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 | FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XVIII Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964-67 Department of State |
 30. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel/1/ Washington, March 14, 1964, 10:48 a.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 32-1 PAL. Confidential; Immediate; Limdis. Drafted by Lucien L. Kinsolving; cleared by Davis, Jernegan, Stephen Campbell of IO/UNP, and Harriman's Special Assistant Frederick Chapin; and approved by Harriman. Also sent to Jerusalem and repeated to Amman. 793. Israel Embassy has been informed of Department's approval of following: 1. We accept Israel Embassy's proposal regarding Munn's passport (Deptel 774 to Tel Aviv)/2/ as most expedient way to resolve issue, i.e., proposal that we issue Munn second passport without designation Palestine which Israel Embassy will visa and return to Dept for disposition. GOI would then issue border-crossing permit against Israel Embassy visa number, but Munn would retain his present passport. /2/Telegram 774 to Tel Aviv, March 5, summarized an informal conversation between Davies and Israeli Minister Gazit concerning Israel's efforts to obtain U.S. agreement to drop the use of "Jerusalem, Palestine" in passports issued or renewed in Jerusalem and issued to officers stationed in Jerusalem. Davies strongly protested Israel's refusal to honor Consul Robert H. Munn's passport, which contained this usage. (Ibid.) A chronology of discussions on this subject, dating back to February 1963, is attached to A-104 from Jerusalem, March 30. (Ibid.) 2. We will cease using "Palestine" in passports as place of assignment and cease issuing, renewing, or amending passports with seal bearing word "Palestine". 3. If there are no adverse repercussions from foregoing, we will change listing of Jerusalem Consulate General in Foreign Service List so that it would be listed under Jerusalem rather than Palestine. Dept stressed that if there is any publicity over steps 1 and 2, it would be difficult for us to carry out additional steps now contemplated to accommodate Israelis on this issue./3/ Israel Emboff Gazit said he would immediately refer proposal to GOI. He again asked about plaque over front door of Congen office in Israel-held Jerusalem. Is our understanding correct that plaque does not contain word "Palestine"?/4/ /3/Telegram 812 to Tel Aviv, March 19, stated that the Department was preparing an order for new seals for the Consulate General, all bearing the designation "Jerusalem" without the word "Palestine." It instructed the Consulate General to begin using the new seals as soon as they arrived and at the same time to cease using the word "Palestine" on letterheads and in correspondence. (Ibid.) /4/Telegram 316 from Jerusalem, March 15, replied that the word "Palestine" did not appear on any Consulate building. (Ibid.) Rusk
31. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel/1/ Washington, March 19, 1964, 3:10 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, AE 11-2 ISR. Secret; Limdis. Drafted at the White House; cleared by Davies, Harriman, and McGeorge Bundy; and approved by McKesson. A March 14 memorandum from Komer to the President states that he had "greatly toned down State's rather abrasive draft" of the letter to Eshkol. Bundy initialed the President's approval on Komer's memorandum and sent the revised draft to Benjamin Read with an attached note of March 19 stating that it was approved by the President. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, Israel, Presidential Correspondence) 810. Please convey following message to Eshkol from President: "March 19, 1964 Dear Mr. Prime Minister: I am distressed to learn from Ambassador Barbour that you feel unable to approve of our reassuring President Nasser about the peaceful character of the Dimona reactor./2/ We are far from confident that apprehension as to Israel's atomic potential will, as you suggest, help deter Nasser from attacking Israel. Quite the contrary, we believe that Nasser's fear of a developing Israeli nuclear power may drive him to a choice between accelerating the UAR military buildup or a desperate pre-emptive attack. Either of these choices would have the gravest effects on the security of Israel. We think it plain that any possible deterrent value that might come from keeping Nasser in the dark is trivial compared to these risks. /2/Telegrams 916 and 919 from Tel Aviv, March 3 and 4, reported a March 3 conversation between Barbour and Eshkol, in which Eshkol argued that a degree of apprehension as to Israel's nuclear potential would serve as a useful deterrent to Nasser. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, AE 11-2 ISR) It is also hard to see how Nasser could adversely exploit reassurance that Israel's nuclear activities are for peaceful purposes. We certainly do not intend to provide him with details. Nor did he misuse our reassurances when, with the agreement of your government, we last informed him along these lines. Indeed our doing so served to ease Arab-Israeli tensions. Therefore I hope you will reconsider your decision on this matter, on which I am sure you will agree that our ultimate interest--enhancement of Israel's security--is the same as yours. With warm regards, Sincerely, Lyndon B. Johnson." You should make following points orally to Eshkol: 1. Nasser aware past US visits to Dimona and eventually will learn of January visit from other countries Israel has agreed we may take into our confidence. Preferable permit us give Nasser information directly to gain maximum favorable results. 2. Content February 22 Nasser speech not new. Every Arab politician must inveigh against Israel to survive politically. Realistic and moderate resolutions taken by Arab Summit Conference reflect Nasser's position more clearly than his words. 3. Al-Ahram editorialist Hassanain Haikal, confidant of Nasser, has publicly voiced UAR recognition that war against Israel is not possible because of US support. 4. Israel's security lies in US capability and preparedness to ward off aggression. Total security is not possible, however; even US lacks that. 5. Tank issue unrelated to Nasser reassurance./3/ /3/Telegram 976 from Tel Aviv, March 23, reported that in a meeting with Eshkol that morning, Barbour delivered Johnon's message and made the five points in telegram 810. (Ibid.) FYI. Jewish Observer February 14 carried article entitled "Dimona Report Studies" that referred to "a top secret report from American experts who had studied the potentialities of Israel's principal nuclear reactor at Dimona. . ." While word visit not used, idea is implicit especially to those aware already of our earlier inspection. Moreover, early in February Israeli newsman here specifically inquired about US interest in Dimona and rumored visit by US scientific team. End FYI. Ball
