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 | FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XVIII Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964-67 Department of State |
 130. Summary Notes of the 544th Meeting of the National Security Council/1/ Washington, February 1, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, National Security Council Meetings File, Vol. 3, Tab 26. Top Secret/Sensitive; For the President Only. According to the President's Daily Diary, the meeting took place from 6:27 to 7:30 p.m., and a total of 24 people were present. (Ibid.) A memorandum for the record by McCone is in the Central Intelligence Agency, Job 80-B01285A, DCI (McCone) Files, DCI Meetings with the President, 1 February-30 April 1965. Vietnam--Arms Sales to Jordan [Here follows a brief discussion of Vietnam.] Under Secretary Ball: Reviewed the problem of military assistance to Jordan. The Arab States are jointly trying to purchase arms abroad. Kuwait is funding the purchases. The United Arab Command has set force goals for Jordan. These include M-48 tanks and supersonic aircraft. Jordan, as a member of the Arab club, must purchase additional equipment somewhere--if not from us, then from the USSR. The supersonic jets Jordan wants to buy are not defensive weapons--therefore it is difficult for us to provide them. There is no good solution to this problem and there are disadvantages from every course of action. If we say no to the supersonics, Jordan will ask Soviet aid. If we say yes, Israel will demand supersonics. Thus, no matter what we do, we will be contributing to the arms race in the Middle East which we have been trying to damp down. If necessary and as a last resort, we will have to give the supersonics, but we should first try to get Jordan to buy them from a European supplier. The decision in the Jordan case is a major one involving all the Middle East. Acting Defense Secretary Vance: The Jordan request is indeed thorny. The Jordanians ask for M-48A3 tanks because the Israelis are getting them. They ask for F-104Gs, an up-to-date jet, rather than the F-104C or the F-104D which are antiquated planes. General Wheeler: The United Arab Command already has superjets. If we add 20 supersonic planes to the Jordan force, the Arab-Israeli balance will not be upset. Libya and Saudi Arabia already have supersonics. The addition of these planes to the Jordanian force is not of great importance. CIA Director McCone: Jordan will get supersonics either from us, from the Europeans or from the Soviets. The price of our not supplying them is too high to pay. McGeorge Bundy: Either way the request is dealt with will end up being disagreeable for us. We should avoid giving Jordan supersonics if possible because the resulting Israeli pressure on us will be very great. However, we must make some arms deal with Jordan and do so before they decide to go to the Russians. We could agree not to give them supersonics now but review the decision again if they insist. Assistant Secretary Talbot: Our reply to Jordanian King Hussein has already been delayed. I will be leaving Wednesday from Washington and be talking with Hussein in Amman on Saturday. McGeorge Bundy: We have already informed Israel of the Jordanian request and we will discuss with them the decision we reach. Secretary Dillon: We should not feel badly about an arms race in the Middle East because it is going on and we cannot control it. Acting Secretary Ball: Secretary Rusk shares all our concerns about this request but he believes we should play out the negotiations until it is certain there is no alternative and then decide to give the supersonics. Assistant Secretary Talbot should press as hard as possible for some other solution but at the end of the road, he should refer back to Washington and at that time we would decide to go ahead. If we agreed to give the supersonics, deliveries could be scheduled for 1968-1970. The planes would thus be under our control for a period. The Jordanians would be dependent on us for replacements and spares. If the Jordanians do go to the Soviets and obtain supersonics, then the Israelis will be surrounded by countries having Soviet-supplied aircraft. The addition of a Soviet presence in Jordan would be serious, especially during difficulties which may arise from the diversion by Jordan of water flowing to Israel. Acting Secretary Vance: Secretary McNamara's view is that we should provide A-3 planes, 20 supersonics--104C and 104D--if the Jordanians cannot buy their planes in Western Europe. The President: There is no problem in providing Jordan with the tanks they request. They should be told to buy their supersonic planes in Europe. If they do not wish to do so, then Mr. Talbot should cable us to this effect and await our reply. He should stay in Amman if it appears that the King is about to break off negotiations with us. Acting Secretary Ball: The King can't resist the domestic pressure he is getting. There have been attempts on his life. Recently he moved toward closer relations with the Arab states in order to gain personal security and security for his country. He could not break with Nasser even if he wanted to. If he does not break with us, how can he get the armaments the other Arab states are demanding he obtain? Mr. Feldman: Jordan gets budgetary support of $46,000,000 annually from the United States. The purchase of arms by Jordan is considered a grant in aid by some people. This is not so but many will see our sale of arms to Jordan as giving a belligerent neighbor arms to attack Israel. Every effort should be made to persuade Jordan to buy planes from France. We should also put pressure on Nasser to stop pushing King Hussein so hard. We should threaten to withdraw our budgetary support of Jordan. This would have the effect of raising the cost of the planes to Jordan. No decision should be made until we have carried out these proposed actions. Robert Komer: We should try out the hard line on Hussein, not mentioning the supersonic planes in the beginning. Then if he insists, we should fall back and regroup, thus giving us more time before a final decision has to be made. King Hussein is not going to jump the reservation at once. In trying to save Hussein we may kill him. If we sell the planes to Hussein, then we will have to provide them to Israel. If this happens, Nasser could say that Hussein was a bad Arab. We should take this in two bites and only sell the planes if the Soviets make a firm offer to do so. McGeorge Bundy: If we warn Hussein that U.S. budgetary support may be in doubt if he makes a deal with the Russians, the King would not be in a great hurry to make a Soviet deal. Acting Secretary Ball: It is not necessary to reach a final decision tonight. When Assistant Secretary Talbot reports back on his talk with King Hussein, we will know much more and can then decide what to do. General Wheeler: It is not likely that France would sell Mirages to the Jordanians. McGeorge Bundy: We could try to overcome French opposition to a sale to Jordan. Vice President Humphrey: In the light of developments in the Congo and in Egypt, if Jordan breaks with us, there may be a very serious reaction on the Hill. The AID bill would be seriously affected. King Hussein is on the U.S. dole. If we sell him supersonic planes, we will have all hell to pay. The sale of modern tanks we could possibly get away with but the sale of supersonics would create an impossible situation. The President: We all agree that Jordan will get the planes from the Russians if they do not get them from us. USIA Director Rowan: Either way we move we face serious difficulties. In a showdown and as a last resort, we will have to go ahead with the sale of supersonics. The President: Mr. Talbot, before the MIGs arrive in Jordan, please call us. (A State Department paper discussing the Jordan arms request is attached.)/2/ /2/Document 129. Bromley Smith
131. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel/1/ Washington, February 1, 1965, 9:02 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 12-5 JORDAN. Top Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Davies and Killgore on January 25; cleared by Meyers, Bunte, Solbert, and Talbot; and approved by Ball. Repeated to Amman, London, and Bonn. 672. For the Ambassador. Subject to final review by the President, Talbot scheduled discuss our decisions on Jordan's arms request in Amman end of January or early February. When you are notified of President's approval, you should at earliest opportunity inform Prime Minister Eshkol of the decision/2/ drawing on following presentation: /2/Telegram 675 to Tel Aviv, February 2, informed the Embassy of the President's approval and authorized discussion with Eshkol. (Ibid.) Telegram 682 to Tel Aviv, February 3, authorized Barbour to discuss it with Foreign Minister Meir, omitting the reference to the M-48 tank transaction with Israel in the third to the last paragraph of telegram 672. (Ibid.) Telegram 919 from Tel Aviv, February 4, reported that Barbour presented U.S. views on Jordan arms to the Foreign Minister that morning. (Ibid.) Telegram 920 from Tel Aviv, February 4, and telegrams 921 and 922, both February 5, reported that Meir expressed unhappiness at the prospect of U.S. provision of tanks to Jordan. (Ibid.) As Prime Minister aware, USG over past six months has been pondering painful dilemmas posed by Jordan's request to buy arms, using funds made available by Unified Arab Command. Jordan has resisted heavy pressure from the UAC to acquire Soviet equipment, against arguments stressing merits of standardization military equipment among Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and Jordan, by assessing that it can and prefers to depend on Western sources of supply. Jordan has also refused agree to positioning of non-Jordanian UAC forces in Jordan except in time of war. If we refuse now to supply arms, particularly armor and aircraft, almost inevitably Jordan will acquire Soviet equipment with UAR military trainers with all the dangers that entails.
Our assessment is that even if US-Jordan relations are put on the line to prevent arms acquisition, Hussein will feel he has no alternative but to accept UAC decision to modernize and expand his forces. Aside from his "image" in Arab World which would be impaired if he abandoned Arab ranks for Western subsidies, his own armed forces would not accept such an outcome. We believe that although Hussein recognizes that acceptance of the Soviet/UAR alternative could be beginning of end for his regime, he would do it rather than take immediate consequences of isolation from rest of Arab world. We have reached conclusion that some positive response to Jordan's request is necessary to avoid disastrous confrontation with UAC which would be strengthened, not weakened, by our refusal sell equipment to Jordan. Prime Minister will realize that UAC objective of improving Arab military posture relative to Israel makes our dilemma especially painful. However, positive USG response less disadvantageous than other possible alternatives. Our strategy seeks to hold Jordan's arms purchases to minimum necessary enable Hussein withstand UAC pressures, and to space deliveries so that there will be no unacceptable rapid arms build-up in Jordan. By avoiding confrontation with UAC, time may well permit divisive Arab forces to effect the weakening or destruction of UAC and policy of diverting sorely needed resources to arms. Jordan has requested USG sell GOJ approximately $90 million equipment including modern tanks and supersonic aircraft. Planned use ground equipment includes modernization JAA and creation five new brigades. Latter will be manned by approximately 8500 men in existing National Guard and 6000 to 7000 new recruits. On air side, King seeks to purchase one 20 plane squadron of F-104G fighters. After months of exhaustive study, we have decided inform King Hussein in next few days of our willingness sell for cash ground equipment to be delivered over calendar years 1965-1969 inclusive which prices out at about $50 million. We are prepared extend credit not to exceed $7 million at any time. We will seek to hold tanks to M-48s on grounds of cost and to phase deliveries through period. On supersonics we will seek to dissuade Hussein from acquisition any supersonics this juncture, but frankly we not likely succeed. We will inform Hussein that if he convinced no alternative to acquisition, we unwilling sell American aircraft and could not countenance Soviet MIG 21s. We will urge Jordan purchase supersonics in West Europe. Supersonic squadron cannot be operational until 1968 to 1969 at earliest. In reaching our decisions, we have had ever in mind requirements of Israeli security. Planned Arab buildup will not threaten existing Israeli over-all military superiority over Arabs for foreseeable future. We are confident Israel will agree USG decision is least unattractive alternative from viewpoint both American and Israeli interests. You should inform Eshkol we distressed that, contrary to Israel's assurances about ability maintain secrecy M-48A3 tank transaction 2-3 years, entire transaction known to Arabs and to large segments general public. He will appreciate under circumstances and in order mitigate political repercussions in Arab world, we compelled either 1) invoke security clause to cancel conversion kit procurement agreement or 2) respond favorably to Jordanian request for similar tanks. We are disturbed at continued press campaign about alleged role Cubic Corporation in UAR rocket program and hiring of German technicians from Litton subsidiaries. Given the Secretary's assurances that allegations about Cubic clearly distortion, we cannot escape conclusion continuing press campaign has tacit approval GOI and stimulated by Israeli leaks. We hope Israel can take effective steps end further sterile and misleading publicity./3/ /3/Foreign Minister Meir alleged in a letter to Secretary Rusk, not found, that the Cubic Corporation was involved in the supply of a missile telemetry system to the UAR. Telegram 490 to Tel Aviv, December 12, 1964, summarizes the letter and states that Gazit had been informed that the charges were unfounded. (Ibid., SCI 11 UAR) Rusk replied in a January 18 letter to Meir, not found. Telegram 627 to Tel Aviv, January 22, 1965, recounts a meeting between Jernegan and Harman in which Jernegan commented on Rusk's letter and provided additional information on the subject. (Ibid.) Barbour reported in telegram 926 from Tel Aviv, February 5, that in a February 4 meeting with Meir, he stressed U.S. concern about "public campaigning" on this subject, and Meir referred to the Secretary's "unsatisfactory" letter of January 18. (Ibid.) In this connection, you should apprise Eshkol questions raised by Israel and press have stimulated interest in problem export sophisticated technological equipment and know-how abroad. View large amount electronic equipment and related information going to Near East, we fear such exports encouragement to escalation arms race. We looking into ways control flow. Of course, as Secretary noted in letter to Mrs. Meir, any controls necessarily applied regionally despite possible hardship to American business. Ball
132. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State/1/ Cairo, February 1, 1965, 4 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 1 UAR-US. Secret; Priority; Limdis. A copy was sent to the President with a February 3 note from Bromley Smith stating that it was sent at Feldman's request. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, UAR, Vol. III) 2671. Department pass as necessary. I have just returned from approximately one hour meeting President Nasser. I thanked him warmly for receiving me on the night before the major holiday of the year and told him that I was grateful for an opportunity to have a talk since I had recently returned from Washington. I made small talk about the inauguration, snow, et cetera, mentioned that I had talked with a great many people both in the Executive Branch and the Congress including Secretary Rusk. I stated my principal meeting with President Johnson had unfortunately not developed due to his illness although it had been carefully scheduled for my last day in Washington. I stated that I had since received instructions and wanted to make several comments based on my talks and the instruction I had received from Washington. I then spoke as follows: Our President and indeed everyone I talked with are very hopeful of maintaining good relations with the United Arab Republic if possible. We have a deep interest in a strong, independent, and prosperous Egypt. We also share major interests in the independence and strengthening of the Near Eastern States. We will continue to work for constructive relations with all these States and for impartiality in our policy and actions in the Middle Eastern area. The President respects the dignity of other nations and insists that US policy reflect this as well as the dignity of our own country. At this point the President interrupted me and referred to the December 23 speech in a slightly embarrassed manner. He seemed to want to remove the speech from our relationship but without admission of error. He stated nothing personal was intended and that the report of the Stino conversation that he had received had indicated aid was conditioned on Egyptian manners and behavior. I said nothing of this sort was intended. I suggested we put the several incidents of the past behind us and look to the future hopefully. He stated we would do this but we must deal with the incident. He then spoke not about the speech but about aid, expressing gratitude for it and the hope that it would continue but with the expressed requirement that the UAR be independent in its actions. I then continued stating as follows: The President recognizes that differences have arisen between us particularly in the Congo. He hopes to resolve these differences by joint effort and mutual restraint. He believes that a positive effort on the part of both governments is necessary to prevent our differences from overriding our interests. The Congo is the most immediate issue now facing us. The President deplores the widespread misunderstanding of US motives there. He thinks that while the UAR and the US may disagree it would far better serve both our interests to help work out a political settlement than to let this problem escalate to a major confrontation in Africa. The President would welcome further discussions with the UAR on how to resolve this problem which has become a major obstacle in our bilateral relations. If Nasser agrees we would welcome any suggestions as to the form and place of any further talks. President Nasser nodded but made no comment. I continued, stating that under our form of government popular and Congressional sentiment must be taken into account. The extent to which developments in Africa and the Near East have stirred popular concern is clearly demonstrated in the recent effort in the House of Representatives to limit the President's authority on foreign aid. The President is determined to oppose this limitation. I then stated I would like to be sure that President Nasser understood the situation within the Congress on this matter. I explained the nature of the amendment within the House. The fact that House action was not a final decision and that even as we spoke Mr. Ball was testifying in an effort to remove the limitation placed by the House. I stressed the delicacy of the situation and expressed the hope that the administration would succeed in its effort. At this point the President returned to a reference at the December 23 speech. He said he had feared for some time there would be a cutoff of aid and that his speech was really the consequence of a cumulative effect of many concerns and statements. He threw up his hands and said "those speeches every year by your Congress and your press". I said we had had some of the same problem here with respect to the press in the UAR. He said, "it is much better now than it was five or six years ago but you may not believe it". I said I had few complaints recently but that we had had difficulty during the first weeks of my stay here. He then said "and I read all these articles by the correspondents." He referred to a Hedrick Smith article (although not mentioning him by name) which stated that "Nasser himself had called off the press in an effort to prevent interference with Congressional action at this sensitive time." He said "this just isn't true". I then suggested that we talk for a moment about our major problem the Congo. Nasser said he had suggested to Gbenye that his Foreign Minister get in touch with the US, UK, and French Embassies in Cairo and meet with them. I said, "to what purpose?" He replied, "I believe that if you talk with him some of your concerns will be removed." I stated that our policy was to support the Central Government of the Congo in accordance with the policy we had consistently followed and in accordance with various resolutions of the United Nations. He made no comment. I said I thought it important that we remove this problem from the military arena and seek a political solution. I pointed out that there were several steps coming up that gave flexibility to the situation--the Congo elections, the sub-committee's travels, the Foreign Ministers meeting, etc., and hoped that there would be a new initiative which would offer hope. He made no comment. I asked him point blank whether he could see hope for an OAU initiative in the context of the present and forthcoming situation. He said, "if you could remove Tshombe it would help." I referred to our last conversation and stated that we had not put Tshombe in; we could not take him out; and that we support the legitimate Government of the Congo where the problems are larger than any one personality. He then said we could tell Kasavubu to get rid of Tshombe. I said "we do not control the Central Government of the Congo any more than you control the rebels. It is a legitimate government and we must respect its status." He said that someone other than Tshombe should be elected. I said this is up to the Congolese. They must decide. He waved his hands as though this could be taken care of with little difficulty. There was then a pause after which I asked him if I might ask him the significance of the closing of the GDRC Embassy which I had noted in the press and which had followed Gbenye's press conference stating that the UAR gave him full support. He said that the answer is that he did not know it was still here. "I thought it was closed at the same time our Embassy was closed in Leopoldville and it was not until Gbenye mentioned that I was aware it still existed here." We both laughed very heartily at this point and he said, "the analysts will have a good time with that one." He stated that if Tshombe could be removed it would make it easier for UAR and others aiding the rebels to withdraw support. President Nasser alluded in a vague way to a Spaak-Gbenye meeting about two months ago in which Spaak had suggested some form of coalition government which Gbenye had rejected. He also referred to a meeting between Gbenye's Foreign Minister Kanza and Attwood and to a proposal made by our Ambassador to Dar-es-Salaam. He made no comment on these proposals but referred to them as among the many things that had been suggested. I returned to the Congo and stated again that we were flexible as long as the legitimate Congo Government was respected and we hoped for a political solution in an OAU context and I hoped he had the same flexibility and would assist us in achieving some solution to the problem. He nodded but was most noncommittal. I expressed the hope for further talks either with members of the government or between the two of us. He nodded to both suggestions and made no specific response. The meeting ended most warmly. President Nasser stated he hoped I was enjoying Cairo. I stated I had been fairly busy and laughed. He also laughed and said he hoped things would quiet down for us. End of conversation. Comments: At no time did he directly mention aid except as noted. It is interesting that Nasser told the British Ambassador yesterday that the OAU had "failed." He never got to this point with me although I led him into a discussion of the OAU several times. He seemed to want to dodge direct discussion of OAU activities and, when I mentioned the subcommittee visit to Leopoldville, Brazzaville and Burundi, he appeared to have no knowledge of the trip. I had the impression that Nasser has no sense of direction re Congo. He may be open to concrete suggestion provided there is a clear face saver for him, but he does not see his way out at this point. Battle
