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 | FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968 Volume XVII Eastern Europe Department of State |
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| 198. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, November 29, 1965, 11:30 a.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 2 EUR E. Confidential. Drafted by Foley, on December 12. The meeting was held at the Department of State. Klaus visited Washington November 28-29. Memoranda of his conversation with Rusk on November 29, dealing with peace efforts, the Asian Development Bank, and Austria's foreign policy, are ibid., POL AUS-US. A memorandum of his conversation with Vice President Humphrey on November 29, dealing with the EEC and East Europe, is ibid., Presidential Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 70 D 217, VP/Memcon. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS Austria United States Mr. Leddy asked how the Chancellor sees recent developments in Eastern Europe. Development of U.S. relations with the Soviets, he said, are somewhat impeded by the Vietnam war. The U.S. would like to continue normal exchanges with the Soviets but we are meeting with a difficult attitude. This attitude is reflected only in part in Eastern Europe and differs from country to country. The U.S. would like to relax tensions and improve trade relations with Eastern Europe. Chancellor Klaus stated that this is a most important subject for Austria. Austria conducts an active Eastern European policy, particularly since the normalization of its relations with Eastern Europe. Seen from Austria, the Chancellor continued, those countries of Eastern Europe, which in 1945 turned completely toward the East, are now turning back toward Western Europe as toward an old family. The governments are permitting more liberalization but, he noted, the government leaders are in no way turning from Communism. However, a healthy climate is being created and Austria wishes to take advantage of it. Austrians find that old traditional relations with the former members of the Hapsburg Empire permit them a special entree. Austrian administration in these lands is well remembered, and this makes discussions for the Austrians easier. Human contacts between Austrians and other Eastern Europeans are increasing, the Chancellor said. 100,000 Austrians have friends or families in Eastern Europe. Crossing the borders is made easier and real human contacts can be made. Austrians now go to Yugoslavia on vacation and many thousands of Austrians go to Hungary and many Hungarians now visit Austria. The Chancellor said that on summer evenings in some parts of Vienna one can hear more Eastern European languages being spoken than German. The Chancellor noted that cultural exchanges in things German are easier through Austria for the Eastern Europeans than directly with Germany. The Chancellor said that economic relations with Eastern Europe are making progress. Austrian-Rumanian trade has quadrupled in recent years. The Austrian Government realizes that this does not necessarily improve relations; politics for the communist countries comes before trade and Austria cannot become dependent on Eastern European trade. Austria actively cultivates official exchanges with Eastern Europe, the Chancellor said. He said he had invited this year to Austria the prime ministers of Poland and Rumania and he himself had had an interesting visit to Yugoslavia. For the time being, he is not accepting invitations to the other Eastern European countries since he wants the officials of those lands to come to Austria first. In response to a question from Mr. Leddy about Czechoslovakia, the Chancellor said that relations here are difficult. Austria first normalized its relations with Yugoslavia, reached an agreement on Carinthia, then the Government reached property agreements with Rumania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Hungary. However, no property agreement has been reached with Czechoslovakia. He explained that since the days of the Hapsburg monarchy, Austria-Czechoslovakian property has been closely intertwined and that large sums of money are involved. This, he said, makes reaching an agreement difficult. As regards Poland, the Chancellor said Austria has no difficulties. A large Austrian cultural institute has been established in Poland and cultural exchanges are going on, as well as increased trade. Mr. Lisle asked for the Chancellor's assessment of the status of the Catholic Church in Eastern Europe and relations with the Vatican. The Chancellor said that status of the Catholic Church differs from country to country. In Poland improvement of relations with the Vatican has come the farthest. Relations with Yugoslavia are somewhat tense but an agreement is being negotiated. The Chancellor said he had visited the Archbishop in Belgrade but had not seen the Cardinal