32. National Security Action Memorandum No. 290/1/ Washington, March 19, 1964. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, NSAM Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 290. Secret. MEMORANDUM FOR SUBJECT Before deciding on whether or how to meet Israel's current request for tanks, the President desires a thorough review of all aspects of this problem, leading to a coordinated interdepartmental recommendation not later than 1 May 1964. Among the aspects he wishes reviewed are: (a) likely Arab reactions and their consequences; (b) various means of offsetting such reactions; (c) likely Israeli reaction if we refuse to meet their request or postpone the issue; (d) the likelihood that Israel could satisfy its needs elsewhere; and (e) the likely course and consequence of Israeli missile development, and the desirability of an effort to turn Israel aside from this course, including ways and means of doing so. The review should also assess various alternative ways of dealing with this matter, such as limiting the size of any sale, postponing such a sale to a more propitious time, or encouraging and perhaps helping Israel to meet its needs from other suppliers. Finally, it should include an analysis of what cooperative measures we might reasonably ask of Israel in return for our responsiveness in meeting its arms needs. I suggest that we prepare a paper in time for discussion of this matter in the Standing Group on 28 April, prior to final approval by the Secretaries of State and Defense and submission to the President. McGeorge Bundy
33. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Deputy Special Counsel (Feldman)/1/ Washington, March 23, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. I. Secret. Here's an extensive set of State talking, briefing, and background papers for your trip to Israel./2/ They seem to me quite in line with the President's views, as put out to the town by Bundy. Here are a few additional thoughts. /2/Filed with a March 20 covering memorandum from Read to Bundy, they included unsigned and undated papers entitled: "Israeli Missile Acquisition" and "Israeli Tank Acquisition" and a suggested talking paper, as well as background papers. (Ibid.) I. Missiles. Mac and I hope that you will make a real effort to turn Israelis aside from SSMs. In so urging we are motivated as much by Israeli as by US security interests. We simply do not seem to have gotten across to Israel that, whereas present UAR missiles (even if multiplied) are little if any threat, Israeli acquisition of good missiles will trigger the UAR to get good missiles in return (and the only place to get them is from the Soviets). This has in fact been the history of arms escalation in the Middle East--whenever one side draws ahead, the other must needs follow. We doubt that the Soviets would give Nasser nuclear warheads, but they might just put Soviet missile bases in the UAR. Either of these outcomes would magnify the threat to Israeli security (and incidentally increase the pressures on Israel to go nuclear). Finally, there's the risk of UAR pre-emptive attack, which our Embassy in Cairo takes most seriously. Is it worth incurring such risks for the deterrent advantage of being able to lob a few conventional warheads into Cairo? If the above argument makes sense, then the corollary financial argument does too. Acquiring a missile capability is hellishly expensive. Why should Israel waste at least a few hundred million bucks on a deterrent of marginal value (without nuclear warheads), when a sum of this size could be far more efficiently used in other ways? Nor do the Israelis seem to pay much attention to our intelligence estimates, the gist of which we've passed quite freely to them. In fact, Eshkol told Rowen we should not question their intelligence, because knowing what the UAR is up to is a life and death matter to them. It so happens, however, that the Israelis themselves have no evidence that 900-1000 UAR missiles are in the cards. There is a sheer guess, and our guess as you know is only a "few hundred" by 1969-70 with probably fewer. And here is one field where we, with our own vast missile experience and intensive study of the Soviets, are a lot more competent than our Israeli friends. They have very little basis for evaluating program cost or the immense complexity of deploying, controlling and salvoing a 1000 missile force. Israel makes much, for example, of the psychological dislocation if several hundred missiles should land during the crucial 72 hours of mobilization. We flatly doubt that the UAR could achieve any such highly sophisticated salvo capability. We feel that the Israelis have simply closed their ears to our efforts to clue them. Bear in mind also that even the Israelis contend that the so-called UAR missile threat will not reach full bloom until 1969-70. This gives us room to maneuver. What the Israelis are apparently buying is the first French SSM. If our experience is any guide, it will be very expensive and may not be terribly good. Simple prudence would suggest that Israel could afford to wait a few years under any circumstances before committing itself to a major program. True, Eshkol himself says that it may be another two years before they decide how much of a capability they need, but this date could apply to the beginning of deployment or to a second tranche of purchases. The simple fact that the Israelis refuse to tell us what they have in mind in itself adds greatly to our suspicions. Indeed, I think you should make quite a point of saying that their evasiveness over Dimona, now repeated with respect to missiles, is precisely what creates uncertainty on our part. II. Security Assurances. Israelis are constantly, though I think largely for tactical reasons, stressing the tenuous nature of our security commitment. You are in a good position to say categorically, from three years in the White House, that there is absolutely no doubt as to US determination to prevent Israel's destruction. This has been reiterated time and again, publicly and privately. The only real question at issue is whether we should give a formal security guarantee. We are unwilling to do so for reasons which serve Israel's interests as much as ours, i.e. such a guarantee would simply trigger offsetting Arab moves toward Moscow which would actually increase the threat to Israel without at the same time adding an iota to our determination to act. III. Tanks. You are quite familiar with the tank arguments--pro and con. Since you will want to avoid getting out in front on this issue, why not emphasize that nothing Israel has told us suggests that the armor imbalance has become so immediate and urgent a problem as to deprive us of further time for reflection. The Israelis freely admit that the time when the imbalance will become potentially serious is 2-3 years hence. Why, therefore, are they pressing us so hard? The real answer, of course, is that it's an election year. IV. US Aid to Israel and the Arabs. It seems to me that you have got to sustain the party line on this issue. Israel is doing magnificently (10% growth rate, estimated $640 million in reserves by end of this year, per capita GNP of $900 plus). We have given Israel through June 1963 approximately $1 billion in aid. True, we have given the UAR $880 million, but this is only $32 per capita (compared to $413 per capita for Israel); much more