NOTE: External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views contained therein.
| The State Department web site below is a permanent electronic archive of information released prior to January 20, 2001. Please see www.state.gov for material released since President George W. Bush took office on that date. This site is not updated so external links may no longer function. Contact us with any questions about finding information. NOTE: External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views contained therein. |
 | FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XVIII Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964-67 Department of State |
 150. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State/1/ Tel Aviv, February 15, 1965, 10 a.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 US/KOMER. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Passed to the White House. 975. From Komer. Third session with Eshkol went as expected. Eban, Meir, Peres again present. Prime Minister did not labor Jordan arms problem, but made strong plea that this plus German capitulation to Nasser confronted Israel with a critical dilemma. Who would replace the German tanks, much less provide the added tanks needed to meet those the US proposed to provide Hussein? The only way out of this dilemma would be direct US supply of arms. He, Eban, and Meir made much of the argument that the Israeli public would never understand why we could sell to UAC member for an openly anti-Israeli scheme, yet not sell to our Israeli friends. In effect, Eshkol's pitch is that the only way in which Israel can justify acquiescing in US arms sales to Jordan is if we do the same for Israel too. I will hold until my return the remainder of his arguments, but there is no doubt that Israelis are building up quite a head of steam. To fend off further repetitious argument, I responded that I felt I now had a full understanding of their concerns and had succeeded in turn in clarifying our concerns to them. Therefore, best thing would be for me to return as soon as possible to Washington and lay their views before the President./2/ /2/Komer reported in telegram 972 from Tel Aviv, February 14, that he told Eshkol he hoped to receive any Israeli suggestions at their February 14 meeting and would return to Washington the next day unless otherwise instructed. (Ibid., DEF 12-5 JORDAN) Upon receiving this telegram, McGeorge Bundy called President Johnson and recommended accepting Komer's suggestion and having him return to Washington where they could "have one more hard look" at the problem. He noted that Ball would like to give Rusk another chance to look at the issue, since Rusk was "very reluctant to get into this double arms selling, even though he doesn't see any alternative." (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of a Telephone Conversation Between Johnson and Bundy, February 14, 1965, 1:02 p.m., Tape F65.06, Side A, PNO 8) Telegram 750 to Tel Aviv, February 14, instructed Komer to return to Washington on February 15. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 US/KOMER) I felt compelled to say that I was confident we would not make any final decisions on aid to Jordan without fully considering both Israel's worries and its requests. However, I warned them that the Jordan matter might have a very short fuse. Despite my disclaimers, the Israelis obviously expected that the President would not send out an emissary on such a mission without certain compensatory gestures toward them. To help fill the gap, I told them I had received new Presidential message asking me to assure them that the US remained fully committed to the security and well-being of Israel, would take their concerns (as reported by me) most carefully into account, and could be depended on to stand by Israel in difficult times ahead. In turn he hoped they would appreciate our motives in such matters as Jordan arms deal, where we had Israel's own security interests very much in mind./3/ /3/No such message has been found. Telegram 750 to Tel Aviv, cited in footnote 2 above, instructed Komer to assure the Israelis their views would be given fullest consideration at the highest level. Once this painful episode was over, I raised (to ease the tension) the Cubic matter, UAR missiles, and Jordan waters. My debunking of the first two was quite reassuring to Eshkol while the last provided a useful opportunity to counsel restraint. We can expect plenty of trouble on this issue, too, however. In sum, Barbour and I believe that my mission was highly opportune in giving Israelis a much needed chance to blow off steam and then be brought tactfully back to earth. We have bought a little time and hopefully forestalled further such mishaps as the leak here on Jordan arms. But everything I've heard here tends to fortify my conviction that to sell arms to Jordan without at least doing the same for Israel will generate a major crisis in our relations. Moreover, their acute worry over the general deterioration of their security position (of which Jordan arms is only a part) is gradually generating a pre-emptive psychology. It could even lead at some point to a decision to go nuclear if this appeared to be the only way to maintain a deterrent edge. Barbour
151. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic/1/ Washington, February 16, 1965, 12:27 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, AID (US) 15 UAR. Confidential. Drafted by Jones; cleared by Davies, Jernegan, Curtis C. Strong of the Congo Working Group, Komer, and Macomber; and approved by Talbot. Repeated to Beirut. 4855. Our immediate problem is to drive home to UARG fact that modification of Michel amendment/2/ is no open sesame to new PL-480 agreements. Increments under existing agreement are out of question in any event and negotiations for new agreement would be unacceptable to Congress and US public as US-UAR relations now stand. Trust Embassy will lose no opportunity to impress these realities on UARG with specific reference to following points: /2/See Document 127. 1. As state with important interests in Near East and major responsibility for defense of free world, US determined bring its power to bear for stability and progress that area: a) by opposing aggression; b) by cooperating in area development. 2. This policy is area-wide. USG is party to no intra-area disputes, seeks with every like-minded state friendly bilateral relationship tailored to specific needs, whether for trade, aid, military backing, or PL-480. 3. Title 1 program in Egypt is not designed to buy off UAR. We recognize sovereign right to differ. However, growing body of American opinion feels UARG has gone beyond protection its own interests into area of unwarranted pressure on US interests in Near East and Africa. Only major Administration effort turned back Congressional initiative to terminate PL-480 sales to UAR. 4. In defending his need for flexibility in conduct of foreign policy, President also gave recognition to need for improvement in psychological climate of US-UAR relationship if economic cooperation is to resume. He is counting on UARG to meet its share of responsibility by according more attention to US interests in the several issues that divide us. 5. Administration could not justify to Congress or public continuation of aid to states supplying bloc arms to Congo insurgents. Since US and UAR both support Congolese unity and independence, they should be able to dispose very quickly of this obstacle to their cooperation by working for constructive cooperation between OAU and GDRC for a realistic solution. 6. Continuing drain on Egyptian resources to support expeditionary force in Yemen also makes US aid to Egypt hard to justify. While USG is not party to Yemen negotiations, it will continue support earliest possible reduction of Egyptian presence for common good of US and UAR. 7. Washington regrets hostile statements from Arab capitals about Israel, is somewhat heartened by indications of UAR success in channeling Arab hostility into defensive rather than offensive posture. UARG has intimated best hope of peaceful Arab-Israel accommodation lies in consolidation of US-UAR relations. Equally true that Arab-Israel hostilities could destroy all that US-UAR cooperation has achieved or could be expected to achieve in this decade. 8. Also germane to above discussion is Deptel 4760./3/ /3/Telegram 4760 to Cairo, February 11, stated that before any new purchase authority could be issued under the existing P.L. 480 agreement with the UAR, the UAR must first meet its normal marketing and other commitments and that the issuance of the purchase authority must then be cleared at a high level as being in the national interest. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, AID (US) 15 UAR) FYI: No decision yet taken here whether to recommend to President it in national interest to proceed issuance PA's for remaining $37 million. Rusk
152. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson/1/ Washington, February 16, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. III. Secret. Mission to Israel. As your emissary, I explained why we would probably have to sell certain arms to Jordan and asked for Israeli understanding--it being as much in Israel's interest as our own. I did not allude to what we might offer Israel as an offset, but the Israelis very quickly raised this issue with me. It is clearly the core of the problem. In three very cordial meetings with Eshkol and his key people I believe I got across why arms sales to Jordan were the least bad of the highly unpalatable choices with which we were both confronted. By probing for their ideas as to any other way out, I satisfied myself that they too see no better solution, much as they dislike ours. They trust Hussein's motives less than we, and regard us as probably not having exerted enough pressure. Moreover, two specific aspects of our Jordan arms position greatly bother Israel. First is the geographic fact that the bulge of Arab Palestine on the West Bank of the Jordan almost cuts Israel in two. While Hussein up to this point has garrisoned it only thinly, Israelis fear that the UAC (and his own added confidence) might lead him to put substantial forces on the West Bank. This would require Israel to redeploy a substantial part of the forces it now has in the north and south against the main Arab threats. Second, Eshkol asks how he (especially as a politician running for re-election in November) can explain that he agrees the US should arm an Arab member of a new unified command aimed at Israel--and at a time when Germany has just reneged on arms. So the Israeli position is that they simply cannot go along with US arms sales to Jordan, much less quietly support them, unless certain other measures are taken to enhance their security position--which they regard as sharply deteriorating in recent months. To understand their violent initial reaction (though they've calmed down some now), one must see it in this larger context. Our proposed sale (which they took as a fait accompli) came as an added shock right on the heels of Bonn's cancellation of arms