NOTE: External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views contained therein.
| The State Department web site below is a permanent electronic archive of information released prior to January 20, 2001. Please see www.state.gov for material released since President George W. Bush took office on that date. This site is not updated so external links may no longer function. Contact us with any questions about finding information. NOTE: External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views contained therein. |
 | FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XVIII Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964-67 Department of State |
 National Intelligence Estimate 4-2-64, "Prospects for a Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Over the Next Decade," October 21, 1964, estimated the capabilities and intentions of additional countries to develop and produce nuclear weapons over the next decade and the consequences if they did so. [text not declassified] (Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-R01012A, ODDI Registry of NIE and SNIE Files)
101. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/ Washington, October 23, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. III. Secret/Sensitive. The President has received a very private and informal approach from Prime Minister Eshkol/2/ on delaying our next inspection of the Dimona reactor, for which we are currently pressing. Eshkol recognizes Israel has committed itself to periodic inspection of Dimona, though apparently on an annual rather than semi-annual basis. /2/The message was conveyed in a memorandum of October 19 from Feldman to the President. (Ibid.) However, he has personally appealed for deferring this inspection until after his elections in November 1965. He is concerned about charges that he has opened Israel's reactor to inspection by other powers, and contends that if he is compelled to honor his agreement it will jeopardize his political position. Eshkol further points out that there is no possibility that Dimona could be converted to military purposes in so short a period of time. The President would appreciate your recommendations. However, he would not want to decide so sensitive a matter until after our elections, which gives time for us to investigate the full implications of a delay en route. In the meantime I suggest that we postpone any further diplomatic approaches in Israel. May I also suggest that we ask John McCone for an evaluation of the possible risks in an inspection gap which might be as much as two years. McG. B.
102. Letter From the Ambassador to the United Arab Republic (Battle) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Talbot)/1/ Cairo, October 27, 1964. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 32-1 ISR-SYR. Secret; Limit Distribution; Official-Informal. Copies were sent to Ambassadors Knight, Barnes, Barbour, Meyer, and Strong, and to Davies and Consul General Wilson in Jerusalem. A handwritten note on the letter states that a reply was drafted on November 6. The reply has not been found. Dear Phil: I did not want to let Ridge Knight's letter and memorandum of October 16/2/ go by without some comment. /2/Knight's October 16 memorandum on the subject "Syrian-Israeli Confrontation in the Demilitarized Zones," attached to a letter to Talbot of the same date, argued that Israel was "seeking with unflinching persistence and tenacity to extend its sovereignty to the demilitarized zones" and that the United States was constantly trying to restrain Arab reactions against Israeli actions and was consequently too bogged down in details to do all that it could to restrain Israel. (Ibid.) I think Ridge's basic thesis is right. The United States is apparently a helpless witness to Israel's inexorable drive not only to gain full sovereignty over the demilitarized zones but to "remilitarize" them. Therefore we get bogged down in details--"Black lines," "Brown lines," etc.