important, it has been mostly food which goes into the bellies of the fellaheen not the sinews of the state. The UAR has bought Soviet arms with cotton which it couldn't sell to us. Moreover, the UAR bought as many arms in the late 50's when we weren't giving it much aid as it has during our three year PL-480 agreement. V. Finally, I do hope that you can get across to our Israeli friends that our relationship cannot be so much of a one-way street. Our underwriting of their security necessarily gives us a legitimate voice in their policy. All get and no give is unsatisfactory as a basis for our relationship. Any objective observer looking at the Middle East of the last 16 years would see US policy as being consistently pro-Israeli (aside from Suez, on which I personally think we flubbed). In my opinion the Israelis know this, they do count on us, and their frequent expressions of doubt are far more for bargaining purposes than because of any real question in their minds. In fact, Mike, Israel seems to have quite deliberately been seeking step-by-step to develop the kind of relationship with us (overt security guarantee, military aid, joint planning) which will compromise our relationship with the Arabs. No doubt the Israelis think that this will be a stronger deterrent to Arab pressures. But in my view it is a most short-sighted policy. The Arabs already regard us as so pro-Israeli that further steps will not add much. What they will do, however, is to force the Arabs to react, by squeezing our base and oil interests, and by moving ever closer to Moscow. This will increase the threat to Israel far more than the reassurance gained from making public what we already do privately. Thus Israeli policy harms rather than serves US-Israeli interests. It is no disservice to Israel to have this out with them, and I hope you will help do so. R. W. Komer/3/ /3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
34. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State/1/ London, March 25, 1964, 5 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL ARAB-US. Secret; Nodis. An attached note of March 25 from Read to Rusk suggested sending copies to the White House, U. Alexis Johnson, and Jernegan. Rusk initialed his approval. 4713. For the Secretary only from Talbot. In meetings Monday night and yesterday in Beirut with Ambassadors Meyer, Knight, Hart, Barnes and Barbour I found several of them rather discouraged by what they consider loss in recent weeks of gains we had made with Arabs over past three years. Root cause, they agreed, is outside our control; we have now begun to absorb anticipated and inevitable Arab reactions to our support of Israeli diversion of Jordan waters outside Jordan Basin. They expect higher pitch of anti-Israeli talk and possibly actions in months ahead, with substantial fallout of anti-Americanism. They are especially concerned that sequence of recent official US speeches and actions has strongly accentuated Arab reactions. In euphoric aftermath of Cairo Conference Arabs, they said, had persuaded themselves that they could be masters in their own homes. Effect of Alexis Johnson and Weizmann Institute speeches was to suggest to Arabs that US asserting American intention of determining future pattern of area. This in Ambassadors' opinion gave rise to so far unshakable Arab belief that "enlightened Kennedy policies have given way to Truman-like pro-Israeli policies." It is obvious that accident of timing shortly after Cairo Conference plus superacute anxieties about policies of a new President reinforced Arab reactions. Ambassadors concurred that cumulative signals coming out of Washington now, including Eshkol visit and talk of possible arms sales to Israel, could generate runaway Arab reaction unless we can find ways to balance overall impression. Knight talked seriously of possible need to evacuate American dependents. Meyer felt US goodwill in Lebanon undergoing great strain, with our friends under pressure to deny us. Barnes thought Hussein would have to emphasize Palestine question in forthcoming Washington visit in order live with fellow Arabs afterward. Except for Barbour, whose concerns are different, only Hart reported that his clients not particularly affected so far by anti-Americanism mood. He doubted however that Saudis would resist participation in Arab programs against Israel. In earlier visit to Baghdad and Kuwait I had encountered similarly heightened sensitivity to Israel question in US-Arab relations. Ambassador Strong, who has found himself more deeply entangled in Israel question since Johnson [garble] two recent USG speeches than before, believes Iraqi posture will be determined in end by way Cairo decides to play Israel question and US-Arab relations. Ambassador Cottam finds Kuwaitis so anxious to be "good Arabs" they adopt rather strong line on Israel and US-Israeli relations. Ambassadors of course did not need my reassurances of continuity of policy and naturally they demonstrated understanding of and loyalty to US policy. They questioned however whether Washington understands erosion already evident in US-Arab relations or sensitivity of Arabs to campaign oratory and especially to any consignment of arms this year to Israel. Understandably, they pleaded for utmost restraint in US policy statements on Near East in coming months. Our Ambassadors acknowledged that Arabs had brought much on their own heads by heating up Israeli issue after Cairo Conference and coupling this with renewed campaign to eliminate Western bases from Eastern Mediterranean region. I would describe their mood not as critical of our policy but as disquieted by thought this is likely to be even more difficult year than they had anticipated. I believe they were encouraged after our meeting. If you wish we can discuss this matter further when I return home later this week. Jones
35. Memorandum for the Record/1/ Washington, April 2, 1964. /1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 80-B01285A, DCI (McCone) Files, Box 6, Folder 7, DCI Meetings with the President, Jan.-Apr. 1964. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by McCone. SUBJECT [Here follows discussion of unrelated matters.] 6. Rusk then brought up the question of the UAR relationship. He said that the Department believed that no benefits had as yet been derived from our attempts to reach an understanding with Nasser. Nasser had failed in his commitments in the Yemen; there were now more troops in the Yemen than ever before and furthermore he had taken overt action against Aden. Furthermore Nasser had stimulated Libya's efforts against the U.S. and British bases and was continuing to agitate this issue. Additionally Nasser had been uncooperative in our numerous efforts to bring the Middle East arms race under control. Rusk said he raised this question with, and informed the Council, that U.S. policies towards the UAR and Nasser were under penetrating study by the Department. Action: DDI should give this matter continuing consideration and should discuss the subject with appropriate people in the Department and also with me. [Here follows discussion of unrelated matters.]
36. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State/1/ Tel Aviv, April 4, 1964, 1 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL ISR-US. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Passed to the White House. 1009. Feldman had substantive conversations with Meir and Eshkol on Friday./2/ Discussion with Meir was largely predictable. She emphasized the growing nature of the Arab threat, the recent speeches by Nasser, and especially the Israeli need for missiles and tanks if Israel was to meet the threats. She stated that in view of her understanding that the US Govt knew Israel would not be an aggressor, she could not understand any reluctance to supply missiles and tanks. She went on to say she was personally convinced of the friendship and good faith of the United States but there were other responsible elements in the Israeli Govt that felt their policy should not be predicated on this understanding. /2/April 3. Feldman commented that the basis of Israeli policy had to be faith in the United States. He asked whether there really was any alternative and she agreed that from her point of view there was none. Feldman then pointed out that the acquisition of missiles by Israel in our view was not in the political, economic or military interest of Israel. Mrs. Meir urged very strongly that missiles were a needed deterrent to Nasser's stated aggressive aims and claimed that his statements were already supported by a large number of UAR missiles, which even in their primitive state could create chaos in Israel. Feldman commented that this was probably not the view of the govt, but that of the Foreign Minister. Mrs. Meir said that she and Eshkol did not see things alike but that they both were vitally concerned with whatever defensive needs the current threats from Nasser made urgent. Feldman raised with Mrs. Meir the unfortunate leak in the Jerusalem Palestine story./3/ Mrs. Meir came as close to an apology as he has ever heard from her, although she disclaimed any responsibility. /3/See Document 30. Telegram 969 from Tel Aviv, March 23, reported that the story of the U.S. decision to drop the "Palestine" designation from passports issued by the Consulate General in Jerusalem was in the local press. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL ISR-US) Telegram 975 from Tel Aviv, March 23, reported that Barbour expressed keen disappointment at this to Arad. (Ibid.) The meeting was attended by Mrs. Meir, Shimshon Arad and Feldman. It adjourned and Mrs. Meir expressed the wish to meet again on Monday. Discussions with Eshkol later in the day lasted approximately 2 hours and were attended by Kollek, Lubrani and Arad, as well as Eshkol and Feldman. The Prime Minister had asked that this be merely an informal chat. But it developed into substantive discussions. The Prime Minister exhibited considerable concern about the forthcoming visit to US. He pointed out that he had only been in office for six months and his party would soon have to stand for election. Relationship with the United States was always of prime importance. He was extremely anxious that the visit have constructive results. The following items were discussed during the conversation: 1. The Israeli request for missiles, tanks and naval weapons. Eshkol accepted the decision that neither missiles nor naval weapons would be supplied, but said the need for tanks was critical. He claimed they needed them fast and he was hopeful they could obtain them under a grant program. Feldman said a grant program was extremely unlikely and pointed out the merits of maintaining a flexibility as to the source of the weapons. Particularly if the tanks could be obtained at a substantial reduction in price it would be in the Israeli interest to get them from some other nation. (Although Eshkol continued to come back to the United States as a source of supply, Feldman is sure that if the investigation which has been initiated shows that it is possible for the West Germans to supply the M48A3 the Israeli Govt would be completely satisfied.) 2. Missiles. In connection with the tank discussions, Feldman urged that the Israelis restrain their efforts to obtain missiles from France. He said that it was his understanding that they had already purchased 25 such missiles for test purposes. He hoped that there would be no further acquisitions. Eshkol said he did not know how many they had thus far agreed to buy from France. After some discussion however, he agreed to consider not making any additional purchases without prior consultation with the United States. He said Israel did not have the resources anyhow to make any large-scale purchase at this time. In fact an agreement might be possible that Israel would not buy any missiles (Feldman believes he meant take delivery) in 1964 or 1965 and would limit themselves to the 25 test missiles for the time being. However, in view of the threat from the UAR he would have to have the right to keep pace with any missile program of the UAR. He suggested, for illustrative purposes only, that Israel might purchase one missile for every two the UAR acquired. This presupposed some effective method of determining how many missiles the UAR had. Feldman asked specifically whether the Israeli Govt would agree to acquire no missiles if Nasser would halt his missile program. The reply was an unqualified yes. (When this question was asked of Mrs. Meir she did not give the same answer. She felt Israel had to have missiles.) 3. The aid program. Eshkol recited the facts and figures showing the large deficit which he stated was running at the rate of $400,000,000 a year, which the Israeli economy had to overcome. He said that when Italy, with a population 20 times that of Israel, ran only a slightly larger deficit it created a major crisis. In view of the history of United States support for Israel he hoped the aid program would continue at the same level and that the rumors he had heard of a reduced level were not true. Feldman did not respond directly to question. He pointed out the difficulties the entire aid program was encountering in Congress and the need for phasing out all over the world. 4. Desalinization program. Eshkol exhibited considerable interest in American desalinization efforts. He asked when Israel could expect the initiation of the joint program announced by President Johnson. He asked also how much such a joint program would cost and what proportion the U.S. Govt would contribute. Feldman said that the first step would have to be discussions between American and Israeli scientists. These conversations would lead to a clearer picture of what is feasible and what cooperative steps could be taken. However, this raised the question of IAEA inspection of nuclear reactors. Feldman said he had intended to discuss this with Ernst Bergmann, whom he was seeing on Sunday. But it would certainly simplify American problems if Israel would agree to IAEA inspection. At this point Arad and Lubrani broke in with all of the objections to inspection listed Embtel 1008./4/ Not being equipped with satisfactory responses to these questions, Feldman again referred to the coming conversations with Bergmann and said he would see whether there wasn't some solution to all these problems. (Feldman believes that if we can get satisfactory answers we may be able to substantially reduce the area of disagreement that presently exists. Urge a more complete response than that contained Deptel 855./5/) /4/Telegram 1008 from Tel Aviv, April 3, requested guidance for Feldman's meeting on this subject with Israeli Atomic Energy Commission Chairman Ernst Bergmann; it listed several anticipated Israeli objections to IAEA inspections and requested guidance in responding to them. (Ibid., AE 6 ISR-US) /5/Telegram 855 to Tel Aviv, April 3, stated that the Department of State preferred to conduct negotiations on this question in Washington. (Ibid.) 5. Eshkol asked at the conclusion of the conversation whether it would be possible to prepare an agenda for his discussions with the President and with Secretary Rusk. Feldman suggested that it might be useful to have from him an indication of the subjects he proposes to raise at those discussions. Eshkol promised to prepare such a list and discuss them at a meeting scheduled for Monday. (Would appreciate any instructions on this point. Would also appreciate any thoughts regarding the meeting with Meir and Eshkol now scheduled for Monday. Feldman also expects to see Eban, Sapir, Dayan, Peres and Rabin course of visit.) He requests this tel be passed urgently White House for Komer. Barbour
37. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State/1/ Tel Aviv, April 7, 1964, 12:30 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL ISR-US. Secret; Exdis. 1020. Feldman and I saw PriMin Eshkol for ninety minutes morning April 6. Eshkol attended by Mrs. Meir, Yahil, Kollek, Arad and Lubrani [garble--met?] with us. Major subjects were tanks, Israel's overall defense policy, missiles, weapons financing, Eshkol's June meeting with President Johnson, desalination and IAEA inspections. Last two topics being reported separately./2/ Following summary, topically rearranged in part, omits some familiar GOI argumentation employed in PriMin's forcefully made presentation. /2/Telegram 1022 from Tel Aviv, April 7. (Ibid., E 11-3 ISR) 1. Tanks. Eshkol glad USG officials are acknowledging Israel's need to modernize its tank force. Where does Israel's request stand? Eshkol compared Israel's inventories of various categories of conventional weapons with weapons held by UAR and Near East Arab countries. Threats by Nasser and others such as Ben Bella must be viewed against growing weaponry gap. Israel needs 500 modern tanks; "We'll start with 300." US is only possible provider. British Centurions not available in adequate number, AFG Israel wants better tanks, ones to last until early 1970s. French tanks, when available, much too expensive. Could Feldman give GOI some consolation now on tank request, which of utmost importance? Noting some variance between USG and GOI figures on weapons presently in area, Feldman said tanks would be appropriate subject for June meeting. He stressed non-partisan nature of US special commitment to Israel's defense. Israel asks that we evidence this deep commitment more. Obviously we cannot have an alliance nor an inflexible defense guarantee. As last April's crises showed, US is prepared intervene quickly. Other steps might be taken; perhaps there could be additional contacts between our military experts. US wishes avoid significant area arms imbalance in either direction; if Israel attained clear military superiority a dangerous escalation would surely ensue. Feldman said we recognize Israel's need for modern tanks. After discussion of missiles (see 3 below), Eshkol again tried pin Feldman down on tanks. Feldman again acknowledged Israel's need, but said no decision taken by USG as to source of supply. He asked if Israel's objective is not so much that US supply tanks, as to get tanks; possibly other sources would be cheaper. Eshkol said he open to suggestion; maybe would be better for both of us if tanks came from non-US source. However, tanks from US would strengthen US commitment to Israel in Arab eyes. 2. Defense policy. Eshkol voiced appreciation of US public assurances (and on my reminder) of private Presidential assurances. But Israel's "basic philosophy" is autoemancipation of surviving Jews; self-labor and self-defense. USG says its protective umbrella covers Israel but "we must stand on own feet and be able to touch the umbrella." More bilateral military consultations would be good. However, PriMin expressed doubt that, if UAR attacked Israel and Soviets supported UAR, US would necessarily intervene with force on Israel's behalf. Also, future US administrations might have different views on Near East. I reminded PriMin that (1) absolute security does not exist, (2) even US security relies significantly on our friends, (3) our commitment to Israel is fundamental no matter what US political changes occur. Feldman said we agree we want to keep balance of forces in Near East. 3. Missiles. Eshkol and Feldman had spirited exchange as to degree of threat posed by UAR missile program, and Israel's reaction. PriMin said UAR would have 900 missiles in three or four years. Feldman replied this impossible. Eshkol: We know US is unhappy with us on missiles; cannot understand why. Feldman: Missiles Israel is buying from France will accelerate arms race; they are very much better than anything Nasser could have for years. Eshkol: UAR is first in jets including bombers, navy and tanks. How does US know Egyptian missiles will not be markedly improved soon? Feldman: PriMin can be sure if Israel gets superior missiles, UAR will get better ones. Eshkol: Why should we always step back? We will have merely "a few dozen" missiles in year or two. I noted PriMin still talking in terms of direct equations, overlooking striking power of Sixth Fleet. Eshkol: Therefore my stress on our defense philosophy. If Israel attacked, Washington's natural tendency would be to take matter to UN, wait few days, ascertain Moscow's reaction. Meantime, many Israelis killed. "We must be here to help you; we must absorb first shock." I again observed timing of Sixth Fleet's counterpunch not a crucial factor; knowledge that it would come will deter UAR. Eshkol said US means well but fails understand situation. "If I could believe you could persuade Nasser to stop on his missiles or else Israel will get better missiles... But US does not succeed in persuading Nasser." Look at Yemen, where UAR troops gaining valuable experience. UAR has employed mortars in gas warfare. Is USG certain UAR will not put gas warheads on its missiles? Feldman reiterated USG has different appraisal UAR missile threat. Both our experts and Israel's agree Egyptian missiles are now primitive. PriMin speculated Nasser building push-button weapons to compensate for Israelis' man-for-man fighting superiority. He begged USG "not to exaggerate intelligence of our men." Feldman said it impossibe for UAR to become serious push-button attacker for years. He warned that Eshkol will not be able to convince President's military advisors that US appraisal of missile threat is wrong. After deliberating, Eshkol said "then we are in bad situation." During further Eshkol-Feldman exchange on missiles, Feldman stressed dangers of Israel's forcing pace of sophisticated missilery in Near East. PriMin said it "almost inhuman" to ask Israel to foreswear missiles. Feldman urged that before Israel acquired missiles on large scale it consult with us. Eshkol promised consult if "we go into hundreds." Later he said consultation might be appropriate if Israeli acquisitions exceed range of "few dozens" already contracted. Re number of French missiles Israel has already ordered, Eshkol said "Maybe five more or ten less than 25; about one or