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 | FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XVIII Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964-67 Department of State |
 60. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, May 25, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Arab Republic, Vol. I. Secret. Drafted by Davies. According to the President's Daily Diary, the meeting was held at the White House from 11:50 a.m. to 12:20 p.m., and Ambassador Kamel was accompanied by Jernegan. (Ibid.) SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS The following account of his conversation with the President/2/ was provided by Ambassador Kamel. /2/Bundy had recommended that the President see Kamel before the Eshkol visit as "political insurance with Nasser." Kamel had met privately with President Kennedy in 1961 and had told former Secretary of the Treasury Robert B. Anderson that he had Nasser's authority to have a similar private interview with Johnson if he was invited. (Memorandum from Bundy to Johnson, May 6; ibid., National Security File, Country File, United Arab Republic, Vol. I) The Ambassador said he had received a telegram from President Nasser conveying his very best wishes and high regards for the President and asking the Ambassador to convey his thanks to the President for his initiative in entering into correspondence with him. He was particularly touched by the President's having done so during the sad days immediately after the death of President Kennedy. He instructed the Ambassador to stress his most earnest desire for good relations between the U.S. and the U.A.R. and his great hopes that these would be consolidated on solid bases during the President's Administration. The Ambassador began his presentation with the following three points: 1. The Near East has great strategic and economic importance to the United States, ranking next to Western Europe in this respect. 2. Egypt, through the ages, has been the heart and mind of the Arab world. 3. The Middle East is passing through a deep and broad transitionary period, and its stresses and strains are not directly related to those of the cold war. The Ambassador said that American relations with the Arab states of the Near East could be divided into two periods. The first ranging from the close of World War II to 1958, and the second from 1958 to the present. Prior to July 1958, relations with the Arabs had deteriorated because of: 1. The creation of Israel in the Arab heartland; 2. The backward-looking policies of U.S. allies, France and Great Britain; 3. The "with me or against me" policies of Mr. Dulles; 4. The refusal of the United States to provide arms requested by Egypt; 5. The fact and manner of withdrawal of the High Dam offer; 6. The tripartite aggression of 1956; 7. The Eisenhower Doctrine with its premise of a power vacuum existing in the Near East. As a consequence of these factors: 1. The Soviet Union was provided an opportunity to expand its influence in the area. 2. Arab confidence in the United States was reduced to a new low. 3. The United States was identified with the alien intrusion of the Zionist state into the Arab World. However, after July 1958, a creative and positive aspect emerged in American policies. American policies, recognizing the forces and trends in the area and adapting to them, achieved the following: 1. Not one Communist government arose in the area, despite political instability and sizeable Soviet military and economic assistance. Iraq and Syria, threatened with internal Communist takeover, were purged of Communism primarily through actions and influence of the UAR. 2. Economic and cultural relations of the Arabs with the West have expanded. 3. U.S.-U.A.R. cooperation in matters such as Yemen has developed. a) There is hope of emergence of a modern intelligentsia in Yemen capable of managing Yemen affairs. b) The Royal House of Saud has been stabilized; Saudi relations with the UAR restored and improved. c) There has been no interference with Western oil interests. (The Ambassador noted that the British, following different policies, did not enjoy the position in the area which might have resulted from policies similar to those of the U.S.) 4. There is no broad anti-American sentiment in the area. 5. All major U.S. interests are intact. 6. The Arab-Israel conflict has been contained. The Ambassador said that this latter factor had been enhanced by the understanding shown by President Kennedy of the merits of a policy of "freezing the Israel issue", avoiding public statements which might exacerbate Arab sensitivities, and excluding the issue from U.S. domestic politics. He warned that at the present juncture Israel and American Zionists were "seeking to defreeze" the issue in order to embarrass American-Arab relations. The visit of Prime Minister Eshkol came in the midst of a militant Israeli-Zionist campaign against U.S. policy. The New York Times recently noted that the Prime Minister was coming to seek arms, money, and a security guaranty. He actually, however, would seek to torpedo U.S.-Arab relations. The Ambassador said that here the President asked what he thought the U.S. should do. The Ambassador said he explained that in his opinion the Cuban confrontation of a year and a half ago had resulted in a detente in U.S.-Soviet relations. However, behind this facade the cold war continues. He had long thought the Soviets would concentrate their attack on American interests in the Near East. This was proving the case. To counter this attack, the following should guide U.S. actions: 1. Extreme caution in U.S. decisions involving relations with the Arab states. 2. Efforts to constrain Israel to adopt policies of restraint. 3. Positive efforts to continue the momentum of improved relations with Cairo. In the latter connection, the Ambassador felt that the U.S. might take action to: 1. Moderate Zionist inspired attacks against the UAR in the Congress. Threats of aid withdrawal only create negative reactions in the UAR. 2. Get the British to bring about a normalization of relations with the UAR and the YAR. 3. Bring the UAR to the periphery of the free world alliance, primarily through increasing economic ties. A Western consortium to provide for UAR economic needs was essential. The U.S. must encourage and support the UAR desire for closer economic relations with the West. The Ambassador summed up by saying evidence of U.S. desire to continue economic cooperation was even more important since yesterday's announcement of massive USSR credits for the UAR. Continued cooperation plus efforts to preserve U.S.-Arab relations by freezing the Zionist question would ensure continually improving U.S.-U.A.R. relations. Only the Soviets will benefit if the Zionists succeed in disrupting relations between the Arabs and the U.S. The Ambassador stressed that direct correspondence between the President and President Nasser would be of great significance in ensuring good relations. The U.S. should use its good offices to improve U.A.R. relations with the British. The President need not worry about the Khrushchev-Nasser communique./3/ The facts of the situation, not words, were important in foreign relations. Egypt will not abandon its policy of non-alignment. It is, however, important to note that the USSR has the same goal as Israel and the Zionists: disruption of U.S.-Arab relations. The interests of the U.S. and the free world call for a green light from the President for the Secretary of State and his aides to launch a more active and positive program to improve U.S.-Arab relations. /3/The communique was issued at the conclusion of Chairman Khrushchev's May 9-25 visit to the United Arab Republic, where he took part in ceremonies marking the completion of the first stage of the Aswan High Dam. Telegram 2836 from Cairo transmitted highlights of the communique. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 1 UAR-US) In an informal conversation with Kamel prior to his meeting with the President, Komer and Jernegan remonstrated with him about the communique, noting that it had touched on almost every issue that was or could be a source of U.S.-UAR friction. (Telegram 5538 to Cairo, May 27; ibid.) The President thanked Ambassador Kamel for his expose and affirmed his interest in promoting relations between the U.S. and the Arabs. He noted that some elements introduced in yesterday's communique seemed completely unnecessary. These elements took some explaining and could not be wished away. The paragraphs relating to U.S.-Cuban relations were particularly galling. Ambassador Kamel suggested that words were unimportant and Americans should try rapidly to forget any unpleasant aspect of the communique. They should accept it calmly. The President said he was quite willing to be calm about elements of the communique, provided President Nasser would agree to be quiet and calm about Prime Minister Eshkol's visit. The President asked the Ambassador to inform President Nasser that the United States would firmly oppose any aggression by Israel against the Arab states. The U.S. would oppose Israeli expansionism. By the same token, it would oppose any aggression against Israel. The President enjoined the Ambassador to inform President Nasser that Israel does not formulate American policy. At the same time, he would advise the Arabs not to "corner" Israel, for only the Communists could gain by this. The President expressed his concern at the escalation in arms. He noted that the more military equipment was provided by the USSR to the Arabs, the more France provided to Israel. This spiral was both dangerous and expensive to those involved. The President suggested that the UAR not concern itself too much with what Senator Gruening and others who were attacking U.S. policy toward the UAR were saying. He noted that these same men were attacking the President and his policy as well as the UAR. As he could not stop these attacks to protect himself, neither could he stop them in the interest of the UAR. The President noted the importance of the U.S. base in Libya to the global defense posture of the U.S. The President said that he agreed with most of the points made by Ambassador Kamel and would like very much to see him again. He suggested that the Ambassador telephone him when he felt it important to have an exchange of views. The conversation lasted almost an hour.
61. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts/1/ Washington, May 26, 1964, 2:42 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 ISR. Confidential. Drafted by Russell, cleared by Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Henry J. Tasca, and approved by Jernegan. Sent to Cairo, Damascus, Beirut, Baghdad, Jidda, Amman, and Kuwait and repeated to Baida, Tunis, Algiers, Rabat, Khartoum, Taiz, and Tel Aviv. 2199. Following based on uncleared memcon. Representatives of UAR, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco and Sudan called on Secretary May 25 to express concern about possible effect of Eshkol visit on Arab-US relations. UAR Ambassador Kamel spokesman: reviewed Arab-US relations noting Arab-Israel problem only major obstacle to good relations. In recent years removal of Arab-Israel question from political arena and public discussions had resulted in Arab-US rapprochement. Arab states now concerned that Eshkol visit represented Zionist effort rekindle quiescent Arab-Israel problem, provoke Arabs and press aggressive expansionist aims. Israelis expected present large list requests including arms, financial assistance, and even security guarantee. Israelis had no need for arms since Arabs not contemplating aggression, did not require money and had guaranty in form UN Charter. Zionists desired rift in Arab-US relations. While not appropriate for Arabs question who should be guests of USG, Ambassadorial deputation urged exercise wisdom and farsightedness to protect US-Arab relations which prerequisite to peace in Near East. Representatives hoped US territory would not be used as stage for anti-Arab propaganda. Joint US-Arab interests at core of Arab concern. Secretary replied stressing reciprocal US interest in good US relations with Arab world, noting 1) historical tradition of cultural and economic ties, 2) absence of US territory ambitions and 3) interest in emergence of Arab states as strong independent entities in modern world. Differences however had existed and events of 1948 and creation of Israel were among most sensitive. We hoped find ways insulate such differences, otherwise impossible work steadily for peace all hoped to build. We concerned about peace in Near East and did not believe area should become battle field of great powers. We desired assist in development friendly relations throughout area. We were concerned by prospect sharply increased arms race in Near East. We had worked with patient determination at Geneva to seek ways to relieve countries of overwhelming burden of armaments. So far not possible make much progress. Our concern in disarmament field applied as much to Near East as to rest of world. Secretary continued representatives quite properly had not commented on propriety Eshkol visit. US has relations with Israel of which visits normal part. We would take all possible steps to contribute to peace in area and do nothing or say nothing to inflame situation in area or harm our relations with Arab world. We not responsible, however, for press speculation on details visit which might not be reported accurately. We would consider carefully anything we did and hoped visit would not result in any dismay in Arab world or create any untoward problems. Secretary undertook pass representatives' views to President. Ambassador Kamel expressed appreciation on behalf Ambassadors, Charges and countries represented. Informal reaction to Secretary's comments indicated representatives much pleased and considered call successful. Agreed representatives would inform press purpose visit and express nature their concerns. Department would express US views along lines Secretary's comments. Action Addressees should convey foregoing to appropriate host government officials and express hope local news media will treat meeting in same restrained manner characterized by attitude Arab representatives./2/ /2/On June 1, the Arab Information Office in Washington issued a document entitled "Statement by the Arab Press Attaches and Information Officers in Washington, D.C." which criticized the Eshkol visit. On June 2, Acting Secretary Ball called in the 13 Arab chiefs of mission to ask them to inform their governments that the U.S. Government found the statement objectionable. The meeting is summarized in circular telegram 2255, June 3. (Ibid.) Rusk
62. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic/1/ Washington, May 28, 1964, 7 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL UAR-US. Top Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Dickman and Harrison M. Symmes; cleared by Wreatham E. Gathright of S/P, Deputy Assistant Director of ACDA's International Relations Bureau Richard B. Freund, and Komer; and approved by Jernegan. 5567. Embtel 2758,/2/ Deptel 5435./3/ Near East Arms Control. /2/Dated May 19. (Ibid.) /3/Not found; it apparently transmitted the text of Johnson's May 20 letter to Nasser, Document 59. When you hand President's letter to Nasser, mention to him that, as in the case of our letter, we count on opportunity see his proposed reply before it is in final form. FYI. We would hope thereby preclude his preparing response with conditions that would emasculate assurances we seek from him. End FYI. Judging by previous reactions we hopeful Nasser this time will have views on IAEA safeguards on which have pressed him last three approaches. In discussing this aspect you might wish suggest that best assurance Nasser could have that Israel will not develop nuclear weapons would be Israel's acceptance IAEA safeguards for all of its reactors. UAR acceptance same safeguards would be small price to pay. FYI. If Nasser should say IAEA could only provide safeguards for Israeli manufacture and not against acquisition from other nuclear powers, you should point to February 6 Foster statement at Geneva that it declared US policy not transfer nuclear weapons into national control any state not now possessing them. We would do our best obtain similar assurances from other nuclear powers as regards UAR and Israel even before achieving a world-wide non-dissemination agreement. End FYI. In connection with Israeli intentions you should call his attention to Eshkol's statement of May 20 (Tel Aviv 183 to Cairo)./4/ You should cite in particular Eshkol's point (C) that GOI prepared to join in any effort to rid the area completely of all arms at present in area under reciprocal control. We recognize UAR not willing to discuss this directly with Israel nor to enter into arrangement that would be susceptible of exploitation as direct dealing with Israel. We continue believe, however, there is ample scope for an arms control arrangement that would avoid points UAR finds objectionable. In any case, Eshkol statement encourages our belief now is time to work out something, and we hope UAR will not let slip opportunity to prevent further worsening of situation. /4/Not found. You may say to Nasser that we have of course been seeking persuade Israel, too, not to pursue nuclear and missile development. If UAR continues missile development, we believe this will not only lead other side to obtain or develop matching or better missiles but may also lead them develop nuclear capability. Therefore we urge Nasser to think this problem through and hope he will consider carefully effects of closing door to our approaches. We strongly desire you probe Nasser's missile intentions, perhaps citing UK newspaper report UAR preparing force of 1000 missiles by 1965-1966 as means of drawing Nasser out. You should also ask him whether report UAR planning on CW warheads accurate, in light UAR use of gas in Yemen. If Nasser's general attitude negative and discussion proves unproductive, we would hope you nevertheless could keep door open and obtain his agreement reconsider various aspects at some later date. In so doing, suggest you say our concern over arms rivalry has received and will continue to receive attention highest levels of USG. We shall be exploring other means of reducing threat to peace and stability caused by Arab-Israel arms rivalry. Thus, Nasser should not be alarmed if he receives reports we have discussed NE arms rivalry with other states concerned. Our intentions will always be aimed at being helpful. We will of course discuss with UAR any avenues that appear promising. Since this may be your last meeting with Nasser on this subject, request you say we hope exchange of views will bear fruit both in terms of peace and security of his own country and region and in terms of peace we all seek on this planet. Ball
63. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson/1/ Washington, May 28, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Eshkol Visit, 6/1-3/64. Secret. Sent to Johnson with a brief covering memorandum from Bundy calling it "absolutely first-class." The Eshkol visit may be a strenuous one. Eshkol is being briefed to the nines on every issue which might arise. Also it is peculiar to US/Israeli relations that even secondary issues often can only be settled at the top level. Even so, we're confident this exercise will be a success: (a) Eshkol needs to make it one even more than we do; (b) we have a very forthcoming menu planned. In fact, the only big risk is that we'll look so friendly as to create extra Arab problems, following hard on Khrushchev's all-out pandering to the Arabs in Cairo. 1. The sheer fact that Eshkol is the first Israeli PM ever to visit officially marks a big political plus for him. He'll portray the visit as a success almost regardless of how much bacon he takes home. 2. The Israelis seem actually relieved that we're helping them find tanks elsewhere (they apparently expected a flat turndown). They'll keep pressure on us till another deal can be arranged (and we're still far from it), but the heat won't be too intense just now. 3. We can also offer more financial aid, if tank purchases elsewhere create an extra burden. 4. Most important, we can carry your February desalting offer a big step further by offering a prompt go-ahead on joint feasibility studies, and a promise of financial help if the studies pan out. This could easily be the biggest public plus of the visit. 5. We'll also get some very good public noises in speeches and communique. For example, if Eshkol will publicly deny any expansionist ambitions (big Arab beef), perhaps we can reiterate our stand against Arab aggression too. Substance of the Visit. I've underlined and annotated State's extensive briefing book/2/ because you'll want to be up to date on the issues Eshkol will raise (the Israelis will hang on everything you say, and repeat it later). Since we won't be able to brief you this weekend, I'll try to summarize everything in this memo. We can also lay on a briefing session Monday morning if you desire. /2/An undated briefing memorandum from Ball to Johnson on the Eshkol visit is ibid. Other briefing material is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 2406-2407. 1. Reassurance to Israel. To get the meeting off on an ideal footing, and disarm Eshkol, why not tell him right off the bat that the US stands foursquare behind Israel's security and well-being. This has in fact been the consistent policy of the US since 1947. We don't intend to let Israel go under; to the contrary we have from the outset done more than any other country to help build it up (including over $1 billion in aid). While we have necessarily had to maintain an element of superficial balance in our public posture, and have at times disagreed with Israeli policy, the record of our support is crystal clear. This has cost us much with the Arabs, and given the Soviets a big opening to exploit, but we don't intend to swerve from this policy. The one thing we ask of Israel is not to keep trying to force us to an all-out pro-Israeli policy. We ask this not just because a balanced policy is essential strategically to keep the Soviets out of the ME, and economically because of oil but because it is as much in Israel's interest as ours. If we choose Israel's side so openly that the Arabs form alliances with Moscow, Israel loses just as much as we. Our present policy gives the Arabs an incentive not to swing too far away from the West. This is simple common sense. 2. Our Jordan Waters stand is just the latest example of our support. We designed the Johnston Plan and stand fully by it, as the Arabs know. 3. Desalting. We recognize how vital water is to Israel's future, and since readily available sources are about exhausted you have personally inaugurated a new joint enterprise to exploit desalting--the only great new hope for water. We will be as forthcoming here as the still uncertain state of the art will allow. We'll work jointly with Israel to survey what kind of nuclear desalting plant would be technically and economically best, and would be prepared to help finance a plant if and when a mutually satisfactory scheme can be worked out (this could cost us as much as a $100 million loan). 4. Israel's own deterrent posture. We've always kept a close eye on the Arab-Israeli military balance. Our JCS and intelligence people just reviewed it again, and see Israel as able to maintain quite a deterrent edge for the foreseeable future./3/ We also think Israelis tend to discount the US deterrent role, though we're confident the Arabs know the score (McNamara will brief Eshkol on our capabilities). We've always regarded our economic aid as permitting Israel to buy enough modern arms in Europe to compensate for our inability to provide them directly. Even so, when nothing else was available we came through on Hawks. /3/A June 1 memorandum from Bundy to Johnson suggested that he might want to have a brief private talk with Eshkol [text not declassified]. He noted that the United States and Israel had differing estimates of the strength of the Arab states and that it was in the U.S. interest to show the Israelis that U.S. information was more reliable. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 5) 5. Tanks. We appreciate Eshkol's understanding as to why we simply can't afford to sell Israel tanks directly. But we'll do everything we can to help get them elsewhere. Eshkol will probably say he's grateful for our proffered help, but is dubious over whether Israel can get what it needs elsewhere. He will probably make a strong pitch that only M-48A3s from Germany will do. Since a German deal (even through another intermediary) looks questionable so far, we must insist that the Israelis consider the UK Centurion, which is available. It hasn't got the range of our M-48A3, but is otherwise just as good, and our military say it's adequate to meet Israel's defensive needs. My instinct is that Israel will make every effort to get M-48's, but fall back on the UK if this fails. So we ought to make every effort to help them with the Germans, but not let them come back to us if this aborts. 6. Other arms requests. Eshkol may, in the course of describing Israeli security worries, mention other arms needs, such as the jet bombers he mentioned to Feldman, or some counter to the UAR's Soviet-supplied missile boats. Our response is that our JCS and intelligence people see Israel as still able to maintain quite a deterrent edge. Nor should the Israelis forget our own deterrent support. 7. The UAR Missile Threat and Israel's Own Missile Plans. We've been over this ground many times unsuccessfully, but Feldman put Eshkol on notice that you'd have a personal try. Attached (Tab A)/4/ is a Defense study which counters the latest Israeli allegations (now it's chemical warheads). Perhaps the best argument with Eshkol is that his military (like our own so often) may have sold him on a very expensive and dangerous counter to a threat they hadn't really evaluated. We probably can't get Israel to cancel its existing French contract (which may be only for R and D missiles, though we just don't know). We can't veto Israel's missile plans, but as Israel's security guarantors we're entitled to ask it not to buy operational missiles until after it has consulted us. /4/Not found. 