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 | FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XVIII Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964-67 Department of State |
 50. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic/1/ Washington, May 3, 1964, 4:41 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 US/McCLOY. Top Secret. Drafted by Davies and Dickman; cleared by Walt Rostow, Harriman (by telephone), Foster, U. Alexis Johnson, and McGeorge Bundy; and approved by Talbot. 5141. Eyes only Cane for Ambassador. Our previous two Cane probes with Nasser have accomplished little more than provide a basis for continued discussion. But risks of continued arms buildup in the Near East so serious that we believe it essential to continue dialogue and press for some tacit agreement on both types and quantities weapons before matter gets out of hand. We believe that in frank discussion we should put our cards on table and make clear we think missile-nuclear arms race one which Nasser cannot win given Israel's financial resources, technical capabilities, and general availability armaments. In any case Nasser knows that US and other Western Powers simply cannot allow Arabs to knock Israel any more than (as proved at Suez) we intend to tolerate Israeli aggression against Arabs. We should also make clear that in our approach we are not seeking to do Israel's work. Our bona fides has been established in 1956 and years following. Now armaments are threatening to get out of bounds with increasing risk to area stability and of possible great power involvement in any conflict which might inadvertently develop. Self-defeating nature missile race should now be more evident to Nasser. For example, IDF's General Rabin stated April 15 that Israel has appropriate answer to UAR missile threat and Adzhubei implied in Paris April 8 that France supplying Israel with SSM's. So did Foreign Secretary Butler's backgrounder here, which undoubtedly got to Arabs. Recent Eshkol statement to Feldman that he would halt Israel's efforts enter SSM race if Nasser could be persuaded exercise restraint is additional new element. Israel is particularly concerned about missiles just as Nasser worries about Israel's nuclear potential. Therefore, what we aim for are tacit, private assurances from both sides re nuclear non-acquisition and missile restraint. If Nasser will come along, we can probably get Israel agreement as well. Accordingly, you should take early opportunity make following points to Nasser: 1) You may say President Johnson much appreciated Nasser's recent letter,/2/ and will be replying. President particularly noted Nasser's assurances about UAR opposition to nuclear weapons races. President hopes will be possible to work out some practical means of dealing with risks of ME arms race, and has requested you to take matter up quietly with President Nasser once again. /2/Nasser's April 26 letter was transmitted in telegram 2508 from Cairo, April 27. It welcomed the continuation of correspondence between himself and Johnson and expressed agreement on the desirability of expanding areas of cooperation and seeking to reduce areas of disagreement, but it went on to review broad areas on which he implied there was disagreement: imperialism, Arab disunity, inequality between rich and poor nations, inequality within nations, and Israel. (Ibid., POL UAR-US) 2) USG gravely concerned over implications ever more-rapid acquisition destructive weapons by Near East states. We were pleased to learn from President's talk with Talbot that UAR not now planning major deployment SSM's but clearly, basic problem remains. UAR missile development is forcing pace leading to Israeli reaction. Nasser may now be aware from Adzhubei statement in Paris that Israel apparently obtaining small number SSM's from France. UAR acquired missiles first. Israel is following suit. We tell Israelis UAR missiles do not represent significant military threat but they are nervous. With missiles, Israel will have added incentive seek develop nuclear capability. US determinedly opposes nuclear proliferation but recognizes Israel might be impelled try "go it alone" in response UAR missile build-up. However, missiles are expensive and we believe Israel would forego them if convinced that UAR would show similar restraint. 3) If UAR pressure continues build up, Israel has financial strength to match acquisitions. We doubt support from world Jewish communities likely taper off. 4) Accordingly, we think Nasser would be foolish not to consider seriously some kind of tacit arrangements of mutual restraint which would embarrass neither party. In fact, one could argue that Nasser would gain more than Israel. There is parallel here with variety of tacit arrangements we have arrived at with Soviets. In addition to Test Ban Treaty, we have understanding on bombs in outer space and matching decisions to curtail production of fissionable materials. These are not policed except through our intelligence capabilities. As UAR intelligence on Israel's armed forces is good, so is Israeli intelligence on UAR forces. If Nasser could only assure us that he does not intend to proceed further with UAR missile development and will not acquire nuclear weapons (see separate message),/3/ we believe we could also obtain quiet assurances from Israel not to deploy SSM's or develop nuclear weapons. If Nasser not really intending waste lot of money on missiles, we see to his advantage not to spook Israel too much. /3/Telegram 5140 to Cairo, May 3, instructed Badeau to note that Nasser had told Talbot he would reconsider a statement not to develop or acquire nuclear weapons, although he had difficulties with the proposed draft letter that Badeau had given him in October 1963, and to make clear U.S. willingness to consider a new draft or some other technique. It transmitted the text of an alternate draft letter from Johnson to Nasser. (Ibid., POL 7 US/McCLOY) Except for minor revisions in the first paragraph, Johnson's May 20 letter to Nasser (Document 59) is identical to the draft letter. 5) So far as nuclear weapons are concerned Nasser is aware we are pressing Israel to accept these safeguards; we shall continue to do so. We are puzzled by UAR statements on IAEA at Geneva Disarmament Conference where UAR representative objected to IAEA safeguards on transfer of fissionable materials or equipment as proposed by U.S. delegate March 5. We had impression from Talbot discussion that Nasser thought it possible for UAR to accept IAEA safeguards at an appropriate time. If UAR considers present IAEA arrangements too complex, we would like to know. 6) UAR support for principle of IAEA safeguards would help our worldwide effort extend these to increasing number of peaceful use facilities of all member states. Of these, Israel is clearly one of most significant where agreement most needed. We also recognize major nuclear powers must accept for increasing number peaceful nuclear activities same inspection they recommend to other states. USG therefore is offering major US reactor for IAEA inspection. We hope this offer, like Tarapur in case of India, will be helpful precedent. 7) In our approaches, we not seeking press Israel's case and we hope our bona fides sufficiently established for Nasser to realize this is so. We are aware Arab conviction Israel inherently expansionist and poses continuing threat. We do not share this conviction, on basis our knowledge. We wish affirm categorically that US would vigorously oppose any effort by Israel to expand its borders. Similarly we would react within and without UN to threat of aggression against any area state. 8) Although we especially concerned over new rivalries in missile and nuclear field, we also hope to develop some means to slow down race in conventional arms. As UAR has acquired larger quantities modern tanks and aircraft, Israel has sought same. The more Nasser gets from Soviets, more Israelis will have to get from French, UK, FRG and US. Time to curb arms race is running out. With appreciation for Nasser's understanding of area forces and trends, we would welcome his thoughts on how spiraling of arms stockpile might be slowed. 9) We hope Nasser will give these points careful thought. US remains determined pursue effective Near East arms limitation not because it favors either side but because, in its own interest, wishes avoid being drawn into conflict into which it will almost inevitably be drawn. We earnestly hope it will be possible for Nasser to see merit of our contention. We also hope he can make early response re foregoing ideas. Rusk
