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 | FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XVIII Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964-67 Department of State |
 180. Message From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/ Tel Aviv, March 6, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Harriman Israeli Mission (I). Secret. Received at the White House at 2331Z. Eyes only for Bundy from Komer. Herewith my current appraisal our negotiating position. 1. Big problem is that it has probably lost good deal of its credibility in Israeli eyes. A. Barbour's initial demarche telling Israelis we had to go ahead pronto on Jordan arms was 4 February over month ago. Since then we've repeatedly underlined urgency this matter. As instructed I just told them again we must go ahead. But by this time, Israelis must have concluded we unwilling actually do so without adequate assurances at least tacit Israeli support. B. Keeping Harriman and then me here so long further underscores our reluctance to move. Though Israelis also realize I being kept here so they can't shift venue to Washington, even this adds to their bargaining leverage. C. Fact that each time we get new instructions we slightly enrich our offer probably also convinces them that we prepared pay pretty high price if they wait us out. Even latest proposal, though deliberately conditioned be unacceptable, at least dangled possibility some 40-50 million dollars in arms sales, which would buy quite a few tanks and planes. D. Inevitable publicity attendant on Harriman mission further eroded our bargaining position. I should have come out again covertly, but hesitated argue this too strongly a second time. Adding to publicity is what I suspect is deliberate Israeli press campaign put pressure on us sell arms to Israel. This too probably inevitable once speculation on Harriman mission mounted and Israelis also found out we willing in principle. 2. Thus chief remaining credible element our position is that we keep insisting Israel give us quite far-reaching reciprocal undertakings for what they want from us. At bottom, Israelis have probably already accepted our basic propositions insofar as they can. Biggest difficulty is how to get these recorded in manner politically tolerable to Eshkol yet sufficiently reassuring to us. 3. You may recall my prediction about six weeks of haggling needed get Israelis signed on to Jordan arms sale. However, I was wrong in assuring President that adding major concession of willingness make direct sales Israel too at long last would permit quick agreement. Perhaps this was possible if negotiation confined these two issues. But several factors--trying reach broad package understanding, necessarily high pressure tactics because of need go ahead with Jordan, some awkward phrasing, our brief, and Israeli inability shake hands on a deal without haggling, have stretched out bargaining process. Nor is this really surprising, given crucial importance to both Israel and US of series of matters we trying settle. 4. Next essential to be taken into account is that Israeli security position is in fact deteriorating, even if there were no prospective US arms sales to Jordan to add marginally to Arab threat. Crux of matter is continued Soviet arms supply to Arabs, but secondary factors are new degree of Arab unity of command under UAC, and German arms cancellation. Add to this Israeli nervousness over what they rightly see as mounting new Arab-Israeli crisis over Jordan waters, which will test their mettle and ours. 5. This is basic context in which Israelis (a) worry lest we tie their hands on preemption; (b) fear we falling away on Johnston Plan, where US their chief supporter; and (c) naturally seize on golden opportunity presented by our coming to them on Jordan matter to milk us for all they can get. 6. Important to recognize, however, that our coming to them merely precipitated these issues. They would have been at us shortly in any case with new arms requests and appeals for support on water. Remember they asked to send Golda Meir and military team for talks even before we hit them on Jordan arms. 7. If above analysis correct (Barbour, an old hand by now at Israeli game, believes it is), then we need reassess our negotiating position. Barbour comments that we trying buy new Cadillac for ten bucks. If our real position is that we unwilling go ahead on Jordan arms without satisfactory assurance at least tacit Israeli support, and if Israelis convinced of this by now and think they can afford to outwait us, then have we any alternative but to pay the necessary price? 8. Little doubt their basic demand is for credible fleshing out our carefully hedged promise to sell arms. This probably will take light bombers as well as tanks. Perhaps best means of sawing off matter promptly enough to enable us move on Jordan sales, would be private oral commitment by me, on President's behalf, that will provide certain number tanks and see that they get certain number light bombers at decent price within specified period, if they keep matter completely secret. Sanction would be, as on earlier tank deal, that we'd cancel if matter came out. Reason for wording on bombers is that we may prefer subsidize a Vautour/Spey engine deal. 9. Another way to restore credibility our position would be to take calculated risk Israelis already sufficiently hooked, and go ahead with Hussein now. Odds are Israelis would still keep reasonably quiet, while redoubling their pressures on us. But need not spell out risks this course. 10. In sum, maintaining Israeli deterrent edge is so important to us as stabilizing factor in new Arab-Israeli crisis, other commitments we seek are so valuable, and it so important go ahead with Jordan that we ought either (a) make final offer good enough to sign up Israel; or (b) soften up Israelis by showing them they don't have veto on Jordan arms. 11. Believe I aware as anyone in Washington of importance preserving US position in Arab world. Moreover, I fear we'll lose Hussein if we don't sign contract before Arabs conclude from all the publicity that we have to buy off Israelis first. Indeed unless some secrecy preserved on Israeli arms, we may lose Hussein anyway, because Nasser will accuse Hussein of forcing US arms sale to Israel by his insistence on taking US instead of Soviet arms. 12. But underlying reality is that developing situation in Middle East will compel us to sell tanks and probably planes to Israel sooner or later anyway, as only alternative to binding alliance. So it strikes me as much better to promise this quietly now, when we can get maximum in return, than to stall till public pressures plus area imperatives force us to do so later with less return for US. Afraid my NEA colleagues fail grasp this fundamental. 13. Unless next Israeli counterproposal proves above analysis wrong, will send gist shortly to Department. But want inform you in advance in hope you can weigh in on these unpleasant realities; if relayed too bluntly from here they may sound like self-seeking advice.
181. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel/1/ Washington, March 7, 1965, 6:53 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 12-5 JORDAN. Secret; Priority; Exdis. The message was drafted at the White House and sent to the Department of State with a note from Bundy stating that it had been cleared in substance by Ball and should not be sent until Talbot saw it. The telegram indicates that it was cleared by Talbot. 889. For Komer from McGeorge Bundy. 1. Have reviewed all your messages over this week end and have had long talks with highest authority. I detect a difference in temper between our sense of the problem and yours, which this message aims to bridge. Current clear preference here is for a prompt and clear-cut understanding limited as closely as possible to the immediate problem of Jordan arms sale. The general line in Deptel 685/2/ is not a bargaining tactic but his genuine preference. /2/The reference should be to telegram 865, Document 175. 2. Highest authority does not now believe we should accept continuing general open-ended obligation to supply arms to Israel. The carefully hedged offer in Harriman's initial instructions was matched by a requirement of strong Israeli undertakings on nuclear weapons and on avoidance of pre-emptive attack over Jordan waters. But Israelis resist flat undertakings which affect their ultimate sovereign power. (This Israeli reluctance has been reaffirmed forcibly through Feinberg today--protect source.) 3. In this situation White House view is we should leave these larger wider questions open for later discussion. We cannot now get a guarantee on the nuclear matter or even on Jordan waters. We have requested State-Defense coordination on concrete proposal which might meet Eshkol's aside to you--taking account of your own recommendations to us. In addition we would want a gentlemen's agreement that our deal with Hussein will not be undercut by Israel, but we do not currently think that Eshkol letter to President is essential means of registering this gentlemen's agreement. This message is for guidance only and is not an instruction. Instruction should follow today or tomorrow, and present object is simply to insure that in any intervening discussion you focus attention sharply on the immediate problem of Jordan decision and a balancing arms offer to Israel. Highest authority wishes to take every possible step to turn talks away from open-ended arms commitment now./3/ /3/Komer replied in telegram 1131, March 8, which reads in part as follows: "Read Deptel 889 loud and clear. Our tempered reaction is that prompt and limited understanding along lines described possble if we prepared pay reasonable price." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 12-5 JORDAN) Rusk
182. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel/1/ Washington, March 8, 1965, 8:57 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 12-5 ISR. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Text received from the White House, cleared by McGeorge Bundy, and approved by Jernegan. The substance of the telegram was apparently decided at a meeting of the President, McNamara, Rusk, Ball, and McGeorge Bundy between 6:01 and 7 p.m. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary) No record of the meeting has been found. Briefing memoranda and draft cables prepared for the meeting are ibid., National Security File, Country File, Harriman Israeli Mission (II), and in Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 70 A 1266, Israel 470. 896. For Komer. 1. Since Israelis have delayed several days in making counter proposal, you should now approach Eshkol as soon as possible and seek his prompt agreement on carefully defined and limited agreement foreshadowed in Deptel 865./2/ /2/Document 175. 2. Terms and conditions of proposal are as follows: (1) The US recognizes Israeli tank needs have increased because of prospective Jordan sale and possibility of non-delivery of 90 remaining German tanks. Accordingly, the US is now prepared to ensure sale on favorable credit terms of tanks to meet these changes as follows: (a) 100 tanks for later delivery to match new Jordan sales, and (b) 90 tanks for delivery in calendar year '66 if German agreement is not completed. We can make these deliveries in form of M-48A1 or M-48A3 tanks, but you should point out that what we offer Israel we may have to offer Jordan. (2) The USG is prepared to ensure opportunity for Israel to buy "a few" planes for later delivery, if not from Western sources, then from the United States. The USG does not believe it is in the interest of either government to decide now on exact model of airplane. FYI. "A few" means less than 20, which is the upper limit of possible sales under proposed Jordan agreement, and you should make this number privately known to Eshkol. End FYI. (3) We wish to have a private agreement with Prime Minister Eshkol that Israel will not attack Jordan arms sale and that friends of Israel in the US will be given clear private guidance on this point. We ask this private agreement because we understand from Harriman/Komer mission that Government of Israel does plainly prefer US to USSR as Jordanian arms supplier. You should re-emphasize our understanding of this point and make it clear to Eshkol that if he takes a different view, now and not later is the time to say so. (4) US undertakings on tanks and aircraft for Israel, as stated above, must be kept wholly secret for as long as possible in interest of both governments, and there must be agreement to consult fully on means of handling public statements when they become necessary. 