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 | FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XVIII Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964-67 Department of State |
 170. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State/1/ Tel Aviv, March 1, 1965, 1 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Harriman Israeli Mission (I). Secret; Flash; Exdis/Tan. Received at 6:33 a.m. and passed to the White House. A typed copy was sent to the President. (Ibid., Harriman Israeli Mission (II)) 1075. Personal for Secretary from Harriman. Your message confirms again the difficulty of communication by telegraph that I have known since my 1920 international banking days. I can assure you that all the points you make have been underscored with Eshkol et al to point of rudeness. Your telegram makes assumptions that should not be read into Eshkol's words. We are not on notice that Israel intends military action. It wants to avoid such action but it will not give up its sovereign rights on the basis of a general assurance that we will help them get their share of water. Israelis want to know precisely what we are going to do in support of peaceful means. They certainly believe that the threat of military action is something to keep holding over Arabs as an essential in any negotiations. Eshkol assures me Israel is not flirting with nuclear weapons but they are not willing to commit themselves irrevocably at least until they know Egyptian intentions. Their suspicions are aroused and I could not allay them to point of forever giving up threat they might go nuclear, which they see as of value in deterring Nasser aggression. They believe Nasser's threats that he intends to obliterate them if he can. Experience with Hilter's threats is too recent to be forgotten. I have told Israelis unmistakably that proposed change in U.S. policy means we will give careful consideration to their residual arms needs "if the general security situation in the Near East requires it." They have answered and firmly believe that the security situation in the Near East has already deteriorated since last June, even before our proposal to supply tanks and other material to increase Jordan's military capacity. They ask that we face these facts together now in Jerusalem or in Washington. I am meeting with Eshkol again with Barbour and Komer in Jerusalem this afternoon and I can assure we all will do everything possible to achieve purposes outlined. We agree impolitic for me to remain longer, but that Komer should stay with Barbour to continue negotiations. As procedural matter, however, he cannot "assist Barbour" when he has just recently been here as private Presidential emissary. Barbour concurs. Their working relationship could not be better. Barbour
171. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel/1/ Washington, March 1, 1965, 12:16 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 US/HARRIMAN. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Jernegan and approved by Rusk in draft. Repeated to Kabul. 848. Eyes only for Harriman from Secretary. Tel Aviv's 1075./2/ Please believe me my telegram 847 was not intended to reflect slightest doubt regarding clarity, vigor and force with which you have presented our views during these past four difficult days. On contrary, we can see from your reporting that you have stood very firm against powerful onslaught. /2/Document 170. Forceful reiteration in my telegram of points already essentially covered in your initial instructions was intended simply to give you renewed authority to press Israelis to utmost. It reflected continuing and growing feeling by the President that there are limits beyond which we cannot go in support of Israel. He wanted you to be sure that even the strong case which Eshkol has made on Israel's behalf could not be allowed to override what he considers to be basic interest of US. If we cannot pursue a policy which enables us to further our overall interests in the Middle East, he would prefer to shift responsibility for that area's stability to other hands. I think you have done splendid job, regardless of how your final session today comes out, and you have my warmest and most sincere thanks. Good luck and happy landings for the rest of your trip. Rusk
172. Message From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/ Tel Aviv, March 1, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Harriman Israeli Mission (I). Secret. Received at the White House at 1728Z. For McGeorge Bundy from Komer. 1. Need your help in resolving apparent failure effective communications between Washington and here evident from Eyes Only Deptel 847./2/ /2/Document 169. 