8. Dimona Reactor. We appreciate Israel's commitment to regular inspection but are disturbed at Eshkol's refusal to let us reassure the Arabs in general terms (you sent Eshkol two messages on this). We're firmly convinced that Israel's apparent desire to keep the Arabs guessing is highly dangerous. To appear to be going nuclear without really doing so is to invite trouble. It might spark Nasser into a foolish pre-emptive move. Without in any way implying that Israel is going nuclear, one has to admit that a functioning secret breeder reactor plus an oncoming missile delivery system add up to an inescapable conclusion that Israel is at least putting itself in a position to go nuclear. This could have the gravest repercussions on US-Israeli relations, and the earlier we try to halt it the better chance we have. This is why your raising a to-do about missiles, even if unsuccessful, will at least put Israel firmly on notice that we may be back at it again. 9. IAEA Controls. Israel's reluctance to accept IAEA controls also adds to our suspicions. We can't make Israel an exception because we're making sixty or so other clients of ours toe the IAEA line. The immediate issue is over renewal of a piddling 1-MW research reactor, but any new reactor on which we help Israel would have to be under IAEA. We hope you'll personally tell Eshkol they should bite the bullet now. 10. Economic Aid. Israel's economy is doing so well that Dave Bell sees no economic justification for new AID loans. Israel has had a fantastic 9-10% growth rate, has over $600 million reserves, per capita income of over $1,000 (better than Italy), etc. While Eshkol worries over Israel's great foreign debt, fact is that Israel bonds are being paid off mostly in Israeli pounds for tourism et al. However, Eshkol is determined to show that Israel still needs help, and there may be a political requirement here. Bell hopes we can keep trend downward from $20 million DL this year, but could live with $10 million per annum in 1965 (our presentation was $0-10) and 1966. But we would want to make clear that this is help in financing indirectly Israel's arms purchases, i.e. an additional incentive for them to go to European suppliers. 11. Our Arab Policy. No one can blame the Israelis, surrounded as they are, for repeatedly sniping at our Arab policy. The top people want to believe that we know what we're doing (and many Israelis agree with our policy), but they've been conditioned by living under the gun for so long to a "fortress Israel" psychology which leads them to over-react. In turn, the constant Arab verbal attacks are in reality a reflection of Arab frustration at their own impotence. We want to avoid at all costs a situation in which we become lined up so overtly behind Israel that the Arabs choose the USSR as their champion. It is Soviet arms, not US wheat, which creates the real threat to Israel. The greater the Soviet presence in the Middle East, the greater the threat to Israel. If you will only drive home these facts of life politely but firmly to Eshkol, it will help mightily in toning down the kind of repeated pressure from Israel and its friends which poses such a dilemma for us in the Middle East. R. W. Komer
64. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic/1/ Washington, May 30, 1964, 1:09 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL UAR-US. Top Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Davies and Symmes, cleared by Komer, and approved by Jernegan. 5592. Ref Deptel 5567./2/ We particularly want you to emphasize mischievous role of UAR missile program in pushing arms rivalry to new and dangerous levels, as covered in previous guidelines. We recognize of course thin line between insuring Nasser understands and appreciates nature of this escalation and on other hand giving him impression Israel about to go nuclear with our understanding and tacit support. We therefore leave to you best means of convincing Nasser this is game he cannot win because of Israel's technological development and access to outside financial sources. /2/Document 62. Moreover, we think it important he be made to realize, in way he will not resent, fact that he must shoulder large share responsibility for arms race in general. His periodic opening of "icebox" door (cite cases) has let out blasts of cold air that put great psychological pressure on Israelis to obtain deterrent. We are not trying to justify Israeli actions to him; we are merely explaining them and his responsibility. Essential facts are: (1) UAR was first to opt for surface to surface missile force. (2) UAR is continuing to develop SSMs. (3) Reports are that Israel in response is also acquiring SSMs. (4) Once possessed of SSMs and confronted with a growing UAR missile force, Israel might well seek to develop more lethal warheads to provide deterrence against implacable Arab hostility it senses from Arab public statements. (5) We believe Israel can be persuaded not to proceed further with SSM development if UAR willing to demonstrate restraint. (6) Otherwise, we fear race will inexorably escalate. (7) But no good purpose served by such escalation. Situation is obviously self-defeating for both sides. Not only does it make for greater danger of war, it also diverts resources badly needed in development of more prosperous Arab nation. Moreover, US determined forestall aggression by either side, and has capability do so. So we wonder why either side should engage in wasteful expensive programs, which will not achieve any decisive military result. Ball
65. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, June 1, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. II. Top Secret. Drafted by Feldman. A handwritten note by Komer on a July 30 memorandum from Read to Bundy, returning the memorandum of conversation to the White House after its review by Talbot, states that it represented the work of Feldman, Harman, Talbot, Harriman, and himself. (Ibid.) According to the President's Daily Diary, the meeting was held in the President's office at the White House. The President and the Prime Minister met alone from 11:30 to 11:45 a.m., when they were joined by Feldman and Harman. The other participants joined them at 12:05 p.m., and the meeting concluded at 12:46. (Ibid.) SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS The President His Excellency, Levi Eshkol, Prime Minister of Israel Participants who entered mid-way in discussion U.S Israel The President began by saying to the Prime Minister that the United States was and would continue to be interested in the security The President said that he appreciated very much the way Mr. Feldman had been received by the Prime Minister. The President said that as long as he remained in the White House, Mr. Feldman would continue to serve as his "Prime Minister" on the question of Israel. The President went on to say that he was foursquare behind Israel on all matters that affected their vital security interests. Just as the U.S. was in Southeast Asia, they would be wherever they were needed. The President took up the specific problems on the agenda. With regard to tanks, he said he appreciated the readiness of Israel to agree to the manner in which tanks could be provided. He pointed out that we could not provide tanks directly but we would be glad to help Israel in every way possible to get a sufficient quantity of tanks elsewhere. "We believe the Centurion is a good tank" he said, "and it will certainly be available. However, we will also do everything we can to help in the M-48." The President then referred to the fact that Senator Ribicoff had discussed this matter with him and also that he appreciated the fact that the tank matter had not been made a public issue but had been kept discreet. On the question of water, the President pointed out that all the Arab capitals have been informed that the United States supports the Johnston Plan. There can be no doubt in anyone's mind concerning U.S. commitment to this water project. The President said "We back Israel fully on the Jordan water. We want Israel to have more water. For that reason we are ready to undertake a study in connection with the desalting program which will also provide Israel with the water it needs. If the study proves that the desalting project is feasible, we will help in working it out. We will help Israel on this as much as possible. We have told the Arab Governments about this. Of course, we will get some backlash from the Arab countries as a result of your visit with me. However, I am not worried by that. It is important both to