in Zagreb. Vatican relations with Czechoslovakia are normalizing and in Hungary Cardinal Mindszenty is the only remaining problem. Rumania, the government which has in many respects gone further in normalizing other things, has been the most difficult for the Catholic Church. Four bishops have died in prison and one is now under house arrest. The Chancellor said that Austrian Cardinal Koenig has attempted to establish relations with the Catholic hierarchy in each of the Eastern European countries. He has had good relations with them at the Ecumenical Council. Mr. Lisle asked about the newspaper reports that Rumania wants to act as a mediator in Vietnam. Chancellor Klaus said that in the four hours of his discussions with Maurer the question of mediation was not mentioned. He said apparently Maurer mentioned this only while traveling in Western Austria. There is no question, Klaus said, of either Austria or Rumania acting as mediator. Maurer did criticize U.S.-Vietnam policy. The Chancellor said that Austria has stated that it is interested in securing peace but he noted that Foreign Minister Kreisky had said that no solution to Vietnam is possible without U.S. prestige being protected. Mr. Karasek said that so as not to create a false impression he wished to emphasize that the Austrian Government had not discussed mediation in Vietnam with the Rumanians. He has tried to check the source of these reports of Maurer's alleged statements. The reports seemed to have been the conclusions of a reporter who had heard several of Maurer's statements on Vietnam. Other reporters who had heard Maurer on the same occasions had not confirmed this conclusion. Chancellor Klaus said that there can be no mediation unless both sides request it. He added that visitors to the West from the East have repeatedly tried to get the Austrian Government to denounce U.S.-Vietnam policies and the Austrians have at all times rejected this.
199. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State/1/ New York, October 6, 1966, 2322Z./2/ /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL AUS-US. Confidential; Limdis. Repeated to Vienna and Rome. /2/Beginning in spring of 1965, the dates and transmission times of all incoming Department of State telegrams were in six-figure date-time-groups. The "Z" refers to Greenwich mean time. 1309. Secto 35. Secretary's conversation with Austrian FonMin Toncic Oct 5, 1966. Fol is uncleared FYI, Noforn, subject to revision upon review. 1. In hour-long tour d'horizon with Secretary, Austrian FonMin Toncic in company of Director Political Affairs of Austrian Foreign Ministry Haymerle and Austrian Perm Rep Waldheim discussed Vietnam, ChiRep, Albania, Mongolia, East-West relations, Common Market and Kennedy Round, Austrian draftees, UNOID, Tyrol, SWA and NATO. Fol are highlights of conversation. 2. Vietnam. Secretary made it crystal clear that US will not permit North Vietnam take South Vietnam by force. To do otherwise would destroy credibility of US which of fundamental importance to peace and war in world, as Berlin and Cuban missile crises have proved in past. Toncic replied it was good to hear US would not sell out South Vietnam. In his view no political solution possible without first denying other side military victory. In this sense he considered "American victory" now secure. When Toncic asked why US did not destroy Haiphong, Secretary replied that all important military targets except those in heavily populated areas have been covered. (Comment: Toncic's privately expressed views contrasted rather sharply with those expressed in public in subsequent address before UNGA, in which Toncic hewed closely to neutral line.)/3/ /3/For text of Toncic's address, see U.N. doc. A/PV.1430. 3. ChiRep. Toncic volunteered that Austria will again abstain on ChiRep issues in GA. Secretary stated it would be big mistake for world endorse ChiCom militancy just at time when failures of ChiCom foreign policy should be persuading ChiComs that militancy leading into blind alley. 4. Albania. Toncic reported Albanians in Vienna have for some time been making vague proposals for coming nearer to West. He asked how Austria should respond. Secretary speculated it possible Albanians are becoming restive under ChiCom monopoly and stated it would be constructive and helpful if Austrians could probe their intentions, though it would clearly be mistake for US do so. Waldheim made point Albanians will not change ChiRep position and continue insist Taiwan must be expelled. 5. Mongolia. Toncic recommended recognition of Mongolia, stating Mongolia would like become Switzerland of Asia. Secretary explained US has special problem because of GRC. 6. East-West relations. Secretary stated while bridge-building is OK, Austrians should keep one thing in mind: No vital issues such as Germany are to be settled without US. Secretary added that US did not fight World War II for nothing. 