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 | FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XVIII Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964-67 Department of State |
 160. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel/1/ Washington, February 26, 1965, 1:42 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66 DEF 12-5 ISR. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Talbot, Davies, and Ball; cleared by Bromley Smith for the President; and approved by Ball. 823. For Harriman. Tel Aviv 1037,/2/ 1039./3/ Following telegram cleared at highest level. /2/Document 158. /3/The reference should be to telegram 1038 from Tel Aviv, February 26, which stated that Harriman had not been able to convince the Israelis to agree that rather than taking preemptive action they would take the water problem to the United Nations. It proposed alternative language for his instructions as follows: "Israel must agree not to embark on pre-emptive action but to undertake to exhaust all peaceful recourse including the United Nations." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 US/HARRIMAN) Telegram 1039 from Tel Aviv, February 26, reported Harriman's unsuccessful effort to assuage Israeli anger at the West German Government. (Ibid., DEF 12-5 ISR) We can see virtue in reducing our understanding with GOI to an explicit statement. We believe that this understanding should be expressed in two simultaneous separate documents. The first would be a memorandum initialed by both parties along the following lines: 1. The Governments of the United States and of Israel agree that full secrecy shall be maintained on all matters referred to herein and all subsequent actions taken in this connection, until the two Governments agree on how and when to divulge them. 2. The United States agrees to review with Israel the dangers posed by the Arab counter-diversion scheme and the Unified Arab Command build-up. 3. The United States is prepared to reiterate at an appropriate time both its policy of opposition to aggression in the Near East and its support for the Unified Plan as an equitable standard by which to judge Jordan water usage by riparian states. 4. The United States will seek a firm private assurance from King Hussein that he intends to keep his armor on the East Bank of the Jordan. 5. The United States will undertake to make selective direct sales of military equipment to Israel, if the United States and Israel agree that a disproportionate arms build-up on the Arab side is developing which cannot be otherwise met. Any such sales would be arranged on a quiet case-by-case basis, with minimum attendant publicity, after Israel had made maximum efforts to obtain its requirements from Western European sources. 6. The Government of Israel pledges not to develop or obtain nuclear weapons and, before any direct sale of arms is initiated, will certify this by accepting IAEA safeguards on all its nuclear facilities. 7. Israel undertakes not to embark on preemptive action against the Arab Jordan diversion works, but to utilize all peaceful recourse including the United Nations./4/ FYI If Israelis insist you may add "where the United States would be prepared to support the principles of the Unified Plan." End FYI. /4/Talbot told Ball in a telephone conversation at 12:50 p.m. on February 26 that the President had read the outgoing telegram and approved the word "utilize" rather than "associate." (Johnson Library, Ball Papers, Israel) As a part of the over-all agreement you should insist upon a letter from Eshkol to the President which might read as follows: "Dear Mr. President: I greatly appreciate your consideration in sending Governor Harriman to discuss with us in depth the problems our two Governments face in connection with the developing situation in the Middle East. We have, I think, come to a full understanding. Governor Harriman has made clear the concern of your Government for the maintenance of the security of Israel. On my part, I want you to know that we shall be as understanding as possible in helping you to meet some of the heavy responsibilities that you bear. I am, therefore, prepared to assure you that the actions of my Government will consistently reflect the following considerations: (1) We believe that it is both necessary and useful for the US to maintain an effective influence and presence in the Arab world; (2) We accept the need for the US to provide certain military equipment to Jordan; (3) Should it prove necessary for the US to make direct sales of military equipment to Israel we will cooperate fully to minimize the resultant strains on US relations with other states in the area." Rusk
161. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State/1/ Tel Aviv, February 26, 1965, 9:45 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 US/HARRIMAN. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Received at 3:48 p.m. and passed to the White House. 1050. From Harriman. Embtel 1037./2/ /2/Document 158. I opened day long sessions February 25 saying the President is following closely current Israel-Arab situation. After summarizing critical world security situation, I outlined our analysis of current Middle East realities. I particularly stressed that it imperative Israel-Arab confrontation not become polarized on West-East lines. Noting we must make decision on Jordan arms within few days, I reviewed rationale this step at length. Then I reiterated President's basic commitment to Israel's security. In ensuing discussion: I emphasized significance of President's willingness to consider direct sales of such military equipment as Israel needs and cannot obtain from traditional sources. I stressed essentiality there be no publicity about what we might agree re principle of arms supply to Israel. I requested GOI seek quietly to influence Jewish community in US to abide by such conclusions as we may reach on this and Jordan arms. Mrs. Meir asked if our arms aid to Jordan would continue