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 | FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XVIII Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964-67 Department of State |
 110. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic/1/ Washington, November 27, 1964, 6:08 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 23-8 UAR. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by Dickman, cleared by Davies, and approved by Jernegan. 3101. At our request, UAR Minister Eleish met November 27 with Jernegan discuss Thanksgiving day vandalism against Embassy (Ambassador Kamel in New York). Jernegan delivered copy of Embassy's note protest (Embtel 1856),/2/ emphasized that Department strongly supports statements contained therein, and expressed concern at recent trend of misunderstanding that had crept into US-UAR relations along lines Deptel 3092./3/ /2/Telegram 1856 from Cairo, November 26, transmitted the text of a note Battle planned to deliver protesting an attack on the Embassy that day by several hundred African students. (Ibid.) /3/Telegram 3092 to Cairo, November 27, endorsed Battle's protest note and stated that the Thanksgiving Day vandalism was particularly disturbing as a symptom of the "dissonance" that had recently entered U.S.-UAR relations. It noted increasing criticism by the Cairo press of U.S. policy in Vietnam, the Congo, India, Sudan, and elsewhere and a Foreign Ministry statement of November 25 condemning the U.S.-Belgian rescue of foreign nationals in the Congo. (Ibid.) Jernegan said we took serious view of attack because felt could have been prevented if adequate action taken. Press reports had noted that Ambassador Battle who lives further away than fire or police stations able reach Embassy from his home through mob before police and firemen. Also noted that when police did arrive, concentrated on front of building leaving rear unprotected where burning occurred. Because we considered UAR had responsibility in this matter, Ambassador Battle had delivered note of protest to Acting Foreign Minister Abu Shadi. We understood from Ambassador's report,/4/ Abu Shadi expressed astonishment at protest and claimed UAR had done all that could be expected. Also, that Washington not taking as serious view as Embassy. We wished disabuse UARG of any such idea. Dept fully expected UAR compensate for damages and believed proper for UAR publicly express regret. Jernegan noted only regret so far had come from Chief of Police and from Abu Shadi, but latter very matter of fact. Ordinarily, this handled by foreign government official visiting scene and government issuing public statement. /4/Battle reported his meeting with Acting Foreign Minister Abu Shadi in telegram 1068 from Cairo, November 27. (Ibid.) After presenting substance Deptel 3092, Jernegan remarked that series of things had created impression in US of UAR hostility. It seemed there no policy followed by US which free UAR criticism. While we recognized that US-UAR relations cannot be based on what said in press, USG could not help but think UAR press treatment past two months symptomatic of UARG attitude. Added this had effect on Congress, American public and other US officials. Thus, attack on Embassy, while in itself not incident of grave severity, could have effect out of proportion to actual damage done. Eleish expressed his personal regret for mob attack, agreed report conversation, and expressed appreciation on learning neither Dept nor Embassy intended release text of note. Rusk
111. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State/1/ Cairo, November 30, 1964, 6 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 23-8 UAR. Confidential; Priority. 1904. I called this morning on Prime Min Ali Sabri at his request. He began conversation by saying not necessary repeat all the things Fawzi had said to me./2/ Then stated interested in use of phrase "pre-arranged and premeditated" (Sabri's words) in note and in conversation. He asked that I give him any evidence we had this point. I stated there could be no doubt of pre-arrangement if one examined nature of incident and its success from point of view those who wished it. I said that if he read carefully my statement and our note, he would see that I had never stated by whom incident arranged and had refrained carefully from any charge Egyptian involvement. I said I had done this and reported my govt no Egyptians involved even in light of numerous rumors and reports to contrary. I had avoided carefully overemphasizing these rumors for fear of exacerbating situation. I was now authorized to accept the UAR note expressing deep pain and the statement of willingness to negotiate compensation,/3/ subject, or course, to successful working out matter. I said my prime purpose now was to overcome bad effects this incident but that it was impossible for me to do it alone. I must have their help. I said they had failed comply basic customs in matters of this kind and that throughout night of incident many of American and foreign press as well as others repeatedly asked me, "have you heard from Egyptian Govt?," to which I of course had to reply in negative. I said I could only compare this with custom through centuries and for example recent example in Sudan, where half of Cabinet called to express regret for incidents, of which he aware since his govt involved in same circumstances. He said he had not been aware of custom and thought that sending Chief of Police with his expression adequate. I said his expression concern had reached me only in the note and had not been conveyed by Chief of Police. I told him that I had arrived two months ago with great hope and great expectation strengthening our relations. I still had them and wished to overcome problems surrounding this incident, but he must help and help more than he had done before and after incident. I said good relations two-way street, that I would do my part, but that I could do no more than that. He said, "What would you like me to do?" I said, prevent creation situations such as UAR press treatment issues involving US. I told him I would like to inform US press that he had called me in today to repeat expressions given me by Dr. Fawzi of GUAR regret and willingness to