7. Common Market-Kennedy Round. Toncic spoke at some length about Austrian desire there [share?] in economic advantages of Common Market without paying political price. "Everything would be easy for us if Common Market were to conclude trade agreement with Austria." Secretary expressed understanding for problem, but when Toncic suggested maybe GATT would help relieve problem and give Austria a waiver in five years, Secretary explained at length importance of achieving progress in Kennedy Round by early March if protectionist course by US is to be avoided. 8. Austrian draftees in US. Toncic asked for some kind of assurance that Austrians in US on immigrant visas not be drafted. Secretary stated that as general principle permanent residents who participate in all benefits of US system must accept corresponding obligations. Secretary admitted there was special problem with Austria because legislation conflicted with earlier treaties. Secretary pointed out selective service had worked out problem by administrative means. Secretary suggested Austria and US not engage this question as a matter of principle. Secretary pointed out to Toncic that if question gets stirred up in Austria through public pronouncements, it will also get stirred up in US Congress. Secretary suggested Toncic answer inquiries from Austrian press along fol lines: Authorities in US have complicated problem because of conflict between treaties and subsequent Congressional legislation. As a pragmatic matter we have been able work out cases that seem of special interest. We hope that can continue. 9. UNOID. Toncic announced that in speech to UNGA (which followed hard on bilateral) he would offer Vienna as hqts for UNOID. Secretary stated he was not familiar with this particular problem but in general encouraged Austria build up Vienna as site for international mtgs. 10. Tyrol. Toncic estimated it would take Austria and Italy about one year to settle Tyrol dispute. (In subsequent GA address Toncic spoke in moderate tones about this problem, stating that goal of current negotiations had been to establish effective and internationally guaranteed autonomy for minority. Toncic resolutely condemned use of violence to resolve this problem.) Secretary recalled that in past Austria had tried draw us into Tyrol dispute, and expressed hope we would be spared recurrence of such attempts. 11. SWA. Toncic expressed his unhappiness over way SWA problem was being handled in UN. Secretary stated we too have serious reservations about African res on SWA, but expressed hope that further discussions would lead to some changes. When Waldheim raised the possibility of establishing an ad hoc commission to study problem, Secretary stated he thought this was attractive idea. 12. NATO. Secretary explained it had become imperative that NATO jointly reassess common threat, establish new force goals to meet threat and allocate individual responsibilities. Toncic's only reaction was that it would be dangerous if US strength in Europe were to be replaced by German strength. Rusk
200. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, April 21, 1967. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 2 AUS. Confidential. Drafted by Foley on April 25. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS Austria United States Gruber said that it is not a love affair but economic necessity which leads Austria to seek arrangements with the EEC. Austrian industry must specialize in, for example, machine tools and needs export markets. Austria is beginning to feel the effects of EEC trade barriers in its industry and agriculture. If economic troubles come, Gruber observed, political troubles will follow. Gruber continued that Austrian neutrality forbids membership in the EEC but Austria is seeking an affiliation. The Soviets do not like an Austrian connection with the Common Market in any form. However, following the Klaus visit to Moscow,/2/ the Austrians feel that the Soviets now understand Austria's economic needs better. The Austrians have supplied the Soviets with a long paper on the justification for Austrian association, including a factory-by-factory analysis. But the Soviets suggest separate trade agreements with the countries of the Common Market. Gruber expressed his personal opinion that the Soviets themselves realize that they one day must recognize the Common Market. Gruber said he feels that the Soviets will do nothing dramatic as regards Austria's association with the Common Market. /2/Chancellor Klaus visited Moscow March 20-21. As regards EFTA, the Austrians have felt from the beginning that EFTA was an instrument of negotiation with the Common Market. The Austrians see no problem in this connection. The French position is important to Austria, he continued. As a member of the Common Market and a signer of the State Treaty,/3/ their attitude is significant, and France has been helpful in Austria's dealings with