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 | FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XVIII Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964-67 Department of State |
 140. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/ Washington, February 7, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. III. Secret. A note in Komer's handwriting at the top of the memorandum reads, "Essence of Jordan arms problem." Mac-- This is memo I sent LBJ yesterday,/2/ which I believe had major impact on tentative decisions taken. Since he had Moyers sit in on meetings and Bill called me for lunch, I showed it to him and he asked me to tell LBJ he agreed. /2/Reference is apparently to Document 138. In the series of meetings we held it became crystal clear that the President's chief reason for not accepting the repeated State/DOD/CIA recommendation was his concern over the US domestic reaction when it came out that the US was supplying arms to a UAC aimed at Israel. Of course this was the angle we kept cluing him on, since State/DOD tended to argue only in terms of keeping Jordan from going the Soviet route. The predictably violent Israeli reaction (see Eshkol letter)/3/ and Feldman's flank attacks added to his worries. /3/See footnote 3, Document 137. It gradually dawned on me that we were three-quarters pregnant anyway. If Hussein accepted our package he'd have to tell UAC in Cairo; once it then came out that US selling to Jordan, we'd be trapped. In fact, Israelis themselves threatened they might have to reveal it (according to Mike). Moreover, US role in German tank deal is bound to leak soon; when this happened, we'd stand revealed as making arms sales to Israel too. So I kept pressing on State to face up to fact that if we agreed to sell Jordan, we'd have to sell Israel too--as the only way of protecting our domestic flank. Moreover, as I argued in attached, maintaining a decent Arab-Israeli deterrent balance was essential to forestall another Arab-Israeli clash, one piling up of Soviet arms to Arabs gave latter enough confidence. Moyers made a big contribution by arguing Friday/4/ that we'd have to make a public statement justifying arms to Jordan in a way that would satisfy domestic critics. So at Saturday afternoon meeting/5/ I expanded on this. My argument was that the only means of getting away with arms to Jordan was to say publicly we would help Israel too, in order to prevent piling up of Soviet arms from threatening peace. /4/February 5. /5/See footnote 2, Document 135. In addition to above arguments, I pointed out that we were inevitably being pushed in this direction anyway, citing 1962 Hawk deal and then 1964 covert tank deal. It was a fact of life that we were going to have to change our policy. German attempt to renege on tank deal, coming at same time, might be panicking the Israelis. But we needed their active support if we were to get away with Jordan arms sale--only way to get this was to tell them we'd sell to them too. So why not bite the bullet? Ball, Vance, Wheeler all agreed in principle, though expressing reservations as to how much we should say or do right off. I made clear that we'd get plenty of flak from the Arabs, but perhaps best to ride it out now. Only alternative was a flat US security guarantee and joint planning, which would spook the Arabs even more. Jernegan agreed, saying a security guarantee would force us into arms aid anyway, so was worse. There was no firm decision (I didn't press for one because this is a major policy shift) but I do feel all top echelon are on notice that if we sell to Jordan, we have no other viable alternative. You should know that LBJ authorized modified offer to Jordan (only basic M-48s, no US jets) only on basis unanimous judgment Hussein wouldn't accept. Ergo, in effect it was a tactical device designed to buy a little time (I was only one to say I thought some chance Hussein might buy). Am going on at this length, because this whole affair may come to a boil while I'm gone. I envisage a public statement (after news leaks) that US: (1) reiterates 8 May '63 statement against aggression in ME; (2) has sought for years to avoid contributing to ME arms race; (3) but in view of constant Soviet effort to upset stability by cut-rate sales, US prepared sell to friendly countries which don't wish to go Soviet route; (4) will sell arms only for defensive purposes when obvious cases of imbalance developing. If we go this route, I believe we should send a credible emissary secretly to Nasser pronto to clue him, saying that public spat will help no one and just result in US/UAR split; we still prefer arms control to arms race but he left us no choice (cluing him in advance on Hawk deal helped immensely). Bob Anderson would be admirable (LBJ mentioned sending him to persuade Nasser to lay off Hussein, but Ball and I countered this wouldn't do any good just now). RWK
141. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State/1/ Amman, February 7, 1965, 7 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 12-5 JORDAN. Secret; Immediate; Exclusive Distribution. Repeated to Tel Aviv. Passed to the White House. The retyped text of the telegram was sent to the President on February 8 with a covering memorandum from Komer, noting that the talk with Hussein "didn't go as badly as State feared, though this may be Arab courtesy." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Jordan, Vol. I) 436. From Talbot. We have just seen King Hussein for two and a quarter hours. He had Khammash with him. Ambassador, Solbert and Bunte accompanied me. Barnes and I are to meet King alone for second session at luncheon Monday,/2/ after Khammash, Solbert and Bunte have spent morning on details of USG proposal. /2/February 8. Telegram 443 from Amman, February 8, reported that Talbot's luncheon conversation with the King ranged over a variety of Near Eastern issues. No decisions were reached in their discussion of the arms package. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 12-5 JORDAN) King listened intently my 45 minute presentation based on talking paper as modified by Deptel 437./3/ He then expressed warm appreciation for amount and seriousness of attention given Jordan's problems at highest levels USG. He hoped I would report views he was about to express so USG leaders could further consider his position. Otherwise "we may be in for some very grim times indeed." King repeated many points we have heard before, including statement that whether Soviet equipment appears in Jordan now depends on our decisions rather than on him. He expressed disappointment at ground package as we presented it. Prompted by Khammash he said we appeared to be reopening understandings that he had thought long since achieved on ground equipment sales. King and Khammash both reacted visibly when told M48A3's not available for sale. They did not, however, argue tank question this evening. King later said this request had been intended to balance the tanks being provided by Germany to Israel and converted to 105 mm guns. So far as we could tell Khammash's main difficulty with ground force proposal, apart from tanks, was five-year delivery time. He appears still to want entire tranche within next year or so. /3/Telegram 808 to Beirut (Document 139) was sent to Amman as telegram 437. On non-availability of US supersonic aircraft, King contented himself with quiet assertion that if Western European aircraft could have done the job he would not have troubled USG with request for American aircraft. Khammash stated that Mirage failed to meet requirements on both quality and price. King observed gloomily that one at least of great dangers he foresees ahead might have been avoided had we been able to provide US aircraft. We inferred he was referring to costs I had enumerated that would ensue if Jordanians took Soviet aircraft. Other comments by King related to general situation in area, Jordan's exposed position, efforts of Arabs to act responsibly rather than discordantly and emotionally as so often in the past, need to build up Arab defensive forces to stabilize Arab-Israel situation since "our friends" apparently unable help bring solution and apprehension of great dangers likely in months ahead. Comment: Session was clearly one in which both sides laid out positions, with the Jordanian response being quite formal, contained and in somewhat general terms. We may hear more of theme that Israel getting better tanks than US willing to sell Jordan. At end of session we were shown newspaper cartoon displaying large Uncle Sam holding Germany who in turn holding an Israeli figure pointing a gun at a small Arab. Further sessions on Monday may reveal other specifics of Jordan position, and should give us chance to press detailed argumentation of our position. I believe decision on Presidential letter should await this next round. Detailed report of conversation will follow./4/ /4/Telegram 437 from Amman, February 8, reported an extended discussion with King Hussein the previous evening concerning the U.S. arms proposals. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 12-5 JORDAN) Barnes
142. Telegram From the Department of State of the Embassy in Jordan/1/ Washington, February 8, 1965, 5:36 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 US/HARRIMAN. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted and approved by Jernegan and cleared by Ball. 446. For Talbot. Acting Secretary has asked Jernegan to get in touch with you urgently by teletype. Understand however atmospheric condition unfavorable and this message contains what he had planned to put to you. Request immediate answer. Presidential decision/2/ is that emissary to Israel should be Harriman accompanied by Feldman and Komer./3/ In effort to avoid too much focus on real purpose of trip, Harriman would plan to go on from Tel Aviv to Tehran, and Kabul and perhaps visit one or more African countries on way back. General line with public would be that he taking occasion of visit farther east to stop off briefly in Israel. /2/A draft attached to the telegram indicates that the decision had been reached that morning, presumably when the President met very briefly with Ball, Komer, and Jernegan on the subject of Jordan following an NSC meeting. Discussion of the question of arms sales to Jordan had been scheduled to follow