2. Well realize Washington may think we need be bucked up, but we've already made and remade every point Deptel 847 in far stronger terms, especially on nuclear weapons. I'm surprised Israelis still speak to me. Also Harriman told them flatly that if they used force on Jordan waters US would be "spang up" against them. 3. Realize Washington worried about mounting Arab counterpressures, but as Harriman says even Soviets are less tough bargainers than Israelis. Harriman, Barbour and I convinced what set back talks was draft Eshkol letter to President we instructed propose. We can get credible assurances if we prepared pay price, but not in this form. 4. In line Deptel we'll threaten again to turn against Israelis if they don't play ball, but this not too credible. Also sure President doesn't want us break too much crockery at time US aid to Arabs already under fire, we trying get new aid bill through Congress, and we face major Jordan water crisis. Nor can we say too loudly we'll withdraw from Middle East and let chips fall where they may. 5. Crux of matter is that these people have received so many broken promises in their long history of dealings with great powers that they must get more than general statements we'll help them out with arms. Though we've said till we're blue in face that they can and must trust US word, no mistaking their determination keep negotiating, if possible in Washington, till they get more on arms. 6. Moreover, let's put ourselves in their shoes and realize we're asking for several specific pledges on matters they regard as essential their security, in return for very unspecific pledges on our part. True, they need us more than we need them, but we can't high pressure them in a few days to settle matters we've been arguing about for several years. At any rate, we can't do so without a little more flexibility. 7. As I tried indicate in Embtels 1060 and 1068,/3/ there must be some way to be specific enough to meet Eshkol's needs without really robbing us of much freedom of action. We're buying so little by delaying the inevitable that I conclude State's chief worry is leaks here which could grievously harm us with Arabs. I couldn't agree more, but let's carefully examine risk of general contingent commitments we have in effect already given without getting firm pledge of secrecy versus risks of leak slightly more specific commitments for which we can get strongest secrecy pledges. Frankly, we're already compromised by leakage German deal, imperatives of selling to Israel once we sell to Jordan, and resultant offers we've already been authorized make here. So risk to us in going slightly farther seems to me far less than risks we already courting. /3/Documents 165 and 168. 8. Any mileage in getting McNamara to look at possible Vautour deal mentioned Embtel 1068? 9. Finally, remember time pressure is requiring us use such strenuous tactics to force Israeli hand that they've probably concluded they can either bid up price now or get further delay while they keep bargaining. Though we've told them they must choose whether to lose Jordan, trouble is they know we are in a bind. 10. I'll stay here pushing hard but urge you help get us minimum necessary to put across early deal, US itself needs as much as Israel at this point. Even so, across-the-board package deal so complex and involves so many gut issues, that breaking up package in favor of more limited understanding along lines alternative B in Embtel 1068 may be best we can get. We just can't settle water issue here and now. My personal view is alternative A shouldn't be ignored either, but this probably too risky.
173. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State/1/ Tel Aviv, March 2, 1965, 2 a.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 US/HARRIMAN. Secret; Immediate; Exdis/Tan. Received at 7:28 p.m. on March 1 and passed to the White House. 1082. For the Secretary from Harriman. In three hour talk with Eshkol, with Mrs. Meir participating, I believe I laid on the line all points covered in your message 849/2/ with Komer by prearrangement filling in for double emphasis. We reviewed sentence by sentence memorandum of understanding, including authorized modification. I believe I am now in a position to advise what we can get in the way of an agreement with the GOI in time to deal with the Jordan arms arrangements. /2/The reference is apparently to telegram 848 to Tel Aviv, Document 171. Telegram 849 to Tel Aviv, sent to Amman as telegram 493, March 1, concerned arms for Jordan. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 12-5 JORDAN) I hate to leave before completing job but under circumstances think my continued highly publicized presence any longer is counterproductive. Eshkol agreed it politic for me to leave tonight and appeared pleased that Komer would stay on with earnest desire of reaching some understanding. A. To cover the most vital subjects first: (1) Israel's non-proliferation commitment: Eshkol has no intention of undertaking nuclear arms development under present circumstances and will restate whatever he has said before, including that Israel pledges it will not be the first to bring or develop nuclear arms into the Middle East. Constitutionally, he can not go much further without full Cabinet and Israel AEC Commission support with attendant public discussion, particularly as AEC Chairman is a political opponent of Eshkol. Net of this is that our earnest talks, plus my appeal to Eshkol to be the President's first supporter of non-proliferation has done some good for long pull. But it is clear that it is not politically possible for Eshkol to do more than the