51. Special National Intelligence Estimate/1/ SNIE 36.1-64 Washington, May 6, 1964. /1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-R01012A, ODDI Registry of NIE and SNIE Files. Secret; Controlled Dissem. A table of contents is not printed. According to a note on the cover sheet, the estimate was submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence, and concurred in by the U.S. Intelligence Board on May 6. The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, and NSA participated in its preparation. The State, Defense, and NSA representatives concurred; the AEC and FBI representatives abstained, the subject being outside their jurisdiction. Paragraph references are to the Discussion portion of the estimate, not printed here. NASSER'S POLICIES AND PROSPECTS The Problem This estimate is designed to assess the policies and prospects of the UAR's President Nasser in his own country, in the Arab world, in the nonaligned camp, and in the world at large. It is aimed at providing judgments about where Nasser is heading, what he is likely to do along the way, and how his actions are likely to affect US interests. Conclusions A. Nasser's fundamental objective is to create a new order in the Arab world--to build a prosperous Egypt, establish its independence and dignity and that of the Arab world generally, and bring about some measure of Arab solidarity under his aegis. He considers that the elimination of foreign influence is essential to the achievement of these goals, and he regards a strong military force as basic to his own retention of power. Since the influence of the Western powers is more extensive in the Near East than that of the Communist states, Nasser's campaign against the status quo impinges more on US than on Soviet interests. (Paras. 1, 3, 4, 22) B. Nevertheless, Nasser's policies are designed not primarily to favor or to injure the interests of the West or the Bloc, but to serve those of the UAR. Indeed, Nasser is well aware of his need to remain on tolerable terms with both the US and the USSR, since he presently relies on the former for food, on the latter for arms and for aid to build the Aswan dam, and on each for the political backing that keeps him from becoming unacceptably dependent on the other. His basic consideration is to remain nonaligned; in particular, he would not want to see Soviet military bases and special political positions in the Near East replace those of the West. (Paras. 21, 24-26) C. Nasser will continue to work for the establishment of governments favorable to him and for the removal of special Western political and military positions in the Near East. He will support Arab nationalists (except Baathists) with propaganda and material aid. A principal target in the near term will be Aden, where a dissident populace offers tempting opportunities. However, Nasser will exercise a good deal of caution to avoid a military confrontation with the UK. (Paras. 12-15) D. We foresee a continuation of Nasser's personal rule in Egypt and of his efforts to develop an economy largely controlled or supervised by the state. He is likely to incur repeated foreign exchange stringencies, but these will probably not be so severe as to cause major cutbacks. (Paras. 5, 7-9) E. Nasser hopes that Israel will some day be eliminated as a state. He recognizes that for the foreseeable future he will not have the military strength to defeat Israel. He will bitterly resent any Western moves that seem to reinforce Israel's political standing or military strength. (Paras. 17, 18) [Here follows the Discussion portion of the estimate.]
52. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State/1/ Cairo, May 8, 1964, 1 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 US/McCLOY. Top Secret; Exdis. 2632. Reference Deptels 5140, 5141,/2/ 5168./3/ President Nasser received me 1930 hours May 7 for 45 minute interview. In light of Deptel 5168 I focused discussions principally on possibilities Middle East arms race alleviation along lines set forth in reference telegram. /2/See Document 50 and footnote 3 thereto. /3/Telegram 5168 to Cairo, May 6, urged Badeau to find out from Nasser as soon as possible his reaction to the arms limitation probe before Eshkol arrived in Washington on June 1, so that the President could actively support a new approach to Israel. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 US/McCLOY) My presentation opened with transmittal written text of Presidential letter contained in Deptel 5140. After carefully reading this and requesting exact meanings of certain words, President recalled this subject had been discussed with John McCloy and Secretary Talbot. I reminded him that origin of discussion was President Kennedy's earnest concern for practical steps in the reduction of armament and containment nuclear development which would further world peace. As President Johnson's letter indicated he completely shares this interest and is desirous of carrying it forward. The presentation I was about to make was at President Johnson's request and represented his thinking. I then put forward in slightly expanded form the views set forth in Department telegram 5141, emphasizing particularly the following: 1. The accelerating pace of sophisticated weapons acquisition between the UAR and Israel generated geometrically progressing danger so that any step, small in itself, greatly increased chances of final explosion. 2. Israeli financial and technical capability is such that they will match, and perhaps overmatch, every step taken by UAR as Adzhubei statement in Paris re SSM's shows. Result is not only that UAR security can never be absolutely established but growing financial burden will make it increasingly difficult for UAR to support weapons and economic progress at same time. 3. As a great power US has embarked on course of self-disciplined restraint in aspects of weapon development vis-a-vis Soviets. Without formal agreement or special verification procedures, Soviets have taken similar steps. While admittedly these are limited they are not only a hopeful beginning in containment of arms development but indicate quiet process by which some advance can be made without formal bilateral negotiations. UAR as great power in Arab world should be willing to follow same path. 4. USG deeply concerned over all nuclear development and particularly over possibility of nuclear weapons in Middle East. In view of this we consider it essential to peace of area as well as to world interests that IAEA safeguards be accepted. As I had pointed out to President Nasser on earlier occasions, we consider this one of most effective and practical steps to meet Arab fears that Israel may be developing nuclear weapons. I therefore bespoke UAR support on IAEA safeguards, expressed concern at UAR criticisms of these at Geneva Disarmament Conference, and invited any constructive views President desired to put forward on this subject. 