discussion of Vietnam at the NSC meeting, but the meeting broke up after the Vietnam discussion. (Ibid., S/S-NSC Files: Lot 70 D 265, NSC Meetings, 1965; Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary) /3/The question of who the emissaries to Israel should be was discussed by the President and Ball in telephone conversations at 5:15 and 5:25 p.m. on February 7. Ball suggested sending Harriman. (Ibid., Ball Papers, Jordan) This mission is felt to be necessary because of probability that Israelis would leak a Presidential letter as they have already done with the news of the proposed Jordanian arms deal (see Tel Aviv #945, rptd Amman 212)./4/ /4/Telegram 945 from Tel Aviv, February 8, reported a front-page story in Maariv that Israel had expressed concern to the U.S. Government over its decision to supply Jordan with arms worth $50 million. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 12-5, JORDAN) Ball called in Harman on February 8 and expressed U.S. unhappiness with the leak. (Telegram 712 to Tel Aviv, February 8; ibid.) President and Acting Secretary wish to do everything possible to forestall anticipated Israeli drive in US against foreign aid and other essential US policies. Such drive seems probable if GOI is not placated in face of Jordanian deal. Presumably a special emissary of Governor Harriman's stature and ability could help soothe Israeli feelings and bring about some cooling off of high emotions. We would appreciate your views regarding this projected mission. Assuming arms deal with Jordan is in fact concluded, on terms you have offered or on anything more liberal, we very much fear repercussions in Congress affecting whole Middle East policies and perhaps other aspects foreign policy. As indicated above, President himself deeply concerned about this aspect. We are beginning to think that only step we could take which has chance of being really effective is to give Israel assurance that when and if necessary USG would be willing to consider direct arms sales on favorable terms. Following is some language illustrating what we have in mind: "1. Recognizing that continued Soviet arms sales to the Arabs can over time upset the deterrent balance (which US arms sales to Jordan are designed in fact to preserve), the US would consider selective sales of arms to compensate for any disproportionate buildup on the Arab side. "2. This, however, does not seem to us to be an immediate problem. We continue to prefer that Israel seek maximum help from European sources. But, if and when we agree that Israel has a demonstrable need which cannot be satisfactorily filled elsewhere, the US will consider direct sales on favorable credit terms. "3. In return to USG desires Israeli undertakings: a) actively to support US aid to Jordan and other Arabs and to assist in abating the stir over aid to the UAR; b) not to undertake premature preemptive action against Arab diversion works; c) not to go nuclear or deploy strategic missiles; d) accept full IAEA safeguards." Would like to know how this strikes you and Barnes. Realize Israelis may well balk at agreeing to 4 considerations in para. 3 above. However, if we got even three of them, with or without commitment to abandon missiles, we would have achieved some pretty major objectives, possibly at the cost of nothing more than we will inevitably be forced to give over coming years without any quid pro quos. Do you and Barnes think there is any chance of getting Hussein to postpone his trip to Cairo for a week or two? This might give us more time for consideration here and further attempts to bring him around, while at same time it would give us breathing space in which to persuade Israelis to calm down. Do you think that a concession of 100 M-48A3s to be delivered in three years or thereabouts would enable you make deal with Hussein? Ball
143. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson/1/ Washington, February 9, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Jordan, Vol. I. Secret. Jordan Arms. Here are the key issues for 4:30 p.m. meeting. Of course the underlying decision to be made is whether we should now sell arms to Israel as well as Jordan, as the only way to buy off the Israelis and protect your domestic flank. This would raise hob with the Arabs, but is probably necessary sooner or later anyway. A. Should we sweeten the Jordan package? Talbot, Solbert and our Embassy recommend doing so pronto, to forestall Hussein going the Soviet route./2/ They doubt Hussein would take even sweetened package, but feel we could buy 10 days or so by saying we'd reconsider in Washington. /2/Talbot's recommendations, summarized in this memorandum, were sent in telegram 444 from Amman, February 9. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 12-5 JORDAN) 1. Supersonics are still the crux. Talbot again urges we offer 20 F-104C's, since Hussein claims he's committed to take MIGs otherwise. If not, he suggests we say we'll reconsider and answer a week from now. He also suggests we tell King we'll help him try to get European jets, but if this fails we'll provide 104s. I'd prefer saying we'd "consider" 104s in that case. 2. Tanks. Talbot says we're in a bind because Jordan knows Israel is getting better tanks. He proposes offering M48A1 with promise to "discuss" conversion to M48A3 "at early date" (it would take two years to deliver in any case). 