3. You and Ambassador are authorized to develop argumentation for this straightforward agreement in the light of your own understanding of thinking of GOI. The following arguments seem important to us: (1) Unless Israelis will tell us that they prefer Soviet arms to Jordan, we must move promptly with Hussein. But we greatly prefer not to make a deal with Hussein unless we have an understanding with Eshkol, and therefore such understanding is increasingly urgent unless Israelis wish to take responsibility for driving Hussein to the Soviets. (2) The offer to find necessary tanks up to a total of 190 should more than meet immediate Israeli concerns deriving from Jordan sale and possible German shortfall. (3) Similarly, offer to join in finding "a few" aircraft represents precisely what Eshkol asked for in his aside to you. First military analysis suggests that B-66 is not at all what Israelis really want, in either political or military terms. It would outrage Cairo but not offer best capabilities. There are a number of other planes, both US and European, which deserve careful study before a decision is made. In this situation it is much better not to decide on specific aircraft or means of ensuring sale. We have taken full note both of Eshkol's aside to you and of his statement that Israelis can find the funds they need. We believe him on both counts. He in turn should believe us when we say that we will help. This offer in fact goes beyond any commitment we will now make to Jordan. (4) You should make it absolutely clear that broader agreement initially proposed by Harriman now seems to us wholly impracticable. Our offer to supply arms in the future was carefully hedged and made contingent upon Israeli acceptance of undertakings on Jordan waters and on nuclear development which are flatly unacceptable to the GOI. We recognize and accept that it is impossible for Eshkol to abandon final sovereign right of decision. But what is true for Prime Minister is just as true for the President. We therefore conclude that it is much better for both governments to reach a clear agreement now on the issues which need decision and to proceed as friends in the future, treating wider issues on their merits. We both will be free to press our view on these wide issues, always within the framework of recognition by both governments of their deep common interest in preserving the peace both by limiting the arms race and by avoiding a dangerous imbalance of power. FYI. If necessary to reach agreement, we could consider a reaffirmation of US policy in this sense, just as we are ready to reaffirm our policy on Jordan waters as stated in Shriver letter and our readiness to press Hussein for agreement to keep tanks east of the river. End FYI. 4. You should make it very clear to Eshkol that if this generous solution to the immediate problem is not acceptable, your mission will be at an end and it may become necessary for USG to make its own decision on Jordan even without Israeli support. You should make it clear as your own personal judgment that, without agreement, Washington would have to reach and publicize its own judgment that Israelis themselves prefer US supply to Jordan, as against Moscow. The US and Israel have now spent a month exploring alternatives and we are not prepared to allow the Government of Israel to bargain indefinitely in search of advantage from a US decision which in and of itself already serves true Israeli interest. 5. Finally, you should make it very clear indeed that we are not ready to accept a shift in the arena of discussion either by a special Israeli emissary to Washington or by an attempted end-run through friends of Israel in the United States. Such tactics are certain to react adversely to the interests of Israel. We have now made this point clear on about five occasions to friends of Israel in Washington and we are not pleased by continuing efforts to use these side channels. Rusk
183. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State/1/ Tel Aviv, March 10, 1965, 1 a.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 12-5 ISR. Secret; Flash; Exdis. Received on March 9 at 6:58 p.m. and passed to the White House. 1142. For Secretary and Bundy. Part One. Most grateful your 896 and 898./2/ We played to hilt. After talk with Peres, Levavi, Harman tonight we confident final closing tomorrow with Eshkol possible. Had arranged meeting with him tomorrow Wednesday 10 March 9 p.m. say goodbye, at which will now hopefully settle whole matter. Did not reveal our full position tonight. Instead passed word Peres and others earlier I had permission go home. US was tired with months' haggling and would make its own decisions, since no gentlemen's agreement seemed possible. Histrionics rejecting last night's Harman performance useful too. This worked, and they came to us tonight. /2/Telegram 896 is Document 182. Telegram 898 to Tel Aviv, March 9, responded to telegram 1140 from Tel Aviv, also March 9, in which Komer proposed revisions and clarifications in his instructions in telegram 896. Telegram 898 stated that the United States should offer M48A1 tanks to Israel and M48 tanks to Jordan, that Komer could refer to "less than 24" planes rather than "less than 20" but should avoid specific comment on types of planes, and that he should make it clear that the United States might have to conclude arrangements with Hussein the next day. (Both in National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 12-5 ISR) Their counterproposal follows in Part Two,/3/ as amended by us to