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 | FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XVIII Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964-67 Department of State |
 120. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic/1/ Washington, January 12, 1965, 4:53 pm /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, AID (US) 15 UAR. Confidential; Noforn. Drafted by Jones; cleared by Davies, Jernegan, and Rusk's Staff Assistant Edward J. Streator; and approved by Talbot. Pouched to Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus, Jidda, Khartoum, Kuwait, London, Moscow, Paris, Rabat, Taiz, Tel Aviv, Tripoli, Tunis, USUN, and Leopoldville. 4008. Rusk-Kamel Meeting. UAR Ambassador called on Secretary January 8 to appeal to USG to step up aid. Talbot attended. Secretary opened by stating he hoped quiet talks could counteract effects of recent events on US-UAR relations. He would welcome Kamel's personal and official appreciation of situation. Kamel expressed gratitude for opportunity, conveyed Nasser's best wishes for New Year to Secretary and President, and expressed personal hope for year of constructive US-UAR and global cooperation. As for unfortunate events triggered by Congo situation, Kamel considered them minor, but they had been dramatized in effort destroy UAR-US relations. Help and wisdom of Secretary and President needed to overcome this tactic. Hence Kamel considered this meeting with Secretary equally as significant as his meetings with Secretary and President in 1961 when policy of US-UAR cooperation was laid down. Because of its troubled history, its sharp contradictions in creed and status, its current social upheaval, its proximity to Soviet Union, and its preoccupation with Israel, Kamel said Near East was a particularly complicated area in a complicated world. Hence Near East policy had to be formulated in expectation of such difficulties as those just experienced. Objective was not to rake over old problems but to seek solutions. Major US interests in area were preservation of Near East independence, protection of Western economic interests, protection of status quo, and control if not solution of Arab-Israel conflict. In 1958, with crisis of confidence between US and Egypt and Western troops in Jordan and Lebanon, all four US interests were in jeopardy. Kamel then arrived in US to hear on all sides Near East was lost to Communism. However, Kamel said, activation of US-UAR economic cooperation had kept Communism out of Near East (even though it had infiltrated to within 80 miles of US shores), had frozen Arab-Israel conflict, muted inter-Arab disagreements, and reduced area of Soviet opportunity; not one major US interest had been touched. Why then the agitation in Congress? To pursue protection of US-UAR cooperation, Kamel advocated that parties beware of defeatism, pressure tactics, over-dramatization, and excess of zeal--focussing instead on subtlety, restraint, and silence. If USG did not fully recognize Egypt's need for economic assistance in its demographic problem, Egypt might fall to the Communists, and its loss to Free World might be as grave as loss of China. Economic cooperation was one arena in which US had advantage over Soviet Union. One hundred fifty million per year was modest investment in terms of results achieved and dangers averted. Oil company revenues alone far exceeded it. In late 1963, primarily as result of Yemen problem but possibly also as effect of US-Soviet detente, Kamel said Egyptians had sensed slow-down in US aid. Implementation of existing agreements continued, but no new areas of economic cooperation were penetrated. Growing stress on negative aspects of US-UAR relationship had left mark on his Government that Kamel now seeks to erase. Even at this, UARG had continued to fulfill its side of the understanding by playing constructive roles in Arab, African, and neutral summits and averting the war everyone had expected over Jordan diversion. But Kamel's efforts secure reactivation of aid had failed. Recognizing limits on USG capabilities, he had also sought IBRD help and failed. In fact Woods' remarks in Tokyo about UARG's delinquency on foreign claims may have been contributing cause to recent incidents in UAR-US relations. As the senior partner in the relationship, Kamel said perhaps USG could muster more patience than UARG. It did not do for USG to play the schoolteacher, react to every line in foreign press, and follow policy of tit for tat. Such policy grated on proud Mediterraneans, as Soviets recognized. They exercise restraint even where Communist party banned. Recognizing Egypt as key to Near East, they would keep up their campaign to win it over. Turning to recent incidents, Kamel said he would not try to assess rights and wrongs and it did no good to cry over spilt milk, but he agreed with Secretary's statements about need for respect for diplomatic conventions. He regretted burning of library and felling of plane; he did not feel harsh words necessary. But UARG had met diplomatic requirements on library, and in context of US global interest these incidents were tempest in tea-cup. He hoped US response would match its responsibilities. He proposed that USG and UARG put these incidents behind them, focus on fact that 99 percent of thirty million Egyptians were predisposed toward West, and open new chapter of cooperation by continuing PL-480 program after June 30, complying with request for increments to present agreement, and perhaps by granting the twenty million dollar commodity loan and enlisting help of IBRD and other states. If USG did not continue PL-480 program, Kamel could not conceive how we could keep the US and the West in the Near East. Communists were constantly at work in Egypt and were another cause of recent incidents. Kamel said France was making approaches to UARG, but he felt they were tactical. In any event he felt his country's interest required that US influence predominate. To alleviate US-UAR friction over Congo, Kamel proposed this issue be left to OAU, with recognition that solution will be long-term process. Kamel was hopeful position his Government would evolve toward that of USG. Kamel pointed to dangers in conducting international relations in anger and in allowing annoyance over one issue affect over-all relationship. He knew this was not the diplomatic style of men at helm of USG; foreign diplomats in Washington were proud to know these men were leading world. He also paid tribute to Department staff. Finally, Kamel asked if USG could not take some action to mute annual attack on UARG in Congress. Repetition year after year had heightened Egyptian doubts about durability of US-UAR relationship. Within limits of US constitutional system, he felt President and Secretary could help guard relationship from this quarter. He doubted it could survive another attack like that of previous session. Whole UAR-US relationship was now jeopardized by trivia. Kamel believed in elemental need to preserve it. In this effort he had 100 percent support of his government. He knew able US Ambassador in Cairo was defending relationship with equal determination. In reply, Secretary said he was grateful for Kamel's clear and eloquent statement of his concern for our