the Soviets. /3/For text of the Austrian State Treaty, signed in Vienna on May 15, 1955, see 6 UST 2369. Mr. Leddy asked if it is not a fact that Austria's trade with the Common Market has increased. Gruber replied that this was so as long as the general European economic boom was on. But with the present economic setbacks, Austria feels the effects of Common Market tariffs. Mr. Leddy asked if the success of the Kennedy Round negotiations followed by trade agreements with the Common Market would take care of Austria's trade difficulties. Gruber said he hoped so, but that trade agreements were not enough. Mr. Leddy asked about the Soviet position. Are the Soviets completely opposed to any arrangement with the Common Market, including a trade agreement? Gruber replied that the answer really will be found in giving Austria's affiliation the proper title, which will not be objectionable to the Soviets. The Soviets will never give their official blessing. In response to Ambassador MacArthur's question, Gruber said that approximately 50 percent of Austria's trade is with the Common Market, 15 percent with the East and 17 percent with EFTA. Mr. Leddy asked Gruber's estimate of the possibilities of UK entry into the Common Market. Will De Gaulle continue to oppose this? Gruber replied that when the UK decides to enter they will get sufficient support. But, he said, he foresees long negotiations with the UK on this. Gruber asked Mr. Leddy for the US attitude toward countries making arrangements with the Common Market. Mr. Leddy replied that the US does not like preferential arrangements now being negotiated with a number of countries. If such negotiations would lead to full membership, the US, he said, would not object. Mr. Leddy added that the US recognizes that Austria is a special case, being inhibited by the State Treaty from full membership. But, he added, the US does not like the piecemeal moves being made by other countries for special and preferential deals with the EEC, if these lead to discrimination against US trade. Ambassador MacArthur said that we hope that it will be clear that an Austrian arrangement is a special case and will not be a precedent. Gruber replied that he is sure this will be clear. Mr. Stabler asked about the requirements for approval in the Austrian Parliament of the EEC arrangement. Is a two-thirds vote required, he asked? Gruber replied that the wording of the text of the agreement will determine if a two-thirds vote is necessary. He added that the Austrian Government will want Socialist Party support anyway. Gruber said he has the feeling that the trade unions now support an arrangement.
201. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, April 10, 1968. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL EUR E-US. Confidential. Drafted by Obst and approved in the White House by Rostow on April 19. A separate memorandum of conversation, dealing with Vietnam, is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Austria, Memos. The meeting was held at the White House SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS The President thanked the Chancellor for expressing the gratitude of the Austrian people for the aid given by the United States to Austria. All Americans hold names like Vienna and Salzburg in high esteem and they have a high regard for the Austrian people. This would be demonstrated at the White House dinner as people from all corners of the United States come to honor the Chancellor and the Austrian people. It is very much regretted that we have the turbulence in our city at this time and the inconvenience of the curfew, which might make it impossible for some people to attend./2/ However, the greater majority of them will be there and they are looking forward to it. /2/Rioting broke out in Washington following the April 4 assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. Federal troops were brought in to quell the violence and a curfew was established on April 5. The President said that the United States is also trying to build some bridges to the Eastern European countries, following the splendid example set by Austria. We are exploring the possibility of expanding trade between the United States and the Eastern European countries. Chancellor Klaus replied that as a country bordering directly on the Eastern bloc, and as a free and democratic country, Austria has been observing a steady process of loosening in the monolithic bloc led by the Soviet Union and a considerable interest by the Eastern countries in the rest of Europe. Since 1955-56 a certain turning around and looking more towards the Western world again can be closely observed among those nations. Austria is trying to gear its policy to this development. President Johnson assured the Chancellor that the United States is very appreciative of Austria's efforts in this direction. We are trying very much to do the same, as we know that