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 | FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XVIII Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964-67 Department of State |
 40. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, April 15, 1964, 3-3:40 p.m. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 77 A 75, Memos of Conversation Between Sec. McNamara and Heads of State (other than NATO). Confidential. Copies were sent to Solbert, Director of Military Assistance General Wood, Sloan, Rowen, Henry J. Kuss, Jr., and Strickland. The meeting was held at Blair House. PARTICIPANTS Summary The important assurances by the Secretary were these: 1. US performance of undertakings incidental to military aid grant and military sales hereafter will be carried out promptly and the items will be in good condition, with adequate spares and appropriate ammunition. Hereafter fulfillment of commitments will be of highest priority--if necessary at the expense of US stocks. 2. He is prepared to talk to Jordanians (even to send representatives to Jordan) about possible purchases by Jordan of US arms using funds made available to Jordan-Syria-Lebanon by the new Arab group. The Secretary did not promise to sell but only to talk about selling. 3. Military aid to Jordan for FY 65 will be at the same level as for FY 64. This will be managed somehow out of whatever Congress authorizes and appropriates. (Note: The Secretary (4) did not discuss the C-47s and (5) did not discuss any $5 million loan to Jordan.) Chronological Account The conversation began by the King's assertion that he thought that the new Arab cooperation would lead to increased stability in the area. There was some discussion of economic development in Jordan--the 7-year program with approximately 10% increase in the economy each year. The King used this point to shift to his concern that economic development, which could make Jordan independent of external aid, could be thwarted if military aid was reduced. He stated that Jordan was far behind militarily. Secretary McNamara, with respect to US past performance of military aid undertakings, stated that it had come to his attention that the US had been late in deliveries, had delivered equipment without spares, and had provided some defective equipment and ammunition. He assured the King that this would be handled more effectively in the future and asked the King to send him a personal cable if our performance in the future was otherwise. The King asked whether the Secretary was prepared to sell arms to Jordan, payment coming from funds made available to Jordan from the new Arab organization. The Secretary stated that he would be prepared to have his people talk about this with Jordanian representatives. He added that with respect to sales as well as grant, hereafter US performance would be prompt and items would be in good condition, with adequate spares, and with appropriate ammunition. Secretary McNamara said that Jordan could assume that military aid from the US for FY 65 would be at the same level as for 64--that this would be managed somehow out of whatever funds Congress authorized and appropriated. There was some discussion about the Jordanian economy (extension of irrigation, drilling for oil, etc.), education and health. The King referred to the Palestine problem--particularly the problem of refugees. He referred to Communist influence in the Near East and called the area a "bridge" between the Bloc and Africa. He stated that he saw the new Arab grouping as a stabilizing regional thing and hoped to see Iran and Turkey included. He mentioned that there were enticements--financial and ideological--to tie to the Soviets. He stated, for example, that the Soviets offer MIG-21s at two-thirds price. He hopes that the US looks at both sides of the problem and does nothing to make it difficult for US's friends to continue the course they want to continue, as friends of the US. Secretary McNamara, stated that fulfillment of undertakings to deliver military items will hereafter have top priority, if necessary at the expense of US stocks. Mr. Talbot raised the question of the unfortunate introduction of "sophisticated" hardware into the Near East. The King stated that all Jordan wanted was to maintain a "balance" in the area. He stated that Israel could "clobber" Jordan in 48 hours. Mr. Talbot stated that Israel phrases the problem in almost exactly the same terms and urges increased armaments for themselves on the grounds that the Arabs could destroy them. He suggested that an increase of several million of arms on one side would almost certainly lead to an increase of an equivalent or a greater amount on the other. Brigadier Khammash stated that 15 million pounds a year for 10 years will be made available to Jordan-Syria-Lebanon by the Arab group. The King and he stated that perhaps 5 million pounds of this each year would go to equipment. The King stated that something had to be done to stop Israel--that Israel had set up a potash operation in Jordan territory ("formerly Trans-Jordan"), that Israel was occupying more and more of the demilitarized zones, and that Israel was misbehaving with respect to the Jordan river waters. He urged the United States not to do anything without considering "both sides." Both Secretary McNamara and Mr. Talbot assured the King that the United States was doing exactly that. Secretary McNamara concluded by assuring the King again that DOD performance of undertakings hereafter would be as he had indicated earlier. John T. McNaughton
41. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, April 15, 1964, 4:30 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Jordan, Visit of King Hussein, 4/14-15/64 (II). Confidential. Drafted by Ambassador Barnes on April 22 and approved by U on April 29 and by White House on May 4. According to the President's Daily Diary, the meeting was held in the President's office from 4:33 to 5:25 p.m. (Ibid.) SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS The President H.M. King Hussein of Jordan The President opened the conversation by presenting the King a volume of colored photographs taken during the King's visit, commenting with a laugh that on the basis of the hospitality and good will reflected in the pictures it was going to be hard for the King to demonstrate to his Arab colleagues the diminishing interest of the U.S. in the Arab world, which he was quoted in the press as having mentioned in his address that noon. The King quickly denied that he had said any such thing and added that he was very upset that such a story could appear in the press. It was completely contrary to everything he felt. Exchanges such as those he had had in Washington could do much to erase doubts and establish a level of good will that would extend through future relations. The President said the truth of the matter was that the USG is interested in and concerned with the future of the Arab people and would continue to be in the future. Of course there would always be some people who would seek to misinterpret our position but he could assure His Majesty that there had been absolutely no change in policy by the present administration. We had no intention of being friends of one country at the expense of another but would always strive to deal with each one equally. The King said he was very pleased with the exchange of views which had taken place and if at any time in the future some misunderstanding should arise he would be glad to exchange personal messages in order to avoid having a serious problem develop. The President then said that it was important for the King to bear in mind that the amount of help which Jordan received from sources other than the U.S. would affect what we were able to do. Within the limit of the resources which Congress makes available he stood ready to help Jordan. The Secretary of Defense had already discussed military assistance. We were also ready to help with economic assistance. He hoped the King would assure the Arab world that this was our attitude. At the same time he should realize that Soviet aid to the Arabs did influence the Congress and could have a bearing on the level of resources made available to the Executive Branch and therefore on our ability to render assistance. The King said he was very grateful for this statement and he knew that President Nasser would be too. Nasser had asked the King to convey his greetings to the President and he personally wanted to express the hope that U.S.-Arab relations could in the future be close. The President said that he wanted to be able to do more than at present but the Congress wanted to do less. It was true that we had very heavy taxes and a very large national debt. The answer to our level of aid would be some agreement between the Executive and the Legislature, but the conduct and actions of foreign governments could do much to influence the range of this agreement. The King said that Jordan remained deeply grateful for everything which had been done and continued to do the best it could with the resources which it had. For instance, various reforms had been instituted in the budget and fiscal side of the government. A new 7-year development program was being initiated with the object of reducing Jordan's need for external assistance. The rate of taxation in Jordan was the highest in the Arab world but even so they had just proposed a bill providing for reform of the income tax. Domestic expenses had been frozen for the past two years while government revenues had been pushed up about 10% per year. This was Jordan's response to American aid. As for the Communist problem the King said he did not today consider this a threat to the area. It had been a problem in the past but there was now a relaxation of tension which had reduced the threat. Jordan had accordingly established relations with the USSR. There had been times in the past, he said, when he did not know whether Jordan could survive. Now he felt in a more secure position. He wanted to thank the President again for his kindness in inviting him on this visit. From time to time he welcomed the opportunity to tell the Arab side of the story and he believed this kind of frank exchange could assure friendly relations between their two states in the future. The President said he appreciated this comment and wanted the King to assure all the Arabs that Johnson is just as much their friend as Kennedy was. Our desire was for peace and good will. He referred again to his Weizmann Institute speech and said he had never meant to take sides. This had apparently been misunderstood but the real truth is that we want to help all. He would like to be able to see all the Arab leaders to make this clear but since that was impossible he was glad it had worked out so that the King could come and speak as a representative of all the Arabs. The President then referred to the constant Israeli pressure for more arms because