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 | FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XVIII Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964-67 Department of State |
 20. Letter From President Johnson to President Nasser/1/ Washington, February 27, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, UAR, Presidential Correspondence. Secret. The letter bears no indication of the drafter. The text of the letter was transmitted in telegram 3968 to Cairo, February 27, which indicates that the text was received from the White House. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 1 UAR-US) A February 26 memorandum from Komer to Bundy notes that he had rewritten a draft sent with Rusk's February 19 memorandum to Johnson (see footnote 2, Document 19). Dear Mr. President: I have carefully read your extensive correspondence with President Kennedy and am struck by the degree of mutual respect and understanding it revealed. I sensed also a genuine will to move forward in areas where we could, while setting aside and working to limit the impact of those issues where we necessarily disagreed. For my part I would like this sense of growing confidence on both sides to continue, and to forestall the misconstruing of each other's policies which has marred our relations in the past. In this vein I want to assure you personally that we are as determined as ever to carry forward policies of constructive cooperation, in the United Nations and out, with other governments of like intent. Thus I look forward to continued fruitful cooperation with your government and with the others of the Middle East and to exchanging views with you on our mutual interests. I believe the main concern of leaders in all nations today must be to keep the clouds of war from forming. The nuclear scientist has added new and terrible dimensions to war, and only deep and abiding international cooperation and understanding can make nuclear science a peaceful instead of a military pursuit. You may rest assured that we remain opposed to nuclear proliferation in any area of the world. Since it is inevitable that nations will disagree, we believe we must try diligently to make whatever progress is possible to settle issues in dispute. Meanwhile we must concentrate on expanding areas of agreement. I was heartened by the recent affirmation by Arab leaders meeting in Cairo of the doctrine that nations should compose their differences by peaceful means. We recognize the statesmanship that subordinated narrower grievances to the common good and engendered a climate of cooperation among the various Arab governments. We welcome the prospect of normalization in Yemen, of temperance in the Arab-Israel problem, and of increasing the Arab League's potential for constructive cooperation. So I hope that in the coming months we can work together to enlarge the areas of mutual interest and narrow those where we may disagree. In fact, I look forward to the day when we can meet in person. Meanwhile I would like to continue the frank and friendly dialogue that has already contributed to understanding between our governments. The next few years will be a strain on both of us, but the US and the UAR have so much to gain through good relations that we must both strive to maintain and expand them rather than letting our two nations drift apart. Sincerely, Lyndon B. Johnson
21. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Jernegan) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson)/1/ Washington, February 28, 1964. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 19-3 US-ISR. Secret. Drafted by Russell and cleared by Jeffrey C. Kitchen, Kenneth L. Brown of INR, Davies, Adrian S. Fisher, Deputy Counselor and Vice Chairman of Policy Planning Henry D. Owen, and Edward A. Padelford, Jr., of NR. The memorandum was received in Johnson's office on March 2. SUBJECT Discussion: Attached is a self-explanatory letter to Deputy Secretary of Defense Cyrus Vance indicating that the Department of State is not willing, at this time, to approve the sale of tanks to Israel./2/ /2/The tabs are not attached; the letter has not been found. Cairo Telegram 1896 (Tab D)/3/ well summarizes the political imperatives for searching for more feasible alternatives to that earlier decision. Since the analysis in that telegram was prepared, Nasser has signalled in his speech of February 22 that the Arabs will react violently to any U.S. actions in 1964 that threaten their security interest. The Libyan Prime Minister has informed Ambassador Lightner of the badly deteriorating situation regarding the Libyan attitude toward Wheelus (Tripoli's 331, Tab C)./4/ In addition, the results of the Rowen mission show there are no grounds for thinking our supplying tanks could be used as a counter in dissuading Israel from proceeding in its missile program. /3/Telegram 1896 from Cairo, February 21, is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 12-5 ISR. /4/Telegram 331 from Tripoli, February 27, is ibid., DEF 15 LIBYA-US. The proposed letter also calls Mr. Vance's attention to the fact that, judging from the reports we have seen, members of the mission appear to have indicated to Israel officials that the U.S. was giving favorable consideration to the tank request. This was directly contrary to the limitations in the terms of reference, paragraph 3, b. (Terms of reference attached at Tab B.)/5/ /5/The political terms of reference were set forth in telegram 716 to Tel Aviv, February 13. (Ibid., ORG 7 OSD) Recommendation: That you sign the attached letter at Tab A.
22. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic/1/ Washington, February 29, 1964, 5:32 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. I. Top Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Dickman on February 28; cleared by Walt Rostow, Komer, U. Alexis Johnson, Adrian Fisher, and Sloan; and approved by Jernegan and Rusk. 4011. Cane for Talbot./2/ You authorized by President renew dialogue with Nasser on NE arms. Objectives are (1) demonstrate President shares predecessor's concern spiraling arms race particularly field missiles and nuclears; (2) impart assurances re our understanding Israel's current nuclear program; (3) impress Nasser with self-defeating character his missile program; (4) emphasize importance we place on mutual restraint in field sophisticated weapons and in gaining support for IAEA safeguards; and (5) obtain further insight Nasser views and suggestions on problem. /2/Cane was the distribution indicator used for telegrams pertaining to the arms limitation probe described in Document 18. Talbot visited Cairo in the course of a trip to several capitals in the Near East and South Asia during March. Except for specific assurance re our examination Dimona reactor (see Deptel 748 to Tel Aviv)/3/ and raising NFZ to which Defense interposed objections, you should follow Talking Points paper which pouched Feb 25/4/ and summarized below: /3/Telegram 748 to Tel Aviv, February 27, instructed the Embassy to seek Eshkol's agreement on passing reassurance from the Dimona inspection to Nasser, as requested in telegram 747 (see footnote 3, Document 19) as soon as possible. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 12 ISR) /4/Not found. (1) Basic theme should be that accelerated NE arms race not in basic interest UAR or Israel. Whatever ultimate purpose UAR surface to surface missile program may be, has had unsettling effect and viewed as new stage in NE arms race. (2) For example, we and others continue be under constant Israeli pressure provide all sorts weapons correct imbalances resulting from continued acquisition Soviet arms by Arab countries and UAR weapons development. Our ability curb various Israeli initiatives made more difficult particularly where obvious imbalances occur. (3) We following very closely Israel's progress in nuclear field. At this time, no evidence Israel engaged in production nuclear weapon. However, Israel may acquire capability make nuclear weapon at some future time. (4) Missile race picking up steam. We have not viewed UAR's SSM effort as presenting great threat as long as levels low. However, Israelis fearful Nasser's missile goals, and intelligence indicates they intend taking steps redress situation. If UAR develops large missile force and Israel follows suit, this would be self-defeating exercise for both countries. (5) USG has been through similar experience with Soviets. Though no major arms control agreements reached, Nasser must have noticed both Soviets and ourselves have sought limit further increases our military budgets. Similarly, have both supported UN resolution last November concerning nuclear weapons in orbit. This was direction which arms race could have been extended but neither side stood to gain. Control by "mutual example" can serve interests of both US and Soviets during period when formal agreements difficult to reach. We believe there is parallel for UAR