two or three dozen." PriMin made clear Israel would be glad to stop missile acquisition if UAR ceased its missile program. He asked USG to "keep going to Nasser" on missile problem not to concentrate wholly on dissuading Israel./3/ /3/Telegram 1021 from Tel Aviv, April 7, reported that in a meeting with Eban later on April 6, Feldman emphasized the danger to the Near East region if Israel were to put nuclear weapons on the missiles it was acquiring, noting that the United States felt very strongly about this, although he had been diverted from stressing it with Eshkol. (Ibid.) Telegram 1033 from Tel Aviv, April 9, reported that in a meeting on April 7, Deputy Defense Minister Peres reiterated Israeli willingness to abandon missile acquisition if Nasser halted his program, but that Feldman and Barbour had concluded there was virtually no hope of persuading the Israelis to eschew a missile program. (Ibid.) 4. Weapons financing. Early in our talk Eshkol decried US "over optimistic" analyses of Israel's capability to pay much for more weapons. Sure, Israel has 700-800 million dollar balance, but it owes vast sums in dollars. In 1965 foreign trade gap will be $400-450 million. If USG "denies, denies, denies, we will sell everything we have to gain security", Eshkol said. Near meeting's end PriMin said he hoped talk of USAID clear-out untrue. Israel must buy missiles; US can help financially on tanks. Dollar drain for (French) jets enormous. 60-70 Mirages cost Israel "much more" than $100 million, plus spare parts and cost of training "there". Eshkol reminded us that as MinFinance he had opposed Hawk deal. I noted GOI nevertheless approved deal. PriMin promised provide Feldman with precise figures on Israel's outstanding dollar obligations for military hardware. 5. June 1 meeting. Having set guidelines for consideration of tanks, missiles and desalination, Feldman said President may wish also discuss Jordan waters problem. Mrs. Meir said question of Maqarin Dam capacity would be worth focus. Eshkol said in view UAR missile threat and opposition and press realization thereof, when he returns from Washington he must have "something to tell the people". (Deputy PriMin Eban and others are pushing this line too.) Feldman said another worthwhile topic could be general NE area relations. (Israelis did not comment on this point at this meeting, but later Assistant DirGen Herzog discussed long-range NE policies with Feldman.) Feldman said Palestine refugees also might be discussed, although he doubted if anyone had come up with workable new idea. I commented it difficult to discuss Israel's relations with its neighbors without reference to important refugee problem. Eshkol said only solution is resettlement; Cyprus has taught GOI a lesson. Also, USG should give more money directly to host governments rather than a UNRWA. Mrs. Meir said she already drafting direct negotiations draft res for next GA. Feldman remarked she could spend her time more profitably otherwise. Feldman several times noted Eshkol's time with President will be limited to about an hour, thus important to concentrate on most vital issues. Yahil suggested if USG wishes discuss refugees, PriMin might do so with Secretary Rusk rather than President. Feldman recommended Eshkol not be specific in publicly claiming any accomplishments, especially re tanks, as result visit to US. PriMin agreed. As meeting broke up it was agreed our call on Eshkol would be described to press as for general discussion his June visit. Recommend Department repeat most if not all of this message to recipients Depcirtel 1791./4/ /4/Circular telegram 1791, March 26, sent to 14 posts in the Near East and North Africa and to London, informed the recipients that the Department was preparing a study on the question of Israeli arms requests and requested comments. (Ibid., DEF 19-3 US-ISR) Barbour
38. National Intelligence Estimate/1/ NIE 36-64 Washington, April 8, 1964. /1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-R01012A, ODDI Registry of NIE and SNIE Files. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to a note on the cover sheet, the estimate was submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence, and concurred in by the U.S. Intelligence Board on April 8. The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, AEC, and NSA participated in its preparation. The State, Defense, AEC, and NSA representatives concurred; the FBI representative abstained, the subject being outside his jurisdiction. A table of contents is not printed. Paragraph references are to the Discussion portion of the estimate, not printed here. MAIN TRENDS IN THE ARAB WORLD/2/ /2/This estimate does not cover Sudan and the Maghreb. [Footnote in the source text.] The Problem To estimate general trends in the Arab world over the next several years. Conclusions A. Political turmoil in the Arab world appears likely to continue for many years to come. The military have come to play an increasing role, but--except in Egypt--they have not proved to be a stabilizing factor. Iraq and Syria in particular are likely to remain highly unstable. The monarchies in Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Libya will come under increasing revolutionary nationalist pressure, and one or more of them may be extinguished in the next several years. Nasser appears likely to remain the single most influential Arab leader. The noteworthy economic and social progress of the past ten years will continue, although as in the past, it will be uneven and varied. (Paras. 3, 5, 8-10, 16-19) B. The emotional appeal of Arab unity will remain very strong, but in general the pan-Arab movement is likely to be confined to the kind of cooperation among independent countries that occurred at the Cairo summit meeting in January 1964. (Paras. 20-22) C. Arab attitudes toward Israel remain basically hostile, but a fair proportion of Arabs have gradually come privately and reluctantly to accept the fact that Israel will exist for many years to come. The Arab-Israeli arms race will cause tensions and could lead to limited or selective hostile action. Other danger points are the Jordan waters problem and the possibility of Israeli military action in the event of a radical political change in Jordan. Nevertheless, the general inhibitions on open warfare would be strong, and a serious rise in tensions could probably be contained by great power pressures. (Paras. 23-26, 29, 30) D. Arab relations with the West remain heavily influenced by hatred of "imperialism" and by Western support of Israel. The possibility of a sudden deterioration of Western relations with the Arabs over Israel is always present. The Arab nationalists generally will press for termination of Western base rights in the area. While they will also press for a greater share of oil revenues and a greater degree of participation in production, nationalization appears unlikely. (Paras. 31-33, 35) E. The Soviets probably believe that the tide is running against the West in the Arab world and that they can capitalize on the unsettled political situation and upon various tensions between the Arabs and West. If US-Arab relations should deteriorate sharply, there would probably be a noticeable strengthening of Soviet influence. We do not believe, however, that this would result in one-sided reliance on the Soviets or a more accommodating attitude toward local Communist parties. (Paras. 36-38) [Here follows the Discussion portion of the estimate.]
39. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, April 14, 1964, noon. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Jordan, Visit of King Hussein, 4/14-15/64 (II). Secret. Drafted by Davies on April 15 and approved by U on April 27 and by the White House on May 4. According to the President's Daily Diary, the President met privately with King Hussein from 12:05 to 12:15 p.m. in the Oval Office followed by a 15-minute session with the press for photographs. The meeting recorded here took place in the Cabinet Room from 12:30 to 1:06 p.m. (Ibid.) An April 10 briefing memorandum from Ball to the President is ibid., National Security File, Country File, Jordan, Visit of King Hussein, (II). An April 13 briefing memorandum from Komer and Bundy to the President is ibid., 4/14-15/64 (I). Other records pertaining to the King's visit are in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 15-1 JORDAN and POL 7 JORDAN, and ibid., Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 2385-2386. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS His Majesty King Hussein of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan The President The President and King Hussein had a private conversation before joining the larger group. The President said that he and King Hussein had discussed a variety of topics including foreign aid, military aid, problems with the Congress, the $3 billion odd dollars spent since 1946 by the U.S. in assistance to the Arabs, and the Jordan Waters problem. He had asked His Majesty to outline his views and his feelings on these subjects. He had also touched on his speech at the Friends of the Weizmann Institute banquet. He told the King that nothing he said in any way implied discrimination. The U.S. proposal on desalinization discriminated against none and favored none. The U.S. offer stood for any country. King Hussein said it was extremely important that we all speak frankly on the problems which face the Near East. Realizing the great responsibilities the U.S. Government carries in the Free World, he believed that there are very few differences between the U.S. and the Arabs and indeed few differences in what we believe in. One great difference was Palestine. He had been asked by the Arab League to bring the sincerest hopes of all Arab leaders that Palestine will not be permitted to become a major problem between us and that relations between the U.S. and the Arab world will continue to improve. The King said the President had been kind enough to refer to his surprise at Arab reaction to the President's speech. In frankness, the general reaction among the Arabs was one of annoyance. This can be understood only when viewed against the background of the Palestine problem. There is Arab annoyance that so many sorely needed resources have to be utilized to counter what the Arabs consider the major threat of Israel, a hostile state which splits the Arab worlds of Asia and Africa, and complicates Arab problems of development. The Palestine problem has given Jordan a large refugee population, some two-thirds of its total people. Since the 1947 UN resolution, Israel has acquired a greater area than allotted. There have been many crises such as the 1956 push against the Egyptians. In the case of Jordan, Israel is encroaching on Jordanian territory in the south in developing its potash works. In the demilitarized zones, the Israelis continue to encroach. Perhaps most important at this juncture is the water problem, which boils down simply to a diversion of water required in the area to another area. Against this background the President's remarks had been interpreted as a validation of Israel's right to divert water and offer to provide means for even greater water resources. Those would permit increased immigration and enhance Israel's threat to the Arabs. The King said that Arab policy now was one of containment of Israel. Stability in the area depended on establishment of a balance between Israel and the Arab states. Israel must be brought to realize that she cannot continue to maintain a position in the area based on force. At the present, there is no balance between the Arabs and Israel. This is what has caused the Arabs to look to the Soviets for military equipment. Israel's diversion project raised two problems: The first and most immediate was the increased salinity of the lower Jordan river; the second, the question of increased immigration and the threat to the Arabs of Israeli expansionism. In the face of this acutely felt threat and in light of the fact that Arabs cannot get their requirements for arms from the West, Soviet offers are found acceptable. Arabs do not doubt the desire of the Soviet Union to acquire a foothold in the Near East through provision of arms. However, the Soviets have suffered serious setbacks in the area over the past years and Arab solidarity will be a further guarantee against Soviet penetration. Basically the Arabs seek good relations with all states, but feel that Israel is "the spoiled child at Arab expense and at the expense of the U.S." What Arabs ask of the U.S. is that it look into the future and see both sides of this issue. The President said that the U.S. sees both sides quite clearly and, reverting to his speech at the Friends of the Weizmann Institute banquet, said that the offer on desalination was an example of U.S. evenhandedness: "We take salt out of his waters and yours; we give to you both." Foreign Minister Atallah said that he thought the President's reference had been misconstrued in the Arab world. The particular sentence which caused the difficulty was that saying "Water should not be a cause of war but of peace". The Arabs interpreted this as U.S. official support of Israel's right to divert water from the Jordan. Since the dawn of history water has flowed through the Jordan to Galilee and on to the Dead Sea. If Israel unilaterally states that it has the right to stop this historic flow and divert it to alien areas when there is need in the Jordan valley for water, in self defense the Arabs must take steps to secure their rights in this water. If Jordan's needs for water from the Jordan were satisfied, there could be no objection to Israel's diversion project. However, domestic and international law both give the riparians in a basin the primary right to water until their needs are satisfied. Israel's project will result in stopping the flow of sweet water on which some 30,000 Arab farmers depend. It also prevents Jordan from developing lands on which refugees could be settled. The President said that nothing he had said by implication or connotation reflected anything but the U.S. desire to deal equally with all: for the Arabs, for Israel, for any other country. The U.S. position on Israel's project rests on the plan worked out in 1955. As for the speech, he could not help what interpretations had been given to it, but he did not imply that he would do for one what he would not do for others. This he wished to make clear before other things were touched on. The Arabs complain about what the U.S. does for Israel. The Israelis protest about what the U.S. does for the Arabs and insist that more be done for them. The U.S. tries to do equally for both. The President said the only language he knows is that of candor. In extending $3 billion worth of assistance to the Arabs since 1946, the U.S. showed its interest in their development and their future. The U.S. did not spend money on people it hates. The