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 | FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XVIII Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964-67 Department of State |
 210. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State/1/ Tel Aviv, April 23, 1965, 0945Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 33-1 JORDAN RIVER. Secret. Repeated to Amman, Beirut, Bonn, Damascus, London, Paris, USUN, Jerusalem, POLAD CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA, Cairo, Rome, Algiers, Baghdad, Jidda, Kuwait, Rabat, Taiz, Tripoli, and Tunis. 1358. From Talbot. Following are key points my meeting with PriMin Eshkol April 22. Noting FonMin Meir and I had already discussed Jordan waters issue (see following septel),/2/ Eshkol professed to be flabbergasted by USG characterization of UDP as "yardstick" by which water usage should be measured. He asked that we ensure King Hussein know if Jordan accepted water diverted from Lebanon or Syria, Israel would reopen whole question of Jordanian utilization of Yarmuk. /2/Telegram 1360 from Tel Aviv, April 23. (Ibid.) At Eshkol's request I outlined my impressions of current situation in Arab Near East, particularly Nasser's position. I said area trends during next six months should be watched closely to see whether Arab summit spirit would continue prevail or traditional inter-Arab rivalries again come to fore. I stressed persistence of apparently genuine Arab fear of geographic expansionism by Israel. PriMin strongly reiterated there no intention nor need for Israel's territorial expansion. Eshkol made usual plea, without specifying precisely how it might be done, that we utilize aid to UAR so as to moderate Nasser's policies. Next I stressed our interest in seeing area arms problem eased. Our approaches had undergone three phases. First on conventional arms, we had again re-examined US policy and again determined our best course was to continue exercise restraint in supplying arms to principal parties Arab-Israel dispute, with rare exceptions. Second, on missiles we had made thus far unrewarded efforts. We agreed with Israel that UAR missiles not now effective weapons. Third, re nuclear proliferation President Johnson, as was President Kennedy, is very seriously concerned. This was vital global problem, not one related merely to Arab-Israel confrontation. It most important that IAEA safeguards be applied to nuclear reactors in this area. Eshkol opined disarmament problem should be faced in above order, i.e., conventional arms first and nuclear last. I said we had indications UAR would accept IAEA safeguards. PriMin thought if Nasser accepted safeguards and got a large reactor, he might well then remove reactor from IAEA system. After review subjects reported separately,/3/ PriMin stressed Israel not preparing for "war" in connection water issue. I took occasion reiterate our firm opposition to use of military force. Eshkol said he construed our position as opposing "preventive war," not necessarily opposing "normal shooting" that goes on along borders expecially on Syria-Israel border. I stressed we opposed all shooting as means to solve area problems. Eshkol exclaimed, "It will be done (i.e., Israel would do some shooting). We will not sit quiet for a long time. Arabs can cut off 150 MCM's of Israel's water." I said as GOI well aware from Harriman, Komer, Ambassador, and others, if Israel resorted to shooting "You would find US opposed to you." To this PriMin said, "We'll see. The President told me US would back Israel on the water." I emphasized President was referring to Israel's getting its share of Jordan waters, not about use of force to attain that end. Eshkol said "OK, you get the water without force, what do you advise?" I said it would be long time before Arabs could divert more water than that allocated them under UDP. Eshkol claimed this was mistaken estimate; Arabs could complete diversion projects in two years if allowed to work without interference. /3/Telegram 1362 from Tel Aviv, April 23, reported that after their discussion of IAEA safeguards, Eshkol said he thought the Israeli Government could not foreswear nuclear weapon development in the absence of binding security guarantees, but that "we are so far (presumably from having a nuclear weapon)--it would take huge sums of money, then there would be problem of delivery vehicle. But we can't afford not to think about it, not to try to know all about it," because of the Israeli Government's responsibility for the survival of the Jewish people in the face of Arab threats. The quotation marks and the parenthetical insertion are in the telegram. (Ibid., DEF 12-1 ISR) PriMin requested US move Embassy to Jerusalem. Everyone, with possible exception French, was waiting for this US lead. I said this was not simple bilateral issue; it had important international implications. I did not see our moving Embassy as being in the current picture. Eshkol complained same current picture had obtained almost 18 years. Failure Western powers move to Jerusalem added unnecessary element uncertainty. I pointed out no country outside area had devoted more effort than had US in attempting settle Near East uncertainties. We had worked hard on refugees, water, and other basic problems. At close of meeting, which was extended on PriMin's initiative to over one hour, he said he would give much not to be compelled to use "a little force" on water issue, but water was Israel's life-blood and if necessary Israel would have to fight for it. I stressed, as I had to Mrs. Meir, that if we are to give help on this issue, our views on how we can best help must be considered. We did not consider threat of use of force at all helpful, particularly vis-a-vis delicate political situation in Lebanon. Note: Of interest that after meeting Director US Dept Bitan told EmbOff PriMin had raised Jerusalem issue on his own because he bitterly disappointed at Bonn's decision establish Embassy in Tel Aviv. Eshkol had in fact raised all but one item on his personal initiative. Memcon follows./4/ /4/A summary memorandum of conversation was enclosed with airgram A-808 from Tel Aviv, May 5. (Ibid., POL 33-1 JORDAN RIVER) Barbour
211. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/ JCSM-337-65 Washington, May 6, 1965. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 70 A 1266, Israel 470. Secret; Sensitive. A stamped notation on the memorandum reads: "Sec Def has seen Brief." SUBJECT 1. (U) Reference is made to a memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), I-22656/65, dated 26 April 1965, subject as above./2/ /2/Not found. 2. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff reiterate their view (JCSM-953-63, dated 7 December 1963)/3/ that our Middle East arms policy should not positively identify the United States with either side in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Every attempt should be made to avoid a polarization in the Middle East whereby the United States becomes increasingly identified with Israel and the USSR with the Arab World. Such polarization would have the undesirable consequence of promoting an anti-US Arab unity under United Arab Republic leadership. This process would tend to weaken the comparatively moderate, pro-Western Arab governments while strengthening Soviet influence among the Arab states. Sale to Israel of US offensive weapons, such as tanks and aircraft, can be expected to generate Arab reactions which would be detrimental to US political, military, and economic interests in the Middle East. The impact of US military sales to Israel is discussed in Appendices A and B hereto./4/ /3/Printed in Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. XVIII, Document 383. /4/The appendices are not attached. 3. (S) Although the Israelis have requested 75 combat aircraft, presumably bomber aircraft, the Memorandum of Understanding,/5/ as understood by the United States, provided for no more than 24 aircraft. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the addition of even 24 jet light bombers to the Israeli inventory would provide a significant relative increase in the Israeli military capability, and the addition of 75 bomber aircraft would create a drastic change in the present military balance which cannot be justified on military grounds. With the addition of Hawk missiles, scheduled to become operational about 15 May 1965, the Israeli air defense system will provide an acceptable defense against the numerically superior United Arab Command offensive air capability. /5/See Documents 182-185. 4. (S) Israel's combat aircraft needs have been filled in the past from United Kingdom and French sources. The United States should avoid sale of any US combat aircraft to Israel, particularly bomber aircraft. Every effort should be made to persuade Israel to continue to satisfy its combat aircraft requirements from Western European sources. The British Canberra Mk II or the French Vautour II B (especially if it were equipped with the Spey engine) would give Israel a satisfactory bombing capability. Both aircraft are expected to be available. 5. (S) If a political decision is made to sell US aircraft, bomber aircraft should not be offered, since this would increase the severity of the Arab reaction. If US aircraft must be provided, the F-5 aircraft is the best available compromise on the basis of performance, cost, political considerations, and impact on US military posture. Although its performance does not meet the stated Israeli requirement, it is probable that Israel would accept the F-5 in order to obtain a US aircraft. Other US and Western aircraft which could be considered for sale to Israel are listed in Appendices C and D hereto. These aircraft are listed in the order of preference for sale to Israel if the F-5 is unacceptable. 6. (S) The Memorandum of Understanding commits the United States to provide tanks to Israel of at least the same number and quality as those sold to Jordan. In addition, it commits the United States to deliver the remaining 110 tanks from the German tank arrangement. In additional negotiations, Israel has asked the United States to furnish 100 M-48-A2C tanks to balance the initial commitment of 100 M-48s to Jordan and to furnish 100 M-48-A2Cs to fulfill the German contract. Consummation of the foregoing will significantly increase Israeli qualitative superiority. Therefore, in order to reduce Arab reaction, it is recommended that the M-48-A1 only be considered for sale to Israel in fulfillment of the Memorandum of Understanding to balance the tanks sold to Jordan. Moreover, any sale of current US Army M-48-A2 or newer model tanks would have an adverse impact on the armored capabilities of the US Army, whereas the sale of earlier model M-48-A1 or M-48 tanks would not. 7. (S) Since Israel has preferred in the past to consider self-propelled guns such as the USSR SU-100 in the category of armor and in view of the offensive capability of 155mm SP weapons, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that, if such equipment is requested, sales be approved only if the number of tanks sold is reduced by a corresponding amount. 8. (S) If the Israelis were to acquire, as postulated in the reference, 310 M-48 type tanks, 60 self-propelled 155mm weapons, and 250 Centurion tanks, the Arab-Israeli arms balance would be tipped in favor of Israel to a significant degree by the end of 1967. For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
212. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State/1/ Cairo, May 7, 1965. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL ARAB-ISR. Confidential. No time of transmission is given on the telegram, which was received at 10:38 a.m. Repeated to Amman, Beirut, and Damascus. 3898. Deptel 6651/2/ raises interesting question which this Embassy has pondered for many months. Do actions and commitments arising from two Arab summit conferences constitute an integrated "plan?" We believe the answer, not surprisingly, is "yes and no." /2/Telegram 6651 to Cairo, April 29, asked if the Arab summit conferences held in Cairo and Alexandria in 1964 had agreed on a "plan" or conditions for solution of the Palestine problem. Department officials had noted references to such a "plan" in a number of Arab responses to recent proposals by Tunisian President Habib Bourguiba for a Palestine settlement. (Ibid.) Arab summit I was hastily called by Nasser to devise ways and means short of offensive military action to respond to Israel off-take of Tiberias water. Arab summit I succeeded in achieving this objective, but it set other policies and institutions in motion which, up to present, like Topsy have "just growed." These can be fitted together in some fashion to make up a "plan" but such a "plan" contains several contradictory elements. Main aspects of Arab summit policies include: 1. Arab counter works on Jordan tributaries. This involves joint financing on Arab territories of engineering works calculated to use water from the Jordan system. Arabs tell us confidentially this will not involve off-take significantly greater than Johnston Plan allocations. Publicly they indicate this will harm Israel economy and Israel offensive action against Arab works on Arab territories must be expected. 2. UAC. To deal with this contingency armed forces of Arab states surrounding Israel must be strengthened and preparations made for back-up military support of other Arab states. Up to present we have no indications that UAC planning other than defensive. But imaginative and wishful-thinking Arabs must be discussing contingencies whereby UAC "defense" has been so effective that it can quickly move to offense. This wishful thinking having fairly wide impact on Arab public opinion. But we believe sober Arab leadership contemplates Arabs developing sufficient force to create a military stalemate with Israel. Then UN and/or great powers are expected to step into situation and force a settlement on terms favorable to Arabs. 3. Politico-economic preparation. To achieve UN/great power support at critical juncture postulated above, Arab summiteers decided on such steps as stepped up propaganda campaign, visits of Arab delegations to world capitals to "explain" Arab viewpoint, etc. They also made motions of progress toward policies whereby united Arab economic pressure (mostly oil) could be brought to bear on Western countries to bring them around to Arab viewpoint. 4. Palestine liberation. This is where most contradictions occur. Three elements above can be said to form reasonably comprehensive plan. But it became obvious between two Arab summits that Palestinians themselves should be given greater role. As result, "liberation of Palestine" became proclaimed goal, and PLO and PLA were established. Goal of "liberation" simply cannot be reconciled with defensive politico-military-economic strategy outlined above. Results confuse everybody. Ambitious but untrusted Palestine refugee leader Shukairy tries to equate PLO with bodies that liberated Algeria from France. But Arab leaders obviously refuse to go along. While PLO sits as member of Arab summit conference it has been made clear that (unlike PGRA) it is not a "government" and should not be recognized as such by other governments including Arabs. While Palestine "army" has been created, it has no independent life of its own but operates as part of the United Arab Command. Arabs generally seem apprehensive over Shukairy's direct contacts with Red China, Jordan fears fruition of Shukairy's ambition would curtail its own sovereignty, UAR miffed at Shukairy's attempt dominate Arab League over Bourguiba issue. Foregoing is Arab "plan" as it appears to us after following Arab summitry for nearly eighteen months and many conversations with Egyptians and other Arab officials in Cairo. We do not believe there is more to "plan" than this. Our belief is that "plan's" basic internal contradictions are in effect the seeds of its own destruction. But, as suggested in last sentence reftel, Embassy will pursue its inquiries in this matter as opportunities arise. Battle
213. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State/1/ Amman, May 8, 1965. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL ARAB-ISR. Confidential. No time of transmission is given on the telegram, which was received at 7:37 a.m. Repeated to Beirut, Cairo, and Damascus. 668. Deptel 607;/2/ Cairo's 3898 to Dept./3/ During course of conversation with King Hussein and Prime Minister Tell May 6 I had suitable opportunity to inquire specifically what they meant by Arab "plan" for dealing with Palestine. King replied immediately that Arab plan was simply (1) decision to proceed on divergence of Jordan waters coupled with (2) decision to build up Arab armies to point where they would be able to defend against any Israeli attack on diversion plan. This was full content of any plan on which Arab leaders had agreed. [garble--Bourguiba] had been attacked because he went beyond this framework without consulting other Arab leaders and in particular because timing of his public proposals had been most tragic in view of present emotional state of eastern Arabs. Prime Minister confirmed that this was all he had meant by his own reference to a collective plan. /2/Telegram 607 to Amman, April 29, was repeated as telegram 6651 to Cairo; see footnote 2, Document 212. /3/Document 212. King went on to say that there was absolutely no intention of trying to destroy Israel. He appreciated our efforts over past few months to restrain Israel from any preemptive military move and our assurances that we were prepared to defend independence and territorial integrity of Jordan. In long run however, this not sufficient and Arabs obviously had to feel they were in position themselves to defend against any Israeli aggression. This required improvement in their military posture and "balance" in the military power of two sides which he was afraid was different from kind of balance which we had in mind. However, there was tremendous difference between being in a military position to defend against attack and being in a military