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 | FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XVIII Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964-67 Department of State |
 190. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson/1/ Washington, March 13, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Harriman Israeli Mission (II). Secret. Mission to Israel. I hope I'm right in saying that we finally got from the Israelis the essentials of what you wanted--their agreement to sit still on Jordan arms in return for some tanks and planes. State almost fouled us up again by rewriting the contract at the eleventh hour, but we got over that hurdle too. My final cable (attached)/2/ sums up the matter. /2/Telegram 1333 from Athens, March 11; attached but not printed. A copy is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 US/KOMER. What really broke the logjam was our shifting (Mac tells me on your judgment) from a broad package understanding, which was simply too much to negotiate quickly, to a much more limited deal. Once we called their hand this way, and were prepared to talk hardware, they tried to shift back. However, Eshkol quickly settled when I told him first that we were going ahead with Jordan and then showed him concretely just what we were prepared to do for him. On this last point, I was grateful that McNamara and Bundy accepted my recommendation we talk 24 planes instead of 20. This bit of give will cost us nothing in terms of any Arab reaction (24 is as bad as 20), yet it got us past the point of making Israel so strictly comparable to Jordan that the Israelis could cry foul. Nor will these necessarily have to be US planes. I also taped down that (a) we don't want to see any Israelis here for six to eight weeks--this should buy us at least four; (b) attempted backdoor negotiating with the White House through unofficial emissaries hurts more than it helps; and (c) we will flatly oppose both premature jumping of the Arabs over water and Israel going nuclear. As a bonus, we got a written promise on the latter, for what promises are worth. While I may be prejudiced (and also too tired to see the matter in the round), I think we finally came out all right--and without giving more than we'd have to give sooner or later anyway to our Israeli friends. R. W. Komer
191. Memorandum From the Ambassador at Large (Harriman) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, March 15, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Harriman Israeli Mission (II). Secret. Filed with a covering note from Bundy stating that the memorandum was Harriman's report on his mission and that Bundy did not think it needed the President's attention but had promised to forward it to him. A handwritten "L" and an "NR" on the covering note indicates that it was seen but not read by the President. Israel: I am glad that Bob Komer was able to work out arrangements with Israel satisfactory to you. I was sorry to leave in the middle, but as there was so much publicity about my presence, I felt it better to leave, particularly as I gained such confidence in Komer's skill in handling the negotiations. Ambassador Barbour also was most helpful. My talks did some good in bringing Eshkol and his colleagues around to understanding the need for our continuing military assistance to Jordan. They also now clearly understand that we will oppose their use of force under any circumstances in connection with the Jordan water diversion. We must, however, make every effort to block Arab diversion, if in fact it ever comes off. The Israelis are very sensitive on the subject of their water rights, which I know you will understand. We will have, I believe, continuing difficulty in restraining them if peaceful means don't produce results. I therefore stated bluntly that if the Israelis ever used force they would be up against United States opposition. This was somewhat of a shock, but I am satisfied it was useful. The Israelis feel that the military balance with the Arabs has deteriorated since Eshkol's visit last June and they want to discuss this subject again. Eshkol asked me to convey to you his strong hope that we would move our Embassy to Jerusalem. I explained the difficulties but he persisted in his request. NEA believes it would be most inadvisable to make such a move at the present time. If you agree, I will write Mr. Eshkol informally that you feel this matter should be deferred under the present circumstances./2/ /2/No letter from Harriman to Eshkol on this subject has been found. [Here follow brief reports on Harriman's visits to Afghanistan, India, and the Philippines.] Averell/3/ /3/Secretary Rusk signed below Harriman's signature.
192. Letter From President Johnson to President Nasser/1/ Washington, March 18, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, United Arab Republic, Presidential Correspondence. Secret. Filed with a draft by Bundy, an earlier draft, and related memoranda. In a March 18 telephone conversation, Bundy told Ball that the President wanted a short letter, and Bundy had dictated one. (Ibid., Ball Papers, United Arab Republic) Dear Mr. President: Since my message to you last December 12/2/ I have looked forward to a further exchange of views between us. Now, unfortunately, new tensions have developed in the Near East. I have been deeply concerned by developments in the direct relations of the United States and the United Arab Republic which have put strains on the friendship I hope for between our two governments and peoples. As the proud leader of an important people, you will, I know, share my view that the best way to deal with difficulties of this kind is to discuss them man to man, with full respect for each other's rights and responsibilities. /2/See footnote 2, Document 117. I have therefore asked Ambassador Battle to seek an appointment with you to bring this personal message and to discuss with you the issues of current importance in the Near East that concern us both. The problem which needs this kind of discussion today is that of the best way of dealing temperately and responsibly with the growing arms race in the Middle East. As you know, the United States Government has consistently sought to find ways and means of turning that arms race downward. We are convinced that it does not serve the real interest of any people in the area. At the same time, we have obligations and interests which require us to take account of the pressures that are generated by very heavy arms supply from other countries. It is in this context that I have asked Ambassador Battle to discuss our present position with you. That position has been established within the framework of our traditional policy of restraint with regard to arms sales. The principles of that policy are two: First, we shall, to the greatest extent possible, continue to avoid selling arms to the principal parties to the Arab-Israel dispute. Second, in no case will we sell arms that will give one side a military advantage over the other. This is the policy we have followed and will continue to follow. You and I carry heavy responsibilities. I am convinced that by serious efforts on both sides, we can do much to improve understanding between our Governments. I can assure you that on my side I will do my full part to maintain and to increase relations of mutual respect between our two countries. The interests of our peoples will thrive in strength and understanding, not in weakness and frustration. Sincerely, Lyndon B. Johnson
193. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic/1/ Washington, March 18, 1965, 9:56 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL ARAB-ISR. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Talbot, Symmes, and Komer; cleared by Davies and Komer; and approved by Talbot. 5632. Talking Points for Presentation Letter From President to Nasser. FYI: We wish you to deliver in person Presidential letter to Nasser which will be sent separate message./2/ Primary purpose of letter and your meeting is to put limited and exceptional US arms sale to Israel in most acceptable light. Recognizing Nasser will be almost bound suspect hidden US commitment to arm Israel and abandon "evenhanded" policy, you should bear in mind following rationale: /2/Telegram 5664 to Cairo, March 19, transmitted the text of the letter (Document 192). (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL ARAB-ISR) (1) Sale to Israel would be an exception to our arms sales policy made to prevent significant arms imbalance from posing a threat to peace resulting from overconfidence or from desperation. (2) Sale to Israel is limited commitment that we will strive to keep limited and exceptional assuming Arabs show restraint. (3) Sale is measure forced on us by complex of events including continued heavy Soviet arms supplies to area; threatening posture of Unified Arab Command and Arab spokesmen toward Israel, particularly in connection with Jordan Waters; and Bonn's withdrawal as source arms supply for Israel. Secondary purpose this approach is to invite resumption of dialogue with Nasser, particularly on arms control but also on other matters of difference between us. You should make sure this point is not lost. Since we naturally wish avoid giving Nasser a stick with which to beat Husayn, we don't want to highlight Jordan arms sale as reason we are selling to Israel too. Therefore, it mentioned only briefly in your talking points. If Nasser raises Jordan matter, we wish you to make clear distinction between US sales to Jordan and prospective sales to Israel. Sales to Israel have different justification, in that their rationale is to prevent significant imbalance in arms from posing threat to peace from overconfidence or from desperation. While it is obviously impossible prevent Nasser from assuming some linkage between US sales to Jordan and those to Israel, we count on you to make distinction and avoid direct linkage between two. Although we want over-all signal to be in nature of warning some US assistance to Israel will occur, we do not want this to appear as threat or ultimatum. Tone of presentation should be calm and reasonable without nuances of indignation or complaint. End FYI. Following are talking points: 1. President has been increasingly concerned by strains that have developed in relations of US and other Western states with Near East and particularly by recent divergence of US and UAR policies. Deterioration of Western relations with area has coincided with heightening of tensions growing out of Arab-Israel dispute. Threat of hostilities over Jordan Waters and activities of Unified Arab Command have brought to fore continuing arms rivalry in Middle East. Resulting tensions have perhaps inevitably increased doubts and suspicions about attitudes and policies of outside states toward states of Near East. President has asked you to discuss his concerns in detail, to clarify United States policies, and to invite Nasser to resume dialogue on arms control and on various matters of difference between US and UAR. 2. As Nasser must already know, Israelis have been reacting strongly to spite aspects Arab water diversion schemes, inflammatory and belligerent posture conveyed by Arab statements and UAC arms buildup, and then German arms cancellation. As part of continuing US effort to reduce tensions, President sent Harriman/Komer to Israel to calm Israelis down and talk out their worries. They discussed all aspects current Near Eastern situation and reviewed US policies with Israeli leaders. They explained that US opposition to aggression by any Near Eastern state against another applied to Israel as much as to Arabs. They stressed to Israelis our continued interest in peaceful resolution of area disputes. 3. Harriman/Komer talks have eased situation, but basic problems remain and are still a potential cause of war. Arabs appear concerned lest Israel make military strike outside its borders. But Israel in turn is disturbed by statements some Arab leaders they intend some day wipe out Israel. For our part, we are concerned by Israeli arguments that they might have to act to prevent continued influx of Soviet arms from eventually giving Arabs upper hand. Israelis have convincing case because of continued UAC buildup and stated Arab intentions on water diversion. Because of such pressures we also fear Israelis may someday feel forced shift from peaceful nuclear program to weaponry. 4. US effort has been to try insure Israeli restraint by (a) counselling peaceful solution to water issue; (b) reassuring Israelis on our opposition to aggression and use of force; and (c) warning them against any acts of desperation. To achieve those objectives, and to preserve atmosphere in which peaceful solutions possible, we reassured Israelis that to extent we agreed on existence of dangerous imbalance that cannot be corrected by arms from other sources, USG would make a direct but limited sale of arms as an exception to existing policy. 5. We want Nasser to see this in perspective. As he knows, we have been most reluctant to become direct supplier military equipment to any of principal parties to Arab-Israel dispute. We know each side has been able to obtain weaponry from other sources, and we are well aware each side considers itself best judge of what is required defend itself as sovereign state. In our relations with both Israel and Arabs we have taken all possible steps to arrest self-defeating military rivalry and resultant waste of funds needed for improving peoples' welfare. But our restraint has not been matched by the Soviet Union. While making massive supplies of arms to states in area, it has pretended it is working for peace while using Arab-Israel dispute to foment discord in its interest. 