Acting Secretary of State Ball called the President at 8:20 p.m. on February 3, 1965, to tell him that the Senate had voted 44 to 38 to give the President the discretion Rusk had requested for P.L. 480 sales to the United Arab Republic. (See Document 127.) According to notes of the conversation prepared in Ball's office, after some discussion of the vote in the Senate, the President told Ball "not to let Talbot go and make any deal." He stressed that Talbot should not make any agreement, declaring, "This is a very explosive thing. We can never get anything in the Congress again unless we are careful. That foreign aid of forty to fifty million every year that runs to half a billion total, the King should think twice about." He told Ball to be sure to tell Talbot to hold the line. (Johnson Library, Ball Papers, Jordan) At 5:05 p.m. on February 4, Ball talked on the telephone to Myer Feldman, who said he had discussed Jordanian arms with the President the day before and was left with the impression the President's instructions at the NSC meeting had been modified so that Talbot was not authorized to make any agreement. Ball told Feldman that Talbot had authorization to make an offer on ground material including some tanks. Feldman said his understanding was that the President was concerned about even that and asked that when Ball saw the President he should tell him Feldman was writing a memorandum suggesting that Talbot should simply explore the situation and report back. Ball replied that he would tell the President about Feldman's feelings and that a meeting in the morning might be in order. (Ibid.)
134. Telegram From the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State/1/ Beirut, February 5, 1965, 5 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 12-5 JORDAN. Secret; Limdis. Passed to the White House. 776. From Talbot. Reference Deptels 793 and 795./2/ In view indications in reftels that my instructions for talks with King Hussein may be under fresh review, I have focussed on Jordan arms question in morning discussion here today with Ambassadors Barbour, Barnes, Battle, Cottam, Hart, Knight, Meyer and Strong. Solbert and Bunte also present. /2/Telegram 793 to Beirut, February 4, stated that unforeseen developments might require Talbot to postpone his departure for Amman. (Ibid., ORG 7 NEA) Talbot was in Beirut attending the Chiefs of Mission Conference. Telegram 795 to Beirut, February 4, informed Talbot that Harman had requested a meeting with Ball the next morning to deliver a message from Eshkol to Johnson and conveyed a summary of Eshkol's message as given to Jernegan on the telephone by Harman. (Ibid., DEF 12-5 JORDAN) Views expressed by all Ambassadors reflected sober concern that protection and promotion of U.S. interests in Near East becoming increasingly difficult as Arab-Israel conflict moves toward what some of them believe could be early climactic stage. All agreed that Jordan arms question can be approached effectively only in context of current Arab drive for unified political and military actions, symptoms of which are tensions over diversions of Jordan waters, Palestine refugee emotions, incidents on Israeli borders with Syria and Jordan, publicity on German-Israeli arms arrangements, etc. Each Ambassador present expressed belief our interests in Near East best served by proceeding with Jordan arms offer. Differences centered on such questions as speed with which transaction should be concluded, inclusion of U.S. supersonics in offer, and open sales policy to Israel and other countries in region. Hart, Strong, and Battle urged we should play for time in hope other and more moderating influences could be brought to bear on situation. Meyer also felt this a possible course. Hart argued arms race will continue whether or not we block entry of Soviet arms into Jordan and we might as well stay in the picture because when Arabs and Israelis fight, we will in any case have to move in to stop them. He thought if we sold F-5s to Saudi Arabia, this would encourage Jordan to look at F-5s instead of F-104s and thus slightly reduce sensitivity of supersonic issue. Barnes agreed. Strong was persuaded we could not look with equanimity on early clash between Arabs and Israelis. Impossible to see consequences of such a clash, he pointed out; our remaining friends in Arab world might well be undermined or destroyed in process. He urged that as monarchs are strong force for moderation, we should keep trying to bolster them. He saw other key in area as Nasser and UAR with whom he saw no alternative in interests of peace to trying to get back into a better relationship. If rapprochement with Nasser should fail, he felt, Near East bound to go into more difficult crises. If Nasser is interested in moving toward rapprochement with U.S. he may not wish press for early conclusion on supersonics for Jordan. Strong concluded we should play out our hand with Hussein by being forthcoming on ground equipment but difficult on question of supersonic aircraft. He would not like to see U.S. aircraft involved in deal because that would open up U.S. arsenals to Israelis who now have twice used air attacks against Arabs and may see air action as most economical and useful military instrument in future. Ambassador Battle, agreeing we should offer arms to Jordan to block Arab standardization on Soviet equipment, urged that we try to delay Hussein trip to Cairo, now tentatively scheduled for next week, until he was persuaded to make careful investigation of Western European sources of supersonic aircraft. Without much optimism, Battle hoped we could avoid a crunch with Jordan until several of our political Congressional difficulties with the UAR have become more manageable. In the end he would offer U.S. aircraft to Hussein to preempt Soviet-UAR entry there. Ambassador Meyer suggested that in view of difficulties of maintaining arms sales restraint in face of easy accessibility to other arms sources by both sides, we should permit military sales to any purchaser. He has found the Arabs talking much as they did in the 1950's and has seen emotions and unrealism building up to dangerous levels. Therefore he questioned whether we need exhaust ourselves in efforts to postpone a confrontation. Perhaps an early bloodletting would not be too bad an alternative, especially as a clash several years hence could easily involve larger forces and more sophisticated equipment. In any case conflict now hopefully limited could precipitate on intervention to deal with root problem of Jordan waters which has taken Palestine issue out of icebox. To him the alternative would be to continue playing for time, mainly in the hope that Arab unity would break up once again. Ambassador Barbour agreed that the policy of general arms restraint makes little sense now because of relatively easy availability of arms elsewhere and breaches already made. He also doubted that "even-handedness" can be considered a viable policy, in part because we never had been as close to Arab states as to Israel and in part because he felt chances of maintaining peace might be improved by making certain all parties knew U.S. would not permit Arab attacks on Israel. On assumption Arabs would depend on Soviet backing in any military adventure, he believed Arab aggression would collapse if, as seemed most likely, Soviets should demonstrate they would not face confrontation with U.S. in Near East. As a tactic to meet the immediate situation, he would provide U.S. arms including supersonics as a fallback to Jordan on the basis of also making open arms sales including aircraft to Israel. Barbour also was inclined to believe that Foreign Minister Meir's reaction to the Jordan arms proposal, although