position to destroy Israel; latter was totally beyond their intentions or even reasonable economic capabilities of Arab states. Comments: King did not make any further reference to PLO as he had during our previous conversation (Embtel 656)/4/ but we agree with Cairo's analysis that there is certain divergence between what Arab leaders have agreed on record and whole underlying concept behind PLO which is today becoming somewhat more important aspect of problem in eyes of Palestinians, and thorn in side King Hussein. /4/Telegram 656 from Amman, May 4, reported points made by King Hussein in several conversations during the previous weekend. It stated that concerning the PLO, Hussein had stated that Shuqairi was "throwing his weight around" contrary to summit decisions and would have to be curbed. He thought the basic problem was that "there could be no PLO as defined by Shuqairi alongside Jordan," and he considered this definitely contrary to summit decisions. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 15-1 JORDAN) Barnes
214. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson/1/ Washington, May 10, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, Israel, PM Eshkol Correspondence. Secret; Exclusive Distribution. The memorandum has no drafting information, but another copy indicates that it was drafted by Russell on April 30 and cleared by Talbot, Jernegan, SCI Acting Director Herman Pollack, Thomas, ACDA Assistant Director for International Relations Jacob D. Beam, ACDA Assistant Director for Science and Technology Herbert Scoville, Jr., and Davies, and in substance with Scott George of G/PM. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 ARAB-ISR) The memorandum was sent to the President with a May 19 memorandum from Komer commenting that he and Harriman had pressed the matter with Eshkol to no avail. It was Komer's judgment that Israel was determined to keep the option open as a deterrent against the Arabs. Nonetheless, he thought the letter would be a useful reminder to the Israelis of the President's personal interest in the matter. SUBJECT Recommendation That you authorize negotiations with Israel designed to extend IAEA safeguards to all Israeli nuclear facilities and that you approve the enclosed letter to Prime Minister Eshkol as the first step in this new approach to prevent Israel and the United Arab Republic from developing or acquiring nuclear weapons./2/ /2/A copy of the draft is attached to the copy of the memorandum cited in footnote 1 above. Johnson sent a revised version to Eshkol on May 21; see Document 218. Discussion 1. The Pressures on Israel: The arms rivalry in the Near East has reached a dangerous stage. As U.A.R. missile technology improves, Israel seeks to develop an unmatched, economical counterdeterrent. This seems destined to lead to development of nuclear warheads for Israeli missiles purchased from France. 2. The Israeli Strategy: Prime Minister Eshkol has told us orally that Israel's nuclear activity is peaceful and that Israel would not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the Arab-Israel area. He later said, however, that Israel could not forever foreswear nuclear weapon development in the absence of binding security guarantees. (In 1963 President Kennedy determined that we could not afford politically to guarantee Israel's security and that, in any event, such a guarantee would not give Israel better protection than our present close association and commitment to oppose aggression in the Near East provide.) We must remember Israel deliberately misled us initially about the nature of the nuclear facility at Dimona. Therefore, we must assume Israel intends to make its decisions on whether to produce nuclear weapons without consulting us. Lower level Israeli officials speak frankly about Israel's strategy toward the United Arab Republic: a) surface-to-surface missiles targeted on the Nile delta, and b) a capability to bomb and release the waters behind the Aswan High Dam. Destruction of the Aswan Dam would require a nuclear warhead; bombing with high explosives could not be counted on to do the job. 3. What We Can Do: Our efforts to slow down the U.A.R. sophisticated weapons program--as well as potential nuclear weapons programs in India and elsewhere--will be influenced by the example we set in dealing with Israel. We very much need a breakthrough on the problem of preventing proliferation by presently non-nuclear states. The world recognizes Israel's nuclear capability and the fact we have compelling leverage on Israel because of our special relationships. So long as the Dimona reactor operates without publicly recognized safeguards, the credibility of our worldwide efforts to prevent proliferation is in doubt. Moreover, acceptance of safeguards in contrast to promises of peaceful intent would provide tangible evidence of Israel's good faith. Israel has signed the partial Test Ban Treaty, is a member of IAEA, and has accepted IAEA safeguards on its small research reactor provided by the United States. It is, therefore, reasonable for us to ask Israel to accept IAEA safeguards on all of its nuclear facilities. If Israel does not intend to produce a nuclear weapon, acceptance could lose only the questionable deterrent provided by fear of an unknown nuclear capability. Unilateral action by Israel to place all of its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards would place great international pressure on the U.A.R. and other states to follow suit. The U.A.R., which has consistently opposed safeguards since the establishment of IAEA, recently has demonstrated a new, more forthcoming attitude. President Nasser confirmed to Assistant Secretary Talbot on April 18, U.A.R. acceptance of the principle of international safeguards. This more flexible attitude encourages the hope the U.A.R. may agree to application of safeguards, not only to the large power reactor for which it is now shopping, but to all its nuclear facilities. The prospect of Israeli acceptance of safeguards could provide an added inducement. We should make clear to Israel we expect another U.S. team of scientists to visit Dimona after the parliamentary elections next November. At the same time, we should press Israel now for acceptance of IAEA safeguards immediately after the elections. To obtain maximum leverage, we should make our approach before the arrival in mid-May of an Israeli military team to discuss direct U.S. arms sales to Israel. I think that you alone carry the weight to persuade Eshkol to take this unilateral action. For this reason I am enclosing a draft letter that you might send to him. There is great urgency about this matter in view of the disturbing signals we have been getting from Israel. I think, therefore, that this is something we must come to grips with promptly. A letter along the lines of the enclosed would seem an essential initial step. Dean Rusk
215. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State/1/ Cairo, May 15, 1965. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL ARAB-ISR. Secret; Priority; Exdis. There is no time of transmission on the telegram, which was received at 10:36 a.m. Passed to the White House. 4011. Verbatim text. Following is GUAR unofficial translation letter to President Johnson from President Nasser handed to me by Foreign Minister today. Letter dated May 12. Will pouch original and translation corrected as necessary. "Dear Mr. President: It was my intention to send to Washington, my colleague and friend Dr. Mahmoud Fawzi, Deputy Premier for Foreign Affairs in the United Arab Republic, with a request that you should meet him, so that he might brief you on mine and the government's point of view on a number of important issues with events occurring in the Middle East or beyond it, and which directly or indirectly affect relations between our two countries. Yet, at the time, I noticed that you were reducing your foreign engagements to a minimum, and so I found fit to put off my intention of sending Dr. Mahmoud Fawzi to Washington. Fortunately enough, however, Mr. Phillips Talbot, American Assistant Secretary of State passed through Cairo at the time, and I found it appropriate that I should explain to him and to Ambassador Lucius Battle, who attended the meeting, our position in detail regarding the contents of your letter, dated 18th March 1965,/2/ and with regard to a number of other issues which I thought best that each of us should be acquainted with the other's position on them in all frankness and clarity. /2/Document 192. I have full confidence in the ability of Mr. Talbot and Ambassador Battle to convey to you a full and detailed picture of my long talk with him at my home on Sunday 18th April 1965./3/ /3/See Document 208. If I may stress a few points, I wish to underline the following: 1. The United Arab Republic is very anxious to maintain Arab-American friendship and underlines the necessity of its permanent consolidation. While unfortunately, we find obstacles and difficulties impeding this objective, we have and still do exert all efforts to keep the door open before a free and responsible exchange of ideas and viewpoints. We sincerely maintain that this door should be kept open in the interest of the American and Arab peoples and for the sake of peace in a delicate and sensitive part of the world. 2. The United Arab Republic has not started or planned the arms race in the Middle East, but the United Arab Republic was compelled, following inadmissible armed provocations, to afford itself the ability of legitimate defence against a hostile and expansionist danger represented in the racist Zionism, to which imperialism has facilitated the usurpation of a parcel of the Arab land, to be used as a base to menace the will of the Arab nation for freedom and as a barrier against Arab aspiration to unity. The records--those of the United Nations included--bear witness to the fact that the United Arab Republic has used its armaments only in defence rights, while aggression always came from those who know they adopt a position hostile to nature itself and to history and which is incompatible with the principles of justice and law. Events of 1956 are fraught with proofs and meanings. 3. It is regrettable indeed, that a number of Western countries in general, undertook the responsibility of arming Israeli aggression through dangerous transactions mostly concluded secretly: these include what France offered Israel in early 1956, while the last of these transactions was the offer made by the Government of Federal Germany to Israel, the repercussions of which still remain in the area strong and violent. The Government of West Germany occupied an excellent position in the Arab world, and it is regrettable to the Bonn government and to the West as a whole, that this prominent position which formed a bridge between the Arabs and the West and was a vast path for positive and fruitful co-operation, should be destroyed. Yet, the United Arab Republic is still determined not to allow bitterness to be the centre of accumulation to Middle East forces./4/ /4/Telegram 4013 from Cairo, May 17, reported that the correct translation of this sentence was as follows: "Nevertheless the UAR is still determined that bitterness should not result in the polarization of power in the Near East." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL ARAB-ISR) The difference is basically between the Arab nation and Israeli aggression and its expansionist aims. Here, I wish to observe that efforts, often unbearable, are exerted to restrict the dispute to that framework. 4. The people of the United Arab Republic find and are convinced that the true challenge they face is for the achievement of progress and the development of their life socially, economically and culturally, so that they might lead a life in line with their age, and contribute, with other nations, to the honouring of human value. I wish to state that the constructive achievements of which the Egyptian people carry the burden, constitute a brilliant example of the determination of peoples, who found themselves bound by the chains of underdevelopment--to reshape their lives in spite of great difficulties that burden them and force themselves around them. The people of the United Arab Republic believe that the arms race is a temporary feature, put in motion by bitter experience and crises, and supported by suspicion every day. Yet, what will finally resist and last is life alone, built by the determination of men, their creative minds and their ability to exploit all resources afforded them in the fields of production and services. The outbursts of aggression can but destroy themselves, and the will of life, always remains stronger than all its enemies. Please accept, dear President, kindest respects and very best wishes. (sgd) (Gamal Abdel Nasser)" Battle