relationship and ability with which he had pointed to its central elements. To avoid misunderstanding, Secretary wished make clear he would not comment definitively on all items Kamel had raised until another meeting. Some of these matters were of such importance as to require that Secretary confer with President before replying. Secretary agreed US-UAR relationship has had constructive elements. Certainly Kennedy and Johnson administration had sought to develop them. In narrow national sense, if UARG and USG were to draw up independently lists of their national interests, they would find some major elements in common. It was true that there were matters in background that were not easy to forget on one side or the other, such as High Dam/Suez experience. The record revealed complex elements which US and UAR must continue to try to wrestle with and circumscribe. As for the more superficial aspects of recent events, we regretted that more timely action had not been taken to prevent burning of library, but we could fairly say that, in light of all circumstances, steps taken by UARG in that matter would tend to indicate that norms of diplomatic usage had been sufficiently met to warrant considering case closed. Secretary could not however see incident's early erasure from minds of Congress or American public. USG would have preferred that UARG confine its measures on the American cargo plane to pursuit over frontier and possible protest. Although we recognized complications from UARG point of view and did not condone flight pattern of plane, we felt UARG remedy had been a bit drastic. However, we felt this incident was also behind us. Speech of December 23 was kind that creates problems. Perhaps it reflected sensitivity, but it had aroused counter-sensitivity. Secretary did not know if speech had reflected misunderstanding of the talk between Stinu and our Ambassador. Presence of Shelepin did not help anyone who sought to explain the remarks. Secretary would not press exceptionally able ambassador like Kamel to defend another's rhetoric, but Secretary was hearing of the speech several times a day. Perhaps most serious problem between US and UAR was Congo. USG had no special national interest there, no appetite for special presence. For several years we had supported Congo's unity and integrity through UN and through bilateral aid approaching half a billion dollars. For most of period USG had worked in near unanimity with African states in effort to keep Cold War out of Africa and prevent fragmentation of Congo. While Adoula was Prime Minister, we had learned of illegal arms shipments into Congo from Tanzania and Burundi territory. Weapons of Communist Chinese origin had been captured. USG had no fore-knowledge of Tshombe appointment, but supports his Government under already existing policy to support GDRC. USG had been disappointed and a little surprised by UARG's seeming association of itself with elements holding hostages in northeast Congo. We felt we had acted with great patience under extreme provocation during period August-November when rebels held incommunicado many hostages including five American consular officers and subjected them to barbaric indignity, brutality, and threat of torture, execution, and cannibalism. These elements with whom Cairo seemed to be associating self had in our eyes put themselves beyond the pale of a civilized world. Provision of arms to Congo rebels, particularly as an act of avowed national policy, was a grave issue. Most arms reaching rebels were of Soviet manufacture. We had good information on how they were reaching Congo. Their provision seemed to promote Cold War type of conflagration we had tried five years to avoid. If it could be stopped, we could concentrate our assistance on economic development. Continuation of arms shipments made that very difficult. Secretary would like to pursue this subject with Kamel further in some detail. Since rebels are poorly trained, large quantities of their weapons were falling into hands of Congo Government. There was now some indication deliveries to rebels slowing down. We hoped we could find answer through Security Council and OAU in order to prevent this issue from intruding on totality of our relationships. Secretary told Kamel his effort regarding existing US-UAR Food for Peace agreements was to ensure that nothing was done to interrupt them, but, as press showed, this effort was under very considerable attack. He viewed this program as an important channel of US-UAR communication; it contributed to welfare of Egyptian people, stood on its own feet, and lent itself to kind of relationship that need not be affected by every sensitive issue that arose. Objectively considered, there were important national interests on both sides that can be basis of cooperation. For the future, we hoped for steady improvement in UAR-US relations. If Egypt should be free and prosperous, that was extent of US national ambition for Egypt. On that basis we sought cooperation and friendship. Secretary said he had tried limit his own public statements, and he would hope by quiet discussion we would find better answers than we had found thus far. He took encouragement from Kamel's able and diligent efforts to find a basis, and he paid those efforts full respect. The Ambassador should not consider that what Secretary had said in this one meeting constituted full reply to Ambassador's important statement. Secretary would wish to confer with President. Kamel stressed once more urgency of situation and his personal concern and urged that both sides resist demagogy. Secretary suggested that in next meeting perhaps Kamel would comment on specifics of that urgency and, re his compilation of US interest in good relations with UAR, perhaps Kamel could also state how he sees Egyptian interest in good relations with US. Kamel said he could answer latter question at once. Only alternative to cooperation with US was cooperation with Soviet Union. Latter was greater danger to Egyptians. They counted on power, patience, and wisdom of US more than on wisdom of others. He adjured USG to continue economic cooperation and to be patient. Secretary responded that, for our part, we needed help in enabling a great democracy to be patient. Kamel closed discussion by contrasting superficial benefit to Soviets of arms sales with lasting benefit to US of food sales. By continuing economic cooperation, USG could promote relaxation of Near East political tensions, reduce Egyptian need for Soviet arms, and thus diminish Soviet leverage. If Congress were to force cut-off of aid, it would promote exactly opposite effect. Rusk
121. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, January 14, 1965. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 12-5 JORDAN. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Davies on January 19 and approved in S/S on January 27. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS Mr. Talbot said that decisions on how to meet Jordan's arms request went far beyond our bilateral relations. These could force abandonment of our traditional policy of restraint on sale of arms to the Arab states and Israel. They could ultimately bring polarization of the area with the Arab states armed and backed by the Soviets united against a "Fortress Israel" armed and supported by the U.S. He was to impart our decisions to King Hussein by the end of January during visit to Amman. The Unified Arab Command, financed by the Arab states of North Africa and the Near East, has levied a requirement on Jordan to modernize and expand its army and air force as part of an Arab program to achieve parity with Israel. If the U.S. refuses to sell arms to Jordan, King Hussein tells us he will be forced to acquire Soviet equipment. He has withstood UAC pressure to standardize Arab military inventories on the basis of Soviet equipment only by assuring the other Arab states that the U.S. will provide essential equipment. If Jordan acquires Soviet aircraft and tanks which would require Egyptian training crews, Israel's alarm would be intense. We would find it difficult to justify before Congress continued U.S. support of the Jordanian budget. If we meet Jordan's request, thus violating our traditional Near East arms policy, Israel probably would tolerate or even welcome our sales to Jordan for she recognizes we could no longer fend off Israeli efforts to obtain offensive American weapons. We believe the bitter emotional response of the Arabs to the direct supply of offensive U.S. arms to Israel would be so great that it might force those Arab states now drawing on Western arms to turn to the Soviet Union. This would be a major step toward polarization which our policies over the years have been designed to prevent. The Secretary asked whether it would not be possible for the Jordanians to meet at least its aircraft requirements from European sources. Mr. Talbot said that we hoped to preserve the basic essentials of our arms policy by persuading King Hussein to acquire the French Mirage fighter which is comparable to the Soviet MIG 21 or our F-104. The British Lightning seems ruled out because it is excessively heavy and expensive. In addition the British have made clear that they will not consider credits in the sale of military equipment to Jordan. If we can persuade Hussein to acquire the French plane, we will have averted the worst of our potential problems with Congress and preserved a chance of maintaining continued American restraint on arms sales to the area. Mr. Davies noted that the French Mirage was expensive with a fly-away cost for twenty aircraft of approximately $28 million as compared to $12 million for the MIG 21 and $27 million for the F-104G. Other versions of the 104, the C and H, ran from $10 million to $20 million, however. Mr. Talbot said that while we would push for a European sale, we must be ready for the contingency that King Hussein will refuse to accept our views. Although the balance of disadvantages is close, he believed that to obviate Jordan's acquiring Soviet supersonics, he should have stand-by authority to offer to consider selling American supersonic fighters. Mr. Talbot said the situation was also complicated by Jordan's request for M-48-A-3 tanks with 105 mm cannons. Although we recognize Jordan's need to modernize its armor, we have previously declined to sell this particular tank to Israel. If we sold the M-48-A-3 to Jordan it would arouse strenuous protest from Israel and its supporters in the United States. On the other hand, if we talk the Jordanians down to the M-48 or the M-48 with the diesel engine but not the 105 mm cannon, the Arabs will be incensed when Israel acquires this model from other sources. There is some possibility that the Arabs are aware that Israel is planning to acquire this particular tank. The Secretary said that the issues involved were so important as to require consultation with the President. He asked for a very short summary of the problem/2/ to take with him to Texas the following day so that he might brief the President if opportunity arose. In any event, when the President returned, it would be necessary to discuss these decisions with him. /2/The memorandum indicates that a summary sent to the Secretary, dated January 15, was attached. The summary is not attached, but was apparently the memorandum from Talbot to Rusk summarizing the issues, drafted by Killgore and Davies on January 15, a copy of which is filed as an attachment to a memorandum from Jernegan to Rusk, March 27, 1964. (Ibid., NSAM Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 290)
122. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State/1/ Tel Aviv, January 18, 1965, 12:35 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 33-1 JORDAN RIVER. Confidential; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to Amman, Beirut, Cairo, and Damascus and pouched to Jerusalem, London, Paris, and USUN. 833. PriMin Eshkol called me in evening January 17 to tell me he is greatly perturbed over recent developments concerning diversion Jordan headwaters and that, in view of reports that Lebanese parliament due to formulate GOL position this coming Thursday,/2/ he thought it would be wise to ask USG tell GOL that diversion is serious matter and will be dealt with by GOI as serious matter. Eshkol pointed out that what is at stake is large portion (100 MCM's or more) of sweet water which is necessary for Israel's development. PriMin stated he would not want to use force protect this water but sooner or later he might have to do so. However, to avoid such development, GOI wished use USG channel to exert counter-pressure upon GOL which, while probably not wanting assume responsibility diverting waters, is subject to Egyptian threats. He referred, apropos such USG assistance, to "promises" and "assurances" he had received in his talks with President Johnson and others in Washington. /2/January 21. I said that USG fully agrees that question Jordan headwaters a serious matter and also believes that GOL has some room free for maneuver. I pointed out, however, that our assessment differs from GOI's in that we do not think Lebanese suffering from any misapprehension re Israeli attitude. Thus, while USG has had several talks with GOL re diversion, we would wish avoid any undue pressure which might provoke unfortunate Lebanese reaction, notably if Lebanese prestige directly involved by such tactics. Eshkol interrupted to say GOI certainly didn't wish press too much but question was vital and that somewhere along the line there was a zero hour. He didn't know of any halfway measures. I answered that I didn't think that the critical point would be reached with the beginning of digging or the pouring of concrete, but only when water was actually diverted from Israeli use. If Israel forced employ drastic measure he feared, such measure would be just as effective against completed works as it would in earlier stages of construction and obviously consequences such intervention could be far reaching and unpredictable, possibly disastrous. Since there was always the possibility that Arabs would never be able get project off the ground I thought GOI had every reason play this hand out. Eshkol admitted that the construction of pumping stations and tunnels would take time and that it is a question of months rather than days. However, he is greatly perturbed and wishes USG know his concern and communicate it to GOL. Fundamentally, I believe he feels coming Lebanese parliamentary session important point in formulation Arab strategy and every effort should be made try to ensure best possible outcome. In assuring PriMin that I would bring his personal concern to attention USG I told him it would not be helpful if Israel started a big press campaign of intimidation against Lebanon. Eshkol said he did not envisage this and that GOI is trying to avoid public involvement Lebanese prestige./3/ /3/Telegram 615 to Tel Aviv, January 19, also sent to Beirut, endorsed the line Barbour had taken with Eshkol and instructed the Embassy in Beirut to continue to pursue the line it had been taking with senior Lebanese officials on this subject. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 33-1 JORDAN RIVER) Circular telegram 1317 to Tel Aviv, January 22, instructed the Embassy to suggest that Israel might bring the Jordan waters problem to the United Nations by means of a letter to the Security Council President describing the problem and warning of the possibility of an eventual clash of riparian interests. (Ibid.) Barbour
123. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan/1/ Washington, January 18, 1965, 7:47 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 32-1 ISR-JORDAN. Confidential; Priority. Drafted and approved by Davies. Also sent to Tel Aviv and repeated to Jerusalem and USUN. 378. Jerusalem's 204 to Department./2/ Assistant Secretary Talbot conveyed to Israel and Jordan Ambassadors USG deep concern at reports received from UNTSO of build-up arms and troops on both sides Jerusalem, urged restraint and fullest cooperation with General Bull. /2/Telegram 204 from Jerusalem, January 18, reported a UNTSO request for a U.S. approach to Israeli and Jordanian representatives to urge restraint in the Jerusalem area. (Ibid.) Ambassador Harman said problem is continual resort by Arabs to firearms. IJMAC subcommittee provides forum for Jordan complaints; instead they shoot. Arabs creating intolerable situation in which they can create disputed areas by irresponsible shooting. If they have question of where line or track lies, be it in terms of one, ten or a hundred meters, MAC exists to adjudicate problem. Talbot noted situation potentially explosive and that we as matter of urgency requesting Israel's cooperation with General Bull in relation to mounting Scopus patrol and in all other matters. In these situations, Israel should find judgment of UNTSO invaluable. It should be important to Israel not to find itself in violation of the GAA. Harman noted need to protect people in crowded urban area when, as UNTSO report confirms, Jordanians bringing up tanks. Hoped Department's demarche to Jordanians would stress need to rely on machinery of MAC rather than on guns. Said he certain General Bull's wish will receive immediate consideration in Jerusalem and that he would immediately notify his government of our request. Talbot noted to Ambassador Jumaa our deepest concern at UNTSO report of Jerusalem situation and hope that Jordan would exercise greatest restraint. He realized there were differences of fact between the two sides but stressed need for working these out with UNTSO rather than through shooting. Jumaa undertook to convey Department's request for restraint immediately to Amman. Ambassador Harman subsequently telephoned to say that telegram crossing his reported Bull travelling Amman tomorrow to discuss situation with Jordan's Defense Minister. At Bull's request and to enhance prospects success his endeavors, Israel postponing January 19 patrol. Talbot informed Harman that in conversation with Jordan FonMin Kadri Tukan January 18 Ambassador Barnes informed that while Jordanian troops on Israel frontier nervous over recent incidents, had firm instructions not to start anything. Noted also FonMin's statement that Jordan did not want any trouble and his hope we could make this clear on other side. Harman undertook to convey this latter immediately to his Government. Rusk
124. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson/1/ Washington, January 21, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Near East. Secret. The memorandum bears the President's handwritten note: "Have Bundy see me on this. L." Jordan Arms. Rusk has asked for a meeting soon to lay before you our painful dilemma here. Our Jordanian friends have been pressing us for months to sell them arms and planes for the Arab buildup against Israel's water diversion scheme, claiming that otherwise they'll have to buy Soviet items being touted by the UAR. With Israel's tacit consent, we've been subsidizing Jordan for years, in order to keep King Hussein--the most sober of the Arab leaders--out of Nasser's clutches. We think Soviet arms in Jordan would be the beginning of the end, and to be forestalled at almost any cost. We've agreed in principle to some staggered arms sales to Jordan so long as the Arab kitty can finance them, but have stalled on the key item--supersonic aircraft. Our fear is that if we sell supersonics to Jordan for an announced Arab buildup against Israel's diversion scheme, we'll come under acute Israeli and US Zionist pressure to sell arms directly to Israel too. In fact, our whole aid program to Jordan might come under attack. If we get into overt arms sales to Israel, then all the Arabs may turn against us, and Jordan may have to accept Soviet and UAR arms anyway. We owe King Hussein an answer by the end of January. Our proposed strategy is to come through with some carefully phased ground equipment sales, but to tell Hussein he can't have either US or Soviet fighters without jeopardizing US aid. If he feels absolutely compelled to get supersonic fighters he should buy them from the UK or France. We hope by this combined package to string out the whole program, in hopes the Arab buildup against Israel will fall apart in time (as it has before). But DOD and now State's Arab experts fear that Hussein won't play. So they propose as a fallback an offer of one US squadron by 1968-69 (which they think Hussein will buy) if he is adamant. Others of us oppose going this far now. We should try our hardest to turn Hussein aside before deciding on any fallback because of the acute risk of a violent Israeli reaction. Also we have promised to clue the Israelis on what we propose, and haven't told them, pending your decision. A new complication is that the Israeli/German/US tank deal is now leaking (though our commitment to modernize the German M-48s is still not out). This could be played up by the Arabs to force Hussein to take Soviet arms. We told the Israelis we might have to call the deal off if it leaked prematurely, and may want to threaten this as pressure on them to keep their lips buttoned (they may have been the leakers). Another important part of this problem package is our policy toward the UAR. We face a growing crisis in 1965 on Jordan Waters, and if Nasser wants he can make it highly painful to us. The one issue on which he can always rally the Arab brethren is Israel. So you might want to send Luke Battle back with some quiet word that we'd rather talk than fight if only Nasser would show a little understanding of our problems too. State will have a long paper for you shortly but I wanted to provide an advance look tonight. R. W. Komer/2/ /2/McGeorge Bundy initialed below Komer's signature.
125. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson/1/ Washington, January 22, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Arab Republic, Cables, Vol. II, 6/64-12/64. Secret. The memorandum bears no drafting information, but another copy indicates that it was drafted by Jones and Davies. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL UAR-US) SUBJECT /2/The copy cited in footnote 1 above bears the typed notation: "White House (President) appointment Saturday, 1/25/65" and the handwritten notation: "Cancelled--Pres in hospital." Embassy Cairo indicates that President Nasser will wish to see Ambassador Battle on his return to Cairo. This follows on various indications that the U.A.R. would like to improve relations with us. The Department recommends that you explore the following with the Ambassador and authorize him to convey our views to Nasser as soon as possible after his return to Cairo Sunday. I. What We Want from the U.A.R. on the Congo We seek termination of Nasser's support of dissident groups in the Congo and use of his influence in the Organization of African Unity in support of the Central Congo Government. The U.A.R. has indicated it will not buy a position of unconditional support for Tshombe but shares our objective of seeing a stable, independent Congolese Government emerge from the present chaos. We feel there is room for some bargaining with Nasser on this issue. II. What We Need in Way of Policy Implements Nasser faces an acute supply crisis coupled with a shortage of foreign exchange and credit facilities. Termination of PL-480 shipments would aggravate the crisis although Soviet assistance--granted at a price of further political concessions--would enable him to ride it out, we believe. Nasser's reliance on PL-480 foodgrains is so great that the program poses the threat of unbalancing his economy unless he knows he can count on it. Two years of Congressional criticism coupled with the "running down" of our economic cooperation program have caused suspicion and frustration. What we need to draw the U.A.R. into a more cooperative posture is a "carrot" to hold before it--an assurance of continued support from the "Food-for-Peace" program in the years ahead. III. The Importance of "Normalizing" U.S.-U.A.R. Relations Getting back onto even keel with the U.A.R. is important for issues other than the Congo. If we let the situation lead to an open break, Egypt will use Arab solidarity and emotionalism to bring pressures to bear against British and American interests and against Israel. Only the Soviets will benefit from such a situation. We could lose military and civilian air rights (MATS, PanAm, TWA), oil concessions (a billion dollars a year to the U.S. balance of payments), unharassed passage of the Suez Canal, and much of our influence in the Arab world. Friendly regimes in Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, and Saudi Arabia would be subject to intense nationalistic and possibly subversive pressures. Arab Communist parties would operate openly in the area as probable price for Soviet support to the U.A.R. and other Arab states. None of our major interests in the Near East have been damaged over the past six years. We must ensure that this situation continues. Dean Rusk
126. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, January 25, 1965. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 12-5 JORDAN. Secret; Exdis/Tan. Drafted by Davies and approved in U on February 1. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS The Secretary asked whether we could not arrange a tacit guarantee of Jordan's security in lieu of selling it arms. The U.S. could say simply that it would not permit Jordan to be overrun by Israel. Mr. Talbot said the Arabs held that they would not attack Israel, but would react when Israel struck at the Arab diversion project. Jordan held it was part of a defensive arrangement with the other Arab states. Mr. Ball noted that circumstances pushed Hussein to cooperation with the UAC. His internal situation would be seriously endangered if he didn't go along with the other Arabs. In addition, Jordan's defensive position, like Israel's, was "thin," given the proximity of each other's forces. Mr. Talbot doubted Jordan could be diverted from acquisition of additional arms. It sought, however, maximum freedom of action from the UAC by acquiring arms from the West. The Secretary said the U.S. had demonstrated its interest in Jordan's independence through President Kennedy's statement of May 8, 1963./2/ He thought Hussein knows his real enemy is Egypt, not Israel. By deeper involvement in the UAC, the U.A.R. threat to Jordan was enhanced. Hussein faced a bleak future of growing Egyptian influence to his country and of certainty that Jordan would take the brunt of any military engagement with Israel. /2/Reference is to a statement on U.S. policy in the Near East made by President Kennedy at a press conference on May 8, 1963, in the course of which he declared that the United States supported the security of both Israel and its neighbors. (Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1963, p. 373) Mr. Ball said Hussein could not draw back without excluding himself "from the Club." Mr. Talbot agreed that this was the heart of the problem. Hussein, however, sought to retain membership while keeping his powder dry. He wanted to avoid closer military ties with Egypt which runs the UAC show, but psychic factors prevented him from disassociating himself from Arab solidarity. To the Secretary's question as to Saudi participation in the UAC and whether Kuwait wouldn't tire of making UAC contributions, Mr. Talbot noted that Saudi Arabia was a full participant and major financial contributor and that Kuwait's $100 million per year increase in income assured continued support. Mr. Ball noted that Libya would soon be in a position to make larger contributions, and that these smaller states felt they must keep on trying to buy their independence. The Secretary asked whether we couldn't tell Jordan that we would not object to its acquiring MIGs provided there were no Russians involved in training. To Mr. Talbot's remark that this then would entail UAR trainers, the Secretary noted that the Jordanians could be trained abroad on the MIG. Mr. Talbot