3. Timing of Deliveries. King claims they must meet UAC timetable, so must have whole ground force package in one year instead of four (1966-69) we propose. Talbot urges two years with added stretchout on tanks. I'd prefer three years because early deliveries might spook Israelis into pre-empting. 4. Credit terms. Jordan wants full credit terms (we offered only $7 million revolving credit) so it can get whole package before other Arabs pay for it. King claims Soviets offer easy credit terms. Talbot and State favor increasing credit margin to $15 million and letting first year's sales go on credit. I'd be much tougher, since our safety valve is to sell only what King can find money for. Ball will argue for sweetening package as Talbot wants to keep Hussein on the hook while we take 7-10 days to reconsider. But the higher we bid the more trouble we'll have with Israelis (who now know our minimum). So I'd argue for just enough sweetening to show Hussein we're serious and 10 days reconsideration in Washington (while we beat up Israelis). B. How do we calm down Israelis? Despite their leak, they're still salvageable in my judgment. My hunch is they panicked because Germans reneged on them at very same time. So after a great show of indignation, we ought to go back at them hard, since we need their active help to protect your domestic flank. As I see it, more turns on what we're prepared to offer them than on who carries the word. To really calm them we'll have to say (once other arguments are exhausted), that we'll sell to them too if and when we both agree that a need arises. This is a mighty big sweetener, and a mighty risky one, since it may get us in real dutch with the Arabs. We may even make it impossible for Hussein to take our arms. State is for this in principle, but afraid to bite the bullet. If we do go this route, we ought also to get some quid pro quos: (a) nuclear non-proliferation and acceptance of IAEA controls; (b) active Israeli lobbying in support of Jordan arms deal and aid to Nasser; (c) a commitment against pre-emption on Jordan waters. C. How do we negotiate this? A special emissary is the best bet, and the sooner the better before the whole business leaks. But the more public the exercise the more risks of leaks. Harriman has the clout (and I'll gladly side him) but: (a) Israeli papers will have a field day speculating why Harriman is there; (b) Arabs may put two and two together and say he's there to get Israeli permission to sell arms to Jordan. D. If we decide to sell to Israel, we must clue Nasser in advance. This may be a long shot, but it damped his reaction to Hawk deal. We'd have to tell Nasser face-to-face that if Arabs keep building up against Israel, we'll have to maintain the balance. Ball has talked with Bob Anderson, who is going to Cairo in about four days. E. Getting the Germans to help. If they actually cancel their military aid to Israel,/3/ Israelis will immediately be after us to replace this. Therefore, I see every merit in urging Germans at highest level not to cancel but to promise Arabs they'll end program as soon as existing commitments are filled. They could claim this is a matter of honor. /3/Telegram 2940 from Bonn, February 6, reported that the German Government had concluded that it could not continue shipments of arms to Israel, which had been conditioned on secrecy but had become public knowledge, and had proposed to Israel that it stop further shipments and pay Israel a sum of money as a "quid pro quo." (Ibid., DEF 12-5 ISR) The above combination of moves seems the best way out of our painful dilemma, but one which was going to be on us sooner or later anyway. R. W. Komer
144. Memorandum for the Record by the Deputy Director for Plans, Central Intelligence Agency (Helms)/1/ Washington, February 9, 1965, 6 p.m. /1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 80-B01285A, DCI Files, DCI (Helms) Memos for the Record, 1 Jan. 1965-31 Dec. 1972. Secret. Prepared on February 12. SUBJECT PRESENT WERE 1. This meeting, scheduled for 4:30 on Tuesday, 9 February, convened in the Cabinet Room at 6:00 P.M. It adjourned at 6:30. The President was absent from the Room for about ten minutes, the Vice President came to the meeting ten minutes late. 2. Acting Secretary Ball opened the discussion with a detailed description of the recommendations made by Assistant Secretary Talbot in a cable from Amman (EmbTel-444)./2/ He also outlined a recommendation for a compensating deal with the Israelis. There was general agreement on his recommendation except for Mr. Feldman who expressed his opposition on the grounds that the Israelis would not accept the United States "package." It was clear that neither the President nor the Vice President liked Acting Secretary Ball's proposal either, but their opposition appeared to stem from troubles which they anticipated having with the Congress. /2/See footnote 2, Document 143. 3. The meeting ended inconclusively. The President did authorize the sending of an emissary to Tel Aviv. (It was later decided that Mr. Komer would be the President's representative for this purpose.)/3/ /3/Notes of telephone conversations on February 10 between Ball and Jernegan and Ball and Harriman indicate that Komer was to go immediately to Israel and that Harriman was to follow a week or so later. (Johnson Library, Ball Papers, Jordan) RH
145. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan/1/ Washington, February 9, 1965, 9:50 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 12-5 JORDAN. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Jernegan, cleared by Komer, and approved by Ball. Repeated to Tel Aviv. 454. For Talbot. Ref: Amman tels 444/2/ and 445./3/ You are authorized offer increase amount of credit to fifteen million and to promise expedite delivery of ground equipment as much as possible. (Communications items in very tight supply and probably could not be delivered before end of 1966, while APC's in great demand and also subject considerable probable delay. Conversion of tanks, if insisted upon and agreed upon, would take at least two years according Defense.) You should leave King under no illusion that we can promise that expedited delivery will mean delivery within one or two years even for all of equipment not specifically mentioned. FYI. This is for both technical and political reasons. End FYI. /2/See footnote 2, Document 143. /3/Telegram 445 from Amman, February 9, commented on telegram 446 to Amman (Document 142). In it, Talbot supported sending a special emissary of Harriman's stature to Israel to try to persuade the Israelis that a U.S. arms sale to Jordan was the best available alternative. He agreed that the real choice was between selling arms to both Jordan and Israel or selling arms to Israel after Jordan obtained Soviet equipment, and he urged that he be given authority to tell Hussein the United States was prepared to make available a squadron of F-104s in 1968. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 12-5 JORDAN) You are not authorized make new offers on tanks or supersonics at this time. Hope you can persuade King accept first 100 tanks as M-48's with promise discuss A3's later. If King still insists on either point, you should say you will return Washington and arrange further consideration, although you cannot promise what outcome will be. This does not mean that acceptable deal for King ultimately foreclosed but growing feeling here is that final agreement with Jordanians on any package will be extremely difficult sell in U.S. as well as in Israel if full discussions have not been held previously with Israelis. Plans not yet finalized, but hope to get Presidential Mission to Israel by weekend. You should of course do your best persuade King to postpone visit to Cairo. If invitation to Khammash to come to Washington in about ten days will make this possible you authorized to extend it and/or promise your own early return Amman if necessary. FYI. Discussion continuing here at highest level but doubt any further definite decisions will be made before your return. End FYI. Ball
146. Memorandum for Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff/1/ Washington, February 10, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. III. Secret; Exdis. The memorandum, typed on White House stationery, bears no indication of the drafter. A handwritten notation states that it was approved on February 11. Bundy sent a copy to Ball that day, stating that he "did not like to show these things to the President without Ball's seeing them." (Ibid., Ball Papers, Jordan) Telegram 736 to Tel Aviv, February 11, from Bundy to Komer, states that his instructions had been approved by "highest authority." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 US/KOMER) Your mission is to explain to the Government of Israel in full and friendly candor the reasons why we believe that limited and carefully spaced out US arms sales to Jordan are far better than the alternative of uncontrollable Soviet or UAR supply. Since the Israelis seem to have focussed only on the added threat to them from US arms sales to Jordan, you should lay heavy emphasis on the far greater threat which would ensue from uncontrolled Soviet or UAR supply. You should point out that from our talks with King Hussein we are convinced that, unless he can get minimum satisfaction from us or Western European sources, he will be compelled to take the Soviet route. I want you to make clear that our effort from the outset has been primarily aimed at minimizing the threat to Israeli security and area stability, not the reverse. Indeed, we have no independent interest in Jordan. Our subsidies to it, now totalling almost a half billion dollars, have been primarily designed to maintain an independent Arab kingdom, not under hostile domination, along Israel's longest and most vulnerable frontier. In our judgment this factor has contributed materially to Israel's security. You should further stress our conviction, buttressed by the views of our Joint Chiefs of Staff, that the limited arms sales we envisage to Jordan will not significantly increase the overall threat to Israel. Even if this