Washington, May 20, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Komer Memos, Vol. I. Secret. A copy was sent to McGeorge Bundy. Abe Feinberg called on the President tonight, and the latter asked me right over. Subject was Israeli worries on arms, especially the planes./2/ /2/On April 19, Gazit gave the Department of State a request for Israeli purchase of tanks, planes, and other military equipment. (Telegram 1075 to Tel Aviv, April 20; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 12-5 ISR) Feinberg's plaint was that the Israelis were concerned about: (a) our evasiveness on the matter--they couldn't even get any information; (b) in wigging Harman on the recent unprovoked Israeli pre-emptive attack on Syrian bulldozers, Talbot had said we couldn't even discuss arms if this sort of thing was going on./3/ Harman was most upset over this linking of Israeli behavior and our arms agreement (Rusk had personally told poor Phil to do this), so had poured out his woes to Feinberg. /3/The reference is to a May 19 conversation between Talbot and Harman, in which Harman pressed for a response to Israel's request for arms purchases. Talbot replied that the response was being formulated but raised the subject of the recent incidents on the Syrian border, noting that the United States opposed the use of force in the water issue and stating that if the evidence clearly showed Israel was involved with military initiatives, it would not be possible to proceed with military talks. (Telegram 1184 to Tel Aviv, May 19; ibid.) I explained the circumstances, and how unhappy we were over the Israeli use of strongarm tactics (the Syrians didn't even fire back). The President backed me up, and asked Feinberg to tell Eshkol we couldn't accept shooting and killing on the water issues. On the planes I explained how we frankly doubted that Israel had made much effort to explore European sources first. We had to insist that if Israel could get planes there it should do so. The President was good as gold on this too, telling Feinberg he knew the Israelis wanted "US" planes, but that we weren't going to come through unless there was no other alternative. He then told me to give Feinberg all the fill-in he wanted, and to make sure we lived up to our agreement. We were going to be hard bargainers, but we didn't welsh on any deals. He then explained to Feinberg his worries that he'd ruined Erhard's chances for re-election. We had a little discussion of the BG/Eshkol squabble (Feinberg thought Eshkol sure to win) and that was that. I then took Feinberg off and mollified him, explaining some of the reasons for the delays and assuring him that everything was reasonably on the tracks, so long as the Israelis behaved. To give him a little something to say to Eshkol, I told him I thought we could deliver a few tanks before the Israeli election to back Eshkol's hand. On the planes, however, we were sure there were adequate European types available--probably better than we could provide. If the Israelis were smart they'd stop wasting time trying to probe our availabilities and latch on to the best European deal they could. If they ran into roadblocks they could ask our help. We wouldn't let State drag its heels too much--but Israel had to play ball too. Feinberg's next worry was how he could reassure various groups in US Jewry who were hearing about arms to Jordan and wondered how Israel could be protected. He'd have a big problem here when the 1966 elections rolled around. I told him in spades that secrecy was still the order of the day, although by the time of the 1966 campaign we might be able to take off the wraps a bit. I taxed Feinberg gently for squawking to the President too quickly, but blamed it on Harman. Feinberg hastened to explain that he hadn't sought an appointment for this purpose; he was going to Israel so had asked if the President would like to see him first. He'd been invited, and only when he came down today and saw Harman had the latter poured out his woes. Ergo, I shouldn't tax Harman for having gone around end. Having made my point, I subsided. RWK
217. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic/1/ Washington, May 21, 1965, 12:43 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL UAR-US. Secret. Drafted by Jones on May 20; cleared by Davies, Blake, and Komer; and approved by Jernegan. Repeated by pouch to Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus, Jidda, Taiz, Tel Aviv, and Tripoli. 7149. US-UAR Relations. Begin FYI. We are accustomed to UARG's taking one line with us and another with the Arabs, but lately we have sensed greater degree of ambivalence than usual. On one side we have noted a set of initiatives, restraints, and responses apparently calculated to requalify UAR for US aid. They include: 1. Unexpectedly warm reply to President Johnson's message of congratulations on Nasser's re-election./2/ /2/Johnson's message of congratulations was sent in telegram 5660 to Cairo, March 19. Nasser's reply was dated March 23. Both are in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence, UAR, Nasser Correspondence, Vol. I. 2. Sharp improvement in relations between US Embassy and UARG since last winter's crise. 3. Policy of restraint toward Saudi Arabia despite Saudi contribution to recent royalist successes. 