above, without long and full analysis of this problem, including deterrent effect of keeping [garble] guessing plus IAEA technical problems. In sum I recommend that we not attempt to force Israelis beyond what Eshkol can do at this time. (2) The most pressing problem is Israel's Jordan River water rights. I am sure the President understands, far better than I do, that water rights in our Western tradition are fundamental to land rights. Interference with water rights is to Israelis as fundamental as invasion of territory. Israelis will not agree in advance never to use force to protect the water to which we have agreed they entitled under Johnston Plan. They will agree to state affirmatively that they will use all peaceful means to protect their water rights as agreed to by us, and that they will explore with us and utilize every peaceful method to achieve these ends. However, they will not, and nothing will persuade them renounce ultimate use of force to protect their water any more than they would renounce use of force to protect their territory. We must recognize also that use of force has varying degrees. I saw yesterday area where Syrian bulldozers were clearing the ground for diversion canal within a few hundred yards of Israeli border. One heavy machine gun could knock them out. Considering that last night Jordanian terrorists invaded Israeli territory 5 miles to blow up inhabited house, Israelis do not believe warning to Arabs on water will produce full-scale war. However they will agree not to use force till all peaceful means exhausted or preferably affirmatively state that they earnestly seek peaceful means of protecting their water sources. They will agree explore with us and utilize any and all peaceful means to this end. A provision along these lines is negotiable, but we can not expect a renunciation under all circumstances of the use of force to protect Israel's water. B. On the minutiae of memorandum of understanding. In paragraph 2 Israelis don't understand phrase "counter-diversion." They request "counter" be dropped and suggest paragraph read "Both governments agree to review the dangers posed by Arab diversion schemes and the Unified Arab Command buildup." In paragraph 3 Israelis are highly suspicious of phrase Johnston Plan "an equitable standard by which to judge Jordan water usage by riparian states." They fear this means a major change of U.S. policy. I urge we stop using fancy new language and tell Israelis we will support their right to water as provided in Johnston Plan. Greatest difficulty in wording is in paragraph 5. Israelis feel we have insured ourselves three times against any possibility of U.S. direct arms sales. I do hope draft will be reviewed and we recognize that we have to convince Israelis we mean to sell them something. So I urge we drop word "selective" (it means nothing anyway) and combine last phrase of first sentence with last phrase of second sentence so that we state only once our expectation all reasonable Israeli efforts to get arms from Western Europe. Also I urge that "maximum effort" be amended to read "every reasonable effort." With these changes Komer can work out (acceptable) wording for this paragraph. C. Given changes along lines A and B above, Komer, Barbour and I believe we can make a deal promptly for Israeli acquiescence both here and in Washington in US arms sales to Jordan. It is of course for Washington to decide whether we wish to abandon Jordan deal or do it without Israeli acquiescence. Either of these has its domestic and international risks. For my part I earnestly recommend to you and the President that you accept our combined advice to get the best possible on the Jordan arms deal described above, and leave to future negotiations the other difficult problems we have to face with Israel. We always have the leverage of stopping arms delivery if Israelis misbehave. They know they must keep in our good graces, but we must understand in turn that we are dealing with a dedicated people who will not abdicate their right to survival. In leaving I want to express my deep gratitude for the unbelievably prompt responses you have given me at the most inconvenient hours and with I realize, other taxing pressures. Many thanks. Barbour
174. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State/1/ Tel Aviv, March 3, 1965, 1 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL ARAB-ISR. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Received at 7:59 a.m. and passed to the White House. Repeated to New Delhi for Harriman. 1098. From Komer. Deptel 854./2/ As we thought Governor Harriman's reports made clear, almost half of difficult argument here has been over language our brief on Johnston Plan. /2/Telegram 854 to Tel Aviv, March 2, stated that the Israeli Embassy raised the question of whether the language used by Harriman and Komer about the Unified Plan and Jordan waters represented a falling back from the U.S. position taken in discussions with the Israelis in January and February 1964, especially in the memorandum given Ambassador Harman on January 24, 1964. (See Document 11.) Telegram 854 asked how deeply Harriman's and Komer's talks had gone into questions such as allocations, transfers from Lebanon to Syria and Jordan, and the possibility of renegotiation and whether the Israelis seemed alarmed at the U.S. attitude on questions of this type as contrasted with the U.S. opposition to a pre-emptive strike. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL ARAB-ISR) Israeli alarm bells rang from moment we started speaking of US willingness express support of "the principles of the Unified Plan (Deptel 823,/3/ para 7) or that US supported Johnston Plan" as equitable standard by which to judge water rights of riparian states (Deptel 823, para 3). /3/Document 160. Israelis kept asking what this fancy new language meant. Did we still support Johnston Plan or not? They said this reaffirmed all fears aroused recently by Talbot's evasiveness, letter to Mrs. Sisto, etc., etc. Israelis regard us as committed to Johnston Plan as a whole. They keep coming up with new references to the record to sustain their stand. Clearly their tactics are going to be to hold us as much as possible to letter of plan. While this is obviously a bargaining position, they mean to play it to hilt as long as possible and beyond present round of discussions. As Eshkol keeps saying, "It is ok if Lebanon takes 35 MCM's of water but not if it takes 36 or 40." However, Eshkol in aside to me Monday said, "Don't take away our whole basis for compromise. Don't try to make us compromise at the beginning of a crisis rather than at the end." He gets the issue clearly, and Harriman said in return that we obviously weren't going to let Israel tie us down to last letter of Johnston Plan, which only agreed to by Israel, not Arabs. Our firm policy was to see that Israel got the water to which it was entitled. They then cited President Johnson's 2 Jan. 1964 letter to the P.M.,/4/ delivered by Sargent Shriver, which said, "We stand behind you in your rights of withdrawal in accordance with the Unified Plan." We said this still our policy, but not that Arab part of plan was inviolable. /4/Document 1. Stripped of all diplomatese, Israelis see US as slipping away from them on Jordan waters issue, in interests of promoting some other form of compromise. Relevant phrases in our memo of understanding, which I regret to say were not fully understood by me at White House nor properly flagged by me for President, have greatly heightened their suspicions. They think our next step will be to say they don't really have to go to war if 320 MCM allocation is shaded slightly. After all, they'd still get most of the water they need. This in turn adds greatly to their reluctance give up their own right of pre-emption in exchange for wobbly promise of US support. Barbour and I fully agree US cannot let Israelis so tie us down to letter of Johnston Plan that we lose any flexibility in necessary effort work out some new form of peaceful compromise. But manner in which we have sought to evade this issue has inflamed Israeli suspicions and greatly complicated our negotiating task. Deptel 854 shows Dept. still evading issue, while we believe it must be squarely faced. We recommend (and know Harriman does) that we stand firmly on statement in President's Jan. 1964 letter to Eshkol and on Harriman's statement here, that we support Israel's right to water allocated to it under Johnston Plan. This gives us half a loaf of freeing us on Arab portion of plan. It gives Israelis half a loaf by quieting their fears we're beginning to renege on their allocation of Jordan waters too. Moreover, it gives us good public position in Israel and elsewhere against which Israelis will find it hard to make convincing arguments. Barbour
175. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel/1/ Washington, March 3, 1965, 10:48 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 12-5 ISR. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Talbot and approved and initialed by Rusk. 865. For Ambassador and Komer. The President has decided that in view of Israeli difficulties with the proposal carried by Harriman, as subsequently modified at Israeli insistence, we might now take another track. You should inform Eshkol that while we cannot wait longer to go forward with our agreement with Jordan, which as Israelis aware we consider in mutual interest of Israel and USG, we recognize Israeli concerns. In view of Israeli hesitation in accepting proposal presented by Harriman with subsequent modifications we were able to make, we are now prepared to make following alternative offer. The USG is prepared to sell military equipment to Israel comparable in quantities and kinds to the equipment that the United States sells to Jordan to preclude the Soviet supply of arms through the UAC to Jordan. The United States regards such sales as an exception to its existing policy and not as creating any precedent for the future. Condition is that if GOI accepts above offer, it must make a commitment not to oppose our offer to Jordan and to keep all aspects entire agreement completely secret until both governments agree on appropriate publicity. We would expect a letter from Eshkol confirming this understanding along following lines: "Dear