discuss compensation. He acceded. /2/Telegram 1885 from Cairo, November 28, reported Battle's meeting that day with Foreign Minister Fawzi. (Ibid.) /3/Telegram 1886 from Cairo, November 28, transmitted the text of the UAR note delivered that day. (Ibid.) Sabri repeated desire as expressed by Pres Nasser in his recent speech to maintain good relations with US. I said this also our desire, repeating again it was a two-way street. We then sat for minutes in which neither of us spoke. I made no move terminate conversation. He then repeated strong desire good relations. I said that before leaving I wished to tell him that humanitarian mission conducted in Congo had been completed, that large number hostages had been evacuated, and that Belgian troops and US planes transporting them now out of area. I said I had noted UAR press treatment given Ball statement this morning and said I had sent off tel immediately asking for guidance. Response from Washington had indicated statement taken out of context and had referred to Congolese land movements. Conversation very firm, slightly tense, but ended reasonably pleasantly. I will talk with American press later today. Battle
112. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, December 4, 1964, 4 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 12 JORDAN. Secret. Drafted by Killgore on December 15 and approved in M on December 22. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS State Department: Defense Department: White House: Robert Komer Governor Harriman said he had read and understood various briefing papers prepared for him by the Department in connection with the meeting. He therefore proposed a discussion of the issues, asking Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Solbert to begin. Mr. Solbert stated that we had to do the minimum necessary to keep Jordan on our side. He thought this would involve selling American supersonic aircraft, mentioning the F-104C as a likely prospect. To Governor Harriman's question on why DOD wanted to sell the F-5,/2/ Mr. Solbert replied that, in his view, the F-5 would entail a lesser political reaction, plus the fact it is easier to maintain. To a series of questions from the Governor, Mr. Solbert replied that the Jordanians say they now want to buy three squadrons of supersonics at 20 planes to the squadron, that Jordan has approximately 24 jet-trained pilots and that beginning delivery dates of any American supersonic fighters to Jordan would be at least three years into the future. /2/A December 5 memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to McNamara (JCSM-1019-64) stated that the F-5 aircraft was preferred for sale to Jordan but recommended selling F-104H aircraft if the F-5 was unacceptable to the Jordanians. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 68 A 306, 452.1 Jordan) Governor Harriman inquired if there was anything more to be said favoring the sale of American supersonic aircraft. Mr. Solbert stated we had also to consider a Jordanian request for a large amount of ground equipment for its Army. Governor Harriman asked a number of questions, drawing out replies from Mr. Solbert on the source of funds for Jordan's military purchases, the relative importance of the ground and air buildup and types of tanks desired. Governor Harriman asked what the chances would be of diverting the Jordanians to a West European supersonic aircraft. Mr. Talbot responded that it comes down to what kind of arms policy we want to pursue over the years in the Near East. In his opinion, Jordan's acquisition of either MIG's or American supersonic aircraft would trigger irresistible pressures from Israel for reciprocal or better treatment. Governor Harriman's question therefore came down to the nub of the issue. A short discussion then ensued on how strong Israeli pressure would be if American supersonics of any kind were sold to Jordan. Governor Harriman asked what attitude Jordan would have toward taking West European supersonics. Assistant Secretary Talbot replied he understood that King Hussein had expressed a desire for the French Mirage IIIC to President De Gaulle during the King's recent visit to France. Mr. Talbot proposed we tell Hussein that if a West European aircraft were available he should obtain this type aircraft and that we could not, for political reasons, supply an American aircraft. If the King persisted that he must bend to UAC pressures to accept a MIG squadron, we should inform him that to do so would be at the cost of reduced American support to Jordan. Mr. Komer expressed the view that we probably had not worked hard enough initially to persuade King Hussein against early acquisition of any supersonic aircraft and that we should go back and inform him we could not supply American, nor could we acquiesce in his acquisition of Soviet aircraft. We should also go to Cairo in a further effort indirectly to dissuade Jordan from acquiring supersonics. However, we would leave enough opening in our position with Hussein to be able to fall back to a European supersonic if this appeared absolutely necessary. Governor Harriman asked if the group could agree on a European airplane. Mr. Talbot said that this would be his recommendation. Mr. Komer replied we should make every effort to dissuade the King from any early supersonics at all but he recognized that we might fail. There was general agreement that pre-Summit and other pressures of last summer, which had required our buying time rather than confronting Hussein head-on, had now eased. We could and should now take a harder line. To Governor Harriman's question on the timing of our reply to King Hussein on supersonics, Mr. Talbot said he did not favor borrowing trouble by saying anything to the King at this point. We would like to leave the situation somewhat flexible and review what our reply should be as December 31, 1964 approached. Mr. Komer proposed letting the White House handle any disappointed American airplane manufacturers who might protest a European aircraft sale to Jordan. This proposal was immediately accepted without debate. Mr. Komer thought we should make crystal clear to King Hussein our opposition to his acquisition of MIG's. Governor Harriman agreed, stating we would probably