this is a turbulent area which seeks to find a new level of balance while looking for more freedom. Chancellor Klaus said he wished to make very clear that in those areas, 70 to 90 percent of the people are not thinking along Communist lines, but their thoughts are very much the same as in the West. Four years ago he talked to a Hungarian engineer who had been imprisoned by Kadar and asked him if he would consider it strange or natural if the Chancellor were to shake the hand of the man who imprisoned him. The engineer's response was typical. He said please do come and visit him by all means. We must not forget that 80 percent of the Hungarians think and feel with the people of the West and want a democratic way of life. The Chancellor recalled that he had made visits to Moscow, Budapest, Bucharest, Belgrade and Sofia in 1967 and also traveled East as a private citizen. Everywhere he found great sympathy for Austria, for Europe, for the free world and for democracy. Austria, being historically and geographically the closest country to the Eastern bloc, can demonstrate to these countries a different way of life and government. President Johnson replied that we have observed Austria's policy with great interest and we very much appreciate her excellent efforts. We want to contribute wherever we can to such a policy. He hoped that the Chancellor would be able to discuss details of this policy more closely with Secretary Rusk./3/ /3/According to Secretary Rusk's Appointment Book, he hosted a luncheon for Klaus on the afternoon of April 10. (Johnson Library) No memorandum of conversation was found. Chancellor Klaus said that this conversation had been a great experience for him. He was grateful to have had the opportunity to meet with the President personally and to discuss the three most important issues of concern to the United States. He thanked the President for having spoken with him so frankly and in such a cordial manner and took this as a token of the trust that exists between the two countries. He hoped that his future meetings with the President and with his very able Secretary of State would contribute to a continued exchange of views between our two governments and that those talks would be fruitful. He thanked the President for having given him this opportunity on a very, very busy day. President Johnson closed by saying that he was very happy that the Chancellor could come and see him and he was looking forward to being with him again at the White House dinner.
202. Telegram From the Embassy in Austria to the Department of State/1/ Vienna, September 4, 1968, 1628Z. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL AUS-USSR. Secret; Limdis. 6390. Subject: Chancellor Klaus informal request for indication of US reaction if Austria were attacked. Ref: Vienna 6174, Vienna 6253./2/ /2/Telegram 6174 from Vienna, August 24, and telegram 6253 from Vienna, August 28, are ibid., POL 27-1 COMBLOC-CZECH. 1. Chancellor Klaus asked me to call today to exchange views on "very informal basis" re developments in Central and Eastern Europe. After reviewing again reasons (Vienna 6174) why GOA statements re Czech invasion had been without polemics (he is still obviously sensitive to some domestic criticism for not speaking out more strongly), he inquired how we presently viewed threat to Romania and Yugoslavia. Drawing on Dept's helpful guidance,/3/ I told him that while Soviets obviously had formidable capability to move on Romania, information available does not lead us to believe intervention is in prospect for time being. Re Yugoslavia, I indicated I knew of no intelligence indicating there is any extraordinary Warsaw Pact build-up on Yugoslav frontiers. Furthermore, some qualified observers in Europe and elsewhere doubted that present Soviet leadership would undertake what Stalin had decided was not a profitable venture some twenty years ago. /3/Probably a reference to telegram 231312 to Vienna, August 31, which provided the Department's updated analysis of the Czech situation. (Ibid.) 2. Klaus said while he also doubted Soviets planned any imminent military move against Romania, Yugoslavia or elsewhere at this time, one could never be certain. Therefore, on most confidential and informal basis, he would like to know how we would react if in fact Soviets moved in Europe against such targets as Romania, Yugoslavia, West Berlin and particularly Austria. (Comment: Klaus obviously asked me to call to put this to me.) 3. I replied to Klaus that I would try answer his question on a personal basis. Each of the four targets he mentioned represented a different situation. Romania, like Czechoslovakia, was a member of the Warsaw Pact and COMECON and therefore full-fledged member of Soviet bloc. Yugoslavia, by contrast, while Communist state, had been independent of Moscow since 1948. Furthermore, it seemed certain that if Soviets moved on Yugoslavia, the Yugoslavs would