firm and serious, reflected less concern over this aspect than she had shown about Syrian and Lebanese programs to divert the headwaters of the Jordan. However, in view Harman's immediate approach to USG it appears GOI position has hardened following subsequent talks with Eshkol. Ambassador Cottam believed that offering arms including supersonics to Jordan at present time represented an essential step up protection of our interests in Near East, but to make our relations with Arab states satisfactory we would need to go beyond this. We should find better ways to take account of and adjust to modernization and doctrines of liberation, unity, and socialism, fueled by anti-Zionism and anti-imperialism. Ambassadors Knight and Barnes questioned whether we still have latitude in area necessary to pursue tactics suggested by some of their colleagues. Ambassador Knight felt with passage of time we had lost several options open to us two or three years ago and our major failure in these years of relative quiet had been our inability to persuade Israel to give up its hard line "fortress Israel" concept and to seek accommodation with the eastern Arabs. He estimated that we have now moved so far to final confrontation between the Arabs and Israelis that "even-handedness" policies are probably no longer useful. He thought we might better restrain the forces leading toward an explosion by a policy of open military sales to all parties and of making fully clear where U.S. stands in case of conflict. While unfortunate, he thought we should deal with situation as it is shaping up and not as we would have preferred it. On Jordan, he felt strongly that we should go the whole way to save Hussein from going the Soviet arms route and to keep on our side only truly friendly state in area that adjoins Israel. In his opinion, we should bend over backwards to meet the problems caused by the provision of supersonic aircraft to Jordan because he is convinced our offer will get nowhere without supersonics. Ambassador Barnes expressed view that U.S. arms package as currently constituted could not meet King Hussein's needs. On question of likelihood of Hussein and UAC accepting Western European supersonics for Jordan, Barnes believes Hussein not favorably inclined toward Mirages. Barnes further believes Western European supersonics will not in eyes of UAC match MIGs or F-104s both in terms of performance and his present understanding of French financial terms. There are some rumors in Beirut of a possible Saudi-Lebanese-Jordanian joint purchase of Mirages on very favorable terms. Barnes feels this would cause Hussein to look somewhat more favorably on Western European aircraft. Hart believes it would reduce USG influence in Saudi Arabia. Barnes reported that Hussein is scheduled to go to Cairo next week, probably about February 10, for talks with Nasser and the UAC. Barnes estimated that without promise of U.S. supersonics Hussein cannot sell the U.S. package in Cairo, and will not resist anticipated UAC decision that he should therefore accept the proffered MIGs. Difficulty arises over fact Hussein considers he committed himself last September to accept MIGs if he could not get U.S. supersonics. In the judgment of Barnes, should Hussein try to resist a UAC decision that he take MIGs, he could probably not stand 48 hours against a new UAR-UAC campaign labeling him still a tool of imperialism who was blocking Arab plans. Ambassador Hart asked that it not be construed that the U.S. has lost all its important assets in the Arab world. Saudi Arabia, for example, has not been deeply inoculated with anti-Westernism. While ready to pay for Arab rearmament against Israel, Faisal is much more concerned over the intrusion into the peninsula of Soviet influence, Arab socialism, and the Egyptian military presence. He will himself avoid Soviet weaponry. An additional reason to play for time lies in Faisal's future utility as a moderating influence. The above comments which reflect the diversity of views of our Ambassadors were made after I had laid out in detail our recent agonizing policy appraisals in Washington. I had described our efforts to balance the risks of Soviet-UAR military presence in Jordan against those of arms oscillation fueled by American sales to Israel as well as to several Arab countries, and had discussed the possible consequences of polarization between Soviet-Arab forces on one side and Israel and the U.S. on the other. I had also pointed out as clearly as possible the overlapping foreign policy and domestic political concerns which had been taken into account in the President's instructions to me. Comment follows./3/ /3/Talbot commented in telegram 777 of February 5 that the assembled Ambassadors all felt Hussein was "on extremely difficult spot with other Arabs" and might well capitulate to the United Arab Command after hearing that the United States was unwilling to furnish U.S. supersonic planes. (Ibid.) Meyer
135. Record of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Rusk and the Under Secretary of State (Ball)/1/ Washington, February 5, 1965, 7 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, Ball Papers, Jordan. No classification marking. Prepared by Helen Hennessey in Ball's office. GWB called to report that we had had a long meeting this afternoon with the President and are meeting again tomorrow./2/ The President has a natural reluctance but he is now fully appreciating the considerations involved. What GWB has recommended, with the support of his colleagues, is that Phil (Talbot) be authorized to offer the ground package which is the ground equipment, including only the basic M 48, A 1 tank which has the limited armament and the gasoline engine with the limited range. On supersonics he should encourage them to go to Western Europe. If this doesn't wash he can come on back. This starts us down the road. It seems to us that there is a serious danger the King may go on to Cairo on the 10th and be persuaded to decide he is going down the other road with the other people. This is about as good a plan as we have to hold the line and see what develops. The general feeling is that this will not satisfy him and this deal will not be made on this basis and there will have to be further haggling. We have started talking with his neighbors who are very upset. GWB sure that part of their own rather vociferous anxiety is the desire to build up a case for some large demands on their part. It is an unattractive situation no matter how you slice it. GWB wanted to make sure the Secretary was in general accord with this line. /2/According to the President's Daily Diary, he met with Ball, General Wheeler, Under Secretary Vance, Komer, and Feldman from 3:35 to 5:05 p.m. on February 5, and with Ball, Wheeler, Vance, Jack Valenti, Bill Moyers, and Komer about Jordan from 3:50 to 5:28 p.m. on February 6. (Ibid.) The Secretary thought that was right. He didn't think that by going as far as some of the papers indicated we ought to go to avoid the problems that we will be trying to avoid that it would cure the problem. On both sides of an arms race we will be building up the United Arab Command which is aimed at Israel. GWB said we had come to the kind of conclusion to offer something not acceptable in order to have an opportunity to talk further and see what comes out. If we offer nothing we can be certain we have sent him down the other road. Talk of losing the buffer state. Jernegan interrupted to mention the comparison with the UAR in 1955 when we refused a relatively modest request for arms and within two months he (Nasser) had turned around and accepted a much larger Russian offer and has had a close relationship with the Russians ever since. GWB mentioned the neighbors coming (Israelis) and saying don't offer anything. Then the boss comes up to the realization they are pretty smart people but realizes they have their own domestic political problems. Secretary mentioned they were not very objective on the PL 480 business--at least not as objective as we thought they would be. General discussion of the weather and the state of the Secretary's health.