said that a preemptive U.S. sale seemed desirable if Soviet arms supply threatened. Had we moved to meet Egypt's arms request in 1954, the Near East today might be quite different. The same was true in Afghanistan in 1955 and India in 1962. It would have served both Israeli and U.S. interests had we provided Egypt arms from the West. Although relations might have been just as bumpy, we would have had some control through Egypt's need to purchase new equipment and spares. Assuming Hussein did not dare leave the Club, would it serve our interest to limit Jordan to procurement from the West. Mr. Ball said that Israel's bargaining power would be infinitely multiplied if Jordan and the other Arab states went over to Soviet supply. We would have chosen up sides. Israel could point to the Communist danger in the Arab states to justify arms procurement from the U.S. Mr. Talbot said we had learned that the Arabs knew full details of Israel's arrangements to acquire tanks. It was certain that they would insist on Jordan getting what Israel got. Significantly, Jordan's request for M-48 tanks had escalated to the M-48A3 tank with 105 mm cannon--just what Israel is getting. The Secretary noted that we might suggest that Hussein get his tanks the same way that Israel does. Mr. Talbot said that there were 83 M-48s remaining in Germany and these might make up most of the 100 in our proposed package for Jordan (five-year). The Secretary said that both Israel and Jordan in acquiring tanks were behind the times. Anti-tank missiles provided a surer defense. Mr. Talbot noted that the Pentagon had disagreed with this thesis when we tried to apply it to Israel. Mr. Ball noted that the diesel engine gave the M-48 sufficient range to make it an offensive rather than a defensive weapon. Mr. Talbot said that given unpalatable alternatives, we believed that an effort to provide for a reasonably phased modernization of the JAA was the best for us. We would space deliveries of $55 million worth of equipment over the next four years. The minute division among the Arabs split the UAC, we could cut off the pipeline. However, if we forced a confrontation by refusing to sell, Jordan would be forced to a Soviet/UAR basis for her army; if we bought time by the sale there was some chance Arab solidarity might come asunder. Mr. Ball felt from the Israeli viewpoint, either course would be advantageous. If American equipment went to Jordan, Israel would press for American supply. If Communist equipment went, Israel would press even harder for American supply. Mr. Talbot said that we anticipated a negative Israeli reaction when they were informed of our decision. To reduce the heat, instructions to Tel Aviv must indicate that the President approved the decision. The Secretary queried whether more time couldn't be given to consider alternatives. Mr. Talbot said that this was the fourth time we had been pressed for an answer. However, the President's illness and the Churchill funeral could permit us to slip the schedule for a week. We had still to get the President's clearance and to inform the Israelis before we could proceed to informing Hussein. The Secretary asked whether instead of informing Eshkol, we could not put the alternatives to him and ask his reaction as a loyal friend. Governor Harriman thought we would get a strong reaction with arguments that we should force Hussein to forego arms. We should be guided by our interest in preempting the situation and by the desirability of U.S. control through provision of spares and ammunition. Mr. Ball said that Israel would not object to a Soviet-U.S. polarization of the arms supply situation. Mr. Talbot assented and said that this would advance Israel's objectives of a U.S. security guarantee and joint military planning. In the Secretary's view the two principal questions were: should we buy into both sides of an arms race? Should we buy major items of equipment for the UAC given its objective of developing strength against Israel? He asked whether this was something we could work out with the Soviets. Mr. Talbot replied that he had discussed this possibility with Ambassador Thompson who agreed that the Soviets had nothing to gain from restraint. Arm sales provided the principal entree for Soviet influence into the Near East. Governor Harriman thought there was no harm in trying this out with the Soviets. Mr. Talbot said that we had learned that the details of Israel's tank purchase arrangements were known to the press and they could hit headlines within two or three days. Our agreement with Israel was conditioned by a secrecy clause which could be invoked if the matter came to public knowledge. He felt that the strength of Arab reaction could be minimized if we cancelled that part of the arrangement which dealt with retrofit kits. We could then say that we had given approval to the shipment of M-48 tanks from Germany to Israel and apprise the Israelis that we could consider later a direct deal on diesel engines. Both Governor Harriman and Mr. Ball noted that Prime Minister Eshkol and those accompanying him in June had given categorical assurances that the transaction through the Germans and Italians could be kept secret for two or three years. Mr. Talbot said that in the event of cancellation, Secretary Vance was extremely worried about our public posture if the Israelis or the Germans leaked the fact that we had agreed to provide retrofit equipment. We could not very well deny the agreement even if we were able to say that we were not fulfilling it. The Secretary said that he felt the cancellation of our part of the arrangement would leave both the Germans and Italians out on a limb. We had pushed the Germans into the deal and we should stand by it. As a great power we cannot back away from an agreement freely entered into. If the Arabs protested, we could note the large flow of Soviet arms to the area and that no-one publicized Soviet deals with the Arabs. We could also tell them that we would welcome resort to the Geneva Conference to explore ways and means of limiting the flow of armaments to the area. We should accordingly not invoke our cancellation right. On the problem of Jordan arms, the Secretary decided action would be delayed until he could acquaint the President with the proposal.