resist bitterly as they had the German invasion in the last war. West Berlin represented still another situation in that we were present there and had rights and responsibilities stemming from 4-Power Agreement to which Soviets were a signatory. President Kennedy had made crystal clear to Khrushchev in their Vienna meeting that West Berlin was not negotiable and if the Soviets did indeed move on West Berlin militarily, they would have to attack US forces stationed there./4/ Austria, on the other hand, was a militarily neutral country and not a member of any Western security pact. However, we, as well as Britain, France and Soviet Union, were signatories of the Austrian State Treaty which recognized Austria's independence and territorial integrity. If Soviets invaded free and independent Austria, a very grave situation would obviously arise which would affect the military balance of power and equilibrium in Europe. Exactly how the United States or other NATO countries would react to such an aggression I could not say. However, in this connection I assumed that as chief of government of a neutral state he was not seeking any specific guarantee or assurance as to how we or other NATO countries would react militarily but rather sought a general indication of our reaction to an attack on Austria. /4/For documentation on the Vienna summit June 3-4, 1961, see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, volumes V and XIV. 4. Klaus hastened to say that his query was informal, that he would make no record of our conversation, that I was right in assuming he wanted to know our "political reaction rather than military reaction," and that he hoped our conversation would be held in strictest confidence. He said, however, that he would be grateful if we could give him some private indication that there would be a "serious political reaction in the United States if Austria were attacked." I replied I would hold the substance of our discussion in strictest confidence and would report it most confidentially to Dept. I personally felt that we would take a very grave view of any Soviet attack against Austria since, as contrasted with the cases of Hungary and Czechoslovakia, it would be an attack against a free and independent nation that was really a basic part of Western Europe even though it was militarily neutral. 5. Comment: I believe I have steered Klaus away from the idea that it would be either wise or prudent for him to try to obtain from us some specific assurance of how we would react to a Soviet attack on Austria since obviously we are not in a position to give any such assurances. However, I do recommend that I be authorized to inform Klaus that I reported his conversation to Washington which informed me in reply that USG would indeed take most serious and grave view of an attack on Austria, etc. Would appreciate Dept's comments Sept. 9 as Klaus indicated he would like another "informal" discussion about events in Central and Eastern Europe next week./5/ /5/In telegram 234682 to Vienna, September 7, the Department of State authorized MacArthur to tell Klaus that the United States had undertaken to respect Austrian independence in the State Treaty, which "remains fully valid today," and that the United States "would regard a Soviet attack against Austria as an extremely serious and grave threat to peace." (Department of State, Central Files, POL AUS-USSR) MacArthur relayed this message to Klaus on September 9. He reported on his meeting with the Chancellor in telegram 6459 from Vienna, September 9. (Ibid.) MacArthur
203. Telegram From the Embassy in Austria to the Department of State/1/ Vienna, September 10, 1968, 1640Z. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL AUS-USSR. Secret; Priority; Limdis. 6500. Subject: FonMin Waldheim's views on Czechoslovakia. Ref: State 234682 and Vienna 6459./2/ /2/See footnote 5, Document 202. 1. Saw FonMin Waldheim today and conveyed to him same comments as I gave Chancellor Klaus based on State 234682. 2. Waldheim expressed appreciation and said although some members of GOA had been extremely nervous recently about possibility of Soviet move against Romania, Yugoslavia and even Austria, he did not share view that Austria was threatened. While Soviets would unquestionably move against any member of Warsaw Pact that Soviets thought might try to detach itself from Moscow's orbit, Soviets recognize that Austria is free and independent state which, while militarily neutral, is integral part of democratic West. If Soviets moved against Austria, it would, in his judgment, only be if they were prepared for major war with Western powers, which he strongly doubted. He said in strict confidence that Austrian military had bad case of jitters and has been the source of reports that major move against other Eastern and Central European countries might take place during Sept. 7-9 or Sept. 15-16 (Vienna 6459). He said basis of these reports were rumors of sketchiest kind picked up by Austrian military, and in Cabinet meeting this morning he made clear he disagreed with them. In this connection he had also issued a press denial today qualifying as "absurd" a press report emanating from Austrian press agency that GOA was seriously worried that in event of Soviet attack against Yugoslavia, Soviets would request right of passage for Soviet troops through Austria. 