aid. This had a double adverse psychological impact because it not only meant the loss of one of their three major sources of arms supply (France and the UK are left) but was a clear victory for Nasser. Then, just as they were losing a source of tanks, we told them we planned to provide some to their enemies. These two shocks also occurred at a time of rising Israeli concern over the unexpected vitality being shown by the Arab counter-diversion scheme and by the Unified Arab Command (they made a great point of taking me right up to the border to see the Syrians digging canals in plain sight). Israel clearly anticipates a developing crisis over the Jordan Waters (and is worrying over where we stand). Finally, the embattled Israelis regarded our Hill fight to continue aid to Nasser as a capitulation after he thumbed his nose at us, burned our library and shot down our plane. All the above will give you the current frustrated mood in Israel. With all due allowance for Israeli emotionalism and shrewd bargaining tactics, it is a reality with which we must deal. Indeed, Eshkol and the others kept coming back to the larger argument that continued Soviet arms aid to the Arabs, combined now with a surprisingly coordinated Arab approach, was creating a new order of threat to Israel. This, together with the partial drying up of Israel's European arms sources, made the US policy of avoiding direct arms supply out of date. If the US was as firmly committed to Israel's security as we kept saying, and if our policy was to maintain a deterrent balance to forestall another Arab-Israeli war, we must become direct arms suppliers to Israel. Only this way could we deprive Nasser of his psychological victory over Bonn in the short run, and convince the Arabs that they could not overpower Israel in the long run. Eshkol also made a strong plea for early public US support on the Jordan Water issue, as a means both of reassuring the Israeli electorate and deterring the Arabs from continuing their diversion scheme. He gave me a letter (Tab A),/2/ asking you to receive his Foreign Minister Golda Meir in early March to put this case personally to you after we'd had time to digest my report. /2/Eshkol's letter to Johnson, dated February 14, is attached but not printed. Conclusions. Israel's worries over its deteriorating security position, and its resultant mood of frustration are likely to grow, since the prospect is one of rising Arab Israeli tension over the Jordan Waters issue. 1. Therefore, unless the Arab diversion scheme loses momentum or the German action is reversed, there will be increasing Israeli pressure on us for help, regardless of what we do about Jordan arms. 2. While Israel now more fully understands the rationale for US arms for Jordan, and Eshkol and Eban at least probably see it as the least bad way out of a painful dilemma, Israel will be compelled to oppose such sales in the absence of compensatory actions tending to reduce their adverse impact. Eshkol put me on notice that he would be compelled to denounce them, especially in an election year. 3. Moreover, such US action would (a) dangerously increase already noticeable pre-emptive tendencies, aimed at warning off the Arabs from their counter-diversion schemes by overt action; and (b) increase Israel's tendency to go nuclear, as the best means of offsetting the decline in its conventional deterrent posture. 4. Because Israel's leaders recognize that controlled US arms sales to Jordan are probably necessary, however, they would prefer to find some way of justifying them by being able to point to other US actions favoring Israel. Their first requirement is US acceptance of principle of direct arms supply. Second, they want US agreement to supply the 90 tanks Bonn cancelled. Third, they want some arrangement which would insure that Hussein keeps his new armor on the East Bank. Fourth, they want public US support of Israel's position on the Jordan Waters and a reiteration of our pledges to resist aggression. 5. The Israelis were somewhat reassured that we intend carefully to control and space out any Jordan arms sales, especially that we contemplate selling only 100 M-48 tanks. To the extent that we enrich the Jordan arms package we will have to enrich what we do for them. Recommendations. I believe that we can get at least quiet Israeli support of US arms sales if we do at least the following: 1. Keep the Jordan arms package at the present level, i.e. no M-48A3 tanks and no US aircraft. If we have to tell Hussein we'll consider these later, let's face up to this problem when we come to it. 2. Tell the Israelis privately that we will consider direct arms sales if, as, and when we jointly agree they're required, if they in turn will give certain undertakings to us. 3. Be prepared to sell 90 M-48A1 tanks, and to say so publicly, if the Germans finally cancel. 4. Agree in principle to appropriate public statements on Jordan Waters diversion and our opposition to aggression, if we can reach a meeting of minds on Israeli restraint and get them not to insist on the letter of the Johnston Plan. In sum, we can make a deal with the Israelis by doing certain things that we would probably have to do sooner or later anyway if Arab-Israeli tensions heat up. R.W. Komer/3/ /3/McGeorge Bundy initialed below Komer's signature and added a handwritten note: "This seems to me almost right. It may be that we'll need to give Hussein 50 cents more than Bob says--but he's very near the target on what Eshkol needs. McG.B." He also added a postscript praising the President's recent speech to Congress.
