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Arab Republic, UAR Memos, Vol. IV. Secret. With the aid bill over the hump, Rusk asks that you take another look at aid to Nasser. His long memo (attached)/2/ is worth weekend reading. /2/Rusk's September 23 memorandum to the President recommended that he meet with Bell, Battle, and Rusk to review U.S.-UAR relations, including the recent UAR request for a new P.L. 480 agreement, and that he approve negotiation of a P.L. 480 agreement with the UAR. (Ibid.) Johnson approved the first recommendation and disapproved the second. The issue is whether we now agree to start talking quietly about more PL 480 for the UAR. We'd come back at you in a month or so before signing anything but even to start talking does imply we'd go ahead. All agree we should be much less generous than in the past, and keep Nasser on a short rein. But State and our Ambassador argue cogently that some food is useful insurance to keep this key Arab country from taking a strongly anti-US course and becoming too dependent on the USSR and Red China. They're right on straight foreign policy grounds--moreover, we've now faced Nasser down and shown we're not to be trifled with. But if we flatly cut him off (and he halfway believes we have), he'll have no incentive to think twice about shafting us. This leaves the domestic US reaction; how do we justify resumption of food? After Yemen and the Congo there's a general impression now that Nasser is behaving more sensibly, and Battle's recent Hill talks (he didn't talk aid) lead him to believe that anti-Nasserism is far less acute. So if you're agreeable in principle, I'd suggest the following scenario: 1. Battle see Nasser, and say you'd asked him to get Nasser's views on the future of US/UAR relations. We get into a political dialogue. 2. If this goes well, then State take such Hill soundings as are feasible before Congress goes home. 3. Then we enter quiet negotiations in mid-October or so for only a six-month agreement (with a six-month renewable clause) for under $50 million worth of Title I wheat, etc. Anything beyond this he'd have to take in Title IV dollar sales (which are good business for us). Thus we'd be giving much less than in the last three-year $400 million plus Title I agreement, and Nasser would know he was on his good behavior. R. W. Komer
/3/The option originally read, "Let's have talk Rusk wants first." Johnson crossed out the words "Rusk wants first" and checked the option.
238. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State/1/ New York, September 30, 1965, 0103Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL ARAB-ISR. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to Tel Aviv. Secto 10. Secretary's talk with Israeli Foreign Minister Meir./2/ /2/Memoranda of the conversation are ibid., Conference Files: Lot 66 D 347, CF 2548. Following salient points of conversation held at USUN Sept 29 are drawn from uncleared memcon FYI, Noforn, and subject to change to revision upon review. Bulk of seventy-minute conversation devoted to exchange of comments on position of President Nasser. FonMin Meir drew parallel current India-Pakistan crisis with Arab-Israel question, noting ominous lesson to be drawn from an adversary's repetition year after year that "this country must be destroyed." She noted that despite well-publicized plans and budget appropriations by Arab command for assault on Israel, nothing being done by world community to head it off. FonMin took little comfort from Nasser's Arab summit announcement that assault on Israel would be delayed four years. She acknowledged that Nasser is having a number of troubles, particularly stemming from frustrations of Yemen adventure, but she warned that Egyptian Army, conscious of having suffered defeat in Yemen, may try to find someone else to fight. Without stressing point she posed question whether it was wise for us to facilitate food shipments to UAR. She asked that USG make Nasser appreciate that his preparations against Israel are something he cannot be allowed to execute. She noted that Israel was not the only interested party in this question; other Arab states were concerned lest Nasser find ways of strengthening his position. FonMin made repeated references to long-term dangerous effect, especially on young people in Arab world from Nasser's belligerent public speeches about Palestine. Secretary noted that USG regards Nasser's influence in Arab world as more moderate than GOI gives credit for. He suggested that UAR posture toward Israel more doctrinaire than activist. Secretary recalled that Nasser had exerted a calming influence on Syria and in Jordan waters question. Secretary remarked that in general we are not inclined to be optimistic about Nasser performance but there was some evidence restraint as, for example, in changed UAR behavior regarding supplies to Congo rebels, agitation about Wheelus Base, relations with Saudi Arabia, and some responsiveness to our representations on trade boycott. FonMin expressed thanks for USG willingness receive IAF General Weizman. GOI was highly satisfied, she said, at our agreement that (1) IAF suffering "disbalance" and (2) US willing consider supplying IAF needs if equipment not available elsewhere. Secretary replied that we would be glad to talk to General Weizman and review this problem thoroughly. He expressed frank hope that GOI aspirations re USG as supplier were based on differences in price and performance and not on political advantage to be gained by Israel having USG agree supply. FonMin assured Secretary that Israeli recourse to USG being resorted to only after thorough exploration other potential sources. FonMin gave Secretary list of "acts of sabotage" allegedly committed by infiltrators coming from Jordan during July, August and early Sept. FonMin said she knew King Hussein does not want trouble but GOI considered Fattah problem as very serious. Secretary told her we did not consider striking back at Jordan as best way to deal with problem. FonMin emphasized that Israel had struck only at Fattah centers. Furthermore, GOI provided Jordan Govt with information about Fattah activities but lower echelons GOJ were making trouble. She noted that Fattah saboteurs who had been arrested were subsequently sent home by Jordan officials without trial. FonMin raised question of Moqeiba Dam and said it is not clear whether Jordan intended to stick to allocations provided under Johnston Plan or whether some other diversion was intended. She said we ought to tell King Hussein that Jordan cannot have all sweet water of Yarmuk, Hasbani, and Banyas leaving only relatively brackish waters to Israel. She said it would be helpful if USG could also inform Jordan that if they intend to carry through Meifeidoun crossing of Litani River, Israel position was that this would be inadmissible. Secretary made no commitment to do so. Rusk
239. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations/1/ Washington, October 5, 1965, 7:12 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 3 PAL ENTITY. Confidential. Drafted by Campbell, cleared by UNP Deputy Director Jonathan Dean and in substance by Wolle, and approved by William B. Buffum. Repeated to Tel Aviv. 759. Re USUN 1091,/2/ we assume "memorandum of Permrep PLO" is opening move in effort to gain UN recognition of PLO. We realize we have little leverage with Arabs on this issue, but we think it might be useful to point out to more moderate Arab dels that procedure on this question in past several years has been satisfactory to Arabs and that we hope they will agree to its continuance at this session. If they insist upon specific recognition of PLO, they should realize this might lead to nasty floor fight which may not necessarily come out to their advantage. /2/Dated October 4. (Ibid., ARAB-ISR) Mission might wish to tell Israelis we are, in response to Amb Harman's request, (Deptel 371)/3/ trying to head off Arab campaign for greater recognition of PLO. /3/Telegram 371 to USUN, September 2, summarized a conversation between Harman and Sisco. (Ibid., REF 3 UNRWA) Ball [Continue with the next documents] Volume XVIII Index | Foreign Relations Online | Historian's Office | Department of State | Secretary of State |