remove nonsense. Also our comments on what needed close deal, which will cause Washington no pain in our judgment. Komer will see Peres privately for lunch tomorrow convey gist our response. Will draw on Deptels 896 and 898 if you can't respond by then. /3/The proposed Israeli memorandum of understanding, with Komer's comments, was transmitted in telegram 1143 from Tel Aviv, March 10, which constituted Part Two of Komer's message. (Ibid.) Telegram 1144 from Tel Aviv, March 10, transmitted Part Three of his message, which reported additional details on the meeting. (Ibid.) They bought our insistence secrecy and credible undertaking tacit acquiescence in Jordan arms sale. Promise give this to us as firm oral gentlemen's agreement tomorrow, which Harman will execute Washington. Harman much subdued tonight. Part [Two] will follow. Barbour
184. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State/1/ Tel Aviv, March 11, 1965, 2 a.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 12-5 JORDAN. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Received on March 10 at 8:32 p.m. and passed to the White House. 1151. For SecState, SecDef, Bundy. Ref: Embtel 1150./2/ Highlights final sessions with Israelis. Komer went over script with Peres at luncheon, saying had only tentative Washington OK since top echelon had not yet signed off./3/ But told Peres previous night's session enabled him suggest way break logjam by urging some give on planes in lieu impossible idea $40-50 million compensatory sales. Gave Peres list suggested oral understandings plus draft memo. /2/Telegram 1150 from Tel Aviv, March 10, informed Johnson, Rusk, and Bundy that the memorandum of understanding had been signed. (Ibid.) /3/Telegram 903 to Tel Aviv, sent at 12:59 a.m. on March 10, told Komer that he should press for a final understanding that evening but that his instructions would be confirmed in time for his talk with Eshkol. (Ibid., DEF 12-5 ISR) In evening Peres, Levavi insisted meeting first with us and attempted reintroduce concept sales to Israel of value comparable to Jordan. Komer flatly rejected, saying if so must go back to comparable kinds and quantities too. That was that. Then accepted minor addition of "direct" sales para 5. Also told Peres Washington willing consider so-called Peres gambit on Bonn/US/Israel tank drill./4/ Peres sent off cable Bonn that "unofficial US answer is they will consider if and when Germans approach US." /4/Reference is to a proposal reported by Komer in telegram 1144 (see footnote 3, Document 183) that since the United States had been willing to sell 150 M48A2 tanks to Germany to replace the ones that Germany had intended to sell to Israel, the United States might ship 90 of them to Israel and charge the cost to the Germans. When met Eshkol he had word on preceding, so all went well. Expressed great appreciation President's response Israel's needs. Said ready to sign memo. On publicity we could tell President he would do everything possible. He wouldn't brag US giving Israel tanks, if only so Jordan wouldn't brag either. Said tell President Israel relations with Germany would now improve. Pleased at Nasser's latest "folly." Komer replied would assure President Israel would not undercut Jordan sales program. Komer regarded US as having gentlemen's agreement (PM nodded assent). As agreed yesterday, we depended on Harman give clear private guidance friends in US why US compelled sell limited arms Jordan prevent Soviets/Nasser coming in. Hoped Eshkol wouldn't mind if President told one or two mutual friends too. Assured Eshkol we would try hardest avoid press leaks our end too. On principle cui bono, US had no interest damaging Hussein by revealing Israel agreed US arms sales. We planned deliver basic M-48 to Jordan and M-48A1 to Israel, Israel could convert latter under contract with US. Remaining M-48's we'd deliver if Germans didn't were 90. On planes, should leave to military experts. Though planes either from US or other sources, we did not exclude B-66 or include it, latest word was our military people don't think B-66 best type for Israel. In response Peres question, Komer said that, speaking entirely personally, he didn't see why USG wouldn't at least consider SP guns instead of tanks or engines instead of planes. Let's leave to experts. PM agreed. Komer said must repeat this no change our long-standing arms policy--a balanced exception; not open-ended. Komer expressed appreciation PM's agreement on secrecy. Said essential keep M-48A3 kit deal secret as long as possible too. This in Israel's own interest to keep down Jordanian pressure for M-48A3's. Next Komer said asked make clear genuine perturbation at highest levels USG at unofficial approaches purporting speak for Israel. Hoped government-to-government matters could be handled through same channels though couldn't stop friends from talking about general attitudes. Stressed importance mutual understanding between heads of states as more important than anything else. PM got point. Had earlier told Peres to tell PM not send people Washington prematurely. Suggested at least 6-8 week interval let us recover from shock. PM himself mentioned this later. Believe point made. At this point Deptel 909/5/ brought to us in meeting. Asked recess so could consider. Must say this almost blew up whole show again. We compelled make command decision, what to change in memo already being typed for signature and which to finesse. We take full responsibility. /5/Telegram 909 to Tel Aviv, March 10, authorized Komer to give U.S. agreement to a draft memorandum of understanding, the