4. Provision of high-quality temporary housing for John F. Kennedy Library. 5. Warm remarks of Deputy Prime Minister Sidqi in Nasser's name at Bagasse dedication. 6. Offer to send Fawzi to Washington. 7. Intimation that Sadat will head parliamentary delegation to US. 8. Restrained treatment of US decision to sell arms to Israel in Nasser's May 1 speech. 9. Positive tone of Nasser's May 12 letter to the President./3/ /3/See Document 215. However, Nasser's May 1 speech also seems to have foreshadowed a hardening of Egyptian attitudes toward us on some issues. Aspects of that speech particularly unpalatable to USG were Nasser's endorsement of the "liberate Palestine" theme and his blunt treatment of possible cessation Title I program. Since that time Cairo's "Voice of Palestine" has attacked HKJ for frustrating PLO's proposals, UARG has reportedly reinforced its troops in Yemen in apparent contradiction to its ostensible support for Numan's conciliation campaign, Akhbar has criticized the three Arab hold-outs on the Germany/Israel issue, Ahram has launched a campaign against Libya and Wheelus Field, and Nasser has reportedly not only disclosed US disarmament initiatives but also misrepresented them. We can understand compulsion Egyptian regime must feel to present itself to public in best possible light, to placate Soviet Union, to throw up an anti-American smoke screen to camouflage fact of its pulling back on the Congo, and even to prod USG a bit. We suppose UARG's problem of image-maintenance is painfully complicated by uncertainty of PL-480 program. If current agreement not renewed, UARG will have unenviable task of explaining to a people who suffered losses in Yemen why they must now go on half-rations in Egypt. We suppose allegations about US pressures that Nasser made in public May 1 and in parliament May 16 were made to justify regime's position if US aid is cut off. However, at best these considerations are irrelevant to US interests and at worst conflict with them. End FYI. Department expressed to UAR Ambassador its concern at deleterious effects on US-UAR relations of capricious attacks on Libyan Government with which USG has excellent relations, of unilateral disclosures of informal talks between USG and UARG on highly sensitive subjects, and of generally unfriendly tone UAR press. Concur with your 4068/4/ that you should delay any approach along lines Deptel 7098/5/ (not repeated info addressees) at least until you return from Addis. In meantime may be useful for Embassy to convey our concern about anti-Libyan campaign to appropriate level UARG. /4/Dated May 20. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 15-1 UAR) /5/Telegram 7098 to Cairo, May 19, stated that a Department officer met with Ambassador Kamel that day and expressed concern at the unfriendly tone of a recent speech by Nasser. (Ibid.) Rusk
218. Letter From President Johnson to Prime Minister Eshkol/1/ Washington, May 21, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, Israel, PM Eshkol Correspondence. Secret. No drafting information appears on the letter, but see Document 214. The letter was transmitted to Tel Aviv in telegram 1188, May 21. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, AE 11-2 ISR) Barbour reported in telegram 1510 from Tel Aviv, May 25, that he had delivered the letter on May 24. Eshkol's preliminary comments were (1) that Israel was already among the countries that had agreed to IAEA inspection of part of its nuclear reactors, and (2) that the cost to Israel of relinquishing a psychological deterrent was in his view a matter of importance in the Israeli security picture. (Ibid.) A briefing paper prepared in NEA/IAI on September 19, 1966, noted that President Johnson never received a reply to this letter. (Ibid., POL ISR-US) Dear Mr. Prime Minister: I have been thinking over our exchanges on visits to the Dimona reactor as well as recent unfortunate publicity on this subject. I can understand that secret visits pose problems for you. On the other hand, failure to make such visits on a regular basis poses a difficult problem for us and we feel compelled to continue them. Recognizing, however, that you face parliamentary elections and that a visit before they are held would cause you increased internal political problems, we have agreed to defer the next six-monthly visit until after the elections. A preferable alternative to these bilateral arrangements would be for Israel to place the Dimona reactor and all other nuclear facilities under IAEA controls, as you have already agreed to do for the Nahal Soreq reactor and for any U.S. materials or equipment transferred to Israel in connection with the U.S.-Israel desalting program. Because of our unalterable opposition to any further proliferation of nuclear weapons, our policy is to press for extension of IAEA or similar safeguards to all nuclear facilities in those countries not now possessing nuclear weapons. We have made substantial progress thus far, and nineteen countries including the United States have accepted IAEA controls over all or part of their nuclear facilities. Such action by Israel would help establish an effective ceiling beyond which the Near East arms race would not escalate. In order to protect Israel from any political injustices in the IAEA--which we by no means anticipate or even believe could occur--my government is prepared to support a statement by Israel with a withdrawal clause on the part of Israel that it would give up safeguards unless its own neighbors accepted them. We do not see any U.A.R. nuclear capability for the foreseeable future and are convinced the U.S.S.R. will not supply Nasser with nuclear weapons. Suspicion that Israel is developing nuclear weapons, however, might stimulate Nasser to make concessions to the U.S.S.R. that could result in a Soviet nuclear support program similar to the one that was attempted in Cuba. Voluntary adoption of IAEA safeguards would cost Israel only the questionable deterrent provided by fear of an unknown nuclear capability, would