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 | FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XVIII Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964-67 Department of State |
 Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964-1967 1. Letter From President Johnson to Prime Minister Eshkol/1/ Washington, January 2, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, Israel--Presidential Correspondence. Secret. The text of the letter was transmitted in telegram 594 to Tel Aviv, January 3. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 US/SHRIVER) Dear Mr. Prime Minister: The visit to Israel of my good friend, Sargent Shriver, Director of the Peace Corps, provides an occasion for me to renew the frank and friendly exchange between our two governments./2/ /2/Shriver delivered the President's letter to Prime Minister Eshkol on January 7. Their conversation is summarized in telegram 751 from Tel Aviv, January 8. (Ibid.) A January 29 memorandum from Robert W. Komer of the NSC Staff refers to an invitation conveyed by Shriver to Eshkol to visit Washington. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel) I am of course familiar with the correspondence between President Kennedy and yourself as well as former Prime Minister Ben-Gurion. I too value greatly the close and candid relationship that exists between our two governments. This must continue, so I look forward to establishing the same high degree of mutual understanding as existed during the administrations of our predecessors. Among the major problems which we will have to consider in the near future is that of the Jordan waters, on which we stand behind you in your right of withdrawal in accordance with the Unified Plan./3/ Also high on our agenda is the assurance of Israel's future security, in ways which will stabilize rather than upset the situation in the area. We are much concerned, too, with finding a satisfactory way to settle the refugee problem, as a prerequisite to Arab-Israeli peace. You may be sure that we are giving these questions our earnest attention and hope to exchange views fully and frankly with your government on the best means of handling them. I hope to write you again soon in response to your letter of November 4/4/ on Israel's security problems. /3/The Unified Plan, or Johnston Plan, developed in 1953-1955 negotiations with the riparian states of the Jordan River Basin conducted by Presidential emissary Eric Johnston, had never received formal acceptance. For information about the Plan and U.S. policy concerning it, see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. XVII, Document 8, and vol. XVIII, Documents 352 and 355. /4/For information concerning Eshkol's November 4 letter to Kennedy, see ibid., Document 356. Meanwhile, I want to assure you that I stand fully by President Kennedy's public declaration on May 8, 1963,/5/ that we are determined to defend the security of all states in the Near East, as well as our other public and private assurances of support for the safety of Israel. There will be no change in the policy of the United States Government on this issue. /5/For text of the statement that President Kennedy made during a press conference on May 8, 1963, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1963, p. 373. I hope I may look forward to the pleasure of meeting you sometime in the not too distant future to talk things over face to face./6/ /6/Eshkol replied in a letter of January 22 that he looked forward to meeting Johnson, that he valued Johnson's statement on the U.S.-Israel relationship, that he hoped for an early reply to his November 4 letter, and that he was encouraged by Johnson's assurance of U.S. support of Israel's withdrawal of Jordan waters in accordance with the Unified Plan. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, Israel) Sincerely, Lyndon B. Johnson
2. Letter From President Johnson to King Hussein/1/ Washington, January 2, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence, Jordan--Presidential Correspondence. The text of the letter was transmitted in telegram 269 to Amman, January 3. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 15-1 JORDAN) Your Majesty: I am taking the occasion of the visit of my good friend and colleague Sargent Shriver to the Holy Land to have him convey to Your Majesty my sincere greetings and warm good wishes. Although I have never visited Jordan, I feel I know your country both because of my deep interest in the Bible and because of the very close and cordial relations this country has with Jordan. Our support of Jordan's progress under Your Majesty's wise leadership has been shown in many ways. We have followed with pride the advances in Jordan's economic and political welfare. The United States is pleased to be associated with Your Majesty's efforts to build your country and serve your people. I know the heavy burdens and serious obstacles faced by Your Majesty in leading Jordan forward. Only a few years ago it took great faith to believe Jordan could overcome the obstacles in its advance towards economic self-sufficiency. Your Majesty supplied that faith through your leadership. Your enduring confidence has now demonstrated that economic independence in the foreseeable future is no idle dream. Let me assure you most sincerely and categorically that the United States will continue to assist as it is able Jordan's efforts toward achieving the goals you have so wisely set./2/ /2/Shriver delivered the President's letter to King Hussein on January 6. Telegram 319 from Amman, January 7, summarized their conversation. Shriver asked the King if an informal visit with President Johnson in April would be agreeable if it could be arranged, and the King replied that he would be happy to accept an invitation for such a visit. (Ibid., POL 7 JORDAN) Sincerely, Lyndon B. Johnson
3. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, January 3, 1964. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 19-3 ISR. Secret. Drafted by Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Phillips Talbot on January 4 and approved in S on January 19. The memorandum is marked Part I of II. The other portion of the conversation is recorded in a memorandum of conversation, ibid., POL ISR-US. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS The Ambassador said that on his recent consultation in Israel he had found the government preoccupied with the key issue of defense. Israel regarded the talks on November 12 and 13 between its representatives and U.S. Government officials/2/ as very full and helpful, and subsequently had given further information especially on the tank situation. He believed that the United States now had a good picture of Israeli needs. /2/For a summary of the talks, see circular telegram 897, November 13, 1963, printed in Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. XVIII, Document 359. In Jerusalem, the Ambassador said, the Prime Minister had asked him to put to the Secretary for consideration of the U.S. Government the entire security situation in Israel, and especially the position concerning tanks, which was very serious indeed. He appreciated the opportunity to do that now. There were two aspects, qualitative and quantitative. Qualitatively, there was no question that Israel was now completely out-classed by the UAR. Israel had Centurions, AMX's and Shermans. By contrast, the UAR had obtained Soviet T-54's, Stalin 3's, and also had a declining number of T-34's. The T-54's, which were coming in larger numbers, out-classed anything in the Israeli tank inventory in all respects; fire power, armor, maneuverability, etc. Thus, it was vital for Israel to replace at least three hundred of its tanks with more effective tanks. It sought to obtain from the United States two hundred M-48-A-3's within a year or so; and within two or three years one hundred M-60's. These would all be replacements of old tanks. Israel also faced a quantitative problem, the Ambassador said. In the November talks the Israeli representatives had expressed the view, with which they understood the Americans agreed, that minimum safety lies in Israel maintaining a ratio of one to two, or at worst one to three, tanks facing the Arabs. To maintain such ratio in the next two or three years Israel would need to add two hundred more M-60's. The Secretary asked where Israel had obtained its Shermans. The Ambassador responded that they had been bought mostly in Europe, and that Israel had obtained them because they were all that were available. The Ambassador stated that Israel believed its policy of deterrence had worked in the past fifteen years. Now Israel was faced with problems of maintaining the deterrent. It regarded these problems as finite. With the aid he was discussing Israel thought it could preserve its position for the next five years or so making it quite clear to the Arabs that attacks on Israel would not pay. The Ambassador said that while the UAR was the main threat to Israel, his country had to keep certain tank strength to face the Jordanian armed forces, whom Israel rated highly. It also kept a small number of tanks against the Syrians and Iraqis, because Israel was very vulnerable in the middle of the country, at places not more than ten miles wide and good tank country. The Secretary, stating that he was not implying anything by his question, asked whether Israel had looked into the race between tanks and anti-tank missiles. He had the impression that over time the tank was likely to be on the way out, like horse cavalry. As an old infantryman, he would be happier handling a modern anti-tank weapon than being inside a tank. The Ambassador said this question had come up briefly at the November talks, and that General Rabin had made the Israeli view clear. Israel was thinking of its immediate tank problem as a very short range issue during a period of extreme vulnerability. The one thing to do in the next few years was to meet tanks with tanks. The Ambassador continued that Israel hoped to get these tanks from the United States as military assistance. Its military burden had become very heavy. The Prime Minister was an old hand at defense problems, having been Secretary General of the Finance Ministry and Minister of Finance, and now being Minister of Defense as well as Prime Minister. Thus he was very alert to the financial aspects of the military burden, and had shown himself very sensitive to it, so he was not inflating the need. The Secretary said that military assistance funds were very stringent at the moment. Some of the recent cuts had been more damaging to our military assistance program than to the economic assistance program. We would, of course, study the request. The Secretary asked whether we have had from Israel information about its military expenses outside of any aid question. The Ambassador replied that Israel had not been asked to provide this. The Secretary pondered that it might be useful. The Ambassador said he wanted to speak a word about the naval side. The UAR had developed a capability of blockading, bombarding and landing, against which Israeli defenses were absolutely out-classed. Now Israel faced the problem of ship-to-shore missiles as well. This was another aspect in Israel's enormous defense burden. In the budget for the coming year, starting April 1, the Israel defense establishment would get one billion Israeli pounds, 40 percent of the regular budget, and 11 percent of the GNP. The Secretary said that we were very sympathetic to the problem of defense, and would take a look at Israeli requests. Military assistance was a considerable problem for us, he noted, with reduced availabilities and very important needs. He said he thought it would be helpful if the Government of Israel would let us have information on defense expenses abroad, since this information could be highly relevant and was of the sort always expected of military aid recipients. The Secretary asked if the Israeli Government had made its request in writing. The Ambassador said not except in the letter that Prime Minister Eshkol had addressed to President Kennedy./3/ /3/Reference is to Eshkol's November 4 letter to Kennedy; see footnote 4, Document 1.
