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 | FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XVIII Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964-67 Department of State |
 10. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/ JCSM-40-64 Washington, January 18, 1964. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 70 A 1266, Israel 470. Secret. SUBJECT 1. Reference is made to a memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), I-20042/64, dated 6 January 1964, subject as above,/2/ which requested the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Israel's request for tanks and specifically asked: /2/A copy is ibid., OASD/ISA Files: FRC 68 A 306, Israel 470. a. Are the numbers and types of tanks requested necessary and appropriate to Israeli needs? b. If the United States does approve the Israeli request in principle, is the equipment requested the most useful equipment to offer? c. Is it advisable to substitute anti-tank weapons (other than tanks) or other vehicles for a part of the total requirement in order to reduce costs? 2. In JCSM-953-63, dated 7 December 1963,/3/ the Joint Chiefs of Staff forwarded their views on proposed changes to the "Near East Arms Policy," including the assessment that "the substantial military equilibrium presently existing among Near Eastern states does not warrant immediate action to supply major quantities of arms to any of these countries. Rather, the highest priority effort should be directed toward achieving agreement among Middle East arms suppliers to restrict the flow of arms into the area. Pending the results of such efforts, however, the arms policy should provide the requisite flexibility without positively identifying the United States with either side in the Arab-Israeli conflict." Appendix A hereto provides an assessment of the Arab-Israeli arms balance./4/ /3/JCSM-953-63 commented on two undated draft memoranda to the President on the subject "Near East Arms Policy." The first, prepared in the Department of State, recommended adhering to the traditional U.S. policy of restraint regarding arms sales to Near Eastern states. The second, prepared in the Department of Defense, recommended modifying the traditional policy by permitting sale of defensive armaments, abandoning the practice of deferring to European sources of arms for Israel or the Arab states, and permitting the sale of offensive weapons on a case-by-case basis if consistent with the objective of maintaining a sufficient equilibrium between the Arab states and Israel and among the Arab states to minimize the danger of hostilities. The text of JCSM-953-63 is printed in Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. XVIII, Document 383. The two draft memoranda are included ibid., Microfiche Supplement, Documents 15 and 16. /4/The appendices are attached but not printed. 3. It is understood that a final decision to reaffirm or modify the "Near East Arms Policy" has not yet been made. In considering the questions posed in the referenced memorandum, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have therefore assumed that: a. US objectives in respect to the Near East include the maintenance of military equilibrium between Israel and its immediate Arab neighbors, and the avoidance of actions likely to intensify the Arab-Israeli arms competition. b. Provision of tanks to Israel must be consistent with the US policy on supplying arms to Near Eastern countries. c. US military equipment would be made available to Israel only through the medium of sales. d. To minimize the diversion of Israeli foreign exchange resources from essential economic development programs, the most economical solution to Israel's tank modernization problem is desirable. 4. With these assumptions in mind, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the following criteria should be applied in responding to Israel's request for tanks: a. Conformity with approved Israeli Army Force Guidelines, which are predicated on Israel's orientation toward the West and her subjection to international peace-keeping supervision, which requires restraint on excessive arming. b. Consistency with requirements for strengthening Free World security forces and the protection of US political and economic interests. c. Necessity for internal security and legitimate self-defense requirements. d. To the extent possible, avoidance of contribution to and acceleration of regional arms competition. e. Assistance in offsetting the foreign exchange costs of maintaining the US military position abroad. 5. Applying these criteria to the Israeli tank request, the Joint Chiefs of Staff note that the major Israeli Army combat units in being coincide with the approved Force Guidelines. Furthermore, a significant increase in Israeli Army units does not appear to be justified by the existing strength relationship between the Israeli and Arab Armies. However, replacement of obsolete armored equipment in the current Israeli inventory could be justified on the basis that the Arabs possess modern heavily armed and armored tanks. Because of the extremely sensitive political situation in the Near East, any US participation in a program to sell modern tanks to Israel would have to be managed discreetly. At a minimum this would entail phasing in small quantities over a time span of 2-3 years and insuring that there is no significant net increase in the number of weapons in Israeli hands. See Appendix C for discussion of additional factors bearing on the problem. no comparable US weapon in production. Recoilless rifles, M-72s and the like, very probably would not meet the Israeli desires to enhance their tactical offensive capabilities, implicit in the tank request. Armored personnel carriers would be useful to Israel as a replacement for its US armored half tracks, but would not be responsive to the Israeli request. 