136. Memorandum From the Department of State's Executive Secretary (Read) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/ Washington, February 5, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. III. Secret; Exclusive Distribution. Filed with a brief covering memorandum from Komer to Bundy noting that the inspection was reassuring but that "we remain suspicious." The memorandum bears no indication of the drafter, but another copy indicates that it was drafted by Russell and cleared by Jernegan, Davies, Charles W. Thomas, and Scott George, Director for Atomic Energy and Aero-Space in G/PM. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, AE 11-2 ISR) SUBJECT A United States inspection team visited the Dimona reactor site January 30, 1965. Although the ten hours spent at the site did not permit as detailed a visit as desirable, the team believes there was sufficient time to determine the status of activity at Dimona. Major findings (see enclosure)/2/ included: /2/The enclosure, entitled "Preliminary Draft Report on Dimona Inspection Team," unsigned and undated, is not printed. 1. The future direction of atomic energy development in Israel appears uncertain because anticipated acquisition of a nuclear power and desalting plant has increased Israeli interest in slightly enriched uranium fueled reactors from abroad and reduced interest in developing natural uranium fueled reactors in Israel. 2. While nothing suggests an early weapons development program, the Dimona site has excellent development and production capability that warrants continued surveillance at intervals not to exceed one year. The team findings indicate that we can afford to accede to Prime Minister Eshkol's request that we postpone the next agreed six-monthly inspection until after the parliamentary elections in November this year. We remain concerned that Israel may have succeeded in concealing a decision to develop nuclear weapons. The team findings must be weighed against the following facts: 1. Israel concealed the existence of the Dimona reactor from us for about two years. 2. Israeli officials did not allow adequate time for thorough inspection of the Dimona site and arranged no visits to sites of projected related facilities. 3. Israeli officials ruled questions about procurement of uranium from abroad "outside the scope of the visit" and suggested taking them up through normal diplomatic channels. 4. Israel is acquiring missiles from France designed to accommodate either high-explosive or nuclear warheads. 5. Public and private statements by Israeli officials suggest military planning that includes the use of nuclear weapons. Given these circumstances, we urge prompt approval of the request of the Acting Secretary to the President December 18, 1964,/3/ for authority to initiate negotiations with Israel to extend IAEA safeguards to all Israeli nuclear facilities./4/ /3/Not found. /4/A marginal note in Komer's handwriting next to this paragraph reads, "Not now, till we get Jordan arms sorted out." Ben H. Read
137. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel/1/ Washington, February 6, 1965, 7:58 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 12-5 JORDAN. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Russell, cleared by Davies, and approved by Jernegan. Repeated to Amman for Talbot. 701. Following is text of uncleared memcon./2/ FYI and Noforn. /2/Not found. Ambassador Harman delivered to Under Secretary February 5 message from Prime Minister Eshkol/3/ along lines predicted Tel Aviv's tel 927./4/ Message urged President prevent provision military equipment to Jordan and use utmost influence persuade King Hussein abstain from creation new and aggressive Army. Stressed following points: (1) Increase in size Jordan Army from 7 to 12 brigades would transform it from defensive to offensive Army under aggressive directives of UAC. (2) Under circumstances impossible for King Hussein not embark on aggressive policy. (3) Supply of tanks and other material to Jordan would place large aggressive force only few kilometers from Tel Aviv. Israel would lose capacity defense in depth. Result would be fundamental change in balance strength unacceptable to Israel. Psychological blow to Israeli people no less significant than military blow. (4) GOI must and will do everything in its power to oppose development tension in Near East to all-time peak. (5) Arab countries openly preparing steal water to which Israel entitled and maintaining UAC for aggressive purpose and blackmail Western countries. /3/Eshkol's message to Johnson was conveyed in a note of February 5 from Harman to Rusk. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, Israel--Presidential Correspondence) /4/Dated February 5. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 12-5 JORDAN) Ambassador Harman supplemented message with oral presentation stressing: (1) Communication on US intentions supply arms to Jordan transmitted by Ambassador Barbour took GOI by surprise. Matter of gravest concern to Israel and Ambassador had been assured US officials would keep in touch as matter developed. (2) Urged initiation intimate and detailed consultation on highest level. Such consultation had not yet taken place, but vital to security Israel. (3) Supply US materiel to Jordan would change character Jordan Army from defense to offense. Whole basis GOI defensive planning based upon assumption Jordan Army defensive with role guard frontier until reinforcements from other countries arrived, i.e., permitting five day lag. With new offensive Jordan Army on frontier Israel defense concept invalid. (4) Increase in size Jordan Army with incorporation National Guard largely made up of Palestinians would result in Palestinianizing Jordan Army. Such development particularly dangerous view growing importance and effectiveness PLO. (5) US proposal constituted recognition UAC since Jordanian request for arms generated by it. UAC established to enable Arab diversion Jordan waters with resultant destruction years of Israeli planning. (6) Only economic development could assure survival Jordan. Enlarged Army would constitute severe economic drain that would threaten Jordan's viability and independence. (7) Impact on public opinion in Israel would be severe. (8) Prime Minister requested (a) US not respond to Jordanian request for arms and (b) seek dissuade King Hussein from following suicidal path. Under Secretary said US aware Israel's concern about any arms accretion in neighboring countries. We faced serious dilemma in Near East. Heart of matter is whether better for Israel's security and peace of area for some arms to be given to Jordan on controlled basis by friend of Israel or on uncontrolled basis by Soviet Union. We remain interested in damping arms spiral but face problem maintaining control over Jordan. We presumed Israel regarded prospect of uncontrolled arming of Jordan by Soviets more ominous than situation we contemplated. We agreed necessary make Hussein understand stakes. Decision on Jordan arms of utmost importance to US and Israel. We would take careful account of Prime Minister's message. US never understood we would consult Israel on Jordan