5. Although USA does not share Arab belief Israel inevitably expansionist, I stressed our vigorous opposition to any Israeli expansionism beyond its borders and our strong reaction to any aggressive threat against States in area. With this as background I dwelt at some length on USG commitment to general peace and tranquility in Middle East. This is sometimes interpreted by Arabs as being a pro-Israeli policy but I was sure President Nasser understood the falsity of this and recognized that howsoever strong Arab distaste for Israel might be its continued presence is a hard fact that had to be taken into account in seeking to prevent undue arms acceleration with ensuing danger of conflict. 6. In conclusion I reviewed plan whereby UAR would unilaterally and quietly give USG assurances that it was prepared not to go beyond its present level on either number or sophistication of advanced weapons, particularly rockets. On this basis chances are good that similar undertaking can be obtained from Israel both as to increase and deployment of SSM's and most importantly the eschewing of nuclear weapon development. A first step would be President Nasser's affirmative answer to the request made in President Johnson's letter for written assurance re UAR intention to acquire nuclear weapons. President Nasser listened quietly to this presentation, asking several questions for clarification of English technical words and details of proposal. He then requested that I send him as soon as possible a written summary of the presentation I had made,/4/ saying that this question was of such importance that he would have to study it carefully before giving any answers. He promised to see me for a "long session" after the Khrushchev visit. /4/Telegram 5503 to Cairo, May 14, stated that the Department wanted to review the draft of a written presentation of the points made by Badeau before giving it to Nasser. (Ibid.) Telegram 2709 from Cairo, May 15, reported that Badeau sent a memorandum of the conversation to Nasser on May 12. (Ibid.) President Nasser then said that he would be replying to President Johnson's letter and that he would give assurances on UAR's purpose to refrain from acquiring nuclear weapons as the President had requested. I probed to discover whether this assurance was a private one for President Johnson alone or would be in such a form that it could be made public, but without success. The President again assured me that he would answer President Johnson's request affirmatively but could not be drawn into either the exact form or contents of the commitment. Comment: During McCloy conversations on above topic, the President put forward immediately objections to the plan. That he did not do so in this interview I consider somewhat hopeful; certainly a small gain will have been made if Nasser fulfills his intention to give President Johnson the assurances he seeks re UAR acquisition nuclear weapons. While Nasser will certainly give me one or more long sessions on above topic and other basic questions of UAR-USA relationships after Khrushchev visit, I believe it unlikely these will be completed before Eshkol arrival in USA June 1st. In my opinion it would be a mistake to press any timetable of talks that suggests this exercise is governed by Eshkol visit. Perhaps one reason for not prolonging the discussion was that President Nasser is obviously under the weather. He looked grey and drawn and told me that ever since his return from Yemen he had been ill and was still taking heavy doses of antibiotics. Badeau
53. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Counsel (Feldman) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, May 11, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Tanks, Vol. I. No classification marking. A handwritten "L" on the memorandum indicates the President saw it. A handwritten note by Walter Jenkins reads: "Mac--President says pls talk to Feldman and LBJ about this." In a May 13 telephone conversation, Bundy asked Johnson's approval to have Senator Abraham Ribicoff and New York banker Abraham Feinberg tell Ambassador Harman and any Jewish leader they thought necessary that public discussion of the question of tanks for Israel would be counterproductive. It would "make life tough for our British friends," Bundy commented, if it looked "as if we were passing the buck to them." He told Johnson that he was with Ribicoff, who was willing "to try and keep things buttoned up" if Johnson wanted. Johnson approved, saying, "I want him to stop everybody that's talking about it." (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation Between Johnson and Bundy, May 13, 1964, 3:35 p.m., Tape F64.26, Side B, PNO 7) SUBJECT I have rarely been exposed to as much pressure as I have had recently on the question of tanks for Israel. It has been only after considerable effort that members of Congress have been restrained against making speeches on the question, the Anglo-Jewish press has killed several articles, and responsible leaders of the Jewish community have demonstrated their confidence in the Administration by keeping silent. I call this to your attention at this time because the pressure continues to mount and I believe we should prepare our position as soon as possible so that we may be able either to (1) take advantage of any favorable decision or (2) counter any adverse decision. I believe the various Government departments concerned are now ready with their recommendations, and I am ready with mine. Myer Feldman/2/ /2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
54. Research Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Denney) to Acting Secretary of State Ball/1/ RNA-12 Washington, May 11, 1964. /1/Source: Department of State, NEA/IAI Files: Lot 69 D 492, POL 3/2, Palestine Entity. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. SUBJECT The projected conference of Palestinians now scheduled to take place in Jerusalem late in May 1964 focuses attention on various attempts of the Arabs to organize their Palestinian brethren into a group to represent the common interest. This paper has been produced in response to a request for a study of the past history and current status of the Palestine entity question. Abstract The Arab states once again are giving prominence to plans for the establishment of some form of body to represent all the Palestine Arabs. At the Arab Summit Conference in Cairo in January 1964, Ahmad al-Shuqayri, a Palestinian long prominent in Palestine Arab affairs, was designated to organize a so-called "Palestine entity." Thus far, Shuqayri has announced a "National Charter for Palestine" and a "Constitution of the Palestinian Liberation Organization." These documents will be laid before a conference of Palestinians scheduled to open in Jerusalem on May 28, 1964. He has announced also the formation of a "Palestine Liberation Front" to be composed of commando units to be kept combat ready. While Shuqayri has been attempting to gain support for this Charter and for the establishment of the Palestine Liberation Organization and the Palestine Liberation Front, his rivals, notably Hajj Amin al-Husayni, have been organizing to oppose these schemes with the support of Arab states opposed to Nasser. The current endeavor to create a Palestine Entity, like previous attempts, seems destined to become a victim of the continuing struggle for power among Palestine Arab leaders and of the contest over the balance of power in the Arab world. [Here follows the Discussion portion of the paper, followed by copies of the proposed charter and constitution.]