Washington, January 3, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Arab Republic, Vol. I. Secret. UAR Press Attache Habib came in today at his request (the real power in the UAR Embassy, he is leaving for Cairo January 6th to handle press releases with Western correspondents during Arab summit)./2/ He wanted any words of advice I had to offer. /2/The Arab Summit Conference was held January 13-17 in Cairo. Documentation relating to it is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 UAR. Pointing out the considerable improvement in US-UAR communication which had taken place under President Kennedy, a policy which President Johnson had already told Nasser he wanted to continue,/3/ I stressed that 1964 was likely to prove a real test of our improving relationship. This was primarily because of the Jordan waters, one of those Arab-Israeli issues on which the US and UAR necessarily disagreed. We were impressed by Nasser's handling of this problem so far (I cited Port Said speech/4/ and Haikal commentary), and we emphatically hoped that Nasser as the No. 1 Arab leader could sustain a policy of restraint. I gently reminded Habib how circumstances over the last year--particularly Yemen--had led to the Gruening Amendment,/5/ which seriously limited our freedom of maneuver. I feared that an outpouring of Arab hostility over the Jordan waters would lead to great Congressional pressure on the Administration. This (despite our own recognition that the Arabs intended no military action) might just force our hand. If we could only get through 1964 without a real setback in US relations with the Arabs, I felt sure that the obvious uptrend of the last few years would be continued and strengthened. /3/Reference is to an oral message from Johnson to Nasser which had not yet been delivered. For text of the message, see telegram 2860 to Cairo, December 23, 1963, in Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. XVIII, Document 391. /4/A memorandum by Robert W. Komer of the NSC Staff commenting on the speech is ibid., Document 395. /5/Reference is to an amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1963, signed December 16, 1963 (P.L. 88-205; 77 Stat. 387), barring U.S. foreign aid, including assistance under P.L. 480, to any country that the President determined was engaging in or preparing for aggressive military action against the United States or any country receiving U.S. assistance. The amendment's sponsors made it clear that it was aimed at the United Arab Republic. Habib seemed most receptive, but asked what kind of an "out" we could provide for the Arabs. I replied that we had attempted to devise just such an out with the unified plan of 1955, calling for an equitable division of the Jordan waters among various users. We were insistent that Israel stick to this allocation, which left 60% of the waters for the Arabs. Habib asked what our attitude would be toward an Arab call for international observation and checking, both of water withdrawals and of nuclear developments. I parried that our response would obviously depend on the nature of the proposals but in principle I felt we would favor any such international arrangement that seemed acceptable to the parties. As Habib left he mentioned Abu Simbel and the UAR's hope that President Johnson would send some personal message when the US contribution was made. I told him only half jocularly/6/ that if he could manage in some way to keep the Israeli issue in the icebox (as Kamel keeps saying) during the Arab Summit, we could suitably memorialize US help for Abu Simbel. /6/The words "only half jocularly" were added in Komer's handwriting. R. W. Komer/7/ /7/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
5. Summary Prepared in the Department of State/1/ Washington, undated. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Arab Republic, Vol. I, Cables. Secret. Both the summary and the 9-page letter from Badeau are filed with a covering memorandum of January 14 from Rusk to the President; a covering memorandum of January 14 from Komer to Bill Moyers, which noted that the President might want to urge Badeau to stay on during the "ticklish period in US-UAR relations" expected to develop over the Jordan water issue; and an undated note from Moyers to NSC Executive Secretary Bromley Smith, stating that the President had seen the package and that Bundy should talk to him about asking Badeau to stay on. SUMMARY OF AMBASSADOR BADEAU'S LETTER OF 1. Egypt is the paramount Eastern Arab state and the leader of the nationalist reform movement. Although the drive for Arab unity has slowed, Nasser remains the most widely respected Arab leader. This gives the UAR a significant independent capacity to affect American interests in the area. 2. Our interests are: to blunt Soviet penetration; to preserve Western access to sea and air routes and to Arab oil; and to promote peace and progress in the area. 3. Our policy has featured: extension of economic assistance; evenhandedness in area disputes; and readiness to commit our power and prestige to the defense of our interests. 4. The wisdom of these policies has been shown by an increase in American influence at the expense of Soviet influence since 1956. In addition, inter-Arab quarrels have been moderated; the public UAR position on Jordan waters has been moderate, as has their position on recent U.S. support for Israel; the UAR has kept the Israel question in the icebox, and is now considered to be likely to attack Israel only if it believes Israel has begun to produce nuclear weapons. Private U.S. claims are slowly being adjudicated; Western access to the Suez Canal seems assured (barring Arab-Israel hostilities); and the Egyptians have shown an increasing appreciation of the advantage of closer cooperation with the West. 5. The remaining problems between Cairo and Washington are manageable. Egyptian withdrawal from Yemen has been slow, but they recognize the disengagement principle. There is no present threat to the Saudi Government or to Aden, and there might be chaos in Yemen if the UAR moved out too fast. 6. The UAR remains heavily dependent on Soviet military aid, but Western aid--especially PL 480--has helped preserve nonalignment; the UAR is still hostile to Israel, but leans toward containment. Time may heal even this wound. 7. In conclusion, cessation of U.S. aid to the UAR would not moderate their policies, would nullify the gains since 1956 and jeopardize our interests. The guillotine can only be used once per subject.
6. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State/1/ Cairo, January 7, 1964, 1 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 33-1 JORDAN RIVER. Secret. Repeated to Baghdad, Amman, Jidda, Rabat, Algiers, Tripoli, Damascus, Khartoum, Beirut, Tunis, Kuwait, and Taiz. 1493. Depcirtel 1176./2/ In course of tour d'horizon with President Nasser on January 6,/3/ I discussed Jordan waters problem along lines reftel. /2/Circular telegram 1176, January 2, sent to Amman, Beirut, Cairo, and Tunis and repeated to 13 other Missions, stated U.S. views on the Jordan water issue and instructed the addressees to state them to their host governments if an appropriate occasion arose, without taking the initiative or giving the impression the United States was using pressure to influence the outcome of the pending Arab Summit Conference. (Ibid.) /3/Badeau reported in telegram 1490 from Cairo, January 7, that during an 80-minute tour d'horizon with Nasser, he had delivered the oral message from Johnson cited in footnote 3, Document 4. After noting that progress had been made in some areas in recent U.S.-UAR relations, he reviewed the Yemen problem and pointed out that Congressional amendments aimed at the UAR were "storm signals" as to the state of U.S. public opinion and its possible impact on U.S. economic assistance to the UAR. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 1 UAR-US) Earlier in conversation President stated Summit Conference had been under consideration since last mid-summer. So long as Baath regimes controlled both Syria and Iraq, UAR considered summit meeting impossible and therefore had waited until Baath collapse in Baghdad had isolated and weakened Baath in Syria, putting it in a position where it could not refuse to attend conference. This factor determined date of issuance call for summit. Re Jordan waters, I briefly presented US attitude based upon reftel, stating I had requested political counselor Bergus to meet with Presidential advisor Hassan Al Kholi on January 7 for full exposition of US position. US position put forward not in intent to influence summit deliberations but as factual statement of our well-known diagnosis of problem and attitude thereon. In making presentation I particularly stressed riparian rights, pointing out UAR as downstream user of Nile waters originating beyond its borders should be particularly sensitive to correct riparian position. President at once responded by saying withdrawal of Nile waters based upon agreement between countries concerned and no such agreement had been made between Arab states and Israel. While admitting this diplomatically true, I pointed out Johnston Plan had evoked a technical "meeting of minds" by all parties concerned and on this basis USG believed progress in utilizing potential of Jordan waters for benefit of all parties could be made. President did not argue point but passed on to ask what my "personal" opinion was--"not as Ambassador but as long-time student of Middle Eastern affairs." I responded neither I personally nor my Government were in any position to put forward "our solution," but it seemed to me any objective student of situation would identify following points: (A) Use of force--either overt or covert--would not solve Jordan water problem and therefore this solution must be put aside as neither in interests of Arabs nor of international community whose concern for tranquillity in Middle East was active and legitimate. (B) Plans to divert headwaters of Jordan, as speculated upon in Cairo press, equally unrealistic and dangerous. Whatever legal rights or wrongs of such a move, any riparian state whose chief water supply is thus cut off would have no recourse but to fight. If in course of an Ethiopian-UAR dispute, Ethiopia diverted Blue Nile, Egypt would certainly move to stop this. I opined Israel would do same and would win large measure of sympathy and support in international community. (C) Question appeared to be not whether Israel would or would not use more Jordan water, but if it would do this within context of Johnston Plan which had been technically recognized as possible and beneficial to all users. Therefore most protective and constructive action Arabs could take would be to develop their own use of water, both as benefit to themselves and as inhibition of Israelis using more water than allotted to them by Johnston scheme. (D) Machinery existing for consideration of international disputes is UN, of which both Israel and Arab states members. President's only response was to ask, "Do you mean if we were to divert headwaters of Jordan, we would be subject to Israeli aggression?" I objected to use of word "aggression," saying water was such vital interest any state would move to protect it, and this could scarcely be called "aggression." President then said, "This means we must remain strong and prepared." With this he dropped topic, being obviously unwilling to discuss any details of summit meeting. Badeau
Washington, January 10, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Robert W. Komer, Israel Security (Tanks), Nov. 1963-June 1964. Secret. A handwritten note indicates that copies were sent to Talbot, Jernegan, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Frank K. Sloan, and Bundy, and subsequently to USIA Director Carl T. Rowan and Deputy Special Counsel to the President Myer Feldman. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS Ambassador Harman explained briefly that he was calling, as he had on several others, to explain the basis for Israel's increased security requirements, especially for tanks. As Prime Minister Eshkol had said in his 4 November 1963 letter, Israel's needs fell into three categories: (1) surface-to-surface missiles to meet the growing UAR missile threat; (2) tanks to modernize Israeli armor; (3) some means of countering growing UAR naval strength. The Prime Minister had also stressed the great economic burden that Israel was carrying, which it had to take into account in seeking to meet its security needs. Of course Israel's immediate and primary need was for tanks. Mr. Bundy commented that we could see how the growing imbalance between Israeli and Arab armor posed a "real" problem, and were actively looking into it. But why did Israel need missiles? We genuinely had trouble in following their reasoning here. To us, for Israel to spend a lot of money on missiles seemed wasteful and unnecessary. Harman responded that Israel had hoped escalation of the arms race in the Middle East could have been avoided, but the US itself had found that Nasser was uninterested in arms controls. The Israelis had presented to us their evidence about growing UAR missile stockpiles. These created a real psychological and military problem for Israel. In the absence of any effective arms controls, the Israeli Government felt it had to go ahead and develop a deterrent to Nasser's missiles. Bundy said that he literally could not follow the Ambassador's argument. He could see a psychological problem, but in practical military terms Nasser's missiles were useless. So what would Israel get from matching them with an equally wasteful investment? It reminded him of the arguments of those people in the US who thought we ought to build blast shelters and anti-missile missiles just because the Soviets might have them rather than because we saw an actual need for them. Tanks, he granted again, were a "real issue." We could talk about this, but when we got down to brass tacks there was a genuine question as to why we should give tanks as grant aid to Israel when it was, as we had heard, planning to buy surface-to-surface missiles from France. We simply didn't see Nasser's missiles as posing the kind of threat that would require a major Israeli investment in anyone's missiles in return. Our intelligence people had looked at the problem again after the US-Israeli intelligence