text of which was transmitted in telegram 910 to Tel Aviv, also March 10, and commented on some of the desired changes. (Both in National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 12-5 ISR) The draft transmitted in telegram 910 was similar in substance to the signed memorandum of understanding except as indicated in this telegram and in footnote 6 below. Got in clear reference to 90 tanks, i.e. remainder of the 150 not shipped. Peres wanted latter phrase to cover possibility Italians would hold back 20 in Italy. We said would argue later. Felt essential leave language re sources aircraft as change this sensitive matter could have re-opened whole package. Furthermore, present form says same thing as Deptel 909. Skipped altered secrecy provision;/6/ can't repudiate all previous words at last meeting. /6/The paragraph on publicity in the draft transmitted in telegram 910 to Tel Aviv consists of two sentences similar in substance to the second and third sentences in paragraph VII in telegram 1152 (Document 185), but does not include the first sentence. Telegram 909 states that the change was made in view of the U.S. intention to disclose the general outline of the deal to the Jordanian and UAR Governments and to some Western Europe allies. [Language?] on Hussein's intention inserted, at cost raised eyebrows. Last sentence para 7 also altered per Deptel 910. In return we agreed new sentence in para IV that US told Hussein no sales if he got Soviet arms. To clear atmosphere, Komer then paraphrased Deptel 909 para on Peres gambit,/7/ citing it as good news. This helped. /7/It expressed willingness to cooperate in the "Peres gambit" but commented that it would be best arranged through a private Israeli-German understanding. Next we suggested agreed memcon to be initialed both sides. PM agreed and Barbour will follow through./8/ Finally, Komer asked PM if could give him some good word on non-preemption. PM said Israel wouldn't move "for month, two months, three months." While discussions going on. Agreed must be further talk about water, either here or in Washington. /8/Barbour sent the memorandum of conversation, initialed by Bitan and Barbour, to Komer with a covering letter of March 17, and Komer forwarded it to Read with a covering memorandum of March 31. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 US/KOMER) A copy of the memorandum of conversation is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Harriman Israeli Mission (IV). One comment PM was that between Komer and Harriman over last four weeks, they had managed much persuade him Jordan sale made sense. Harman urged, with PM's consent, that we urge Hussein keep US sales to him secret as long as possible. This would greatly help Israel keep quiet too. Harman further proposed we consult on what Israel might say if and when matters began coming out. We agreed. And urge prompt follow-through on both items. In final private aside to Eshkol and Meir, Komer told them President had made every effort meet their needs. He asked reciprocal understanding. Planes from US or other sources was great last-minute concession Komer hadn't really expected. In fact, in response PM's plea for concreteness President had just told Komer tell PM privately "up to 24" planes in mind. After near blow-up result in arrival Deptel 910, Komer and Barbour felt had to state number positively instead of negatively. PM moved, expressed appreciation, said tell President we'll collaborate fully. Komer ended by saying don't press things too hard. Give us time to think matters through. Let's work together, not argue with each other. Gently reminded PM that personal rapport with President worth more than any and all pieces of paper. Barbour
185. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State/1/ Tel Aviv, March 11, 1965, 2 a.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 12-5 JORDAN. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Received on March 10 at 8:38 p.m. and passed to the White House and DOD. 1152. Embtels 1150 and 1151./2/ Text of signed memorandum of understanding follows: /2/See Document 184 and footnote 2 thereto. "I. The Government of the United States has reaffirmed its concern for the maintenance of Israel's security and has renewed its assurance that the United States firmly opposes aggression in the Near East and remains committed to the independence and integrity of Israel. II. The Government of Israel has reaffirmed that Israel will not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the Arab-Israel area. III. In view of the importance of an effective Israel deterrent capacity as a major factor in preventing aggression in the area, the United States will of course continue, as in the past, to be ready to discuss with Israel its needs and problems. IV. The United States has informed the Government of Israel that it may sell quantities of arms and military equipment to Jordan in order to preclude the Soviet supply of arms through the UAC to Jordan. King Hussein has assured the United States that if he purchases US tanks, he intends to keep his armor on the East Bank of the Jordan. The United States also has made clear to King Hussein that if he purchases Soviet arms there will be no sales from the United States. The United States will keep Israel informed of the completion of any deal with Jordan for the provision of US arms and equipment. V. It is understood that Israel is not interested in buying some of the particular items sold to Jordan. Instead the United States will sell Israel on favorable credit terms, or otherwise help Israel