and Israel. (6) What we seeking is means reduce possibility of chain reaction which would ultimately require outside involvement in struggle which either Arabs or Israelis might start but which neither could end. Must look other alternatives: (a) Tacit understanding on missiles: While believe some unobtrusive arrangement involving third party verification most desirable way, if this not possible, would like explore possibility mutual restraint in avoiding SSM forces and other sophisticated weapons. We find strong economic as well as other reasons for both UAR and Israel stop pursuing present course in developing highly expensive weaponry. FYI. Urge you try pin Nasser down more specifically re his vague comment to McCloy that UAR did not plan extensive missile force. End FYI. (b) Support IAEA safeguards: We heartened by UAR endorsement partial test ban. Practical additional step now would be for countries support IAEA safeguards. We look to India's acceptance safeguards for Tarapur reactor as hopeful precedent. UAR support in principle for future yet unbuilt reactors would have profound effect and serve as lever move Israel accede similar safeguards for Dimona reactor. If UAR accepted principle and Israel refused, would have basis for questioning Israel's nuclear policy. (c) Exchange of letters: Another possibility would be exchange of letters with President Johnson along lines suggested Deptel 1035./5/ /5/Telegram 1035 to Cairo, September 12, 1963, is printed in Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. XVIII, Document 324. (d) Collective Agreements: We continuing work on arms control on broader basis. Currently at Geneva, we discussing problem nonproliferation nuclear weapons. This discussion might provide Nasser with opportunity make position on UAR nonacquisition clear. If Nasser raises Nuclear Free Zone, you should indicate interest in UAR ideas and inquire how he thinks concept might apply in Arab-Israel context. (7) We do not believe end results present arms race can contribute Nasser objective strengthening independent role UAR in area. Rather, role can better be fulfilled through exercise restraint in ways suggested above. Would of course welcome any further thoughts Nasser might have. Rusk
23. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, March 4, 1964, 3 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 ISR. Secret. Drafted by Russell on March 10 and approved in S on March 16. The memorandum text is marked Part I of IV. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS His Excellency, Abba Eban, Deputy Prime Minister of Israel The Secretary Mr. Eban said Israel now appeared to be low on the list of urgent world problems. An early conflict in the Near East seemed unlikely. The recent Cairo Summit Conference had opted for a course of caution. Tense tranquility characterized the climate of the Near East. The crisis remained since Nasser was giving increased public emphasis to the inevitability of an Arab-Israel war. The upward spiral of the Near East arms race seemed impossible to stop. Mr. Eban believed Israel had convinced the U.S. that it had fallen behind in the Arab-Israel military balance. Specifically, it was weak in armor. No agreement had been reached as yet on the importance of the U.A.R. missile threat but it was safer to overestimate than to underestimate. A general spirit of Nasserist adventurism pervaded the area. U.A.R. forces in Yemen had increased and Nasser had questioned the position of the West in Libya. Nevertheless, Israel should welcome the present comparative serenity in the Near East. Nothing was inevitable, even Nasser's predictions of inevitable war. It was important, however, to preserve the arms balance. Prime Minister Eshkol urged prompt action on the Israeli request for tanks. He felt strongly that this issue should not be linked to other aspects of Israel's military defense. The provision of tanks was important both substantively and psychologically. Israeli military officers believed the U.S. was sincere in its assurances to protect Israel against aggression but doubted that the U.S. would take prompt action in time of need. Response to Israel's request for tanks had become a symbol of U.S. willingness to give concrete support to Israel against aggression. Israel's view of the dangers of the U.A.R. military build up was such that even if it were possible to prove that a given number of missiles did not constitute a significant military threat, it would be impossible to convince the Israeli people. The problem was largely psychological and required more discussion. Israel was prepared to pursue the matter further but meanwhile hoped for prompt action on the matter of tanks. The Secretary inquired whether Israel desired to purchase the tanks or hoped for grant military assistance. Mr. Eban replied that outright purchase would impose an intolerable burden on Israel. The Israeli economy was intricate and its seeming strength belied the strain that such a financial burden would create. The Secretary stressed the relevancy of the use of available Israeli resources for acquisition of tanks. Grant assistance for tanks might conceivably permit diversion of sufficient resources for Israel to acquire missiles. Regarding the results of the Arab Summit Conference, Mr. Eban said Israel had noted a surprising consolidation of Hussein's position. Jordan's resumption of diplomatic relations with the U.A.R. had made Hussein a respectable Arab nationalist leader. Nasser had reached a less ambitious concept of what he could do in the Arab world. He was more prepared to live and let live. In Yemen, however, he was engaged more deeply than ever. There were no indications that Syria could be worked into a union with the U.A.R. Continuing instability there seemed likely. With respect to the proposed Arab diversion of Jordan headwaters, the major danger was from Syria. The positions of Jordan and Lebanon were ambivalent, and the U.A.R. was not immediately concerned. Israel wished to play down the Jordan waters off-take. Regarding the salinity problem, Mr. Eban noted that off-take above Lake Tiberias would have assured sweeter water. Israel, however, was accepting the criteria of the Unified Plan and water usage as provided thereunder. Israel greatly valued the U.S. support and agreed to the desirability of no publicity. In recent talks with the United Nations Secretary General, the latter had agreed that it would be undesirable to raise the Jordan waters issue in the UN. The Secretary expressed concern about the arms race in the Near East and the backbreaking financial burden it created. He noted a tendency on the part of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. voluntarily to cut nuclear and other arms production and wondered about a parallel desire on the part of the U.A.R. and Israel. Mr. Eban said disarmament interested Prime Minister Eshkol greatly. The U.A.R., however, had been the first on each occasion to introduce a new level of weaponry into the Near East arms race. Mr. Eban said the diffusion of power in the world in recent years had resulted in increased possibilities for small power conflicts. Large powers might wish to intervene but often felt unable to do so for fear of far-reaching consequences. These circumstances led Israeli military men to wonder about the ability of the U.S. to act promptly in support of Israel. They hoped for more clear-cut indications of U.S. intentions. The Secretary interjected that there was no automaticity in any of our agreements to support our allies. Mr. Eban said it was important, under the circumstances, to build up indigenous forces and not to depend upon big power intervention. This underlined the need for Israel's tanks. The Secretary said that since the return of the Rowen mission from Israel he had had no opportunity to discuss the matter with the President. He would do so shortly and be in touch with the Israel Ambassador. We recognized Israel's needs but had problems of our own to consider. On the position of the U.S. in the Arab world, Mr. Eban said it was safer for all concerned if U.S. influence in the area remained strong. The recent speeches of President Johnson and U. Alexis Johnson had created considerable uproar but the Arab states could not afford to ignore the strength of the U.S. It was salutary occasionally to stress the idea of U.S. opposition to aggression. The Secretary commented that the Arabs did not share Israel's doubts as to our position on this score. The reaction to the speeches showed that they were convinced of U.S. intent to oppose aggression. Mr. Eban agreed that the military were never satisfied but said that Mr. Eshkol saw the matter in terms of survival of the Jewish people. It was not possible, therefore, to depend upon U.S. assurances without tangible evidence to back them up. The Secretary said President Johnson looked forward to the coming visit of Mr. Eshkol and to the opportunity to exchange views with him.
24. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State/1/ Cairo, March 4, 1964, 8 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 US/McCLOY. Top Secret; Exdis. Received at 5:04 p.m. 1994. Cane from Talbot. Nearly half my two hour conversation with Nasser Tuesday evening/2/ was devoted to arms questions. I told him President Johnson had carefully reviewed earlier communications between him and President Kennedy, along with reports of McCloy's talks with him. McCloy had emphasized US concerned with area stability and diversion of resources into arms race. President Johnson was equally anxious that in any way possible US shall help nations in this area to curb arms race of weapons of mass destruction and conventional weapons. McCloy and he had had candid talk on missiles and nuclear proliferation, and, expressing President Johnson's deep concern, I hoped we could discuss in all seriousness problem as it now appeared. Nasser agreed and asked me to proceed. /2/See Document 25. I said it seemed to us that accelerated Near East arms race was not in interests of either UAR or Israel. In particular, UAR development of surface-to-surface missiles was having clearly unsettling effect. It was seen by Israel and by other nations including US as new step in arms race. We assumed that in view their mutual distrust, UAR and Israel could not realistically agree now to reduce existing conventional arms. However, decisions made now about this new stage could influence course of arms race for years to come. We hoped he could consider this matter very seriously. I continued that we and other nations have been, and are, under constant Israeli pressure to obtain weapons which in Israel's view needed to correct imbalances deriving from UAR acquisition of Soviet arms or development of its own weapons. Our ability to curb Israeli appetites particularly difficult where obvious imbalances occur. Any dangerous imbalance between two countries merely heightens the temptation for pre-emptive attacks. We have followed very closely, I said, Israel's progress in nuclear field. I could say with full authority that at this time we have no evidence of Israeli production of nuclear weapons. However, it would be possible for Israel to acquire such capability in future. Nasser would recall how strongly President Kennedy had stood against nuclear proliferation and he could be certain that President Johnson just as firmly opposed to that dangerous course. Meanwhile, it apparent that missile race picking up steam. In our people's judgment, UAR surface-to-surface missiles--of type described by Nasser to McCloy as improved V2's--might be considerable psychological threat but would not have great military importance so long as numbers were kept low. This was London's experience under V2 attack in World War II. However, Israel is uncertain and fearful of UAR missile plans and our intelligence indicates Israelis taking steps to redress situation. If numbers of missiles kept low on both sides, problem might be largely psychological. However, should UAR develop large missile force and Israel follow suit two forces would obviously be selfdefeating, as we assume Nasser would recognize. Problem particularly acute because missilery, as we have reason to know, excessively costly and yet we suppose that if competition really got going at this level both UAR and Israel would find means to build up missile force. I noted recent USG experiences with USSR. Although no major arms control agreements have been reached, US and USSR have quietly sought to limit further increases in military budget. In future they might find ways even to reduce military budgets. Obviously no formal agreement involved here, but mutual restraint brought this result. Also, Nasser would recall that US and USSR had concurred in prohibition of nuclear weapons in Outer Space. Both countries could have orbited these weapons but neither stood to gain by such action. These restraints by "mutual example" might, we felt, be useful guides for UAR and Israel. What we were seeking, I said, are ways of reducing chances of chain reaction which might be started by either Israel or UAR but could not be stopped by them and would be likely to draw in other countries including major powers, with consequences Nasser could readily perceive. Being much concerned at such possibilities, we would like to suggest to him, for his consideration and any response he might wish to make, several alternatives. One possibility would be a tacit understanding on limitation of missiles. Some unobtrusive understanding on verification would of course be better way to deal with possible development of surface-to-surface missiles and other sophisticated weapons. However, recalling what Nasser had said to McCloy on this subject, we hope he would at least be willing to explore possible mutual restraint. We see not only compelling military reasons but very strong economic reasons for this course in both countries. We would welcome an indication by Nasser of willingness to limit numbers of UAR missiles. Secondly, we hope Nasser has had opportunity to consider advantages to UAR of accepting IAEA safeguards for future reactors. We are not asking Nasser to change current UAR practice. Safeguards would apply only to any larger reactor it might build in future. Nasser knew that India has agreed to principle of IAEA inspection of Tarapur. It seems to us that for Nasser to take similar step would be no derogation of sovereignty, as he had suggested to McCloy, but rather a highly responsible use of sovereignty to reinforce system of safeguards which if generally adopted could benefit whole of mankind. Nasser's agreement in principle would not only be powerful action in support of IAEA principles, but it would also give other nations, including U.S., sturdy leverage to apply to current Israeli reluctance to place its Dimona reactor under IAEA. Should Israel resist these safeguards after their acceptance by Nasser, U.S. would have basis for questioning Israeli nuclear policy. As another suggestion I recalled the draft letter that President Kennedy had promised [proposed] last October/3/ and said President Johnson would welcome a letter from President Nasser stating UAR has no intention of developing or acquiring nuclear weapons. In our opinion public exchange of this sort would be statesmanlike advance. /3/For text of Kennedy's proposed draft letter, transmitted to Cairo on September 12, 1963, and given to Nasser by Badeau on October 5, and Nasser's reaction, see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. XVIII, Documents 324 and 325. Finally, President Nasser had mentioned to McCloy possibility of collective agreements. We do not know exactly what he had in mind, but we have continued working at nuclear weapons problem on broader basis in Geneva. It has occurred to us that UAR might helpfully state its own position in that forum on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. If Nasser had any other ideas about how to proceed, I said we would be very glad to hear of them as well. In conclusion, I expressed hope I had successfully conveyed President Johnson's deep concern over problems of missile escalation of possible nuclear weapons development. We found it difficult to see how entry into new and costly phases of arms race could serve UAR's desire to strengthen its own independent role in world, for dangers of sophisticated weaponry so great that any hostilities involving them could very well draw in large powers seeking restrict any aggression. As one who understands these problems