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 | FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XVIII Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964-67 Department of State |
 200. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic/1/ Washington, April 2, 1965, 6:28 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 1 UAR-US. Secret; Limdis; Noforn. Drafted by Jones, cleared by Davies, and approved by Rusk. 6049. Kamel called on the Secretary April 1 to appeal for immediate issuance of PA's under current Title I agreement. Jernegan attended. No other memcon will be prepared. Secretary said he hoped for another meeting soon when he would be in position to discuss US-UAR relations across the board officially and formally. Meanwhile, present meeting gave him opportunity to consult Kamel informally on ways to reverse distressing trend in US-UAR relations. One area of possible improvement was that of arms that UARG had said publicly it was giving to Congo. USG sensed growing concern from neighboring states about their involvement with Congo rebels. Perhaps UARG concern was also growing. Problem of blocking arms infiltration into South Viet-Nam made USG particularly sensitive to arms infiltration into Congo. USG had told all parties of its hope GDRC would maintain active contact with other African states and with OAU in interest of resolving situation. USG wanted to be able to concentrate its aid to Congo in fields of economic and social development; it hoped Congo would not be drawn into intra-African strife or East-West cold war. It seemed to Secretary that provision of aid to rebels was not a very rewarding activity and created difficulties for USG efforts to rebuild relations with UAR. Kamel responded with his familiar case for freezing Arab-Israel dispute and reactivating UAR-US cooperation. He said he felt gravity of situation required him to make a frank, formal, and carefully studied presentation. He felt that UAR-US relationship required personal attention of Secretary and President. (Secretary assured Kamel he and President had given considerable time and thought to this subject.) Kamel said problem was, not to assess blame, but to devise workable formula for normalizing relations: 1) USG should frustrate Israeli efforts to take Palestine issue out of icebox. Israel did not need arms since UN Charter and US commitment against aggression were adequate protection. Diversion of Jordan headwaters would take years at best. Kamel detected that many Americans mistakenly viewed Arab-Israel conflict as central issue in Near East, whereas real issue was how to preserve Near Eastern neutrality and independence. As sincere friend of US, Kamel appealed to USG not to provide arms directly to Israel. 2) USG should resume full economic cooperation with Egypt. From his January meeting with Secretary, Kamel had understood PA's for amounts remaining under current Title I agreement would be issued. So far no action had been taken. Kamel understood difficulties posed USG by Congo situation, but people of Egypt must eat. On their well-being hung stability of whole Near East. Kamel appealed to USG at least to provide urgent Egyptian needs under CCC or Title IV and begin negotiations for conclusion of new Title I agreement. Kamel questioned identification of Congo as critical issue in UAR relations. His reporting had given Nasser full understanding of US position. As far as Kamel knew, UARG was no longer providing arms to rebels. USG could hardly expect UARG to provide affidavit to this effect. Secretary replied that, out of respect for Kamel's dedication to US-UAR cooperation, he wished to convey to Kamel, for his personal information only, full appreciation of problem that Congo posed USG. If Administration should issue Purchase Authorization before Secretary was in position to assure Congressional leaders that arms shipments from UAR to Congo had ceased, Congress would be likely to enact legislation disqualifying UAR from any aid whatsoever. Just today, Secretary had received perplexing report that Gbenye and rebel leaders were going to meet in Cairo. Until Congress obtained necessary assurances, it could not be convinced UARG truly nonaligned. In view of Ambassador's important statement that arms flow had stopped, Secretary would review personally all information available to USG. Any information Kamel could provide on rebel meeting in Cairo would be helpful. Kamel feared that USG failure to resume aid would defeat the mutual objective of reviving cooperation. Citing his obligation to inform Nasser of any trend he discerned in Washington, he said reactivation of economic cooperation would strengthen his hand in Cairo, but insistence on unattainable guarantee would frustrate conditions in which Congo issue could be resolved. By withholding aid, USG was denying Nasser the power to maneuver within his own country. How could Kamel urge more concessions on UARG when USG had made no positive gesture in two years? It seemed that both his and Secretary's hands were tied. Secretary said that, while he comprehended Kamel's broad approach to US-UAR relations, Congo was issue that loomed largest in his talks with Congress and this was handiest lever by which to get US-UAR relationship back on tracks. He would investigate possibility of USG's taking certain specific actions and talk with Kamel again. Rusk
201. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts/1/ Washington, April 6, 1965, 9:01 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 33-1 JORDAN RIVER. Confidential. Drafted by Stackhouse, cleared by Symmes, and approved by Jernegan. Sent to Amman, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Jerusalem, London, Paris, Tel Aviv, and to Geneva for Talbot. 1893. Jordan Waters. Depcirtel 1854./2/ Assistant Secretary Jernegan opened fifth final session of current round talks on subject with Israeli Minister Gazit/3/ by reiterating several points central to understanding U.S. position on subject: US supports Unified Plan fully as Plan or yardstick. No change in US position. It is not agreement and we do not believe parties involved should be expected abide by "every dot and comma" as if they were parties to agreed document. Projects now beginning take shape on upper tributaries do not seem to accord with UDP and we have argued thus with Lebanese. Must recognize argument that particular point does not agree with UDP is of limited usefulness with Arab riparians. US would not acquiesce in major divergences from UDP that would cause trouble. View held at highest level USG was that use force in this matter not advisable and USG could not acquiesce in it. We counting on GOI use peaceful means. /2/Circular telegram 1854, April 1, summarized working level meetings with Gazit held March 29 and 31 and April 1 on the subject of Jordan waters. (Ibid.) The meetings are also recorded in memoranda of conversation dated March 29 and 31 and a memorandum of April 1 from Davies to Jernegan. (Ibid.) /3/A memorandum of the conversation is ibid. Without attempting answer directly to these points Gazit said he had two or three of his own to make. GOI was interested in Lebanese reaction to our demarches. Jernegan said Lebanese did not accept all our arguments but they glad not to force issue. We could not say how this would come out but we confident Lebanese would do all they could to drag out matter. Gazit said GOI considering suggestion made that it take up Lebanese diversion projects in ILMAC. Would make decision in one or two days. Re use force Gazit said GOI not trigger-happy but could not be expected abjure force in matter of vital interest. For GOI use of force was "last rather than first thing." Gazit said GOI attached considerable importance to knowing whether US agreed with Israel on out of country diversions (water transfer problem) and out of basin diversions. Re latter Jernegan said it clear from record Johnston negotiations out of basin diversion contemplated for Israel but not for Arabs. This was not helpful argument to use with Arabs, however. As for out of country diversion this apparently not contemplated by negotiators. It hard to say whether it considered and turned down. Gazit said GOI attached much importance to preventive diplomacy and wondered whether US felt it doing all it could. Jernegan said we were and assured him we would continue our efforts. Pointed out we had most influence in Beirut and after that, though considerably less, in Cairo. If we could increase our influence in Cairo could be more helpful because UAR key in this matter. Gazit urged US press undesirability Wadi Sreid canal in specific terms with Lebanese. We said we wished consult with Ambassador Meyer before pursuing this particular tactical line. Jernegan said he sure Talbot ready discuss in Israel aspects Jordan Waters we had covered in our discussions but be felt matter had been dealt with thoroughly during last week and he did not see what more there was to say at present time. Ball
202. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson/1/ Washington, April 7, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Arab Republic, Vol. IV. Secret. A note in Johnson's handwriting reads as follows: "Bob--See that MacArthur, O'Brien, Ball & Company check with all appropriate chr [chairmen] & leaders before we move. Then give me results at once. L." The UAR's request is for a CCC credit sale of 200,000 tons of corn, which would cost it an estimated $10-12 million depending on market prices. 1. This isn't aid. It is a private dollar sale whereby a private US exporter can buy from CCC for resale to the UAR after he gets a US private bank guarantee (just in case the UAR doesn't pay). The interest rate is 4-5% plus 1-1/2% for the guarantee. 2. The terms are near commercial. In fact, we allow only a year to pay on corn, in order to permit US exporters to compete with European sellers. France just sold the UAR wheat on 3-year terms. Agriculture regards CCC sales as meeting normal marketing requirements; i.e. as commercial sales not aid. 3. Nor is this much of a carrot for Nasser. We made two CCC credit offers last year which the UAR never took up. So one problem is that such a gesture might be too piddling to accomplish much. 4. There is no Agriculture press release, though Agriculture doesn't hide these matters and they could be picked up. If there is a query we could put out the above legitimate story, which our AID and State people think ought to carry weight with the Congress. In fact Macomber tried the CCC gambit on L. H. Fountain yesterday and got a favorable reaction. We are living on pins and needles lest Nasser blow the whistle on US arms sales to Jordan and Israel. Even a minor gesture like the above could do a lot to keep alive