6. We regard arms rivalry as self-defeating since each side ultimately can match armaments obtained by other, but always at risk provoking preemptive attack and at regrettable cost to progress and economic development. Thus there is danger that one side will get military advantage substantial enough to tempt it to launch preemptive attack--particularly if that advantage appears to be declining. Key to shaky peace in Near East therefore may lie only in preventing imbalances in categories of arms that might lead to preemptive strike. This does not mean outsiders have right to regulate armaments in absence of agreement among states concerned, tacitly or otherwise. It means only that it may be in international interest to accede to some arms requests in order to prevent conflicts. 7. Thus, if two sides are unwilling find peaceful accommodation or to arrange some kind of attenuation in arms race, international community has no alternative to selling arms to correct imbalances and thereby to preserve peace. In observance this principle, USG sold Hawks to alleviate Israeli apprehensions of UAR bombers. For same reason USG now would be prepared to sell Israel limited types and quantities of arms required for their defense if assured of Israeli restraint. This exception has not been lightly made. It has been made clear to Israel Government, as President has asked you to make clear to Nasser, that just as we have not lightly made this exception in past we do not intend to do so in future. FYI: If Nasser asks about specific US commitments, you may say: US has made no sales agreements with Israel but has agreed consider limited Israeli requests. If he asks about tanks, you may say: Limited number of older model US tanks are probably on horizon for obvious reasons. If he asks about supersonic aircraft, you may say: USG does not contemplate selling Israel supersonic aircraft in F-104 category. If he asks about less sophisticated aircraft, you may say: We continue prefer Israel use European suppliers unless significant imbalance develops in area. If Nasser asks about other weapons, you may say: No arrangements for any other equipment on horizon as yet. If he asks about price, you may say: US arms supplies will be sales at same price to all buyers. End FYI. 8. US need to sell arms to Israel of course will be governed by what Arabs do. Nasser should realize that if Arabs challenge US on any limited arms sales to Israel, they might provoke US public reaction that would jeopardize USG's restrained and evenhanded approach to Arab-Israel problem. USG has always resisted going as far as Israel keeps pressing it to go. Should Arabs force a showdown, they would undercut US incentive to limit arms sales to Israel and force very polarization of Near East situation USG seeks to avoid. Arab restraint toward their own arms acquisitions and toward Israeli acquisitions from Western powers would facilitate Western efforts to exert similar restraint. Thus we want to assure Nasser that impartiality and restraint remain basis of US arms policy. Any US sales of weapons to Arab states or Israel will be minimum dictated by circumstances. 9. In this connection, President wants Nasser also to know we have agreed to sell certain arms to Jordan. We considered Jordan request carefully over period of several months. Although Arabs may not appreciate danger, alternative of Soviet arms in Jordan would mean Soviet presence and influence in unstable area from which they previously excluded. Resultant dangers to stability of entire Near East would threaten Arab as well as US interests. US therefore decided it would sell arms to Jordan to prevent Soviet exploitation of situation. 10. USG holds firmly to other tenets of its Arab/Israeli policy beneficial to both sides. USG will keep up pressure on Israel not to go nuclear. As Nasser undoubtedly aware fact of recent American visit to Dimona has been revealed by US press./3/ USG also determined to oppose aggression from any quarter and to continue effort to reduce risk of war. These are more important, in our view, than limited arms sales. /3/An article by John W. Finney, entitled "Israel Permits U.S. To Inspect Atomic Reactor," appeared in The New York Times on March 14. The text was transmitted to Near Eastern Embassies in circular telegram 1692, March 14. (Ibid., AE 11-2 ISR) Telegram 922 to Tel Aviv, March 11, states that Finney was working on a story, beginning from a lead given by Foreign Minister Eban in a "Meet the Press" television interview. (Ibid.) 11. Indeed, given special relationship we have had with UAR, we hope our two governments may still find a way to reverse Near East arms spiral. We have been gratified by indications UAR leaders share our conviction that Arab-Israel dispute is insoluble by force of arms. In face of world opinion and US commitment to oppose aggression, neither side will ever achieve military capability to impose solution on other. Consequently, best hope of reducing arms drain is for Arabs to renounce development of certain categories of weapons in return for similar renunciation by Israel. 12. We should also work together to find some way of avoiding a Jordan Waters crisis. Most immediate threat to peace is prospective Lebanese action to begin to divert Jordan tributaries to Syria. Most critical element in this project is its representation by Arabs as device to deny water to Israel. We believe tension could be relieved and magnitude of Israeli counteraction reduced if Arabs would present their projects in more positive light, indicating that purpose is to guarantee Arab users' access to water to which they entitled on basis internationally accepted riparian laws and usages. As Nasser knows, USG believes Johnston allocations meet these criteria. We recognize neither Arabs nor Israel refer to Johnston Plan publicly, but we wonder if some other formula could be devised that would encourage both sides to stay within their legitimate allocations. 13. We welcome ideas of Nasser and UARG as to how Arab-Israel situation may be defused; we are ready to cooperate in any way we can in mutual Arab-US interest. FYI: We have given some thought to consideration Arab-Israel arms race by Geneva Disarmament Conference. Do not however believe it advantageous surface this idea at this time. End FYI. 14. President recognizes sensitivity these issues and hopes his frank views will be considered in same spirit in which offered. We are seeking to reason together in effort to prevent conflagration which would spread far beyond confines of the Near East. FYI: If Nasser appears likely to react violently and publicly to news you deliver, you may add that if Nasser desires, President is prepared to send a special emissary to discuss whole complex of Near East matters more fully with him. President considering this as a device to provide a "cooling-off" period. End FYI. Contingency talking points on other subjects Nasser may raise will follow by separate message./4/ /4/Telegram 5686 to Tel Aviv, March 20. (Ibid., POL UAR-US) Rusk
194. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts/1/ Washington, March 19, 1965, 7:13 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 1 NEAR E-US. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by Symmes on March 18; cleared by Director of the Office of Northern African Affairs David D. Newsom, Davies, and Komer; and approved by Talbot. Sent to Amman, Baghdad, Jidda, Kuwait, Beirut, Rabat, Algiers, Tunis, Tripoli, and Khartoum and repeated to Damascus, Taiz, and Cairo. Circular telegram 1752 to the same Embassies, March 20, requested that they delay action on circular telegram 1750 until they were advised to proceed. (Ibid., DEF 12-5 ISR) Circular telegram 1842, March 31, instructed them to do so. (Ibid.) Reports of the Embassies' presentations made in response to circular telegram 1750 are ibid. and ibid., POL NEAR E. 1750. FYI: Developments in Near East since mid-1963 have caused significant strains in relations of US and other Western states with area. As of early 1965 USG is perforce reexamining its relationship with UAR. Prospect of military conflict over Jordan Waters looms larger. Renewal of Saudi-Egyptian confrontation in Yemen looms with possible reinvolvement of US. Arab nationalist drift toward Communist Bloc poses danger that, led by economically distressed UAR, Arab states could move toward closer relationship with Soviets than at any time in last ten years. Recent West German difficulties with Arab nationalists have accentuated deterioration of Western relations with Near East. While Israel's loss of German arms source created new pressures in US, exceptions in US arms sales policy forced by Jordan arms request also faced us with probable serious repercussions from Israel and from domestic reaction. In last few weeks doubts and suspicions about US attitudes and policies have been voiced by Arab leaders throughout area. Some of deterioration in Western position is obviously beyond capability of USG to control or influence. On other hand, frank discussions US views and policies with host governments are needed to dispel some of doubts and suspicions that have arisen. This particularly true so far as moderate Arab leaders are concerned. Moderate Arab leaders are important asset to US. Although it would be mistake to try to use them as counterweights to Arab radicals, they may be able quietly and behind scenes to restrain extremists. We envisage unity spirit of Arabs as having certain built-in restraint. For sake of preserving unity spirit, radicals will be constrained to avoid moving counter to moderate sentiments, so long as moderates avoid forcing issue. Purpose of following presentation is to clarify US views on various aspects current situation--to avoid misunderstandings with radicals and to dispel doubts and suspicions of moderates. End FYI. You should seek early appointment at highest appropriate level stressing our hope confidential nature discussion will be respected to make following presentation which may also be used with other key officials of host government at your discretion: 1) President has been concerned by recent signs of deterioration in Arab relations with West. Tensions growing out of Arab-Israel dispute in particular have accentuated strains between West and Arabs. Doubts and suspicions have been expressed about attitude and policies of outside states toward states of Near East. You have been instructed to review situation in order to dispel any confusion about US policies and to promote better understanding of our views. 2) For many years US has sought to help find way to just and honorable peace in Near East. We are frank admit we see no prospect immediate solution to Arab-Israel problem. On the other hand, we believe most leaders privately agree with us that Arab-Israel dispute will not be solved by force of arms. Yet positions taken on Jordan Waters problem have caused widespread concern in international community. 3) Initial tone of moderation in First Arab Summit Conference in January 1964 encouraged us to think there would be peaceful and positive approach to Jordan Waters problem. But more recently it has seemed to us that constructive spirit of January 1964 has been forgotten. Arab spokesmen have described Arab water projects in terms of spite diversion designed to take water from Israel rather than to provide water for Arab peoples. Inflammatory statements have been made by both sides in connection with serious border incidents. Unified Arab Command has pressed individual Arab states to increase their armaments, thereby adding new pressures to existing arms rivalry. Arab statements of intent to liquidate Israel have tended give UAC belligerent and threatening posture. 4) US has been particularly concerned by worsened relations between West Germany and Arab states and is hopeful that moderate views will prevail so that productive German-Arab relations can be restored. We have noticed drift among some Arab states that has seemed to us solely to serve interests of Communists and has called into question policy of nonalignment. Some of policy confrontations with West, including Congo, Cyprus, and South Arabia, are difficult for us to understand if Arab states concerned desire mutually beneficial relationships. These repeated confrontations have forced USG to reexamine its relations with some Arab states. US continues to desire mutually beneficial relationship with all Arab states, but this is two-way street. As demonstrated by our reaction certain recent events, we do not intend to take any policy actions out of anger or indignation. On other hand, it is increasingly difficult for us to maintain close relations in atmosphere created by some states during past few months. 