procure, certain arms and military equipment as follows: A. The United States will ensure the sale directly to Israel at her request of at least the same number and quality of tanks that it sells to Jordan. B. In the event of the Federal Government of Germany not supplying to Israel the remainder of the 150 M48 tanks outstanding under the German-Israel tank deal of 1964, the United States will ensure the completion of this program. C. The United States is further prepared to ensure an opportunity for Israel to purchase a certain number of combat aircraft, if not from Western sources, then from the United States. VI. The Government of Israel intends to provide the Government of the United States with a list of its requirements in the near future and requests that discussions on this list take place in Washington at a mutually convenient time. VII. The Governments of the United States and Israel agree that full secrecy shall be maintained on all matters referred to herein and all subsequent actions taken in this connection, until the two governments agree on how and when to divulge them. The Government of the United States has explained to the Government of Israel that premature publicity on the matters covered under this understanding could create serious complications for the United States in its relations with other states in the area. The Government of Israel has informed the Government of the United States that it understands this concern and will be guided accordingly." Barbour
186. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan/1/ Washington, March 10, 1965, 8:59 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 12-5 JORDAN. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Davies; cleared by Stoddart at DOD/ISA and Bunte and in substance by Rusk and by Bundy for the President; and approved by Ball. Repeated to Tel Aviv. 521. Deptels 516 and 518; Embtel 527./2/ FYI After extended negotiations Barbour and Komer late Wednesday night reached agreement with Israelis that was prerequisite to our completing Memorandum of Understanding with King Hussein. Package includes Israeli assurances against being first in area to go nuclear, Israeli agreement to acquiesce in US arms sales to Jordan, renewed US assurances of opposition to aggression in the area, and US agreement to sell Israel on favorable credit terms military equipment in quantities and kinds comparable to US sales to Jordan, plus "less than twenty-four" aircraft after 1966 if Israel unable obtain them from Western European sources. US would also stand ready to complete unfinished portion of German-Israeli tank deal of 1964. End FYI. /2/Telegram 516 to Amman, March 10, transmitted an approved draft of a U.S.-Jordan memorandum of understanding. Telegram 518 to Amman, March 10, discussed the changes in the new draft memorandum of understanding from the draft given to the King and Khammash during the Talbot-Solbert visit. (Both ibid., DEF 19-3 US-JORDAN) Telegram 527 from Amman, March 10, reviewed potential problems in reaching agreement with the King and requested guidance on some points. (Ibid., DEF 12-5 JORDAN) You are authorized to present approved draft of Memorandum of Understanding (Deptel 516) to King, explaining changes described Deptel 518. Although you would expect King to find draft acceptable in view of earlier careful negotiation of understanding, he should know that you instructed to refer to Washington any changes that may be proposed. You have authority to sign Memorandum of Understanding in present form. If, as foreshadowed in your recent talk, King asks what are USG intentions with respect to any military sales or assistance to Israel, you should remind him that he and Khammash had earlier told you and Talbot that Jordan could live with US military sales to Israel provided they not disproportionate. You should say that during Harriman mission and since then USG has been making strong efforts to restrain Israel through a most difficult period. Harriman was successful to some degree in reassuring Israelis as to continued US interest in their integrity and security and US determination to use its influence for peaceful resolution area problems. We believe that likelihood of a preemptive military strike by Israel has been substantially reduced. King knows well that US desires to give maximum support to Hussein's regime, yet traditional US policy has been not to become a major supplier of armaments to either side of the Arab-Israel dispute. This latter position has been part and parcel of our policy of balance in the Arab-Israel context. This dilemma has been difficult for us to resolve. While we have not considered the US has a right to regulate the balance of arms in the Near East, we do have a legitimate concern in preventing development of a significant military imbalance that would be a major threat to peace because of overconfidence or desperation of one side or another. As we are prepared to make an exception to our policy in the case of Jordan, we want the King to know that this may involve comparable sales to Israel. Such sales would generally conform in quantity and type to what USG is prepared to sell to Jordan. We plan to inform certain other Arab governments of the purpose and substance of the Harriman talks in Israel and of the possibility US may make limited arms sales to Israel. Our purpose will be to allay concern and suspicion by explaining frankly reasons for decision. On aircraft, you may assure the King that we have encouraged Israel to look to traditional sources of supply. In conformity with our position on question of