Nasser's hope that he can still do business with the US. Once he decides he can't, we're in for a blow. The real test will come over the remaining $37 million in Title I PL 480. R. W. Komer Note the attached./2/ If the UAR will keep quiet about US arms sales to Israel and Jordan, it is worth ten CCC sales to us. And it's much more important than the Congo, where we're winning despite the UAR./3/ /2/Telegram 3518 from Cairo, April 7, attached, reported a conversation between Presidency adviser Hassan Sabri Al-Khouli and an Embassy officer. Al-Khouli stated emotionally, "Don't you realize that the Palestine question is more important to us than Vietnam, Yemen and Congo all put together is to you? You [are] having your way in Palestine. You have pressured us to accept your selling arms to Israel." He also declared: "Now it looks as though you want to use your food to pressure us on the Congo in addition to Palestine." Battle noted that this was the clearest indication yet of UAR acquiescence in U.S. arms sales to Israel. /3/Komer added this paragraph by hand. RWK
203. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State/1/ Amman, April 8, 1965, 11 a.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL NEAR E. Secret; Limited Distribution. Repeated to Geneva for Talbot and to Rabat, Tripoli, London, Beirut, Damascus, Tel Aviv, Tunis, Jidda, Kuwait, Baghdad, Algiers, Cairo, and Jerusalem. 589. Depcirtels 1750 and 1842./2/ Following drafted by Ambassador before departure. /2/See Document 194 and footnote 1 thereto. First opportunity see King Hussein since receipt second reftel came late afternoon April 7 following his return from Aqaba. Since most of same ground had been covered with him before, I couched presentation in terms of request from Washington that I review with him before departure for Geneva meeting current USG thinking on Middle East and his own earlier request that we be completely frank with him. I then made detailed statement based on first reftel. I added expression of appreciation for his recent comment to NY Times that he understood Harriman mission had been helpful, and in discussing drift of some Arab states toward Sovbloc said I could not refrain from noting his government planned sign agreement for use of Soviet radio programs whereas they had never been willing use ours. While admitting this different type of drift, said Washington could hardly refrain from speculating on such action. King listened attentively and then said he wished comment on some of points made. First he appreciated frankness of approach. He had always desired intimate and honest exchange of views with USG on area problems but in past had never felt this fully achieved. He hoped Washington would be willing make possible continuation of discussions this nature. He placed great value in relationship with Western powers which stood for things in which Jordan believed and above all else he desired preserve this relationship. Second, he was pleased American Ambassadors in Near East meeting together and he hoped we would take very hard look at US policy in area and particularly at possibilities of some rather drastic new ideas or initiatives. Admitted he did not have solution which he wanted to sell but felt that for too long USG had reacted to events rather than trying to influence them in proper direction. Only hope for peace and stability in area, he felt, lay with U.S. and other Western friends. As for behavior of Arab states, he admitted this had not been what it should have been not because of summit but despite summit. Summit decisions in his opinion had been essentially correct but some leaders were going back to pre-summit atmosphere. This was very dangerous and his policy, as he had shown in West German case, was based on determined effort to maintain Arab unity even when this involved minor concessions on items where Jordan would otherwise have disagreed. He recognized however that Arabs must do more than this; they must work together constructively and in particular begin to deal with internal problems of economic, political and social growth. This has been his effort in past few weeks in Jordan and would continue to be major point of his domestic policy. We could expect further changes, both in personnel and concepts within coming weeks. Hussein [garble] agreed there had been drift to left in some Arab states, particularly Syria and UAR, but he still adhered to belief Arabs would not become Communist. However this was problem which needed careful attention for Communists were only ones gaining from present tensions. As to report of agreement for Soviet radio programs, he knew nothing of this and would look into it. Did not think I should take matter seriously (report had come from Under Secretary Information) and in any case if GOJ reached such decision, they would make comparable agreement with USG. Jordan water question was without doubt at very critical state, though he considered this more symptom of underlying dispute than real cause of difficulty. Arab states would not and could not stop diversion works, though it remained to be seen whether these works would seriously hurt Israel. However, he felt Israel had embarked on determined effort to halt Arab works. Therefore he suggested that for planning purposes USG work on hypothesis that hostilities would ensue in 1965. He hoped these could be limited and under [no?] circumstances would Arabs attack, and perhaps out of it all some sensible agreements could be reached. But at moment he could not see entirely peaceful resolution of issue. On arms question he felt we were guilty of miscalculation. As USG well knew, he firmly believed Israel was expansionist power determined to acquire more territory. Balance of arms which was needed in area was one which would convince Israel it could not continue aggressive policies, push out its frontiers and constantly strive for more territory. Only when Israel recognized this could there be resolution of basic issue. There was no question of "driving Israel into sea" but equally Arabs would not sit back and accept further encroachments. His great concern was that US approach on arms to Israel was not designed to create kind of balance he had in mind but rather was one which constantly tempted Israel to flaunt its power in face of weaker neighbors. He was particularly conscious of this because Jordan was most exposed and stood to lose most if hostilities resulted. Finally, he said he wanted to enter plea that we so conduct ourselves as not to give Nasser another club with which to beat Arabs or West, since all Arab states and Western interests would inevitably suffer. Queried to his meaning, he said he felt that it important that we continue wheat shipments with minimum fanfare so that Nasser would really have to stand up and face horrible economic mess he has made of Egypt. If we stopped shipments, Nasser would charge Western imperialist conspiracy against Egypt and make political capital out of it, thus hiding what was real problem inside Egypt. Hussein implied without so stating that he anticipated that Nasser, if we stopped wheat shipments, would call for nationalization of oil so that greater profits could be made available to Arab world and hence to Egypt, but in process seriously damage position of oil producing states and of West. Calder
204. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, April 8, 1965. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 3 PAL ENTITY. Confidential. Drafted by Jones. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS Mr. Saad hosted luncheon at the International Club to introduce Mr. Naqib. The following subjects arose during the conversation: Biographical Note on Naqib Born in Safad, Naqib went to Syria in 1948 and attended Washington State University from 1951 to 1956. He obtained a license as a medical laboratory technician in the United States and then returned to Syria where he established in partnership with a General Saba a medical laboratory which is still in operation. Naqib is married to a girl from Haifa. They expect a child in May. Naqib is a serious type in his late 30's, bespectacled and balding, who speaks English quite well and conveys an impression of combined reasonableness and determination. Naqib's Mission in the U.S. Saad said that, in accordance with what he understood to be the preference of the State Department, the PLO would not attempt to open an office in Washington. However, it was contemplated that he would assign office space and secretarial assistance to Naqib and the two would work closely together--the primary difference being that Saad represented the 13 members of the Arab League while Naqib represented the 14th unofficial member of the League, Palestine. Neither was a registered lobbyist and their purpose would be through press, radio, TV, and public speeches to get their message across to the American people. They were not here to cultivate officials or members of Congress. Mr. Jones stated that the Department of State was unable to maintain formal relations with the Palestine Liberation Organization. On the legal side, it did not represent a sovereign entity. On the practical side, it was widely regarded in the United States as an organization dedicated to terminating the existence of a state that we recognized. Naqib suggested that the Department view the PLO as an organization dedicated to promoting the rights of the Palestinians. Mr. Jones said that on that basis he would be pleased to provide any personal assistance to Mr. Naqib./2/ /2/No record of any further contact with Naqib during the period covered by this volume has been found. The Arab-Israel Dispute Mr. Jones stated the Department's conviction that there is no military solution to the Palestine problem. We hope eventually that the military and political situation would evolve to the point of making war obsolete, but for the foreseeable future the possibility of a military solution was negated by the American commitment to oppose aggression from any quarter. Therefore, the resolution of the Arab-Israel dispute would have to come about gradually in accordance with basic political, economic and social forces which we hoped would eventually promote the acceptance of the people of Israel by the Near Eastern community. Saad and Naqib listened to this statement without comment. Arab Unity When this subject came up, Jones stated the Department's position, adding his own personal belief that, since Arab disunity appeared to breed instability, any trend toward unification would appear to be in the American interest. He had no idea how such a trend might be established, whether collectively or by accretion, but in any event it was a matter to be dealt with by the people of the area themselves without