well, Nasser, we hope, can see how much better it would be if ways could be found to exercise positive restraints in field of missiles and other sophisticated weaponry. With apologies for length of my presentation, I invited Nasser comment as he might desire. He started by observing that once again heart of problem between US and UAR was Israel. It seemed always this way, he said. He thought his position had been made clear in his talks with McCloy and Ambassador Badeau. The UAR had to maintain its defenses. It did not trust Israel. It had been told before that Israel might agree to certain actions, but had been fooled. In 1955 the US had talked about getting some balance between Israel's forces and all Arab forces, but Israel had moved into Sinai and suddenly fallen upon UAR units there. The first news he and his officers had heard of this was conveyed by an Israeli broadcast. None of them could forget those days of 1956. There was no point, therefore, in discussing limitation of arms, because UAR and all Arabs just cannot trust Israel. I pointed out we not talking about cutting back existing weapons. We understand lack of trust which prevents effective discussions directed toward limiting existing arms. Our central concern is for limitation of missiles and other sophisticated weapons yet to become operational. Nasser said UAR had gone into missile program in 1960 to develop deterrent against growing Israeli strength. He had also started building aircraft then. He felt UAR must develop its own aircraft and missiles because at that time Soviets, with whom UAR had some disputes, was refusing provide spare parts and otherwise making clear they not completely trustworthy source of arms. UAR had sought arms elsewhere, including US, without success; therefore he felt UAR had no choice but to develop its own planes and missiles. He could not tell me about numbers of missiles, Nasser said, because UAR has no plan yet. He is not thinking now in terms of numbers. His first job is to increase quality of their performance. So far they have not been very accurate, and inaccurate missiles aimed at Israel might hit Jerusalem or Amman. I observed that Israelis are disturbed because they seem to think UAR preparing to produce missiles in the hundreds. I said if it were matter of only small number, just possible Israelis also might limit themselves to small number. Could Nasser give me idea of range of UAR planning? He regretted that he could not, for reason just stated. He observed I had said missiles might have psychological impact but not much military effect in small numbers. As military man he agreed with this. With conventional warheads missiles could deliver only a ton or so of explosives. Aircraft might be more effective. But now of course Israel getting Hawks from US, so aircraft alone no longer much deterrent. I pointed out Hawk purely defensive and would not protect Israeli forces should they attack outside Israeli borders. He turned that aside by commenting that UAR has not also obtained SAM's, from Soviets. These are extremely expensive, and UAR could not hope to cover whole country or even all important spots, as could Israel with US-purchased SAM's. Indeed, UAR vulnerable because unlike US it does not have full radar coverage of frontiers. These deficiencies increase UAR need for deterrent. I argued SSM's of type he described not really deterrent especially as their development would almost certainly cause Israelis to develop or acquire their own SSM's, which could be quite sophisticated. Returning to question of numbers of SSM's contemplated by UAR, I again got no answer. Nuclear weapons are another matter, Nasser said, as he had told McCloy and Ambassador Badeau. UAR has no intention of developing nuclear weapons. In any case UAR lacks necessary resources; for example, it has no source of plutonium, as does Israel. Nasser also observed that strategic nuclear weapons--"I know only of them, I don't know about tactical nuclear weapons"--could probably not be used against Israel anyway because it is such small country. As it only 1520 kilometers wide at some points, strategic nuclear bomb might easily spread destruction partly in Arab lands outside Israel. He would consider what to say about not intending to develop or secure nuclear weapons. Perhaps he could state this in a letter to President Johnson, as we had suggested. They had looked at Kennedy draft letter and had found some difficulties in it, but they could consider matter again and see if such a letter could be sent. As to IAEA safeguards, he thought it might be possible for UAR to accept these at appropriate time. UAR is now seeking to construct large nuclear reactor for peaceful purposes. Ambassador Badeau asked whether arrangements for electrical power from Aswan Dam would not be adequate for some time to come. Nasser said point is UAR feels must get into nuclear age in good time. It was late getting into industrial revolution and into electrical age. It does not want to be late again even though nuclear power may cost more than other forms. Perhaps at time of arranging for new reactor UAR could announce its acceptance of IAEA safeguards. He thought this might be possible. I asked him about timing, explaining this was of interest since question of Israeli action on IAEA safeguards for its larger reactor was already at hand. He said he did not know when UAR would reach this stage. He left me with impression, however, that he got the point. I went after him again on numbers of missiles as a basis for some tacit understanding on limitation of numbers, with the same negative results as before. As conversation was beginning to get repetitive, I dropped it at that point. Comment: Ambassador and I believe there may be some significance in Nasser's indication he may be prepared write letter to President stating UAR intention not to develop or acquire nuclear weapons. This was clearest indication we got that he did not consider Cane exercise necessarily closed with President Kennedy's death. We also feel his willingness talk about IAEA safeguards for future reactors may reflect recognition that Tarapur pattern may now be adopted by nations giving assistance for building reactors in developing countries. My failure to budge him on missiles does not necessarily signify UAR yet committed to produce large numbers, Ambassador and I feel. Assuming UAR is in fact still facing serious technical problems in missile development, Nasser may not wish expose his hand until situation clear. Alternatively, he may not wish to give up this bargaining counter at this stage in exercises. I would like to feel that net result is some give on IAEA safeguards and possible acceptance of idea of committing himself in letter to President on non-proliferation. However, his repeated references to Israel arms suggests his willingness proceed along these lines could be withheld if he comes to believe US changing its restraint on arms provided Israel. Badeau
25. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State/1/ Cairo, March 4, 1964, 10 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL UAR-US. Secret. Received at 6:35 p.m. 1995. From Talbot. Accompanied by Ambassador Badeau I had two hour discussion with Nasser on Tuesday/2/ evening. Throughout conversation he was cordial, quiet-voiced, and apparently relaxed. He repeatedly referred to Israel as the main irritant in U.S.-UAR relations, suggesting that U.S. policies in election year much on his mind. He clearly appreciated hearing directly from President. /2/March 3. See also Document 24.