On January 26, 1965, the House of Representatives adopted by a vote of 204 to 177 an amendment to an appropriation bill, H.J. Res. 234, that would have denied any further sale of agricultural products to the United Arab Republic under Title I of Public Law 480 during fiscal year 1965. On January 27, Rusk met with members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and other interested Senators in executive session to discuss administration policy toward the United Arab Republic and to urge that the Senate drop the provision or give the President discretion in dealing with the last portion of the 3-year program of P.L. 480 assistance to the United Arab Republic established under a U.S.-UAR agreement of October 1962. (Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Together with Joint Sessions with the Senate Armed Services Committee (Historical Series), Volume XVII, Eighty-ninth Congress, First Session, 1965 (Washington, 1990), pages 239-268) For the text of the agreement signed October 8, 1962, see 13 UST 2166. On February 3, the Senate adopted by a vote of 44 to 38 a version giving the President the discretion Rusk had requested. At a news conference on February 4, President Johnson urged Congress to adopt the Senate version, declaring it "of the highest importance" that final legislation should have the flexibility it provided. (Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965, Book I, page 132) In conference, the House accepted the Senate version. The bill as enacted forbade the export of agricultural commodities to the United Arab Republic under Title I in fiscal year 1965 unless such exports were necessary to carry out the 1962 agreement and the President determined that the financing of such exports was in the national interest. (Public Law 89-2, signed February 11, 1965; 79 Stat. 4)
128. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic/1/ Washington, January 28, 1965, 11:43 a.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL UAR-US. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Davies on January 26; cleared by the President, Macomber, and Talbot; and approved by Rusk. 4384. For the Ambassador. When you see Nasser you may draw on the following as appropriate: 1. You know that the President wants to maintain good relations with the UAR, if the US is given the opportunity to do so. He sees that we share major interests in the independence and strengthening of the Near East states. He will continue to work for constructive relations with all Near Eastern states and for impartiality in our policy and actions in this area. The President respects the dignity of other nations and insists that US policy reflect this as well as the dignity of our own nation. 2. The President recognizes that differences have arisen between us, particularly on the Congo. He hopes to resolve these through joint effort and mutual restraint. He believes a positive effort on the part of both governments is necessary to prevent our differences from overriding our interests. But under our form of government he must take popular and Congressional sentiment into full account. The extent to which developments in the Near East and Africa have stirred popular concern is clearly demonstrated in the recent effort in the House of Representatives to limit the President's authority over foreign aid. The President is determined to oppose this limitation. Clearly the actions of the UAR and the statements of its leaders can be major factors in determining the outcome of the Administration's efforts with the Congress. 3. The Congo is the most immediate issue now facing us. The President deplores the widespread misunderstanding of US motives there. He thinks that while the UAR and US may disagree on Congo, it would far better serve both our interests to help work out a political settlement than to let this problem escalate to a major confrontation in Africa. The President would welcome further discussions with the UARG on how to resolve this thorny problem which has become a major obstacle to our bilateral relations. 4. If Nasser raises the question of future aid, you may say that in your discussions in Washington you found hope that US/UAR relations would improve to permit the continuation of our cooperation. The President thinks that American actions of the last four years show the USG's keen interest in helping the UAR grow and prosper. He is sincere in his hope that we can resolve the differences which have arisen over the Congo and other matters and turn our attention to better understanding of each other's problems and further consolidation of our relationship. Ball
129. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson/1/ Washington, February 1, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Jordan, Vol. I. Secret. The memorandum bears no drafting information, but another copy indicates that the covering memorandum was drafted by Killgore and the enclosure by Talbot and Davies on January 22. Attached to the copy is a January 22 memorandum from Talbot to Rusk forwarding the memorandum for his signature and a February 1 memorandum from Blaine Tueller of S/S-S to Rusk's Staff Assistant Edward J. Streator stating that Ball had signed the memorandum and that Ball had talked to Rusk and had been to the White House to discuss the problem earlier that day. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 12-5 JORDAN) SUBJECT THE ISSUES Pressures, applied through the Unified Arab Command (UAC), for an arms buildup in Jordan as part of a larger Arab effort to attain military parity with Israel pose potential threats to very important American interests. At issue are: 1) How to meet King Hussein's arms requests, levied by the UAC, without abandoning our traditional policy of restraint on arms sales in the Near East, which has so far served us well by preventing a polarization of the Arab-Israel dispute along Cold War lines; and 2) How to obtain Israel's acquiescence in the sale of U.S. arms to Jordan. The enclosed paper sets forth The Problem, as we see it, proposes A Strategy For The Years Ahead, discusses The Situation in some detail, describes The Stakes at issue, sets out pertinent Policy Considerations and makes Recommendations. George W. Ball/2/ /2/Ball signed for Rusk above Rusk's typed signature.
Enclosure The Problem During 1964 we have been trying to maintain an even keel in our Near East relations in the backwash of Arab reaction to Israel's completion of its Jordan River diversion project. The Arabs have equated the diversion with the establishment of the State of Israel in Arab territory and Nasser has used their emotional reaction to forge a solidarity, the duration of which will be central to our problems in the area in the years ahead. How the West meets the force of Arab Nationalist solidarity can be a factor in whether it is consolidated or diffused. How the United States meets its challenges will in part determine whether the trend will be to a polarization that would identify us wholly with Israel and unite the Arabs in alliance with the Soviets and Chicoms against us. A Strategy for the Years Ahead We need to engage in a series of complex operations to reduce the threat to our major interests and avert the danger of polarization in the area by: (a) Using our diplomatic, political, economic and military power to maintain the best possible bilateral relations with all area states and to avoid a confrontation with "radical" Arab states so long as they avoid damaging our major interests. (b) Encouraging social, economic and political reform and affording an alternative to Soviet economic support and military supply using, where necessary, highly selective military sales, to prevent a Soviet monopoly on arms supply to the Arabs. (c) Persuading the Israelis that controlled Western sales to the Arabs, though painful for Israel to watch, will enhance the prospects of peace in the area. (d) Renewing endeavors in the United Nations and directly with the parties to the dispute over Palestine to develop a trend toward eventual acceptance of Israel as a Near Eastern state. Detailed recommendations appear below. The Situation (a) Having sensibly eschewed war as an immediate riposte to the Israeli water works, the Arab states have for the time being come together to sponsor and finance (1) Arab diversion works in Syria and prospectively in Lebanon and Jordan to deny to Israel much of the flow from the sources of the Jordan River; (2) a Unified Arab Command, ostensibly to protect Arab soil