any intervention from the United States or any other foreign country. Naqib remarked that history offered no examples of unity that had not been achieved by military action. In reply to a question about the background of the Unionist insurrection in Damascus in July 1963, Naqib said that it had been staged by Jasim 'Ulwan and apparently was easily suppressed because it had been penetrated by the Baath. The regime had used this coup as a pretext to arrest several Unionist leaders who had had no connection with the plot whatsoever. Among those were Muhammad Jarrah, Ra'if Ma'arri, Muhammad Sufi, and Naqib himself, who spent nearly a year in Mezze. Jones commented that the failure of the regime to prosecute Jarrah had given rise to the story that he had been a double agent. Naqib denied this report categorically, saying that the report of early release was false, that Jarrah was with him in Mezze, and that in any event Jarrah could not have been a double agent since he had known nothing about the plot. "Let My People Go" During a discussion of the problem of getting the Arab message across to the American people, Jones attempted to make a distinction between defense of the rights of the Palestinian refugees and defense of the need of the Jewish people for a refuge from persecution. He cited the MetroMedia production "Let My People Go" as a very effective presentation of the latter thesis--a thesis to which the vast majority of Americans firmly subscribe. Those Arabs who advocated blacklisting Xerox for having sponsored this film would make the mistake of confusing these two issues, thereby doing disservice to their cause. In the absence of offers by other countries to accept the Jewish refugees in Germany during the war, it was difficult to blame the Jews for trying to reach Israel. In fact, perhaps the Arab states could blur Israel's unique position as the Jewish national home if they should offer to hold their borders open in perpetuity to the Jewish refugees and their descendants. Naqib's reaction to this observation was stony, but Saad noted that in past centuries the Arab world had played just such a role for Jewish refugees from European persecution and that as late as World War II the Sultan of Morocco had resisted Vichy directives to discriminate against his Jewish subjects.
205. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State/1/ Cairo, April 15, 1965. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, ORG 7 NEA. Secret; Exdis. No time of transmission is given on the telegram, which was received on April 16 at 2:24 a.m. 3624. As culmination five hours of solid if occasionally rambling discussion of US-UAR relations by Fawzi, Kaissouni, Talbot and Ambassador, Talbot set out in candid terms why US finding constructive cooperation difficult./2/ This discussion occurred at end of luncheon with no note takers present. Although Fawzi's response was suave and very general, we believe message got through. /2/Talbot was visiting Cairo and other Near Eastern capitals. Telegram 3626 from Cairo, April 15, reported most of the conversation with Deputy Prime Ministers Fawzi and Kaissouni. (Ibid., POL UAR-US) The portion of the conversation reported in telegram 3624 is recorded in more detail in a memorandum of conversation ibid. Talbot pointed out certain elements in American political life had consistently opposed US assistance programs to UAR but these--notably what Egyptians identified as Zionist groups--had never by themselves dictated US policy. Of late, however, much broader spectrum of American public life becoming troubled at indications UAR involved in "liberation" movements undermining governments of other free countries. This was what ChiComs and Soviets, latter in part spurred by aggressive stance of former, currently pursuing in less developed countries. Since World War II US had expended great treasure and effort to block various forms of aggression. There had been successes. We believed no nation could conceive at this stage in history of nuclear war as instrument of aggrandizement, in view of intolerable risks and consequences. Nor would any government today be likely to face consequences of world reactions to movements of massed troops across frontiers. US now deeply engaged in coping with third form of aggression, secret infiltration of trained soldiers and terrorists across frontiers, which being practiced by Communist nations. World had not yet found fully adequate answer to this type of attack. Its seriousness raised questions about policies not only of Communist countries but of others which seem to practice it. We had therefore been greatly concerned, as UARG knew, Talbot continued, by UAR support of Congo rebels. In addition, we were troubled when UAR fingers seen in difficult situations elsewhere, as in South Arabian Federation, Persian Gulf, North Africa, Cyprus, etc. Some thought these grounds for ending US efforts develop constructive relationship with UAR. At minimum, they clearly questions needing to be resolved as we examined how US-UAR relationship could be put back on constructive basis. Fawzi thanked Talbot for candor of his comments. Rather surprisingly, he said he was relieved that this was extent of our problems. In Cairo's view, these matters should be discussed in full frankness between us whenever US had specific worry. Sometimes our views might differ. He did not wish to rebut points specifically, however, but rather to urge that our representatives discuss in detail any that might arise. Rest of conversation faded into generalities. Comment: Relatively mild response by Fawzi will presumably not be last we hear from this conversation which touched bone of our relationship with UAR. At worst it could bring a strong UAR response, probably from other officials and perhaps even from Nasser. More hopefully, it could have broken way open for Ambassador to pursue specific problems in this field. We expect to be able to make better judgment after meeting with Nasser Sunday. Battle
206. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State/1/ Tel Aviv, April 16, 1965, 1118Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 12-5 ISR. Secret; Exdis. A written notation in an unknown hand reads, "Good show!" 1323. During conversation yesterday with Mrs. Meir, principally devoted to recent publicity re arms sales to M.E. reported separately,/2/ I took occasion refer again to strength USG opposition to possible Israel 1) pre-emptive military action against Arab water diversion, and 2) entry into nuclear weapon field. I said I was speaking without instructions and I had no intention of making threats. However, although US position had been made entirely clear in recent Harriman-Komer talks and on other occasions, I told her I thought it in the interests of both countries that I pass on the brief but impressive comments the Secretary made to me privately last week in Geneva. The Secretary had remarked on his own initiative and not in response to any prompting or query on my part that in either event "the US Government would pull out." I said that my quote might well be inaccurate and in any case the language was not preformulated with precision. To me the importance of this comment is that it emphasizes the seriousness with which the highest levels of the USG would view such Israeli action. /2/Telegram 1319 from Tel Aviv, April 15, reported that Meir expressed great concern over news stories from Washington concerning U.S. provision of arms to various Near Eastern countries, including information that Israel had acquiesced and had been warned not to take any steps to prevent Arab water diversion. (Ibid., DEF 12-5 NEAR E) Circular telegram 1976, April 15, contains the text of a statement made by a Department of State spokesman that day stressing that there had been no change in U.S. arms sales policy in the Near East. (Ibid.) Mrs. Meir thanked me and expressed understanding. She did not comment further but I think she was impressed. Barbour
207. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic/1/ Washington, April 17, 1965, 2:44 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, AID (US) 15 UAR. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Jones and Symmes; cleared by Jernegan, Bennsky, and McGeorge Bundy and in draft by Deputy Director of AID's Office of Near Eastern Affairs John Kean and in substance by Emmett B. Ford of GER; and approved by Ball. Also sent to Bonn. 6406. Suggested Scenario for Talbot's Meeting with Nasser. FYI: This meeting is important to both US and UAR. We hope it will produce confirmation that UARG intends carry out policy adjustments essential to resumption of US aid. Egyptians are looking for a signal that US declarations of desire to resume aid are sincere. With expiration of Title I agreement approaching and Egyptians in grim mood, we wish to accord them such a signal. We suggest following approach: End FYI. 1. Open on a candid note by remarking you have just come from chiefs of mission conference. Nasser might be interested in knowing how participants see present situation in Near East. After conveying your impressions, you could comment on our arms policy along lines of FYI section of Deptel 5632/2/ and Depcirtel to Arab capitals on this subject./3/ You might also wish to draw on separate telegram on specific issues between US and UAR. /2/Document 193. /3/Document 194. 2. At this point, to promote atmosphere of give and take, you might solicit Nasser's views on these matters. 3. Nasser may, as Kamel has advised, broach UARG desire for resumption of aid. If not, might be advisable for US side to broach it. Moving from area problems to Egyptian problems, you might note USG understanding of weighty economic problems UARG faces. You might go on to indicate USG regret that our support for efforts to find solutions these problems has lately been blocked by US-UAR policy differences. It might be well to review at some length the deterioration of the climate of opinion regarding the UAR in Congress as a reflection of wide-ranging sentiment throughout the country. While there are a number of major policy differences between the US and UAR, the Congo problem was the proximate cause of the latest difficulty. The Administration made a major effort to obtain authority for the President to continue useful economic relations with the UAR. It succeeded only by making it clear that a substantial improvement in relations must precede such further cooperation. Congressional reaction focused heavily on arms shipments to the Congo and the cessation of such shipments was clearly made a condition to the resumption of assistance. This is not to say that many Americans are not continuing to work toward the improvement of US-UAR relations. For example, Eugene Black's reports of his conversations in Cairo have been helpful in clearing the air. 4. You might elicit Nasser's views on prospects for reviving satisfactory climate. 