153. Memorandum for the Files/1/ Washington, February 18, 1965. /1/Source: Department of State, NEA/IAI Files: Lot 80 D 102, Arms Deals with Israel, Background File. Secret. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS The Secretary reviewed the proposed memorandum to the President on Near East arms/2/ and made the following comments: /2/Evidently a draft of Rusk's February 19 memorandum, Document 155. In the first paragraph, "compensatory assistance for Israel" should be "balanced assistance". The former, he thought, implied we were "paying off" Israel. Our concern, in fact, is with Israel's security. He thought that we should not agree at this juncture to tell Jordan we would sell U.S. supersonic aircraft if their needs would not be met from other free world sources. He suggested we should do no more than agree to consider the sale. Mr. Talbot replied he felt we would have to go beyond this. Since the Jordanis were in the process of checking with the French on the Mirage, we might be faced with the problem within two weeks. The Secretary said that we should not go beyond considering sympathetically the sale of aircraft. He noted that prior to 1967 we might for a variety of reasons have to cancel the sales agreement. Paragraph 2b, the Secretary thought, implied that we would condone an Israeli attack provided it had exhausted action in the UN. He said that we must never indicate that we would endorse a preemptive attack that would be support for an aggression. He suggested that we inform the Israelis that the diversion problem should be taken to the UN where the U.S. would be prepared to lend support on the basis of the principles of the Johnston Plan. Mr. Talbot hoped the U.S. could stick with this position. The Israelis already seemed to be preparing a case on the internal and external threat to Israel, and comparing their position to that of the U.S. in Southeast Asia. The Secretary asked that the reference to an Israeli undertaking not to deploy offensive missiles be eliminated. With the UAR developing missiles, the US could not ask Israel to forego them. The Secretary said that further action with Israel and the UAR should await Hussein's reply to our proposed memorandum following his return from Cairo. The Secretary asked why the whole problem of the Near East arms race could not be given urgent consideration in the disarmament conference in Geneva. He thought the proposals to Jordan and Israel could go forward and still leave us room to undertake such a move. Mr. Talbot undertook to explore this possibility with Mr. Foster.
154. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State/1/ Amman, February 19, 1965, 5 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 12-5 JORDAN. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to Cairo. 486. Deptel 473--Jordan Arms./2/ /2/Telegram 473 to Amman, February 18, requested information on King Hussein's meetings with Nasser in Cairo. (Ibid.) King Hussein phoned residence late evening February 18 during farewell party for Eqs and requested EmbOff call on him that night. In subsequent conversation he said he had not been able avoid arms question in conversations with Nasser but had had lengthy discussions on subject and had finally told Nasser truth about where USG-GOJ negotiations stood as result of Talbot visit. He said discussions with Nasser had not been easy and had involved separate talks with Ali Amer and UAC. He felt his argument about dangers of polarization had little if any impact on Nasser and final resolution of conflicting positions had only been achieved with greatest difficulty. Factor which influenced discussions was UAR assessment of present German-Israeli arms package (septel), but key issue on Jordan arms build-up was supersonics. He and Nasser agreed they did not want to do anything which would contribute to Israeli pressure on USG to sell 104s to Israel. On other hand they understood such a sale already consummated through Germans. However if we could give assurances 104s would not be sold to Israel during period of present agreement, he would withdraw request for 104s and ask for our help on Mirage. Nasser concurred in this. Remaining problem would be finance since Nasser insisted there would be no more UAC money and Jordan must acquire its arms within funds currently pledged for this purpose. King then handed EmbOff letter to Ambassador/3/ which in summary makes following points with request they be transmitted urgently to Washington: /3/Not found. 1. Requests he be informed ASAP of accuracy of report he has received that recent German-Israeli arms agreement includes number of American Honest John surface-to-surface missiles. 2. Requests we confirm willingness to discuss, subsequent to concluding agreement covered by draft memorandum of understanding, supply of second increment of 100 tanks of M48A3 type with 105 mm gun. 3. States that if USG confirms that no aircraft of 104 series of US or free world manufacture has been sold to Israel, if we reaffirm our policy to deny such aircraft to both Israel and Arabs for at least duration of present agreement, then Jordan will limit its request to USG assistance in acquiring free world aircraft of type at last equal to Mirage III. 4. Reaffirms intention to fulfill arms requirements from free world sources so long as such equipment is made available to Jordan. 5. Reaffirms "commitments under agreement of joint Arab defense of Arab League through which UAC developed." Letter closes with request for earliest possible reply. Text by pouch. Comment: In view of intelligence given Hussein re FRG-Israeli arms agreement, believe it would be useful supply as many facts as possible in addition to point (1) above. Barnes
155. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson/1/ Washington, February 19, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Harriman Israeli Mission (II). Secret. The memorandum bears no drafting information. It was sent to the President with a covering memorandum of February 19 from Bundy noting that a meeting was scheduled for 6:15 p.m. that day. The President met with Ball, Bundy, and Komer between 6:45 and 7:39 p.m. on February 19. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary) No record of the meeting has been found. Bundy attached a February 19 memorandum from Komer and stated that he shared Komer's view that the Department of State proposal was "a little heavy on the Jordan side and light on the Israeli's." SUBJECT After further consideration of the Jordan Arms request, I see no alternative to improving the package we have offered to King Hussein and agreeing to consider balanced assistance for Israel. For the reasons discussed in the enclosed memorandum,/2/ this will require coordinated actions in Amman, Tel Aviv, and Cairo. These actions will be necessary to insure that the major policy shift we are making adequately protects all of our interests in the area and minimizes domestic political reactions. /2/The attachment entitled "Recommendations on Near East Arms," unsigned and undated, is not printed. I recommend you approve the following actions: Jordan (1) Agree to sell ground force equipment costing about $42 million, including 100 M-48 tanks to be delivered in 1965 to 1966 rather than 1965 to 1969 as originally authorized. (2) Agree to consider selling additional ground force equipment including M-48A3 tanks with the 105 mm gun with deliveries to be made from late 1967 through 1968. (3) Cooperate with Jordan in finding suitable supersonic aircraft from Free World sources on the understanding that, if Jordan is unsuccessful, we would then tell the Jordanians we would sympathetically consider selling them 20 F-104s with deliveries starting in 1968 or 1969. (4) Reach an understanding with the King that Jordan will not station tanks on the West Bank. Israel (1) Inform Israel that if there should develop any disproportionate buildup of arms on the Arab side, we will consider making selective, direct sales on credit terms, provided Israel had exhausted all other sources of supply. (2) In return, we would expect Israel: (a) to support quietly our Jordan program and to assist in abating opposition to our aid to other Arabs and (b) not to undertake preemptive action against Arab diversion works, but, rather, take this problem to the United Nations where the United States would be prepared to support the principles of the Johnston Plan. (3) Before making any sales, we would wish Israel to accept full IAEA safeguards on all their nuclear facilities and to provide assurances they would not develop a nuclear weapons capability. (4) Agree to review with Israel dangers posed by Arab diversion plans. The U.A.R. To attempt to prevent severe Arab reactions, apprise Nasser by a letter from you, of the reasons leading to our decisions to sell arms to Jordan and to consider direct sale of arms to Israel (draft enclosure 2)./3/ /3/The draft letter is not attached. A handwritten note by Komer states that the draft was detached for redrafting. Domestic Pressures Assuming Israel's acquiescence in sales to Jordan, give confidential briefings to selected American Jewish leaders and members of Congress. George W. Ball/4/ /4/Ball signed for the Secretary above Rusk's typed signature.
In a 13-minute telephone conversation on February 20, 1965, President Johnson discussed the question of arms sales to Jordan with New York banker Abraham Feinberg, Chairman of the Executive Committee of the American Trust Company. Feinberg said that McGeorge Bundy had suggested he call because the President was on the horns of a dilemma with respect to the Jordan situation and felt he had not heard a clear expression of Israeli views. (Johnson indicated later in the conversation that he had received indirect reports that Ambassador Harman was expressing opposition to arms sales to Jordan.) Feinberg told Johnson that he had given Bundy a rundown of the Israeli point of view as he had received it in a conversation that morning. He said the way to get a clear expression of Israeli views was to let Prime Minister Eshkol send Foreign Minister Golda Meir to Washington and meet with her. Johnson said they had reviewed this proposal a couple of days earlier and he thought it would be "about the worst thing that could happen" because it would attract worldwide attention. He said he had asked Averell Harriman and Robert Komer to go to Israel to talk to Eshkol, tell him the importance that Johnson's advisers attached to responding to King Hussein's request for arms, and obtain his views. Johnson told Feinberg: "We can go one of two ways, and I'm willing to go either way. If the Israel friends in this country want to substitute their judgment about the consequences of Soviet planes and don't think it makes much difference, kind of like Mike Feldman argued in the meetings up here, I'm prepared to tell my advisers that that is the course. I'd be perfectly willing. I don't look with much approval on becoming a munitions maker." He continued in this vein, telling Feinberg that he would