talks. Mr. Komer confirmed that we couldn't believe the Israeli estimate that Nasser would build a 900-1000 missile force by 1969 or that even a force of this size with conventional warheads could interrupt Israeli mobilization. He and Col. Ron had a brief exchange about the differences in our estimates. Ambassador Harman then put the case of Israeli missiles on political grounds, saying that we must appreciate the Israeli situation--Israel, surrounded by the Arabs, hemmed in on every side, harassed by constant Arab hostility, had to show its own people that it was able to deter any level of Arab military attack. Mr. Bundy again expressed skepticism as to whether a substantial Israeli investment in SSMs was the answer. He noted that Israel did not seem to have told us very much about its missile plans. How far along were they? Harman replied that their plans had not yet jelled, as General Rabin had indicated when here./2/ /2/Komer's memorandum of a conversation with Rabin, Ron, and Gazit, November 14, 1963, is printed in Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. XVIII, Document 360. Bundy thought it would be helpful if the Israelis would tell us about their plans. It would create a tough problem for the US to find that others were selling Israel missiles while we were giving tanks. Moreover, while not deprecating the seriousness with which Israel must look at every aspect of the UAR military build-up, we tended to credit the Israelis with greater qualitative superiority over the Arabs than the Israelis did themselves. Harman objected to what he called the general tendency in the US Government to "overexaggerate" Israel's superior technology and manpower. He pointed out that 55% of the children entering primary school this year were of non-European descent. Israel was having a hard time absorbing so many immigrants. The quality of its armed forces vis-a-vis the Arabs wasn't as high as many Americans seemed to think. He then returned to the problem of UAR missiles, saying that one of the difficulties was that these missiles might make the UAR cocky enough to try a fight with Israel, simply because the Egyptians wouldn't realize how limited a capability they actually had. Possession of a missile force might encourage the UAR to be more aggressive than purely military calculations would justify. Bundy's rejoinder was that we had no desire to look down our noses at the UAR missile force, but the simple fact was that such missiles without nuclear warheads would not be meaningful. However, if Israel went in for a substantial missile force along with its existing nuclear potential, it would create the real possibility of a whole new dimension in the Middle East arms race. If any Middle East country acquired a nuclear delivery capability, then we would have such a major change in the situation as to confront us with a grave policy problem. We would be forced to re-evaluate the whole basis of our Middle East policy. Ambassador Harman, who seemed a little harassed at this point, switched the subject by asking "how about tanks?" Bundy again said that this was a real question which we could look at in real terms, though grant aid would be difficult because MAP was so thin. We could see Israel's need for tanks, but there were legitimate questions as to the numbers and types that Israel needed, and as to when and how these could be made available, either by us or by other friends. He was no expert on tanks so couldn't discuss these, but his brother in the Defense Department was looking into them and could give some more authoritative reactions. Bundy was sure that we would have arguments over such questions as the number and type, but at least these were real questions with which we could come to grips. Harman explained the Israeli "two-bite request." First of all, they wanted to replace some 300 of their Shermans with modern tanks--200 M48A3s and 100 M60s. The second bite would be to meet the continuing Soviet build-up of Arab armor. Here they hoped for some 200 M60s over the next 2-3 years. On the money, they hoped to get the tanks free. Harman explained the great security burden Israel was carrying. Defense now took 40% of the Israeli regular budget and 11% of GNP. The Israeli economy was really stretched. Israel had to lay out vast sums for the absorption of immigrants, and it was hard to see how it could buy tanks at full value. Bundy explained the tightness of our MAP program, given the recent Congressional cuts. These had fallen particularly heavily on MAP, so on this question we would have to be tough. We would expect to apply to the Israelis the same cost-effectiveness standards that we applied to our own military establishment. But at least these were questions we could lay on the table and discuss. At the same time, in the common interest, we ought to take another look at the missile problem. We should have a similarly real discussion of what the Israelis had in mind and whether it made sense. If Israel was asking us for grant aid, we had an interest in knowing how they were spending their own money. He emphasized that if we thought for a minute there was a real UAR missile threat, we wouldn't talk this way. We were not saying that Israel couldn't or shouldn't buy a few missiles (5 or so) for psychological deterrent purposes if it felt it mandatory, but our impression was that Israel was going much further. These things were "silly" with conventional warheads. Yet, for just this reason if Israel bought missiles it would mean to Nasser that Israel was going nuclear. This was the risk we saw--and it wasn't just Israel's risk, it was our risk too. It was a matter of deep common interest to the US as well as to Israel to keep all of our commitments to Israeli security. This had been President Kennedy's view, and it was equally that of President Johnson. Bundy then pointed out that 1964 was going to be a very sticky year anyway, because of the pro-Israeli stand we were going to take on the Jordan Waters. If on top of this we seemed to be subsidizing directly or indirectly a build-up of Israel military strength in so dangerous a field as missiles, especially against essentially frivolous UAR weapons, it would be hard for us to maintain our present position in the Middle East. Ambassador Harman fervently hoped that we would not get into a missile discussion with Israel. He expressed his strong conviction that Israel was under the gun, recounting how when he returned to Israel twice in 1963 he had explained to all concerned that the US commitment to support Israel was firm. However, he'd had a rough time at home. He had found a general feeling that Israel could not depend solely on unofficial US guarantees, but had to have its own deterrent power. The Israeli Government and Prime Minister Eshkol faced a difficult problem in convincing the Israeli people that Israel could cope with the missiles which Nasser was obviously building and which he kept flaunting publicly. The Ambassador, after pausing, commented that he greatly appreciated Mr. Bundy's candor and would be frank in return. When we raised certain economic questions about Israel's request for tanks, this was reasonable; we could talk about costs and whether Israel could