if the Soviets gave Jordan economic aid. I stressed that a major purpose of our Jordan policy was to keep Soviet influence out. It came out eventually that what she had in mind was concern that Soviet financial assistance directly or indirectly enable Jordan to continue water diversion plan, i.e., Mukieba Dam. Eshkol said Jordan waters issue was fundamental "first test" for him. In lengthy back and forth, he urged we directly press Jordanians and Lebanese to desist from cooperating in diversion projects. Eshkol bore in on arms supply problem. He asked that simultaneously with our agreement to meet Jordanian arms requirements as outlined by us, we commit ourselves to add to Israel's deterrent by announcing we would insure it maintain adequate arms balance. Eshkol called for active USG assistance re establishment Israeli full diplomatic relations with Iran, Turkey, India. PriMin called on us to move Embassy to Jerusalem. He even brought up Suez transit question. I rebutted that public declaration re our arms policy must be made at time and in manner considered most opportune. I insisted on Israel's undertaking not to strike against Arab diversion projects; that she must take peaceful road, including UN, to resolve Jordan waters crisis. Subsequently I repeated this theme in clearest possible formulations several times. On nuclear question, I requested Israel's continued undertaking that it would not build weapons, and would consent to IAEA observation. Eshkol agreed to reaffirm non-nuclear undertaking, but said Israel would accept IAEA controls "together with Nasser." I reiterated our strong feeling that we should not now announce any change in our area arms policy, and in this connection, that we still have the problem of Israel's acquiescence in Jordan arms deals. When there is actual US delivery of weapons to Israel, we could then consider public announcement. I stressed historic significance of President's willingness to consider direct arms supply in context of other understandings we seek. We pointed out we have in mind Hawk-type credit terms, not grant supply. In answer to my question regarding undelivered equipment under German deal, Israelis seemed satisfied submarines would be delivered directly from Britain, but were particularly concerned over small naval craft (Schnellbooten) as well as tanks. Mrs. Meir characterized Lebanon's and Jordan's recent accommodations to Nasserist pressure as frightening. She contended King Hussein would at every step raise the ante by threatening to turn to Soviets. She professed to be upset about recent USG-GOI discussions of Jordan waters. Afternoon Session Talks almost entirely on Jordan waters, with Meir reaching for all possible ammunition to point out dangers to Johnston Plan in recourse to UN. Vigorous exchange followed predictable lines. I told them we are willing to discuss ways and means whereby our support in principle of Johnston Plan allocations could be effectuated in UN context. We emphasized that in event Soviet veto putting Jordan waters issue before world, public opinion could not help but improve Israel's case. I was quite harsh in countering Mrs. Meir's scornful appreciation of Security Council's role. We stressed that when Israel undertook not to launch pre-emptive military action against Arab preserve, we would be willing, anytime, anywhere discuss any methods of peaceful approach. As meeting concluded, Eshkol asked for "something in writing" re arms supply to Israel. We stressed confidential nature of our discussions, and said we would consider this among other related subjects prior to 3:00 p.m. meeting Friday. Various members of PriMin's suite have emphasized to our aides "necessity" for some very early public indication of USG willingness supply arms directly and openly to Israel. In side conversations we have stressed that if watershed in our policy is to be crossed, GOI may have to steel itself to endure considerable short range domestic political flak. Komer saw Peres morning Feb 26 in effort to persuade latter of full significance President's package; that there no time for GOI to bargain over wrapping. Barbour
162. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State/1/ Tel Aviv, February 26, 1965, 10 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 US/HARRIMAN. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Passed to the White House. 1051. From Harriman. Our discussion with Israelis this afternoon took a negative turn. Eshkol was accompanied by Mrs. Meir, Peres, Levavi, and General Rabin. He read from a memo based, he maintained, on our previous discussions. In fact, however, he included about everything Israel would like to have us committed to, including arms to Israel to counter Soviet supply to Arabs. General Rabin then presented in graphic form present and future Arab-Israel air and tank relative capabilities. I countered by reading from memo outlining commitments we expect Israel to make in conjunction with US consideration of direct supply arms to Israel as based on my instructions. After emotional statements by Eshkol and Mrs. Meir and a cooler analysis by Peres, it was agreed that Peres and Levavi should meet with Komer and Barbour this evening, hopefully to arrive at meeting of minds./2/ /2/Harriman reported in telegram 1052 from Tel Aviv, February 26, that the evening discussion resulted in some agreement but that the participants failed to agree on a satisfactory Israeli assurance to use all peaceful recourse on the water issue or on the manner in which quiet Israeli acquiescence in the Jordan arms sale would be expressed. In addition, although the Israelis agreed to a restatement of nuclear self-denial, they were unwilling to accept IAEA controls. (Ibid.) I agreed to meet with Eshkol tomorrow to consider outcome tonight's session. We will surely be asked to reaffirm assurances to Israel we have already given. In addition, Israelis will probably insist we make more definite commitment supply military equipment than my instructions cover, particularly make-up 90 German tank shortfall plus off-set to growing Arab strengthening of Jordan as well as improved Soviet equipment to UAR. Possibly we may also be asked for: (a) earlier public statement than we want of US agreement to direct arms supply with consideration of some grants if arms race goes beyond Israel's means; (b) if peaceful effort fails to control spite diversion Jordan headwaters, our non-intervention with Israeli direct action. I may have message later tonight requiring reply soonest. Barbour
163. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State/1/ Tel Aviv, February 27, 1965, midnight. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 12-5 ISR. Secret; Flash; Exdis/Tan. Received at 5:26 p.m. 1057. For the President, Rusk and McNamara. Personal from Harriman. Part I. Fourth meeting with Eshkol today moved up closer to broad meeting of minds, though it hard going./2/ /2/A more detailed account of the meeting was transmitted in telegram 1091 from Tel Aviv, March 2, supplemented by a memorandum of conversation drafted on March 19. (Both ibid., POL 7 US/HARRIMAN) While Israelis still hard keep bargaining till we concede as much as possible, they finally got down to brass tacks after emotional session yesterday when they first saw our terms in cold print. (Eshkol said no risk of their disclosing this draft since it much too damaging to Israel.) Komer later told Peres no agreement possible unless all our desiderata met. Then at fourth session I laid it on line about only alternative to US/Israeli agreement, precisely as outlined in Sections II and V of Presidential instruction. I made clear consequences to Israel and US if Jordan lost to West because US decided against arms deal in light Israeli opposition or because Israelis fiddled while Rome burned. Asked immediate answer. While Prime Minister was shaken, he said heart of matter was what US could provide Israel. He appreciated proposed major change US policy to direct sales to Israel as well as Arabs, but how could he convince his Cabinet? He couldn't say that he agreed to actual US sales to Jordan, which would promptly be publicized by Arabs and then seized upon by his political foes, in return for generalized and secret promise US in principle agreed to unspecified direct sales to Israel at some future date--and this only in return for series of Israeli undertakings which could be political dynamite for him. He urged we forget about other US requests, and focus on central problem of precisely how US could concretely demonstrate this change in policy simultaneously with Jordan arms sale. Eshkol reviewed deterioration Israel's deterrent posture since Washington intelligence talks almost year ago, citing new USSR/Egypt arms deal, new specter of coordinated Arab action through Unified Arab Command, and cancellation German/Israel arms agreement. This created two acute problems as how Israel's increased security needs to be met and how he could bring his Cabinet and electorate along with him if he did what President Johnson requested. To meet security need, Israel must have hardware--planes and tanks. He couldn't go to his Cabinet and get even their tacit support of US arms sales to Jordan (however friendly an enemy) without showing them Israel could get its hands on hardware too. Since a deterrent balance was essential, Israel's first need was bombers to create counter-threat to Soviet Badgers and IL-28's in UAR, Iraqi, Syrian hands. What Israel would really like was US Phantom, but he realized this impossible. Next he would buy Mirage IV, but with electronics it cost $5 million per copy. So Israel had decided best bet was old 1954 model B-66, which it understood US now phasing out. Since Israel's resources were so limited, would we let Israel buy 75 of these at cheapest second hand price ? (Peres had told Komer in morning that reason for 75 was that US spare parts production had ceased; so Israelis would cannibalize some for spare parts.) Peres noted B-66 good for conventional payload. Second was Israel's need for tanks, which had been fully agreed in previous Washington talks. Now Bonn had backed out. He must tell Cabinet that at least Israel's previously accepted tanks needs would be met regardless, especially since threat of US tanks in Jordan must now be added to that from Soviet tanks in Arab hands. Even if he agreed that the US should sell $50 million in arms to Jordan, we must also see his political problem. He couldn't say merely that the US sold tanks to Jordan because this was better than Soviet tanks in Jordan. So there must be some public "conjunction" between what US sold Israel and US sold Jordan. When it came out that we had made arms sale to Jordan, he must be able to tell his public we were going sell arms to Israel too. Once it became known that we were selling tanks to Jordan he must be able say we were doing same for Israel. Finally, because of new deterioration Israel's security position he must at least be able to say US would sell surplus B-66 planes to Israel too. He couldn't meet his acute political problem without some such coordinated disclosure. Part II follows. Barbour
164. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State/1/ Tel Aviv, February 27, 1965, midnight. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 12-5 ISR. Secret; Flash; Exdis/Tan. Received at 6:12 p.m. and passed to the White House and DOD. 1058. For the President, Rusk and McNamara. Personal from Harriman. Part II. US Response. I gave Eshkol no encouragement. I said this first we'd heard of B-66 request, and could hardly express any opinion. Eshkol urged that I at least submit to Washington. I agreed, though saying could in no way predict early answer to wholly new proposal which would hit Washington cold on weekend. Meanwhile Jordan matter couldn't wait. Komer took up cudgels, reminding Eshkol that at first meeting PriMin had said Israel's security had priority over his own political problems. Washington insisted. But one thing he would say without hesitation was that, whatever US interim response, USG could not reach decision on such major request quickly nor in any way accept concept of simultaneous publicity. There no point even discussing this. President felt that in proposing basic shift in long-standing US arms policy he had made far-reaching new step toward helping meet Israel's security needs. In effect, Israelis saying they could not accept US word but must see results too. Perhaps Washington might agree elaborate our offer to include promise consider tank and even plane requests. But one thing certain, US was not going to invite disaster like that Bonn just had with Cairo. Even if USG prepared entertain specific arms requests, Komer certain USG would insist adamantly that timing and nature of disclosure must be fully in US hands. No point in even referring Israeli requests to Washington if simultaneous disclosure with Jordan sales also mandatory. Eshkol granted security needs more important than political requirements. If USG prepared indicate it willing respond favorably on M-48's and B-66's US could decide how matter should be publicized. However Israel must be consulted. He thought he could assure compliance on secrecy. We believe that meeting of minds reached on absolute US requirement for secrecy insofar as possible. I then insisted only US package proposal could be considered. As President has instructed me, we could not agree even to direct arms sales in principle unless other US conditions met. Will report further on these, but highlights are: A. Eshkol only willing reiterate existing public commitment "not be first to introduce nuclear weapons into Near East." He insisted this most he able get through Israeli Cabinet. It politically impossible agree on IAEA controls until all other major potential proliferators do so, not just UAR. B. Jordan waters problem consumed most time, as in other meetings. Mrs. Meir carried ball. Eshkol willing give secret promise end or "exhaust" all peaceful means solution but unwilling so far have any mention recourse to UN. Israelis also insist US agree to all-out support precise allocations Johnston Plan and "oppose" any Arab deviation. They propose we reserve both UN angle and degree US support of Johnston Plan for later full discussion. C. As to quiet Israeli support for US arms sales to Jordan, I stressed President Johnson's political requirement, which he saw as in Israel's own interest. I made clear Israeli acceptance our needs here indispensable to any agreement. I believe Israelis will accept our position provided other matters settled. I gave no ground on three issues above, but will submit recommendations later. My comments on key issue of US arms sales follow in Part III. Barbour
165. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State/1/ Tel Aviv, February 28, 1965, 4 a.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 12-5 ISR. Secret; Flash; Exdis/Tan. Received at 9:58 p.m. and passed to the White House and DOD. 1060. For the President, Rusk and McNamara. Personal from Harriman. Part III. Comments. We have stood foursquare on President's instructions. I am also quite mindful of Secretary's desire we stick it out until understanding reached. Increasingly clear that key to matter is fact Eshkol, with his relatively unstable coalition government, faces real difficulty in carrying his Cabinet even as far as tacit acceptance US arms sales to Jordan. Eshkol says he can only get Cabinet acceptance Jordan arms deal, and their collaboration on essential secrecy, if Cabinet can get feel of actual hardware, not merely of carefully hedged statement that US will eventually make some kind of direct sale. Frankly, I believe we must give Israelis some hope on hardware if we want a deal in time to give Hussein his answer. Minimum needed is a promise to consider favorably Israel's tank and plane requests, subject of course to later agreement on type, number, price, delivery schedules and timing of each step in each specific sale. This seems relatively small added price for larger agreement we seek. It is essential to lend credibility to our commitment to direct sales. Nor do I see it as involving more than a spelling out of our general undertaking, under which it is implicit anyway. We can't avoid selling tanks, or planes either, at some point. So the more specific we can make this undertaking the more quickly agreement can be reached, and the more leverage we have on other points we want. I believe that if we in position to satisfy Eshkol on provision hardware, we can reach prompt meeting of minds on our desiderata at least to extent that Israelis will 1) tolerate i.e. acquiesce in our Jordan arms supply and will so advise their Ambassador and their key friends, 2) maintain maximum secrecy re arms sales provided we agree coordinate public statements when matters become public knowledge, 3) understand that US will oppose use of force to preempt Arab water diversion and be prepared with our cooperation to have recourse to all peaceful means to prevent such diversion, which includes resort to UN in some manner without specific mention, 4) reaffirm what they have already stated as to their intention not to embark on nuclear weapons program, leaving question of IAEA to future. We have of course not in any way accepted the above, and will continue trying to improve on it. Believe some chance of doing so, but am not so sanguine even in event extended bargaining. Therefore, Komer, Barbour and I recommend adding some more specific wording to key para on direct arms sales in 21 February 1965 Presidential instruction. We suggest following addition after underlined portion at end of that para./2/ /2/The underlined portion is italicized in Document 157. "USG recognizes that Israel's highest priority arms needs are for (a) replacement of 90 M-48 tanks if West Germany fails to meet this commitment; and (b) certain aircraft such as the B-66. USG is willing to consider favorably sale of such items provided all above conditions are met." Request further negotiating instructions. I realize weekend burden this places on you, but would be most grateful for earliest answer, if possible by noon local time 28 February. Also, if B-66 or comparable aircraft at all in cards, would appreciate such positive or negative info on general availability and possible timing of delivery as I could be authorized pass to Israelis. Am of course prepared stay as long as desired, but suggest that the longer we stay the more it will look as though we engaged in detailed negotiations. Barbour
166. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel/1/ Washington, February 28, 1965, 12:56 a.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 12-5 ISR. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Jernegan and Talbot, cleared by Rusk with the President by telephone, and approved by Rusk. A message to Komer from Bromley Smith, February 28, states that the reply was cleared with the President after he read Harriman's 3-part message and that the telegram was dictated by Rusk after discussion with the President. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Harriman Israeli Mission (II)) Rusk called the President to call Harriman's message to his attention and cleared the two amendments with him. (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversations Between Johnson and Rusk, February 28, 1965, 11:12 and 11:37 p.m., Tape F65.09, PNO 5-6) 843. For Harriman from the Secretary. Embtels 1057, 1058, 1059 and 1060./2/ The President has approved two amendments to instructions contained in Deptel 823./3/ /2/For telegrams 1057, 1058, and 1060, see Documents 163-165. Telegram 1059 from Tel Aviv, February 28, reported that Eshkol pressed for a U.S. commitment not only on tanks and planes but on timing and that Peres indicated Israel would not insist on the B-66 if a comparable aircraft was available. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 12-5 ISR) /3/Document 160. (1) Add to numbered para 5 following language: "USG recognizes that Israel's highest priority arms need is for the completion of the tank program which had been arranged with West Germany. It is prepared to consider sympathetically this need if West German deliveries are not completed." (2) Substitute following language for numbered para 6: "Israel agrees to provide the USG with complete assurances with respect to the non-acquisition and non-manufacture of nuclear weapons and will give favorable consideration to the acceptance of IAEA safeguards as soon as practicable." We cannot agree at this time to inject bombers into Near Eastern situation. General language of numbered para 5 of course leaves it open to Israelis to raise this question with us later. Regarding substitute language on IAEA, you should make it clear that we cannot accept that Israeli situation is tied to problems in other parts of the world rather than solely to the situation in the Arab states. We can conceive of no threat of any kind to Israel from any non-Arab state and in particular from such potential nuclear powers as India. Language used means that at minimum we would expect Israeli acceptance of IAEA whenever Nasser similarly accepted those controls. It may be useful for you to have in mind that IAEA controls on nuclear materials can be tailored by negotiation to meet specific circumstances and conditions. For example, agreements can be either for indefinite duration or a specified period. They can also include escape clauses which may provide that any party can terminate on a certain period of notice or that they may be terminated if a certain set of circumstances materializes. If negotiating situation makes it seem useful, you might put forward idea that Israeli acceptance of IAEA controls could contain escape clause to effect that agreement could be terminated by Israel if any Arab state acquired nuclear facilities capable of producing weapons and, within a given period, refused to accept IAEA or other controls satisfactory to GOI. You should, however, put forward any such thought as your own idea and strictly ad referendum. We hope these amendments will enable you conclude deal 28th. We deeply appreciate stout efforts and able presentation you have made during past three days. Rusk
167. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State/1/ Tel Aviv, February 28, 1965, 11 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 12-5 ISR. Secret; Flash; Exdis. Received at 4:49 p.m. and passed to the White House and DOD. 1064. For the President, Rusk, McNamara--from Harriman. At Eshkol's request I agreed to send him memorandum of understanding and letter to the President (Deptel 823 as amended by 843)/2/ before our meeting this afternoon. As Komer had an engagement with Peres preceding the meeting, I gave him these papers to deliver. /2/Documents 160 and 166. Peres took papers to Eshkol and returned after one hour, just before I arrived, to tell Komer Eshkol felt no agreement was possible on basis these drafts. Eshkol suggested brief meeting to conclude our talks gracefully and submitted draft communique (see septel)./3/ Komer deduced from reference to continued talks that this meant Mrs. Meir projected visit this month. In effort to head this off Komer urged on Peres that Mrs. Meir visit counterproductive. Peres commented that I was only one who could say this to Eshkol. /3/The text of the draft communique was transmitted in telegram 1065 from Tel Aviv, February 28. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 US/HARRIMAN) Under these circumstances I asked Barbour to arrange for me to see the PriMin alone instead of as large group. In this personal talk, Eshkol told me he had discussion with Cabinet and it was impossible for him to put through our proposed arrangements. He explained nothing was offered except indefinite assurances. When I referred to sentence on replacement German tanks he commented "sympathetic consideration" did not have the meaning to the Jews that I assumed. These words had been used for years, going back to the days of the Balfour Declaration, only to produce disappointments. After long but calm argument as to whether US Government intentions could be trusted he agreed but maintained something definite had to be settled now to reassure his colleagues. He underlined changes for the worse to Israel's security since his visit to Washington last June and asked why could we not at least make some gesture which would justify him with his Cabinet in acquiescing to our Jordan arms deal. If planes are not available why not some more tanks. (He referred to the 232 M48A3s they had hoped to get, against the 150 finally agreed to.) The upshot was that he proposes Jordan deal be held up a week. Peres and General Rabin go to Washington quietly at once to review change in Israel's military situation with the hope that a specific deal can be agreed to for a limited amount of hardware (a few tanks or planes). Eshkol would then expect to get his Cabinet to go along with Jordan sale, and agree to no publicity on our arms sales to Israel as we want. I had previously told him Mrs. Meir was not the one to send to Washington. I had to admit however that the matters relating to peaceful methods, including recourse to United Nations on the Jordan water problem, were in her field. Eshkol suggested we work together in any way we wanted to explore all peaceful means to deal with this problem. Israel wanted more than anyone a peaceful way to get its share of the water. Eshkol assured me I could state to the President that Israel had no military intentions at the present time and that certainly no action would be taken while they were working with us on every possible peaceful solution. Eshkol agreed to carry on discussions with us on this subject in any way or in any place we wanted. On nuclear problem Eshkol again gave assurance Israel had no plans for development nuclear weapons. He accepted my statement that the President felt one of his chief world responsibilities was to prevent nuclear proliferation, particularly since Red China's detonation, and said he wanted to cooperate. However he explained he could not get his AE Commission to accept IAEA without some specific consideration such as Nasser agreeing as well. However he wanted to assure the President Israel wanted to help and would not make the President's task more difficult. Taking the above and my previous talks into consideration, I recommend that (1) We divide up our package--I think we will do better with them separately. (2) Eshkol be permitted to send Peres and Rabin to Washington quietly, and Hussein be held off for a week. (3) Dept after consultation with Stevenson decide how to proceed with Israel on Jordan water problem. (4) We continue our pressure on IAEA inspection nuclear facilities in context of nuclear problem. Eshkol is not dominant in Israel. He is well meaning but does not control. I feel that in the long run we will do better with him if we try to understand his political problems and negotiate realistically on each matter. He knows tough trading, but is susceptible to friendly understanding. I have an engagement with Eshkol tomorrow afternoon to take my leave and hopefully to give him an answer. I urgently ask for a reply to this message, and approval of my departure for Kabul tomorrow, Monday midnight. Regret I haven't been able to bring home the bacon but feel that much has been accomplished in calming Israeli emotions on our providing arms to Jordan and the ground has been prepared for reasonable future understandings on issues involved. Barbour and Komer concur. Barbour
168. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State/1/ Tel Aviv, February 28, 1965, midnight. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 12-5 ISR. Secret; Flash; Exdis/Tan. Received at 7:09 p.m. and passed to the White House. 1068. For President and Secretary from Komer. Following supplemental to Harriman report in Embtel 1064./2/ /2/Document 167. For four days we have vigorously pressed Israelis to accept formal package deal covering all key aspects US/Israel relations except economic aid and desalting. Effort today, tabling our proposed memo of understanding and letter as reconfirmed by President, convinces us no quick agreement possible along these lines, even with sweetener that we'd now consider "sympathetically" replacement 90 tanks. Partly for bargaining purposes, but also because of domestic political reasons and Israel's particular psychology, they refuse (1) deny themselves any later nuclear option by accepting IAEA controls; (2) utterly forswear residual right of pre-emption on water issue they consider vital; or (3) be required go UN. What they get in return is generalized promise we will in principle sell arms direct but only if there is agreed need, no other supplier, etc. Without minimizing great importance this commitment, it not sufficient enable US pressure Israelis into signing within three days such a broad series of undertakings affecting all their vital security concerns. But our failure get Israelis sign firm written contract in language we want should not blind us to degree of broad understanding achieved. We have (1) satisfactory contingent promise to support tacitly Jordan arms deal; (2) renewed undertaking not to go nuclear, which in itself highly important, despite fact Israelis flatly unwilling brave domestic political storm or deprive selves of nuclear option by accepting IAEA controls; (3) assurance they won't use early force against Arab diversion scheme--in fact Israelis even willing have US take case to UN, though they won't do so themselves; and (4) Israeli agreement to maintain secrecy about any US/Israel arms transactions, provided we willing consult with them about how to handle such matters when they become public sooner or later. Depending on how long Hussein will wait, and on how tough we willing be, further hard bargaining might even bring