7. In view of the above and the factors discussed in Appendices B and C hereto, the Joint Chiefs of Staff conclude that the sale of tanks to Israel cannot be predicated primarily on military considerations and that:[dc0] a. Replacement of 300 of Israel's present M-4 tanks is militarily sound on the basis of modernization, and the types requested are appropriate to Israeli needs. However, a net increase in Israel's tank inventory is not presently justified. b. The types of tanks requested are the most useful equipment that could be offered Israel, but M-48 tanks would also meet Israeli needs. c. The United States can provide no substitute anti-tank weapons which would meet Israel's needs and also be substantially lower in cost than M-48 tanks. 8. Should a decision be made to sell US tanks to Israel, it is recommended that: a. Israel be offered 300 M-48 tanks for phased delivery during the next 2-3 years. b. If Israel considers M-48s unacceptable, M-48A3s be offered only on the basis of converting present stocks of M-48A series tanks to M-48A3s (with the addition of 105MM gun, if Israel so desires). Such action would require that tanks so converted be replaced in the US Army inventory with M60A1s. c. If it is decided to offer Israel M-60A1 tanks, this be done only on the basis of expanding presently authorized production rates to provide the quantity agreed upon. For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: J. W. Davis
11. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel/1/ Washington, January 25, 1964, 4:20 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 33-1 JORDAN RIVER. Confidential; Limdis; Immediate; Verbatim Text. Drafted by Crawford, cleared by Davies and Special Assistant for UN Planning Elmore Jackson, and approved by Harriman. Repeated to Amman, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, London, Jerusalem, and USUN; and pouched to Aleppo, Algiers, Baghdad, Jidda, Khartoum, Kuwait, Moscow, Paris, Rabat, Tripoli, and Tunis. 679. Jordan Waters. Embtels 786,/2/ 817;/3/ Deptel 658./4/ Israel Ambassador Harman had long talks in Department January 23 and 24 with, respectively, Under Secretary Harriman and Assistant Secretary Talbot. /2/Telegram 786 from Tel Aviv, January 16, reported a January 15 meeting between Ambassador Barbour and Eshkol, in which Eshkol urged that if the Arab states decided to take the Jordan waters issue to the United Nations, the United States should support Israel in opposing any Security Council discussion of this issue, which could "only bring complications." (Ibid.) /3/Telegram 817 from Tel Aviv, January 22, urged a prompt response to Eshkol's demarche. (Ibid.) /4/This telegram, sent to USUN as telegram 1870 and repeated to Tel Aviv as telegram 658, set forth points which the Department of State proposed to make in reply to Eshkol's January 15 demarche. (Ibid.) While Israel Embassy had led us expect final reply re Wiener-Criddle technical formula/5/ that would enable us make constructive proposals to Jordan to help it over difficult period ahead, Harman said he could not reply until Jerusalem assessed January 23-24 meetings. /5/The technical formula was developed in talks held January 7-9 by Dr. Aharon Wiener, Director of the Israel National Water Planning Authority; U.S. consultant Wayne Criddle, who had been a hydrology consultant to Johnston in 1954-1955; and Department of State and Israeli Embassy officers. Records of the talks are ibid. The text of the technical formula reads as follows: "The 100 mcms delivered downstream by Israel shall be made up as follows: "15 mcms derived from saline springs around Lake Tiberias; 85 mcms to be released from Lake Tiberias. Of the 85 mcms from Lake Tiberias, about two-thirds will be released during the summer months at constant flow in accordance with procedures anticipated in 1955. All captured saline spring waters now draining into Lake Tiberias will be discharged by Israel at some point below Lake Tiberias. It is anticipated that the foregoing schedule of deliveries will be reviewed at such time as facilities for storage on the upper Yarmuk become operative. "Israel would receive an allocation of 25 mcms during the irrigation season at a maximum demand rate of 2.3 cubic meters per second from the Yarmuk River. "Jordan may use any Lake Tiberias spills, and Israel may use any uncaptured Yarmuk flood waters, to the extent either exists, rather than allowing them to waste to the Dead Sea." (Telegram 281 to Amman, January 9; ibid.) In addition those points put to you by PriMin Eshkol January 15, Harman (1) sought agreement USG would desist from specific reference to Unified Plan allocations, particularly Yarmuk allocation for Adasiya, in talks with other governments; (2) pressed us reaffirm specifically that USG supports (a) downstream disposition of all saline waters that may be collected in and around Tiberias and (b) principle that no waters be wasted; and (3) urged USG not to press for final resolution of allocational differences since technical formula as far as Israel could possibly go. Both the January 23 and January 24 conversations tended become rather complex reiterations of respective positions and concerns. So much so that at conclusion January 24 meeting and to make absolutely clear where USG stands in response PriMin Eshkol demarche, we handed Harman following "piece of paper": "1. We would strongly oppose Arab aggression if there should be an effort to frustrate Israel's plans. "2. Cairo Conference made it unlikely Arabs will seek recourse to Security Council. We can discourage such recourse but not deny it. We do not share Israel's fears of United Nations involvement and its possible consequences. If problem should get into Council one way or another: "a. We would oppose renegotiation of Unified Plan; "b. We would be against halting or otherwise interfering with completion and operation of Israel's Tiberias pumping plan provided latter is kept within Unified Plan; "c. We would have to maintain flexibility as regards nature of verification and supervision over riparians' Jordan water operations to ensure consistency with Unified Plan. We would not approve unilateral verification or supervision. In our understanding with Israel we have almost complete agreement as to nature of supervision