afford purchase rather than grants. But he feared that if we entered into long negotiations about US availabilities and numbers and types, we would complicate matters. Quite frankly, there were many in Israel who said Israel should not spend desperately needed money on older model, reconditioned tanks which would soon be obsolete. It would be wiser to wait a while and buy a new model, which would give Israel a deterrent advantage for several years. Harman feared that if we were sticky, this school of thought would again come to the fore. Both Bundy and Komer responded that there might be something to the argument about waiting for something better. In any case, Bundy assured him we were fully prepared to lay our cards on the table and discuss this as well as other matters. However, Israel must recognize that there were legitimate questions as to what was needed for our own forces, what we could spare, what our new production plans were, etc. In closing, Bundy emphasized how we regarded both the missile and tank problems as matters of common interest, which we should explore jointly and freely with a full exchange of information on both sides. He also hoped that nothing he had said would indicate that we did not regard Israeli concerns as serious. However, among close friends there ought to be the kind of full and frank airing of respective viewpoints that would lead to those joint decisions which would best serve us both. RWK
8. Memorandum of Conversation Between the Israeli Ambassador (Harman) and the President's Deputy Special Counsel (Feldman)/1/ Washington, January 15, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Robert W. Komer, Israel Security (Tanks), Nov. 1963-June 1964. Secret. I had lunch with Ambassador Harman and he used the occasion to renew the plea for surface-to-surface missiles, tanks and naval weapons. He referred to the fact that he had discussed this with Mr. Bundy and that he had been disturbed by the reaction he had received. He said that Mr. Bundy kept directing the conversation to the missile question and strongly urged that Israel deny itself surface-to-surface missiles. Ambassador Harman said that if this was the position of the United States Government the conversations would probably be unproductive, for Israel must reserve the right to decide what weapons it needs to protect itself. I said that we were not attempting to structure Israeli defense forces, but the question presented to us fell into three categories: 1. What type of weapons should we make available to Israel? Our analysis indicated that neither missiles nor naval weapons were necessary, but we were actively considering a request for tanks. 2. Assuming we agreed to make tanks available, what kind of tank could be provided? Here there was some question as to whether or not we could export M-60s and whether or not anti-tank weapons would not also be useful. This determination was largely a Defense Department matter. 3. Assuming Israel accepted the tanks, we had the problem of payment terms. It was in this connection that Mr. Bundy made the valid comment that before we modified the terms on which military equipment was normally sold we had a right to know whether Israel could afford to pay regular prices at regular terms. The only way to make this determination was to examine the purposes for which the defense budget was being used. If Israel was expending money for useless equipment, we had a right to demand that such expenditures be curtailed and the funds diverted to tanks before offering special assistance in the purchase of tanks. Similarly, if Israel was using its defense budget in a manner that would heighten the arms race or increase the prospect of war, we had a right to request that these funds be diverted to the purchase of tanks before modifying the normal purchase terms for military equipment. Ambassador Harman found this difficult to understand. He pointed out that Egypt already had surface-to-surface missiles, and we had agreed that they would have at least 500 of these within 4 years (Israeli intelligence said they would have 900 to 1,000). Israel would be at a serious disadvantage, he said, if they could not have at least 100 missiles. I asked specifically whether Israel had an agreement to purchase missiles from France. He said he did not know. Ambassador Harman concluded the discussion by urging that we send Prime Minister Eshkol a prompt response. He said this was promised in the letter from the President delivered by Mr. Shriver and was eagerly awaited. Time was extremely important to him and to his Government. I said he would have to understand that the subject was complex and that it took some time to develop the United States position, but I assured him we were proceeding as expeditiously as possible. Myer Feldman/2/ /2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
9. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson/1/ Washington, January 16, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. I. Secret. The memorandum bears no drafting information, but another copy indicates that it was drafted by Talbot. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL ARAB-ISR) SUBJECT We face a difficult and challenging year in the Near East. The Soviets are actively seeking to recoup their recent setbacks. Turmoil in the Arab States has sharpened tensions among themselves and vis-a-vis Israel. Israel is increasingly anxious about its future security. What is more, our own interests are steadily more caught up in the area, because of Europe's growing dependence on reasonable access to Middle East oil, our needs for strategic transit and communications, the importance of blocking Soviet advances, and our other stakes in peace in the region. I foresee a series of issues in the coming months that could severely strain our position and our influence in the area. The most important of these are: -- Arab reactions to Israeli diversion of Jordan waters (the toughest of all); We have learned over the years that the key to a constructive Near Eastern policy is maintaining a balance in our relationships with the Arabs and Israel. This has never been easy. In our interest, but also in Israel's, we have been at pains during the past three years to build fruitful ties with the Arabs. In 1964, as never before, we will need our Arab relationships to weather the storms likely to be aroused by the issues I have listed. I believe we shall need to make a heavy investment of U.S. prestige in 1964 in support of Israel against Arab resentments on several of these issues. Actions we propose to take, with your approval, to limit adverse effects of the Jordan waters diversion, Dimona, refugees, and the arms race are discussed in Enclosure 1. As to Israel's estimates of its military defense needs, which preoccupy its leaders and shape their current view of U.S.