3. Re Kuznetsov mission to Prague,/3/ Waldheim said Soviets obviously hope that this skilled negotiator can get Svoboda, Dubcek, Cernik, et al to do Soviet dirty work so that Soviets will not have to resort to further use of force. As GOA tentatively sees it, if Kuznetsov succeeds present Czech Government risks seriously alienating support of Czech people since Soviets obviously are very dissatisfied with GOC implementation of Moscow agreements and want Svoboda and Dubcek to impose full Soviet system on Czechoslovakia. Waldheim believes that present Czech leaders will remain and try to do Soviet bidding as long as they can save something for Czech people, but if they are pushed to the wall they may either resign or be removed and replaced by more pliant Soviet sympathizing Czechs, or Soviets may have to impose puppet regime maintained in place by Soviet bayonets. Waldheim thought imposition of puppet regime would be last resort for Soviets. /3/First Deputy Foreign Minister Vasiliy Kuznetsov visited Prague September 6-9. 4. Dept repeat as appropriate. MacArthur
204. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, October 21, 1968. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL EUR E-USSR. Secret. Drafted by Crump and approved in S on October 24. The meeting was held in Secretary Rusk's office. Waldheim was in the United States attending the U.N. General Assembly. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS Austrian His Excellency Dr. Kurt Waldheim, Federal Minister of Foreign Affairs United States Czechoslovakia Minister Waldheim emphasized that, contrary to the impression created by Austrian newspapers, there had not been a sense of panic among the Austrians and there had never been a fear of Soviet invasion, although there had been and still remains serious concern. He admitted that the Austrian military establishment had contributed to the sense of nervousness by its prediction of Soviet action against Austria. This fear had been based upon the large numbers of Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia,/2/ illegal over-flights over Austrian territory and a three-day period when Soviet leaders were not available to the Austrian Ambassador in Moscow. The current feeling is that the Soviets will not undertake direct action against Austria because to do so would bring on a direct confrontation with the West. It is difficult to see into the future but Austria expects no action by Warsaw Pact powers against Yugoslavia or Austria. /2/Soviet troops held maneuvers in Czechoslovakia June 19-30. The Secretary replied that in August we had considered the chances of an intervention in Czechoslovakia to be 51/49. We had the impression from the Soviet Ambassador and others that developments in Prague represented a fundamental threat to the Soviet Union and that possible Czech defection from the Communist Bloc had been raised. In addition, the Czechs themselves had raised questions regarding the fundamental governing position of the Communist Party. The question which now remains is the presence of Soviet forces near the Bavarian border. This is a problem for NATO and certain steps will be taken--these steps are a matter of prudence rather than steps arising from a fear of immediate attack. Possible Future Soviet Actions The Secretary outlined possible actions which might be taken by Warsaw Pact powers in a descending order of gravity. 1. Action against Berlin; this would clearly mean war. 2. At almost the same level, any Soviet move against Austria would surely involve a confrontation with the West. The U.S., France and Great Britain have an interest in Austrian independence arising from the State Treaty and if Austria were to call on the signatories of the Treaty to help her preserve her independence, this would surely precipitate a crisis. 3. Soviet action against Yugoslavia would produce a far more formidable crisis than Czechoslovakia. We cannot look calmly at Soviet actions aimed at the Adriatic area. The question arises whether Yugoslavia is still considered a member of the Socialist commonwealth. In this regard, the Secretary mentioned a press briefing recently at the Soviet Embassy which indicated that the Soviets do not consider Yugoslavia to be a member of the Socialist Bloc. 4. An attack on Romania would have different motivations because there is no question there of the monopoly of the Communist Party. The question regarding possible intervention in Romania was put directly to Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin who replied categorically that the Soviet Union is not planning action against that country./3/ While it is questionable what value should be given to that response, we do not see the threat of military action against Romania nor any of the other three areas at the present time. /3/See Document 167. This can obviously change very quickly. We are concerned about the recent Pravda article which apparently set forth a new doctrine of the "Socialist commonwealth."