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 | FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XVIII Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964-67 Department of State |
 90. Letter From President Johnson to President Nasser/1/ Washington, August 13, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, United Arab Republic, Nasser Correspondence, Vol. I. No classification marking. Drafted by the President, the Department of State, and Komer. The text was transmitted to Cairo in telegram 914, August 17, which stated that the Embassy should not deliver it pending instructions. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 15-1 US/JOHNSON) Dear Mr. President: I was most grateful for your letter of July 26, 1964,/2/ which Ambassador Kamel delivered to me personally. I place high value on our correspondence and anticipate that it will continue to yield useful results in the future. /2/See Document 86. It is most gratifying to have your personal assurance that the United Arab Republic does not intend to devote its efforts or resources to acquiring weapons of total destruction. Your interest in advancing the well-being of your people and the peace of the world is attested by your statement that the United Arab Republic has no thought of introducing the danger of nuclear conflict into the region of which it is a part. I believe this expression of your views constitutes another significant step in the continuing quest for means of curtailing the nuclear arms race and ensuring the peaceful use of nuclear energy. I am also encouraged by your statements to Assistant Secretary Talbot and Ambassador Badeau that you are continuing to give thought to the value of international safeguards in looking ahead to the time when the United Arab Republic may build a nuclear power reactor. Again, let me thank you for your assurances. They give me increased hope that mankind is turning away from the ever-spiraling arms race and toward ever greater reliance on peaceful solutions. Sincerely, LBJ/3/ /3/Printed from a copy that bears these initials, not in the President's handwriting.
91. Special National Intelligence Estimate/1/ SNIE 36.3-64 Washington, August 13, 1964. /1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-R01012A, ODDI Registry of NIE and SNIE Files. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. According to a note on the cover sheet, the estimate was submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence, and concurred in by the U.S. Intelligence Board on August 13. The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, and NSA participated in its preparation. The State, Defense, and NSA representatives concurred; the AEC and FBI representatives abstained, the subject being outside their jurisdictions. Paragraph references are to the Discussion portion of the estimate, not printed here. IMPLICATIONS OF CERTAIN US MILITARY AID TO JORDAN The Problem Jordan has requested that the US sell it some $70-100 million worth of arms. This estimate assesses the consequences and implications of (a) an outright rejection of this request, (b) full compliance with it, and (c) partial compliance. It also examines briefly three related matters: the prospects for the Arab plan for diversion of the Jordan headwaters, the viability of the United Arab Command (UAC), and the anticipated Israeli reactions to this diversion and to the buildup of Arab forces under the UAC. Conclusions A. Rejection of Hussain's request would cause him to turn to the Egyptians or the Soviets for arms. Although Hussain probably believes that he could take Soviet arms and still get some US economic aid, he would be concerned that US military assistance and budgetary support could well be cut off. If the Egyptians succeeded in sending training missions to Jordan with such materiel, Nasser's influence in Jordan would be increased and Arab-Israeli tensions would be seriously heightened. (Paras. 7-9) B. US sale of all or most of the requested equipment, while it would lessen Arab resentments concerning alleged US favoritism toward Israel, would impair US ability to check the escalation of the Arab-Israeli arms race. Though Israel would find a large, US-equipped Jordanian army a lesser evil than one equipped with Soviet weapons and under strong Egyptian influence, the Israelis would renew and increase their pressures on the US for more weapons. Any large arms acquisition and expansion of the Jordanian forces would put serious strains on Jordan's economy, since the UAC is unlikely to foot the entire bill. (Paras. 10-12) C. Partial compliance through a US package, of a size governed by UAC willingness to pay, which included some supersonic aircraft and some tanks would probably suffice to prevent the Jordanians from shopping elsewhere and from admitting UAR or Soviet training missions. Hussain would be able at the second round of the Arab Summit Conference to claim that Jordan was doing its share in the buildup against Israel. [2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] Nevertheless, partial compliance would have, though to a lesser degree, some of the unfortunate consequences of full compliance. (Paras. 13-15) D. Arab plans to deny portions of the Jordan waters to Israel, even if only partially implemented, would heighten tensions. Israel has said that it would regard diversion by the Arabs of more water than was allotted them under the 1955 proposals as grounds for war. We believe that they would carry out this threat, and that the Arabs, believing it too, are unlikely to test the Israelis until they feel confident that they have become strong enough to provide an effective defense against Israeli attack. (Paras. 17-18) E. The UAC goes further than previous efforts to unify Arab military forces, and for the first time money is available to improve the common military effort. The Arabs estimate that it would take 24 months to create the military capability to repel an Israeli attack, but we believe that it would require three or four years at a minimum. It is too early to say whether the UAC will survive for more than a year or two the strains inherent in the Arab situation. (Paras. 19-22) [Here follows the Discussion portion of the estimate.]
92. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan/1/ Washington, August 20, 1964, 9:43 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 4 ARAB. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Killgore and Symmes; cleared by Stoddart, Bunte, Director for Operations in G/PM Howard Meyers, Newsom, and Komer; and approved by Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs James P. Grant. Repeated to Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Jidda, Khartoum, Kuwait, Taiz, Algiers, Rabat, Tripoli, Tunis, London, and CINCMEAFSA/CINCSTRIKE for Ramsey. 333. Although recognizing desirability first determining if any change in Hussein's attitude, Department does not wish delay much longer approach to Nasser on UAC and Jordan arms problem. In addition, we plan approaches to other Arab leaders counseling moderation at Summit Two and restraint on military buildup by UAC./2/ Accordingly hope you can obtain audience with Hussein immediately following his return. /2/Instructions to this effect were sent in circular telegram 332 to Khartoum, Beida, Tripoli, Tunis, and Rabat; telegram 103 to Jidda; and telegram 36 to Kuwait, all dated August 20. (All ibid.) Request you elicit whatever he willing tell you about his talks with Nasser. Specifically you should inquire if after further reflection he is still intent on forcing supersonic issue prior September 5. If he maintains position reported Embtel 94/3/ you should then make presentation along following lines: /3/Telegram 94 from Amman, August 14, reported that on August 13 Barnes had sent King Hussein the resume of the U.S. position as instructed in telegram 86 to Amman (Document 88), and that in a discussion of the U.S. package later that day, the King stated that the package was constructive, except that it ruled out the supersonic squadron that he considered essential to his position vis-a-vis other Arab leaders. Barnes concluded that without F104s, the King would accept a MIG squadron. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 12-5 JORDAN) As result King's message to President/4/ USG willing to take another look at supersonic problem, but only if we are given sufficient time to do so. US refuses to be forced into hasty decision on matter with such obviously far-reaching implications for US interests in area and for very viability and integrity of Jordan. We feel that all-out US support of Jordan over the years and close US/Jordan relationship entitles us to ask for enough time to take another look. Moreover, this would be way of wisdom for Hussein as well as US. /4/An August 15 message from the King to President Johnson, transmitted in telegram 99 from Amman, August 15, argued the case for a squadron of supersonic fighter aircraft. (Ibid., DEF 12-5 JORDAN) Therefore if Hussein willing to hold up a few months longer at most, US prepared to (1) send survey team shortly to review whole RJAF modernization problem, in light probable infrastructure and supporting costs; (2) based on this report USG prepared review whether supersonic jets can be made available, either as replacements or additional squadron. We would consider any and all types US or other Western aircraft although it must be made clear that no commitment of any kind involved; (3) we would promise to let Jordan know our decision as soon as possible, in any case before end of year; (4) we also ready discuss with Jordan advanced flight training limited number pilots. This program could start October. We well aware Summit Two conference will be held in heady atmosphere of new spirit of Arab solidarity and that King must not (and does not wish to) appear out of step with that spirit. Nevertheless, we believe we have been forthcoming in our response to King and that in addition he has good argumentation to support delay if he willing use it. We also believe there are other Arab leaders who can understand his position and who will be on side moderation and wisdom. Important point is that King will be able show he has acted on UAC plans and proposals and that we have been forthcoming. He can stress that based on available UAC funds he was able to obtain generous USG offer of equipment for Jordan ground forces and assurances of US willingness discuss further sales when UAC finances clearer. He can say that USG has undertaken begin immediate survey air needs of Jordan including problem of infrastructure and supporting costs. If King pressed by UAC or Summit leaders for details on type and nationality of plane, he should say that much depends on results of survey and on kinds of UAC fund guarantees he able obtain from Summit for both materiel items and maintenance support. (FYI. If queried by him you may say that US air survey would consider all types US and other Western aircraft. End FYI.) Hussein can also say that USG in conjunction with comprehensive survey of RJAF is prepared to initiate advanced flight training in October for limited number of pilots. We believe King should be prepared say to other Arab leaders that although he would have liked fuller and more final answers from US he is encouraged by forthcomingness of US response. We think he could also add that, as Summit leaders aware, he depends on US and other Western sources for nearly one-half Jordan budget. It therefore understandable USG, which has borne heavy burden support economic development and budget of Jordan for almost decade, would wish examine carefully new pattern of expenditures with widespread implications for Jordan economy. He could say regretfully that this fact of life and that he could not blame USG for wishing consider carefully what it should do. Finally we see no reason why King could not also say on basis longstanding and fruitful relationship that he is confident fuller and more definite US responses will be forthcoming in due course. King could then take initiative with other Arab leaders to say he would be greatly helped if better guarantees of funds from UAC could be assured. If necessary, he could say he recognized Soviet equipment might be easier obtain without requiring funds in hand. Nevertheless, problem not simply arms and could not be considered in vacuum. He had his whole economy to consider and very viability of Jordan. You should then tell King that USG convinced that King and other Arabs mistaken in believing, as they apparently do, that planned UAC arms buildup can quickly alter Arab-Israeli arms balance. Rather than improving Arab military stance relative to Israel, present UAC pressures will stimulate intensified arms race of self-defeating nature. Not only would Israel be likely continue obtain hardware it needs, but risks of preemptive actions would rise particularly if MIGs introduced into Jordan. Moreover, effects of arms buildup on Arab economics, particularly that of Jordan, could leave them weaker rather than stronger relative to Israel. Finally, acquisition by Jordan now of supersonic squadron bound to increase Israeli pressures for additional arms from UK, France, and especially US, particularly if issue should be forced during US national election period. Results could be contrary to Arab interests, preventing US from continuing its present restrained arms policy, and ultimately leading to polarization with US selling to Israel and Soviets selling to Arabs. This is neither in Arab interest nor ours. We therefore once more urge King not to force supersonics issue at this time, not to take final decisions at Summit Two, and to use the argumentation mentioned in order to show that as Arab leader he is responding to UAC spirit but in wise and statesmanlike manner. Rusk
93. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan/1/ Washington, August 23, 1964, 6:21 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 12-5 JORDAN. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Killgore, cleared by Symmes, and approved by Grant. Repeated to London, Beirut, Damascus, Rabat, Tel Aviv, Tunis, Khartoum, Baghdad, Tripoli, Jidda, Kuwait, and Cairo. 352. Amman's 114 to Dept./2/ Department commends your presentation to King Hussein of USG position on supersonic fighter squadron for Jordan. We relieved that King feels he will have sufficient argumentation at Summit II to delay decision on supersonics. /2/Telegram 114 from Amman, August 23, reported a meeting the previous evening between Barnes and the King. (Ibid.) We concur in your recommendation that approaches to other UAC-member governments on arms problem concentrate on general dangers inherent in arms build-up, rather than on problem of Jordan. Amended instructions being sent separately./3/ /3/Instructions were sent in circular telegram 356 to Khartoum, Tripoli, Tunis, and Rabat and telegram 108 to Jidda, August 24 (ibid.), and telegram 39 to Kuwait, August 24 (ibid., DEF 4 ARAB). From Hussein's response to your presentation, appears he may have mistakenly believed you were conveying President Johnson's reply to his message of August 15. If this is case, would appreciate your recommendation whether further reply to King's message is necessary./4/ /4/Barnes replied in telegram 120 from Amman, August 24, that he thought the King had interpreted his remarks as the President's reply and that he did not expect any further reply. (Ibid.) Separate message forthcoming on timing and terms of reference air survey team. In continuing US/UK conversations in Washington on Jordan arms problem it has come to be accepted that British would participate. If you anticipate GOJ resistance to UK participation, would appreciate your recommendations how best make proposal. In our view, we cannot avoid making proposal. Rusk
94. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic/1/ Washington, August 24, 1964, 8:20 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 12 JORDAN. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Symmes, cleared in draft by Killgore and Curtis F. Jones, and approved by Grant. Repeated to Amman, London, and CINCMEAFSA/CINCSTRIKE for Ramsey, and pouched to Moscow, Algiers, Rabat, Tunis, Tripoli, Beirut, Taiz, Kuwait, Khartuom, Jidda, Baghdad, Damascus, and Tel Aviv. 1063. Deptels 995 and 895,/2/ Amman's 114 rptd Cairo 44./3/ Developments reported Amman's 114 to Department obviously require changes in rationale approach to UARG outlined in reftels. /2/Telegram 895 to Cairo, August 15, instructed the Embassy to convey to Nasser the U.S. view that it was essential to maintain the political balance in the Near East, the U.S. concern that the United Arab Command "by forcing on HKJ a disproportionate arms program of unprecedented character" might introduce into the situation new elements "with dangerous and unpredictable implications for all governments concerned," and the U.S. hope that the Second Arab Summit would not foreclose U.S. efforts "to preserve area calm and US-Arab cooperation." Telegram 995 to Cairo, August 20, reiterated the instructions in telegram 895 with one revision but instructed the Embassy to wait until the Embassy in Amman could assess Hussein's attitude following his visit to Cairo. (Both ibid.) /3/See footnote 2, Document 93. You should convey following to Nasser via Sami Sharaf/4/ or other suitable channel: /4/Director for Information for the UAR President's Cabinet. 1. Despite formidable obstacles there has been created in Near East a delicate political balance that reduces threat of governmental instability or provocative initiatives and permits states therein to move ahead on urgent business of economic development and social reform. 2. USG feels this balance has been reinforced by: a) Its impartial commitment to prevent aggression by any state in the area; b) Constructive relationship built up in recent years between US and UAR, a notable product of which was understanding so far as possible to freeze Palestine issue. 3. Prior convocation Second Arab Summit we wish express USG concerns that developments flowing from first Arab Summit meeting could affect profoundly balance of political and military forces in Near East if they should continue along present course. 4. At January Summit meeting, Arab leaders under leadership UAR had wisely decided against war and had made statesmanlike announcements to that effect. Nevertheless some measures decided on in January have developed in such manner as to appear to be leading to greater risk of war and instability in Near East. This seems true particularly with regard to Unified Arab Command. 5. Aside from UAC developments we have also noted various statements about diversion of Jordan waters, excitation of Palestinians through Palestine Entity, and other measures such as proposed Jerusalem radio project. Statements about war with Israel by Arab military spokesmen have been more bellicose since Summit. In addition, in recent days there seems danger in raising expectations of Palestine refugees by making unrealistic demands on UNRWA for increased expenditures at time when no further funds forthcoming, costs are rising, and UNRWA budget coming up for discussion at UNGA. USG, which has borne burden of refugee support over years, especially concerned that funds that might be used to support refugees and promote economic development of Arab countries are instead being diverted to acquisition extensive new armaments under aegis UAC. 6. USG has recently discussed with Jordan extensive UAC-sponsored military procurement requests that in our judgment are inconsistent with freeze on Palestine problem, would involve self-defeating drain on funds badly needed for Arab economic development, and could upset Near East political and military balance. 7. We have informed HKJ we wish to comply with request insofar as our arms policies and economic realities permit. We cannot, however, go so far as to upset stability we have done so much to establish. 8. Jordanians have suggested they might have to turn to Soviets if US sales not possible. Jordanian purchase of Bloc weapons would make if difficult if not impossible to convince US electorate of necessity to continue Jordanian "budgetary and other assistance at present level. Pressures to provide compensatory assistance to Israel might also be irresistible. We would see pressures on Jordan to arm too much too fast as upsetting prevailing pattern of military strength and political alignments in Near East. 9. We wish to emphasize that the closer the Arabs and Israel come to hostilities, the more remote becomes the prospect of a just solution. We have been gratified by UAR leaders' recognition that Arab-Israel dispute is insoluble by force of arms. While we look confidently to the UARG to take the lead in dissuading Arab states from aggressive action, we are also deeply concerned that measures taken solely in the name of self-defense not be so precipitate or so extensive as to increase the risk of hostilities or result in a major acceleration of Near East arms race. 10. In our efforts to meet Jordanian requests, we have stretched our arms policy to limit. We believe expansion of Jordanian military establishment should be carefully phased over period of several years. We do not want to be forced into hasty decisions on matters with far-reaching implications for US interests in area and for very viability and integrity of Jordan. We hope UAR can understand that USG, which has borne heavy burden support economic development and budget of Jordan for almost decade, would wish examine carefully new pattern of expenditures with widespread implications for Jordan economy. 11. To sum up, USG hopes Second Arab Summit will not foreclose our efforts to preserve area calm and US-Arab cooperation. We are especially concerned lest UAC, by forcing disproportionate arms program of unprecedented character, might introduce into tense Near Eastern situation irrevocable new elements with dangerous and unpredictable implications for all governments concerned to say nothing of starting accelerated arms race in Near East. USG counts on UARG, as leader of Arab opinion, to guide proceedings of Second Arab Summit in statesmanlike and constructive paths. Rusk
95. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, September 23, 1964, 4 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 12-5 ISR. Secret; Exdis; Tan. Drafted by Russell on September 28 and approved in S on October 8. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS His Excellency, Avraham Harman, Ambassador of Israel The Secretary Ambassador Harman summarized developments with respect to Israel's acquisition of tanks: Prime Minister Eshkol had asked for the direct supply of M-48A3 and M-60 tanks and had been told we would consider it. Then the transaction through Germany had come up. Israel had needed 300 tanks quickly. The Germans had 232. Israel proposed to take up the slack with Centurions, which it regarded as inferior. By mid-June the German transaction was well underway. The first shock had come in July; Germany offered only 150 tanks that it proposed to send to Italy. Next, Mr. Sloan had said that the Israeli request for 80 trainees could not be approved on grounds of security and that only if there were no other possibility for training could a small number be considered. Israel had revised its request downward and hoped that it might receive sympathetic consideration. In a letter dated October [September?] 18,/2/ Mr. Solbert had stated there was no possibility of supplying conversion kits and ammunition at excess prices. He had doubts about the wisdom of direct supply of these items to Israel. He indicated the need for a lead time of at least three months in procuring conversion kits. These factors jeopardized the feasibility of the whole project. Delays in procurement meant Israel would not be able to obtain the first tanks until 1966 and the last until 1968. /2/Not found. Prime Minister Eshkol was deeply concerned and had proposed the following solution to keep the transaction from foundering: 1. Training: Israel had asked DOD for 26 training slots. This was the limit even of Israel's capability of improvisation. Training courses normally last 12-14 weeks. Israel suggested two successive phases of 13 men each, scattered in three or four different courses. No single course was limited to the M-48A3 specifically, so pinpointing would be difficult. There was already an Israeli Lieutenant Colonel in training at Fort Knox, so that the arrival of additional Israeli trainees would create no new precedent. Moreover, Israel was fully cognizant of the need for secrecy and committed to it. 2. Delivery Schedule: The amount of lead time required by DOD threatened to disrupt Israel's proposed schedule for conversion of tanks. Israel had suggested delivery of 50 conversion kits by March 1965, 50 more in September 1965 and the last 50 in March of 1966. This would permit delivery of the last tanks to Israel by the end of 1967. Only this or a similar schedule would assure timely deliveries. 3. Acquisition of Conversion Kits, Spare Parts, and Ammunition: When Deputy Defense Minister Peres was in Washington, he had indicated the need to do some work on the tanks in Italy, but the general idea was direct delivery to Israel. Cost would determine the proportion of conversion work to be performed in Italy and Israel. Direct delivery was indispensable to the success of the transaction because a) negotiations with the Italians did not cover purchasing or procurement, only work on the tanks; and b) direct delivery required that only three people in Italy be aware of the transaction, while, if Italy were to engage in procurement, knowledge of the transaction would spread to many others, including members of the Italian Embassy in Washington. The U.S. had already shipped 500 tank engines (for Sherman M-4's) as well as a number of tank guns directly to Israel. These transactions had remained secret. To refuse direct delivery of conversion kits, spare parts and ammunition would be a retrogression. 4. Financial Arrangements: The cost of tanks would be high, amounting to $30,000 per unit plus large conversion expenses. Israel hoped to cushion the impact of these large expenditures by a) obtaining a mark-down on equipment purchases through classification as excess, b) indirect aid through increases in development loans and PL-480 sales, and c) agreement to provide conversion kits, spare parts and ammunition as non-reimbursable aid. On the basis of quoted prices, Israel estimated that conversion kits and spare parts would amount to $14 million; and ammunition for 300 tanks to about $14.75 million. Since Israel was already listed as a recipient of MAP aid, it would make little political difference whether this aid were in grants or loans. Israel would be unable to handle the tank transaction without such assistance. Despite Israel's apparent prosperity, it had severe economic problems. Israel's foreign debt amounted to about $1 billion, as against foreign exchange reserves of $430 million. Israel hoped last year's level of development loans and PL-480 might be maintained, with increases in development loans to cushion foreign tank purchases. The cost of the whole transaction could be spread over three fiscal years. The Secretary replied: 1. DOD hoped to provide an answer to Israel's request for training shortly.2. Delivery of conversion kits by March might be possible but at higher cost. Since the equipment must be manufactured, we could not provide surplus pricing. The need to work overtime to meet Israel's proposed delivery would increase costs. We would try to meet this deadline if Israel considered it important. Meanwhile, we would undertake to obtain firm cost figures. 3. Regarding the manner of delivery and its relation to problems of security and use of a cut-out, further talks with DOD would be desirable. We did not know whether this would involve Munitions Control. There seemed some likelihood that MC licenses might be open to public inspection. 4. Did we have information on Israel's external defense purchases? A program of Israel's defense buying would be helpful. 5. We were considering the determination of the level of development loans, PL-480, and related matters. We hoped to have an answer soon, though certain problems continue to concern us. Ambassador Harman said he had not supplied material on Israel's defense purchases, but could do so. He wished to convey the Prime Minister's feeling of urgency about the supply of tanks and his worry that it was not moving rapidly. The Prime Minister had said everyone agreed that Israel needed tanks but it seemed impossible to obtain concrete results. Meanwhile, 46 tanks had been sent to Jordan. The need to arm in the wake of belligerent statements at the Second Arab Summit Conference increased the economic burden on Israel. The Prime Minister was desperately looking for some way to freeze arms escalation in the Near East and turn the tide of arms acquisition. He hoped there might be some possibility of broaching the subject with the Soviet Union. Also he had heard in the U.S. of a possible approach to Nasser. Jordan needed no additional arms; Hussein was merely responding to pressure from the UAC. Additional acquisition of arms by Jordan would force Israel to recalculate its arms needs. Finance Minister Saphir had given Mr. Bell a five-year forecast on economic development in Israel. This assumed no absolute increase in arms in the area, which, of course, was not a valid assumption. Ambassador Harman confirmed that acquisition of new tanks by Israel resulted in removal of old tanks from inventory. The first "bite" of 300 replacement tanks would mean the removal of 300 unreconstructed Shermans from Israel's armed forces. Ambassador Harman confirmed that Israel had ordered 250 tanks from the U.K.; 150 by the end of 1966 and the remaining 100 by the end of 1967. Israel was not pleased with Centurions, however, and had hoped to obtain M-60's as the "second bite." Ambassador Harman suggested that, if desirable, one of Israel's Deputy Defense Ministers, an expert on tank procurement, could come to Washington to confer with DOD. The visitor could, or course, come to the U.S. indirectly since he was scheduled to visit Canada in the near future. Mr. Talbot agreed to look into this matter with Defense. The Secretary commented on the needlessness of the Near East arms race. A regional approach on arms control at Geneva, however, had met with colossal indifference, despite the presence of a regional representative (Israel). Nasser's position toward this problem was affected by the attitude of the other Arab states. Jordan was indeed under pressure to acquire arms but so far had not reacted. The Soviet track was not promising. It had not proved possible to limit arms control to one or two countries. Inevitably U.S. aid to countries such as Korea and Turkey became involved. We were prepared, however, to give the matter further thought and would discuss it with Mr. Foster, Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. The Secretary inquired whether Israel was looking into the possibility of developing an anti-tank capability rather than proceeding on the tank vs. tank thesis. Col. Ram Ron noted that all large countries continued to develop new tanks. Moreover, south Israel was ideal tank country. The Secretary assured Ambassador Harman that he would follow up personally on Israel's problems on tank acquisition.
96. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Cairo, September 28, 1964. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL UAR-US. Top Secret; Exdis. Drafted by McCloy on September 30 at 11 a.m. A typewritten note on the memorandum reads, "Text prepared on cable forms but hand carried to Department." In company with Ambassador, called on President Nasser noon September 28. After presenting him with copy of Warren report/2/ and talking a little about assassination, in course of which he said it was in his opinion impossible to provide full security and at same time have President perform necessary functions of his office, I told him object of my visit. I stated President Johnson had very strong desire to emphasize to him that he had same interest which President Kennedy had in cordial and well-understood relationship with Egypt as well as in welfare and progress of entire area in which UAR plays such large and vital part. Because of interest and importance President Johnson attaches to this area, he had asked me as same emissary President Kennedy had used, to call upon him in Cairo in order to express the continuity of his interest in the peace and stability of the area. /2/Reference is to the Report of the President's Commission on the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964). McCloy was a member of the commission. I pointed out it had originally been intended I should call during hiatus between departure of Ambassador Badeau and coming of Ambassador Battle. He broke in to say he had become very tired during course of summer and what with the preoccupation he had in connection with visits of Chiefs of State and preparation for summit, it had been inconvenient for him to meet with me at that time and that he was glad that I had been able to adjust myself to his convenience. I then recalled to him my last visit which was on the same general subject as that of my present visit. We had the same object in view, namely, to relieve tensions and avoid expenses of unlimited arms race in this area. I pointed out that though he had not felt it was desirable or practical to enter into any agreement with Israel or indeed with US in connection with any disarmament measures that affected Israel and UAR, he had stated he had no intention of introducing nuclear weapons in area nor had he any aggressive designs on any of his neighbors. I stated he had also said if test ban treaty was agreed to between US and Soviet Union, he would endeavor to be among first to ratify it; that he had repeated the above statements and had been among first to ratify test ban treaty, for all of which President Kennedy had been deeply appreciative. Now President Johnson was replying to his letter of July 26, and had asked me to deliver it to him. I handed him letter/3/ which he took and read without further comment. /3/Document 90. I told him he could see from contents and tone of letter that President was sincerely anxious to develop possibility of further action in this field of armament and that he continued to wish to find steps which would redound to benefit of all concerned. I dwelt on frustrating aspect of an arms race which no one could expect to win; that counter effort would inevitably be forthcoming from others if he attempted to build up his strength. I stated that we all knew that Israel with assistance of France had been building up missile strength as a counter to what they considered to be Egyptian threat. What President had in mind was, in view of increased expenses and increased dangers of missiles arms race, time had come to level off activities in missile field. What we had in mind involved no formal agreement between UAR and Israel or between UAR and US. On other hand we did contemplate and suggest independent action on his part, effect of which would be to level off at present state of missile strength. This independent action we suggested could be accompanied by a statement defining his position in this regard. Of course if any action inconsistent with spirit of such commitment on his part was engaged in by any other country in area, he would have full freedom of action restored to him and his commitments would not be binding. US would be prepared to bring its influence on Israel to respond in kind, again without formal agreement but with hoped-for result that badly needed resources could be deflected from purchase of arms to more beneficial purposes and dangers inherent in such arms race avoided. I emphasized he should accept my visit as indication of our own strong interest in area and not as any attempt to advance interests of any particular country. We had heavy investment in area and because of its general strategic importance, both political and military, it was one in whose stability United States as a world leader must be deeply concerned. This interest was in keeping with persistent and conscious effort on part of US to do all in its power to relieve tensions in sensitive areas in hope of avoiding what otherwise might be a far reaching catastrophe. He seemed to accept our good intentions in this respect and was apparently less suspicious of our motives than he had been at the time of my prior visit. I then gave him our proposals on missiles which were somewhat modified from those that were included in talking papers./4/ He read them as well as proposed statement which UAR could make. I then emphasized in reply to his question as to what form assurances would take that they could be either oral or written and that they were designed to avoid any form of inspection which might be invidious to him. I pointed out such information as he might be able to gather in regard to the carrying out of commitments of another country could be supplemented with information of our own. /4/The talking papers have not been found. Background material relating to McCloy's mission are in Department of State, NEA/IAI Files: Lot 72 D 438, Background Papers for 2nd McCloy Probe w/Nasser, 9/64. At this point I told him that I was prepared to advise him upon instructions that at present time, Israelis were not possessed of any nuclear weapons nor were they producing any material for such weapons. I stated that this was an indication of our cooperation. After reading proposals on missiles, whose new form follows in separate message,/5/ he said we must understand that problem in Middle East is not problem of missiles but problem of Palestine. Arabs cannot accept present status in respect to Palestine. There must be solution of Palestine problem based upon justice. Nothing can stop the arms race or change the atmosphere in Middle East except solution of Israeli problem. This is fundamental to everything and it is fatuous to suppose that agreement in respect of missiles or any other incidental issue could solve this fundamental problem. He added that this was a profound political problem and he himself had no solution. Missiles were now very close to the heart of the army. It had no interest in nuclear weapons, but the missiles were a symbol of its renewed strength and confidence. They were a