-Israel relations, we face decisions on what the U.S. should do and when. Israel has asked us to furnish it five hundred tanks under the Military Assistance Program. Prime Minister Eshkol also wrote to President Kennedy that Israel needs assistance in obtaining naval equipment and missiles. In fact, Israel seeks ever closer military and political identification with us. We are looking at ways to help it meet its most critical problems. However, we see its needs in a broader context. In the past, consistent with our policy of refusing to become a major supplier of offensive weapons to states likely to be involved in an Arab-Israel war, we have encouraged Israel to fill its requirements for such weapons in Europe. It has done so. Israel has both public and private assurances of our commitment to its integrity and security. In mid-1963, a JCS review of our military capability to respond to possible aggression against Israel/2/ completely satisfied President Kennedy that we could deploy to meet any potential threat within 30 hours. He so informed Prime Minister Eshkol. What is more, the Arabs have shown they are well aware of both our intentions and our capabilities to deter and stop aggression. In our view, this reduces the need for Israel to press far and fast toward weapons escalation that would almost certainly throw the Arabs closer into the arms of the Soviets. /2/Text of JCSM-611-63, August 7, 1963, is printed in Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. XVIII, Document 308. While Israel's increased vulnerability in the field of armor will not become critical for the next year or two, or perhaps longer, there may be an earlier psychological requirement to assure Israel that its armor needs will be met in time. Otherwise, we are likely to be subjected to a strong Israeli pressure campaign and renewed demands for a security guarantee. On the other hand, we may want to time any arms deal with Israel so as to avoid additional Arab antagonism just when we are taking a pro-Israeli stand on the Jordan Waters. It is also essential to use the steps we take to aid Israel as leverage to achieve greater Israeli cooperation in matters of importance to us. For example, we are greatly concerned lest in response to the UAR's so-called missiles, which we see as of no military significance, Israel acquire much better missiles in quantity from France. Aside from the drain on Israeli funds (which could otherwise be used to buy tanks), this would enhance Arab fears of a nuclear arms race and might create dangerous repercussions. So we may want to use our help on Israel's tank problem to get Israel to forego (or sharply limit) any missile buildup. The problems, our approach to them, and suggestions about what we might do for Israel are discussed in detail in the enclosures./3/ /3/Enclosure 2, unsigned and undated, entitled "Actions To Reassure Israel: 1964," is not printed. Dean Rusk
Enclosure 1 DETAILS OF ARAB-ISRAEL PROBLEMS--1964 Five major problems involve potential violence or threaten basic United States interests in the Near East in 1964. Fortunately, we begin 1964 with considerable prestige and good will built up during recent years. These assets give us positive leverage, which we shall need to maintain through and after 1964 if we hope to see an ultimate Arab-Israel accommodation and protection of our major interests in the Near East. Our policy problems in the Near East are almost always a matter of balance. To deal successfully with the issues ahead, we shall continue to need influence with both Arabs and Israelis. In practice the question of exclusive identification with any Arab state, or with the Arabs generally, does not arise. Israel, however, seeks a close military identification with us to serve as a deterrent to the Arabs. Such a relationship would not only destroy the influence we need to maintain with the Arabs but stimulate closer Arab-Soviet ties and reduce our ability to bring about an eventual peaceful solution to the Arab-Israel dispute. In the mid-1950s the Arabs thought we had identified ourselves completely and finally with Israel. The Soviets saw an opportunity to side with the Arabs and wreck the Free World position in the Near East. They largely succeeded so far as the French and British were concerned. It has taken several years to reverse Soviet successes, damp down the Cold War in the Near East, and regain the flexibility we need. A policy of balance permits us to protect our own interests in access to oil on reasonable terms, strategic transit and communications rights and facilities, as well as to help Israel achieve long-term security. Our ability to maintain meaningful relations with the Arab states is essential to attain these objectives. Against this background, the five predictable problems of 1964 come into focus: Jordan Waters: Israel will begin to divert water out of the Jordan basin, from Lake Tiberias, this spring. Test pumping is scheduled for about mid-February. Sustained pumping will begin two or three months later. For a decade this has been foreseen as the issue most likely to cause a new Arab-Israel war. Despite their determination to prevent diversion, the Arabs cannot successfully take on Israel. But there is always some danger they will talk themselves into disaster. In a major gesture of support, President Kennedy committed us to stand beside Israel, provided its water withdrawals are held within the limits of Eric Johnston's comprehensive 1955 Plan. We have made extensive diplomatic preparation to fulfill this commitment. Our objective is to prevent Arab use of force or any Arab interference with Israel's plans, but in such a way as not to exhaust the leverage we need with the Arabs in other divisive issues. Our best bet is reliance on: a) A strengthened United Nations peacekeeping machinery in the area, b) Vigorous behind-the-scenes diplomacy with the Arabs, and c) Recourse to the United Nations Security Council or General Assembly as necessary. If we get over this hump without war, we will have made a contribution to Israel almost as basic as our support for its creation in 1948. Dimona Reactor: Israel's French-built 25 megawatt power reactor will be completed in January or February. Israel has assured us it will be limited to peaceful uses but with it Israel will have a small nuclear weapons potential. We anticipate strong Arab reactions and, at the least, renewed talk of acquiring comparable installations, perhaps with Soviet help. Fortunately, we have persuaded the Israelis to invite us to inspect Dimona periodically. We can use our findings to limit the fears of the Arab governments. We need to continue pressing the Israelis firmly to keep off the nuclear weapons path. But these steps will not be enough in the long run. Israel is thinking of a 125-150 megawatt power reactor, five times the size of Dimona. The UAR will try to keep abreast. We cannot prevent the two sides from moving ahead so long as both stick to peaceful uses. Therefore, safety will lie in: a) Involving responsible Free World states in reactor development on both sides so we can know what is going on and have maximum control through bilateral safeguards arrangements, b) Encouraging acceptance of IAEA controls to replace bilateral ones, c) Exploring possibilities for an Arab-Israel nuclear free zone or acceptance of such other international restraints as may be evolved, and d) Reassuring each side on the basis of our knowledge of the capability and intentions of the other side in the nuclear field. Israel's Security and the Arms Race: Nuclear potentials