--and end up assisting the Israelis in a process which is a clear violation of the letter and spirit of the Armistice Agreement and of the UN Charter. What should add to the Syrians' apprehensions re Israel intentions and latent U.S. support for them is the fact that the Israelis in 1955 possessed themselves of the Nitzana demilitarized zone on the Egyptian-Israel armistice line and now operate that region in fee simple with none to protest the presence of Israel armed forces there. We are unable to persuade Israel to return to the Israel-Syrian Mixed Armistice Commission so we get directly involved in the details of General Odd Bull's informal negotiations with the parties. We have been unable to persuade the Israelis to withdraw their unilateral denunciation of the Egyptian-Israel Armistice Agreement so we involve ourselves in the details of financing and administering the United Nations Emergency Force. We are unable to formalize the international community's very real interest in Jerusalem. Under Israeli pressure, we have now removed the designation "Jerusalem, Palestine" from our directories. Maybe this was the right thing to do. Maybe Jerusalem will just disappear. Maybe the next change in the Foreign Service List will be to call Israel-occupied Jerusalem "East Tel Aviv." We are unable to obtain Israel compliance with UN resolutions calling for the repatriation and compensation of the refugees. Therefore we natter at UNRWA to prune its lists and cut expenses and keep reminding the Arab host governments that it is American bounty that keeps the unfortunate refugees alive. The above picture is not very pleasant. It is compounded by the fact that Israel and its friends in the United States have been able to establish widespread credence in an upside-down world where Syria is the trigger happy party in the demilitarized zones, Nasser is dedicated to the destruction of "peace-loving" Israel, and the plight of the Arab refugees is somehow the fault of the Arab host governments. All the above is said neither in sorrow nor in anger. I don't think it is realistic to expect the United States suddenly after sixteen years to gain the capability to reverse any of these situations. To the contrary, I think we should probably take some pride in that despite these handicaps we have not only kept the peace in this area but have also managed to contain Soviet influence and to pump out nearly a billion dollars a year in petroleum revenues. I do, however, go along with Ridge's thought that our preoccupation with trees often obscures the forest. The fact is that Israel's interests (as determined by Israel) do not at all times and in all respects coincide with those of the United States. This is neither abnormal nor wicked. Perhaps we should strengthen our efforts to bring this fact to the attention of Americans. It was Thomas Jefferson, I believe, who in a little document proclaimed on July 4, 1776 said something like this: "Let facts be submitted to a candid world." How do we do this? A number of suggestions come to mind. Perhaps some well-known journalists could be persuaded that there is a story behind some of the aspects of the Palestine problem and UN and other efforts to keep the peace. Rick Smith, the Cairo correspondent of The New York Times, tells us he has been commissioned to write a piece for the Sunday Magazine about the Palestine refugees to be run at about the time the UNRWA debate takes place in New York. We intend to give him every assistance. Perhaps other American correspondents in the area or in Washington would be interested in writing pieces about the demilitarized zones, the operations of UNTSO and the Mixed Armistice Commissions, etc. More importantly, however, it seems to me that it would be useful if some leading American legislators from states where there is little involvement in the Arab-Israel dispute were to take an interest in the Palestine situation and make speeches about the issues and their effect on the totality of U.S. interests in this area. Candidates for this type of exercise who come quickly to mind are Senators Fulbright, Church, and Monroney. The Arab-Israel area has been relatively free over the past few years of clashes and incidents of the magnitude which grab headlines on a continuing basis at home. This is, of course, a good thing as it demonstrates the effectiveness of our policies. At the same time it has meant that the field has been left fairly clear for special pleaders. This, I think, we should try to remedy. Sincerely yours, Luke
103. Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency Washington, October 28, 1964. [Source, Department of State, INR Historical Files, NEA Area Files, Policy Papers, 1964. No classification marking. 1 page of source text not declassified.]
104. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel/1/ Washington, October 30, 1964, 8:23 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 US/McCLOY. Top Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Dickman; cleared by Davies, Harriman, and Komer; and approved by Talbot. 362. Embtel 401./2/ We commend your presentation to Eshkol. We believe our ability to continue quiet, low-key approaches with Nasser not only useful but essential if any tacit restraint in arms field is to occur by both sides. Therefore, we hope PM can be convinced that continued efforts to develop more positive influence in Cairo is in our joint interests. You should stress once again necessity for absolute secrecy with regard our discussions. /2/In telegram 401 from Tel Aviv, October 14, Barbour stated that he would inform Eshkol at first opportunity of McCloy's meeting with Nasser, as instructed in telegram 283 to Tel Aviv, October 12. He also commented on the "fragility" of U.S. progress with Nasser and noted that Eshkol had recently expressed the hope that reports of an economic crisis in the UAR would not lead to an increase of U.S. financial aid to Egypt. (Both ibid.) Telegram 438 from Tel Aviv, October 21, reported that Barbour conveyed the information to Eshkol about McCloy's visit to Nasser. (Ibid.) FYI--We recognize fragility US progress with Nasser on arms issue. It is this very fragility which underlines importance of Israel's cooperation if USG is to further our mutual objectives. Believe dialogue has helped contain a situation which otherwise could be far more disadvantageous for US and Israeli interests. National defense concerns and psychological effect of new weapons just as important in Cairo as in Jerusalem. Our ability to move significantly in this field can only be within context permitting dialogue continue with both sides. Thus it plainly in Israel's interest as well as ours that we develop maximum influence with UAR. Through continued quiet discussion we hope without going into any actual details to make clear to American Zionist leaders that significant progress towards arms restraint and other objectives in Near East is most difficult with Israel's supporters mounting wide-ranging campaign stop all aid to UAR or otherwise discredit our entire Near East policy./3/ So long as we continue give aid to UAR, Nasser has some vested interest in reasonable behavior. Once that aid ceased, net effect would not be to make him more reasonable but to reduce inhibitions on him. Needless to say, would also make him far more dependent on USSR. /3/An October 9 memorandum from Talbot to Harriman reported indications of a concerted campaign by Israel's supporters in the United States against U.S. efforts to maintain positive U.S.-UAR relations. (Ibid., POL ARAB-ISR) We also hope impress on thoughtful Israeli observers relationship of our aid to our being able continue frank discussions with Nasser even on most sensitive issues. Were dialogue to break down with growing Arab uncertainty over Israel's capabilities or our intentions, Nasser might well choose take more dangerous course of action and tie more closely with Soviet or Chicoms. At this very moment, we believe there important review UAR economic policies and hard decisions having be made how allocate existing resources. If Nasser convinced Israel going down dangerous road of sophisticated weapons or feels he being put under intolerable Western pressure likely decide give priority to military weaponry. End FYI. At this stage we consider it essential not to permit either UAR or Israel to develop position of monitoring or controlling this extremely fragile US initiative. We want to be frank with both sides and intend keep both properly informed. We do not want either at this stage to start trying to mastermind our explorations. You should discreetly make foregoing principle clear by saying we cannot provide further substantive details on UAR talks to PM at this time. Nothing we are doing commits either side. At proper time we will provide fuller details. Rusk
105. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic/1/ Washington, November 14, 1964, 4:08 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, AID (US) 9 UAR. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Drafted by Davies and Symmes; cleared by Officer in Charge of Near Eastern Economic Affairs George M. Bennsky, Jones, and AID Deputy Assistant Administrator for Near East and South Asia Walter G. Farr, Jr.; and approved by Talbot. 