55. Memorandum From President Johnson to His Deputy Special Counsel (Feldman)/1/ Washington, May 15, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Tanks, Vol. I. Secret. Drafts of this memorandum entitled "Feldman Talking Paper, "dated May 13 and 14, apparently drafted by Komer, are ibid. The memorandum was sent to Johnson with a May 15 covering memorandum from Komer, which states, "It tells Mike exactly what we want him to say, so he won't stray off the reservation." (Ibid.) A copy filed with a May 19 covering memorandum from Bromley Smith to Rusk, McNamara, and JCS Chairman Taylor states that the instruction, as amended by Rusk, was approved by the President on May 16. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 70 A 1266, Israel 470) See Document 57. SUBJECT In view of the repeated Israeli pleas for a quick answer on their tank request, I am sending you to explain our position on the matter. You should explain to Prime Minister Eshkol that we are giving him our firm views through you so the tank matter won't get in the way of a constructive visit, to which I am looking forward eagerly. You should then talk with him along the following lines: I. Context in Which We Considered Tank Request. We've taken a most exhaustive look at the tank matter, as the Israelis well know. Our JCS and intelligence community have assessed the present and prospective military balance. In arriving at our decision we also had to take into account whether the likely gain to Israel and the US outweighed the potential costs. I want you to assure Eshkol, however, that we did so on the basis of the underlying premise that Israel's security must be preserved. A. In fact the US regards itself, and all the Arabs do too, as consistently the staunchest supporter of Israel. It is primarily the US which is expected by them to come to Israel's defense if attacked. This, of course, is simple truth--since 1950 it has been a fixed tenet of our policy, reiterated by every President, to deter and if necessary cope with military aggression against Israel. We have also, through both public and private means, been Israel's strongest financial backers. I want you to say again that I am as firmly behind this policy as my predecessors. B. But we have felt it necessary to maintain at least an appearance of balance between Israel and the Arabs, because of our wide interests in the area and desire not to thrust Arabs into arms of Moscow. This policy has always seemed to us as much in Israel's interest as our own--not only does it give us leverage with Arabs but it helps limit Arab receptivity to such obvious Soviet meddling as Khrushchev is up to right now in Egypt. C. One facet of this policy has been to avoid providing clearly offensive weapons to Israel or to Arab states which could use them against her. Nor has this policy compromised Israel's ability to maintain a substantial deterrent edge. Shrewd purchases from Europe, indirectly subsidized by US aid, have enabled Israel to stay well ahead of Arabs. In fact, our JCS and intelligence people all see Israel retaining a substantial margin of superiority for the next several years. D. This is also the year of the Jordan Waters crisis, on which the US is already carrying the main burden of backing Israel. To overload the circuit by such a dramatic shift in US policy as a big tank sale, especially at the very time when Moscow is bidding for Arab favor, could simply undermine our relations with the Arabs. We mean here not just the UAR but almost every Arab country: 1. It might jeopardize the position of Jordan, and at the least make it impossible for Hussein to maintain close relations with us. 2. Since Libya has become one of the most fanatical anti-Israel states, we would almost certainly lose our base. 3. Our restraining influence on issues like the Jordan diversion would be thrown away just when it is needed most. Arab frustration over their inability to do much about it could easily be catalyzed by a tank deal into a violent reaction against us. 4. In fact, we see a major risk of Arab counteraction against our oil, already likely to come under fire because of the Jordan Waters crisis. Khrushchev could end up the chief gainer, not Israel. II. Meeting Israel's Need for Tanks. For all these reasons I do not believe that the US can afford a direct sale of tanks. Nonetheless we are as interested as ever in seeing Israeli deterrent capabilities maintained (though our JCS and intelligence people think Israel more pessimistic than it need be, and we believe Israel discounts far too heavily the added deterrent created by Arab belief the US will intervene). A. On tanks specifically, we recognize that Israel's armor needs gradual modernization to keep a dangerous imbalance from developing, though here too our JCS see needs as more like 300 than 500 tanks over next 2-3 years. We also note heavy Israeli purchases of advanced AT weapons. B. We intend to see that Israel gets the tanks it needs, but without exposing the US to unacceptable political risks. We believe, based on recent inquiries, that it can buy enough modern tanks to meet its needs--in quantities, on terms, and with delivery schedules comparable to the best we could do ourselves--from the UK and possibly West Germany. Of course we can't speak for them; Israel will have to talk directly. C. But we promise US help in paving the way. The one absolute imperative is to avoid publicity, especially surrounding the Eshkol visit here. If the finger is pointed at London or Bonn it would be politically impossible for them to fill such a large order. D. The US could not justify grant MAP to Israel in any case. Its financial position is such that it can afford to buy tanks. And Centurions from the UK or M-48s from Germany are probably available at similar prices to what we'd charge. Nor, as you told Eshkol before, could we justify giving tanks free while Israel uses its own foreign exchange to buy missiles from France. III. Israeli Missiles. I want you to assure Eshkol that our concerns over Israeli missile plans in no way influenced our decision. We also recognize we can't make this decision for Israel. But I want Eshkol to know of my worry lest Israel get missiles on a scale which would actually serve to accelerate the arms race rather than damp it down. You needn't argue this matter, but simply remind Eshkol that it is on our agenda. Tell him our experts are convinced UAR can't develop enough missile capability to present much of a threat. Even advanced missiles are of questionable value without nuclear warheads, which are far beyond the UAR. So we wonder why Israel should spend so much on highly expensive missiles, which are wasteful without nuclear warheads and highly dangerous if the Arabs conclude, as we fear they will, that Israel has nuclear plans in mind. In sum I want you to make clear that, while we can't sell Israel tanks directly, we intend to see that a comparable alternative is worked out, always provided the matter can be closely held. Thus we are confident that Israel's security concern can be suitably met. Lyndon B. Johnson
56. Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (McNaughton) to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/ I-24,361/64 Washington, May 16, 1964. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 70 A 1266, Israel 470 Secret; Eyes Only. A stamped notation on the memorandum states that McNamara saw it on May 16. SUBJECT There will be a meeting at the White House at 1130 today to discuss this subject. Problem. To determine whether to send a mission (Mike Feldman, of the President's Staff and Sloan) to Tel Aviv to advise Prime Minister Eshkol of the U.S. decision on tanks; and to consider a proposed "talking paper" for the mission (Tab A)./2/ /2/Tab A, entitled "Feldman Talking Paper," dated May 13, is a draft of Document 55; see footnote 1 thereto. Discussion. Upon return of Komer and Sloan from Europe,/3/ and after your report of conversation with Minister Von Hassel,/4/ a letter from the President to Mr. Eshkol was drafted, advising that the U.S. could not supply tanks but that European sources would./5/ The President indicated that he preferred to send a personal messenger since the answer was to be essentially negative, provided we had sufficiently firm British and German positions on the sale of tanks to inform Eshkol that his needs could be met. /3/Sloan and Komer conducted discussions May 3-8 with officials in London and Bonn concerning the possibility of Israel's purchase of tanks. Reports on their mission are in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Tanks, Vol. I and in National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 12-5 ISR. /4/Reports of McNamara's discussion of tanks for Israel with German Defense Minister von Hassel and Chancellor Erhard on May 9 and 12 are ibid. /5/The draft letter is filed with a May 12 memorandum from Jernegan to Talbot. (Ibid.) The British have decided they are willing to sell; both Centurions to be fitted with 105mm guns, and new Chieftains further on. Denis Greenhill advised Mac Bundy of this decision orally on Thursday/6/ and promised a written message to confirm by today. /6/The conversation is recorded in a May 15 memorandum by Komer. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Tanks, Vol. I) The Germans are experiencing considerably more difficulty. Ambassador McGhee reported by telephone to Komer on Thursday that Erhard, Schroeder and Von Hassel all continue to remain negative./7/ Von Hassel continues to be concerned about problem of replacing M-48s sold to Israel by the FRG; and the Foreign Office is very concerned about Arab antagonisms and the question of Arab recognition of the East Germans. /7/The telephone conversation is recorded in a May 14 memorandum by Komer. (Ibid.) McGhee had a meeting with Schroeder scheduled for today, and a further cable was sent to him yesterday on the subject (Tab B)./8/ His answer should be available by the time of the meeting this morning. We may then determine whether the mission should be sent to Tel Aviv. /8/Tab B is a copy of telegram 3242 to Bonn, May 15. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 12 ISR) A negative answer from Bonn will throw a cloud on the British deal also, because they wish the U.S. and/or the FRG to share the political heat. Besides the Israelis least prefer the Centurion which has a range of only 120 miles. They want as many M-48A3s as possible. There is the further problem that no final decision has been made by the President that the U.S. will provide the retrofit kits (105mm guns and diesel engines) to convert the German M-48s to M-48A3s. Mac Bundy and Phil Talbot take the position that we must be responsive on this, but the supply would be through the FRG and not direct from U.S. to Israel. Recommendations 1. We should send the mission to Tel Aviv only if we have a reasonably affirmative answer from the Germans. Otherwise a Presidential letter is preferable. 2. We should agree to furnish retrofit kits for any M-48s which the FRG sells to Israel, provided the Germans will act as a channel for the sale of guns and engines also, and it is not a direct sale to Israel by the U.S. 3. Approve the proposed "talking paper" for the mission (Tab A). John T. McNaughton
Washington, May 16, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of McGeorge Bundy, Memorandum of Meetings with the President, Vol. I. Secret. Drafted on May 18. Bundy wrote at the top: "No dis. McGB." SUBJECT PRESENT When this item came up Mr. Bundy distributed the draft instructions from the President to Feldman and Sloan for their mission to Israel. Secretary Rusk queried whether we should say anything about possible economic aid at this time if this seemed necessary to pave the way for Israeli tank purchases in Europe. Feldman thought that this would really be desirable because as he pointed out the Israelis probably did not want secondhand tanks. Their main interest would be in the new British Chieftain. However, this was terribly expensive; hence to steer the Israelis in this direction, we ought to be willing to promise them some indirect help along the line Rusk suggested. Bundy felt this would create a difficult political problem. We had been telling everyone that Israel had done so well economically that it was on the list of those countries which no longer needed US economic aid. Could we say now that it should get more aid, and still carry credibility with the Congress? Rusk thought that the Congress would buy reasonable continued aid to Israel more easily than to any other country. McNamara suggested, as a way out, that we were selling many millions of dollars of equipment to the UK; we could easily knock down the price sufficiently to make up the difference. If the differential between secondhand M-48s or Centurions and new Chieftains was on the order of $150,000, then the total add-on needed might be on the order of $30-40 million. It was agreed on Bundy's suggestion that this subject should be left for the Eshkol visit itself. However, Feldman could tell the Israelis that if price were a serious problem, we could consider how to help meet it. Feldman thought that if the purpose of his mission was to get tanks off the Eshkol agenda, we must be able to tell the Israelis more than currently seemed feasible. Harman had told him that the Israelis did not want Centurions. The German deal was better, but unfortunately he couldn't tell them at this point that the Germans were signed on. Bundy's view was that we couldn't really take tanks off the Eshkol agenda. We'd have to talk tanks with Eshkol. But we could take them off the "public" agenda if we handled the matter properly. Feldman asked Secretary McNamara if we could tell the Israelis that we would provide the guns and engines for German M-48 tanks if these were available from Bonn. McNamara seemed to agree, and Rusk pointed out that this would be feasible if we could sell these items through the Germans. Bundy commented that this was the best we could do at the present juncture. Feldman thought that the best he could come back with under these circumstances was assurance that the Israelis would keep quiet till they could explore tank prospects with the