were the case, however, the increased threat would hardly be comparable to that created by Jordan's acceptance of Soviet and UAR arms, and possibly UAC troops on Jordan's soil, which in turn would risk ultimate UAR domination of Jordan. Thus I see US arms sales to Jordan as merely a further step in a longstanding US policy, which I understand to be tacitly acquiesced in by Israel, of forestalling this worst of all eventualities. If you are asked whether the US has already agreed on arms sales with King Hussein you should say that we have not yet done so, but are prepared to do so shortly if he meets our terms. I believe that these terms are so much in Israel's interest that I wish to solicit not only Israel's understanding but its active support of our policy. While you are not authorized to discuss the matter pending further instructions, I am aware that to secure Israel's active support it will probably be necessary to indicate our willingness to sell arms to Israel sooner or later. The US recognizes that continued Soviet arms sales to the Arabs can over time upset the Arab-Israeli deterrent balance. The Israelis will be particularly eager for such sales if West Germany cancels the remainder of its program. We continue to prefer that Israel seek maximum help from European sources. However, if and when we and Israel jointly agree that Israel has a demonstrable need which cannot be satisfactorily filled elsewhere, we will consider direct sales on favorable credit terms. In return the US would expect to receive certain undertakings from Israel. These matters will be the subject of a further instruction to you.
147. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State/1/ Tel Aviv, February 13, 1965, 1 a.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 US/KOMER. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to DOD and passed to the White House. 969. From Komer. Friday/2/ given over to practically uninterrupted series of meetings, including two with Prime Minister and long session with Foreign Minister, Eban, Peres, Rabin, etc. I made and remade all points in my brief, particularly stressing lack of any viable alternatives. Will not repeat these here since detailed report will follow. Highlights are: /2/February 12. 1. Israelis, while immediately and deeply concerned over prospect US arms sales to Jordan, see it in larger context of unexpected cohesiveness of UAC, Bonn's caving to Nasser, US catering to the UAR, and continued Soviet arms aid to the Arabs. In effect they see this combination of circumstances as creating (a) an increasingly grave threat to Israeli security; (b) a psychological fillip to the Arabs, which enhances their belief that Carthage can be destroyed; and (c) an incipient crisis of confidence among the Israeli public. By now they are far more exercised about Nasser (and his victory over Bonn) than over Jordan. 2. While Israelis have calmed down considerably on Jordan arms issue, little doubt that Israeli military in particular acutely disturbed by prospect of even a modest increase in strength of one of the two adjacent countries they have not regarded as a military threat. From briefing by Rabin with no punches pulled it clear Israelis were counting on not having to divert much first-line strength to screen piddling Jordanian forces. While they still talk about Jordan acquiring an offensive instead of defensive capability, long and short of matter is that they now feel they'll have to deploy a fair proportion of their standing forces against a surprise Jordanian attack, instead of keeping them mostly in south against UAR and secondarily in north opposite Syrians. They made much of lack of warning time. 3. Beyond security threat is political problem faced by Eshkol as a practical politician heading unstable coalition and a split, plurality Mapai Party, going into a fall election, and with Ben-Gurion having in effect declared open war against him. While he himself didn't stress this point, and is probably more convinced than he's willing to concede as yet by our arguments, it is obvious that he is deeply concerned over how to explain to his Cabinet, and the public why it's the least of all evils for Israel's great friend the US to sell arms to the UAC. 4. With all due allowances for the replay of old records, it is quite apparent that the Israelis foresee a gathering storm over the Jordan waters issue, and as might be expected, are nervous over US support. 5. Also significant were repeated veiled and not veiled references to the need for pre-emption. Most of these were in connection with the need to scare off the Arabs from their counter-diversion scheme. While much of this talk was for our benefit, there seems little doubt that a pre-emptive psychology is building up in Israel and will become an increasing risk so long as the Israelis see no other way out of their dilemma. 6. Throughout eight hours of almost uninterrupted back and forth, we kept bringing them back to the fundamental dilemma--that however unpalatable the course we proposed to take, it seemed much less risky than the most likely alternative. Though Eshkol and others asked why we didn't threaten to cut off our subsidies, etc., I believe that such plaints were for form's sake and that they recognize that we are proposing the lesser of evils. 