5. If Nasser's reply is encouraging, we suggest you convey following: a) USG willingness to consider now Egyptian request for CCC credit for corn. FYI: Terms on wheat (6 months) not likely be competitive with European offers but better on corn (12 months). End FYI. b) Your desire to bring about the assurance of further purchase authorizations to complete Title I agreement and your intention to work to this end provided that in the meantime the UARG can see its way clear to stop arms shipments to the Congo. (We leave it to you to develop a form of words that will make this point clear without sounding too much like an ultimatum.) c) You would hope a period of quiet and steady improvement would create favorable Congressional climate for negotiation new Title I agreement. 6. You might conclude with reaffirmation of genuine USG desire for cooperation. Our insistence on improvement in climate is not capricious but reflects political realities that cannot be ignored. USG has global interests and commitments to consider which we hope Nasser will recognize. FYI. As we see it, UARG believes it has made some difficult political concessions--notably tolerance of arms sales to Israel. Longer USG delays in reciprocating, greater is danger that Egyptian extremists will foreclose possibility of salvaging US-UARG cooperation. By reopening tap to allow thin stream of economic aid, we perceive better than even chance of confirming UARG on its present conciliatory course. This action would be consistent with ambassadors' findings (Geneva's 1599)./4/ It would demonstrate that we are not stringing Egyptians along--that USG has will and capability to meet concession with concession. (We suspect FRG is thinking along similar lines in regard to its own problems with UARG. Embassy will have noted the several reports, of which German Foreign Office appears to be unaware, that Werner carried aid package to Cairo.) /4/Telegram 1599 from Geneva, April 12, reported that Talbot and U.S. Ambassadors to Near Eastern countries, who were meeting in Geneva, recommended completing the deliveries of surplus grain to the UAR committed under the current P.L. 480 agreement. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, AID (US) UAR) "Satisfactory climate" cannot be defined in terms of specific issues. It will obtain when sum total of UARG positions on major issues between us reflects conscious Egyptian effort to adapt to USG requirements. However, improvement in regard to Congo must be part of picture. End FYI. For Bonn: Above position is preliminary, not to be discussed with FRG. Rusk
208. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State/1/ Cairo, April 18, 1965, 1805Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, ORG 7 NEA. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Passed to the White House. 3652. From Talbot. Ambassador Battle and I had two and one-half hour talk with Nasser today ranging fully over US-UAR relations and many other issues in world affairs. He had obviously been briefed carefully on my earlier talks with his Ministers and officials and had done his homework sufficiently well so almost all points I had raised were skillfully woven into his comments and responses to my questions. Tone was personally cordial throughout. He was candid in comments about UAR policies, tactics and difficulties, and equally candid in complaining about certain aspects of US policy. For a time we concluded he had decided to pursue fairly stiff line. However, this turned out to be in part protective coloration for specific concessions to points we have been urging on UARG in recent weeks. Nugget he dropped in middle of fairly assertive discussion on Congo situation was flat statement UAR not now providing arms to Congolese rebels. In discussion of nuclear proliferation, he stated equally definitely that UAR will accept IAEA safeguards on reactors it builds, large as well as small. He gave us clear impression he has decided to swallow US arms sales to Israel, however unpalatable. He stated Arab water diversion works will not exceed, at least by much, Johnston Plan allocations. Also indicated current disinterest on Cyprus situation, though he helped Makarios last summer. On other hand, he raised signals of possible further difficulties with Saudi Arabia on Yemen and with British over SAF. He suggested prompt Amer-Sulatan talks to clear misunderstandings over his agreement with Faisal. He urged that US stop bombing attacks on North Vietnam to give NVN chance to respond to proposals for negotiations. It was clear our decision to sell arms to Israel was much on his mind. We discussed principal Arab-Israeli issues including Jordan waters and refugees as well as arms in detail. He repeatedly averred that Israel can influence US policy but Arabs cannot. At end of session I made offer, as authorized in my instructions, of US readiness to consider CCC sales of wheat and corn on credit terms of six and twelve months, respectively. I also said we hoped for prompt decision on remainder of current PL480 agreement. I expressed further hope that together we could achieve improvement of climate of relations necessary to enable us to enter negotiations for new PL480 agreement. Extensive telegraphic