counter to deep reactions suffered in the 1956 invasion. All soldiers wanted all weapons they could get. Whereas our Pentagon might not be involved in political matters, army in Egypt was and it had deep political significance because of its fundamental position in domestic as well as international security of country. Missiles, therefore, carried strong political implications. He had to be frank about this and we had to understand it. /5/See Document 97. Nasser said that he would give thought to proposals and talk them over with his advisors, but he would have to say he was not optimistic in regard to an understanding which involved limitations in regard to missiles. When I asked him how long it would take him to give us reaction to proposals, he said about one week. I told him under these circumstances it would be best to leave further discussions on this subject to Ambassador Battle. However, I wanted to point out that though Palestine might be a fundamental problem in the Middle East, a limitation of arms race was not inconsistent with a recognition of that fact. Indeed, limitation of arms might create an atmosphere in which a better solution might be effected. Because Palestine was difficult and fundamental problem was no reason why one should not attempt moderation of arms race in view of inherent dangers that were involved in such race, and great wastage of resources that could not benefit anyone. It was apparent both to Ambassador Battle and to me that he felt he would be faced with a very real political problem if now he attempted to limit production of missiles. It was this rather than any outright hostility on his own part to the proposals which he seemed to stress. Also involved, in our opinion, was his assumed role of leader of Arab world, whose sole binding element is antagonism to Israel. Only unity that existed in Arab world was Palestine issue, and his preoccupation to remain as the influential leader of Arab world precluded any action now which could be interpreted as softness toward Israel. Any weakening of his position toward Israel would impair that leadership and a suggestion that the missile program would be tapered off would be construed by his colleagues as weakening. When I suggested that we had found in our dealings with the Soviet Union that unilateral action of this sort was sometimes productive of improvement in our relationship, he insisted that the parallel between US and Soviet Union and between Israel and UAR was not a good one. Israelis were occupying Palestine, Arab soil. They had invaded and committed aggression against UAR. Only parallel would be if Soviet Union were occupying California. It was left that he would carry on discussions with Ambassador Battle for moment, that I would not stay to await his reaction, and that if it seemed desirable, I could return to carry on further discussions at a later date. But I think it was clear to both of us that he felt it would be very difficult, if not impossible, to accept proposals. Both of us had impression that he would indeed be involved in heavy political difficulties because of the symbolic character that missiles now occupied in minds of his soldiers and people if he suggested cut back. Moreover, he was fearful of any action that might expose him to charge he was being soft toward Israel in view of his position as leader of Arab world. He was most cordial throughout, recalling number of other occasions we had managed to deal with outstanding issues, and seemed in good health. As we left, he rather warmly, I felt, requested I pass on his good wishes to President Johnson. Comment: In appraising conversation, we found Nasser less flexible on missiles than we had hoped. While tone of conversation may have suggested he could see some advantage in proposals, it was obvious he felt his internal and external political problems were major hindering factors to any action he could take. At this point my view which Battle shares is that it is important keep the dialogue going and hopefully not to have direct turndown for fear ending what has thus far been useful discussion with possible side effects of bringing about exactly what we attempting avoid, acceleration rather than moderation of arms race this area. Our guess is that UAR will not give us early answer and may delay giving us any final response, which may be preferable to direct turndown if we press too hard at this point.
97. Memorandum by John J. McCloy/1/ Cairo, September 29, 1964. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL UAR-US. Top Secret; Exdis. Drafted by McCloy at noon on September 29. A typewritten note on the memorandum reads, "Text prepared on cable forms but hand carried to Department." Following are verbatim texts of two papers given President Nasser September 28 during McCloy visit: Proposal for Missiles: 1. Private assurances, written or oral, would be provided that large land-based surface-to-surface missiles would not be deployed either through the use of mobile launchers or the construction of permanent launching facilities for this purpose. 2. Assurances would also be given that procurement or production of large surface-to-surface missiles for military purposes would be held to present levels. As it is understood that the number of missiles that are now available is limited, there would be no question of destroying any existing capacity. 3. Any space research programs would be conducted openly and in a manner consistent with furthering international scientific cooperation. Any production of rockets for use in such programs would be limited to the numbers required for planned launchings. 4. With respect to production or acquisition of missiles, the type of assurances that might be given to create confidence that the above commitments were being carried out would be left for further discussion. It is believed this could be done without the introduction of any type of inspection system which would be considered invidious to the countries concerned. 5. With respect to deployment, information which the countries accepting this arrangement would seek to obtain through their own resources could be supplemented by such information as may become available to a third country which would be aware of the arrangement. 6. If any country in the area should take any action inconsistent with the above, this commitment and related assurances would not be binding. Proposed written statement: The United Arab Republic wishes to provide assurances that its efforts to develop surface-to-surface missiles have been undertaken only for the purposes of self-defense. As a result of its missile development program, the UAR is now in a position to create a large missile force should it be necessary. It will be appreciated that the question whether the UAR should decide such a force is necessary for its national defense will be strongly affected by the course others in the area may follow. In the long run, the UAR hopes that the real value of the missiles it has developed will be for the role they can play in furthering man's knowledge of outer space.
98. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, October 6, 1964. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 15-1 UAR. Top Secret. Drafted by Dickman on October 7 and approved in M on October 22. McCloy also met briefly with Rusk on October 6; a memorandum of the conversation is ibid., POL UAR-US. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS After summarizing briefly the high points of his meeting with President Nasser on September 28, Mr. McCloy said he had found Nasser this time to be less suspicious and more willing to talk about the arms problem than when the subject had first been raised in June 1963. While Nasser gave no indication that he would be able to do anything about keeping his missile strength at present levels, he did not reject our proposal. He was frank in pointing out the political problems, both internal and external, which he faced if he should take any action which could be interpreted as softness toward Israel. Asked if he gave any hint on the number of missiles he had, Mr. McCloy said he had not asked the question. However, Nasser had reiterated that he had started missile development because he could not rely on the Soviet Union for his full arsenal. Mr. McCloy was not optimistic that Nasser could conform to the kind of proposal we had presented not to increase the present number of surface-to-surface missiles. We were asking him something that was very hard for him to do. Yet, there was a dividend for us in trying to maintain the arms dialogue with Nasser. If we kept working on Nasser, we might eventually get some results. He hoped Ambassador Battle would have an opportunity to review his meeting with Nasser whenever it was practical. Mr. McCloy then noted that when he conveyed our assurances on Dimona, Nasser made no comment. He assumed this meant that this information confirmed other UAR intelligence on the subject. He also thought it significant that Nasser did not mention pre-emptive war to him during this visit--as he did in the last--in the event Israel obtained nuclear capability. Also interesting was Nasser's lack of reaction to information that Israel was going in for its own SSM's. There seemed to be an almost casual acceptance of this development. Governor Harriman commented, in reading Mr. McCloy's report, that Nasser had held out little encouragement for accepting the present status quo in the Near East. Mr. McCloy said Nasser had argued that a solution of the Palestine problem based on justice was fundamental. Nasser had volunteered that he himself had no solution. This seemed to imply that war was not a feasible way to resolve the problem. It also seemed to imply that Nasser did not feel he was strong enough with other Arabs to take any statesmanlike actions on this issue. Mr. McCloy mentioned that his visit had come to the attention of the Cairo press because his name had been listed on Nasser's register of visitors. He asked how he should respond in case any questions were raised. He noted parenthetically that Joux (sic) in the Quai d'Orsay had noticed his visit with Nasser as had Eric Warburg at the Council of Foreign Relations in New York. He had told them that he had gone to review several matters in connection with his business interests. Since the President knew of his friendship with Nasser, he had been asked to reiterate our interest in developments in the Near East and the need to tamp down tensions created by the arms race. Mr. Warburg had told Mr. McCloy that he thought this was a good development and hoped these efforts would continue. It was agreed that Mr. McCloy should respond along these lines in case questions were raised again by responsible private individuals. Governor Harriman suggested that Mr. McCloy might usefully point out at the same time why it was desirable for the U.S. to maintain a dialogue with Nasser. The Governor then expressed his concern over recent statements by Senator Keating and Congressman Taft urging the Administration to submit an ultimatum to Nasser or otherwise stop all assistance. He instructed NEA to prepare a telegram to Ambassador Barbour in which the Ambassador would convey to Premier Eshkol the general tenor, but without the specifics, of Mr. McCloy's meeting with Nasser and point to the utility of maintaining a dialogue. Governor Harriman thought that after the elections, the Department would have a job to try to get the Israeli Government to get its supporters to think of the long-range aspects of our policy and understand why it was desirable for us to continue frank discussions with Nasser. He thought Mr. McCloy might play a useful role in this connection. At the close of the meeting, there was a brief discussion of the Chase boycott problem/2/ and the Warren Commission Report. /2/The Arab Central Boycott Office in Damascus had announced the blacklisting of Chase Manhattan Bank on July 9 and had given the bank 6 months to liquidate its affairs in Arab countries. McCloy raised this with Nasser on September 28, noting it as an example of the desirability of avoiding any action that might irritate U.S.-UAR relations, and discussed it with Hassouna and Kaissouni on September 29. (Telegram 1078 from Cairo, September 29; ibid., FT 11-2 ISR-ARAB)
99. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Counsel (Feldman), the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy), and Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson/1/ Washington, October 19, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. III. Secret. Filed as an attachment to an October 27 memorandum from Bundy to Rusk stating that the President had approved the recommendations in Rusk's October 10 memorandum on FY 1965 help to Israel, with a Development Loan level of $20 million and a P.L. 480 Title I program for FY 1965 of at least $34 million, with any additional Title I or Title IV to be subject to negotiation between the United States and Israel. The October 10 memorandum is printed below. Aid to Israel. Attached are Secretary Rusk's recommendations on FY 1965 aid and various aspects of the tank deal. By wrapping all these up in one package, we can use the plus items to offset those where we simply have to say no. Thanks to our help, the Israelis have done quite well on tanks. They will get not only 150 German M-48s, with an option on 82 more, but some 250 UK Centurions. The prices are better than we could have given. While the grand total may run over $70 million, it is now for many more tanks (482) than the 2-300 we were talking about earlier. We'll help out on training and delivery, and give the same good terms as on Hawk (10 years, 10% down payment, 3-1/2% interest) for the modernization kits and ammunition we've agreed to sell directly for $24 million or so. Though pleased with the overall deal, the Israelis have hoped to shave this US price. They've suggested a number of ingenious ways, but DOD and State reject these as infeasible or highly risky. Nor, as Rusk says, do we have any commitment to go even further in helping out on tanks. If we want to help Israel on political and defense burden grounds, the sensible way to do so is via an indirect subsidy through PL 480 and economic aid (as we've done in past years). Dave Bell points out that Israel hardly qualifies for DL on any economic criteria, but this is still the safest way. So we recommend that you approve DL to Israel at the same $20 million level as last year (the high side of the range proposed by Rusk), and Title I PL 480 of at least $34 million, which Agriculture believes can be managed. There is pressure for moving Israel at least partly into Title IV this year, but we propose leaving this to negotiation with the Israelis. Together with the generous tank credit terms, this would add up in effect to a somewhat higher aid level than last year. While it naturally falls short of Israeli desires, we think they'll be satisfied. We must also keep in mind that nuclear desalting may cost us a lot in future years. If you approve this general aid level, we'd like to put out the word quietly right now./2/ /2/The President initialed his approval. Mike Feldman /3/Notations in Bundy's handwriting appear next to the three signatures. One next to Komer's signature reads: "He did it. McGB." One next to Feldman's signature reads: "He agreed." And one next to Bundy's signature reads: "This is a very good arrangement. McGB."