2794. For Ambassador from Talbot. Embtel 1637./2/ Appreciate fully your concern that presenting Egyptians with alternatives to commodity loan might be regarded as attempt to renege on an agreement whose requirements they feel have been met. Agreeing with Embassy position that continued inaction in field of economic cooperation could bring an end to our policy of seeking to broaden areas of common interest with the UAR and recognizing practical difficulty if not impossibility moving forward on commodity loan, we have sought to provide another basis for moving ahead. The State/AID proposals carried by Macomber supplemented by Aidto 198/3/ we believe can be presented as an economically useful token of US intent to carry forward on current policies. /2/Telegram 1637 from Cairo, November 11, conveyed Battle's disappointment with the apparent unwillingness in Washington to proceed with a $20 million commodity loan to the UAR. He concluded: "New administration must give early sign of continuation cooperative effort or a new policy will exist here whether we intend it or not." (Ibid.) /3/Not found. Commodity loan is hamstrung by our inability to demonstrate to Congressional and other inquirers' complete satisfaction second requirement or evidence that U.S. aid does not in fact pay part of foreign exchange costs of a UAR "occupation" of Yemen. We can hardly claim progress on third condition, given presence over 50,000 Egyptian troops in Yemen (latest intelligence community estimate) as against less than 30,000 when Yemen costs discussed with Kaissouni in October, 1963. While UAR-Saudi detente on Yemen hopeful, know from our experiences through 1963 the danger of claiming "major progress" on UAR performance until actual and substantial drawdown takes place. If the UAR should opt for the $20 million program loan, they must understand that we cannot proceed until Egyptian performance permits us to defend the loan against domestic criticism. This being the case, we propose moving forward by offering an alternative which we believe could be presented to Egyptians as more advantageous and more immediately available. We note that, since our agreement in principle supply $20 million to help meet chronic foreign currency shortage, Kuwaiti loan of over $90 million has been received. Any current balance of payments strains for which UARG had earmarked commodity loan can be covered to some extent by at least part of increases in the FY 65 Title I program requested by UARG over that remaining in the present multiyear agreement. The sector loan-project loan package added to this should serve as adequate symbol of US intent to restore aid momentum. Neither we nor the Egyptians should labor under illusion that program (i.e., commodity) or project loan for FY 65 is major benchmark passing of which will ensure smoothing of course of future assistance. PL 480 agreement which is core of our economic cooperation program remains to be negotiated for years subsequent to '65. Our flexibility in this and working toward a future Western approach to counter Soviet influence will to a large degree be dependent on Egyptian action in meeting its commitments under present PL 480 agreement, in managing its economy, and on Egypt's political posture in the area and on the world scene. We are gratified by recent reports that Nasser and his key lieutenants are giving UAR economic problems their personal attention. Strong argument can be made we should not come between them and their decision to face and reappraise unpleasant economic realities. They know from qualified foreign economists what needs to be done. Their willingness take bitter medicine necessarily will be one of principal determining factors in future US-UAR economic cooperation. Rusk
106. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts/1/ Washington, November 17, 1964. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, REF 3 UNRWA. Confidential. Drafted by Campbell; cleared by Stackhouse, Jernegan, William B. Buffum, Louise McNutt of FE/RA, George N. Monsma of ARA/IPA, and in substance by Ross E. Freeman of EUR and Joseph J. Wagner of AF/AFI; and approved by Sisco. Sent to 37 Embassies and pouched to 61 Embassies and USUN. 954. We do not expect to undertake any major initiative on Palestine refugee problem for time being, and hope to steer UNRWA item through GA with no change for worse in basic elements of overall Arab-Israel conflict over refugees. We intend maintain to maximum degree "even-handed" position which will resist all proposals designed to tip balance in favor of one side or other. This policy should give us maximum leverage to obtain our objectives, and produce middle-of-road res acceptable to all. With UNRWA up for extension this year, we have increased capability for keeping problem within tolerable limits. Some new elements have entered picture. Cairo non-aligned conf declaration included statement endorsing "rights of Palestinians to homeland" and Arab League has endorsed new and stronger refugee organization called "Palestine Liberation Organization." We do not know that either of these factors will have any strong influence at UNGA, but we must be ready in event Arabs decide to press forward for additional UN backing for refugee cause in Palestine. On other hand, in keeping with even-handed position, we must be alert for Israeli efforts to ram through partisan resolution. As usual both sides are expected to open early campaign at UN and in capitals throughout world to gain adherents in this annual contest. Palestine Liberation Organization is making plans to send special missions to various govts to seek support for Arab objectives; Israelis are planning counter offensive. Many governments will look to US for lead. In your discussions this subject, you may be guided by following: 1. USG favors even-handed res along lines last year's. It would extend UNRWA for perhaps two years. Exact length of time to be left open for time being. 