Germans and the UK. Bundy agreed, and felt the Israelis should start on this right now. Feldman warned that the Israelis, if they did not get satisfactory responses, might come back to us about tanks. Again Bundy said we would [have?] to leave this to them. He asked whether the President approved the instructions. The President told Feldman to "get the job done and don't come back without it." Rusk raised a question about the points on Israeli missiles in the Presidential instruction. Missiles were missiles, even if the UAR variety didn't seem very good; Rusk didn't think the President should tell the Israelis they shouldn't acquire missiles when the UAR had them. He recognized the limited military value of such missiles, but pointed out that they created a major psychological and political problem for Israel. Bundy said the difference was that the Israelis could make nuclear warheads to put on their missiles, while the UAR couldn't. The real issue was whether Israel was going for a nuclear capability. Rusk felt in that case we should focus on the nuclear weapons. This was the risk. Feldman agreed. He mentioned that Eshkol had said he would gladly settle for a 1-2 ratio missiles vis-a-vis the Egyptians. Bundy pointed out that the number of missiles wasn't the issue. The intelligence community thought that Israel's covert program was aimed at a nuclear capability. McCone concurred. The issue, therefore, was one of nuclear proliferation, as Bundy put it. Feldman suggested he use as a cover story that he was going to Israel to arrange a sale of three million pounds of beef under PL-480, and that he actually sign the agreement while there. This would provide a perfectly legitimate cover. He had also been asked by the Kennedy Library to take BG's recollections for the oral history. This might also provide good cover. The President agreed on the beef story, but felt it inappropriate for a Government official to be going to take oral history interviews. He told Feldman to leave this out. RWK
58. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Jerusalem, May 17, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Tanks, Vol. I. Confidential; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Palmer on May 18. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS Levi Eshkol, Prime Minister Myer Feldman, Deputy Special Counsel to the President Walworth Barbour, Ambassador Note: The meeting took place at the Prime Minister's residence in Jerusalem the evening of May 17. The Prime Minister could not receive us Monday morning, May 18, the regular weekly cabinet meeting having been deferred until then because May 17 was an Israeli national holiday. Mr. Feldman outlined the points in the President's instructions, reiterating a number of observations for emphasis. Inter alia, he explained that the President had been thinking of replying to the Prime Minister's last communication with another letter, but had decided it would be preferable to send Messrs. Feldman and Sloan to talk with Mr. Eshkol. The President sent warm greetings and asked Mr. Feldman to reaffirm the President's firm adherence to the commitment of his predecessors to the security of Israel. The Israeli request for tanks had been very thoroughly considered at the highest level of the USG. An important factor in these considerations was how the US could best maintain and expand its influence in the Arab world. We realize there is some difference of view between the USG and the GOI regarding US relations with the Arab states. We feel it is in our mutual best interests that the US retain as much influence as possible with the Arabs. The President has concluded that if the US were to become a major supplier of arms to Israel, especially at this time of particular stress, the situation would polarize dangerously. For instance, such an act could have very negative effects on the Jordan waters situation. In this connection, the President wishes to reaffirm our support for Israel's utilization of Jordan Basin waters within the Unified Plan. The supply of arms by the US to Israel would severely set back efforts to achieve better de facto relations with Jordan generally. The Arabs would undoubtedly turn to the Soviets for more military assistance. The USG has considered this matter and its ramifications in great depth. We simply could not come to any conclusion other than that we could not be a source of tanks for Israel. However, Mr. Feldman continued, we recognize Israel's need for tanks and therefore we have looked into the matter much further. We sent a team, consisting of Mr. Sloan and another expert, to the UK and Germany in order to ascertain how those countries might help. Foremost in our minds were two considerations: (1) Israel's need for tanks, and (2) the desirability of Israel's obtaining these tanks at the best possible price. Mr. Eshkol wryly interjected that Israel would like to receive the tanks free of charge. Mr. Feldman recalled that when he was last here the Prime Minister and he had discussed the missile problem as well as tanks. He stressed there was no relationship between missiles and the decision we have made about tanks. The USG is prepared to assist in two important ways: (1) we shall assist in every way we can to help Israel get the tanks it needs from the UK and Germany, and (2) in this effort we are willing to supply to the Germans the engines and guns for converting M-48 tanks to M-48A3 models. Although we have no definite assurances either from the British or Germans, we feel almost certain that the UK will supply Centurions on a fairly quick delivery schedule, and that Israel probably can also obtain Chieftains from the British. Mr. Feldman urged the GOI to go to the Germans as soon as possible regarding M-48s. We are talking to the Germans and will continue to do so. They would have a number of problems in such a deal as we envisage. The need for absolute secrecy in this whole matter is paramount, Mr. Feldman emphasized. It is extremely important that it not appear that the British and Germans have been forced by the US to supply tanks to Israel. Therefore, all discussions about the possible arrangements should be held very closely. Noting that the implementation of this plan would result in meeting Israel's tank requirements, Mr. Feldman said that we would like this present talk to serve as a substitution for Mr. Eshkol's discussing tanks with President Johnson. Chancellor Erhard will be visiting Washington about a week after the Prime Minister leaves the US. If the German government has not responded to the Israeli request for tanks before Erhard arrives in the US, we will put this topic high on the agenda of our talks with him. Mr. Feldman stressed that the projected arrangement was the best possible, and that it would result in Israel's securing tanks much more cheaply than it could from the US. The Prime Minister asked what would happen if the German answer were negative. Mr. Feldman said we would prefer not to speculate on that question now. He reiterated the importance of secrecy. He told the Prime Minister that Israel's friends in the US