of the increase in Arab arms. The King said no such increase applied in the case of Jordan which was still far behind in armaments. This was very worrisome to him and he hoped that some day a balance could be achieved. Secretary Ball spoke up to say that we had always sought to avoid an arms race. New weapons produced a demand for more new weapons which led to a spiral of ever increasing armaments. Ideally we should have complete disarmament but this was not possible. By the same token you could probably never achieve a perfect balance for one side or the other would forever be seeking more. Dr. Nuseibeh said he wanted to make it clear that Jordan was the victim of this increase in armaments. They were not increasing their armaments but they remained the most vulnerable country. Foreign Minister Atalla added that he had no doubt as to the sincerity of the U.S. position toward the Arabs. He knew we had tried to avoid an arms race in the area. We had sought to solve the refugee problem. But Jordan nevertheless remained the country in the exposed position and therefore the one which needed outside assistance. Mr. Talbot pointed out that it was this very situation which had given rise to the statement made by President Kennedy on last May 8. President Johnson added that the May 8 statement remained the policy of the U.S. Government. The King said the fundamental element in this picture had to be the long Jordan frontier with Israel. Presumably the arms which Saudi Arabia or Iraq possessed were considered part of the so-called balance but these arms would do Jordan little good. Israel had the capability of hitting hard and effectively and therefore Jordan felt very exposed. Secretary Ball said the presence of the U.S. Sixth Fleet should provide a measure of security in the area. Our power was Jordan's assurance of protection. Therefore we found it very hard to understand Nasser's attack on the Libyan bases. These were useful to us and therefore were a part of the stability of this area of the world. The King said that if there could be a continual exchange of views in the future we could avoid this kind of misunderstanding. He had seen the statement that these bases were designed to help Israel. This is part of the Arab concern. He was glad to have this explanation and he would certainly report these views to the other Arab leaders. The President added that the matter of the bases was a real problem. If we were in effect to bring the bases home why should we send military assistance out the following week to help maintain stability in the area? Dr. Nuseibeh said the Arabs had a genuine fear that these bases were designed to assist Israel. They had not simply adopted a pro-Soviet position on the bases but were concerned about them as a threat to the Arabs. The President said the bases were definitely not a threat to the Arabs but were a part of the stability of the area. He hoped the King would convey this message to all the Arab leaders.
42. Special National Intelligence Estimate/1/ SNIE 36-2-64 Washington, April 15, 1964. /1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-R01012A, ODDI Registry of NIE and SNIE Files. Secret; Controlled Dissem (Background Use Only). According to a note on the cover sheet, the estimate was submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence, and concurred in by the U.S. Intelligence Board on April 15. The Central Intelligence Agency, the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, and NSA participated in its preparation. The State, Defense, and NSA representatives concurred; the AEC and FBI representatives abstained, the subject being outside their jurisdiction. Paragraph references are to the Discussion portion of the estimate, not printed here. IMPLICATIONS OF US MILITARY AID TO ISRAEL The Problem To assess the implications of a US decision to provide Israel with 500 modern medium tanks. Conclusions A. The atmosphere of US-Arab relations, which has been relatively good for the past few years, has recently become clouded by a resurgence of Arab suspicions that the US has a pro-Israel and anti-Arab bias. These suspicions would be greatly increased in scope and intensity were the US to furnish 500 tanks to Israel. (Paras. 4-7) B. Every Arab state would take at least some anti-US action, which might include harassment of US diplomatic establishments and of oil companies, revocation of some military transit rights, and increasingly anti-US positions in international forums. Termination of US base rights at Wheelus Field would be speeded up. Self-interest would, however, place some restraint on Arab reactions, and widespread nationalization of oil properties would be unlikely. (Paras. 8-10) C. The receipt of tanks from the US would gratify the Israelis and would strengthen their long-held hope that the US will eventually make a definite decision to take Israel's side in its disputes with the Arabs. Israel's own policies and attitudes towards the Arabs would not be softened, however, since they are dictated by considerations of national security. (Paras. 15-17) D. US ability to moderate area disputes would be seriously impaired for some time, especially with respect to the Middle East arms race, which would be intensified by the US action. The Soviets would be alert to exploit a variety of opportunities which the US action would give them to identify themselves more closely with the Arab cause. (Paras. 12-14) [Here follows the Discussion portion of the estimate.]
43. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson/1/ Washington, April 16, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, Israel, PM Eshkol Correspondence. Secret. Eshkol's second negative reply (Tel Aviv 1054 attached)/2/ to your renewed personal appeal that he let us reassure Nasser about Dimona is probably not final. Instead, I'd see it as a bargaining counter he wants to hold out for his meeting with you. /2/A copy of Eshkol's April 15 letter is attached. Telegram 1054, April 15, which transmitted the text, is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, AE 11-2 ISR. So instead of going back again, I suggest we too hold off; meanwhile we'll tell Israelis of your disappointment./3/ /3/Bundy wrote "agree" in the margin next to this paragraph. Eshkol's negative and Mike Feldman's inability to move him on missiles further strengthen our suspicions that Israel is heading for a nuclear deterrent, even though some years off. We thus face a tough decision as to how hard we want to hit Eshkol when here, given our flat opposition to nuclear proliferation. We'll have this fully staffed out for you. Bob Komer/4/ /4/Bundy initialed below Komer's signature.
44.Memorandum of Conversation/1/ New York, April 17, 1964. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 JORDAN. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Ambassador Barnes on April 22 and approved in S/S on April 29. The meeting was held in Ambassador Stevenson's apartment. PARTICIPANTS Following a dinner which he had given in honor of King Hussein, Ambassador Stevenson took the King aside for a private conversation. In the course of their discussion the Ambassador said that in his opinion the time had come for a serious effort at finding some solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. As the King had been told, the U.S. would not countenance any effort to exterminate Israel and equally we could not tolerate Israeli aggression against the Arabs. If both sides could accept this it should be possible to discuss possible ways and means of ending the present conflict. Otherwise we appeared to be on the edge of a new arms race which might have disastrous results for the whole area. There were two elements which appeared to give new hope. First, in the post-Cairo atmosphere, he assumed it would be possible to find a single Arab voice. Second, he gathered from what the King had said that he would be willing to give a private commitment of the territorial integrity of Israel. If these two suppositions were true, it should be possible to undertake some private talks, without any publicity, about ways and means of ending the present impasse. After it was pointed out that territorial integrity was a difficult concept because there were territorial aspects of the present controversy, Ambassador Stevenson suggested that what he really meant was mutual pledges of no aggressive intentions. This should create the basic condition necessary for some exploratory discussions. The King said that the Arab states were prepared to give such a pledge of no aggressive designs on Israel provided there was no publicity. He then went on to stress what he called the "inequality" of past actions with respect to Israel, the basic distrust which the Arabs had of Israeli intentions, plus the suspicion in many Arab quarters that the U.S. shared the Israeli aggressive designs on Arab land. Under the circumstances he thought that finding an amicable solution to some specific problem such as the salt pans dispute would greatly assist in establishing the bona fides of Israel and the U.S. Government and would thereby facilitate the steps which Ambassador Stevenson had in mind. The King then reverted to the point he had made both publicly and privately over the previous few days that he hoped the U.S. could look at the Arab-Israeli dispute "from both sides." He implied that in his opinion an examination of the record over the past few years would indicate that we had not been impartial. The only example which he would offer was that Jordan invariably faced great resistance whenever it sought financing for something that competed with Israel, such as the proposed potash plant. Governor Stevenson continued with the comment that the Arabs were their own worst enemies. Statements about driving Israel into the sea merely built up Zionist determination to fight the Arabs and their ability to raise funds. The time had come to face this whole issue realistically and to work toward some solution. Otherwise we faced a new arms race with no one gaining and all losing. Hussein said he felt the Arab leaders were prepared to face the problem realistically. Further he had left Washington with a real feeling of the President's sincerity and he therefore understood what Ambassador Stevenson was saying. In response to a specific query, he said that Jordan did need some increase in its military forces but that he had in mind only incorporating the national guard into the regular army which would increase overall security and also lead to better discipline and control over all Jordanian forces. He did not want sophisticated weapons but just the necessary small arms. He stressed the importance of receiving help on this in order to maintain at least some Arab states with western type equipment. In concluding the conversation Ambassador Stevenson commented on the relative lack of any attack on the King in the American press. He said it was very important to try to keep the public aspect of the trip balanced and he still hoped to see a headline before the King left quoting him to the effect that peace was possible in the Middle East. This would help more than anything else the King could do. He knew the King had a message to get across in the Arab world but he should also remember that he had a message to get across in America. The representative of the Arab League who had just joined the group expressed his agreement with this comment. The King said he still hoped to return some day in a private capacity with his family and perhaps really get to visit and understand America.
45. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Talbot) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/ Washington, April 20, 1964. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 1 UAR-US. Secret. Drafted by Talbot, Davies, Duncan, and Curtis F. Jones and concurred in by Rostow. Sent through Harriman, and Macomber (AID/NESA) was informed. SUBJECT 1. You asked me to take a hard look at our U.A.R. policy. Toward this end a good many man-months of effort have already gone into the National Policy Paper on the U.A.R.,/2/ the current draft of which substantially supports our policy approach. The attached summary and abstract (Tab A)/3/ represent the latest version of the policy paper, which is now to be circulated to members of the U.A.R. Working Group for further refinement. Ambassador Badeau addressed himself to this same subject in a recent letter to the President (summary and text at Tab B)./4/ /2/The National Policy Paper on the UAR has not been found, but a summary in outline form and an abstract are attached to a copy of Talbot's memorandum, ibid. /3/The tabs are not attached. Copies of Tabs A through C are attached to the copy of Talbot's memorandum cited in footnote 2 above. /4/See Document 5. 2. I would like an early opportunity to give you a brief oral summary of our policy review. In view of S/P's responsibility for the U.A.R. National Policy Paper, I have asked Mr. Rostow to accompany me. The Problem 3. Whether we can better protect and advance United States interests in the Near East (Tab C)/5/ by continuing our present policy toward the U.A.R., including active dialoguing and substantial economic assistance, or by seeking to restrict Nasser's freedom of action by, in effect, cutting off his rations. In-between measures would bring all the disadvantages of the present policy without any of its advantages. /5/Tab C is an unsigned, undated paper entitled "U.S. Interests in the Near East (In Approximate Order of Importance." Discussion 4. Most U.A.R. policies that we and our friends find troublesome relate to Israel, Western bases in the Near East, or intervention in neighboring countries. All three are regional perennials, and the first two, at least, are widely shared by other Arabs. 5. On these and other issues the U.A.R. has the political and economic power, independent of United States assistance, to jeopardize United States and British interests in the region if it should determine to do so. With all its weaknesses, it remains the most populous, most powerful, and most influential of the Arab states, with a capability not only to move but also to lead other Arab states against Western interests. Cessation of United States aid would not adequately reduce this capability. (Tab D)/6/ /6/A copy of Talbot's memorandum dated May 4, one of a set of copies of the memorandum made for wider distribution, is filed with a complete set of tabs, including Tab D, "U.A.R.'s Base of Independent Economic and Political Power;" Tab E, "Benefits Derived from U.S.-U.A.R. Cooperation, 1960-1963;" Tab F, "U.A.R. Intentions and Capabilities to Move Against American Interests;" and Tab G, "Western Capabilities of Political and Economic Reprisal Against the Arab States," all unsigned and undated. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/P Files: Lot 70 D 199, Egypt) 6. Constructively, benefits have been derived from our policy of recent years, when we have successfully moderated pressures against our major interests through our dialogue with the U.A.R. (Tab E) 7. Advocates of the "get tough with Nasser" policy fail to realize that we already appear to the U.A.R. to have embarked on this course. The relevant factors include the virtual freezing of new assistance since mid-1963, the Gruening-Farbstein amendments, the attendant personalized attacks on Nasser in Congress and the press, the assassination of the President, and the reactions to the two Johnson speeches. In the atmosphere of the Arab Summit and our support for Israel's diversion of the Jordan, these developments have provoked anxiety as to constancy of United States policy and an Arab public posture of truculence toward the United States and the West. 8. During our effort in the mid-50's to roll Nasser back by confrontation, the damage done Western interests, as then perceived, was enormous. It was then that Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal, brought in a massive Soviet military and economic presence, pressed a hard anti-Western line throughout the Arab world, and accented a leftist neutralism that supported Castro, Lumumba, and extremist movements elsewhere. Since 1961 the balance has been substantially different. 