Israelis around a bit further on recourse to UN and accepting IAEA controls if UAR did. But to get these assurances more firmly tied down, and above all to get Israelis' cooperation on handling Jordan arms deal, will require more give on our part, firmer promise to supply tanks and/or planes. In my judgment, this true whether we reach understanding now or later. We've all but accused Israelis of doubting USG's pledged word and of grievously overbidding, but fact that Israel's primary interest is in such security needs evident from PriMin's wish send Peres and Rabin to Washington instead of Golda Meir (though our hints Meir visit would not be productive helped). Israelis want to prolong negotiations and shift to Washington, because they think they need, and can get, more than we willing give as yet. They willing take risk Jordan will go sour, or even that US will go ahead with Jordan arms sale in absence prior understanding here. In this tough impasse, we see three alternatives: A. Go ahead and sign with Jordan, depending on Israeli desire for proffered compensation to inhibit Israel from overreacting. Odds are Eshkol would keep still for time being, while negotiating with Washington. But Israelis would naturally threaten blowup unless we came through pronto on tanks and planes. Moreover, risk of leaks here would be substantial in absence prior Cabinet agreement. B. Try for quick deal covering only immediate Jordanian problem. We could tell Eshkol we'd provide 90 tanks before end 1965 if Germans finally cancelled, provided he in turn agreed to quiet support on Jordan deal pending negotiation of other issues. We strongly doubt this salable but could try. C. While Harriman must leave, we could still forestall new round negotiations Washington by having Barbour continue talks here. In many respects we close enough to acceptable formulation to offer hope. However, no point in continuing here unless we prepared say something more positive about tanks and/or planes. All here feel unavoidable implication our own formula on "direct sales" if necessary is that at the least we must sell tanks, since only other M-48 supplier now gone. Israelis keep harping on fact that we accepted Israeli need for at least 300 tanks as long ago as November 1963. Since then, Soviets have delivered many more tanks to Arabs, and we've delivered 48 to Jordan. Now we propose sell 100 more, besides delivering another 48 gratis under MAP. So we're hooked for tanks, and for more than 90 too. As to planes, Israelis point out that Soviets have already "injected" literally hundreds of jet bombers into Near East. Why are we so reluctant? However, I sense that Israeli interest in B-66s less urgent than previously thought. General Weizmann today said B-66 marginal; he much preferred French Vautour if only US could help pay for it. When I replied de Gaulle unwilling do business with us, even for Israel, he suggested we help buy UK Spey engines for Vautour./3/ I've no idea whether this feasible, but it might be better than selling B-66s directly. /3/This conversation was reported in telegram 1071 from Tel Aviv, March 1. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 US/HARRIMAN) Washington will have to decide whether quick agreement with Israelis essential enough to pay the price. All I urge is that we make this decision in full recognition we'll sooner or later have to give Israelis some further indication our arms sales intentions. Pressures will become intense as Jordan waters crisis mounts. Also, sooner we do so the more we can get, particularly in way of firm Israeli secrecy pledges without which the policy shift forced on us by Jordan arms deal will be all the more risky. Am sure it possible cook up some formula which will satisfy Israelis while not materially reducing our leverage, since we can still stall on many related issues of price, delivery, publicity, etc. Will need such formula for Peres-Rabin visit, since this whole purpose of their coming. In sum, we seven months pregnant on arms sales to Israel as well as Jordan. If we sell to Jordan, we must sell to Israel too. If we don't sell to Jordan, Soviets will. Then we'll have to sell to Israel anyway. So we must compare risk of greater commitment to tanks and planes now against risk in having to make these later anyway with far less in way of return commitments than we can get today. Barbour
169. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel/1/ Washington, March 1, 1965, 12:02 a.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 US/HARRIMAN. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted and approved by Rusk and cleared in substance with the President by Rusk. 847. Eyes only for Harriman from the Secretary. I have had full discussion with President about your 1064 supplemented by 1068./2/ We do not believe that further delays are desirable or practicable. The issues have been fully explored in great detail. What is now required are some hard decisions by the Israeli and United States Governments on questions to which there are no easy answers. Time is an urgent factor because we cannot be certain that the movement of the Arab bloc into Nasser's control and Soviet domination will not occur very fast if we are unable to proceed with Jordan. MIG aircraft could arrive in Jordan from Egypt within a week or two. Problem is now that of understanding of facts in the Arab world as they affect Israeli and U.S. interests. Therefore, if you are unable to obtain a final agreement on basis this telegram, Komer should remain behind to assist Barbour for further immediate discussions while you proceed on your schedule. /2/Documents 167 and 168. We fully understand the domestic difficulties which Israeli Government faces in connection with decisions it must make. But these difficulties must be faced because of the decisions which are necessary to protect Israeli security and U.S. vital interests in the Near East, which include Israeli security. It seems to us that Israel is not so alarmed