Attachment Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson/4/ Washington, October 10, 1964. /4/Secret; Exdis-Tan. The source text is erroneously dated October 1. SUBJECT We have come under considerable Israeli pressure to button up various subsidiary aspects of the tank matter and to decide on our FY-1965 aid level--in the last analysis a political decision. I believe that we would do best by handling all these matters as a single package, so that the favorable items can offset those where we must be negative. Israel has done well on its German and U.K. tank purchases, largely owing to your intervention with Erhard. It is going to get 150 M-48A1 tanks from West Germany in an "as is" condition at a somewhat better price than we could have offered for the same tanks. We will sell kits to modernize the M-48's and provide necessary training, ammunition and support spares. We also found to our surprise that after all Israel's pleas that the U.K. Centurion was no good, it has now signed up for some 250. So Israel will get 400 tanks over the next few years, and the prices for the basic tanks will be fully comparable to what we could offer. Alleging both economic need and a need for indirect defense subsidy, Israel has requested $29.5 million in Development Loans and $38.5 million in Title I PL-480, (including $17 million already available for 1965). This is a total of $68 million for FY-1965 compared to $20 million Development Loans and $28 million PL-480 last year, or a total of $48 million. Given Israel's continued remarkable economic growth and rising reserves, Dave Bell sees no economic justification whatsoever for any Development Loans (which AID in its presentation to Congress estimated as $0 to $10 million, as compared to $20 million FY-1964). Since the U.K. and German prices are most reasonable, we do not have a commitment to help out indirectly on the tank deal. Although Prime Minister Eshkol may have the impression from the conversations in Washington that we intended to be of financial as well as other assistance, the record shows that the only concrete suggestion we made was that we would consider such help if the European tanks turned out to be substantially more expensive than those from the United States. Recommendation: Balancing off the many factors involved, I recommend that you approve the following proposals: 1. PL-480: Meet the Israeli request with a program of approximately $21.5 million which, added to the amount of $17 million already available for 1965 in the current agreement, comes to a total of $38.5. This could be on the same terms as last year taking account of changes in PL-480 legislation and the need to maintain usual marketings, except that $7 to $10 million worth would be repayable in dollars rather than local currency, but this amount would not necessarily represent sales of beef. The dollar sales would be included in order to establish the principle that the time has come for Israel to move to a Title IV program. 2. Development Loans: Though Dave Bell sees no case based on economic aid criteria, there are valid reasons for Development Loans in the range of $10-$20 million on the same terms as last year. Request you indicate the amount you approve. 3. Helping Israel get Tanks: On top of our all-out efforts to date: (a) we have speeded up the flow of U.S. replacement tanks to Germany so the others can be released; (b) we have provided technical data requested by the Israelis; and (c) as an added concession, DOD proposes to give Israel favorable MAP credit terms similar to those on Hawks (10 years at 3-1/2% with only 10% down payment) for the modernization kits, spares and ammunition which must be purchased from us. As yet we do not have firm dates when the Italians need to have the overhaul and conversion kits on hand. Through the use of overtime, DOD can probably deliver the necessary overhaul and conversions kits to Italy on a schedule dovetailed with the arrival of M-48's from West Germany. 4. Sale of Kits and Conversion: During Prime Minister Eshkol's June visit we were given to understand that, in the interests of secrecy, M-48's obtained from West Germany would be overhauled and fitted in Italy with diesel engines and large guns. It was also contemplated that the sale of the U.S. conversion kits would be through a third country. The Israelis are now urging that sale of the kits be made directly to Israel and that some or all of the conversion be undertaken in Israel. They contend that this procedure will be more secure. We should be openminded on this and hear them out, but accede to the Israeli suggestions only if we are satisfied that they do provide adequate security from the U.S. point of view. 5. Tank Training: The Israelis originally wanted to have almost 100 people trained in the U.S. For obvious security reasons, we got them to cut this to 26 plus visits by a few engineers to study conversion techniques. We think we can handle all of these visitors if properly spaced. 6. Surplus Prices: The Israelis have urged that we provide our tank kits and ammunition at "surplus" prices, to save them money. DOD says it simply cannot do so, because practically all is new output. The kits represent special orders; the ammunition is going currently to U.S. forces./5/ /5/There is no indication of the President's approval or disapproval of the recommendations. While the above does not meet all Israeli requests, it adds up to a generous package, which should relieve any pre-election pressure on us. If you approve, I propose to communicate these decisions to the Israelis shortly./6/ /6/A November 15 exchange of letters between Solbert and Colonel Ron outlined the terms for procurement of articles and services relating to the conversion, overhaul, and support of M48 type tanks obtained from sources other than the United States. Solbert's letter stated that if the nature of the transaction should become public knowledge before the U.S. Government determined that secrecy was no longer required, it might exercise its right of cancellation. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Robert Komer, Israel Security, Tanks, July 1964-December 1964) Dean Rusk [Continue with the next documents] Volume XVIII Index | Foreign Relations Online | Historian's Office | Department of State | Secretary of State |