leave the decision to Eshkol but making it clear that he thought failure to provide arms to Jordan would lead to disastrous results. He indicated that if the United States did not sell arms to Jordan, it would not sell arms to Israel. His judgment and that of his advisers, he told Feinberg, was that they should not let King Hussein "go down the river," but "if you want to turn him over and have a complete Soviet bloc--well, we'll just have to, and we'll get out of the arms business." He would let the Israelis make the decision, he told Feinberg, "but it's got to be in or out. If we go in, of course we've got to be of some help to Israel. If we get out, then we've just got to say, well, we're not taking part, we're not going to supply arms to one side or the other, we're just not going to be in here to sell a lot of munitions." Feinberg said one of Israel's major concerns was that the United States would reach an agreement with Jordan without further discussion with Israel. He again raised the question of a Meir visit. Johnson again rejected it. He repeated his view of the importance of selling arms to Jordan but said again that the decision was up to Israel: "What I want is, I want Eshkol to tell me what he wants to do. And I don't want him to just tell me, I want him to tell the people over here what he wants to do." He repeated that "we'll furnish both of you" but if Israel did not want that, "we'll furnish nobody." (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation Between Johnson and Feinberg, February 20, 1965, 11 a.m., Tape F65.08, PNO 1-2)
157. Memorandum From President Johnson to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Harriman) and Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff/1/ Washington, February 21, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Harold H. Saunders, Israel Security (Harriman/Komer Mission), Feb.-Mar. 1965. Secret. The memorandum bears no drafting information, but another copy is filed with a covering memorandum from Komer to the President, which indicates that Komer drafted the memorandum and had cleared it with Rusk and Ball. Komer added, "With an eye to history (it might get published twenty years after), they toned down some of the flavor of your approach the other night, but I have it firmly in mind for oral use." (Ibid., Country File, Israel, Vol. IV) Following on Mr. Komer's earlier mission, I want you both to impress vigorously on Prime Minister Eshkol and others why they and we confront momentous decisions on aid to Jordan. We have postponed acting as long as possible and now believe that we can delay no longer. We must decide within the next few days. Therefore, I am sending you out to consult with the Government of Israel once again. Your job is to require the Israelis to face up to the hard choice involved./2/ /2/Telegram 776 to Tel Aviv, February 20, informed Barbour that the President was sending Harriman and Komer to Tel Aviv for confidential discussions and instructed him to inform Eshkol. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 US/HARRIMAN) Notes of telephone conversations between February 20 and 23 between Ball and the President and other officials concerning plans for Harriman's trip are in the Johnson Library, Ball Papers, Israel. I. You should explain fully again why we regard it as the lesser of evils to sell a limited amount of US arms to Jordan. You may describe how we are now within sight of an arrangement which will enable Hussein to withstand UAC pressures while still minimizing the threat to Israel. You should candidly outline all the built-in restrictions which we have devised to control the military threat to Israel posed by these sales: (a) present commitment limited to M-48 tanks; (b) no F-104 aircraft, provided that the US does not sell them to Israel either; (c) only a $42 million ground force package spaced out over two plus years; (d) a credit margin of not more than $15 million at any given time; (e) a clear understanding on Hussein's part that he must obtain outside financing and that if not there will be no further deliveries; (f) no Soviet arms in Jordan. II. If, despite all your arguments, the Israelis insist that our Jordan proposals are totally unacceptable, you should use the following negotiating tactic. Remind them in no uncertain terms that we have made these proposals primarily because of our own deep concern over Israel's security. We have no major interests of our own in Jordan. We have been supporting it, at a cost of roughly one-half billion dollars to date, primarily as a means of preserving stability in the area; among other things, this has been of obvious advantage to Israel. It is my own judgment, buttressed by those of all of my advisers, that if we do not help King Hussein out of his dilemma, Jordan will be compelled to accept much larger quantities of Soviet arms. If this occurs, we have told King Hussein we will have to cut off all aid. The almost certain result in our judgment will be Nasserite domination of Jordan. Then Israel will be hemmed in by a hostile Arab ring, with Soviet arms on the East Bank. I cannot quite understand why the Israeli Government should take such a totally different view from that of all my top advisers. Is Israel prepared to live with the likely result? The US can do so more easily than Israel. It is hard enough for me to get foreign aid through Congress without having also to defend aid to Nasser and aid to Hussein, which we regard as so much in Israel's interest. At least we can save