arms decision but would undertake inform Israel before action taken. Decision had been made but no action yet taken. Under Secretary noted in all honesty action might be taken within next few hours. Ambassador Harman said he was much disturbed that action might be taken in a matter of hours since he had been assured US officials would be in touch with him on this matter. He said he felt considerable trepidation in taking his leave and appeared obviously dejected. End FYI. You should make following points to appropriate GOI officials. (1) Prime Minister's message ignores fundamental problem facing us, i.e., question not whether Jordan gets arms but who supplies them and in what quantity. (2) Message grossly overstates magnitude threat to Israel of modernization Jordan Army. Entire projected sale includes electronic gear and ground equipment including M48 tanks at rate 25 per year for four years beginning 1966. (3) We not meeting Jordan's full request for arms and proposed offer may not suffice to relieve UAC pressure on King to build up his military forces. (4) We look to GOI for suggestions on how to ease growing tensions in area. We see no advantage in premature reaction to plans such as Arab water diversion, extent of which unclear and which far from fruition. Counter-pressure at this time only encourages and speeds buildup we hope avoid. While we appreciate Israeli concern about growing Arab military strength GOI should remember US determination oppose aggression from whatever quarter. In last analysis Western power is and will be prime deterrent to hostilities./5/ /5/Telegram 702 to Tel Aviv, February 6, instructed Barbour to inform Eshkol that an NSC meeting had been scheduled for February 8 to consider the matter raised in his message. After the meeting, a representative of the President would come to impart the President's reply and explain the U.S. position. The visit of the emissary was to be kept strictly secret. (Ibid., POL 7 US/HARRIMAN) Barbour replied in telegram 938 from Tel Aviv, February 7, that he passed the message in telegram 702 to Eshkol via Bitan, stressing the need for secrecy. (Ibid.) Telegram 703 to Tel Aviv, February 6, instructed Barbour to take no action on the last paragraph of telegram 701. (Ibid.) Telegram 705 to Tel Aviv, February 7, stated that the Embassy could use the arguments in the last paragraph of telegram 701 but without reference to Eshkol's message. (Ibid.) Ball
138. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson/1/ Washington, February 6, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Jordan, Vol. I. Secret. Komer's handwritten note at the top of the memorandum states that Bill Moyers and Jack Valenti read it and agreed. Here is how the Jordan arms issue breaks down at this moment. State/DOD/JCS/CIA and our ambassadors all still favor going ahead now with a minimum package (basic M-48 tanks, and European jets) as essential to keep Hussein from jumping the reservation. McNamara and Rusk agree. In fact, most of them think even our minimum package won't be enough to do more than buy us a little time. Only new wrinkle is that if Hussein won't take M-48 tank we suggest we'll help him get better German or UK models. The Israelis (and Mike Feldman) are still dug in hard. Their immediate objective is to buy time to bargain with us, so they're taking a very stiff line. I believe that if we had the time (and were willing to pay the price) we could bring them around. But our dilemma is that if we stall any longer we may lose Hussein. It's important to view the Jordan arms problem in full perspective, as part of the major new Arab-Israeli crisis (this time over the Jordan waters) which we face over the next year or two. We stand only to lose in this crisis because we favor the status quo. So does Israel, which has a special claim on us. So does Jordan, which joined Israel in sharing Palestine. The USSR, UAR and Syria are revisionist powers, with the other Arabs passively on their side on any issue involving Israel. Thus our real aim is simply to get through this new crisis without: (1) sacrificing Israel's security or getting a domestic black eye for appearing to do so; (2) ruining our relations with the Arabs--along with all this would cost us; (3) letting the Soviets score another major gain in the Near East, as they did in 1954-57. Israeli aims are rather different from our own. They've consistently felt nervous about US support in a crunch, so have long favored tying us to them publicly (security guarantees, arms aid), regardless of whether this would throw the Arabs into Soviet hands or cost us our position in the Arab world. We've always felt that such a course would be disastrous to Israel as well as us. This is again a basic issue, as it is in every Arab-Israeli crisis. The second thing we want to avoid is another major Arab-Israeli clash, because we'd probably have to step in to stop it. We'd be caught in the middle again too. The best way to avoid such a clash is to maintain an adequate deterrent balance. I'd now argue that this will sooner or later require us to sell arms to Israel. The simple reason is that otherwise the growing Soviet arms sales to the Arabs will slowly tilt the balance against Israel (even after the latter gets missiles, though not necessarily if it goes nuclear). But if we want to prevent Israeli nuclear proliferation yet protect Israel and forestall another conflict, we'll have to provide Israel with its own arms. A sale of arms to Jordan could give us the excuse for selling to Israel too. In fact, it would almost compel us to do so. We could justify this publicly as a response to Soviet moves. Moreover, to the extent that our arms sales to Jordan kept the Soviets and UAR out, this would minimize the threat to Israel too. Since this basic policy reversal on our part (from avoiding sales to making them) is probably inevitable, there's a case for making it now! The Arabs may react violently, but they will also react violently when we have to back Israel in a Jordan waters crisis too. And Arab knowledge that they could not win an arms race against Israel should contribute over the long run to a damping down of the Arab-Israeli dispute. In sum, I see longer range policy reasons for taking the plunge now. Announcement of this new policy might largely blanket any Congressional reactions to our sales to Jordan. Returning to the immediate Jordan arms issue, we have three basic alternatives: A. Take Israeli line--offer nothing and rely on threats of withdrawal of US aid. We've tried this already and Hussein said he'd have to risk loss of US aid. Note his reaction last August (Tab A)./2/ Experts think probabilities are that Hussein would have to go the Soviet route. So this course gravely risks the worst of all eventualities--Soviet/UAR arms in Jordan. /2/Tab A is a copy of telegram 84 from Amman, August 11; see footnote 2, Document 88. B. Take State/DOD line. Offer minimum package designed to keep ball in play, while making crystal clear that if Hussein goes Soviet route he'll sacrifice US aid (DOD and State think we might be able to get Hussein to go for UK, French, or German tanks and planes). Experts still think this