are being requested not to ask questions about Israel's arms requirements during the forthcoming delicate period. The Prime Minister should instruct his Embassy to do likewise. If this plan were to become public, its implementation would be rendered impossible. Mr. Feldman urged that the GOI immediately approach the British and the Germans. Mr. Eshkol asked about financing the purchase and conversion of the British and German tanks. Emphasizing that his figures were necessarily only estimates, Mr. Sloan said M-48s converted to M-48A3s might run somewhere between $120,000 and $135,000 per unit. In his discussions with the British, they indicated they could refit the Centurions for approximately the same figure, although they made no definite commitment on price. The British appeared to be very interested in the possibility of selling Chieftains to Israel, and therefore they will probably be inclined to offer to refit the Centurions for a reasonable price. Mr. Sloan said that the Chieftains would probably sell at about $300,000 per unit, about the same as the German Leopard. Stressing that what he was about to say should in no way be taken as any kind of a commitment, Mr. Feldman commented that the USG was aware of Israel's limited resources. We expect Israel to talk more with us about the problem of financing its security needs. However, we cannot furnish the tanks under the military assistance program, on a grant basis. When the GOI has firm prices from the UK and Germany, it can come to the USG for a further discussion of cost. The feeling in Washington seems to be that Israel's resources are adequate to cover the purchase of the 300 older tanks, but that when it comes to acquiring newer models, we shall be willing to take another look. Mr. Sloan discussed various technical aspects relating to the German part of the plan. If the Germans can be persuaded to provide M-48 chassis, the cost would probably be less than that which we would have to ask. We would furnish the guns and engines at our lowest book price. The retrofitting would be done in Israel, where labor costs are lower. Continuing, Mr. Sloan said that leaving aside the political questions, the picture appears to be as follows. The British seem ready to deliver Centurions almost immediately and at a more rapid pace than they indicated in their previous discussions with the Israelis. Further, UK probably would like to sell Chieftains to Israel. It is our hope that the Germans can be persuaded to make up the balance of approximately 300 with M-48s. In response to a question by the Prime Minister, Mr. Sloan commented further on the cost estimates on the components. In the ensuing discussion, in which Mr. Peres participated, it was noted that if the Germans supplied Israel with M-48s or M-48A1s, they would have to replace these with M-48A2s at greater cost. Mr. Sloan noted that entirely apart from the political problems involved, there simply are no M-48A3s available. In reply to a question by Mr. Peres, Mr. Sloan said the US had discussed tanks for Israel both with the Defense and the Foreign Ministry people in Germany. He too stressed that perhaps the primary problem is that of keeping this whole matter secure. The Germans and the British are extremely concerned about the possibility of leaks. Mr. Peres and Mr. Sloan discussed additional factors relating to cost and delivery schedules of components. Mr. Peres asked if Israel could not negotiate better prices on the US guns. Mr. Sloan said these prices cannot be reduced; they are our cost prices. If we were to assist Israel on financing, it would have to be done in some other way than changing the item prices. Mr. Peres asked about spares. Mr. Sloan said that both we and the Germans have spares; they present no problem. Mr. Peres noted that Germany's problem would not be just a question of money. The Government would have to put it before a Parliamentary committee; maintaining secrecy would be very difficult. He suggested that the US give the Germans a tank for a tank at no extra expense; after all, the M-48 is a dying tank. Mr. Sloan said this would present problems for us. Preliminarily, the Germans seemed willing to exchange models even if this involved extra expense for them. Meanwhile, the US will be cooperative. In response to a further question from Mr. Peres, Mr. Sloan said we have indicated to both the British and the Germans that Israel's immediate problem is acquiring a minimum of 300 tanks over the next two or three [years]. We also told them Israel has a total figure of 500 in mind. Both the British and Germans, each of whom is aware that the other was approached, understand that together the problem is to meet the 300 requirement. Mr. Peres said the provision of the conversion kits normally would take a year. Couldn't we do better than that? Mr. Sloan thought probably we could not, but we would look into it. The Prime Minister observed there are many "ifs." Moreover, as far as the Chieftains are concerned, they are extremely expensive. He said he would postpone consideration of the Chieftains for the later tranche of 200; Israel must find cheaper tanks to make up the first 300. Mr. Eshkol asked about the credit terms which the UK might offer. Mr. Peres said they would probably offer three to five years at five and one-quarter percent. The Prime Minister asked if the GOI should approach the Germans; what was the bridge? Mr. Sloan said that while we are quite sure Israel will get a positive response from the British, we are not as sure about the Germans. Israel should approach the Germans now. Mr. Feldman also urged that the GOI immediately approach the Germans. The Prime Minister said he would like to sum up. The USG has decided that it cannot give tanks to Israel. It is suggesting that Israel go to the UK and Germany. He thought the US part of this arrangement should be to come up with some assistance on financing. Mr. Feldman suggested that the GOI first find out what the prices will be, then ascertain what resources are available, then come to the USG and we will talk further. Mr. Sloan reiterated that in our judgement the provision of 300 units at approximately $125,000 per unit, on reasonable credit terms, is something with which Israel could cope out of its regular budget. The Prime Minister said it would be a mistake to assume that Israel could afford such a burden. A deal involving some $60 million, even if payments were stretched over ten-fifteen years, is not something Israel could easily bear. Israel's deficit in foreign currency (sic) is running at $400 million; next year it will be $420 or even $450 million. Israel is having to pay dollars for the Mirages. Mr. Eshkol said he "confessed" that Israel would mortgage everything in order to ensure its security, "but this is a very heavy burden for you to impose on us." Mr. Feldman suggested taking one step at a time. The first step is to secure the British and German commitments to provide tanks; the Germans will need a lot of persuasion. Mr. Peres said the IDF is not happy about Centurions. They are inferior to the Soviet tanks which the UAR