as we about the prospect of solidification of the Arab world under Nasser's leadership with, in effect, a close working alliance with the Soviet Bloc. We had supposed that this would be the strongest imaginable threat to Israel security. Israel apparently has another view. If that is their considered judgment, we cannot force them to take another course but it would be necessary for us to consider most seriously whether we attempt to involve ourselves any longer in the problems of Near Eastern security. There should be no misunderstanding that the obligation of the United States Government is to act on the basis of the interests of 190 million Americans. And there should be no misunderstanding that Americans expect this of the United States Government. From your 1064 we gather that Eshkol's principal problem is that he does not feel that he has a specific and firm commitment from us about military hardware. You should tell him that we have not been anxious to reduce these matters to specifics because (1) we do not yet know whether the West Germans will in fact complete their tank deliveries and (2) a flat commitment leaked to the press would make it extremely difficult for us to move diplomatically in support of U.S. and Israeli interests in our discussions with Arab governments. Nor do we wish to lose freedom of action in discussions with the Germans about their future course. However, if Eshkol feels he must have something specific, you can tell him, and include in the memorandum of understanding, that if West Germany does not complete its delivery of tanks under the original arrangement, the United States itself will provide those tanks. You can also tell him that we will give careful consideration to further tanks if the general security situation in the Near East requires it. We do not believe that we should make specific commitments at this time about further military hardware, such as planes, which Israel can always raise under the general language already proposed in the Memorandum of Understanding. You should not, however, encourage them to believe that they can get jet bombers merely by asking for them. You should again make it clear to Eshkol that the decision to sell arms to Israel, even on the proposed basis, creates major problems for the United States in supporting U.S. and Israeli interests in the Arab world and you should make it clear again that this decision has been a major development in U.S. policy. You should also make it clear that if Israel makes it difficult for us to support U.S. and Israeli interests in the Arab world, they force upon us a fundamental reexamination of our role in the Near East. Please be sure that Eshkol understands we cannot accept the idea that we should proceed to assist in the arming of Israel when we are on notice Israel plans to take preemptive military action with respect to Jordan waters. We will not support such preemptive action. We will continue to support in every way Israel's right to a share of Jordan waters within the framework of the Unified Plan. But we cannot leave any implication that we will support an Israeli military initiative leading to war in the Near East over this problem. You should further attempt to put this question into the background by insisting that our best information is that there will be very considerable time before Arab diversion of such waters could possibly affect Israel's share under the Unified Plan and that we shall do our best to support the Unified Plan by all other means. You should further underline that the United States cannot support any Israeli flirtation with nuclear weapons. On nuclear matters, the United States is as old as Methuselah and utterly cold-blooded in terms of U.S. vital interests. We shall resist with every resource at our command the dissemination of nuclear weapons into the Near East. We shall try to find ways to bring the UAR into IAEA safeguards but there should be no misunderstanding between us and Israel as to our view of Israeli acquisition of such weapons. If the above instruction about being specific about tanks does not open the way for the final agreement we seek, then Barbour and Komer should stay with it until we get such agreement. There is nothing that can be said in Washington that cannot be said in Jerusalem. (FYI. This means President does not want agree now to Peres-Rabin visit. End FYI.) We approve changes suggested in your 1066/3/ for your departure statement but suggest insertion of following sentence at end of first paragraph: "these exchanges will be continued through diplomatic channels." /3/Dated February 28. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files, POL 7 US/HARRIMAN) We have some reservation about issuance of agreed communique, which would stimulate rather than suppress speculation. You might point out to Eshkol that, in your new role as Ambassador-at-large, you do not wish to set precedent of formal communiques since you will be visiting many capitals informally from time to time, and communiques become a complicating factor. Let me conclude with point made at beginning, namely, that we are prepared to make extremely difficult decisions in support of Israel's security in the Near East, decisions which will greatly complicate American interests in that part of the world. What is called for is equally difficult decisions by Israel. They should know that if we cannot make these decisions jointly, they cannot assume that their decisions can be supported by the U.S. The President has a deep commitment to the security and well being of Israel but he wants their help on matters involving both the vital interests of the U.S. and our ability to help Israel. Many thanks for your fine effort. We will keep trying to give Barbour and Komer quick answers to help them reach agreement, no matter how much midnight oil we burn. Rusk [Continue with the next documents] Volume XVIII Index | Foreign Relations Online | Historian's Office | Department of State | Secretary of State |