have to pull out of Jordan if Hussein did so. Mr. Talbot agreed that any appearance of hesitation on the aircraft issue might well be fatal to our aims. Mr. Talbot replied to Governor Harriman's request for a summary of his recommendations by proposing (1) that an amended version of the Air Survey Report consistent with our political objectives be worked out for presentation to the Government of Jordan, (2) that when our position is ready we inform Hussein there are a whole range of priorities in Jordan's drive for increased armaments, (3) that Jordan can well do without any supersonic aircraft, (4) that the acquisition of Soviet MIG's would be a very critical matter from our point of view, and (5) (if Hussein were adamant) that acquisition of West European supersonics could be acquiesced in by us. The Governor said he was persuaded of the wisdom of Mr. Talbot's recommendations. Governor Harriman asked how we would deal with Hussein in carrying out these tactics. In the discussion that followed, the consensus was: (1) Our future discussions will be at the Hussein level; (2) We would have either the Ambassador or a special emissary pursue the discussions with Hussein; (3) We would discuss a full package, ground and air, with Hussein, rather than proceeding piecemeal; (4) The question of who would pursue the discussions with Hussein would be decided after the details of our ground and air positions had been worked out in Washington. A further exchange took place involving Mr. Solbert, Governor Harriman, Mr. Meyers and Mr. Symmes concerning the F-5 aircraft. A discussion ensued of its characteristics and whether there would be any value in offering it to Jordan. Governor Harriman could not see the advantage to offering the F-5. Selling it to Jordan would have almost if not all of the adverse effects on our arms policy that we saw in the F-104. However, if it were desired to hold it deep in the background as a possibility ultimately to sell to Jordan, should everything else fail, he would not object. Governor Harriman said he hoped as a result of the foregoing words that the U.S. Air Force and the Pentagon would not try to sell the F-5 to the Jordanians while we were trying to induce the Jordanians either to forego supersonics or settle on a West European squadron. A short discussion followed on the desirability of better controlling American aircraft manufacturers in various parts of the world. Mr. Meyers said quite effective controls had been established over the activities of American aircraft salesmen in South America and he deemed it desirable that further efforts be made to assert this kind of control in the Middle East area. Others present emphatically agreed.
113. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel/1/ Washington, December 14, 1964, 5:26 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, AE 11-2 ISR. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by Russell on December 11; cleared by Davies, Officer in Charge of Atomic Energy Affairs Charles W. Thomas, Kenneth L. Brown of INR, Kratzer and Reichard of the Atomic Energy Commission, Devlin and Cooney of CIA, and Komer; and approved by Jernegan. 492. Embtel 660./2/ At earliest opportunity you should inform Eshkol President gratified at GOI agreement schedule Dimona visit. /2/Telegram 660 from Tel Aviv, December 7, reported that after Barbour presented President Johnson's position as set forth in telegram 441 to Tel Aviv (Document 109), Eshkol agreed to a visit to Dimona on the weekend of January 30. Barbour reported that he had pressed for an earlier date, but that Eshkol resisted, finally saying, "we cannot build a nuclear weapon in two months." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, AE 11-2 ISR) USG naturally unhappy at Israeli postponement to January 30, but can accept this date so long as it thoroughly understood that inspection can be effectively comprehensive to meet our needs. Since Dimona now operating over 12 months inspection requirements more complex than last time. At minimum must include following: 1. Visiting team will require whatever time necessary (minimum estimate two days) complete observations at site with full access to reactor and all other facilities in order verify nature all such facilities, their production capacity and their present utilization. 2. Team should have opportunity review operating records reactor and any facilities either at site or elsewhere in which irradiated or unirradiated reactor fuel is stored, fabricated or processed, perform physical inventory and make independent measurements as may be necessary to verify production of reactor since previous visit. This more detailed inspection necessary to account for production. 3. Team also should have opportunity verify location and use any plutonium or other fissionable material produced in reactor. 4. Thorough inspection outlined above which corresponds to US bilateral and IAEA requirements minimum necessary permit President at later date reassure others on peaceful nature Israel's nuclear activities. FYI: Visits to date have fallen considerably short normal safeguard requirements and at best accomplished only determination nature facilities at site and productive capacity at time of visit. AEC and intelligence community agree above more thorough inspection imperative. We regret earlier date for inspection not set. Embassy's excellent reporting of developments on Israel's domestic scene has helped explain Eshkol's attitude. We appreciate difficulties and distractions he faces, but do not believe secret Dimona inspection would significantly affect his party's election prospects. Decision permit six-monthly Dimona inspections originally taken by Ben-Gurion and reconfirmed by Eshkol, presumably after full Cabinet discussion. Deputy Defense Minister Peres also involved in decision. Thus, difficult believe "hard liners" in Cabinet could oppose Eshkol on decision in which they and Ben-Gurion participated. Embassy's reporting suggests that with approach elections domestic pressures likely increase rather than lessen. Thus, inspection earlier than January 30 would appear decrease risk adverse domestic political repercussions. Our inability fathom Eshkol's arguments for delay naturally heightens our security fears. Eshkol's remark that "we cannot build nuclear weapon in two months" not reassuring in light estimate US experts that if Israel decided to produce weapon following January 1964 inspection, it could produce enough plutonium for one or two nuclear devices by the end of 1965. USG of course would not presume to suggest to Eshkol best timing of inspection politically. We hope however he will not invoke domestic political problems as pretext for further delays. Given other indications suggesting that Israel may be engaged in development weapon, further efforts delay inspection would bring into question Israel's good faith. End FYI. Ball
114. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ SecDel/MC/43 New York, December 19, 1964, 11 a.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 32-1 ISR-SYR. Confidential. Drafted by Daniel O. Newberry of the Office of Near Eastern, South Asian Regional Affairs and approved in S on December 24. The memorandum is marked Part I of III; Parts II and III are ibid., Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 2449. The meeting was held at the U.S. Mission at the United Nations. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS Foreign The Secretary opened the discussion by telling the Minister that the U.S. policy toward Syria was one of support for the independence, security and prosperity of Syria. The Minister reciprocated the Secretary's comment. The Minister went on to express the pleasure of the Syrian Government and the Syrian people in the re-election of President Johnson. The Syrians, he said, felt that the Johnson Administration showed good understanding of the aspirations of national liberation movements. He also remarked on the great understanding shown by the U.S. in the current Security Council discussion of Syria's complaint against Israel./2/ /2/Both Israel and Syria had requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council following an outbreak of fighting on the Israeli-Syrian border on November 13. The Security Council considered the complaints at nine meetings between November 16 and December 21. Documentation concerning the discussions at the United Nations is ibid., Central Files 1964-66, POL 32-1 ISR-SYR/UN. The Secretary said that it was unfortunate that Israel had moved the tractor into the zone in the first place; it was unfortunate that the Syrians had begun shooting; and it was unfortunate that the incident escalated as it did. The Minister noted that there was no precedent for an aerial attack of the sort mounted by Israel. The Security Council had not been able to deal with it and it was clear that the U.N. machinery in the area must be enabled to cope with such problems. The Syrian Govenment was insistent on remapping and marking the entire demarcation line as recommended in para. 45 of the report of the UNTSO Chief of Staff (August 23, 1963). The marking could, of course, be done step-by-step but unless the entire line is remapped, incidents might recur indefinitely. Dr. Mufti interjected that if the remapping were to be done only in the northern sector, Israel might later be unwilling to consider doing the same in other areas. Later in the conversation the Minister returned to the subject of Arab-Israel relations in general, stating that he would be derelict in his duty to his Government and to other Arabs unless he expressed to the Secretary the grave feelings of the Arabs in the face of Israel's long-term expansionist and hostile aims. The Minister spoke at length of the inculcation in the minds of Israeli young people of hostile attitudes toward Arabs. This mentality, when associated with Israel's projects in the field of nuclear research filled the Arabs with great foreboding. The Secretary responded by affirming that the U.S. was opposed to territorial expansion and the spread of nuclear weapons. The Secretary then asked the Minister what kind of situation might prevail if, hypothetically, the element of fear might be removed on both sides, noting that the Israelis also had occasion for their fear since they understood that many Arabs thought of Israel as a people marked for destruction. The Minister replied that it was not possible to conceive of such a situation given the present activities of the Israelis. The Secretary reminded the Minister of the U.S. efforts to restrict the spread of nuclear weaponry. When the Minister expressed a fear that Israel might be able to acquire nuclear weapons through the private sector, the Secretary expressed doubt that such a thing was possible and assured the Minister that the U.S. Government watches every aspect of nuclear production very closely. The Secretary told the Minister that the two of them would keep in touch on the matters they had been discussing. He remarked that Ambassador Ridgway Knight was an old friend of his and noted that Ambassador Knight had a direct channel of communication which the Minister could avail himself of whenever he had a personal message for the Secretary.
115. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, December 23, 1964. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL UAR-US. Secret. Drafted by Davies on December 28 and approved in M on December 31. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS Mr. Talbot noted that the Secretary's answer earlier in the day to a question on U.S.-U.A.R. aid negotiations/2/ and President Nasser's anti-American remarks,/3/ first excerpts of which were received after the Secretary's press conference, would be interpreted by the press as a direct confrontation between the U.S. and Nasser. He thought our broader interest would suffer if we reacted sharply to Nasser's remarks. He thought we should "sit on our hands" for now. He proposed that we suspend all action on any new economic aid to the U.A.R., including the request for amounts of corn supplementary to the agreed amounts for the third year of the multi-year agreement, pending resolution of our policy differences. Existing programs, he thought, should be continued. /2/Rusk was asked at his December 23 news conference if thought was being given to cutting off P.L. 480 aid to the United Arab Republic; he replied that this was not being discussed but that "relationships are reciprocal" and "if relations are to be good, both sides must make important investments in those relationships." For text, see Department of State Bulletin, January 11, 1965, p. 39. /3/Reference is to Nasser's December 23 speech at Port Said, summarized in a CIA Intelligence Memorandum of December 24, which called it "Nasir's bitterest attack on the U.S. since 1956." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, UAR, Vol. III) Governor Harriman said he thought we should not take any new initiatives with the U.A.R. but carry out any standing commitments. These need not, he suggested, include further processing of the grain storage project which had been stalled for some time. Mr. Macomber said that there was approximately $15 million in the AID pipeline in non-PL 480 assistance. The Secretary asked about the safety of dependents in the hinterland of the U.A.R. in the event of demonstrations in the aftermath of Nasser's speech. Mr. Macomber said that there were some Americans in Assiut, but he did not believe under present circumstances these would be endangered. Mr. Talbot and Mr. Davies felt it highly unlikely that possible demonstrations would endanger American lives. Mr. Talbot said he thought in considering future relations with Nasser, the last sentence of Marquis Childs' article in Wednesday's "Washington Post" was pertinent ". . . this (U.A.R.) is a new world and unless it is recognized as such, it will move wholly out of the orbit of the West." The Soviets, he said, were standing by to pick up any advantage they could from deteriorating U.S.-U.A.R. relations. In addition, we had major interests such as Israel's security, overflight rights, Hussein's stability, facilities at Wheelus, Kagnew and other spots which could be damaged through U.A.R. influence or action. Nasser might, for instance, convince the Kuwaitis to draw down their security holdings in London. The question that faces us is whether we should seek confrontation with Nasser or continue our long-term effort to moderate his policies. Governor Harriman said we should look at the reverse of the coin, how much would we pay to dislodge the Soviets from an enhanced position in the Near East and Africa. For all the vast Soviet investment, so far they have received few dividends. Their fortunes would look up if U.S.-U.A.R. relations deteriorate. Mr. Talbot said at the same time we must recognize that Nasser's policies and such recent incidents as the library burning, attack against the Mecom plane,/4/ and the Port Said speech would raise tremendous pressure domestically for termination of aid. If we decide to continue economic assistance, it will perhaps be necessary for a full and frank briefing of the Foreign Relations Committee and key members of Congress. He thought continued assistance was in the best interest of the U.S. He noted that inside the U.A.R. the drift toward the East had alarmed pro-West elements. We had received several indications that these felt U.S. economic support was essential to prevent a rise in pro-Soviet influence within the regime. We heard recently through a friendly intelligence service from the Egyptian General Intelligence Agency, ostensibly on behalf of Nasser, that he would welcome U.S. assistance in ameliorating his precarious financial situation and in improving relations. Earlier in the day Henry Fowler had told him that the speaker of the U.A.R. Assembly a few days before had proposed to an associate of Robert Anderson that a U.A.R. Vice Presidential party be invited to come to Washington to discuss with the President the Salhia project and means of improving relations. /4/Reference is to an airplane owned by U.S. citizen John W. Mecom, which was shot down while overflying Egyptian territory on December 19. Related documentation is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 31-1 UAR-US. To date no major U.S. interest has been hurt by Nasser. If we clash we are certain to incur some damage. We should now avoid any actions which would provide a basis for further deterioration of our relations. The Secretary suggested that we might assume a posture of taking no initiative whatsoever and waiting until the U.A.R. came to us for economic or other discussions. Mr. Macomber said that this would mean suspending action with respect to new projects contemplated in the $25 million FY '65 level of A.I.D. loans. After recalling that no A.I.D. loans were made to the U.A.R. in FY '64, Mr. Macomber noted that there were several projects still in the process of completion which had been funded in FY '63. He indicated that there would be little difficulty in holding up on the new (FY '65) projects but that, with the exception of the grain silo project, it would be a much more complicated task to suspend those FY '63 funded projects which were presently underway. Mr. Talbot noted that since getting agreement in principle to the $20 million commodity loan for fiscal '64, the U.A.R. had received $100 million in loans from Kuwait and $280 million from the Soviet Union. Our aid leverage, therefore, was limited except for PL 480. The Secretary decided PL 480 and aid in pipeline except for silo project will continue. We will not at this time proceed with processing supplementary PL 480 request or new aid agreements. The Secretary suggested that if the U.A.R.G. comes to us to discuss aid, we should indicate our desire to continue cooperation but also talk beyond to U.A.R. actions which make it difficult to justify additional aid to American people and Congress.
116. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel/1/ Washington, December 24, 1964, 12:29 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 32-1 ISR-SYR. Confidential. Drafted by Heywood H. Stackhouse; cleared by Davies, Buffum, and Sisco; and approved by Jernegan. Also sent to Damascus and repeated to Amman, Beirut, Cairo, USUN, and Jerusalem. 536. Israel-Syria. Even though SC consideration November 13 incident/2/ was technically without issue Dept believes debate, behind-scenes negotiations and votes indicate abundantly broad SC consensus on major steps necessary to prevent recurrence such incidents. Without attempting set out guidelines for resolution specific issues behind Nov. 13 clash (UNTSO must continue exercise primary responsibility for this) Dept wishes convey to GOI and SARG its recognition this consensus exists, has force and merits Israel's and Syria's respect. /2/On December 21, the Security Council failed to adopt a U.S.-British draft resolution (S/6113) deploring the renewal of military action on the Israel-Syrian Armistice Demarcation Line on November 13 and recommending that both parties cooperate with the Chairman of the Israel-Syrian Mixed Armistice Commission for the purpose of maintaining peace in the area, that the parties cooperate in the continuation and completion of a survey begun in 1963 according to the recommendations of the UNTSO Chief of Staff, and that both parties participate fully in the meetings of the Israel-Syrian Mixed Armistice Commission. The resolution received 8 votes in favor and 3 votes against but was rejected because of the Soviet Union's negative vote. For Tel Aviv. You should make following points to Acting Foreign Minister: 1. Although SC decision technically nullified by Soviet veto, believe resolution as amended constituted expression of majority opinion which should not be ignored. Comment by Israeli Foreign Minister after SC vote on Almagor incident September 4, 1963,/3/ equally appropriate this instance: "Technical veto cannot detract in slightest from moral and political significance of stand formulated in Security Council." /3/On September 3, 1963, the Security Council failed to adopt a U.S.-British draft resolution (S/5407) concerning an August 19 incident on the Israel-Syrian border, with 8 votes in favor, 2 against, and 1 abstention, the Soviet Union voting in the negative. 2. Differences between majority and minority in SC had essentially to do with SC's interpretation of events November 13. On question of what should be done to prevent such incidents in future there was consensus that demarcation in disputed areas and participation in MAC meetings by Israel and Syria are necessary. 3. Israel would serve cause peace in area by acting in spirit this limited but very real consensus. 4. We think Israel should continue to exercise same restraint in response in UNTSO request it has exercised during last three weeks in Tel al-Qadi area both there and elsewhere along ADL. Specifically we would hope Israel would not resume patrolling in disputed Tel al-Qadi area but rather attempt again by working with UNTSO to remove causes of conflict in area or at least agree to such measures as UNTSO might suggest that would minimize danger of escalation such as occurred November 13. 5. We exerted considerable effort to see that unbalanced resolution did not emerge from SC. If controversial Israeli patrolling activities are a proximate cause of further violence in Tel al-Qadi area we would find it very difficult--if SC is again seized of matter--to achieve even limited influence on other members we succeeded in achieving this time. For Damascus. Appreciate fully our limited influence with SARG but believe expression our views could have some positive effect. You should inform Acting Foreign Minister (a) We deeply regret Sovs vetoed res which contained nothing of harm to Syria and so many elements favorable to its long-term wishes, viz., a strong request "that Israel as well as Syria participate fully in meetings" of MAC. (b) Our conviction that in spite veto SC majority opinion should be respected. (c) Whatever SC differences on interpretation November 13 incident there was limited unanimous agreement MAC should be fully utilized and demarcation Tel al-Qadi area should be matter first priority. (d) We hope Syria will make special effort cooperate with UNTSO to reduce tension in Tel al-Qadi area, specifically as regards efforts to demarcate line. To possible recriminations that we in service Israel during SC debate you should not fail note Israelis had objected strongly US-UK resolution, but that we tabled it nevertheless because we believed it most important SC throw itself behind measures to prevent recurrence such incidents. Rusk
117. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, December 31, 1964. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL UAR-US. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Davies. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS 1. U.S.-U.A.R. Relations Mr. Talbot said the press wanted to know where we were going with the U.A.R. To give direction to the press we first had need for some policy guidance. We needed to decide our reaction to the U.A.R. approach through F.M.C. officials. The Secretary asked whether a message to Nasser or a reply from Nasser was due. Mr. Talbot replied that we had sent an oral message to Nasser on the Congo./2/ Since some Arabs, including Nasser, regard an oral message as being sent from a senior to a lesser official, it is problematic whether we get a letter in response to the President's message. He noted that, meanwhile, Nasser had reactivated a long-unused [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] channel to express his desire to avoid further deterioration in our relations./3/ /2/Reference is to an oral message from Johnson to Nasser transmitted in telegrams 3429 and 3443 to Cairo, December 12 and 13. The message declared that U.S. policy was to support an independent unified Congo and assist in its development, and it urged against support of the rebel movement in the Congo, which would provide the Soviet Union and China with opportunities to extend their influence in Africa. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence, UAR, Nasser Correspondence, Vol. I) Ambassador Battle presented the message at his first meeting with Nasser on December 19, reported in telegram 2129 from Cairo, December 19. