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 | FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XVIII Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964-67 Department of State |
 220. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts/1/ Washington, May 28, 1965, 8:25 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 32-1 ISR-JORDAN. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Russell; cleared by Davies, Campbell, Staff Assistant in EUR George W. Jaeger, and Talbot; and approved by Talbot. Sent to Tel Aviv, Beirut, Damascus, Baghdad, Cairo, Jidda, London, Paris, Jerusalem, CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA, USUN, Bonn, Rome, and Moscow. 2380. Following is uncleared memcon FYI Noforn./2/ Secretary called in Israel Ambassador May 28 to express deep concern over Israeli military raids into Jordan territory May 27-28. He said USG took serious view such activities on peaceful frontier. Timing raids during meeting Arab Prime Ministers in Cairo made situation even more explosive. USG had hoped that in view its clearly expressed opposition to use of force such activities would not occur. /2/A more detailed memorandum of the conversation is ibid., POL 27-14 ISR-JORDAN. Ambassador Harman explained attacks not on Jordan but on bases of Fatah organization which since January had been conducting raids against civilian targets in Israel. Ambassador reviewed number such incidents including 1) February 27 attack on Kfar Hess which gave rise to Israel's letter to Security Council; 2) March 4 incident along Negev border which UNTSO investigation indicated was work of organized group for which Jordan responsible; and 3) Recent increase in sabotage during May culminating in Ramat Hakovesh and Afula attacks. Israeli attack aimed at three places: 1) Shuneh where training base and arms cache of Fatah destroyed, 2) Qalqiliya which jump-off point for attacks on Kfar Hess and Ramat Hakovesh, and 3) Jenin from which Afula attack mounted. Ambassador stressed need for Jordanian responsibility for activities within its borders and attacks emanating from within Jordan. Israel had exhibited patience when sabotage caused no casualties but attacks on inhabited areas intolerable. Ambassador hoped Jordan would derive lesson from raids and take more serious view regarding need control Fatah. Secretary noted: 1) incident at Qalqiliya involved not just pinpoint sabotage but sustained artillery fire; 2) some question regarding what occurred at Afula since GOI apparently blocking further investigation incident; facts available cast doubt upon Jordanian responsibility for incident; and 3) Jordan had said it would concert with Arab nations for joint action in retaliation to Israeli attacks. This could lead to serious situation. Secretary requested resume of Fatah incidents with indication those reported to UN./3/ He urged Israel do everything to restore calm and not permit escalation of military activity. While Israeli contention that Jordan responsible activities individuals within its territory valid as general proposition, sovereign governments cannot always guarantee behavior individuals. /3/Telegram 1227 to Tel Aviv, May 29, transmitted a list of nine incidents provided by Ambassador Harman. (Ibid., POL 32-1 ISR-JORDAN) Ambassador said Israel anxious avoid military escalation but believed that interest area stability served by making Jordan aware of its responsibilities. Secretary concluded with reference to having instructed our Ambassador to make parallel approach in Tel Aviv./4/ /4/Instructions were sent in circular telegram 2367, May 28. (Ibid.) Barbour reported in telegram 1533 from Tel Aviv, May 28, that he had discussed with Foreign Ministry Director General Levavi the U.S. view of the raids. (Ibid.) He reported in telegram 1544 from Tel Aviv, May 29, that he had raised the subject with Foreign Minister Meir. (Ibid.) Rusk
221. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, May 31, 1965, 12:40 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 10. No classification marking. SUBJECT Secretary Rusk has now asked formally for a determination on the completion of shipment under the existing PL 480 agreement. I attach his memorandum at Tab B/2/ and a good one-page from Bob Komer at Tab A. The Secretary and Bob Komer are both ready to go ahead on this and I am sure they are right from every point of view but that of Congressional reaction. The Department (Rusk and McArthur especially) has done a comprehensive consultation with the top Leadership, but it is a fact that the Senate authorization on aid will be up in the next ten days. /2/The tabs are attached but not printed. If you want to go ahead with the wheat sale, but keep it out of the Senate debate, we could probably make some money by telling Nasser informally that we expect to be able to go ahead in the next couple of weeks./3/ He keeps his mouth shut on this sort of thing because it is in his interest to do so. I will put this on the agenda for our next Tuesday lunch-type meeting with Rusk and McNamara. So this particular paper is for information and not for decision. /3/The words "telling Nasser informally that we expect to" are circled with the following note in Johnson's handwriting: "We tell Nasser--we hope to go $17 in 2 or 3 wks & perhaps can get Congress to go along shortly thereafter but ask him to bear with us with other 20. L." Telegram 7401 to Cairo, June 2, instructed Battle to inform Nasser privately and in confidence that the U.S. Government hoped to be able to proceed with $17 million in purchase authorizations within the next 2 weeks and hoped Congressional acquiescence in issuance of the remaining $20 million could be obtained shortly thereafter. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, UAR, Vol. III) Battle reported in telegram 4281 from Cairo, June 4, that he had given the message to Kaissouni for Nasser. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, AID (US) 15 UAR) McG. B.
222. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel/1/ Washington, June 5, 1965, 2:59 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 12-5 ISR. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by Russell; cleared by Symmes, Talbot, Solbert, Bunte, Creel, and Komer; and approved by Rusk. A May 27 draft by Russell is attached with a note that the telegram was retyped with White House changes. Repeated to London, Bonn, and to Paris for the Embassy and DEFREPNAMA. 1254. Israel Arms Procurement. This message FYI throughout. High level discussions within USG May 22 on Israel arms procurement/2/ resulted in following US position: /2/No record of these discussions has been found. I. Tanks: US prepared: 1. Offer 110 M-48A2c tanks to make up shortfall in German deliveries. Fifteen ready for delivery in US this summer; balance in three months beginning mid-June 1966. 2. Offer 100 M-48A1 tanks to offset sale similar number basic M-48 tanks to Jordan. In view of Israeli request that M-48A1's be delivered before M-48A2c's to permit early conversion, deliveries to Israel would be made over four months beginning in mid-January 1966. US could deliver M-48A2c's ahead of M-48A1's if Israelis change their minds. 3. Provide kits to install 105-mm guns on 110 M-48A2c tanks and 140 M-48A1 tanks (40 from Germany and 100 from the US) in Israel. 4. Provide 140 kits for conversion in Israel of Israel's M-48A1 tanks to M-48A3 configuration. In view known Jordanian desires and comparability of Jordan and Israel tank sales (see Deptel 898 and US-Israeli Memorandum of Understanding),/3/ implication clear US will in due course be under strong pressure to supply Jordan M-48A3 tanks with 105-mm guns. /3/See footnote 2, Document 183 and Document 185. If Israel should press for delivery of 100 M-48A2c instead of M-48A1 tanks (as we think they will) to offset the Jordan sale, we could probably agree (unless it turns out that it seriously degrades US forces), provided we supplied neither kits for conversion of the 40 M-48A1's in Israel to M-48A3 configuration, nor kits to up-gun any of Israel's M-48 type tanks. Since these M-48A2c models could not be delivered before 1967 this concession would have advantage of broader phasing of deliveries and less political impact on Israel's neighbors. Any up-gunning kits would have to come from the UK. II. Self-Propelled Guns: US prepared to supply only M-44A1 SP 155-mm howitzers and then only in lieu of tanks on one-for-one basis. III. Aircraft: 1. Clear consensus contrary US interests to sell military aircraft to Israel. 2. We are committed to sell Israel aircraft only if Israel cannot obtain suitable aircraft from Western European sources. In any event, we would not sell supersonic aircraft, the number would not exceed 24, and delivery would not be until 1967. We are also most reluctant to sell a bomber or even an attack aircraft, but to avoid charges of bad faith we propose to stick for this round with the precise language of Memorandum of Understanding (i.e. certain number of combat aircraft) and March 10 Agreed Minutes (i.e. certain number of mutually agreed type). 3. We propose tell Israel Embassy here we expect detailed evidence of GOI effort procure Western European aircraft. 4. If, after intensive effort, GOI unable find suitable aircraft, we intend canvass Western European sources ourselves. 5. Since we wish to steer Israel to Europe rather than whet its appetitite for US aircraft, we do not now intend furnish GOI information on availability, price, characteristics, or recommendations re potentially available US combat aircraft. Supply such information before conclusion investigation Western European possibilities could destroy credibility US insistence upon thorough search for Western European aircraft. However, we will provide certain information on costliness selected US aircraft we do not intend to sell, with a view to encouraging Israelis to search for suitable foreign aircraft. During forthcoming discussions with Israel here/4/ we intend to reiterate statement made to Israel Ambassador May 19 (Deptel 1184)/5/ and stress that Israel's military attacks intended to solve water diversion issue could cause suspension of arms arrangements at any stage. /4/Talbot and Solbert presented the U.S. response to the Israeli arms request to Harman on June 15. (Memorandum of conversation; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 12-5 ISR) /5/See footnote 3, Document 216. Rusk
223. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, June 8, 1965. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 32-1 ISR-UAR. Confidential. Drafted by Wolle on June 9. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS Mr. Gazit said that the Foreign Ministry in Jerusalem had reiterated June 7 to Ambassador Barbour that the Israeli Government seriously desires a return to tranquility in the border areas and that it wishes to cooperate with the Jordanian authorities to bring this about. Ambassador Barbour in recent days had also been given copies of messages sent by the GOI to the Jordanian and Lebanese governments via the MACs containing lists of individuals suspected of Fatah connections. There were 29 names on the list for Jordan and a single name on the list for Lebanon. Mr. Gazit said his government hoped the United States Government would go back to King Hussein in a follow-up to his initiative with Ambassador Barnes several days ago/2/ and, in addition to stressing to the King the Israeli desire for a return to peace along the border, would raise a number of specific points relating to the recent border events. These points had been enumerated to Ambassador Barbour, but Mr. Gazit said he would mention some of them as examples. For one thing, the GOI does not understand why the official Jordanian letter to the Security Council concerning the May 31 Jerusalem incident/3/ is at odds with what has been learned from the Jordanians themselves to be the real explanation. The GOI wonders what kind of punishment Jordan will impose on the army captain arrested because of that incident, which it considers to have been most serious. Israel fails to understand Jordan's apparent inability to spot saboteurs moving toward the border, since groups of several persons rather than simply individuals have been involved in some cross-border incidents. /2/Telegram 732 from Amman, June 3, reported a discussion between Hussein and Barnes concerning the background of the recent incidents on the Jordan-Israel border. Hussein said concerning Fatah that Jordan was not sponsoring the group, was completely opposed to its alleged activities, and was making every effort to control the border against infiltrations. He expressed willingness to have his comments communicated to Israeli officials. (Ibid., POL 31-1 ISR-JORDAN) On June 4, Davies gave Gazit the substance of telegram 732, stressing that the information must be held very closely within the Israeli Government. (Ibid.) /3/The Jordanian letter, dated June 4, responded to a June 1 Israeli letter charging that Jordanian Army posts had opened fire the previous day across the armistice demarcation line into Israeli territory. (UN documents S/6415 and S/6397) The Israeli Government would continue to supply information concerning Fatah complicity in the sabotage incidents, said Mr. Gazit, though it could hardly supply such a quantity that it became in effect a branch of the Jordan security services. Mr. Gazit expressed gratitude on behalf of the Israeli Government for the USG's readiness to transmit such information and more general messages to Jordan on its behalf. He went on to note that his government believed the onus was now on King Hussein to see that border tranquility was restored. Mr. Davies said that U.S. intelligence confirmed the serious desire and efforts of King Hussein to keep potential saboteurs in check. He noted that it was a little too much to assert that Jordan had absolute control of such activities. Nearly 