5) Jordan Waters problem and continuing arms rivalry cause particular concern because of prospect of conflict Israelis quite aroused. So as part of continuing US effort to reduce tensions in Near East, President recently sent Ambassador Harriman to Israel. While there Harriman discussed all aspects of current Near Eastern situation with Israel's leaders and reviewed US policies with them. He assured Israel Govt of continued USG interest in peaceful resolution of area disputes. He reaffirmed our position with regard to Unified or Johnston Plan as equitable standard by which to measure use of Jordan Waters. But he emphasized that USG opposition to aggression and use of military force to solve disputes applies to Israel as well as to Arabs. He stressed our belief that peaceful solutions to area problems must and can be found. In our view Harriman's talks have helped to ease situation. 6) On other hand, basic Arab-Israel hostility remains. Arms rivalry poses constant threat of conflict. Danger is that one side will get military advantage tempting it to launch preemptive attack, or other side seeing disadvantage may attack out of desperation. We ourselves for years have followed policy of not supplying arms to parties directly engaged in Arab-Israel dispute except for limited sales of defensive weapons. We have repeatedly declared our intention to prevent or stop aggression by either side. We have never argued we have right to regulate military balance. But recognizing weapons sales sources available to both sides--and particularly irresponsible way in which Soviets have sought to buy Arab friendship by weapons sales--we know our restraint is not enough. Thus, we consider we have legitimate interest in preventing imbalances in military hardware from posing threat to peace by leading to preemptive strikes. 7) In this connection, you wish to point out that we have recently agreed to sell certain arms to Jordan. We had considered Jordan request carefully over period of several months. Request had been made under sponsorship of Unified Arab Command, and it posed alternative of Soviet arms in Jordan if US did not agree to sales. Although some Arabs may not appreciate danger, alternative of Soviet arms in Jordan would mean Soviet presence and influence in unstable area from which they previously excluded. Resultant dangers to stability of entire Near East would threaten Arab as well as US interests. US therefore decided it would sell arms to Jordan to prevent Soviet exploitation of situation. FYI: Since we naturally wish avoid giving Nasser or other radical Arab leaders a stick with which to beat Hussein, we do not want to highlight Jordan arms sale as one of reasons for selling to Israel. If connection is raised, you should make clear distinction between US sales to Jordan and prospective sales to Israel. Sales to Jordan were made to prevent Soviets from entering Jordan. Sales to Israel were made under following rationale: (a) Sale to Israel would be an exception to our arms sales policy made to prevent significant arms imbalance from posing a threat to peace resulting from overconfidence or from desperation; (b) Sale to Israel is limited commitment that we will strive to keep limited and exceptional assuming Arabs show restraint; and (c) Sale is measure forced on us by complex of events including continued heavy Soviet arms supplies to area; threatening posture of Unified Arab Command and Arab spokesmen toward Israel, particularly in connection with Jordan Waters; and, last but not least, Bonn's withdrawal as source arms supply for Israel. End FYI. 8) Insofar as possible US intends to continue its policy of restraint in arms sales to principal parties to Arab-Israel dispute. We do not intend to try to buy friends by irresponsibly selling weapons of destruction. At same time, we cannot overlook serious imbalances that would threaten peace. Nasser's action forcing Germans to cancel arms sales to Israel put heat directly on us. We have told Israelis and also are informing Arabs that in such exceptional cases we would sell Israel limited types and quantities of arms required for their self-defense. However, we intend resist Israeli efforts purchase more than their minimum defensive needs. We have not lightly made such exceptions to our arms sales policy in past and would not make them lightly in future. It really up to people like Nasser and Syrians to decide by their own actions how much we forced sell to Israel. 9) Moreover, Arabs should try to see in perspective that limited US sales to meet Israel's basic security needs essential element US efforts restrain Israel from dangerous military action. So US hopes there will be no public campaign or Arab attempt force showdown. Result could be adverse US public reaction jeopardizing our policy of restraint and evenhandedness. 10) US desires constructive and productive relationships with all Arab countries. We wish to make certain our views are understood at all times and will welcome continued policy consultations on matters of mutual interest. For Kuwait: Suggest this be discussed with Amir rather than FonMin. For info addressees: Leave entirely to your discretion whether, at what level, and how much foregoing approach you should make local officials. For Tripoli: Suggest you use in forthcoming audience with King and at Embassy's discretion with Muntassir. For Tunis: Suggest Bourguiba, Jr. For Rabat: Suggest Benhima. For Algiers and Khartoum: Appreciate post's recommendation re desirability use and official to whom this might be transmitted. Rusk
195. Letter From President Johnson to Prime Minister Eshkol/1/ Washington, March 22, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, Israel, Presidential Correspondence. No classification marking. The letter bears no indication of the drafter. Another copy lists both Johnson and Bundy as drafters, but it is filed with a March 22 memorandum from Bundy to Johnson indicating that it was drafted by Bundy. (Ibid., Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 9) Dear Mr. Prime Minister: I want to thank you for your thoughtful letter of March 12. I followed very closely your discussions with Governor Harriman and Mr. Komer, and I think your own summary is just right. And I agree with you entirely that our confidence in each other's understanding, goodwill, and friendship is more important than words--though words are important, too. I also understand fully the responsibility which you carry for the safety of your land and people, and it helps me to have your generous recognition of the responsibilities that fall to me. I believe that in the future, as in the past, it will be possible for our two Governments to meet their responsibilities for peace and security in the Middle East by policies built on trust and respect for each other. In this task we are fortunate in our traditional friendship for each other--a friendship which is clear once more in your generous letter. Mrs. Johnson joins me in sending our warmest good wishes to Mrs. Eshkol and to you. Sincerely, Lyndon B. Johnson