I opened by presenting letters from Mrs. Kennedy and from the President./3/ Nasser laid aside Mrs. Kennedy's letter for later reading but opened President's letter and read it through slowly and carefully. I then said I had come in expression President's desire continue full and frank discussion that had characterized President Kennedy's relations with Nasser. President Johnson, who had sat at his predecessor's side as Kennedy administration policies shaped, had carefully reviewed our Near Eastern policy. /3/Document 20. The letter from Mrs. Kennedy has not been found. Recognizing problems that necessarily affect our relationships, he was ready to pursue effective relations with UAR, seeking ways to resolve problems and where possible working to broaden areas of common interest. I said Ambassador Badeau had already spoken to Nasser about continuity of U.S. policies, and we hoped he understood our readiness to continue cooperation in economic and other fields. We were glad of contribution American cereals making to meeting Egypt's consumption requirements and that proceeds from their sale also helping meet investment gap. As we had told Dr. Kaissouni during his very recent visit to Washington, we also were prepared as matter of practice carry on with development lending. There were, indeed, some problems to be overcome first, but Nasser would understand importance meeting these problems, such as International Monetary Fund terms for stabilization agreement. In fact friends of UAR, both governmental and non-governmental, had come believe IMF agreement to be central accomplishment necessary for further development assistance. However, our willingness in principle to negotiate loans remained as before. I commented on recent Cairo summit conference, saying we impressed by moderate and statesmanlike management of meeting, applaud Arab decision to use peaceful means to resolve disputes, commend reduction of tensions apparent between several Arab states and governments, and hope some improvement in UAR-SAG relations might also result. I said this opportunity discuss broad field of U.S.-UAR relations with Nasser emboldened me mention several issues which would probably face us in course this year. One, of course, was refugee problem. As he knew, for three years we had exerted strong efforts to deal with this difficult, seemingly intractable problem. As no overall solution found in past 15 years, we had hoped some step-by-step arrangement might help start process by which genuine progress could gradually be achieved. We now had impression Israel might take in some refugees, but in absence understanding of what Arab side would be willing to do, we found it difficult to press forward with this initiative. We had tried energetically to find path toward implementation of Paragraph 11 of UN Resolution 194./4/ In autumn we would be facing question of termination of UNRWA, with anticipated debate over future of Palestine refugees. If, by that time no progress made, situation would be difficult. He could understand we would find it hard continue status quo indefinitely. /4/Resolution 194 (III), adopted by the UN General Assembly on December 11, 1948, established a Conciliation Commission for Palestine and instructed it on various subjects. Paragraph 11 resolved that refugees wishing to return to their homes should be permitted to do so and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return. It also instructed the Conciliation Commission to facilitate the repatriation, resettlement, and economic and social rehabilitation of the refugees and the payment of compensation. Nasser responded that, as he had said before, we have few problems in our direct relations. Troubles arise out of third party issues. First among difficulties in our relations has been, and continues to be, Israel. As he had said in recent speech, US had always supported Israel and had supported status quo. Arabs could not accept this. Arab-Israel problem could never be settled until Arabs got their rights. Refugees have right to return to Palestine homeland. Dr. Joseph Johnson/5/ had come to talk about 20,000 refugees going back. If Arabs accepted this, life would be intolerable for them. At present Israel with more than 2,000,000 Jews has about 250,000 Arabs, who live under martial law restrictions as second class citizens. If all refugees returned, there would be more than 1,000,000 Arabs in country and balance between communities would be better. /5/Joseph E. Johnson was appointed Special Representative of the UN Conciliation Commission for Palestine in 1961 to conduct indirect negotiations between Israel and the Arab states to seek a solution of the refugee question. Documentation pertaining to his efforts is in Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, volumes XVII and XVIII. Returning to subject of refugees later, Nasser said it seems insoluble problem. It cannot be solved by war nor can it be solved by peaceful means because Israel will not give Arabs their rights. I noted Dr. Johnson had withdrawn illustrative figure of 20,000 refugees; what he really sought was a process that might progress so long as both sides were willing. In absence of agreement on final solution, step-by-step process seemed only path to progress. Nasser said Arabs could not accept this nibbling at problem. I said we all would need in coming months look carefully for ways to progress, else there could be great difficulties ahead. He assented with smile. Nasser returned to theme that US supporting status quo to protect Israel. I said I thought he underrated US efforts to work constructively with all nations in area. This was our policy with UAR, as he knew. Nasser said he agreed. President Kennedy had worked for peace, but then after latter's death had come new policy statements by Alexis Johnson and President Johnson which troubled Arabs. Perhaps exact wordings used should not have caused anxiety; this had already been explained to him. But Arabs are sentimental people and had felt hurt at these speeches coming right after Arab summit, which praised Israel and had no warm words for Arabs. I commented that Alexis Johnson's speech, scheduled before we knew of summit meeting, had been effort to state carefully the various considerations in American Near Eastern policy at beginning this important year. Careful reading of President Johnson's speech would show that American assistance in study of desalting was explicitly extended to any interested country. Ambassador Badeau noted that American desalting specialist had in fact been working with UAR specialists in past year. [Here follows discussion concerning Yemen and Cyprus.] I noted that we had been disappointed to hear his reference to American base in Libya. We felt he knew US policy of support of freedom and independence of Near Eastern countries and we were surprised at his mention of a matter really peripheral to US-UAR relations since we had thought both countries seeking to broaden area of common effort. Nasser responded that as we well knew he doesn't like system of bases anywhere in world. He had mentioned bases in this speech and had identified British bases, so he referred to American base also. He had been thinking primarily of our support of Israel, and this was a connected question. Comment: At several points in conversation Nasser found ways to reinforce impression he obviously sought to convey that what we are doing for Israel is on his mind in this election year. He gave appearance of willingness discuss any subject and suggested, as I did, that this sort of candid review helpful in our relations. In parting he asked me express his best wishes to President Johnson and said he would be replying to President's letter. Badeau