200 Israeli soldiers had, after all, moved almost unnoticed well into Jordan territory during the May 27-28 raids, and even the Israeli security forces could not detect individuals or groups of infiltrators immediately on entry into Israel. He stressed that the USG was quite convinced that any further Israeli military raids would push the Jordanians into some sort of military reaction. Mr. Gazit referred to PLO efforts to raise a Palestine Liberation Army and stated his government was impressed by the serious steps in process, particularly in Gaza. He spoke of the seriousness with which the GOI viewed the question of keeping UNRWA ration cards from PLA conscriptees. Mr. Davies agreed this was a serious question, reiterated the steps the USG had taken with UNRWA officials regarding it, and expressed again the hope that this issue would be kept out of the press since the glare of publicity would render UNRWA action much more difficult. Regarding the PLO, Mr. Davies said it seemed clear that the Arab states principally concerned were holding the organization at arm's length. There was a danger, however, in the extent to which the Chinese Communists could make good on Peking's reported promises to Shuqairy of funds, arms and training. Mr. Gazit read brief passages from a GOI letter to the Security Council regarding the June 1 explosions at Yiftah and Beit Guvrin,/4/ and spoke briefly of two more recent border incidents. At Beit Qama (about 13 miles north of Beersheba and 6 miles from the Jordan border) an Israeli watchman had come upon four intruders cutting the fence around a water tower and had thereby prevented damage to the installation. At Jisr Shaikh Hussein the Jordanians had fired across the border for 45 minutes with no apparent cause. Mr. Moratt commented that the Jordanians now claimed to have repulsed two Israeli attacks, neither of which in fact ever existed. Mr. Davies commented that the Jordanians undoubtedly were apprehensive about possible incursions. He emphasized that the USG is counseling restraint on all parties concerned although our leverage in one location (Damascus) is at an extremely low level. /4/Dated June 4; not printed. (UN document S/6414)
224. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson/1/ Washington, June 16, 1965, 9:30 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. IV. Secret. A note on the source text states that the memorandum was received at 10 a.m. Planes for Israel. Our Israeli friends are typically pressing us to enrich the secret arms deal as much as possible. Since we've done even better than they originally expected on tanks, they're now zeroing in on aircraft. When I was out there, they talked about an old light bomber like the B-66, which they thought they could buy for peanuts. We agreed to help them get up to 24 "combat" planes (not necessarily bombers) either in Europe or here. Since then we've convinced them that the B-66 is not available as surplus so now they're asking for the F-4, our fanciest current operational model./2/ /2/A June 10 letter from Harman to Talbot states that Israel had been unable to find suitable military aircraft in Europe and was looking to the United States for a plane such as the Phantom. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 12-5 ISR) The F-4 is (a) simply outside the spirit of our understanding; (b) would cost them a mint; and (c) would raise hob with the Arabs. Rusk is very strongly opposed; he doesn't even want to sell old planes. This memo is to (a) inform you so you'll be ready for any backdoor approaches; and (b) ask you to let me say I've confirmed our negative position at the highest level--hopefully this will fob off further useless talk. We can always take another look later. The alternative is not to bring your name into this yet, but I fear the Israelis won't look seriously in Europe unless I can do so. I already have Feldman on my neck.
/3/This option is checked. R. W. Komer /4/Bundy initialed below Komer's signature.
225. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson/1/ Washington, June 17, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Arab Republic, Vol. IV. Secret. A note at the end of the memorandum in Bundy's handwriting reads: "I am absolutely sure we should do this--because if we don't the explosion will be our fault. We can haggle like Hell in the next phase. McGB." Tab A is Rusk's formal request for a green light on the remaining PL 480 for the UAR, and the draft Determination (cleared by BOB) for your signature./2/ /2/The tabs are attached but not printed. Rusk's memorandum for the President is dated June 16; the draft Determination is undated. Tab B is Rusk's view on how seriously Egypt has violated the PL 480 agreement./3/ It did not bar sales to Communist states but did contain rice export quotas and other provisions which the UAR probably did violate at least in 1964. /3/Tab B is a June 17 memorandum from Rusk to the President. State argues that the UAR fell short of its export quota in 1963 almost as much as it exceeded in 1964, so these should be offset. We have this sort of problem with many PL 480 clients, and have had to work them out by agreement. Agriculture is willing to go ahead on this basis so long as we put the UAR on notice that this matter must be cleared up, especially before any new PL 480 agreement. To meet any adverse publicity, we have the UAR Ambassador's authority to say that the UAR fully agrees to negotiate out any such issues to our mutual satisfaction. This is a messy problem, and will generate some flak, however we move. But the Secretary of State makes a powerful case for giving Nasser just enough rope to limit the risk of a difficult confrontation in the Near East. I can only add my sober judgment as your Middle East hand that he's dead right./4/ /4/Talbot met with Kamel on June 21 to tell him that a few hours previously the President had approved issuance of purchase authorizations for the $37 million remaining under the existing P.L. 480 agreement. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL UAR-US) R. W. Komer
226. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson/1/ Washington, July 2, 1965, 3:30 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 12. Confidential. Despite the Javits speech, Congress and the press reacted with restraint on the whole to the $37 million food for the UAR. There was relatively little other adverse comment, though Gruening, Farbstein, Pelly, Michel and Horton said the expected. The returns aren't all in, and we hear that Michaels may try to amend the appropriation to block all aid to the UAR. But the telling argument was willingness to honor a commitment, not sympathy for Nasser. We moved just in time to spoil partly a big Soviet propaganda coup. In desperation Nasser got Moscow to divert 300,000 tons of its own purchases from Canada and Australia, which he doubtless planned to announce with fanfare once he decided there was no hope from us. Nasser also apparently got some wheat on credit from Mexico and Argentina. All this, plus the UAR's own crop, will fill Egyptian needs through the winter. So it relieves pressure on us, and gives us time to sort out our relations with Nasser. There's a rumor that you feel we led you astray on the UAR by painting a grim picture of its inability to get food. I don't believe this, because we put the case on straight political grounds of preventing a real bust-up between the US and UAR. Our chief hope was to forestall total UAR dependence on the Soviets for wheat as well as arms. We're still in this ballgame if we choose. New Problem. Releasing the $37 million has led to growing pressure on Agriculture from the trade and its Hill friends to resume CCC credit sales. We've been sitting on about $30 million worth of applications for wheat, tobacco, barley, etc. Agriculture is pressing to release these because they earn dollars and help meet PL 480 usual marketings. It's also odd that we would give wheat under Title I but not sell it for dollars. In fact, however, the UAR is so low on foreign exchange and its credit so poor that it cannot get the needed US bank guarantees to permit many (if any) dollar sales unless the EXIM Bank will reinsure these guarantees. Thus by authorizing CCC sales, but not allowing EXIM reinsurance, we can have our cake and eat it too--avoid trade and Hill criticism but still keep the UAR on a short rein. I'd add that these small dollar sales generate no adverse publicity. Is this OK?/2/ /2/Johnson wrote at the bottom of the memorandum: "See me. L." A note in Bundy's handwritting follows: "Bob: I think you should do this." R. W. Komer/3/ /3/Bundy initialed below Komer's signature.
227. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel/1/ Washington, July 19, 1965, 8:22 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 33-1 JORDAN RIVER. Confidential. Drafted by Wolle and Kinsolving, cleared by Symmes and in substance by Campbell, and approved by Talbot. Repeated to Beirut, Amman, Cairo, Damascus, London, and Paris, and pouched to Jerusalem. 58. Assistant Secretary Talbot July 19 gave Israel Ambassador Harman reply to Israel Embassy's formal demarche of July 7 on Lebanese diversion plans./2/ Talbot stated our estimate Lebanese work proceeding slowly, as GOL had informed us. Question of Lebanese deceiving us has not arisen since they never said they would stop, only that they would drag their feet. If we should now perceive any unusual activity, we would consider what extraordinary efforts we should make. Meanwhile we will continue express our concern to GOL. Israel should convey its concern through ILMAC which would be an appropriate and effective channel. Talbot noted recent public statement by Israel COS Rabin had reduced GOL flexibility and made it more difficult for us to exercise our influence. Harman specifically inquired at what level we would be making demarches to GOL. Talbot replied it might be at more than one level, normal contact with senior level of GOL being our Ambassador. /2/Reference is to a conversation between Gazit and Rusk, during which Gazit raised the subject of Israeli concern about continuing Lebanese canal construction and stated that the Israelis thought the situation required an immediate high-level demarche urging the Lebanese to discontinue further construction. (Memorandum of conversation, July 7; ibid.) A memorandum of Talbot's conversation with Harman is ibid. Harman emphasized Israelis do not believe what GOL doing is foot-dragging. Israel Minister Gazit reviewed Israeli position stating GOI had refuted US deprecation of Lebanese project by indicating both Lebanese and Syrian sections of canal are on same contour and excavations near al-Meri are for larger enterprise than mere roadshifting. He reiterated now is right time from diplomatic point of view to push Lebanese into removing tractors, slow foot-dragging down to standstill and create right atmosphere for gradual shelving entire plan. Harman stated there had been predisposition in GOI to minimize Lebanese project while watching Syrians most closely. However GOL, even after Nasser speech of May 31 and for reasons Israel cannot fathom, continued at increased pace when it had excuse to stop. Now Jerusalem is no longer predisposed minimize it. Harman concluded that, while he would report Talbot's suggestion of continued use of ILMAC channel for this purpose, GOI would still be appreciative of US demarche to Lebanese stressing new element in Israeli concern over situation. Talbot replied we would keep eye on situation and might have further conversation on it. You should seek meeting with Eshkol to speak along following lines: 1. We, as friends of Israel, are concerned at certain recent Israeli actions vis-a-vis Arabs. We would have expected, during recent months as high tide of Arab Summit solidarity receded and as Arab realists recognized once again Israel's basic military preeminence, that GOI actions would be characterized more consistently by calm, confidence and restraint expected of nation whose security is essentially, if not absolutely, assured. However we have noted GOI on several occasions past six weeks has acted as if its existence was in immediate jeopardy. GOI reaction late May to alleged Fatah raids was out of proportion to damage those raids and appears to us ill-advised in that target nation was one that seemed to be working curb terrorist activities. Erection of large burlap screen on border by Israeli forces in Jerusalem early July aroused fears and suspicions unnecessarily. Finally GOI reaction to Lebanese canal digging has in our view gone beyond justifiable requirements. 2. Appears to us Israel may be losing opportunities inherent in present Arab disarray. In current phase through which Arab world passing there may be real opportunities make large strides toward peace and stability in Near East. We hope Israelis will look beyond immediate desiderata (e.g. desire achieve final collapse of presently feeble Arab water diversion efforts) to longer-range goals of finding necessary pre-conditions for peace or long-term modus vivendi in area. 3. GOI actions pointed to above also have disadvantages in our view of detracting from Israel's image as country sincerely devoted to peace with its neighbors and of making USG efforts to help Israel more difficult and reducing their chances of success./3/ /3/Barbour reported in telegram 77 from Tel Aviv, July 26, that he discussed the subject with Eshkol that morning. (Ibid.) 4. We will, of course, as indicated to Ambassador Harman, continue express our concern to Lebanese over pace of their diversion activities at this juncture. We will continue keep watchful eye on that situation and anticipate further conversations with GOI officials on it./4/ /4/The approaches to Eshkol and Helou were approved by Rusk. (Memorandum from Talbot to Rusk, July 14; ibid.) Telegram 64 to Beirut, July 17, instructed Porter to discuss Israel's concern with President Helou. (Ibid.) Porter reported in telegram 69 from Beirut, July 20 that in a meeting with Helou the day before, the latter assured him that there was no cause for Israeli concern. (Ibid.) Rusk
228. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State/1/ Cairo, July 22, 1965. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL UAR-US. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. The telegram does not indicate the time of transmission; it was received at 12:21 p.m. Passed to the White House. 261. I was summoned today from a lunch at the Australian Embassy attended by the Ambassadors of France, Italy, UK to see the Foreign Min as soon as possible. I began by thanking the Foreign Min for a most pleasant dinner at his house the preceding night. He said he regretted having to disturb me but that he wished to bring on behalf of the President a matter to my attention that he assumed I had already been informed about--the arrest of Mostafa Amin in Alexandria yesterday. Reading from pencilled notes he then stated that an American Embassy official, Mr. Bruce Odell had been lunching with Mr. Amin in what was apparently a weekly lunch (I expressed great surprise at this point), but that immediately on ascertaining the identity of Mr. Odell he had been released although Mr. Amin was under arrest following a surveillance of many weeks. The Minister stated that Mr. Amin had apparently for some time given info to CIA, some of it, as was done yesterday, of a military and security nature. Mr. Amin had claimed to have a personal continuing relationship of confidence with President Nasser, a relationship which did not exist. I stated that I had in fact heard of the incident but that my knowledge of the facts was rather sketchy. I stated, however, that I was shocked at the implications that he had apparently read into a routine lunch with Mr. Amin who had a wide acquaintance among diplomats and Americans and had seen them off and on over the years as I understood it. I said I rejected any idea that there was anything improper in the lunch with Mr. Odell who happened to be vacationing in Alexandria in recent days. I said also that the treatment which had been accorded Mr. Odell had been considerably less than courteous and customary when a diplomat was involved. He appeared surprised and asked me to explain what I meant. I said that my conversation with Mr. Odell on his return this morning had been extremely brief and that I would not want to go into any detail on a matter with which I was not completely informed. I then stated I assumed that he had told me the foregoing for my info and that he would continue to investigate the matter as would I. I said that I would hope that any matter of this seriousness would not be permitted to become a major issue between the U.S. and the U.A.R. as I had worked for many months to improve our relations and viewed with alarm any threat to our friendship and cooperation. I said that the charges with respect to Mr. Odell were most serious and that I found them impossible to believe or accept. We paused for a moment and I then asked whether the fact he had seen me today would be a matter of public record and what he intended to say to the local press concerning our conversation. I said I was concerned because the American press knew of the incident and I might have to make some statement to them in the event he intended to make our conversation public. He then stated he had no intention and, in fact, had not even thought of making a statement. I said that in the event either he or I had to mention the matter publicly I would hope that we could confine our comments to the fact that he had informed me of the incident and that we were both looking into the facts with care. He readily agreed and then stated he did not know what President Nasser's intentions were, but he implied rather strongly that the President would not be pursuing the issue. During the course of the conversation he remarked that if we wanted to know anything about the UAR I could always get a straight and sometimes colorful answer from the President and that he, the Minister, would always speak with me frankly and honestly. At this I replied that I was grateful for the frankness and sincerity of the President's and his own conversations with me and, in fact, was increasingly pleased with the candor and warmth of the relationship between the Minister and me and I would not want any incident to interfere with either that relationship or the increasing friendship between our two countries. He readily agreed. In parting I again stated my great shock at the incident and my concern over the implications he had read into a routine lunch. Comment The conversation was very warm, very friendly and more in sorrow than in anger. I am convinced that to the best of the Min's ability this matter will be dropped although he appears to have some uncertainty as to Nasser's intentions which will probably be clear to us in his speeches in the next few days. I think it is vital that this matter not be permitted to get out of hand and that we be as restrained and relaxed as possible in dealing with the press. Our earlier recommendation that we refer to the fact that an Embassy officer was detained but that he was released when his identity was established is by far the best line I can think of. I cannot get through the day without having to take it with some of the press. If you have any different views, send them to me as quickly as possible. Addendum: PAO has just been informed by Reuters correspondent that Mena plans issue statement to effect Bruce Taylor Odell arrested along with Mostafa Amin and had been communicating with Amin re internal affairs in UAR; that there was list of questions from Odell to Amin in his handwriting at time of arrest; and that Odell had been released after claiming diplomatic immunity. In view this development and to dampen increasingly wild rumors I plan brief American correspondents this afternoon along lines proposal Embtel 255./2/ /2/Telegram 255 from Cairo, July 22, recommended informing the press that Embassy Political Attache Bruce Odell was lunching with Amin at his house when the latter was arrested and that Odell was detained there for 1 hour and 45 minutes until his identity was established and then was released. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Arab Republic, Vol. IV) Battle
229. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic/1/ Washington, July 26, 1965, 3:30 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, AID (US) 15-4 UAR. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Russell, cleared by Symmes, and approved by Talbot. 600. Following summary based on uncleared Memcon and subject to revision on review. FYI only and Noforn. Secretary July 26 gave UAR Ambassador Kamel initial reaction to UAR request for new PL-480 agreement./2/ He said: /2/Kamel conveyed the official UAR request in a July 7 call on Secretary Rusk. (Memorandum of conversation, July 7; ibid., POL UAR-US) 1) Our problem still one of public atmosphere and timing. We judged present UAR procurement arrangements allowed some time. With aid bill before Congress we in difficult position these coming weeks. Until bill passed discussion proposed agreement sensitive. 2) Suggest quiet talks in Cairo to deal with unresolved technical aid matters. We cannot now engage in talks that might be interpreted as negotiations new PL-480 agreement, however. 3) Hope meanwhile conduct U.S.-U.A.R. relations in low key, get them off front pages and into diplomatic channels. Ambassador undertook convey Secretary's views to Nasser. He stressed response to Nasser's request for wheat vital since he going to Moscow next month. Important give Nasser impression US will seriously consider try make agreement. Secretary said he could not give such categoric answer. Reference in Nasser's July 22 speech/3/ tying US supply of food to US "pressures" not helpful. Actually PL-480 agreement and talks on Near East arms limitation unrelated. Apart from problems arising from reservations here that large UAR arms build up impaired effectiveness aid as stimulus to economic development, best avoid public debate. /3/Nasser's July 22 speech is summarized in a memorandum of that date from Read to the Secretary. (Ibid., POL 15-1 UAR) Extracts are printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965, pp. 619-620. Kamel said he thought Nasser's motive in citing US pressure was to underline vital Egyptian interest in wheat. Crux is if US does not supply food others will. Egypt has maintained non-aligned policy thus far, but failure obtain US wheat would expose it to Communist domination. Important that President understand that seriousness situation comparable to 1955 Aswan dam decision. UAR Ambassador at that time criticized for not having given adequate warning dangers involved; Kamel wished avoid similar mistake and clear his conscience toward Secretary, history and world. Question not of wheat, but US relations with Egypt, Near East and perhaps Africa. Secretary agreed consequences could be serious, but if UAR wished go to other side, little we could do to stop it. UAR should not underestimate US constitutional system and need to build coalitions of popular support behind each governmental policy. We committed consult with Congress on new agreement and impressions from Cairo important in shaping Congressional attitudes. Speech by Nasser thanking Soviet Union for wheat, but failing mention $400 million worth US wheat sales inevitably caused adverse domestic effect. Secretary hoped, if matters kept quiet, it would be possible work out another agreement. Important that both Cairo and Washington understand elements that make action possible. Later Ambassador Kamel expressed satisfaction to Dept officer about results meeting. He said, however: 1) Important remove fear of famine from Nasser's mind. UAR must have food; would prefer US as supplier, but will go anywhere to get it. 2) Since suspension PL-480 sales last January, UAR officials puzzled and perplexed by US attitude conducting agonizing reappraisal US-UAR relations. 3) Important maintain and even accelerate tempo contacts with UAR officials during coming weeks to forestall rash acceptance possible Communist wheat arrangement. Detente might lead to discouragement. 4) Effort to improve climate US-UAR relations must be joint endeavor along broad front in both Cairo and Washington. Control of US secret activities not in best interests UAR important contribution. Many Egyptians feel UAR position in Arab World being undermined. 5) While Nasser aware of domestic problems USG faces in formulation foreign policy, he does not understand them and believes President capable fully controlling domestic pressures. He suspects US reluctance move on wheat may be plot to exploit vital UAR need as means embarrass and overthrow him. Should he become convinced validity his suspicions he would react violently and irrationally regardless of consequences. Foregoing given in strict confidence with injunction source remain undisclosed. Rusk [Continue with the next documents] Volume XVIII Index | Foreign Relations Online | Historian's Office | Department of State | Secretary of State |