from Israeli aggression (preemptive or punitive attacks) against Arab water works; (3) the Palestine Liberation Organization, to stir up Palestine refugee pressure to return to old homesteads now in Israel; and (4) unified Arab diplomatic and economic pressures against Israel, including the boycott of foreign firms doing business with Israel. (b) The united Arab front against Israel has so far survived for 12 months and shows signs of continuing, because of fear of Israel and because currently high--and still growing--oil revenues permit relatively easy financing of Arab schemes mainly by such states as Kuwait (which sees such payments as a way of buying into the club of independent Arab states), Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Libya, etc. How long this pattern of united action will remain dominant is a central question. Already there are signs that the usual divisions may re-emerge. Kuwait and some others have given indications of tiring of the heavy assessments, and some inter-Arab disputes (as in the Yemen) have reintensified. (c) All our estimates continue to show Israel as maintaining its military superiority over the Arab states for the foreseeable future. Nonetheless, the arms race goes on. Israel is increasing its conventional weaponry, probably is getting French SSM's, and may be exploring nuclears. The U.A.R. is obtaining more and better Soviet conventional equipment and is experimenting (not so far very successfully) with home-made missiles. Iraq and Syria are getting Soviet-made conventional arms. Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, and particularly Jordan are requesting new U.S. weaponry, including supersonic fighters, to be paid for in the latter cases by UAC funds. (d) Israel's security anxieties are increasing rapidly because of the threats inherent in a united Arab front, the growing military strength of Arab countries, Arab diversion works which in time could cut off important water supplies to Israel, and more activist postures by Syria and Jordan along Israel's borders and by political organizers among the Arab refugees. Israel has grown increasingly firm and even provocative in border patrolling, and the number of military incidents along its borders is rising. Responsible Israelis do not now rule out the possibility of preemptive or punitive strike against Arab targets. (e) The Soviet Union, apparently envisaging new opportunities in the strongly anti-Israeli stance of all Arabs and anti-"imperialist" stance of some Arabs, and possibly goaded by Chicom rivalry, is stepping up its activities in the Arab world. In the past year the U.A.R. has obtained new military hardware and a new pledge of $280 million economic loans from the Soviet Union, promise of a $60 million loan from Communist China, and a $100 million loan from Kuwait. In contrast, the U.S. has offered no military assistance, made no economic development loan since 1963, maintained a small ($2.3 million) technical assistance program, and remained committed to the third and final year of a 1962 PL-480 agreement. (f) The U.A.R. is involved not only with other Arab states vis-a-vis Israel, but also directly in the Congo problem and certain other "liberation movement" situations. In most if not all of these, our objectives are in conflict. In other situations, however (e.g., the Chase Manhattan boycott, certain issues in the non-aligned conference, etc.), U.A.R. efforts have helped us against other radical states. (g) By cutting off PL-480 commodities from the U.A.R., the U.S. could hurt Nasser but probably not topple him (and, in any case, no visible prospective successor looks better). It would also set in train an Aswan-like reaction by Nasser leading to such punitive actions as cancellation of our MATs and commercial airline rights, inspection of vessels transiting the Suez for radioactive hazards, stepped-up pressure against the Wheelus base agreement, removal of UNEF from Egyptian soil with the consequent threat to the Israeli port of Eilath and of a direct Israeli-U.A.R. military confrontation, further stirring up of other Arab states against Israel, etc. (h) Many of our friends and most of our opponents would like to force the U.S. into actions that would tend to polarize the Near East. So would some Americans. The Stakes Our major interests in the Near East are: (a) The maintenance of peace, to preserve the freedom and integrity of Israel and the other states in the region. (cf: JFK statement 5/8/63) (b) Ready access to and transit through the area by air, sea or land. (c) Continued availability of oil and its economic movement to Europe. (d) Denial of any part of the area to Communist-state control. (e) Economic growth and political stabilization to increase the prospects of independence and stability. The defense of these major interests (particularly the first four) is our central concern. Policy Considerations I believe the following are pertinent: (a) Over the past years, none of our major interests have been damaged. We have dealt with lesser problems within the framework of our flexible bilateral relations with all states in the area. We must continue this. (b) We cannot permit any state to challenge a basic interest without opposing it vigorously. If we cannot with dignity avoid a confrontation with the U.A.R., it has the power in the area to attack our special positions and to mobilize most if not all other Arabs into an anti-Israel front, thus effecting polarization since the Soviets would exploit the opportunity to give all-out support to the Arabs against Israel, "the beachhead of western imperialism in the Arab East." Saudi Arabia might be in a position to maintain useful relations with us, but Jordan probably would have to follow the Arab Nationalist line or the regime would succumb to internal and external pressures that could be mounted from Cairo. (c) Assuming, however, that we can maintain tolerable relations with Cairo, there is the possibility of continuing the strengthening of the regimes and capabilities of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Lebanon. In addition, we could and should continue to compete with the Soviets in the U.A.R., Syria, and Iraq by offering alternatives to full dependence on the Soviets. This would involve continued "Food for Peace" programs and a willingness, in the case of Jordan, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia, to sell military equipment up to the minimum levels being insisted upon and financed by the UAC. (d) Although Israel may in fact understand that U.S. military deliveries to Arab states participating in the UAC buildup is the least disadvantageous of alternatives at hand, vigorous high-level efforts will be required to persuade Israel's friends in this country that such a course (1) gives us a restraining hand on the amounts and types of equipment made available to these states; (2) prevents the introduction of Soviet equipment and Soviet or Syrian/Egyptian/Iraq trainers and technicians along the long frontier with Jordan; (3) loosens the "radical" Arabs' otherwise total grip on the UAC, thus strengthening and speeding the prospects of a splintering of the support for the UAC. Continuing strong high-level efforts will be required to resist pressures for compensating U.S. sales to Israel which would polarize the Near East to both Israel's and our disadvantage. Recommendations A. That we actively and aggressively seek to resolve policy differences with the U.A.R. while carrying forward on our present PL-480 commitments and holding out the carrot of a new agreement for a further period. Should we be able to arrive at an acceptable political compromise on the Congo, limited economic development lending would be considered. B. That we proceed to discussions of the Jordanian military shopping list along the general lines of a 5-year, $55 million ground equipment program and a major effort to persuade Hussain to purchase the supersonic aircraft he insists he needs from some Western European supplier--with the fallback that we will consider the sale and delivery of one squadron of U.S. planes as early as 1968 (after pilot training and construction of airfield for jets) as a last resort to prevent his taking MIGs. C. That we inform Israel of the move we intend to make and seek to abort its strong adverse reaction with the argumentation developed above. [Continue with the next documents] Volume XVIII Index | Foreign Relations Online | Historian's Office | Department of State | Secretary of State |