7. If nothing else, this exercise has been most useful in re-establishing intimate communication with GOI, which had felt genuinely bruised by our failure to give sufficient advance notification. Quite clearly, Bonn's craven behavior had added to the shock. There were many harsh words about the Germans today. 8. More important, we believe we have gotten the top level of GOI (though not yet their military) over the hurdle of reacting primarily to Jordan arms and not to the larger issue. Pending instructions, I sedulously (and I must say disingenuously) refrained from even hinting at compensatory US measures. I did, however, seek to focus their attention on constructive responses by repeatedly posing the question of whether they had any better solution than the one we had come up with. 9. They didn't do more than hint at this, but this was enough to make Barbour and me conclude that Eshkol, Eban, Meir, and probably Peres are already beginning to turn their minds to what Israel could do itself and get from the US to cope with their problems. For example, Eshkol and Meir both noted that we had not made any recent public statement of our support for Israel's use of Jordan waters within Unified Plan. Eshkol mentioned the importance of dispelling any illusions the Arabs might have as to our continued determination to prevent Arab aggression against Israel. As Golda Meir put it, we should tell Nasser we would give Israel a tank for every tank Moscow gave him. All concerned carefully pointed out that any increase in Jordanian capabilities, plus Israel's loss of further German arms, created an even greater increasing requirement for added Israeli deterrent strength. In the afternoon Rabin quite pointedly mentioned that Israel's primary needs were tanks and planes. 10. We have another meeting scheduled for 5 P.M. Sunday local time. Taking advantage of the Sabbath, we suggested postponement till then to give Washington time to consider (in the midst of Vietnam) my report. Since we have tried our hardest to force the Israelis themselves to come up with alternatives, we may receive proposals at that time. However, Peres has asked to see me urgently tomorrow morning, which may provide some advance clues. 11. The recommendations of Ambassador Barbour and myself are already before you. But developments today reinforce our conviction that Israel can be brought to accept, and even to support quietly, limited arms aid to Jordan if we are prepared to do and say those things which would reinforce the deterrent balance and, equally important, give verbal evidence of this intention to both the Arab and Israeli audiences. 12. I feel duty bound to add that, so long as we do not close with Hussein and confront Israel with yet another presumed fait accompli it does not seem imperative to make either a general or specific tender to the GOI right now. However, the sooner we can do so, at least in general terms, the more rapidly we will be able to move on to the question of how to get demonstrable Israeli support of our Jordan arms program. Suffice it to say that if we do feel compelled to make Hussein a new offer, especially one any richer than the present bid, prior action here essential. Of course, aside from indicating that Hussein has not accepted our offer, we refrained from indicating that we might feel compelled to enrich it. Barbour
148. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel/1/ Washington, February 13, 1965, 8:28 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 US/KOMER. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Davies, cleared by Talbot, and approved by Ball. 748. For Komer. Tel Aviv's 971./2/ At this juncture Hussein would be most reluctant enter into private understanding which if leaked could seriously endanger his position. Additionally, our capability to enforce such an understanding, even if one could be arrived at, would be limited. /2/In telegram 971 from Tel Aviv, February 12, Komer reported his meeting with Peres, who said Eshkol had authorized him to discuss the situation frankly and informally. Peres stressed Israeli concern about the need to preserve Israel's "depth territorially and balance militarily." He suggested a private understanding with King Hussein that Jordan would not increase its armored strength on the West Bank or would do so only to a very small degree, and he requested that the United States make up the shortfall of 90 tanks which were to have been provided by Germany. (Ibid.) In Talbot's discussions with Hussein and Khammash, it was made clear that Jordan will keep bulk of its modern tanks on East Bank on theory armored force has defensive role only. Believe you can reassure Peres that even with new arms, armored strength West Bank would be increased to small degree if at all. You may also inform him that Jordan intends remove from its inventory around 100 Charioteers and Centurions in 1965-66. FYI. We do not believe present situation and still doubtful status German deliveries require any decision on our part to make up possible short-fall of 90 