U.S. did not extend more than $40 million to Jordan last year for any reason except to strengthen the country and speed its progress. The King responded that the Jordanians were grateful, but when aid to the two million Israelis was weighed against this, the equation was not balanced. However, the Arabs and the U.S. had many joint interests. Mr. Ball said that problems of this kind were laden with history. The U.S. is aware of the controversial nature of most issues in the area and its relations with the area. Certain principles, however, guide U.S. policies. U.S. policy starts from the point that Israel is a fact. In connection with water, the U.S. made considerable effort to seek a solution and the U.S. regrets that full agreement with the riparian states was not obtained. There must be guiding principles to formulate foreign policy: U.S. actions, we think, are consistent with these principles. The U.S. would regard use of water from the Jordan system as fair if within the standards set by the unified plan. The U.S. had hoped that Jordan would take actions to insure its full share of water under the allocations, as this was the key to full flowering of Jordan's resources. Mr. Talbot said that His Majesty knows the U.S. too is concerned over the question of salinity of the waters of the Jordan and hoped that a solution to this problem could be found. Jordan's East Ghor problem has contributed in large measure to this problem. He believed the recent visit by our water engineer was useful. His suggestion for pumping water from the power company reservoir into the canal offers a short-term solution for the problem of those farmers who face the problem of salinity in waters from the Jordan itself. In the longer range, there is hope for progress on the Maqarin Dam. Storage there would go a long way to preserve resources which are presently not usable. The Jordan valley plan was premised on meeting equitable Arab needs before any allocations to Israel were made; 6-8 years of effort had been devoted to work out a reasonable solution. The continuous concern of the U.S. is that the waters of the Jordan system be available to the appropriate users. We hope U.S. technicians and the Arab technicians can stay in touch with each other on actual and potential uses of the water. This will be of benefit to all and is far more desirable than measures which would serve to increase tensions. Ambassador Juma said that the basic flaw in the U.S. approach is equating of the Arab states and Israel. This flies in the face of the fact that the inhabitants of Palestine are refugees, their property was destroyed, and they are living in misery. In 1947 no Arab delegate would talk with the Soviet representatives at the UN. The strong ties were with the U.S. In one single decade the basic transformation in the entire alignment of the Near East took place because of the U.S. policy toward Israel. Arabs fear that a crisis situation can arise in their relations with the U.S. unless this basic problem is faced squarely. The Ambassador pointed out that the Arabs were not previously interested in large armies or acquisition of modern arms except for parade purposes. He fears that the trend is toward reactivation of the Palestine problem rather than settlement. The Arabs are not opposed to Jews as members of a great religion or as a people. However, the Zionist movement is behaving in a manner which faces the Arabs with dangers. The Zionists are seeking to acquire atomic weapons to further intimidate the Arabs. As a result the Arab world is squandering precious resources in maintaining a balance of armaments. He said he thought it was high time for a new look and a reappraisal of the 1948 policy of "might vs. right". U.S. policy now is that Israel exists and must be accepted. The Ambassador believed that the U.S. with its principles of justice and morality must take another look at the Palestine problem. Foreign Minister Atallah said that tension was rising because of the arms problem and the expected diversion of the Jordan. Arabs know U.S. policy: Israel has been created to remain there. Arabs know the U.S. anxiety for Arab peace. For this latter, thanks are due. However, U.S. policy overlooks the price asked; the price is tantamount to Israel's retaining Arab lands illegally and no enforcement of the UN resolutions and the right of Palestinians to return to their homes. Arabs do not expect the U.S. to pick up their chestnuts but do expect support on any additional forms of aggression. Zionism is aggressive--it has designs on the Arab world. Initially seeking only a national home, this proved not enough and a Jewish state was necessary. The Jewish state quickly overran borders allotted and lines emerging from the Armistice are now becoming sanctified as the status quo. The Zionists took lands, settled aliens thereon and now are bringing more. Although all persecuted Jews have long been settled, Zionists seek other Jews for Israel. They seek them from the U.S., the USSR and Britain. (The President was called out at this juncture for an urgent telephone call.) Clearly their aim is expansionism from the Zionist heartland. Arab refugees have no right to their home but Jews from abroad do. Israel wants more land, more water and more people. If Israel has its way with Jordan waters, Jordan will become a desert while the Negev blooms. Some people say that Palestine provides a military base for the West, the Foreign Minister said. However, he would not go that far. He noted that the President had said that water should be a cause of peace. Arabs interpreted this as saying "Let Israel take your water". There are those that say that the Arabs for four generations let water waste in the Dead Sea. However, resources have not been available to fully utilize this water. This, said the Foreign Minister, is the mood of the Arab world. This is its spirit. Arabs respect you for your efforts to achieve peace, but feel you have different standards for Israelis. Mr. Atallah said that there is nothing sacrosanct in the Jordan [Johnston?] Plan. Arabs have refused it since it gives Israel control of Arab waters. Israel is an expansionist state and a threat to the Arabs. Mr. Talbot said that the foregoing reflected differences in our assessments of the Palestine problem. His Majesty's visit enables us to explore areas in which to seek cooperation on a practical basis. It is impossible now to turn the clock back. The King here interjected his agreement. We are faced with a given situation. We should see how within this framework we can cooperate. Our differing estimates of Israel's expansionism and capabilities must not prevent us from exploring those areas where we seek cooperation. The King said that a review of the background of current problems was useful. Now we could get on with discussions of mutual interests. Mr. Ball noted that we understood and regretted that both sides objected to the basic elements of the Eric Johnston Plan. The U.S. in its approach to the problem needed some standard and the Plan provided this standard. Notwithstanding the position of others we used the Plan as a yardstick on which to base our judgment of what was equitable and reasonable. The President rejoined the group and apologized for his absence. He reiterated the evenhanded nature of proposals made in his February 6 speech. The discussion ended and His Majesty departed for luncheon in the State Department. 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