aircraft for Jordan, we would also tell Israel that if it is unable to meet its requirement in Europe we would consider direct sale of a few aircraft (about the same number as Jordan is asking). As King knows, we have not discussed possible sale of F-104 series aircraft with Israel and do not plan to do so. Unless Soviet bloc provides more and higher performance aircraft to Arabs sufficient to change strategic situation, we will not change our position during life of this agreement. In the course of your negotiations you should make clear that Israel would react sharply to positioning of Jordan armor on West Bank. Recalling previous discussions of this problem with Messrs. Talbot and Solbert, you should note our expectation that Hussein's asserted policy of not exposing his armor by deployment on West Bank under normal peace-time conditions would be continued. We hope to minimize publicity on these arrangements. If the King should feel need for domestic purposes to note purchases of new equipment, we would like to coordinate approaches. You should also note continuing US interest in Jordan's security as made explicit by both President Kennedy and President Johnson. Rusk
187. National Intelligence Estimate/1/ NIE 30-65 Washington, March 10, 1965. /1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-R01012A, ODDI Registry of NIE and SNIE Files. Secret; Controlled Dissem. A table of contents is not printed. According to a note on the cover sheet, the estimate was submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence and concurred in by the U.S. Intelligence Board on March 10. The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, AEC, and NSA participated in its preparation. The State, Defense, AEC, and NSA representatives concurred; the FBI representative abstained, the subject being outside his jurisdiction. THE ARAB-ISRAELI PROBLEM The Problem To estimate present attitudes and future trends in the Arab-Israeli problem over the next two or three years. Conclusions A. The Arab-Israeli dispute is heating up. The initial success of Arab efforts to cooperate in a scheme for diverting Jordan waters at Israel's expense and for achieving a degree of military unity has given the Arabs some confidence that they may be capable of hurting Israel. This Arab cooperation and the new willingness of richer Arab states to contribute funds to the program have led the Israelis to fear that a significant turning point in the dispute is occurring to Nasser's advantage. In response, they are hardening their posture toward the Arabs. In this situation, tension will be higher in the next few years and the danger of armed clashes greater. B. In a year or so, if the Arab projects to divert the waters of the Jordan River basin materialize, the danger of Israeli strikes to put them out of commission will rise. However, we believe that Israel will first seek to deter the Arabs by a combination of political and psychological moves, directed particularly at detaching Jordan and Lebanon from effective participation in a common Arab military and water diversion effort. The chances are at least even that some development will come to pass by which the Arab diversion projects would satisfy Arab self-esteem without encroaching on Israel's minimum requirements for Jordan water. In the absence of such developments, Israeli strikes against the diversion projects, especially in Syria, are probable. An Israeli strike would probably elicit some Arab military response, most likely by Syria, but would severely strain Arab cooperation. There is some chance of more general fighting in the tense circumstances prevailing, but we believe that both sides would try to avoid a general war during the period of this estimate. C. The accelerating arms race is involving both the Arabs and Israel in advanced weapons development, particularly in the missile field. The Israelis probably will be able to deploy a French-built surface-to-surface missile with a range of about 270 nautical miles by 1967-1968; the UAR may be able to deploy considerably less sophisticated missiles of slightly less range by 1968-1969. The UAR has virtually no prospect of acquiring nuclear weapons except from foreign sources--which we consider highly unlikely. By contrast, the Israelis could probably develop nuclear weapons by 1968-1969 and/or nuclear warheads by about 1971 without outside assistance, if a decision to go ahead were given at this time. We do not believe, however, that the Israelis have taken such a decision. D. Whether the Arab-Israeli controversy erupts into armed clashes or remains confined to political tensions, it will almost certainly be more difficult in the next few years for the US and other Western powers to maintain satisfactory relations with both Israel and the Arab states. The dispute will present the USSR with opportunities to increase its influence with the Arabs. Israel is likely to intensify its already strong pressure on the US both to limit arms supplies to the Arabs and to provide Israel with arms. Israel is also likely to press vigorously for a US security guarantee. Given the strong Arab resentment over US support for Israel in the past, developments of this sort might lead toward a more pronounced polarization of the Arab-Israeli dispute to include the Soviets and Arabs on one side, and Israel and the West on the other. In any event, Nasser's strategy will include threats against Western interests in the area in order to pressure the Western powers to lessen their support to Israel. [Here follow the Discussion portion of the estimate, an annex, and 4 tables.]
188. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State/1/ Amman, March 12, 1965, 1 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 12-5 JORDAN. Secret; Exclusive Distribution. Received at 8:10 a.m. Repeated to Tel Aviv. 536. Deptel 521; Embtel 527./2/ Presented draft memorandum of understanding with explanation for changes to Brigadier Khammash March 10 and met with King, Prime Minister and Khammash afternoon March 11 for further discussion. /2/See Document 186 and footnote 2 thereto. Made careful presentation Deptel 521 to which King's reaction milder than I had anticipated. On statement that we considered likelihood of preemptive military strike substantially reduced, he said he was glad to hear this but all of his intelligence contained ominous indications of build-up for aggressive action. On statement that we might have to make comparable sales to Israel, he said he quite recognized that Israel could not be denied access to arms though he hoped that in present mood of area we recognized that other Arabs might not react as moderately as he did. On stationing of tanks on West Bank, he said he obviously could not give assurances as to internal disposition of his forces. However, he could assure me that under continuation of what might be termed normal conditions he intended to keep tanks on East Bank, but obviously under wartime conditions this assurance would not apply. He would also continue make every effort avoid any action that might be considered provocative. On the memorandum of understanding, the King desired to add language along lines of paragraph 3 of his letter to me (Embtel 486)/3/ but after some discussion and in light of remarks I had already made, agreed to delete this provided I would acknowledge receipt of his letter. This I agreed to do. He also sought to insert language in illustrative sales list stipulating that second 100 tanks would be M48A3 but when I said this unacceptable to Washington he agreed to remove language on understanding that DNF dealing with each other in good faith and that he was anxious to move forward on this much of package as soon as possible. He reiterated in this connection pressures he felt from UAC to demonstrate concrete results and fact that these results must ultimately in some form include supersonic aircraft. /3/Document 154. One open point in addition to changes covered below is that GOJ acceptance of our delivery schedule on M48s is still conditioned on our ability to deliver 48 MAP tanks in next few months (Embtel 525)./4/ Otherwise King said he would have to insist on delivery of at least 50 tanks in 1965 in view of commitments which he had made to UAC subsequent to his discussions with Talbot and Solbert. /4/Telegram 525 from Amman, March 9, reported a March 8 meeting with Khammash. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 19-3 US/JORDAN) [Here follow lists of changes proposed in the memorandum of understanding and the illustrative sales list.] Subject to satisfactory answer on delivery of M48 tanks and acceptance of textual changes outlined above, Prime Minister indicated he stood ready to sign agreement promptly. No reference was made to possible publicity and I did not raise subject./5/ /5/The memorandum of understanding signed March 18 by Barnes and Tell provided for the sale to Jordan on a cash basis of defense articles and services along the lines of an attached illustrative list, with details to be negotiated subsequently. Implementation of the memorandum was conditioned on Jordan's keeping the United States and other free world sources as the sole sources of supply to its armed forces, carrying out the modernization and expansion of its ground forces in a manner that would not adversely affect its economic development, obtaining from sources outside Jordan the funds required for the materiel covered by the memorandum and for the planned expansion of Jordan's military establishment, and Jordan's assurance of its intent to keep its military budget at no more than $52 million a year. The illustrative sales list included 100 M-48 tanks and 50 armored personnel carriers, as well as small arms, ammunition, and other items. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 70 A 3717, 400.3295 Jordan) Barnes
189. Letter From Prime Minister Eshkol to President Johnson/1/ Jerusalem, March 12, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security Files, Special Head of State Correspondence Fle, Israel, Presidential Correspondence. No classification marking. Dear Mr. President, I wish to tell you how much I appreciate your having sent Governor Harriman and Mr. Komer here. As I told Bob Komer the night before he left, our discussions were at times outspoken, but they were discussions between friends. Happily they concluded in agreement in writing and orally. This was possible above all because of our confidence that we can always rely on your understanding, goodwill and friendship. This knowledge is far more important for me than words. I know the heavy burden of responsibility that rests upon you as you strive to preserve the peace and maintain freedom throughout the world, in a period of great danger. My prayers and good wishes go out to you. For myself, I am the custodian of a small estate and the representative of a small people. We are surrounded by enemies. I believe we will win our way to peace, but it will be a hard road. We have nowhere to retreat. You can be assured, Mr. President, that we will fulfil the agreement in complete good faith. My wife joins me in sending Mrs. Johnson and yourself our blessings for good health and peace. Sincerely yours, L. Eshkol [Continue with the next documents] Volume XVIII Index | Foreign Relations Online | Historian's Office | Department of State | Secretary of State |