money and avoid controversy in the US. But Israel must realize the likely cost to us and to it if we lose much of our influence in the Arab world. Israel should be quite clear that it is faced with an even more grave judgment of policy than is the United States. The maintenance of some effective US presence and influence in the Arab world has proved of incalculable value to the security of Israel. Should the Arab world be unified and organized on the basis of Nasserite and Soviet influence and direction, the threat to Israel security would be fundamentally worsened. Israel should not rely upon the willingness of the American people to undertake unlimited commitments under circumstances where Israel's own attitude has prevented the use of diplomacy to avoid a military confrontation between the tiny beachhead of Israel and the combined Arab-Soviet forces which could be mobilized in that part of the world. These are considerations which Israel must take into account against the background of the probable attitudes of the American people as a whole. You should also make clear that, regardless of Israel's decision, the US cannot accept Israeli aggressive action against Jordan simply because the latter receives Soviet arms and adopts more pro-UAR policies. We opposed such pre-emptive action before, and we will be compelled to oppose it again--in accordance with the firm US policy last stated on 8 May 1963. III. On the other hand, if we and Israel can reach a firm mutual understanding on the wisdom of the course we propose, I am prepared to have you discuss the larger Israeli political and security concerns conveyed to me by Mr. Komer. First of all, I am well aware that however much the Israeli Government might itself be persuaded of our mutual interest in aid to Jordan, Prime Minister Eshkol would still have acute political difficulty in explaining to his electorate why US arms sales to an ostensibly hostile Arab state for an overtly anti-Israeli enterprise are actually the lesser of two evils. But he in turn must be brought to realize that I would have much the same problem here. Moreover, if we went too far in our explanations we would compromise King Hussein, thus defeating the very purpose we seek to advance. However, I am confident that, given mutual understanding and close coordination, we can work out this political problem. What I need is to be able to say privately that the Israeli Government supports what we do, even if it cannot publicly applaud, and to have that Government back up my words. In turn Prime Minister Eshkol needs to be enabled to say that Israel's security needs can be adequately met and that Israel can face the future with confidence in the strong support of its friends. Second, I gather that Israel's chief concern is over the possible growing threat from the continuing buildup of Soviet arms in hostile Arab hands. Our longstanding policy, which we believe to have been in Israel's interest too, has been to avoid becoming a supplier of "offensive" arms to Israel or the key Arab states. We have preferred that Israel look to its traditional Western European sources. West Germany's cancellation of its arms aid to Israel without consultation naturally was a deeply disturbing development. We still prefer that Israel seek maximum help from European sources. However, if there is a meeting of minds on other matters and if the US and Israel agree that a disproportionate arms buildup on the Arab side is developing which cannot be otherwise met, the US will make selective direct sales on favorable credit terms. Eshkol must understand that we do not make such a major change in US policy lightly, and that I personally have grave misgivings over the potentially disastrous effects on our relations with the Arab states. Under the circumstances, we must employ the utmost delicacy in making the shift and in controlling the attendant public disclosure. We would expect to meet any Israeli needs on a quiet case-by-case basis, with minimum attendant publicity. I would require a firm pledge from GOI to collaborate fully in this respect. Nor do I regard Israel as having any immediate arms needs from us. We still see hope that West Germany may deliver the remaining 90 M-48 tanks at issue. Even if not, Israel is getting 60 M-48s and 247 Centurions from the UK. Should it become necessary, however, we will later consider replacing the 90 M-48 tanks. Third, we recognize that Israel's concerns over any expansion of Jordan's forces relate largely to the geographic threat posed. King Hussein has assured us that he intends to keep his armor on the East Bank of the Jordan. We will ask him for a firm private undertaking to that effect, provided that Israel will promise to keep it secret. Fourth, Israel has raised the issue of the threat posed by the Arab counter-diversion scheme and the United Arab Command buildup. You may say that we are prepared to discuss this matter fully with Israel, though our view of the dangers posed is considerably less alarmist than theirs. However, we are prepared to reiterate at an appropriate time both our policy of opposition to aggression in the Near East and our support for the Unified Plan as an equitable standard by which to judge water usage by riparian states. IV. I regard the actions proposed by us as a major contribution to Israel's security, and wish you to emphasize how they further demonstrate the firm support which we have always given Israel. However, such far-reaching steps must meet with a commensurate Israeli