/4/ It may be that this is an explanation of the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia to those persons in the Soviet Union and elsewhere who require such an explanation. On the other hand, the Soviets may have indeed evolved this new theory which may be used to explain further military moves. /4/Reference is to the "Brezhnev Doctrine." See footnote 4, Document 23. In summary, we doubt the likelihood of further military moves at the present, although the situation remains one of utmost gravity. An attack against West Berlin, a NATO country or Austria would present an extremely grave situation; Soviet moves in other areas would be less serious but still grave. Western Responses Minister Waldheim said that it was of great importance to make clear to the Soviet Union that an act against a neutral European country would lead to counter-action. The Secretary replied that the NATO Ministerial meeting in mid-November will show a clear response on the part of NATO./5/ It is important that all Western countries move together and the days of a response by the U.S. alone are over. For example, during the 1961 Berlin crisis the U.S. added $6 billion to its defense budget, called up reserves and took actions which were not taken by any other NATO country. Similarly, we were alone in some actions following the Czechoslovak invasion. Europe cannot say that it is up to the U.S. alone to respond to Czechoslovakia. /5/The NAC Ministerial Meeting was held in Brussels November 15-16. For text of the NATO declaration, see Department of State Bulletin, December 9, 1968, pp. 595-597. The Secretary said he would hope that if the Austrians receive any information or indications of Soviet pressure, they would immediately inform the U.S., Great Britain and France so that we can make clear to the Soviet Union our reaction. In the case of Romania we had felt it necessary to make a public statement/6/ and to call in the Soviet Ambassador;/7/ we would need as much advance warning as possible if similar actions were to be undertaken regarding Austria. /6/Apparently a reference to President Johnson's August 30 address at San Antonio, Texas. For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968-69, Book II, pp. 917-920. /7/See Document 165. Soviet Internal Reaction The Secretary noted that the Soviets certainly could have predicted the disadvantages which would accrue from their intervention in Czechoslovakia--unfavorable publicity in Czechoslovakia, division among the Eastern Europeans, splits in Western Communist parties. They were willing to pay this price and this may indicate a willingness to move back to the cold war days in the Kremlin. Another explanation may lie in the fact that committee actions, such as are required within the present Soviet Government, make it difficult for an individual to oppose the majority view and this may have a bearing on future moves. It is clear that the Soviets have become afraid of peaceful co-existence. The Secretary added that the Soviet Government may now realize that its intervention in Czechoslovakia has developed badly and cannot survive without far reaching changes. The Soviets face problems with their youth and with minority national groups. They must continually deal with nostalgia in Eastern European countries for ties to the West. These factors have created a difficult situation and their awareness of the situation causes them to be nervous and afraid and they are therefore dangerous. Austrian Views Minister Waldheim responded that the Austrian judgment of the present situation is similar. However, while the Austrians see no danger in the immediate future, they are concerned about long-run developments, particularly in connection with hostilities in the Middle East. If war breaks out again in the Middle East the Soviets can be expected to make further moves in Eastern Europe. He agreed that it was necessary for the U.S. and Austria to keep in close touch regarding any increases in Soviet pressures against Austria. He said that he had been asked about guarantees of Austrian neutrality and had responded that the obligations in the State Treaty are sufficient for that purpose. It is clear to the Soviet Union that an action against Austria would bring on a new war and there is therefore no necessity for any further guarantee. [Continue with the next documents] Volume XVII Index | Foreign Relations Online | Historian's Office | |