196. Telegram From the Department of State of the Embassy in France/1/ Washington, March 23, 1965, 12:18 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, AE 11-2 ISR. Confidential. Drafted by Russell and Richard G. Long in EUR/WE; cleared by Davies, Talbot, Brown in INR, Officer in Charge of Atomic Energy Affairs in SCI Charles W. Thomas, and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Robert C. Creel; and approved by Ball. Repeated to Tel Aviv. 4902. Paris for Ambassador. You should convey following oral message to FonMin from Secretary: I understand that during your recent visit to Washington you mentioned Israel's Dimona reactor to Mr. Ball. In this connection, you may have seen the article in the March 14 issue of the NYTimes on nuclear developments in Israel. The article is generally accurate with the important exception, however, that visits by American scientists to Israel's facilities have been at the invitation of the Government of Israel and were not in the nature of inspections. The visits to Dimona were part of regular exchanges of visits by scientific experts in connection with both U.S. installations and those of Israel. Our experts have seen enough to draw what appears to be a reasonable conclusion that the Dimona reactor is not being used to produce materials for nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, they also concluded that, should the Israeli Government decide to produce such materials and weapons from them, there is an increasing Israeli capability to do so. Under these circumstances, the United States believes it is highly desirable that Israel accept IAEA safeguards on all of its facilities. Since the U.A.R. has no nuclear weapons capability for the foreseeable future, we think Israeli acceptance of IAEA safeguards might induce President Nasser to accept similar controls. Extension of IAEA safeguards to all nuclear facilities in the Near East would be a major step toward abating the area arms race. The United States continues to follow this situation with concern and would hope for close consultations between our two governments regarding any evidence of the introduction of nuclear weapons into that area./2/ /2/Ambassador Bohlen reported in telegram 5448 from Paris, March 26, that he had that day conveyed the oral message to Foreign Minister Couve de Murville, who expressed doubt that Israel would accept the IAEA safeguards. He said that although according to French information, there was no evidence of any attempt by Israel to produce materials for nuclear weapons, he thought Israel would prefer to keep that possibility open. (Ibid.) Rusk
197. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State/1/ Cairo, March 25, 1965, 11 a.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL UAR-US. Secret; Priority; Exdis. 3351. Dept pass as necessary. I have just returned from a meeting lasting one hour fifteen minutes with President Nasser./2/ /2/The meeting took place on March 24. I began by congratulating him on his re-election/3/ and on the great confidence that the people of the UAR have shown in him. He replied that he was pleased with the response of the people. He had had a brief rest out of town with the Vice Presidents who, under his instruction, had not been allowed to talk business. He remarked that the campaign had been unfortunate in one respect and that was that three people had been killed during a demonstration of support which had caused him great sadness. /3/Nasser was elected to another 6-year term on March 16. I then told the President that I was delighted to have a talk with him. I wanted to emphasize the great importance I attached and my govt attached to our continued conversations. I said that we were in a difficult period and that it was essential that we maintain regular, close and frank contacts with each other. He agreed. He then said that he had received the message I had sent him via Dr. Hatem (he obviously meant Sami Sharaf) which had reached him just as he was preparing his speech for Assiut/4/ and that what I had told him had been very helpful and had been contrary to every other bit of info that he had. He also expressed his appreciation for my having kept him informed of my movements and intentions with respect to briefing him on the Harriman mission. He so strongly implied that if he had not received my message his speech might have been different that I said again that we must not, either of us, permit ourselves to act on any matter unless we were sure that we had talked it out together and had the best info available. He nodded pleasantly and agreed. /4/The message has not been further identified. The speech at Assiut was given by Nasser on March 8. Telegram 3117 from Cairo, March 9, reported that the speech contained no direct attack on the United States and that the "preponderance of venom" was reserved for UAR relations with West Germany, which had recently declared the intention of recognizing Israel. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 15-1 UAR) I then said that I was happy to present to him a letter from the President./5/ He appeared pleased. He opened it and read it twice with great care. I had a slight feeling he was about to react to the contents of the letter and I stopped him from commenting, saying that as the President had requested I was there to brief him in detail on a great many matters of some complexity. I said that again in the interest of being sure that we had no misunderstanding I had written down the points that my govt had instructed me to make and would follow closely an outline and suggested that we have a frank talk thereafter. I then carefully went over the points contained in Deptel 5632/6/ which I had paraphrased on paper (with a very few minor changes where I felt he might be offended or confused by one or another word). I went very slowly, watching him closely as I proceeded. He stopped me once or twice and I repeated phrases. /5/Document 192. /6/Document 193. He then said "This gives me a good opportunity to talk about a number of things." I said I was glad to hear him say that. He again seemed on the verge of an emotional response but quickly got himself under control. He spoke strongly about the tanks that Germany had sold to Israel. He said that the UAR had known for some time that military equipment was being sent to Israel but that the UAR had believed it was entirely of German manufacture. He said that the info about the tank deal had reached him two or three months ago and had really caused "all the trouble." He said it led to the Ulbricht visit which had been pressed upon him for three years. He said with great feeling there was no Soviet pressure at any