Washington, March 5, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. I. Secret. Copies were sent to Rusk, Harriman, Bundy, Jernegan, Department of Defense General Counsel John T. McNaughton, and Myer Feldman at the White House. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS In a most relaxed, low-key discussion Messrs. Eban and Bundy exchanged thoughts on Israel's need to redress the imbalance between Israeli and Arab armor, and the pros and cons of further escalation of the arms race. Eban said that he was not here primarily on security business; nevertheless he hoped to contribute to narrowing any points of difference between us before the Eshkol visit, as the President had suggested in his letter to Eshkol. The latter was of course looking forward very much to the visit. Eban did not dwell on the tank problem, commenting that we seemed to be in agreement on the need. It was the Arabs who invariably started the parade by acquiring new weapons systems, and Israel which generally followed. He cited jets and submarines as cases in point. Moreover, Israel had seen in the Hawk sale US acceptance of the principle that we would not allow an arms imbalance to develop. Eban did stress, however, the importance of not linking the tank and missile questions. These were two quite different matters. If Mr. Eshkol could be given favorable word on tanks when he came, this would create the right atmosphere for further productive discussions on other matters. He and Harman both urged that we not attempt to deal simultaneously with an immediate and clear-cut question such as tanks, and a murky issue which was not immediate and on which the PM had explained to Mr. Rowen the Israeli views. As to missiles, Eban acknowledged the gap between Israeli and US estimates. But he emphasized that despite the limited military value of UAR missiles they presented a real psychological hazard, especially to a small, beleaguered nation like Israel. In response to Bundy's query, he said that the purpose of Israeli missiles would be deterrence via threat of retaliation against Cairo. Israel needed a psychological counter which would both bolster popular morale and deter Nasser from thinking he could disrupt Israel with a bomber and missile attack while the US was making up its mind. Bundy rehearsed the arguments as to why we saw potentially great costs and risks to Israel's moving ahead in this field. The UAR missiles of today seemed to be more for parades than a serious military weapon, though we saw force in the argument that Nasser might over-estimate his own strength. Quite candidly, however, what greatly concerned us were the implications of Israel, with an acknowledged nuclear potential, moving to acquire a delivery system which made real sense only with nuclear warheads. Whether or not Israel had any such intention, the Arabs could hardly be expected not to draw this conclusion. What they might do then was deeply disturbing. By now Israel should be fully reassured as to the firmness of US support; the one thing that might upset this increasingly close relationship would be US belief that Israel was moving in the direction of a nuclear deterrent. Yet Israel's lack of candor in explaining its missile program generated suspicions which should be laid to rest. The most significant aspect of the discussion centered around the relationship of tanks and missiles. Bundy explained that we were not trying to link the two questions in any attempt at oriental bargaining. What we were trying to say was that we were deeply concerned over both these aspects of Israel's security problem--precisely because both aspects could also deeply involve us. We felt a bit as though Israel was not confiding in us about its missile intentions because it feared our reaction; this in turn made us suspicious that Israel simply wanted to postpone the matter until after the tanks were settled, and then tell us that it proposed to go ahead on a course which could have a deeply unsettling effect on our relationship. The US should not say "it won't do A without B", nor Israel say "we won't talk about B unless you do A." All we could ask was a rational approach; they should not insist we separate the two issues or have no discussion, and we shouldn't insist we link them or have no discussion. We should go ahead on both problems as a mark of mutual confidence. He couldn't exaggerate the importance of coming to a harmonious view on these issues. Harman and Eban both saw tanks as the "test" of our commitment in Israeli eyes. If the US were unwilling to help meet an agreed need, it would powerfully reinforce the views of those skeptics who felt that Israel could not rely on the US commitment. Eban had again been impressed on this visit, as by past experience here and the Kennedy and Johnson letters, with the extent to which Washington stood firmly behind its words. But we had to reckon with the psychological problem--the fact that our assurances were so private and informal lessened their credibility. Moreover, Israelis closely followed such situations as Cyprus, Vietnam, Malaysia; when they saw the inhibitions on the use of US power, though everyone knew the US had an abundance of power, this raised doubts. Others feared that our tendency to push the UN to the fore in a crisis might lead us down this road at a time when Israel's critical need dictated a quick response. Bundy made clear that we fully understood these concerns; we could well realize how a beleaguered Israel might worry over the US response. As one of the custodians of nuclear power (which some of us had grown increasingly to wish we hadn't brought into the world), we were very cautious about the responsible use of such power. This of course was one reason why we were so opposed to nuclear proliferation, and felt that steps by Israel which might seem to be creating a new nuclear dimension in the Middle East could so affect US policy as to force us to rethink it. In short, the way to make certain our commitment was unreliable might be to act as if one couldn't rely on it. Eban raised another question as to how to give credibility to our assurances that we could come quickly to Israel's aid if necessary. When General Rabin, the new Israeli C/S, had been here, he was "impressed as a citizen" but concerned as a soldier with the vagueness of US protestations that we could come quickly and effectively to Israel's support. To military men precision was essential. He realized the problems "joint planning" might give us, but hoped something could be done to facilitate clear, operational understandings. Bundy felt that "joint planning" didn't prove very much. Our military were understandably reluctant to get pinned down to plans that rarely fitted the real case when it arose, yet robbed us of flexibility and often generated argument and mistrust. The problem of possible arms limitations was also discussed, with neither Bundy nor Eban very optimistic over this route. Eban stressed Eshkol's deep desire to find some way to forestall the constant piling up of arms which cancelled each other out. This was a terrible waste, aside from the grave risks. Perhaps something might emerge from the Geneva talks. Did we see much chance of convincing the Arabs that some sort of a standstill would be mutually advantageous? Eshkol might want to raise this question when here. Bundy guardedly indicated that we didn't see many signs to date of Arab interest, but all of us were undergoing a process of education along these lines, witness the US and USSR. If we felt that we had something to go on from the Israeli side, it would certainly enhance our desire to keep trying. Here Eshkol's refusal to let us reassure Nasser that Israel wasn't going nuclear tended to tie our hands. If the Arabs, already worried about Israel's nuclear capacity, were to see missiles (which were not much use without nuclear warheads) added to the arsenal, this might create quite a problem. At Eban's request Bundy gave some background on our Vietnam policy. There was also a brief allusion to Cyprus, Libya, and the repeated Arab statements of hostility toward Israel. All agreed that such words were generally a substitute for action, but they did serve to keep the pot boiling. RWK
27. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, March 8, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, National Security Action Memorandums, NSAM 290. Secret. Walter Jenkins has passed to me the attached memo from Mike Feldman/2/ about tanks for Israel and told me that you would like to have a recommendation. It happens that I have been talking in recent days with both State and Defense on this matter so that I am able to give you a prompt answer. /2/Not printed. The March 4 memorandum from Myer Feldman to the President stated that he had met with several Congressmen who expressed dissatisfaction with stories they had heard of U.S. reluctance to sell tanks to Israel. He stated that if the United States was going to supply tanks, it would be a mistake to wait too long before announcing it. It has been our position, as you know, that we would not make a firm decision on tanks for Israel until later in the year. Mike Feldman feels strongly the other way, in part for reasons stated in his memorandum and in part because he quite naturally would like to be able to carry this decision with him on his visit to Israel later this month. Our current problem is simply that the Arabs are in an excited frame of mind and are likely to get more excited later this spring and summer as Israel begins to use the Jordan waters. Moreover, the Israelis have been very reluctant to deal frankly with us on their apparent desire to buy surface-to-surface missiles from the French, a move which we think full of danger for them and for us. The Israelis have a nuclear reactor which could make plutonium, and if they buy modern missiles from the French we may have a wholly new level of escalation in the Middle East arms race. Nasser's missiles, by contrast, are both conventional and clumsy and are more for show than for use. Komer and I feel very strongly that it would be wrong to make a commitment on the tanks now, and that you should reserve decision until Prime Minister Eshkol comes. Harriman, who ought to know his New York vote, agrees with us. The State Department, below Rusk, feels strongly the same way, but Rusk himself is more of the view that the matter is already decided in principle and that you can make your own political choice as to when to tell the Israelis. McNamara is also quite pragmatic about it, as a tank merchant, and I do not think that he has concentrated on the politics of missiles or the politics of Arab reaction. I am not sure that either McNamara or Rusk has seen the very strongly worded cables from all our Ambassadors in the Arab countries warning of the violent reaction to any tank deal. On balance, I recommend that you continue to push this decision ahead of you, and that we indicate firmly to our Israeli friends the grave impropriety of turning any Republicans loose on this point while the missile matter is unsettled. My own guess is that if the Israeli missile issue were to get into the public domain, there would be a very serious backlash of criticism against the Israelis. I think we should deal with this by quiet diplomacy if possible, and much the best time for a full-scale review of it is your meeting with Eshkol in June. If you agree that we ought to wait, I suggest that you sign the enclosed NSAM, but before we support it, I would wish to talk with Mike Feldman and try to get him to agree why it is important to wait. Let me add, finally, that if we hastily give in on something as difficult as the tank deal in March, I hate to think what we will be asked for between now and November. The Israelis use all sources of pressure in an election year, and the heat is really quite low so far. At Tab A is Mike Feldman's memorandum. At Tab B is a summary of U.S. Arab problems./3/ /3/Tab B, Special Memorandum No. 6-64, February 25, prepared by the CIA Office of National Estimates, entitled "Storm Warnings Up for US Arab Relations," is not printed. At Tab C is a detailed statement of the Arab-Israeli missile problem./4/ /4/Tab C, a paper by Komer entitled "The UAR/Israeli Missile Problem," March 6, is not printed. At Tab D is the memorandum that you may wish to sign./5/ /5/The President did not sign the draft National Security Action Memorandum at Tab D, but see Document 32. McG. B./6/ /6/Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials. Signed /7/This option is checked. In a March 9 telephone conversation, Johnson told Bundy to tell Feldman that in the light of the Arab reaction to his Weizmann Institute speech (see footnote 3, Document 13), he wanted to "go a little slow." He wanted to take action, but not until after Feldman's trip to Israel. Bundy interjected that Feldman should not tell his Israeli friends this. Johnson agreed. He added, "And tell him we've got a lot we've got to expect of them between now and November anyway and I want to wait till they--if they're so goddamned anxious to get me on the line, they've got to get on the line." (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of a Telephone Conversation Between Johnson and Bundy, March 9, 1964, 4:27 p.m., Tape F64.16, Side B, PNO 1)
28. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/ JCSM-207-64 Washington, March 12, 1964. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 70 A 1266, Israel 470. Secret. A stamped note reads, "Mr. Vance has seen." SUBJECT 1. Reference is made to a memorandum by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, dated 11 February 1964, on the above subject, which requested the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding certain questions posed in a letter by the Deputy Under Secretary of State, dated 8 February 1964./2/ These questions, concerning the desirability of selling tanks to Israel, are: /2/The memorandum from Vance to the JCS Chairman and the letter from U. Alexis Johnson to Vance are not printed. (Both ibid.) a. Whether a significant imbalance exists in the relative strengths of the Arab-Israeli military forces; b. The need for Israel to augment its tank strength; c. The need for modernization of Israel's tank force; and d. Possible substitution of antitank weapons that would meet Israel's needs. 2. A significant imbalance in the relative strengths of Arab and Israeli military forces does not exist at this time. a. Though superior in total numbers and hardware, the Arabs trail Israel in quality and experience of leadership, in the level of general educational and technical background among the enlisted ranks, in mobilization capability, and in incentive to fight. The serious political differences and jealousies of the Arabs make effective combined military action against Israel highly unlikely. Israel will probably retain its over-all military superiority vis-a-vis the Arab States for the next several years. b. Apart from such estimates of over-all capabilities, Israel's concern about tanks is justified. Israel cannot be complacent, for example, in knowing that Egypt has moved from a position of tank disadvantage to advantage in a period of five years. Egypt has moved far ahead in tank quality and has increased its tank inventory from 322 to 739, while Israel's has increased from 626 to 798. 3. There is no need for Israel to augment its tank strength at this time. Current force levels and equipment levels are adequate for the defense of Israel in the light of announced US policies and Arab disunity and weaknesses. With the ability to mobilize to a strength of 250,000 in two d4ays, Israeli forces can continue to counter Arab threats as long as such forces are well led, trained, and equipped. 4. There is a military need for Israel to modernize its tank force because the bulk of its tank inventory is obsolescent. The Arabs (Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, and Iraq) have already gained a favorable modernization differential as well as a numerical advantage, and they are gradually improving their training and maintenance. Thus, Israel needs to replace obsolete M-4 tanks in order to counter Arab T-34s, T-54s, and JS-3s. 5. With reference to the question of substituting antitank weapons for tanks, it must be noted that these weapons are complementary to each other. Even though a nation may have adopted a defense strategy, there is a requirement for an offensive tactical capability to repel and, if necessary, eject enemy forces which have penetrated its territory. Thus, Israel has a need for an appropriate mix of tanks and antitank weapons in order to maintain a balanced military force. 6. The foregoing comments do not alter the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as furnished in JCSM-953-63, dated 7 December 1963, subject: "Near East Arms Policy (U)," and JCSM-40-64, dated 18 January 1964, subject: "Arms for Israel (U)."/3/ /3/See Document 10 and footnote 3 thereto. For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Earle G. Wheeler
29. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, March 13, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, National Security Action Memorandums, NSAM 290. No classification marking. An attached brief memorandum from Bundy to Feldman proposed combining their papers on the tank issue. Feldman agreed in a handwritten note on Bundy's memorandum. SUBJECT Mike Feldman and I have talked further about tanks for Israel and we agree that the best way to put it up to you at this stage is by sending you two memoranda--Mike's is at Tab A and mine is at B. Since Mike agrees with my Tab B, you can expedite this by giving a signal of approval--and keep Mike's longer memo for leisure reading. The consequence of such approval would be that we would not decide on tanks before June. McG. B. Tab B Approved/2/ /2/Johnson checked and initialed this option. A notation in Bundy's handwriting requested Komer to draft a comprehensive NSAM to carry out the decision.