response. Therefore, in return we must have certain firm undertakings from the Israeli Government. These are an integral part of any program of mutual reassurances; they must be considered as a package, and accepted as such. I do not propose to have Israel take what it likes and then argue with us about the rest. A. As already indicated we want Israel's quiet but unmistakable support of our Jordan arms program and its help in abating opposition to our efforts to maintain some sort of a presence in the other Arab states. B. We must have a pledge of full secrecy on all matters discussed by you and all subsequent actions taken until the US decides, in consultation with Israel, how and when to divulge them. C. Given the strengthening of Israeli security by the actions we contemplate, we wish a firm written reiteration of Israel's intentions not to develop nuclear weapons, and that Israel certify this by accepting IAEA safeguards on all of its nuclear facilities. So long as we receive the pledge, however, I do not insist on acceptance of IAEA controls now. D. The US cannot accept Israeli pre-emptive action against the Arab diversion works, but must instead have Israeli agreement to take this problem to the United Nations, where the US would be prepared to support the principle of the Johnston Plan. V. Finally, I want you to emphasize that in our judgment we have only a few days left before we must either sign a sales agreement with King Hussein or see him go the UAR/Soviet route. We have stalled him past the danger point. Therefore, we cannot and will not engage in extended bargaining with Israel. It must decide now on which course it prefers. Our choice is either to sell arms to both Israel and Jordan or to sell arms to neither. We could not have been more forthcoming in our response. In turn I expect Israel to display the spirit of statesmanlike understanding of US problems in the Middle East which has often been lacking in the past, but which can now open a new, hopeful road to the future. Lyndon B. Johnson
158. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State/1/ Tel Aviv, February 25, 1965, 10 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Harriman Israeli Mission (I). Secret; Flash; Exdis. Received at 3:35 p.m. and passed to the White House. 1037. For Secretary from Harriman and Komer. First day's talks with Eshkol went well./2/ We and Barbour believe across the board understanding can be reached along lines Presidential instruction with only minor modification. Israelis accept reaffirmation of nuclear self-denial but IAEA only if UAR does likewise and that there can be no pre-emption on Jordan waters till every peaceful recourse exhausted. However, they strongly doubt utility of taking water issue to UN. /2/Harriman, Komer, and Barbour met twice with Eshkol, Meir, and Bitan on February 25. First Secretary Stephen E. Palmer was present at both sessions; Russell was present at the first. Memoranda of these conversations and other conversations held during the Harriman/Komer visit are ibid., Israel, Vol. IV, and in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 US/HARRIMAN. PriMin has asked that we agree to understanding in writing so that at proper time he can bring his Cabinet colleagues on board. He obviously must consult Cabinet on any matter of such gravity, but firmly promises there will be no leaks. Recommend that to tie down this sensitive and complex matter we be authorized to initial memorandum of agreement along lines appropriate portions Sections III and IV of Presidential instruction. Will submit proposed text tomorrow Friday but request authorization before next meeting with PriMin at 3 p.m. local time Friday to indicate to him that USG prepared in principle to initial a memorandum of agreement along above lines. Barbour
159. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel/1/ Washington, February 25, 1965, 7:50 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 US/HARRIMAN. Secret; Flash; Exdis. Drafted by Talbot and approved by Ball. 818. For Harriman and Komer. Ref: Your 1037./2/ We will endeavor to get a decision to you promptly on initialling memorandum of understanding along lines of Sections III and IV of Presidential instructions. Meanwhile, in further talks with Israelis you should point out that we regard IAEA safeguards as question between us and Israel, not dependent on UAR accession. FYI. You will recall Nasser has told us he will consider IAEA safeguards when he obtains nuclear reactor of sufficient size as to make question significant. End FYI. If and when we should obtain evidence UAR attempting to develop nuclear capability, we would press Cairo hard to accept IAEA safeguards. /2/Document 158. On question of pre-emption in Jordan waters dispute, you will recall strong objection here to asking Israel to hold its hand only "until every peaceful recourse exhausted." Phrasing in Presidential instructions accurately reflects our firm view that U.S. cannot at any time accept Israeli pre-emptive action against Arab diversion works, but must instead have Israeli agreement to take this problem to the United Nations, where U.S. would be prepared to support principles of Johnston Plan. We are delighted at your encouraging progress. Further instructions will be forwarded as soon as possible, though cannot promise decisions in time for meeting with Eshkol Friday. Rusk [Continue with the next documents] Volume XVIII Index | Foreign Relations Online | Historian's Office | Department of State | Secretary of State |