9. The Near East is now being swept by the forces of revolutionary modernization. Since the Arab peoples viscerally identify the status quo with the West, the West is a natural target for their frustrations. In any confrontation between the two, the Arabs have the built-in strategic advantage of contesting on home ground, where Western military superiority is nullified by the nuclear stalemate and the force of neutral opinion. In a contest confined to political and economic action, the West could do serious damage to Arab interests (Tab G), but at the same time the Arabs could do unacceptable damage to Western interests (Tab F). In a struggle between the Arab states and the Western powers, the Soviets would be the only winners. 10. At the present juncture, a challenge to the U.A.R. will be a challenge to the entire Arab world. Our vulnerabilities in the area and the capabilities of U.A.R. propaganda are such as to facilitate conjunction of anti-United States and anti-Israel sentiments and to consolidate the Arabs against us, not only in the eastern area but also in North Africa. On the Israel issue, there is no possibility of emergence of a countervailing Arab grouping. 11. We have enjoyed influence and a degree of immunity from pressures throughout the region in recent years; the challenge of a policy change could reduce our position in the area to the confines of a "Fortress Israel" surrounded by a hostile and increasingly powerful Arab world. U.A.R. pressures could be mounted against civilian overflight rights (access to Africa, Middle East, South Asia), United States commerce (half a billion dollars a year), United States oil interests (a billion dollars a year in direct benefit to the balance of payments), United States presence generally, and against any trend toward eventual accommodation between the Arabs and Israel (Tab G). 12. A policy change would polarize the Near East, with the Arabs solidified into an anti-Israel, anti-American bloc cooperating with the Soviets facing a United States-supported Israel. 13. Nasser has not cast his lot with the Soviet bloc, nor has he turned implacably anti-West. On the contrary, there is evidence that the U.A.R. desires to straighten out the tangled lines of our relations. Propaganda on the Wheelus issue has tapered off, U.A.R. officials have told us that about March 27 anti-United States commentary in Egyptian media was enjoined, and Nasser volunteered to Robert Anderson on March 20 that the single most important question in his mind is improved relations with the West. Conclusion U.A.R. objectives include reduction of the military threat it perceives from Israel, and eventual elimination of western military bases from the area where the U.A.R. has paramount influence. We need to retain the Wheelus base through 1970, and our policies in the Near East are premised on an eventual accommodation between Israel and the U.A.R. Our assistance program provides the carrot which can restrain or contain action. Without it, we will not be able to maintain meaningful relations with the U.A.R. Without it, we stand to promote Arab militancy toward Israel and to expose our base rights to perhaps overwhelming pressure in the period of need. Aside from this element of U.A.R. economic need and our ability to satisfy it, we also have other interests in common: mutual opposition to Soviet expansionism, development of commercial and economic intercourse, and the strengthening of Arab independence and Arab will to resist foreign encroachment. We are not concerned merely with the U.A.R.'s capacity to do grave damage to our interests in 1964. To my mind, the most compelling objection to jettisoning our present policy is that it offers the best prospect for building a durable position for the United States in the Near East in the years to come. To facilitate cooperation, the United States should try to avoid involvement in area disputes not threatening its interests directly, accord Arab states access to United States markets, financing, and cereal surpluses, and provide positive support to development programs. We should seek to maintain constructive exchange with the U.A.R., reaffirming our area interests and our willingness to continue economic assistance provided the basic United States position in the area is not challenged.
46. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic/1/ Washington, April 22, 1964, 6:51 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 33-1 JORDAN RIVER. Confidential; Limdis. Drafted by Heywood H. Stackhouse; cleared by Macomber, Donald A. Wehmeyer, and in draft by Davies; and approved by Jernegan. Also sent to Amman and Tel Aviv and repeated to USUN. 4953. Deptel 397 Amman, 809 Tel Aviv, 4343 Cairo./2/ In meeting with King Hussein April 15 Assistant AID Administrator Macomber urged King give favorable consideration Criddle proposals. Recognizing political difficulties acceptance could pose, Macomber suggested King depict his move pick up waters from power plant pool as unilateral assertion Jordanian rights. Noting Arab Summit Jordan diversion plan may never come to fruition he pointed out Criddle proposals could yield water within year--without King's having declare himself against Summit plan. /2/Telegram 397 to Amman, March 19, also sent to Cairo as telegram 4343 and to Tel Aviv as telegram 809, expressed regret that Jordan and the UAR rejected the technical formula on Jordan waters but indicated hope that it might still be possible to obtain acceptance of its components. The telegram instructed the Embassy in Amman to continue discussion with the Jordanians of the realities of the problem and of the course of action that would best advance immediate Jordanian interests. (Ibid.) For text of the technical formula, see footnote 5, Document 11. King said he had taken lead in trying keep Arab leaders standing by Summit decisions; acceptance Criddle proposals would mean he himself would be "going off the reservation." Macomber suggested he could portray Criddle proposals as interim step to fellow Arab leaders. King wondered about US financing Mukheiba dam and heightening of East Ghor canal walls. He was told USG backing for Mukheiba not possible because it inconsistent with 1955 plan. Similarly we could not assist in raising East Ghor walls unless this project integral part measures carry out Unified Plan. Macomber assured King Maqarin dam would have strong behind the scenes support USG and expressed hope GOJ would move swiftly get engineering and financing for this project. King conceded Criddle proposals and Unified Plan would give Jordan more water than Arab plan and promised he would go back and take another hard look at proposals. Said he remained skeptical about Criddle proposals and would have to discuss with "other Arab leaders." For Amman: Believe King has keener appreciation technical advantages Criddle proposals and has acquired idea of tack that might enable him to carry off politically his acceptance. It clear however in King's conversation with Talbot April 16 (Depcirtel 1950)/3/ he far from convinced Criddle proposals wise. You should not press King on this matter after his return though you should be ready discuss if he raises it. Would seem best continue assure his most influential technical and political advisors are fully conversant our views. You should continue give this high priority. /3/Circular telegram 1950, April 19, summarized the conversation. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 JORDAN) For Cairo: If King actually consults other Arab leaders re Criddle proposals, Nasser will probably be among them. In view Salim's hostility proposals and his apparent role in determining King's earlier negative reaction prospects we could sweeten atmosphere in Cairo seem dim. Dept officers recently have taken line with Amb Kamel that Unified Plan represents only means insure Israel respects Arab rights and that Summit statesmanship has shown signs of turning into spite and menace. Kamel appeared taken with idea Unified Plan which safeguards Arab water rights should not be thrown away. He said he would report along these lines to Cairo. Does Embassy see any prospect mitigating UAR hostility at least to degree assuring silent UAR acquiescence GOJ acceptance proposals? For Tel Aviv: King told Macomber he convinced Israelis already dumping salt water into Jordan. Do you have any info to substantiate this charge? You may inform GOI that in spite negative tone King's remarks on Jordan waters in public here, he did not completely bar possibility re-examining components technical formula. We still consider essentials Criddle proposals alive but believe further time necessary for maturing of ideas we have planted. Rusk
47. Memorandum for the Standing Group/1/ Washington, undated. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSAM File, NSAM 290. Secret. Filed with a covering memorandum of April 27 from Read to McGeorge Bundy. Another copy shows that the memorandum was signed by Harriman for the Department of State and sent to Deputy Secretary of Defense Cyrus Vance, who signed on April 25. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 70 A 1266, Israel 470) SUBJECT The State and Defense Departments have thoroughly analyzed the questions raised in NSAM 290. Their tentative conclusions are that the U.S. is sympathetic to Israel's growing need for modernization of its armor and would find it advantageous from a production and balance of payments point of view to sell 500 tanks to Israel but: (a) Israel's need is not immediate; (b) the political cost to the U.S. of meeting this need directly would be too great; and (c) there are alternate possibilities for meeting Israeli needs via European suppliers which offer promise. The conclusion that the cost of U.S. interests in the area of providing the tanks from U.S. sources would be heavy is supported by SNIE 36-2-64 of 15 April 1964. Moreover, Israeli acquisition of surface-to-surface missiles is a matter of great concern to the U.S., because of the new arms spiral it would help stimulate in the area and the additional step toward an