Mr. President: I greatly appreciate your consideration in sending Governor Harriman to discuss with us in depth the problems our two Governments face in connection with the developing situation in the Middle East. We have, I think, come to a full understanding. Governor Harriman has made clear the concern of your Government for the maintenance of the security of Israel. On my part, I want you to know that we shall be as understanding as possible in helping you to meet some of the heavy responsibilities that you bear. I am, therefore, pleased to assure you that Israel will utilize all peaceful means to ensure protection of its share of Jordan waters and that we are willing to indicate publicly that Israel will not be the first to acquire or develop a nuclear weapons capability in the Arab-Israel area. For our part, (1) we understand that it is both necessary and useful for the US to seek to maintain an effective influence and presence in the Arab world; (2) we accept the need for the US to provide certain military equipment to Jordan; and (3) we welcome the willingness of the US Government to sell military equipment to Israel comparable in quantities and kinds to the equipment the US sells to Jordan to preclude the Soviet supply of arms through the UAC to Jordan. My government understands that the US regards such sales as an exception to its existing policy and not as creating any precedent for the future." FYI. It is entirely possible that Prime Minister will find this less attractive than broader understanding on which we have been working. But there would be some advantage to us in having record show that, insofar as U.S. concerned, our only departure from longstanding policy (arms to Jordan) was balanced by corresponding offer to Israel. He may wish to return to more general discussion. You should report back any counter proposals he makes, specifically in having before him drafts of letter we think he should write President. What kind of letter does he think he can write President? You should know we feel this matter should be brought to conclusion now rather than ending up in any special emissary or delegation to Washington. End FYI. Rusk
176. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel/1/ Washington, March 4, 1965, 10:43 a.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 33-1 JORDAN RIVER. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Lucien L. Kinsolving of NEA/NE, cleared by Davies and McGeorge Bundy, and approved by Talbot. 866. Tel Aviv's 1098./2/ You may assure GOI that USG has not receded from commitment most recently stated in President's letter to Prime Minister hand-carried by Shriver in January 1964 which stated "We stand behind you in your right of withdrawal in accordance with the Unified Plan." It was, however, made absolutely clear to GOI in memoranda of conversation between Jernegan and Gazit of January 9, 10 and 14, 1964/3/ that the USG considers the Unified Plan to be the version which was presented to the Arabs in October 1955/4/ rather than the version embodied in our draft note of July 5, 1955 to the Israeli Government./5/ These January 1964 memoranda of conversation were reviewed with the Israeli Embassy and agreed-on copies given to Israelis so as to constitute joint record of discussions. In conversation January 10 Jernegan stated (bottom para page 2 of memcon) that re the two disputed allocations, "United States does not share Israel's view on the allocations, and we would have to say that we support the 85/15 and 25 mcms allocations if the issue should arise." Throughout memcon Jernegan is quoted as explaining our final version of Plan provided for UN involvement in supervisory mechanism. Subsequently in conversation with Ambassador Harman January 24/6/ (memcon pouched Tel Aviv) Assistant Secretary Talbot in referring to July 5, 1955 note to Israelis specifically stated, "That was a draft" (page 3). /2/Document 174. /3/See Document 11. /4/For documentation on Johnston's October 1955 talks with representatives of Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria in Cairo, see Foreign Relations, 1955-1957, vol. XIV, pp. 586-587. /5/Regarding the "Draft Memorandum of Understanding" that U.S. and Israeli representatives accepted on July 5, 1955, see ibid., p. 278, footnote 2. /6/See Document 11. As indicated in briefing memorandum, US continues to be committed to Unified Plan as an equitable standard. Israel, however, is not so committed and has never agreed to final version of plan. Agreed language of proposed "Summary and Technical Formula" worked out with Israelis in Department on January 9, 1964/7/ makes this clear. /7/The technical formula is quoted in footnote 5, Document 11. While we stand by Israel's rights to its allocations according to final version of Unified Plan, we are not bound unilaterally to ensure, nor do we have the capability to ensure, that the Arabs will abide by Johnston allocations, although we assume that when all is sorted out, the combined Arab off-takes may well be within the combined Arab allocations. Rusk
177. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State/1/ Tel Aviv, March 5, 1965, 5 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 12-5 ISR. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to Manila for Harriman and passed to the White House. Part Two of Komer's report, consisting of highlights of his conversation with Eshkol, and Part Three, Comments, were transmitted in telegrams 1124 and 1125 from Tel Aviv, both March 5. (Ibid.) Bundy sent a retyped copy of the three telegrams to the President with a covering memorandum of the same date, noting that it was Komer's latest report which Johnson would probably want to read, but that there was no need for action until Eshkol's counter-proposal was received. Bundy added that he shared Komer's evident conclusion that they had "pressed the Israelis far enough" and it was time to agree that "in the very nature of the situation we are bound to be their last resort for arms supply from here on out," especially since the only immediate commitment required was for "tanks and `a few' planes." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Harriman Israeli Mission (II)) 1122. For President and Secretary. From Komer. Part One. Komer and Barbour laid proposal Deptel 865/2/ before Eshkol and Meir in three hour meeting morning 5 March/3/ (Eshkol unavailable previous day because attending maneuvers in Negev). Despite our best efforts, including stress on need for prompt understanding lest we both lose Jordan, Eshkol found it unacceptable. As suspected by Washington, he contended that in respect to arms offered Israel it worse than previous proposals. We refused accept such immediate answer and insisted on Israeli counterproposal. If he couldn't accept our new offer, what was he prepared say? He agreed respond, and we think he shaken. /2/Document 175. /3/A memorandum of the conversation, enclosed with airgram A-696, March 17, is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 US/HARRIMAN, and in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Harriman Israeli Mission (II). In aside to Komer at end Eshkol pleaded we recognize Israel's predicament. If President would only tell him privately--orally if necessary that we would meet Israel's needs for tanks and "a few" planes in the next year or so, he could try meet our needs painful as they were. Komer replied that, speaking as Presidential emissary who knew our Middle East problems, he would urge PM not to press us too hard now. Israel would get farther in long run by not trying to force our hand. PM must see our problems too. If he trusted his US friends, he mustn't try to settle everything on arms today. We wouldn't let Israel down, but Israel must in turn comprehend our own deeply held concerns. Hightlights and Comments follow./4/ /4/See footnote 1 above. Barbour
178. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs (Davies) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Talbot)/1/ Washington, March 5, 1965. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, ORG 7 NEA. Secret. Talbot sent the memorandum to Rusk with a covering memorandum of March 8. Rusk's initials on the covering memorandum indicate that he read it. SUBJECT Nuclear Developments All indications are toward Israeli acquisition of a nuclear capability. There is little realization in Israel of the intensity of U.S. opposition to nuclear proliferation. U.S. hesitation and delays in pressing for the recent inspection of the Dimona reactor plus the failure to insist upon a two-day visit have led the Israelis to believe we are not serious. Some embassy officers believe we may run into difficulty in arranging the next visit. Israeli officials and public appear firmly to believe that the U.A.R. will have a nuclear capability within 5 to 7 years. Planning for Israeli acquisition of a comparable capability is moving forward on this assumption. The Science Attache has calculated that the target date for acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability by Israel is 1968-9. He has discovered information indicating that Israel has already acquired the know-how for Plutonium metal production. There is no need for sizeable domestic ore production facilities since Argentina has been a ready source. Ambassador Barbour is convinced Israel fears U.A.R. acquisition of a nuclear capability and believes it must prepare for the time this occurs. He also believes a psychological case can be made for U.A.R. development of a "radiological garbage bomb." The GOI, of course, has exploited this issue publicly. Ambassador Barbour does not seem as convinced as his staff of Israeli determination to acquire nuclear weapons. He felt it inadvisable to press for more trips by Embassy staff to the South. The GOI is already sensitive on this issue and such trips could prejudice 1) the Dimona inspections, 2) [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] and 3) the position of one or more Embassy officers--Ben-Horin/Marom in reverse. The Ambassador believed the Dimona inspections hung by only a thread. Prime Minister Eshkol has found it increasingly difficult politically to continue them, but realizes he has a firm commitment to the U.S. The argument that Ben-Gurion also agreed to the inspections does not solve the Prime Minister's problems