called for in Unified Plan. We prefer leave matters at that for time being. "d. We would anticipate continued closest consultation with Israel, but we should not now try to spell out tactics. "3. We hope hear final confirmation of Israel's assent to technical formula./6/ This is matter of immediate practical importance in terms of what we can recommend to Jordan. /6/Telegram 319 to Amman, January 30, stated that the Israeli Embassy informed the Department on January 29 that the Israeli Government accepted the Wiener-Criddle technical formula. (Ibid.) "4. Even with technical formula agreed to, we would like to be on firmer footing. So far, Israel has reserved its position and we have said what we must support. We will not take initiative but will continue present our view of specific allocations when questions of fact as to nature of Unified Plan arise. If there should be public airing of precise Unified Plan allocations, the difference between Israel's position and what we support would appear. Arabs could drive a wedge between us. Therefore, we urge Israel's formal acceptance of all Unified Plan allocations as United States is committed to these in its understanding with Arabs." On Harman's other points, insofar as these not answered by position paper, we said opposition to water wastage and question of saline water disposal, like other elements technical formula, are matters we can support with Jordanians with conviction they are consonant with US-Arab understanding of Unified Plan. Entire formula is ad referendum to Jordan. This is a highly sensitive matter for that country and we are far from sure it will be able accept our recommendations. You should convey foregoing position paper to PriMin Eshkol or other GOI official as our considered reply to Eshkol's January 15 demarche. At your meeting you may wish add our strong feeling that absolute minimum of public statements remains as important in weeks ahead as it was during and before Cairo Conference. You may also say we preparing detailed analysis of conference and will be glad discuss it with GOI. FYI: At January 23 meeting Under Secretary also raised with Harman regrettable recent publicity given confidential exchanges between USG and GOI, pointing out these not consonant with relationship of trust and discretion on which we place so much value. Ball
12. Memorandum From the Department of State's Executive Secretary (Read) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/ Washington, February 11, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Arab Republic, Vol. I. Secret. Another copy of the memorandum indicates that it was drafted by H. Earle Russell, and cleared by Talbot, Jernegan, and Charles W. Thomas, Officer in Charge of Atomic Energy Affairs in the Office of International Scientific Affairs. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, AE 11-2 ISR) SUBJECT Mr. Komer has requested the following information. President Nasser had indicated that acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability by Israel would be cause for war no matter how suicidal for the Arabs. It is vital for the preservation of peace in the Near East, therefore, to reassure Nasser as to the peaceful nature of the 24-megawatt reactor Israel has just activated at Dimona. President Kennedy explained this problem to Prime Minister Ben-Gurion in 1961/2/ and obtained his agreement in principle to periodic inspections of the reactor by the United States technicians to establish its peaceful nature. Pursuant to this oral agreement, Israel did not object to our passing information on the first two Dimona visits to Nasser. During the last exchange of correspondence between President Kennedy and Prime Minister Eshkol in August 1963,/3/ however, the latter told our Ambassador he was reluctant to agree to our passing information on the reactor to Nasser, but would give the matter further consideration later. Nasser was the only exception; Eshkol did not take issue with our passing the information to other nations. /2/For a record of the conversation on May 30, 1961, between Kennedy and Ben Gurion in which they discussed this, see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. XVII, Document 57. /3/For text of Kennedy's letter of July 4, 1963, to Eshkol and information concerning Eshkol's reply, see ibid., vol. XVIII, Documents 289 and 317. A United States inspection team visited Dimona last January 18. Its findings show the reactor was activated December 26, 1963, and has no immediate weapons making capability. The team agreed periodic semi-annual visits to the facility would be desirable to assure ourselves of its continuing peaceful purpose. A summary of the team's preliminary report is enclosed. With the completion of the first inspection since activation, we should press Prime Minister Eshkol to agree to our discreetly passing our findings to President Nasser. We regard reassurance to Nasser about Israel's nuclear intentions and capabilities as essential to offset the news of Dimona's having gone critical. This is certain to reach Nasser soon. Coming at a time when Israel's building up of a sophisticated missile capability that may also become public, we think passage of such reassurances as we can give is the minimum to prevent some drastic United Arab Republic move to acquire a new level of Soviet weaponry. Past experience has shown that direct intervention by the President is the most effective way to obtain Israel's cooperation on the Dimona problem. We believe firm and persistent persuasion by the President will induce Prime Minister Eshkol's compliance. We believe it desirable to continue treating the problem of reassuring Nasser orally. This permits greater flexibility and does not risk hardening either Israel's position or ours. We recommend approval of the enclosed telegram,/4/ a copy of which we have already sent you on February 1 for clearance. /4/The draft telegram is not attached, but a copy is attached to the copy of Read's memorandum cited in footnote 1 above. John McKesson/5/ /5/McKesson signed for Read above Read's typed signature.