you and to the United States that everybody should know that we are friends. So that is no reason for us not to go forward with this desalting project." The President asked Prime Minister Eshkol to make clear to his people that "if we turned our backs on the Arabs it would hurt Israel. We are deeply concerned with Israel's security. Our Joint Chiefs of Staff keep a close watch on this. And we are more confident of the Israeli deterrent edge than the Israelis seem to be. We don't blame them for running scared, but we hope they will listen to well meant advice. "Of course, we know that the Israeli Government is worried over the U.A.R. missile threat. But that threat is likely to remain feeble through 1970. Israel should not hasten to counter it and accelerate an arms race. It can always count on the United States in an emergency." The President pointed out that the Arabs will inevitably tie Israeli missiles to Israel's nuclear potential. He said that he should like to remind the Prime Minister that the U.S. is violently against nuclear proliferation. If Israel is not going to get into nuclear production, why not accept IAEA controls and let U.S. reassure Nasser about Dimona. It is U.S. firm policy to keep the U.A.R. from getting into nuclear production and it will do everything it can to restrain them. "I want to assure you," the President said, "that we are not being naive about Nasser. What we want to do is to try and prevent him from leaning over too far towards the Russians." The President summarized by listing the following six points: 1. On water, the U.S. will support the Johnston Plan. 2. On tanks, the U.S. will assist Israel in obtaining them. 3. On security, the U.S. will stand foursquare behind Israel. 4. On missiles, the U.S. Government feels that Israel is too worried about primitive U.A.R. weapons. 5. With regard to nuclear weapons, the U.S. is against their proliferation. 6. On the desalting program, the U.S. is ready to help as much as possible. The President expressed the view that the visit was good for both the United States and Israel, for both the Prime Minister and his nation. Following the visit, it will be possible for Prime Minister Eshkol to explain U.S. concerns and friendship to his people. The President said that he was glad that the issues had been kept out of the pressures of the election year and that the whole matter has been kept quiet. Because of this they can go to the Germans and be of help. The President said that he saw a bright future for Israel. The Prime Minister could leave knowing that the U.S. will help Israel in the future, both morally and financially as much as she can. Prime Minister Eshkol responded by first reciting the basis for the feeling of the Israelis that they needed additional strength. He said that after thousands of years of wandering, his people were now trying again to take their fate into their own hands and to do things for themselves. This was the meaning of going back home to Israel. In Turkish rule the area of Palestine had been 100,000 square k.m. but now Israel had been cut down to 20,000 sq. k.m. It was in this area that we tell our people that they must work out their destiny by depending on themselves and doing things for themselves. Of course, they always look for friends and they were immensely fortunate in having the U.S. as a friend. But what he told the people of Israel was to rely on their friends, but that the fundamental importance for Israel was "do it yourself". They had to build their own agriculture and their own industry, their own army and all the other essentials of the nation. They had to be able to create their own future. The problem of security went back a long way. Even before Hitler there had been pogroms in Czarist Russia. Therefore, security was the most important and the first consideration. (At this point the President summoned into the room Governor Harriman, Mr. Talbot, and Mr. Komer who were accompanied by Mr. Shimon Peres, the Israeli Deputy Minister of Defense.) As they were sitting down, the President turned to the Prime Minister and said to him: "Harriman and Feldman are my Prime Ministers on Israeli questions." The President then said that the Prime Minister has just begun his statement and that he wanted them to hear it. The Prime Minister thereupon continued: "When the independence of Israel was proclaimed in 1948 we thought we could live in peace, but we found that we were encircled by enemies. The recent visit by Khrushchev served to give Nasser additional prestige, additional armor and money. This makes him a dangerous enemy. Israel knows that the U.S. is a real friend. We believe this. We are told that there is a United States commitment to Israel. But I cannot ask my people to rely on this alone. When I discuss this matter with my people, the question they ask me is `do you have enough tanks?' It may be true that the Egyptian missiles are not yet accurate, but the Tel Aviv area with a million people is an easy target. The man in the street wants to hear from me that we are on guard. What if one day Nasser, even against the advice of Khrushchev (the Prime Minister interpolated that he thought Khrushchev's reference in his speeches in Egypt on Israel had been somewhat mild in language, and that he did not believe that Khrushchev wanted the destruction of Israel or war against Israel) and against the wishes of the U.S. were to attack Israel, he would do that if he felt that he could do it. Then, in one day or two or three days he could do a great deal of damage. What the man in the street in Israel wants to know is whether Israel would then be able to protect itself, whether it would be strong enough to protect itself. No one could forecast what other problems the U.S. would have at that time." On tanks, the Prime Minister insisted that only the M-48 would meet Israel's needs. He said it would be bad if Israel were compelled to take the Centurion. Israel had some Centurions and knew them. Israel cannot buy new tanks every day and therefore it is very important for us that we should get today the tanks we need, said the Prime Minister. Prime Minister Eshkol pointed out that the autonomy of the Centurion was four to five hours while that of the M-48 was 8 hours. This was very important to Israel. He said that if the Germans objected to doing it directly, it could be done through Italy. With regard to missiles, he said that if Nasser was willing to give up his missiles Israel would acquire none; but Nasser already has about 200. The Prime Minister added: "I think that Nasser is planning to build these missiles in the hundreds. We have some indications of this. For example, we know that he bought quantities of steel. It is impossible for me to believe that Nasser is not improving his missiles." The Prime Minister went on to say that Israel would be prepared to wait a year or two; but Nasser is constantly improving his missiles, and in the next 2 to 3 years Nasser is likely to attack and to use them. Eshkol said he was always glad to hear complimentary things, for it implied that the Israeli armed forces could always overcome a 1 to 5 disadvantage. This might not always be true. At the present time, Nasser has 3 to 4 times as many planes and 3 to 4 times as much armor. At the present time the disparity between Nasser and Israel in respect to numbers is one against 10 or 15 or 20--depending on whether we take only Egypt into account or also the Arab countries. The same goes for tanks where the Arabs have 3 times as much as Israel. Nasser's advantage is great. The Prime Minister observed that he was sure it would be possible to make peace with Lebanon; and though difficult, it would probably be possible to make peace with Hussein. But if Nasser attacks, all the other Arab states will join him. Mr. Eshkol said he did not see any way in which he could explain to his country, or even his own political party, a failure to do something about the missile threat. The Prime Minister said that he did not see any way as a citizen of his country or as a leader to explain to his people that he would just sit back and do nothing in relation to the missile threat. In any case, for a year or two there would be no missiles in