since he has other fractious political elements with which to deal. Ambassador Barbour said that cutting down the duration of the last Dimona visit had not been Prime Minister Eshkol's doing. The Prime Minister had ordered the facility to be cleared for inspection beginning Friday night through Saturday night as late as necessary. The GOI was not monolithic and local officials did not always respond readily to instructions. Eshkol was disturbed that the President might think he had welched on his commitment. In this connection, the Science Attache believed he had convincing evidence that parts of the Dimona facility had been purposely moth-balled to mislead the visiting team. He and other Embassy officers believe Israeli scientists are preparing all necessary elements for production of a nuclear device, leaving undone only last-minute assembly./2/ /2/Airgram A-742 from Tel Aviv, April 9, discussed the status of the Dimona reactor in more detail. It concluded that the Israelis "have now created a flexible basis of choice regarding the possibility of producing nuclear weapons. Although the technical facilities are in an advanced state of preparation, we believe that weapons are not now being made, and there is no evidence that the Israelis have made a decision to move the rest of the way toward producing them." (Ibid., AE 11-2 ISR) Preemption Against Arab Water Diversion Works Embassy officers reflected a widespread Israeli philosophy calling for preemptive action to forestall Arab Jordan water diversion. Although the technical community and some members of the Foreign Ministry discounted Arab intentions to divert water, the IDF and Foreign Ministry "hard liners" played up the need for such action. The public, of course, was sold on the idea. IDF officers had indicated they believed the U.S. had been given ample warnings of Israeli intent to take preemptive action. A commonly expressed feeling was that preemptive action would be desirable soon while U.A.R. troops were still embroiled in Yemen. The Consulate General at Jerusalem reported concern in Jordan that aggressive Israeli pressures might result in hostilities. For the first time in their experience, old time American residents had approached the Consulate inquiring about plans for caring for American citizens in times of crisis. Both the Consulate General and the Embassy were reviewing their E and E plans. In fact, there is at the present time little against which to take preemptive action. Since November 1, 1964, only about 8 kilometers in Syrian territory have been cleared as a right of way for a possible canal. Rains had prevented rapid progress on this work which was supervised by Yugoslav engineers and surveyors. Preemptive action at the present time would be limited to destruction of up to ten bulldozers. Ambassador Barbour did not believe reference of the water issue to the UN was practical and the Israelis believed our suggestion to do so represented backtracking on our undertaking to support the Unified Plan. It had become necessary now to reaffirm this support openly. The verbiage attached to our recent statements of support had caused Israeli officials to feel they were "on the slippery slope." Israeli Rocket Developments Israel's capability for rocket production has increased. The Israel Aircraft Industries (Bedek) has built up its personnel considerably, beyond the needs for a normal aircraft corporation. Research on rocket propulsion and components is moving forward rapidly. Recent reports indicated Israel would soon be capable of producing ten tons of liquid oxygen or more per day. Other rocket production activities included operation of filament winding machines, heliarc tube welding apparati, operation of a $750,000 computer. Israel appeared to have decided to develop an indigenous capability in the production of rocket propellants and small rockets but to acquire large rockets abroad. Israeli Counter Boycott The Ministry of Commerce was not enthusiastic about the Israeli counter boycott because the Israeli economy was doing well without it and its imposition might create unforeseen problems. The Foreign Ministry, however, appeared to favor the boycott and the word had gone out to the American Jewish communities. Companies such as Union Carbide had already begun calculating the pressures that could be placed on its business activities by American Jews. Their preliminary conclusions were that they could not withstand these pressures. Ambassador Barbour's Thoughts on the Jordan Arms Quid pro Quo Package Ambassador Barbour believed that we may have been well advised to append a large package of quid pro quo's to the request for Israeli support on U.S. sales of arms to Jordan in return for selected direct sales to Israel. He was disturbed, however, that the Department thought it could obtain these desiderata. He believed their inclusion may have been useful in shaking up the Israelis but now it might be preferable to seek each objective separately. It was preferable to make a "grand gesture" on direct arms sales since we considered it inevitable anyway. Such an attitude would ensure greater Israeli receptivity to our other demands.
179. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel/1/ Washington, March 6, 1965, 9:19 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 12-5 JORDAN. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Russell and Talbot, cleared by Davies, and approved by Talbot. Repeated to Manila for Harriman. 887. Tel Aviv for Barbour and Komer. Ambassador Harman informed Talbot March 5/2/ that he instructed to proceed Israel immediately for consultation and leaving that night. He believed that reason was GOI concerned and confused about course of current negotiations. He would be asked to explain Washington thinking. Could Talbot throw any light on negotiating problems? /2/A memorandum of the telephone conversation between Harman and Talbot, incorrectly dated March 4, is ibid., POL 17 ISR-US. Talbot said feeling strong here we had to move forward. We have regarded proposals conveyed to GOI by Gov. Harriman as forthcoming and, as he had told PM Eshkol, signalling significant change of direction for future. We had been disappointed that GOI found itself unable accept that formulation. In view of GOI's position, had concluded the alternative was to present a formula directed specifically at protecting Israel from adverse effects of arms sales made to Jordan for purpose of keeping Soviet arms and attendant dangers away from longest segment of Israeli frontier. Harman professed GOI's astonishment that USG had put forward totally new proposal when GOI was awaiting US reactions to suggested changes in Harriman proposal. GOI had gathered impression these changes likely be acceptable. Talbot replied that negotiations had been followed with greatest care at the highest levels of USG who certainly had not concluded that positions put forward by Harriman had in fact been accepted. If this was wrong, we would like to know it. Ambassador Harman said he did not wish to duplicate negotiations being conducted in Israel, but would like to know more about US position. Recognizing para 5 of original proposal/3/ as key policy statement, he probed for Talbot interpretation of its meaning. Talbot held closely to actual wording of para. Harman then asked at what point we believed Israel had not accepted US proposals? Talbot replied that record of talks in Israel showed these points in detail. Harman returned to theme that from report of Harriman's last talk he had understood that certain changes were proposed and it was left that these could be considered. Komer then had come in with new restricted proposal, which as we now knew Prime Minister had found totally unacceptable. Talbot repeated rationale of new proposals: that since Israel had been unable to accept broader arrangements, we had accordingly moved to a position that what we did for Jordan we would do for Israel. This meant that we would hold to same policy of restraint in arms sales as in past 15 years, regarding these proposed new sales to Israel and Jordan as a balanced exception to policy. We had made exception in Hawk sales. We had moved to this position because rapid course of events in NE, which could place us in most difficult position, had led us to conclude that necessary actions could not be further delayed while Israel and US continued discussion of certain aspects of original broader proposal. /3/See Document 160. Harman expressed inability to understand why narrower proposal should have included same request for Israeli assurances on questions of pre-emption and nuclear proliferation that had been in broader proposal. Talbot noted these now framed in somewhat different fashion and that no assurance was now asked for beyond what Eshkol had already said he was willing to give. Harman complained that US seemed to be prepared to give arms to Jordan without conditions, even though Jordan involved in water diversion plans and in UAC. USG, however, still insisting on full Israeli assurances its arms would not be used against Arabs. Talbot reviewed whole complex of reasons making it in interest of Israel and West to meet request of Jordan from non-bloc sources. In repetitive second telephone call of March 5/4/ Harman requested additional clarification points of issue. Repeatedly sought to get from Talbot precise answers to question whether USG would oppose any alteration in Johnston Plan, specifically any off-take by Lebanon beyond 35 MCMs. Talbot replied Harman could assure Prime Minister US position same as expressed in January 1964 in Presidential letter carried by Shriver and Departmental-Embassy discussions on details of Johnston Plan. There had, of course, been some differences in Israeli and US interpretation of Plan at that time. However, in its desire to help protect Israel's interests, US has made clear that it would oppose Arab disruption of Israel's water supply. If Ambassador wished to get into details of interpretation of Johnston Plan again, we could do that on his return to Washington. In meantime, we hoped he would convey reassurances to Prime Minister. /4/No record of this telephone conversation has been found. Talbot suggested Harman could also tell his Government we unable to understand why Israel seemingly taking position that prospective Sovietization of Jordan armed forces, with all significance that would have for Hussein's efforts remain independent, would be more in Israel's interest than our proposed line of action. Harman did not respond directly, but returned to observation that new narrow proposal unacceptable to Israel. Talbot gave no indication we proposed to return to broader proposal. He urged on Harman importance of completing our current discussions promptly. 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