tanks. Israel will receive 310 modern tanks in months ahead. Schroeder's reported demarche to UAR Ambassador Bonn could indicate Germany may complete deliveries if Ulbricht received in Cairo. Until your supplementary instructions received suggest you avoid going beyond saying matter will be considered later in Washington. We agree it seems significant that at this stage Israelis are limiting their demands on us to the 90 tanks included in German deal. End FYI./3/ /3/Komer replied in telegram 973 from Tel Aviv, February 14, that he would again reassure the Israelis along these lines. He commented that the Israelis would not limit their demands to 90 tanks; if the United States stated publicly that it would replace the German tanks, "we're compromised and have in effect changed our whole arms policy. So let's not kid ourselves." (Ibid., DEF 12-5 JORDAN) Ball
149. Briefing Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Talbot)/1/ Washington, February 13, 1965. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 US/KOMER. Secret. Drafted by Killgore and Lee F. Dinsmore of NE on February 12 and cleared by Davies. Filed as an attachment to a February 15 memorandum from Talbot to Rusk. SUBJECT I have been in Jordan February 7-10 negotiating with King Hussein on the arms problem. Simultaneously, several meetings with the President were held here as developments unfolded. In the initial presentation to King Hussein, I was authorized to offer: (1) The basic M-48 tanks, (2) A $42 million ground equipment package to be delivered over a five-year period and to include the tanks, (3) U.S. acquiescence in Jordanian acquisition of a West European supersonic fighter squadron, and (4) a $7 million revolving credit. This was not enough to satisfy King Hussein. The King revealed his knowledge of the supposedly secret tank deal between the Federal Republic of Germany and Israel which, as the King pointed out, included the 105 mm gun. He argued that it was not fair to offer Jordan a tank inferior to that which Israel is getting. The King was also dissatisfied with the delivery schedules envisaged in our offer, the amount of credit, and the West European supersonic. He and the Jordanian side argued that the over-all American offer was not sufficient to enable Jordan to withstand Unified Arab Command pressures to accept Soviet equipment. After the second long meeting on February 8, I reported that the real issue had become whether to sell arms to both Jordan and Israel or to Israel alone, following Jordanian acquisition of Soviet materiel. I recommended increasing the credit to $15 million, offering the M-48A1 tank with a fall-back to the M-48A3 (with diesel engine), cooperating with Jordan to find a suitable Free World supersonic fighter (with American supersonics to be held eventually in the offing if a suitable non-American plane could not be found) and speeding up of deliveries to the extent feasible. After a February 9 White House meeting, the Department authorized me to offer (1) $15 million credit, (2) the basic M-48 tank for the first part of the Jordanian order with an agreement to reconsider the possibility of getting the M-48A3 for the second part, but (3) to offer nothing further on supersonics beyond our original offer. In a final meeting February 10 the King held firm to his request for the M-48A3, but did not insist on delivery before late 1967-1968. He did, however, ask for an agreement to supply 100 of the M-48's in calendar years 1965-1966. Brigadier Khammash later specified 50 M-48 tanks in 1965 and 50 in 1966. The King is obviously convinced he cannot successfully resist the pressures of the UAC with anything less than the above assurances. I am persuaded he has soberly estimated his position and is staking his chances for continued close relations with the West on our supplying what he judges will be necessary to hold his membership in the Arab Club. Our offer to help Jordan find an acceptable aircraft from Free World sources remains. We are proposing to the President that he concur in our proposals to supply 100 M-48 tanks in 1965-66 and 100 M-48A3 tanks with the 105 mm gun in late 1967-68. Meanwhile, Robert Komer has gone to Israel as a special emissary of the President in order to convey our rationale for providing arms to Jordan and to reassure Israeli leaders of our continuing deep interest in Israel's security and welfare. We anticipate agreement to sell arms to Jordan and cancellation of German military assistance to Israel will create pressure for direct sale of U.S. arms to Israel. To mitigate the severe political damage this would cause the U.S. in the Arab world, NEA has recommended that we compensate for any disproportionate Arab military buildup only in return for Israeli agreement 1) to support actively U.S. aid to Jordan and to assist in abetting the stir over aid to the U.A.R., 2) to forego nuclear weapons and accept full IAEA safeguards, 3) not to deploy offensive missiles, and 4) not to undertake premature preemptive action against Arab diversion works. [Continue with the next documents] Volume XVIII Index | Foreign Relations Online | Historian's Office | Department of State | Secretary of State |