memcon being dictated rather hurriedly before my departure Jidda and will follow promptly./2/ Suggest Department may wish to divide it into sections by subject and repeat to other posts as appropriate. /2/Telegram 3653 from Cairo, April 18. (Ibid.) I have now had many hours of talk with UARG officials. It is apparent to Ambassador and me that Nasser's decision to tell us no arms being sent to Congolese rebels represents firm UARG policy decision to attempt to meet conditions we have laid down for completion existing PL480 agreement. For variety of reasons well understood in Department, I believe it very important we now respond by prompt issuance of purchase authorities. You will not be surprised to learn that Ambassador Battle fully agrees. This leaves open for further discussion in coming weeks and perhaps months the question of a fresh PL480 agreement. That, rather than further dialogue on the existing agreement, seems to me the proper occasion for further examination of the many and real problems remaining between US and the UAR. Battle
209. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State/1/ Amman, April 22, 1965. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 6-1 JORDAN. Secret. The time of transmission is not indicated on the telegram, which was received at 8:46 p.m. Repeated to CINCSTRIKE, Beirut, Damascus, Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, and Baghdad. 629. Embtel 619/2/--JAA tanks. Saw King Hussein afternoon April 21 re redeployment JAA tanks. Reminded him of our earlier conversation and his assurance that under normal circumstances tanks would be kept on East Bank and that he would do everything possible to avoid provocative actions. Said I recognized that he and he alone could make decisions re legitimate self defense requirements of Jordan, but I had nevertheless been requested to raise question of tanks on West Bank since this seemed contrary to his own earlier assurances. Added that we had absolutely no evidence of any Israeli build-up or redeployment and under circumstances we were fearful that stationing of tanks on West Bank could trigger very reaction we all sought to avoid. Said that we recognized his concerns over dangers inherent in present state of tension and were doing everything in our power to prevent resort to arms as solution to present problems. His recent action in redeployment of tanks if known on other side could well work against objectives which I thought we both shared. /2/Telegram 619 from Amman, April 22, reported that some tanks had recently been stationed on the West Bank. Prime Minister Tell had stated that this was a purely defensive move and that the tanks would be withdrawn in the near future. Telegram 583 to Amman, April 17, instructed the Embassy that if further information confirmed the presence of a battalion of tanks on the West Bank, it should raise the subject with King Hussein. (Both ibid.) King replied that it was quite correct he had earlier given assurances that under normal circumstances tanks would be retained on East Bank and he felt that he was still operating within framework of those assurances and his own responsibilities for providing all possible defense for Jordan. First, he could hardly describe present situation as being "normal circumstances" which he and I had previously discussed. He had no evidence of an Israeli build-up but he had to face stark reality that Israel had categorically threatened to stop Arab water works by force if necessary. This meant to him that conflict was inevitable and under circumstances he had to take such measures as he could to protect Jordan. Second, tanks that were moved were Charioteers which could hardly be considered a threat. They had been deployed in defensive positions as an anti-tank weapon and in fact they were only anti-tank weapons now available to him. Third, all other tanks including all U.S. models had been retained on East Bank and would continue to be kept there. It was true that he had ordered certain redeployments in last few weeks but in every case he had kept major installations way back from frontier and nothing that had been done could in the least be considered provocative. Fourth, he felt that in his own national interest it was essential that he maintain adequate defense of northwestern frontier against possibility of tank attack which he would under other circumstances be unable to halt. Putting his tanks into defensive positions today rather than after an Israeli build-up was detected seemed less provocative than if this were done at later date. In summary, he said he hoped that Washington would recognize fact that he had not undertaken a provocative action; that this redeployment was relatively minor and entirely defensive in nature. He said he would be glad to have me discuss other changes in military formations that caused us concern, but as he had told me before my departure for Geneva, he thought USG had to proceed on hypothesis that Arab states and Israel were now on collision course and that conflict appeared inevitable in course of year. Until situation basically altered he would have to take reasonable precautions but he could assure us once again Arab states would not initiate any hostilities. Barnes [Continue with the next documents] Volume XVIII Index | Foreign Relations Online | Historian's Office | Department of State | Secretary of State |