has. This was the reason Israel did not press the British on the Centurions. The M-48s are far preferable. Mr. Peres suggested that the US supply the conversion packages at a greatly reduced cost, on a surplus basis. Mr. Sloan noted that this would run into serious statutory difficulties. The Prime Minister expressed appreciation that Messrs. Feldman and Sloan had come to Israel. Mr. Feldman again emphasized the need for keeping this whole matter completely confidential. The Prime Minister said, "I agree." Mr. Feldman commented that Ambassador Harman has been cooperating in preventing speculation; it would be a good idea if the Prime Mininster requested his Embassy in Washington to continue these efforts, especially while negotiations are going on. If the German Government has taken no decision by the time Chancellor Erhard leaves the US, the USG and the GOI will reconsider the situation in Washington. Mr. Feldman said that he would like to review his instructions in order to be certain he had left nothing out. He read out the section on the missile problem and the following sentence re tanks: "We intend to see that a comparable alternative is worked out, provided the matter is closely held." Mr. Peres suggested that we closely coordinate our efforts vis-a-vis the UK and Germany. He and Mr. Sloan made arrangements to meet May 18th. The Prime Minister said it was good to know where we stood. Mr. Peres commented that Israel was very much concerned about the Khrushchev visit to the UAR. Contrary to the USG estimate, Israel is convinced that the UAR missiles are being rapidly improved. Israel is really worried about missiles with conventional warheads, and has reason to fear that the Egyptians are working on chemical warheads. The difference in our respective judgements about UAR missiles is very great, Peres said. Furthermore, Israel would like to take up with the US the problem of its air strength. It needs "a few score" planes that are heavier than the Mirage. The Egyptians are building airfields further and further away from Cairo. If Israel could acquire some light attack bombers, like the Douglas Skyhawks and P-5's, the Israeli missile program could be "correspondingly limited." Mr. Feldman said he was not prepared to react on this point. Mr. Sloan said he hoped it would be possible for Secretary McNamara to give the Prime Minister a thorough briefing on our reaction time and capabilities to come to Israel's assistance if it were attacked. Perhaps there could be an increased exchange of information of a nature which would help allay Israel's concerns. The US is confident of its ability to respond to an emergency very quickly. Some quiet exchanges of pertinent information might be very helpful. Israel would find it impossible adequately to face all possible threats by itself. The Ambassador recalled that he and the Prime Minister had discussed this subject on several occasions. He noted that Secretary Rusk, in a recent speech in Brussels, had stressed the impossibility of any country's being completely secure on its own. The Prime Minister remarked that this was all very good. Israel does not doubt US capabilities. What it does doubt is whether, due to world-wide political responsibilities borne by the US, Israel can count on timely US intervention in all contingencies. Mr. Eshkol said that even though the US is the most poweful country in the world, it feels that it cannot even sell Israel some tanks. There ensued a further general exchange on this question, with Mr. Eshkol contending that only after a country becomes militarily very strong does it take up the theme of the inter-dependence of security. As another group was waiting to see the Prime Minister, the meeting broke up after two hours. Mr. Eshkol again expressed gratification that Messrs. Feldman and Sloan had come to talk to him about this vital problem. At the meeting the following day between Messrs. Peres, Feldman and Sloan, Feldman stressed again the need for restraint in any public discussion of Israeli security needs in the United States. He said it was his understanding, and he asked that Mr. Peres confirm this with the Prime Minister, that every effort would be made to restrain persons following the Israeli security problems from discussing these problems. He referred specifically to public figures who might be unaware of the delicacy of the negotiations. Mr. Peres said he was sure the Israel Embassy would do its part in cautioning against any discussion during the negotiations.
59. Letter From President Johnson to President Nasser/1/ Washington, May 20, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, UAR, Nasser Correspondence, Vol. I. Top Secret. A draft of this letter was transmitted to Cairo in telegram 5140, May 3, and given to Nasser by Badeau on May 7, as reported in telegram 2632, Document 52. The letter was sent to Johnson for signature with a May 19 memorandum from Komer, noting that Nasser had said he would give assurances as to UAR intentions to refrain from acquiring nuclear weapons. Komer wrote that although Nasser had not indicated whether he would do so privately or publicly, his statement was sufficiently promising to fulfill Badeau's request for an official copy of the letter "to smoke out Nasser." A note in Bundy's handwriting on Komer's memorandum stated that he and Rusk strongly concurred. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, UAR, Nasser Correspondence, Vol. I) Dear Mr. President: As Ambassador Badeau was asked to convey to you last year, the United States much appreciated your personal endorsement of the partial nuclear test ban and your Government's prompt signature of the treaty. Your action contributed greatly toward near unanimity in world support for the treaty. As you know, this step has now been followed by a further effort on the part of the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States to curb the increase of nuclear weapons. Thus we are embarked on an earnest effort to reduce tensions and curtail the arms race. Since assuming the Presidency, I have had an opportunity to review the statements made by you and your representatives on the need for disarmament and I have noted your mention of this subject to me in your letter of April 26./2/ I find in your statements assurance that the United Arab Republic views nuclear warfare as the greatest danger to mankind and that your Government regards itself as committed, in a broader sense, not to develop nuclear weapons or introduce them into your defense program. Your confirmation that this understanding is correct would represent a step which others might follow to ensure that the threat of nuclear warfare is further constrained. /2/See footnote 2, Document 50. The ultimate goal we all seek is that of a peaceful world and we must work together in resolving these difficult problems. I know you share this hope and expectation and I would welcome a further expression of your views. Sincerely, Lyndon B. Johnson [Continue with the next documents] Volume XVIII Index | Foreign Relations Online | Historian's Office | Department of State | Secretary of State |