won't work unless package is rich enough. Also Israelis have urged at highest level we not take this road; if we do so without signing them on, we multiply our subsequent problems. C. Stall for a little more time. State, DOD, and our Ambassador all say we've stalled so long (nine months) that we must fish or cut bait. Hussein says so too, and he's a gambler--capable of rash action. But there is a chance that we could shake him enough, without closing the door, to buy ourselves at least a few days and perhaps till 10 February, when he goes to Cairo. This would give a little time for us to pressure and cajole the Israelis. My scenario is at Tab B./3/ /3/Tab B, entitled "A Possible Stall for Time," unsigned and undated, is not printed. As to other possibilities, they seem to net out as follows: 1. Getting concerted Western pressure on Nasser to lay off Hussein is infeasible. De Gaulle would thumb his nose at us. Erhard is fighting desperately to solve his own problem, i.e. forestalling Arab recognition of East Germany. The UK favors a Jordan arms deal. 2. The oil companies are no help. They see the problem, but are so under Arab pressure now that they have no leverage with Arabs. 3. The Soviets won't help us out, because they stand to be the biggest gainers from our woes. In fact, if we even broached the subject, they'd squeal to the Arabs. 4. I personally favor an approach to Nasser if only to tell him what we plan to do. But not before we get Hussein signed on. Then nothing will be lost from trying to convince Nasser not to scream. 5. A secret high level mission to Israel is indicated immediately to try and convince the Israelis we make sense. If it were authorized to offer arms sales, it could succeed. Harriman would be best, or Feldman or myself (but not Mike and I). Bob Komer
139. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Lebanon/1/ Washington, February 6, 1965, 8:06 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 12-5 JORDAN. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Killgore and Macomber, cleared by Jernegan and Komer, and approved by Ball. Also sent to Amman. 808. Instructions to Talbot. We have reviewed the Jordanian arms requests at the highest level. That review has taken account of the strongly adverse reaction from the Government of Israel and the concern that would be aroused in many sectors of the Congress by a US sale of arms to the Unified Arab Command. On the basis of this careful rethinking of the problem we are instructing you to limit your offers to King Hussein in accordance with this telegram and to try to buy time during which Western European sources of supply for tanks and airplanes can be fully explored. Before making any explicit offer to the King, you should forcefully make the following points: 1. The United States friendship for, and support of, his regime in Jordan has been amply and repeatedly demonstrated over the years. This is a partnership we would like to continue. A partnership, however, requires mutual understanding of each other's problems. We feel that we do understand the difficulties of the situation Hussein is facing with respect to his arms buildup under the United Arab Command. 2. Despite our serious misgivings about any large increases in armament in the area we have authorized Assistant Secretary Talbot to make as forthcoming an offer as feasible in the circumstances. At the same time, the President wishes the King--as an obligation under our mutual partnership--to understand United States' concerns and inhibitions. 3. The ambitious arms buildup planned by the United Arab Command can lead only to a rising spiral of military capability between Israel and the Arab world. Sooner or later this will almost certainly result in an explosion since the Israelis will not sit by and see the Arab world outdistance them. Because of Jordan's geographic location, it will inevitably bear a particularly heavy brunt from any Arab-Israeli holocaust. 4. The King's request has put us in serious dilemma. While we are attempting to give the King as much support as possible, he must understand that a major USG contribution to the arms race in Arab-Israel area will be bitterly resented by Congress and American people. This would bring critical US domestic reaction that could adversely affect our future ability to continue our cooperation with, and support of, GOJ. 5. Our offer--which is as generous as is feasible--is necessarily contingent on GOJ not accepting any form of Soviet military equipment. If GOJ should elect to turn to Soviet equipment, we would be regretfully compelled to terminate our present military assistance program. More than that, we would necessarily have to reexamine the status and continuance of our entire partnership relation. 6. Finally, the King must keep in perspective the relative value to him of close and continuing friendship and support of USG as against a few tanks and airplanes. It is USG earnest hope that Hussein will not allow disappointment over present arms negotiations to jeopardize partnership which we deeply value and which we believe of critical importance to him. With the foregoing clearly in mind make following offer: (1) Military ground equipment valued at $55 million/2/ over calendar years 1965-1969 inclusive. /2/Telegram 782 from Beirut, February 7, queried this figure, noting that the proposed 5-year package with M48 tanks came to approximately $42 million. (Ibid.) Telegram 440 to Amman, February 7, confirmed that the figure should be $42 million. (Ibid.) (2) M-48 tanks. Bear down heavily on advantages to Jordan of basic M-48 as outlined in supplementary talking points 1(Armor) (a)./3/ If King insistently demands newer model, point out that we have no M-48A2s or M-48A3s for sale. We would, however, be willing to explore with him possibilities of procuring more advanced armor from Western Europe./4/ If Hussein cannot be convinced, consult Washington immediately for further instructions. /3/Talbot's talking points have not been found. /4/Telegram 782 from Beirut (see footnote 2 above) stated that the only change in the offer to King Hussein was apparently to take a flat position against selling M48A2 or A3 tanks but to express willingness to explore possibilities of procuring Western European tanks. Telegram 440 to Amman confirmed that the only change in the offer related to tanks. (3) Supersonic Aircraft. Use every effort dissuade Jordan against early move into supersonics. If King proves adamant, however, acquiesce reluctantly in Jordanian purchase of a West European squadron. If King insists on purchasing Soviet MIGs in default of an American squadron, remind him of consequences. Urge that he make not hasty decision until you can return to the United States for further consultations. (4) King should understand that sales of arms Jordan may well force U.S. to make arms sales to Israel. We will count on Hussein in this event to help keep down Arab reaction. (5) In discussing the above, you should urge on King maximum secrecy about our discussions. Ball [Continue with the next documents] Volume XVIII Index | Foreign Relations Online | Historian's Office | Department of State | Secretary of State |