Israel. How could he go and explain to the country or to his own political party or to the Foreign Affairs and Security Committee of the Knesset, and when he is asked what he is doing to face the missile threat simply reply: "The Americans told me that the Egyptian missiles are no good." Nasser has always been the first in introducing new weapons. He was the first in jets; he was the first in Komars and the first in missiles. "I am told," he said, "that my boys in the army are very good. But it is too much for me to demand of my boys that they should face a situation like this without the proper materiel at their disposal." The Prime Minister went on to say: "We cannot afford to lose. This may be our last stand in history. The Jewish people have something to give to the world. I believe that if you look at our history and at all the difficulties we have survived, it means that history wants us to continue. We cannot survive if we experience again what happened to us under Hitler. You may view the situation otherwise and it may be difficult to grasp how we feel. I believe you should understand us. It is important that you should understand us." The Prime Minister suggested that his visit would be successful if it had helped the President and the American people to understand the situation of Israel. What Israel wants is peace. Nothing less makes sense. War made no sense for Israel. Israel could not possibly conquer Egypt. But Nasser did not have an equivalent attitude. What Nasser was calling for was for driving the Israelis into the sea. The Prime Minister said: "We want your help but we feel that we must do everything that is within the power of a small nation to do to protect itself. If you can persuade Nasser to give up his tanks and missiles, we will do the same." The Prime Minister offered to destroy all of his arms if Nasser would do likewise. Then the Prime Minister went on to suggest that he would appreciate it if the President would tell Erhard when he came to visit that the U.S. had an interest in helping Israel and in Germany helping Israel. Historically, he felt the Germans had an obligation to do so. The reparations they paid were merely monetary compensation. The Prime Minister added: "The reason I think it would be very important to tell this to Erhard is that sometimes we hear from the Germans that they are not so sure that you are interested in them helping us." On the question of the U.S. relationship to the Arab nations, the Prime Minister said it was not in the interest of Israel that the U.S. break off its relationships with any other nation. But he asked whether it would not be possible for the United States to tell Nasser to work out a development plan and to have assistance rendered Nasser go into the development of Egypt rather than into other areas. He said that Egypt had much to do. He said: "What I am saying is that you should be pushing Egypt into development and building and out of the field of spending their resources on armaments." The Prime Minister suggested that in some instances it would be wise to help Israel publicly. Khrushchev had no reluctance in publicly promising Nasser everything he requested. But when it comes to assistance to Israel, their friends feel it must be done surreptitiously. It reminds the Prime Minister of the German expression: "Don't greet me in public." Perhaps a public greeting he said, would show that the friends of Israel mean to support that state and be conducive to world peace. In summary the Prime Minister said: 1. Tanks--the tanks we need are the M-48. I am glad over your decision of the tanks and I leave our meeting feeling that I am entitled to tell my Government that we will have these tanks. It would be better if we could get them direct for it would not be good if the Arabs were left in any uncertainty that Israel would be helped in matters such as tanks. However, if you do it indirectly, that is all right, for after all, the important thing is that we should get the tanks that we need. But please do not push us into the Centurions. 2. Missiles--there would be no missiles for 1 to 2 years. 3. Water--the support of the United States is appreciated very much. 4. Desalination--the statement of the President is good news. Israel is prepared to pay rather more for water for irrigation than would be considered possible in other countries. Therefore the project should be feasible. 5. Dimona--I cannot agree that Nasser should be told the real situation in Dimona because Nasser is an enemy. After 16 years they withhold peace from Israel. I notice that in your joint communique with King Hussein there was included a point of "just peace." I don't understand the meaning of this term. I know what peace means. What should have happened is that the armistice should have been following immediately by peace. It would be a great thing if you could induce our neighbors to change the armistice into peace instead of pursuing escalation in tanks and missiles. In the meantime, while the U.A.R. remains an enemy and is committed to the destruction of Israel, it would seem inadvisable to communicate such matters to them. Besides, Nasser has worked for years to become a nuclear power. He will continue to do so. A message that Dimona is not manufacturing nuclear weapons would have no effect. The Prime Minister then adverted to refugees by saying that Shukayri/2/ says there are refugees; but they really are not people within the classic meaning of refugees. They are used by the Arab nations to develop enemies against Israel. He stated that Israel was not engaged in nuclear weapons production, but posed the question: "Why tell Nasser?" He asked: "Why should we tell Nasser when we don't know from him what he is doing about missiles?" /2/Ahmad Shuqayri, Palestinian representative to the Arab League, was named chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization executive committee at the Palestine National Congress held in Jerusalem May 28-June 2. Telegram 606 from Amman, June 3, commented on the Congress, and airgram A-586 from Amman, June 17, transmitted unofficial texts of the Palestinian National Charter and PLO Constitution, which the Congress approved. (Both in National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 3 PAL ENTITY) The Prime Minister concluded by saying that he thanked the President, for his decision was a grand thing and very imaginative. The President asked Mr. Feldman to comment and he made a brief statement on the need for cooperation on the tank question and said that Peres would hold various meetings while he was in this country in an effort to establish a procedure whereby Israel would receive them. In the meantime, there was a great need for secrecy. Under Secretary Harriman also made a brief statement dealing with the need to reassure the Israelis by having them inspect the 6th Fleet and other places where the military potential of the United States was evident. Under Secretary Harriman said that he agreed that it was necessary to add meaning and credibility to the U.S. commitment. He added that tanks were the major issue and that he hoped that could be worked out. The President said that it was important that there should be a feeling of security on Israel's part. Under Secretary Harriman said that they were more hopeful about their strategy dealing with Nasser than the Prime Minister seemed to believe. Mr. Feldman said that it was important that the tank question be kept quiet. It is understood, he said, that only three people in Italy would have to know about it. The President then reviewed matters briefly, adding that there would be some mutual assistance in intelligence matters. We would help Israel with our knowledge of Arab intelligence and Israel would exchange information that they had with us. Prime Minister Eshkol suggested that it would be helpful to have semi-annual meetings at the political and military level where there could be mutual exchange of all matters of concern between the two nations. Under Secretary Harriman said this would be an excellent idea and that we would establish some method whereby this can be accomplished. The President closed the meeting by saying: "Well, this has been a good beginning."
66. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff and the Under Secretary of State (Ball)/1/ Washington, June 2, 1964, 11:20 a.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, Ball Papers, Israel. No classification marking. Prepared in Ball's office. Ball asked Komer if he had been able to find out what the President said to Eshkol yesterday when they were alone. Komer said that Feldman had been with them except for the first 15 minutes. Feldman was to do a memcon which had not come up yet. Komer suggested that perhaps Ball and Rusk could impress on the President the difficulty these private discussions cause. The President assured Komer that he had followed the brief/2/ (a quick and short version of the paper that the Dept. sent over). The President did raise the tank question and said we could not give them but we would help all we could. He went into our concern about the missiles briefly. He said he hoped they would bite the bullet on the IAEA. He said don't force us to say publicly that we are behind you. He did not close any deals. He mentioned Dimona. Komer said he did not think Ball should talk about tanks or security although he might have to listen to Eshkol's sales pitch. The important thing is the Dimona reassurances to the Arabs, the IAEA question and the details that we are prepared to do what we can on desalting which was mentioned only in general terms./3/ /2/Reference is apparently to Document 63. /3/In a telephone conversation that afternoon, Bundy asked the President if he had done "that intelligence talk" with Eshkol (see footnote 3, Document 63). Johnson replied that he had. (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and McGeorge Bundy, June 2, 1964, 3:56 p.m., Tape 64.29, Side B, PNO 1)
67. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, June 2, 1964, 11:15 a.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 12 ISR. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Russell on June 15 and approved in U and in M on June 22. Prior to Ball's meeting with Eshkol, the Prime Minister met with Harriman and U. Alexis Johnson for a general discussion of the international scene. (Memorandum of conversation; ibid., POL ISR-US) At 12:15 p.m., Eshkol and Peres met with Vance and received a briefing on U.S. military capabilities to defend Israel. Vance rejected their suggestion of joint contingency planning but indicated willingness to consider periodic discussions with Israel on military subjects. (Memorandum of conversation; ibid., ARAB-ISR) SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS His Excellency, Levi Eshkol, Prime Minister of Israel The Acting Secretary Prime Minister Eshkol inquired about the status of Israel's request for tanks. Mr. Talbot replied that the President expected to speak to Chancellor Erhard about West German capabilities to supply tanks. Between approaches by the U.S. and by Israel we would make a real try. There were also current conversations with the UK. Adequate tanks should be available. Prime Minister Eshkol said he did not wish to be pushed to Centurions. The M-48 was superior. There appeared to be a way to obtain M-48 tanks through an arrangement with Italy. He hoped we would accept the Israeli viewpoint. He commented that Centurions were expensive, but he did not wish to discuss pricing until prices were lower. Israel was willing to take a number of Centurions to complete existing tank units. Mr. Harriman said we would do everything to help, including exploration of the arrangement with Italy. There was, however, the Chieftain in the background. Cost was a problem since it amounted to nearly $300,000 per unit. Mr. Ball added that we foresaw problems with the transparent arrangement with Italy. Security in Italy was not good. The transaction was likely to become widely known. Mr. Peres said failure to obtain M-48 tanks would be a great disappointment both politically and popularly. The Centurion was not as good a tank, and lacked the range of the M-48. To buy Centurions would be to eat and remain hungry. The cost of 300 Chieftain tanks was excessive since they would cost $500,000 each including spares and ammunition. The total package would amount to $150,000,000. Mr. Talbot interjected that we were not thinking in terms of 300 Chieftain tanks. Mr. Peres continued that the Mark-8 Centurion was costly and lacked a suitable engine. The best solution economically and politically was the purchase of the M-48. Failure to achieve this would be a shocking popular experience in Israel. He hoped the U.S. would not retract its support for supply of tanks through Germany. Mr. Talbot suggested that the range of tanks was not important since no one wished to go 300 miles. Mr. Peres said that time of operation was more important than range. It reduced maintenance and decreased vulnerability. Prime Minister Eshkol noted that deliveries of M-48's could begin in 8-12 months. Israel was already negotiating with Italy on the problem of conversion. As to Centurion availability, 48 would be available during 1964; 50-100 more in 1965; Chieftains might be available by the end of 1965. Israel proposed to buy 48 Centurions in 1964 and perhaps 50 in 1965, but no more. Mr. Ball noted that the M-48 tank suggested a more offensive weapon than the shorter range tanks. We understood, however, the advantages of tank "autonomy." Prime Minister Eshkol said he hoped to be in a position upon his return to Israel to tell his government that the tank matter had been resolved. If the U.S. and West Germany were interested, the transaction could be kept secret for 2-3 years, by which time the M-48 would be in the same category as the Sherman tank today. In Italy only three people need be fully informed of the transaction. Mr. Ball said this was a subject for discussion with Chancellor Erhard. He could not speak for him. He believed the problem of tanks could be met. We would take into consideration the arguments made by the Israelis, particularly the need for tank "autonomy." U.S. participants made brief reference to possible assistance to Israel in adjusting the cost of high-priced European tanks but declined to discuss details in the absence of more information on tank availabilities and other elements of Israel's defense expenditures. Mr. Harriman said we would continue to press the Germans, but were not anxious to break away from our policy of avoiding the supply of offensive weapons to the Near East. We believed Israel could meet its needs elsewhere. In conclusion, the Prime Minister stressed that the proposed M-48 transaction could be kept secret for 2-3 years. He also said Israel was spending $450,000,000 every year for defense and could not afford not to follow up the West German transaction. He hoped it would be possible to obtain agreement in principle on the transaction from Chancellor Erhard. The discussion ended with the understanding that any further progress on M-48 tank procurement must rest upon the decision of Chancellor Erhard. Meanwhile, discussions on Centurions should continue.
68. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson/1/ Washington, June 3, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Eshkol Visit, 6/1-3/64. Secret. Your soft sell to Eshkol connected a lot better than we realized yesterday./2/ Israelis came around this morning and: /2/President Johnson and Prime Minister Eshkol met alone from 4:10 to 4:25 p.m. on June 2. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary) No record of this meeting has been found. A June 2 briefing memorandum from Komer to the President stressed that he should urge Eshkol to agree to give Nasser reassurances about Dimona and to accept IAEA controls. (Ibid., National Security File, Country File, Israel, Eshkol Visit, 6/1-3/64) 1. Agreed to let us reassure Nasser on Dimona. 2. Agreed to IAEA observers in joint desalting study. 3. Agreed in principle to IAEA controls on any big desalting reactor. 4. In return for a nine month extension of present US bilateral on existing small reactor, agreed to ask for IAEA agreement within that time./3/ /3/Memoranda of a June 3 conversation on these subjects between Peres and Talbot are in National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, AE 6 ISR-US and AE 11-2 ISR. For what it's worth, I gave Israelis a hard line after your meeting yesterday, saying I knew that while you didn't want to press Israelis so hard as to spoil good atmosphere of visit, you as well as rest of us were disappointed at lack of Israeli response on any points. This may just have helped. While all returns aren't in, this visit seems to have netted out a distinct plus. So far Arab reaction, especially from Cairo, is most restrained (your warning to Kamel took), while Israelis are highly pleased. We also managed to steer press successfully (so far) away from sensitive arms issue. Bob Komer