Enclosure/6/ /6/A copy of the inspection team's report is filed with a February 6 letter from Arnold R. Fritsch, Technical Assistant to the AEC Chairman, to Charles E. Johnson of the NSC Staff. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Robert W. Komer, Israel Dimona 1964) SUMMARY OF FINDINGS OF DIMONA INSPECTION TEAM The inspection team spent over eleven hours at the Dimona reactor site on January 18 and inspected all significant facilities. It determined that The reactor went critical on December 26, 1963, but has operated only at low power. It was clearly designed as an experimental reactor, capable of operation at 15 to 20 per cent above design power of 26 megawatts. Operation at full power is not anticipated until late 1964. The reactor center, valued at $60 million, is the most diversified and well equipped nuclear installation in Africa or the Middle East. Present and projected facilities will provide a capability within 1-1/2-2 years to produce 50 to 60 tons of natural uranium metal per year. This is 5 to 6 times the production rate required to support the heavy water-moderated reactor, if operated according to stated plans. Reasons given for this excessive capacity are 1) the desire to conserve essentially the full uranium production potential from phosphate operations, 2) the desire to be self sufficient, 3) the equipment installed is the minimum size available commercially for a one-step production process, and 4) the belief that uranium will increase in value. The present fuel stockpile includes one full charge and about 10 tons in process. Discussions are underway to obtain a second core from France. It is hoped to produce the third core domestically. The fuel now on hand is subject to material control and committed to be returned to France. Upon completion of construction a year or so hence, the reactor plant may be declassified. The plant has no weapons making capability at present, but continuing periodic inspections are recommended./7/ /7/A talking paper prepared for Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Lieutenant General Marshall S. Carter states that there "appears to be little doubt that the center is now designed and intended for nuclear research" but that the reactor's capacity and fuel supply and preparation facilities "would permit the Israelis to redirect the program in the future toward achievement of a small nuclear weapons capability, should they so decide." It noted that "construction of complex and expensive plutonium recovery facilities would be needed for such a capability." The talking paper is filed as an attachment to outgoing CIA telegram 98215, January 30, which states that on January 29, Carter briefed the President on several matters, including the background and status of Dimona. (Central Intelligence Agency, Job 80-B01676R, DCI Executive Registry Files, Box 14, Folder 1, Memoranda Originated by General Carter (1 January 1964-29 February 1964))
13. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Solbert) to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/ I-21448/64 Washington, February 15, 1964. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 70 A 1266, Israel 470. Secret. Filed as an attachment to a February 17 memorandum from McNamara to the Secretary of the Army. SUBJECT Problem: To determine whether a small DOD Team should visit Israel next week. Discussion: Your approval in principle of a tank sale to Israel was conveyed to State on 26 January./2/ While both State and White House staff seem prepared in principle to consider a sale, through non-US sources if possible, Mr. Komer tells us the President, while sympathetic, does not see the need to make a final decision now. He wants to wait until the election is closer, in any case, and feels if we give tanks to the Israelis now they will be back at us before November for something else. Several other factors also lead Messrs. McGeorge Bundy and Komer, State, and ourselves all to feel we had better make haste slowly here: /2/A letter of January 30 from Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Frank K. Sloan to Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs U. Alexis Johnson stated that McNamara had approved the extension of credit for the sale of 200 M48A3 tanks over the next 1-2 years and 100 M60 tanks over the next 2-3 years. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 12-5 ISR) McNamara recorded his approval on January 28 on a January 27 memorandum from Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs William P. Bundy to him. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 70 A 1266, Israel 470) (1) We are greatly concerned over the likelihood that the Israelis are about to invest some $45 million in a French Dassault missile (similar to the Pershing). We see this as another step toward putting themselves in a position to acquire an independent nuclear deterrent. If the Arabs get the same idea, it could undermine our whole policy in the Middle East. It would force the Arabs to get more arms from Moscow at the least. (2) Considerable anti-U.S. sentiment has been stirred up in Arab States over the Cyprus situation, the Jordan waters problem, and the "anti-Arab" implications alleged to be contained in recent speeches by President Johnson and Alex Johnson;/3/ all of which would make an accommodation move toward Israel impolitic at this time. /3/In remarks on February 6 in New York at the dinner of the Weizmann Institute of Science, President Johnson stated that the United States had begun discussions with Israeli representatives on cooperative research in using nuclear energy for desalinization. For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963-64, Book I, pp. 270-272. Reports on reactions to the speech in the Near East and North Africa are in National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 15-1 US/JOHNSON and E 11-3 US. The text of a speech made on January 20 by Deputy Under Secretary Johnson before the Citizens Committee on American Policy in the Near East in Washington is printed in Department of State Bulletin, February 10, 1964, pp. 208-211. (3) The general U.S. policy toward arms sales in the Middle East is now undergoing intensive review, and State would not like to make a final decision on the tank sale until this has been considered by the President. (4) Messrs. McGeorge Bundy, Komer, and Harriman are of the opinion that any decision to sell tanks should not be conveyed to the Israelis at least until Prime Minister Eshkol's visit here in June, which would meet the President's point about optimum political timing. (5) There is also the necessity to recognize that Israeli intelligence within the U.S. is so good that they will probably learn of our decision almost as soon as it is made and we will have no bargaining position with them once a decision is reached. (6) Your proposed approved sale is for 300 tanks, while Israel requested 500; and some further discussion of the tank requirement at the military level is desirable as underpinning for our ultimate position. Alternative Approaches: Because of the above considerations, State and the White House staff have determined