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 23-8 UAR) /3/A December 28 memorandum from Jernegan to Rusk reported several UAR feelers seeking improved relations. (Ibid., POL UAR-US) Mr. Talbot asked whether the Embassy and USIS should be authorized to accept the U.A.R. offer of a building for the library. The Secretary replied that it would be necessary to touch base with the President before an answer could be given on this. The President had been extremely upset by the signing of the purchase agreement for $17 million worth of wheat. In retrospect, the decision to continue all aid on the pipeline should have been checked out with the White House. The Secretary also said that the President is genuinely perturbed over the incivility manifested by Nasser and other radical leaders. He is inclined to consider such deportment unacceptable in international relations. The Secretary said Nasser's speech was not the core of our immediate problem; U.A.R. assistance to insurgency in the Congo was. If Nasser continues support of "wars of liberation" in Africa, we are on a collision course. Mr. Talbot said that he thought yesterday's Security Council resolution on the Congo may provide a platform for a dialogue with the U.A.R.G. on this problem. The Secretary pointed out there were unpalatable elements in the resolution. The Secretary asked about the merits of adopting a posture of not responding to U.A.R. overtures. Mr. Talbot said that this was difficult because there were day-to-day decisions that had to be made such as the one involved in meeting a U.A.R.G. request for 250,000 tons of wheat flour under the multi-year PL-480 agreement. Agriculture now thought that no more than 50,000 tons could be justified. We need to send a telegram to the Embassy to acquire additional information. Mr. Talbot recommended that we proceed to get the data and, depending on the course of events, apprise the U.A.R. Ambassador during his call on the Secretary that we would move ahead on this request. The Secretary agreed that the telegram could go provided the Embassy was in a position to provide the information without approaching U.A.R. officials. The Secretary said that Senator Hickenlooper had come to see him in great agitation over U.S.-U.A.R. relations. He had become somewhat calmer, however, when the Secretary pointed out that we had not proceeded on the $25 million commodity loan, that we had not met U.A.R. requests for additional aid, and that we were coasting along on past commitments. The Secretary said the CAB/FAA report on the Mecom aircraft should be surfaced normally through FAA channels. He thought Mr. Talbot should have a responsible officer carry the preliminary conclusions of the investigation to Mr. Mecom, along with FBI information on the background of the plane's Captain. Mr. Talbot said that Mr. Davies would do so next Tuesday. The Secretary thought it quite clear that Nasser's speech attacking Ambassador Battle and the U.S. had been sparked by the version given him of the discussion between Battle and the Minister of Supply on U.A.R. aid requests./4/ /4/A December 24 memorandum from Talbot to Rusk commenting on Nasser's Port Said speech reported the UAR version of Battle's December 22 meeting with Deputy Prime Minister for Supply Stino. (Ibid.) Battle reported the meeting in telegram 2162 from Cairo, December 23. (Ibid., POL 31-1 UAR-US) Mr. Talbot noted that this information had been imparted as Nasser was about to make what is characteristically the most emotion-laden speech of the year. The Secretary repeated that the Congo rather than the speech represented the core of our problem. He thought it likely that the Sudanese could be brought to cut off transit of arms to the rebels. That would make it easier for the U.A.R. to back away. Mr. Talbot said in briefing the press he planned to emphasize that while we could not have close relations with the U.A.R. given some basic differences, our national interests require reasonably good working relations. The Secretary said he thought that we should point out that it is in our interest that we maintain correct relations as well as a modest presence and influence. Without these we will have no capability of seeking to moderate U.A.R. policy. He thought we should not emphasize our vulnerabilities to U.A.R. pressures since that might give Nasser an exaggerated idea of his capabilities. The Secretary thought it would be useful to let the press know that there are people in the U.A.R. and Arab world who are extremely concerned about relations between the U.S. and U.A.R. 2. Jordan Arms Requests Mr. Talbot raised King Hussein's eagerness to get American supersonics to fill his commitment to the Unified Arab Command. The Pentagon wanted to supply American aircraft, specifically the F-104's. The Department felt that provision of American aircraft to Jordan would bring about the crumbling of our policy of arms restraint, particularly as regards Israel. The Secretary asked if it would not be possible for Jordan to get aircraft from France. Mr. Talbot replied we were pushing this but the French aircraft were twice as expensive as American aircraft. In response to the Secretary's question whether we had filled the Israelis in on this problem, Mr. Talbot said that we were unable to do this until we had our internal lines straightened out. Some Israelis would fear MIG's in Jordan. Some would prefer American to Soviet planes and might be willing to agree not to press for comparable treatment for Israel. Some others, however, would consider provision of U.S. aircraft as opportunity to press for U.S. supply of arms to Israel. We were making efforts to dissuade the Jordanians from the MIG's and might in the end tell them that we could not accept MIG's in Jordan. The Secretary asked whether, in fact, we would go that far. Mr. Talbot said that if the Jordanians accepted Soviet equipment the whole nature of our problem would change, prospects for arms control or restraint would be diminished and, possibly, the situation would then force the change in our relations. The Secretary said that obviously supersonics for Jordan in the Arab-Israel context did not make sense. However, the F5 might provide an acceptable compromise. Mr. Talbot responded that clearly we might have to negotiate on this, and he contemplated going to Amman in late January for this purpose. The Secretary agreed but again said that it was highly preferable that the Jordanians get their aircraft from either the British or the French. 3. NE Chiefs of Mission Conference Mr. Talbot raised the possibility of the Secretary spending one day at a Near East Chief of Mission's Conference while travelling to or from the CENTO Conference. The Secretary said that he would if it could be worked out. His preference for locale was Beirut.
118. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel/1/ Washington, January 1, 1965, 5:57 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 1 ISR-US. Secret. Drafted by Russell; cleared by Davies, Komer, Talbot, Harriman, and Solbert; and approved by Rusk. 558. Embtel 661./2/ In approach parallel to your talk with Prime Minister Eshkol reported reftel, Deputy Prime Minister Eban recalled to Secretary December 5/3/ that during Eshkol visit to Washington/4/ it was agreed would be desirable keep in closer touch and there should be regular exchanges of views on political and military matters about every six months. Subsequently, this understanding extended to nine month periods. Eban stated rapid pace events in Middle East, some of which seriously affected Israel's security led GOI contemplate two types of meetings: 1) general review involving Israel Foreign Minister that would occur with public knowledge, and 2) concurrent informal, military talks that would not become public knowledge. /2/Telegram 661 from Tel Aviv, December 8, reported that Eshkol had raised the matter of Israel-U.S. political talks with Barbour and had proposed a 2 or 3-day high-level meeting in March 1965. (Ibid.) /3/Rusk and Eban met in New York, where both were attending the U.N. General Assembly. Memoranda of their conversation are ibid., Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 2448. /4/See Documents 65-70. Secretary said he would discuss proposal with President and be in touch with Ambassador Harman. FYI: We fully recognize that informal consultations will have to be held now and then with Israel. However, Israel's insistence upon periodic high-level meetings causes us concern. While consistent with Israel objective promote public identification with US, meetings not necessarily in interest either Israel or US. Moreover, there is no "agreement" on holding meetings. Israeli officials including Eshkol proposed them but President did not express specific agreement and consensus US officials was that occasional ad hoc meetings as needed might be desirable. We have noted repeated Israeli efforts parlay consensus into formal agreement. Since Eshkol visit, about ten such meetings have occurred. We also concerned about any proposal for formal, high-level meeting. This sort of publicized consultation was not suggested by anyone here last June, and in fact is contrary to spirit of informal quiet consultations proposed by Israelis themselves. Fanfare would inevitably attend formal, high-level meeting proposed March 1965 and inspire speculation and anticipation of portentous results facts do not warrant. This could well come at a time when US relations with Arabs over UAC and other matters in critical phase. Military meeting would seem unnecessary in view numerous recent discussions between high-level US and Israeli civilian and military officials over past months. Meetings would 1) reduce our ability help improve Israel's position in Near East by moving us one more step toward joint consultations and contingency planning we oppose, 2) give Arabs evidence to support their contention we backing Israel against them, and 3) accomplish nothing that lower-level, informal, political discussion could not better achieve. End FYI. You should inform appropriate high-level GOI officials Department informing Israel Ambassador we believe formal meetings at foreign minister level unwise in general and not really envisaged by Israelis or us last June. If, however, GA still in session next March and Israeli Foreign Minister present, Secretary would of course be glad to meet with her again. As for other political talks we suggest that Talbot visit Israel when he is in area next spring. We also accept in principle that, if we have specific military topics which we agree should be discussed, then another round of quiet military talks could be arranged at an appropriate time after the political discussions envisaged above./5/ /5/Barbour informed Eshkol of the Department's attitude toward the Israeli proposal on January 4, and Talbot spoke along the same lines to Harman on January 12. (Telegram 765 from Tel Aviv, January 5, and telegram 632 to Tel Aviv, January 26; both in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 1 ISR-US) Rusk
119. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State/1/ Tel Aviv, January 4, 1965, 8 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, AE 11-2 ISR. Secret; Priority; Exdis. 762. Subject: Dimona Visit. Ref: Embtel 738./2/ I approached Prime Minister Eshkol this morning making presentation along lines non FYI section Deptel 492/3/ and left with Levavi of Foreign Office, who also present, copy of talking paper which consisted of close paraphrase all points enumerated therein. /2/Dated December 29, 1964. (Ibid.) /3/Document 113. There followed lengthy discussion in which I emphasized that these were minimum requirements to enable visit to accomplish purpose envisaged by President and Prime Minister and that insofar as they are more complex than previous requirements, this added complexity arises from fact reactor has now been operating over twelve months since last observation. Prime Minister expressed concern that specificity these detailed requirements would seem to alter nature of visit to which he and his predecessor had agreed and he apprehensive that in circumstances he might feel necessary to consult Cabinet again, which if at all possible he anxious to avoid. He said it now appears what we desire is "inspection" as distinct from the visit by scientists as guests of Israel. Such inspection would raise familiar issue of prejudice to Israeli sovereignty and there no precedent in relationships between any two countries he could think of justify such procedure. I assured him there no intention our part to alter nature of visit and reiterated that specific requirements solely designed to enable observation by visitors to accomplish purposes originally set forth in line intervening developments since previous visits. While obviously not entirely reassured Prime Minister then said that he would send me his final comments within next day or two. Without discussing other specifics he declined agree to a full two days (nor to my alternative suggestion that might be possible arrange for team to visit on two successive Saturdays) but said he would be prepared for team to begin visit on Friday, the 29th, at noon and extend through Saturday evening, which corresponds to weekend when reactor personnel absent and is in effect almost two days. In conclusion he again stressed visit must be fundamentally on same basis as previous ones, that is team must be invited guests of Israel and not "inspectors." If I succeeded in allaying his apprehensions, at least in part, I anticipate his confirmation will be forthcoming in day or so. Subsequently, Bitan of Foreign Office, who also present, told me in confidence that he does not anticipate great difficulty with most of requirements specifically probably no objection reviewing operating records reactor and fuel. However, Israelis had already feared team might want to bring scientific equipment of various sorts and our request that they be permitted "perform physical inventory and make independent measurements" tended confirm such fears. Israelis, Bitan said, prepared facilitate inventory and independent measurements with own instruments but would undoubtedly object to team bringing own equipment./4/ /4/Telegram 568 to Tel Aviv, January 5, stated that the team was prepared to accept a January 29-30 visit and that it did not matter whether they were called "invited guests" or "inspectors" provided they were given access to all parts of the Dimona site and to all relevant reports. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, AE 11-2 ISR) Barbour [Continue with the next documents] Volume XVIII Index | Foreign Relations Online | Historian's Office | Department of State | Secretary of State |