Washington, undated. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. II. Top Secret. Copies were sent to McGeorge Bundy, Vance, Harriman, Talbot, and Sloan. The attachment indicates that the conversation took place on June 5. SUBJECT In a cordial talk with Peres Komer laid out certain views and concerns. Frank Sloan joined in. Minister Gazit and Col. Ron were interested observers. By prearrangement Komer mentioned the Shah's interest in M-60 tanks. As suspected, Peres was already knowledgeable; he commented that the Shah seemed to want about 460. Komer suggested that the Israelis might wish to point out to the Shah that the M-48A3 was practically the same as the M-60 and could be bought for a great deal less. Deliveries wouldn't take place for a few years, but when Iran had M-48A3s in quantity, this might be of help to Israel. Komer stressed that we did not want any Israeli approach to appear as being at US instance. Peres fully understood; he quickly grasped the implications of Iran playing a possible future role in the M-48A3 problem, and recognized that this wasn't an immediate prospect but one a few years off. Komer then said that, like Governor Harriman, he felt Peres should get a clear picture of Arab-Israeli policy from his visit; we had heard that Peres was one of those who questioned our policy. The Middle East was an area where much more emotion than logic was at play; this made it all the more imperative to sort out what was really going on. There seemed to be three "myths" about US policy, which Komer wished to deal with candidly, on the understanding that he was talking completely unofficially and personally, and that he would not find such statements being bandied about. Peres fully agreed. First was the myth that the US pursued a strictly "even-Handed" or "impartial" policy, as between Israel and the Arabs. This was what we often said publicly. But if one looked at actions, not words, it was clear that from 1947 on our policy had basically favored Israel. We had been Israel's strongest backer from the outset, financially and otherwise, and it was our deterrent power (not that of the British, French, or anyone else) which really provided Israel its insurance policy. What we did do was to seek an "appearance" of balance in our policy, which would permit us to exercise continued influence in the Arab world. This influence was imperative in Israel's interest as well as ours, because it served not only to protect US assets (oil and bases) in the area but to limit Soviet penetration. The Aswan Dam fiasco had been a blunder in our policy. We had been the ones who in effect gave Khrushchev his golden opportunity to start peddling Soviet arms in the Middle East. It was Soviet arms, not Arab words, which created the real threat to Israel. So long as Arab words were only a reflection of their impotence, Israel could afford to live with them. But it was crucial that we not become so openly Israel's champions as to force the Arabs to line up overtly with Moscow. In this event the real threat to Israel would be magnified. Second was the myth that the US had shifted to a pro-Nasser policy, and that he was our "chosen instrument" in the Middle East. We were making a deliberate and calculated effort to arrive at a basis for mutual cooperation with the man and country which we regarded (as did Israel) as the fulcrum of the Arab world. But no one who looked carefully at the facts could help but see the many places where we were still containing Nasser's expansionist ambitions. How else could one interpret the fact that we were still providing substantial aid to Libya, Sudan, Ethiopia, Saudi Arabia, Jordan--in fact every country around the UAR. We were even willing to help Syria, except that the Syrians were unhelpable. One thing was certain--Nasser saw clearly that we had not gone overboard with him. We intended to do business with Nasser wherever mutual interests existed, in order to provide him an alternative to out-and-out reliance on the Soviet Union. So long as he had such an alternative he would take from both sides, but would be no more interested in serving as Khrushchev's stalking horse in the Middle East than ours. The third myth was that the US could not be relied on to back Israel in a pinch. Harping on this theme from some Israelis was becoming annoying here; we didn't like to be told our word couldn't be relied upon, no matter how nicely this allegation was dressed up. Komer said he fully realized that no 100% guarantees were possible in this world. Indeed we recognized the theoretical force of De Gaulle's argument that a nation could rely totally only on its own resources. What we objected to so vigorously was his feeling that an independent force of real practical meaning could be developed. De Gaulle thought he could tear off an arm, but in practice he might not be able to tear off even a little finger. Ergo, could we afford to risk letting him trigger World War III because of such a delusion? One could argue that Israel had a much more legitimate case for an absolute deterrent than De Gaulle--after all, it was facing the Arabs not the USSR. But in fact we saw no need for such a deterrent, given the US commitment. Even more important, for Israel to take this route would force the Arabs into Moscow's arms. It might even lead to Soviet missile bases in the Nile delta. In any event, while neither Israel nor any other nation could have 100% assurance that the US would defend it, the all-important thing was what the potential aggressor thought. There was no doubt in our minds here. We had made sure that the Arabs knew we would intervene, and we thought unlikely any miscalculation on their part. We then got onto the tank matter. Peres explained how they proposed to handle the tank deal through Italy. Only three people--Defense Minister Andreotti, his intelligence chief, and the deputy intelligence chief would be witting of the ultimate tank destination. [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] Since this would be an arms export from one NATO country to another, no licenses were required. The tanks would end up in Naples and be reexported from there. [1 line of source text not declassified] The German MOD at least wanted to sell all of its 232 M-48A1s, so the Germans could say they were getting rid of these earlier models, in order to standardize on M-48A2 or 3s (which they would buy from us as replacements). The German Army would deliver the tanks to the Italian Army, which would send them to the company for refitting. The tanks would be refitted partly in Italy and partly in Israel. German Army engineers would handle quality control in the Italian plant. Andreotti had asked that 15-20 tanks be left for the Italian Army, which was again interested in the M-48A3. As Peres put it, when Israel bought a new weapon, all sorts of other countries became interested in it because of Israel's reputation for being a wise purchaser. Komer said that the M-48 request proved the point, since the M-48A3 was unquestionably the best tank buy at the price in the world today. As to timing, it would take a year before the first tank got to Israel. There would be about four shipments. It would be at least another year before the Arabs found out. In response to Komer's question, Peres said that Israel had kept its first Centurion purchases secret for 2-3 years. Komer asked for a written summary of these points for our use in talking with the Germans (an unsigned memo furnished later by Gazit is attached)./2/ /2/Attached but not printed. Peres said that Israel wanted to buy new engines, guns, etc. for the M-48s directly from the US. He thought this would avoid messy financial problems, and was just as secure. Israel had bought guns from us before. Sloan was dubious over whether DOD would want to do this. We'd have to reserve our position while looking into the matter. Peres also urged that we find some way to provide ammunition and if possible spare parts at reduced prices from US stocks. Sloan pointed out that US holdings of 105 mm. tank rounds were all of recent manufacture. It would be difficult to declare them surplus. In fact, we were still buying them for US use. We'd also look into this matter but he didn't want to hold out false hopes. Komer mentioned to Peres in passing that he wasn't going to belabor the missile question again, but wished to say that the secretive and evasive way in which Israel responded to our frequent inquiries on this and Dimona inevitably raised suspicions on our part. For the President of the US to have to intervene personally and repeatedly to get the necessary reassurances was frankly counter-productive; it only made us feel that Israel really did have something to hide. As for Israel's missile program, why was it that they wouldn't even answer our queries? Peres said that when one made an arrangement with a third country and that country laid down certain conditions, it tied Israel's hands. Komer replied that this was the first cogent explanation we'd had, but wasn't the US/Israel relationship such that we were entitled to greater candor? He said we'd want to talk with Israel further about missiles. As the meeting broke up Peres said that the Germans wanted to tell the French if they decided to provide tanks. He thought the best way would be for Eshkol to mention it casually to De Gaulle. Westrick had agreed that the Israelis could do so in this event. Komer demurred that we would not like to have our role in the arrangements revealed. Peres was sure this would be no problem, commenting smilingly that when great men get together they don't get into details. RWK [Continue with the next documents] Volume XVIII Index | Foreign Relations Online | Historian's Office | Department of State | Secretary of State |