2. We continue oppose Arab proposals for UN custodian for Arab properties in Israel. We will also strongly oppose any Arab attempt gain GA endorsement of non-aligned conf declaration on Palestinian rights, or to win GA recognition of Palestine Liberation Organization as official representatives of Arab refugees. This connection, if govt to which you accredited asks US attitude toward any special missions by PLO, you should state USG does not recognize it as official reps of refugees at UNGA, and we would be concerned at any effort by PLO to convert UNRWA item (essentially a humanitarian issue) into political problem (Arabs' anti-Israel objectives). If PLO missions ask to see Emboffs we prefer Embassies decline. We do not, however, believe PLO missions likely be very effective. (We have informed Israeli officials we will brief our Embassies on USG substantive position on PLO and authorize them to give our position clearly and forthrightly to any government which asked our judgment on this matter. We declined however to take initiative since any approach by USG could raise allegations of "imperialist" pressure and befog substantive issue in manner which might help PLO. We also said we could not tell other govts how they should receive foreign visitors.)/2/ /2/Harman raised this with Talbot in a meeting on November 12, summarized in circular telegram 905 to Tel Aviv, November 12. (Ibid., POL ARAB-ISR) 3. Similarly, we continue oppose Israeli partisan res for direct negotiations, and regard as unrealistic Israelis' objective of eroding at this time traditional UN affirmation of refugees' right to repatriation or compensation (Para 11 of res 194 of 1948). Embs should report any developments this question./3/ /3/The General Assembly did not discuss issues relating to UNRWA at its 19th session. On February 10, 1965, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 2002 (XIX), in which it extended the mandate of UNRWA for one year, to June 30, 1966, "without prejudice to existing resolutions or to the positions of the interested parties." Rusk
107. Telegram From the Department of State to the Consulate General in Dhahran/1/ Washington, November 20, 1964, 5:11 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, FT 11-2 ISR-ARAB. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Charles W. McCaskill of NE/E, cleared in draft by Officer in Charge of Arabian Peninsula Affairs George C. Moore, and approved by Davies. 105. Chase Manhattan. Since ConGen will be responsible for reporting on forthcoming Bahrain Boycott Conference, and to ensure you informed, following background information transmitted: Arab Central Boycott Office Damascus announced July 9 blacklisting Chase Manhattan for "violation principles of boycott and for being agent Israeli bonds." Bank given six months to liquidate affairs in Arab countries. Department's assistance sought and matter has been receiving continuing attention in highest levels Department to ensure boycott recommendation rescinded in Bahrain Conference. Various Arab ambassadors called in and informed we view matter with great concern and fear consequences in Congress and elsewhere should boycott not be rescinded. Our own ambassadors in Arab countries have made representations to governments to which they accredited taking same line. Bank has only acted as fiscal agent for Israeli bonds held by investors in U.S., authenticating bonds and, together with other banks, disbursing principal and interest. Concerning Arab charges Chase extended loan to El Al, Chase discounted commercial paper arising out of sale of Boeing jets under Exim guaranties. Chase has endeavored satisfy Arab countries by furnishing affidavits and letters to individual Arab countries and by personal contacts. Chase received no formal notification from Boycott Office and has no communication with Central Boycott Office or boycott offices of any Arab country. Most Arab countries appear oppose implementation boycott but unable take lead for variety reasons. We recognize lead must come from Cairo and have made representations to UARG. Prime Minister Ali Sabri informed Ambassador Battle November 17/2/ UAR will "do all it could." In response specific question, PM indicated UARG willing assume leadership in December meeting. Meeting was friendly and Ambassador felt every evidence help forthcoming. However, we still fearful matter may become bogged down in boycott bureaucracy and will continue efforts ensure favorable action in Bahrain. /2/Battle reported his discussion of the Chase boycott problem with Ali Sabri in telegram 1744 from Cairo, November 18. (Ibid.) We approaching British Mission Washington for suggestions help HMG might render Dhahran and Bahrain. Report of this will follow. In continuing effort ensure Congen kept informed, other Arab posts being requested repeat messages concerning Chase your office./3/ /3/A memorandum from Read to McGeorge Bundy, January 8, 1965, states that the boycott threat to the Chase Manhattan Bank had been withdrawn. Ambassador Kamal informed the Department on January 4 that he had received a cable stating that the Chase boycott had been officially suspended for 6 months but that in fact the case was closed. (Ibid.) Ball