Tab A Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Counsel (Feldman) to President Johnson Washington, March 14, 1964. SUBJECT I agree with the Bundy memorandum. However, I would urge that we make the decision as soon as possible as to whether or not we are going to supply tanks to Israel, leaving for a later determination the terms under which they will be acquired. If it is decided that we should supply the tanks, I should like to be able to convey this decision, in confidence, to the leaders of the Jewish community. They have shown in the past that they can keep a secret. Attached is an elaboration of my views on this problem. Myer Feldman/3/ /3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
Attachment TANKS FOR ISRAEL In an earlier memorandum I set forth the political problems we might face if the decision was deferred too long. There are foreign policy aspects to the delay which are even more important. It seems to me that the logic in favor of providing tanks for the Israeli armed forces is inexorable. In view of the commitments expressed many times by many Presidents to come to the assistance of Israel if she is attacked, our basic policy must be directed toward the prevention of any aggression. Our policy must be such that American intervention will not be necessary. Basic to the prevention of war is the maintenance of a balance of forces between Israel and her neighbors. There is no doubt of the growing preponderance of Arab tank strength. Nor is there any question about the Israeli need for modern tanks if Israel is to be able to meet the military threat posed by Russian tanks in Arab hands. Israel feels she must have at least half as many tanks as Egypt. I believe that everyone who has considered this problem believes that the balance of forces needed to prevent conflict requires that a means be found to provide the Israeli Government with between 300 and 500 modern tanks. There are four problems: 1. It is said that any announcement indicating American military support for the Israeli army would disrupt our relationships with the Arab nations. I must confess that I am somewhat skeptical of this argument. I have heard it in connection with every American action designed to give comfort to Israel. We should remember that most of the nations depend upon us for large-scale aid. I notice that, even so, they more often support the Soviet Union than the United States in the United Nations. I read their constant denunciations of American imperialism; and I am more inclined to believe that firmness will attract respect than that concessions will win their favor. Anyhow, if carried too far, this argument will result in actions justifying and encouraging forces in Israel, which have had very little success thus far, that are much more militant. 2. It is said that a decision should be deferred as long as possible. We have already waited five months. These are long-lead time contracts. Unless the Israeli Government receives some indication that American tanks may be provided, it will be compelled to make its plans on the basis of other assumptions. Already, I understand, they have agreed to purchase 90 British tanks. Those who favor letting the Israeli Government purchase their tanks elsewhere overlook the shock to American-Israeli relationships which would result from our action, the balance of payments effects and, most important, the inability of the Israeli Government to purchase any substantial number of tanks if they are sold on the usual terms for military purchases. Besides, ours are the best tanks. To prevent war, these tanks are needed before the disparity between Egyptian and Israeli equipment becomes too great. 3. There is some feeling that we should not agree to the tank sale unless the Israeli Government gives up its intention to purchase ground-to-ground missiles. I find myself sympathetic with this position. However, it is difficult to tell a sovereign power what weapons it needs for its defense. The existence of Egyptian missiles and the fact that the Israeli Government has already contracted for 25 experimental missiles from France makes it impossible to condition the sale of tanks upon a renunciation of missiles. But there are two alternatives. First, Israel could give up its right to missiles of any kind, including Hawks, if Egypt would enter into a similar agreement. Israel would agree to this, but there is little chance that Egypt will. Second, we might be able to persuade Israel to refrain from any further purchases of missiles without prior consultation with us. In order to do this, however, it would be necessary for me to explore the question frankly and candidly with Prime Minister Eshkol, and I would have to know what we might be prepared to do in consideration for such an understanding. 4. Finally, and most important of all, there is the problem of terms of sale. Assuming it is decided that we supply Israel with the tanks, a 500 tank order would cost in the neighborhood of $75 million. This is a staggering sum for a country with a total budget of only $1 billion. The Israeli Government has asked for grant aid. We have explored various other kinds of assistance in the past; we have often increased the amount of development loans in order to free funds for the purchase of military equipment. But with the steadily decreasing foreign aid appropriations this is becoming increasingly difficult. Thus far I have seen no proposal looking toward the solution of this problem.
Tab B Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson/4/ Washington, March 13, 1964. /4/Secret. SUBJECT I still think the best way to go ahead with this issue is to push any decision ahead of us. I think we should use Mike Feldman's April visit to Israel as a reconnaissance in force, providing him with a detailed set of probing questions and comments, but carefully withholding any U.S. Government decision on the ground that such decision should await the meeting between President Johnson and Prime Minister Eshkol. In this same spirit I would now send out a White House directive to State, Defense, and CIA to review all aspects of this problem--tanks, missiles, Arab reactions, actual levels of Israeli procurement elsewhere, etc. etc., with the object of presenting a coordinated interdepartmental recommendation, with dissents, not later than May 1. I would plan to review this recommendation here, with Feldman, Komer, and myself participating, and then bring it to you for decision safely ahead of the Eshkol meeting. McG. B. [Continue with the next documents] Volume XVIII Index | Foreign Relations Online | Historian's Office | Department of State | Secretary of State |