to delay decision on the tank sale for the present, and to acquire as much additional information as possible on Israeli missile and nuclear plans. The following alternative decisions appear to be the most likely: (1) The Israelis will abandon or delay indefinitely plans to acquire an SSM capability, in which case the tank sale would probably be approved by the two governments at the time of Eshkol's visit. (2) The Israelis will not commit themselves to abandonment of their missile acquisition plans, but will agree to consult with us on such planning to such a degree as to make the tank sale desirable as a quid pro quo. Whether or not the sale would be made under these conditions would depend upon the degree of Israeli cooperation and the degree of predicted Arab reaction at the time of the announcement. (3) The Israelis will refuse to abandon or delay missile acquisition. In this case the sale of tanks will probably not be approved. (4) A preferable solution involved in all of the above (which the Israelis have informally proposed) is that the U.S. might avoid political implications of the sale by arranging, or assisting in the financing of a sale by or through the FRG or the UK. This possibility is now being explored in the U.S. Government, but no mention has been made at any level elsewhere. The Israelis have made some inquiries on their own in FRG and UK. State in particular strongly endorses this procedure. Proposed Interim Step: In connection with the problems of nuclear proliferation and the Middle East arms policy, the ISA Policy Planning Staff has been accumulating information and preparing studies for some time on the nuclear and missile capabilities of Israel and the Arab States. This information makes it plain that the Israelis have progressed well along in initial arrangements with the French on missile development and production; and that the Egyptian missile development has no such degree of reliability as would justify the sort of missile planning which the Israelis are pursuing. We are also extremely concerned about the Israeli capacity to produce a nuclear warhead which might be mated with the missile. We see Mr. Rowen's trip as a means of carrying to the Israeli Government our contentions that there is little military threat from the UAR's so-called missiles, certainly not enough to justify Israel's wasting money on a counter-deterrent with all the risks involved. We have little confidence that the Israeli Embassy here has fully clued its home office on our objections to potential nuclear proliferation by Israel, or the way in which Israeli missile acquisition might trigger UAR preemption or, at the least, push the UAR (and other Arabs) closer to Moscow again. Second, we see a need to get a better fix on why Israel wants a nice round number like 500 tanks, so as to buttress our case for offering only 300. So, the next appropriate step would appear to be to send a small party of DOD personnel, who are knowledgeable in the tank and missile fields, to continue the dialogue without publicity in Tel Aviv. Because Henry Rowen will be in Rome for discussions on Monday and Tuesday, and because of his special work in the missile and nuclear programs in recent weeks, it was thought appropriate to have him continue to Tel Aviv on Thursday and Friday, accompanied by an Army General Officer with expertise in tanks and missilry, to continue dialogue, in hope of obtaining further information and indications from the Israelis on these subjects. The party specifically would not discuss details of the proposed tank sale or indicate that any U.S. decision has been made, but would only further discuss the tank requirement. Recommendation: It is recommended that you approve the visit to Tel Aviv by Mr. Rowen, and request the Department of the Army to provide a qualified General Officer to join him in Tel Aviv (Memorandum for your signature attached)./4/ /4/McNamara signed the memorandum on February 17; see footnote 1 above. Concurrences: State--Mr. Talbot /5/The undated paper by Komer, entitled "The UAR/Israeli Missile Problem," is attached but not printed. Both offices have reviewed this memorandum./6/ /6/A handwritten note by McNamara on a February 17 covering memorandum from William Bundy to McNamara reads as follows: "Bill, Harry is to: (1) Try to persuade the Israelis not to buy missiles. (2) Assume that if the Israelis buy any tank we want them to buy our tank, but we are not yet ready to announce approval of a tank sale. (3) Recognize I favor the sale of 500 of our most expensive tanks. RMcN." Peter Solbert
14. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel/1/ Washington, February 20, 1964, 8:23 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 15-1 ISR. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Talbot, Russell, and Komer; cleared by Davies, Jernegan, and Komer; and approved by Talbot. An attached February 20 note from Komer to S/S states that the letter was approved by the President. 734. Verbatim Text. Please deliver following letter from President to Prime Minister Eshkol: "Dear Mr. Prime Minister: "I am delighted that you and I will soon have an opportunity to discuss our mutual interests and problems. The dates of June 1 and 2 would suit me well. "I also want to thank you for the warm welcome given Sargent Shriver during his recent visit to Israel. He has told me in glowing terms of the hospitality he received. He was much impressed with the technical assistance work your people have undertaken, and he particularly enjoyed his meeting with you. "As you know, we have been giving careful thought to your expressed concerns about Israel's security needs. In particular we can understand your worries over the growing imbalance between Israeli and Arab armor, and can see the justification for your feeling that you must take steps to modernize Israel's tank forces and anti-tank defenses. We are fully prepared to discuss this problem further with you. "At the same time we are disturbed lest other steps which Israel may contemplate taking may unnecessarily contribute to a heightened arms race in the region without in fact contributing to your security. Among other things, we seem to have quite different estimates with respect to the likely UAR missile threat, and the potential costs and risks of various ways of meeting it. Because of our own link to Israel's security, I feel that these matters too are of legitimate mutual concern and merit frank discussion. "As you and I are both so well aware, we face a number of issues this year that will demand a heavy investment of United States effort in support of Israel. Among them are the Jordan waters off-take, the activation of the Dimona reactor, and the related problems of Israel's security and the Near East arms race. We must work together to minimize undesirable repercussions and devise steps to avoid unnecessary increases in Arab antagonism, with the consequent weakening of the forces of moderation. At stake is United States influence with the Arabs, which we see as an essential component of our ability to help bring about any improvement in the relations between Israel and its neighbors. "I am sure we will want to discuss all these matters when we meet. Pending our meeting, I hope that your people and mine can air them frankly and freely so as to narrow down any points of difference. In the meantime let me assure you again that your genuine security concerns remain very much in our minds, and we of course wish to keep in closest touch about any significant developments that might affect Israel's situation. "Sincerely, "Lyndon B. Johnson" In connection foregoing you should stress to Prime Minister importance Rowen mission discussions of military problems flowing from November 12-13, 1963 talks./2/ /2/Ambassador Barbour delivered the letter to Prime Minister Eshkol on February 21; see Document 17. Ball
15. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic/1/ Washington, February 22, 1964, 2:28 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, AID (US) 9 UAR. Confidential. Drafted by Enoch S. Duncan and approved by Jernegan. 3879. Following summary for information only and contents should not be disclosed to foreign officials. It is uncleared and subject to amendment upon review of memcon. During call UAR Minister Treasury Kaissouni February 20/2/ the Secretary affirmed President Johnson's intention continue established policies toward UAR. Commended moderation of Arab summit and UAR handling difficult situation. Emphasized our interest UAR improvement relations Saudi Arabia. /2/A memorandum of the portion of Secretary Rusk's conversation with Kaissouni concerning the UAR request for a $30 million commodity loan is ibid. A memorandum of their discussion of general U.S.-UAR relations is ibid., POL UAR-US. Kaissouni reviewed US aid relationships and noted AID Administrator's indication earlier in day of possibility going ahead with $20 million loan in response UAR earlier request for $30 million commodity program financing. Kaissouni expected obtain memorandum understanding to date with IMF re stabilization program leaving some points for further discussion and agreement in Cairo. Since agreement with IMF a condition for possible US loan he hoped progress to date would permit US move ahead. Secretary confirmed we had decided in principle go ahead with loan and would have to look at situation with Fund. Ball
16. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State/1/ Amman, February 22, 1964, 8 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 33-1 JORDAN RIVER. Confidential; Limited Distribution. Repeated to Tel Aviv and USUN. 403. Deptel 346/2/ and Embtel 390./3/ Jordan Waters. /2/Telegram 346 to Amman, February 12, instructed Charge Geoffrey W. Lewis to arrange a meeting with King Hussein to present U.S. proposals concerning Jordan waters and laid out U.S. views on the subject. (Ibid.) /3/Telegram 390 from Amman, February 14, reported that Lewis had met with the King but that his presentation was incomplete because part of telegram 346 had been delayed in transmission. (Ibid.) Saw King afternoon February 22 after his return from Aqaba. Drawing on Deptel 346 and thorough briefings by Criddle and Symmes I sought first to reassure him that primary purpose US proposals was to assist Jordan obtain its rightful share of waters in quickest and least costly manner. Pointed out that due geography of area Jordan, as downstream user, was vulnerable to any Israeli cut off of water which might occur in retaliation for Arab actions whether taken by Jordan or by others. (At this point, King nodded assent.) I went on to explain reasons why US believes it essential retain Unified Plan as background control until or unless replaced by other agreements and why we can consider financial help only for measures that do not contravene plan. At same time, made clear we understand that Jordanian, or Arab, actions must be portrayed by them as part of "Arab plan" and as measures to take what rightfully belongs to Arabs. I then briefly described once more our suggested power plant pool pump and connecting pipe to East Ghor Canal which I had outlined in some detail during previous talk (Embtel 390) and went over in more detail than previously other projects in which USG disposed to be helpful (paragraph 5 Deptel 346). Emphasized that although all are within Unified Plan they not being proposed as alternative to any "Arab plan" which might emerge but could well be parts of that plan. (Especially stressed this point because of indication that Jordanian technicians, thanks to Criddle's persuasive powers, now taking favorable view of US suggestions but feared political authorities would reject them as being substitute we were trying to talk Arabs into adopting in place of "Arab plan.") In speaking of Maqarin Dam I said any USG assistance would have to be clearly related to construction of 300 MCM storage but this did not mean we would oppose the eventual erection with non-USG funds of storage or power facilities in excess this capacity. Reverting again to risks for Jordan involved in contravening terms of Unified Plan and consequent loss our leverage on Israelis to require them to continue to conform, I said US had succeeded in getting their firm agreement to a technical formula re use of Tiberias and Yarmouk waters provided we could assure them Arabs would tacitly abide by it. I then handed him copy of formula, pointing out that adherence to it would ensure sweet water enough to fulfill needs Jordanian farmers on lower Jordan via power plant pool and East Ghor Canal. Concluded by expressing hope we could continue to keep in close and frank consultation. King read formula carefully but made no comment other than that he would study it. Continued he thought we knew his general views which he had expressed in previous conversation and would not now repeat. Would have to press ahead with "Arab plan" but thought that its final provisions might not be very different from those of Unified Plan. Then asked if we had discussed our proposals with others. I said Criddle had fully explained them to Salim/4/ but had not presented the technical formula as explicitly as I had just done. As we were walking to the door, King remarked he was worried by report Hafiz had stated yesterday that Syria would feel obliged to shell Israeli military installations when pumping from Tiberias commenced. I said this worried me also. Since Arabs making great point of being completely united on measures to combat Israeli pumping plans, Israelis might feel the more justified in retaliations against any Arab state--e.g. Jordan. /4/UAR chief water expert Dr. Mohammad Salim. Comment: King again calm and friendly. Difficult to predict how much he impressed by US proposals or how he will react to technical formula./5/ Will follow up by discussing proposals with Court Minister Hazem Nuseibeh and hopefully combined effects this plus direct presentation to King plus apparent favorable attitude of Salim and Jordanian technicians will serve persuade Arabs to back power plant pool and pipeline project and tacitly to abide by formula, at least for next year or two. /5/Lewis reported in telegram 417 from Amman, March 5, that Hussein told him on March 3 that he could not accept the technical formula. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 33-1 JORDAN RIVER) As one other measure which would appeal to King and would give him opportunity to appear to be taking firm measures versus Israeli recommend I be authorized explicitly to suggest construction low diversion dam below entrance to Adasiya Tunnel, provided it so constructed as to allow flow contemplated in formula for Adasiya Triangle. Understand such dam necessary anyway for efficient regulation flow. Lewis