time contrary to what newspaper reporters in the US had indicated. East Germany had never been mentioned by Mr. Khrushchev except insofar as the German problem itself was discussed. He repeated emphatically there was no Soviet pressure and appeared to irritate himself at the thought. He then launched into various statements with respect to the numbers of tanks going to Jordan. He said this would lead to more tanks going to Israel which would lead to more tanks needed here. I attempted to get him off the question of numbers and the inter-relationship of the Jordan-Israel-UAR problem by saying that the Jordanian and the Israeli deals were for different reasons and that I did not have info on the Jordanian matter which was somewhat separate from the general problem we were discussing and that I assumed that through the UAC he would know the details of the Jordanian armament. He then said (and came back to this point a couple of times) that he did not know how many tanks the Germans had sold or delivered to Israel. Estimates ranged from 60 to 300 or even more. He said "I suppose you are now going to match all the tanks they haven't delivered. We don't know how many were promised or delivered although our military consider that 80 percent have been received." I replied that no sales contracts had been entered into but that the present possibility was for a limited number of older models although that this was not yet a firm deal. He then sought other details and I made the statement contained in my instructions with respect to supersonic aircraft, less sophisticated aircraft and to the absence of other weapons on the horizon. I stressed the fact that the supplies we made available would be sales and at the same price to all buyers. This seemed to relieve him. The President then made some general comments. He said that the US "counted all the Arabs together." He said "The Arab world cannot be brought together quickly or easily. You must realize this from your own experience with NATO." He said that what really had to be considered was Egypt. Egypt would be the country which must be knocked out in the event of a conflict. He said that no one could count upon the other Arabs, either individually or collectively and that Egypt was the mainstay as far as military power in the Arab world was concerned. He then reviewed the events of 1956 and the precarious position the UAR was in at that time drawing the moral that the UAR must always be able to defend itself against aggressors. If the UAR had not been able to hold out for nine days if would have made no difference what the UN or anyone else did. We talked for a few minutes of that period and I reminded him rather delicately, I thought, of the US role in 1956. He said that the UAR was appreciative of that role but repeated again that it had to be able to withstand attacks. At that point I reaffirmed our desire now as in '56 for peace in the area and of our readiness to do what we could to assure it. By this time the President became quite reminiscent and reviewed the efforts of the past to solve the Israeli problem. The statement by Ben Gurion re earlier US efforts which recently appeared in the press seemed very much on his mind. He expressed some concern that this statement would hurt him in Egypt and the Arab world because it implied the possibility that he was willing to come to terms on the Israeli problem. He indicated that he had been willing during the Anderson Mission/7/ to go along with a reasonable settlement but had been turned down by the Israelis. He said that he considered the Israelis a threat to him and that the Arab world was concerned about increase of population and immigration into Israel which would increase the threat. He said that earlier proposals which he had been willing to go along with at one time would perhaps have solved the problem but "you would have had something other than Israel as it is today." In effect the plans amounted to a new kind of state based on Jews and the Arab refugees living together. Now he saw no solution to the Israeli problem for years--50 or 60, maybe more. /7/Robert B. Anderson visited Egypt and Israel in early 1956 as President Eisenhower's personal representative. For documentation concerning his mission, see Foreign Relations, 1955-1957, vol. XV, pp. 16-343 passim. During his comments he spoke of the Jordan waters; of the difficulty of getting agreement in the Arab world to a plan; of the minimal effect that the diversion plans would have on the actual supply of water available to Israel; and of the relation to immigration of additional water supplies that Israel might have. I repeated the arguments in my instruction with respect to "spite" aspects of the Arab plan which I said was a source of tension and that I thought we must all look to every source of strain and tension in this delicate situation and try to remove them. He nodded but made no comment. At about this time an air raid warning went off and we sat silently for a few minutes. I wondered what the realities of the Middle East had for us now. He then assured me this was only a practice and a local one. We immediately returned to the arms tension. He said "You have told me you are going to sell arms to Israel. The pressure from my military will be to equal its arms. The pressure from my military resulting from the German deliveries, even though the amount is uncertain, has already been forthcoming." I said this was the point I had been making with respect to the need for some curtailment of the unfortunate arms race in the Middle East. This is the thing we must work toward. He made no comment and did not pursue the matter. As I started to leave I repeated the need for our govts to keep in close touch. I said that we were in difficult period and that we must not permit ourselves on either side to risk grave dangers because of misunderstanding or misinformation and that I hoped that he would talk with me again after thinking over what I had said. He asked me if I would give him a copy of the notes from which I had worked or alternatively to send him a memorandum. I said that the notes were informal with my pencil scribblings but that I would leave them--which I did. (Included paraphrase paras 1-14, not FYI paras, of Deptel 5632.) I said that after he had studied them perhaps a further talk would be in order. I said that all times if he felt uncertainty as to our intention or purpose or even curiosity as to what was going on I would welcome a call from him or one of his staff. I also said that if he had questions I could not answer I would say so and would attempt to get him my govt's view in any situation by special emissaries here if he had any feeling that this would be useful. I said that the President stood ready to assure that he knew the details of our positions and would provide an emissary if he wished to go into depth on any issues. He said no, "I would prefer to continue as we are going." He expressed approval of the President's desire that talks continue and said that he would be happy to see me at any time I felt it desirable. Comment: The conversation, except for the one or two almost emotional moments, could not have been more cordial. His tone was friendly, warm, and more in sorrow than in anger (after he learned of our intentions). The only real emotion came with respect to the tank sale by the Germans. Neither the Yemen nor any of the other contingency subjects were raised and I made no effort to bring them up as I felt we had both had enough. Battle
198. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson/1/ Washington, March 29, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Robert W. Komer, Presidential Decisions (LBJ), 1965. Secret. Small CCC Credit for the UAR. We've been keeping tight WH control over every facet of aid to Nasser. The UAR has requested CCC credit terms for 200,000 tons of corn (about $10 million worth). This would be a dollar sale on only slightly softer than normal commercial terms, and is not regarded as "aid." Even so, we'd be chary were it not that Nasser reacted very mildly when we told him about limited US arms sales to Israel. While this may be only the lull before the storm, it would make life a lot easier for us if he kept quiet. Therefore, State and our Ambassador see the CCC offer as a small and low key signal that we're still interested in doing business if he's a good boy. In fact Luke Battle's analysis (Cairo 3382 attached)/2/ is hopeful on this score. /2/Battle commented in telegram 3382 from Cairo, March 27, on his March 24 meeting with Nasser. He stated that it strengthened the Embassy's impression that they were witnessing the beginning of the end of the current phase of Egyptian policy with its emphasis on Arab unity. He thought a number of Nasser's comments to him made him sound like an "Egypt firster." (Ibid., Country File, United Arab Republic, Vol. III) Bundy and I agree with Rusk, but want to check it out with you./3/ /3/The "Disapprove" line is checked with the notation "See me. L." in Johnson's handwriting. R. W. Komer/4/ /4/Bundy initialed below Komer's signature.
199. Circular Airgram From the Department of State to Certain Posts/1/ CA-10209 Washington, March 30, 1965, 7:10 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 3 PAL ENTITY. Confidential; Air Pouch. Drafted by Stackhouse on March 12; cleared by Davies and Director of the Office of South Asian Affairs Turner C. Cameron, Jr., and in draft by Deputy Director of the Office of Northern African Affairs James J. Blake and Stephen J. Campbell; and approved by Talbot. Sent to Aden, Aleppo, Alexandria, Algiers, Amman, Baghdad, Baida, Basra, Beirut, Benghazi, Cairo, Casablanca, Constantine, Damascus, Djakarta, Jerusalem, Jidda, Khartoum, Kuwait, London, New Delhi, Oran, Paris, Port Said, Rabat, Taiz, Tripoli, Tunis, USUN, and Karachi. SUBJECT Recent press accounts indicate that the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) plans shortly to have offices in all Arab countries except Saudi Arabia. Offices are also to be opened in Great Britain, India, Indonesia and the United States. An office has been opened in Pakistan. As officers in these countries will probably be exposed increasingly to contacts with the PLO and its officials, the Department wishes to set forth guidelines for these contacts. There are of course fundamental differences between the PLO's views of the Palestine problem and our own. We are as a matter of national policy committed to support the continued existence of Israel; PLO officials repeatedly have declared it is that organization's aim to see the state of Israel destroyed. We are committed to a peaceful solution of the whole complex of Palestine issues; the PLO's declared policies increasingly indicate it sees no alternative to solving these problems than by force of arms. Because of our role in Israel's creation and our support of Israel, PLO statements are almost invariably hostile to the United States. We have made no public statements regarding the PLO. We do not recognize it as the sole or even as an official representative of the Palestine people. It is the USG's view that it has no official status whatever. In spite of the chasm between the PLO and ourselves, we do not wish to cut ourselves off entirely and irrevocably from its members and officials as individuals. We believe that productive relations can be established between PLO members and USG officers. We do not believe that we should undertake any kind of broad-scale campaign to establish such relations, but neither should we ignore opportunities as might present themselves. Such relations we believe are another way of demonstrating to the Palestinians and other Arabs our continuing friendship for the Palestinian people. There is of course the possibility of acquiring useful intelligence. And finally the maintenance of these contacts would be a useful hedge against some unforeseen and fundamental change in the Palestine problem and our relation to it. Accordingly the Department wishes to caution the posts that they should take no action that might be construed as official recognition of the PLO. They may acknowledge mail from individuals in the PLO but should not enter into substantive correspondence with them as PLO officials. Officers should not call at PLO offices or encourage PLO calls at embassies or consulates. If PLO officials wish to call at USG offices they should be received at a subordinate level. Officers should not attend official PLO functions. There is no objection, however, to US officers' attendance of small, informal functions given by PLO officers or ones at which the latter are present, even as guests of honor. Officers may where appropriate maintain unostentatious personal contact with PLO officials. They may attend official host country functions at which PLO officials are present, though not ones at which they are guests of honor. For its part, the Department intends to receive any PLO callers at the level of Office Director or below. It is intended that any contacts by Department officers with PLO officials outside the Department be kept at a subordinate level and be unostentatious and informal. The Department welcomes continuing reporting on the PLO and individuals connected with it. Rusk [Continue with the next documents] Volume XVIII Index | Foreign Relations Online | Historian's Office | Department of State | Secretary of State |