108. National Security Action Memorandum No. 319/1/ Washington, November 20, 1964. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, NSAM Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 319. Secret. MEMORANDUM FOR SUBJECT Given the Congressional and other criticism of aid to the UAR, I think it would be desirable to let the President review our policy on this matter before any new decisions are taken. I don't mean to suggest that he is dissatisfied with existing policy, but merely that he should be fully apprised of the case for any new aid measures, particularly since they entail potential domestic reactions. So I suggest that you provide him in due course with your recommendations on proposed FY 1965-66 US aid, including PL 480, together with an analysis of what we expect to gain from such aid and what leverage it provides us. It might also be useful to discuss what other alternatives are open to us. Mid-December would be a good target date. McGeorge Bundy
109. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel/1/ Washington, November 25, 1964, 7:40 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, AE 11-2 ISR. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. The text was received from the White House; cleared by McGeorge Bundy, Talbot, and Davies; and approved by Harriman. 441. For Ambassador. Following instruction supersedes Deptel 434./2/ /2/Telegram 434 was similar in substance to telegram 441, except that points 1-4, which Barbour was to convey to Eshkol, were framed as an oral message from Johnson to Eshkol. (Ibid.) A November 18 memorandum from Komer to the President, enclosing a November 5 memorandum from Harriman to Bundy and a draft of telegram 434, is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. III. In response to PM Eshkol's informal plea to President on Dimona,/3/ you should make following points to Eshkol privately, indicating that you are speaking on Presidential authority: /3/See footnote 2, Document 101. 1. President appreciates the frankness of Eshkol's informal message outlining the problems posed for him by the timing of our next visit to the Dimona reactor. We can of course understand the ever present difficulty of reconciling conflicting domestic and foreign interests. 2. Nevertheless, President does feel bound to urge the importance of the semi-annual visits on which we have previously agreed. We are engaged in a continuing effort to prevent proliferation of sophisticated weapons, not least in the Near East. We believe Eshkol fully agrees that this effort is in the interests of Israel. A vital element in its success is our ability to assure all parties that none of them has attained or is seeking a nuclear capability, and to give this assurance we must be able to satisfy ourselves on this score. 3. The problem is made more acute by the recent explosion of a nuclear device by Communist China. It has alarmed many countries and made some of them--such as India--think again whether they should not attempt nuclear programs of their own. This is likely to focus Arab suspicion even more upon Israel. 4. Our interest in the security of Israel remains unchanged, but the grave responsibility which this puts upon us convinces us that we must leave no stone unturned in our efforts to maintain peace. President hopes, therefore, that Eshkol will see his way clear to arrange for a visit by our people to Dimona in late November or early December. FYI we regard early inspection of Dimona as imperative. End FYI. 5. In return, President has authorized following measures which we hope will ease Eshkol's problem: a. We willing consider waiving Israel commitment to another six-monthly inspection until after November 1965 elections, contingent upon satisfactory findings next inspection and without prejudice to resumption schedule of six-monthly visits thereafter. b. We also willing postpone passing results inspection to Nasser until after November 1965, unless situation in Near East such that US and Israeli interests better served by informing him. We would, of course, consult GOI before such step. However, you should emphasize that the agreement on semi-annual visits to Dimona is particularly important to our efforts with Nasser, because he knows, as does the rest of the world, that Israel is probably the only country in the Near East which has the scientific capability to produce nuclear weapons and also has a facility in being which could be converted to such production. If we were unable to reassure Nasser periodically, for example, he might well be driven to greater dependence on the Soviet Union and even to irrational military action against Israel. He would, of course, be more resistant to our urgings that he limit his own arms development, particularly in the middle field. 6. If Eshkol avers that his problem is with "hard liners" in Cabinet, you can point out our difficulty in understanding this argument, since BG personally agreed to periodic inspections in May 1963, presumably with concurrence of Cabinet. Rusk [Continue with the next documents] Volume XVIII Index | Foreign Relations Online | Historian's Office | Department of State | Secretary of State |