Israeli nuclear deterrent it might entail. These judgments are more fully discussed in a State Department paper (Tab A)/2/ and one from the Department of Defense (Tab B)./3/ /2/The Department of State recommendations, in a package headed "NSC Standing Group Meeting, April 28, 1964: Israeli Arms Requests," were that the United States should (1) encourage Israel to acquire tanks and anti-tank weapons from its usual Western European suppliers, (2) explore means to facilitate this, (3) dissuade Israel, "by appropriate means," from acquiring missiles or developing nuclear weapons, and (4) accelerate and intensify U.S. secret efforts to achieve practical arms control in the Near East. (Johnson Library, National Security File, National Security Action Memorandums, NSAM 290) /3/A Department of Defense memorandum for Bundy, in a package headed "NSC Standing Group Meeting of April 28, 1964: Meeting Israeli Arms Requests, (NSAM--290)," set forth three alternatives: (A) U.S. supply of 300 tanks to Israel as a military assistance sale on liberal credit terms, (B) U.S. assistance to Israel in procuring tanks from Western Europe, and (C) treatment of the tank request as a part of the larger problem of controlling the arms race in the Middle East by seeking Western European and Soviet agreement to prohibit the provision of advanced weapons to the Middle East and seeking their support for an urgent effort to obtain agreement from Middle East countries for arms control measures. (Ibid.) Therefore, the agencies concerned tentatively recommend that the following be the basis for U.S. discussions with Israeli Prime Minister Eshkol: 1. The U.S. should tell Israel that, while recognizing Israel's growing need for tanks, the U.S. cannot enter into direct supply at this time./4/ /4/Bundy wrote "Yes" in the margin next to this paragraph. 2. However, the U.S. believes that alternate sources of supply which meet Israeli needs can be made available, with U.S. help behind the scenes, and is willing to help Israel explore these./5/ /5/Bundy wrote "Yes, plus" in the margin next to this paragraph. 3. The U.S. should tell Israel again of its strong opposition to Israeli missile acquisition and seek to dissuade Israel from going down this road; we are even more concerned about the development of nuclear weapons and insistent that there be no proliferation of such weapons in the Middle East. 4. The U.S. is intensifying its exploration of possible arms control measures to damp down the Middle East arms race, and enlists Israeli help in this effort.
48. Memorandum by the Board of National Estimates Washington, April 29, 1964. [Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-R01012A, ODDI Registry of NIE and SNIE Files. Secret; Controlled Dissem. 2 pages of source text not declassified.]
49. Memorandum for the Record/1/ Washington, April 30, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Tanks, Vol. I. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Jernegan. SUBJECT /2/A draft summary record of the meeting by NSC Executive Secretary Bromley Smith indicates that the meeting was at 5:15 p.m. It presents the conclusions set forth in this memorandum in summary form and adds that the Standing Group agreed on a further effort to persuade Nasser to refrain from a missile program. (Ibid., Files of Robert Komer, Israel Security (Tanks), Nov. 1963-June 1964) The Group met in the White House Situation Room on April 30. Those present were: Mr. McGeorge Bundy, White House, (in the Chair); Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs W. Averell Harriman; Deputy Secretary of Defense Cyrus Vance; Deputy Director of CIA Ray Cline; Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Frank Sloan; Gen. Andrew Goodpaster, JCS; Mr. Robert W. Komer, White House; Mr. Bromley Smith, White House; and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State John D. Jernegan. After discussion of the papers presented, it was decided: 1) The United States could not afford the losses in the Arab States which would be caused by its agreement to furnish the requested tanks to Israel; 2) nevertheless, Israel had a valid need for the tanks and failure to meet it in some way would generate unacceptable pressures against the Administration and in particular against the Foreign Aid Bill; 3) therefore, the United States should make a strong affirmative effort to assist Israel in obtaining tanks from other nations, the most promising sources being Great Britain, France, and West Germany; 4) it would be highly desirable to communicate the decision on this matter to the Israelis before the visit to Washington of Prime Minister Eshkol on June 1 and to be able to assure them that there were good prospects for purchases outside the United States; 5) knowledgeable, high level representatives of the Department of Defense should proceed promptly to London, Paris and Bonn to explore the question with top officials of the three governments; 6) since European tanks were likely to cost more and be less immediately available than American tanks, the United States should be prepared to offer additional economic aid to Israel to compensate for this extra cost and delay; the United States should also seek other means of showing its friendship and support for Israel at the time of Mr. Eshkol's visit--in this connection there was discussion of the possibility of proposing a cooperative project in desalination with nuclear power. It was agreed that it was important to satisfy the Government of Israel that its needs would be fully met. It was further agreed that the initial investigation regarding tank availability in Europe should be kept very quiet. [Continue with the next documents] Volume XVIII Index | Foreign Relations Online | Historian's Office | Department of State | Secretary of State |