17. Telegram From the Air Attache at the Embassy in Israel to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs/1/ Tel Aviv, February 24, 1964, 1450Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 12 ISR. Secret; Priority; Noforn; Limdis. Repeated to the Defense Intelligence Agency, Department of State, Air Force Chief of Staff, Department of the Army, Chief of Naval Operations, and 1127 USAF Field Arty Group at Fort Belvoir, VA. The Department of State copy is the source text. C-40. Joint State-Defense message. Reference my C-36, C-38 and C-39./2/ This message in 5 parts. /2/Telegrams C-36 through C-39 reported talks held February 19-23 between Israeli officials and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Planning Henry Rowen and other Department of Defense representatives. Copies are filed, along with comments by Rowen and Brigadier General Eugene L. Strickland, USAF, Director for the Near East, South Asia and Africa Region in DOD/ISA, in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Robert W. Komer, Israel Security, December 63-March 66. Other records of the talks are filed with a March 26 letter from Ambassador Barbour to Talbot in National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 19-3 US-ISR. Part I. This is fifth in series. The US delegations followed consultations with GOI delegation at G.H.Q. with audience Prime Minister/Defense Minister Eshkol in one-hour plus talks on Friday 21 Feb 64, approx 1245-1400. Eshkol very impressive in this session which almost a monologue, but courteous, sincere and showing firm belief in this convictions/statements. Part II. Ambassador gave Prime Minister President Johnson's letter which arrived that morning. Rowen made appropriate comments including: US viewing Israel's need for armor favorably, but not yet decided. On missiles, US finding difficulty accepting Israeli need, views subject as dangerous and considers acquisition sophisticated missiles by Israelis would initiate missile race in ME. Questioned Peres when final decision to be made with answer of "one year possibly later." Rowen continued that Israeli acquisition would cause escalation. Problem: adequate range missiles, effective only with nuclear warheads thus US interested in Israeli nuclear plans/intentions. Egyptian threat exaggerated and with improved armor IDF does not need missiles. Peres viewed Egyptian missiles could be effective, would cause panic and Israelis required retaliatory missiles. Rowen showed concern that US assistance re tanks would see Israeli use of tank money saved to purchase missiles. Rowen added towards end of audience that when decision on missiles is made, the US would like to be informed Israeli intentions in this field. Part III. Prime Minister's comments: Missiles are dangerous, expensive and not sure decision possible in one year; probably 2 years more accurate. On security basis, price is no object. Israel is home of Jewish nation, last and only foothold requiring last-ditch stand even if must lower standard of living to lowest African level. Israel has tried talking peace with Nasser, but even in last two weeks Nasser has stated no alternative but crush Israel. Nasser/Arabs continually vocally insistent on destruction of Israel. US helps Egypt with far bigger sums which helps Nasser in arms build-up. What does UAR spending such large sums on missiles mean? Israel's population--which from 60-70 nations, are here only 10-15 years--are afraid of even bad missiles. And Nasser's missiles may become good missiles. Also may get further missile help from Russia which makes concern even heavier. There is no solution to concern over Nasser. On giving up missiles, if US provides tanks, Israel not prepared to give up missiles. On controlling arms race in ME, would welcome such possibility, but appears impossible. On Rowen's question whether IDF can live without missiles if UAR doesn't go ahead with missiles, Eshkol said Israelis would be happier and stop thinking about missiles. Part IV. Parts I and II above based on Strickland notes confirmed by Ambassador's recall. Part V. Ambassador's recall/comments, follow: Peres indicated Israelis did not have missile program currently and that decision to develop on own or procure is one-year off or more. Eshkol confirmed and believed two years probably more accurate. Eshkol suggested US instead of approaching Israelis go to Nasser with arguments to stop production missiles or Israelis would get good missiles from US; this would immediately stop race. To Rowen's insistence that type of missile Israelis investigating only useful with nuclear warheads, Eshkol looked aghast, appeared to be new thought to him, and finally stated, "Don't try to persuade us to put nuclear warheads on them." To Rowen's question on Israeli thinking re reactions to Arab threat, Eshkol pointed out formulae developed over years which showed Israelis prepared to accept a time-delay in reacting, prepared to be a little behind new Arab military developments. Eshkol sounds sincere, firm in convictions about political origins of state and status of Israel, last-ditch stand for Jewish nation, Jews all over world but only one Jewish nation, terrible expense for defense justified, and expects to give President Johnson this but in more detail. Major point: When Rowen attempting tie-in acquisition armor to missile problem, Eshkol strongly urged against US consideration of two problems simultaneously and asked urgent closure of gap through fulfillment Israeli armor requirements. Major premise: Israel not interested in taking over 30 million Arabs and Nasser not in right mind if he believed such was Israeli objective. Israel would cut own throat by conquering Egypt. (This is good argument for US approaches to Nasser to cease on missile developments.) Additional Eshkol comments: In view of absolute priority Israel security, even considering US assistance, primary responsibility of Prime Minister is to tell and show his people Israel doing all possible on independent basis to protect their existence. Now understands US looking favorably on armor and that President Johnson plans to discuss this, but Eshkol wonders when discussion will stop and decision materialize. Ambassador's clarification of arms-control possibilities made point that Israel should clearly understand that US not interested in weakening Israeli security posture, and that Israel should put more stock in US commitments. Suggested that security could thus be assured equally adequately and not likely to cause repercussions. Eshkol mentioned Komars to Ambassador, but did not make pitch that they more effective than Egyptian missiles; merely added them to Egyptian missile capabilities.
18. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson/1/ Washington, February 25, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Arab Republic, Vol. I. Top Secret. Another copy of the memorandum indicates that it was drafted by Francois M. Dickman and Davies. The copy is filed with a memorandum of February 27 from Bundy to Rusk conveying the President's approval. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 12-5 NEAR E) SUBJECT Discussion: The potential for missile and nuclear weapons development in the Near East led us last year to explore the possibilities for an unobtrusive arms limitation agreement between Israel and the UAR. A special Presidential emissary, Mr. John J. McCloy, met with President Nasser for this purpose in June 1963./2/ /2/Reports of McCloy's meetings with Nasser on June 27 and 29 are printed in Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. XVIII, Documents 283-285. Nasser's response was not entirely negative but it did not give us a peg for an approach to the Israelis. He indicated he might associate himself with some form of "collective" renunciation of nuclear weapons and might give us written public assurance not to acquire nuclear weapons or attack Israel. Ambassador Badeau in September left with President Nasser a draft letter from President Kennedy inviting written confirmation of assurances he had earlier given Mr. McCloy. President Kennedy's death created a hiatus in this dialogue. Israel's request for 500 new and advanced U.S. tanks and other offensive weapons again raises the question of arms limitation in the area and our ability to play a role. Before taking a decision on Israel's request, there should be a further probe of Nasser's willingness to consider general arms limitation. If some progress were made, it would have a bearing on the decision and give us a basis for an approach to Israel. If not, we would be in better position to justify to Nasser Israel's obtaining new tanks while still leaving the door open for further efforts. Rather than appoint a special emissary, I propose that Phillips Talbot, Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, carry out the probe during his forthcoming visit to the area. He is familiar with the McCloy visit and all aspects of the problem. His designation would give us good cover and serve to avoid drawing undue attention to this sensitive matter. Recommendations: 1) That you authorize me to ask Mr. Talbot to undertake this task. 2) That, subject to your approval and to prior Israeli concurrence, Mr. Talbot also impart assurances based on the latest inspection of the Dimona reactor. Dean Rusk
19. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson/1/ Washington, February 26, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Arab Republic, Vol. I. Top Secret. The good relations we've built up with the Arabs are in increasing jeopardy, primarily because in their frustration over their inability to stop Israel's water diversion, they're lashing out at all Israel's friends. This is why they reacted adversely to your Weizmann speech; it will color their reaction to anything we say or do this year. 1. So Rusk proposes several friendly moves (Tab A),/2/ designed to compensate for the pro-Israeli stand we'll have to take this year. None should trigger much Zionist reaction except maybe the loan to the UAR, though this is covered by the fact we're also giving Israel a loan. Rusk and Bell just told the UAR we re-approve this loan on certain conditions (but these offer enough loopholes for us to renege if the going gets too rough). /2/The tabs are not attached but are listed on a copy of the memorandum in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Komer Memos, Vol. I. Tab A was a memorandum of February 19 from Rusk to the President on the subject "Maintaining the Near East Balance--1964." 2. We also propose you pick up the Kennedy-Nasser correspondence, which the Egyptians themselves say Nasser set great store by. It's been kept wholly private, which shows they want to continue it. A careful but friendly draft is at Tab B. 3. We want to ask Eshkol in your name to permit us to reassure Nasser that our recent inspection of Israel's Dimona reactor shows Israel isn't going nuclear./3/ This has been of real value in keeping Arabs from going off half-cocked, and especially important now when Arabs are already violent about Jordan Waters. /3/Tab C was the draft telegram to Tel Aviv referred to in footnote 4, Document 12. Telegram 747 to Tel Aviv, February 27, instructed the Embassy to seek Eshkol's agreement to passing reassurance from the Dimona inspection to Nasser. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 12 ISR) 4. We want Phil Talbot to try out once more last year's quiet effort to interest Nasser in tacit arms control (i.e. if Nasser will agree to stay out of nuclear and missile business we'll ask Israelis to do the same). This won't take, but is highly useful nonetheless in (1) both reassuring and warning Nasser; (2) putting him gently on notice that if he keeps getting arms from Moscow we may have to do the same for Israel. To show that the probe has the same high auspices as before, Talbot should have your blessing (Tab D)./4/ /4/Tab D was Rusk's February 25 memorandum to the President, Document 18. All these moves were worked out with Bundy and myself; they entail minimum risk of adverse repercussions. We recommend you approve./5/ /5/A note in Komer's handwriting states that the President approved all actions cited on February 26, according to Johnson's Special Assistant Jack Valenti and a subsequent Johnson-Bundy telephone call. R. W. Komer [Continue with the next documents] Volume XVIII Index | Foreign Relations Online | Historian's Office | Department of State | Secretary of State |