clearly demonstrate Israel's peaceful intent to the whole world, would go far toward easing area tensions and abating the arms race, and would put pressure on other countries to do likewise. I make this proposal earnestly and strongly urge you give it your most serious consideration. For the next several years, Israel can rest secure in the knowledge of its military superiority over the Arabs and the steadfast assurances of U.S. support against aggression. Our military experts consider U.A.R. missiles only a psychological threat with negligible military potential. In my judgment an initiative by Israel to adopt IAEA safeguards would be in its own interest, since it would help assure Israel's long-term security by removing the threatening shadow of nuclear war in the Near East. Israel's example would also reinforce our efforts to persuade President Nasser to limit sophisticated weapons acquisition and encourage other countries to renounce the awesome decision that automatically would make them subject to possible preemptive attack. We have reason to believe the U.A.R. will accept IAEA safeguards if it acquires a large nuclear reactor. I realize that the delicate internal political situation in Israel might make acceptance of IAEA safeguards difficult at this time. I urge you, therefore, to consider agreeing now to accept these safeguards after your parliamentary elections this fall. You may be sure that our interest in the security of your country remains unchanged. The grave responsibility which this puts upon us is an important factor in my conviction that we must leave no stone unturned in our efforts to maintain peace. Sincerely, Lyndon B. Johnson
219. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State/1/ Tel Aviv, May 25, 1965, 1103Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 32-1 ISR-SYR. Secret; Exdis. 1511. Embtel 1485;/2/ Deptels 1181/3/ and 1184./4/ Israel-Syrian incidents. During conversation yesterday principally devoted to another subject Prime Minister raised question of developments on Syrian border with particular reference to the previous day's Syrian firing on Israeli fishing boat on Lake Tiberias (Embtel 1507)./5/ He noted this as further instance of Syrian attack on innocent Israeli individuals of which sporadic firing exchange involving Israeli territory the day before is part of pattern. He asked what the U.S. attitude is to such firing. I replied that we had never concealed our disapproval of Syrian attacks on Israeli fishermen and presumably would feel the same way in this instance. /2/Telegram 1485 from Tel Aviv, May 20, reported that in a conversation May 19 with Israeli Foreign Office Director General Levavi, Barbour indicated strong U.S. disapproval of Israeli actions in the May 13 incident on the Syrian border. (Ibid.) /3/Telegram 1181 to Tel Aviv, May 18, instructed the Embassy to inform the Israeli Foreign Ministry the next day of strong U.S. disapproval of Israeli actions in the May 13 incident, to reiterate U.S. opposition to the use of force in the water diversion dispute, and to state that if incidents such as the May 13 incident were to be taken to the United Nations, the United States would not support Israel. (Ibid.) /4/See footnote 3, Document 216. /5/Dated May 24. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 32-1 ISR-SYR) However, I went on that since he had raised the question of the Israeli-Syrian frontier I could not allow the opportunity to pass to reiterate my government's previous expressions of strong disapproval over the Israeli attack on Syrian tractors on May 13. I referred to my conversation with Levavi reported Embtel 1485 which I said I hoped had been repeated to the Prime Minister. I also mentioned that Talbot had spoken in similar firm terms to Harman in Washington. I further said that I hoped there would be no Israeli misunderstanding of U.S. position in regard to such Israeli actions and repeated that if such actions lead to security council consideration the U.S. will not be able to support Israel. Prime Minister acknowledged his understanding of U.S. attitude. He continued with familiar line that Israelis would be in a worse position to counter Arab diversion after diversion projects completed than they are now in attempting persuade the Arabs of folly and dangers of carrying out their diversion plans. I endeavored again to rebut this reasoning along usual U.S. line emphasizing that it by no means certain Arabs will complete diversion and particularly that these Israeli attacks involve risk out of proportion to dangers to Israel from diversion schemes at present underway or in prospect. As expected, Prime Minister was not sold by these arguments although he obviously does not entirely dismiss them. He said he recognizes risks but aside from indicating to Arabs strength of Israeli determination in matter he believes May 13 incident may have served useful purpose of demonstrating Israeli capability of interdicting diversion works by measures short of full-scale war. He also thought it might be welcomed by Lebanese in that Syria instead of Lebanon was Israeli target. These points of course are not new, the Prime Minister having advanced them on various previous occasions. It is clear, however, that he still holds to his thinking tenaciously and will be dissuaded if at all only with difficulty. Subsequently Argov (acting head of U.S. Dept, FonOff) referred to Talbot's conversation with Harman, reported Deptel 1184, particularly connection Talbot made between such Israeli initiatives and GOI-U.S. military talks. Argov sought to argue that these two separate matters. I responded that Talbot's meaning seemed quite clearly to contrary and commented that in any event it obvious that relations between states must be considered as a whole and it impossible to treat issues in isolation without reference to generality of each state's concerns. Barbour [Continue with the next documents] Volume XVIII Index | Foreign Relations Online | Historian's Office | Department of State | Secretary of State |