apart, the "conventional" arms race has reached a dangerous new threshold just as we face the Jordan waters issue and the Dimona question. And Israel is pressing its case for new military gestures from us. Israel wants as close to 100% military identification with the United States as it can get. But its appetites exceed its needs. Neither President Kennedy's May 8 statement/4/ nor the assurances in his letter of October 30 to Prime Minister Eshkol/5/ (which amounted to a written guarantee of Israel's security by the President of the United States) fully satisfied the Israelis. We did not expect they would. /4/Text of the statement, which President Kennedy made at a news conference on May 8, 1963, is printed in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1963, p. 373. /5/Reference is to a letter from Kennedy given to Eshkol on October 3, 1963; for text, see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. XVIII, Document 332. Israel has presented a sizeable request for military assistance. On the list in 1963 were a public security guarantee, secret contingency planning, naval equipment, surface-to-surface missiles, grant-aid United States tanks (300 now, 200 later), etc. Our November exchanges with the Israelis indicated that these requests are out of line with Israel's actual military needs. Israel needs gradual modernization of its tank and anti-tank defenses. In other respects it has a healthy margin of superiority for some years to come. The UAR's showcase missiles are in fact only that, not a military threat, and will probably remain so unless Israel gets into serious missilery and the UAR then turns to the Soviets for help. The UAR missiles point up, however, the domestic psychological problem Israel's leaders face. The Israelis and others have made efforts to downgrade our capability and commitment to defend Israel. Without going so far toward Israel that we break the bond of confidence we have developed with the Arabs and risk creating a vastly dangerous USSR/Arab versus United States/Israel lineup, we can lay more effective emphasis on what we have very generously done and are doing to help. And there are certain new moves we can make in 1964 that will please Israel and help meet its domestic political problem (and ours). Details of both are in the second enclosure. In addition, however, we need to work at measures to curb the arms race and enhance stability. To that end: a) We should continue active exploration of arms limitation and control. Secretary Rusk has spoken to Foreign Minister Gromyko about the possibility of mutual restraint in the disposition of obsolete weapons. Our Ambassador in Cairo has begun to probe his Soviet colleague on aspects of arms control in the area. We have talked to Nasser secretly about the United States becoming a kind of guarantor for working arrangements to control the escalation of arms. There is discussion of arms control, as well as nuclear free zone possibilities, in the United Nations context. From all of these not much has opened up so far, but the time might come when we could do something serious with the Russians about restraint. Our capability to deal with all parties in this field is enhanced by our traditional Near East arms policy. b) We should make clear on appropriate public occasions that we will defend the independence of all Near East states and will resist aggression in any form. c) If we facilitate solution of Israel's tank problem, we should get assurance in return that Israel will not plunge the Near East into either the sophisticated missile or the nuclear weapons field. Arab Refugees: 1964 will be the year of turn-around on this problem. President Kennedy's talk with Ben-Gurion in May 1961/6/ and letters to Arab leaders launched a major initiative designed, if successful, to eliminate, over several years, this problem that bulks so large in the Arab-Israel dilemma./7/ Negotiations over the next several months will show whether this can proceed fruitfully. /6/For a memorandum of Kennedy's meeting with Ben Gurion on May 30, 1961, see ibid., vol. XVII, Document 57. /7/United States supported the 1961 appointment of a Special Representative of the UN Palestine Conciliation Commission (PCC) to conduct indirect negotiations between Israel and the Arab states toward a resolution of the Palestinian refugee question. After meeting with Arab and Israeli leaders, Special Representative Joseph E. Johnson submitted his proposals to the PCC on August 31, 1962. For an August 7, 1962, memorandum from Rusk to Kennedy summarizing the background of the initiative and Johnson's proposals, see ibid., vol. XVIII, Document 15. Extensive documentation concerning the initiative is ibid., volumes XVII and XVIII. The chances, frankly, are not good. Neither the Arabs nor Israel accepted Dr. Joseph Johnson's proposals, and Israel's public rejection of any settlement based on existing United Nations resolutions has further compounded the problem. If we fail, we could probably buy time by continuing to support UNRWA indefinitely (an unpopular course in Congress), or perhaps could phase it out gradually over a period of years. We must expect, however, a storm in the United Nations should the Arabs read this as our goal. We have already tightened UNRWA's belt. The climax will come next fall when the General Assembly must determine UNRWA's future. Whatever the outcome, a heavy investment of United States influence will be required if area stability is to be preserved over this important issue. Oil: From the oil producing countries (organized through OPEC) we now face the most intensive pressures for major concession revisions that have ever been put forward. Our influence will be needed on all sides to help maintain the rapport and trust needed between the companies and governments to prevent changes that would entail either chaos or injury to United States private investment in this vital sector. The threat of Arab sanctions against Western oil interests in reaction to Israel's diversion of Jordan waters may not materialize but is another aspect showing the context in which our interests in the Near East must be viewed. Intra-Arab Relations: Arab actions on these five problems will be shaped by the state of their own relations. Divided and quarreling as they are today, Arab politicians find a hard line against Israel inescapable. This increases the risk of irrational explosion on any of the big problems. Without the UAR, no Arab state or combination of states could really damage Israel. Knowing this, other states--most actively, Syria--seek to embroil the UAR with Israel on, for example, Jordan waters and Palestine refugees. A major object of our policy toward the UAR is to persuade Nasser that he is wise to keep Israeli issues "in the icebox," as his Ambassador says. Similarly, our purpose in Yemen is to prevent a conflagration that might involve other Arab states and ultimately Israel. In intra-Arab tensions, as in other problems cited here, the key is balance and a careful husbanding of limited and hard-won U.S. influence. [Continue with the next documents] Volume XVIII Index | Foreign Relations Online | Historian's Office | Department of State | Secretary of State |