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 | FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968 Volume XVII Eastern Europe Department of State |
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| Finland 205. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Finland/1/ Washington, May 15, 1964, 7:06 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12-5 FIN-SWE. Secret. Drafted by Barr; cleared in the Department of Defense, RPM, and G/PM; and approved by Knox. Also sent to Stockholm. 388. Joint State-Defense Message. Stockholm's 1398, info Helsinki 78./2/ Ref revives possibility that Finns might be interested in purchase Northrop F-5 or other US aircraft. Although F-5 not at level sophistication of Draken, it would for this reason reduce provocation problem and is less expensive. Existence F-5's in Norway also promises simplification of support function. Unless Embassy or USAIRA perceive objection, and bearing in mind caveat final 3 sentences, part 1, AIRA's C-31,/3/ request USAIRA's initial exploration with country representatives and assessment of merit DOD team visit to Helsinki or suggested alternate means approaching Finns for purpose making sales proposal on F-5 or other suitable US aircraft. Credit arrangements are possible. In light Embassy Helsinki's 520,/4/ Dept believes possibility purchase Drakens or F-5's may be wishful thinking on part Finn military, but want to do everything possible keep US aircraft alternatives under Finnish consideration. /2/Telegram 1398 from Stockholm, May 6, reported on upcoming Swedish-Finnish talks regarding aircraft. (Ibid.) /3/C-31, April 6, reported that Finland had decided to purchase the Draken aircraft with the U.S. Falcon missile system and that Finland intended to "take up problem of purchase on political level with U.S. authorities in near future." The sentences under reference read: "Source asked if possible to keep problem on confidential basis and to keep both Hughes Acft Co and Northrup Acft Co from obtaining info on purchases. He stated Finns concerned that Hughes representatives in Geneva or Stockholm will contact Swedes prior to time Finns make political approach to obtain U.S. clearance for purchase. Specifically source asked if possible to have Hughes contacts channeled through AIRA until this matter settled." (Ibid., DEF 12-5 FIN) /4/Telegram 520 from Helsinki, May 2, reported that the Finns were making "exploratory" inquiries regarding the purchase of U.S. aircraft. (Ibid., DEF 12-5 FIN-SWE) Rusk
206. Telegram From the Embassy in Finland to the Department of State/1/ Helsinki, May 21, 1964, 8 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12-5 FIN-SWE. Secret. Repeated to Stockholm. 555. Joint State-Defense Message. Your 388 received only May 20 due to servicing as missing./2/ AIRA sources have provided further information on Finnish interest in Drakens as follows: (1) Ministry of Defense had included 10 Drakens in preliminary 1965 budget estimates; (2) on this basis and on own initiative, Maj. Gen. Artola discussed purchase possibilities with Swedes, which precipitated contact with Hughes Aircraft concerning availability Falcon Missile System; (3) Artola's superiors considered this action premature, and Artola was told to take no further action; (4) subsequently, National Defense Council approved inclusion 10 Drakens in budget which will be before Parliament in September, this decision of course being contingent upon availability and acceptable terms, including credit element; (5) Lt. Gen. Maunula, when in Sweden beginning May 25 on return of Swedish Chief of Gen. Staff earlier visit to Finland, will visit Saab Plant and discuss Draken possibilities (confirms Stockholm's 1398);/3/ (6) if discussions with Swedes go well, Max Jakobson, Dir. Foreign Office Pol Dept., while in US later this year, possibly in August, will explore availability of Falcon system with US authorities; (7) while 1965 budgetary provision for Drakens not directly involved in 5-year (1966-70) military procurement proposal, rejection of this proposal might require replanning of which Drakens might conceivably be victim; (8) 5-year program now being vetted from standpoint of financial feasibility (this confirmed to me by Jakobson). /2/Document 205. /3/See footnote 2, Document 205. AIRA primary source states that 1965 budgetary provision for 10 Drakens to replace Gnats now has concurrence of highest Finnish political authority. Embassy satisfied with this information, but continues to doubt that this authority's concurrence in Finnish military's long-range objective of total replacement of Migs has been given or even sought. Our impression is that Finnish military considers acquisition of initial ten as opening wedge, with fulfillment of long-range objective being contingent upon performance Drakens and salutary political environment. An AIRA source also reports his colleagues concerned that, if Drakens with Falcon system denied them, they may be forced turn to improved Mig-21D. Embassy considers this an understandable fear in light ease of obtaining Soviet credit. In this connection, present Finnish procurement team now in Moscow (see Embassy telegram 531)/4/ has shopping list which includes ammunition, artillery, and other hardware but from which aircraft have been studiously excluded. Relatively small size of credit arising from sale to USSR of agricultural surpluses has made this exclusion not too difficult to accomplish. /4/Telegram 531, May 6, reported on the makeup of the Finnish negotiating team. (Department of State, Central Files, AGR 12-5 FIN) With regard Deptel 388 suggestion that DOD team visit Finland, Embassy firmly of the view that such a move would be unfortunate. Any determination to press for acceptance F-5s as alternative to Drakens should be pursued through more shaded avenues. Furthermore, given decided preference for Drakens on part Finns, believe it best to let Finns explore whether they can both have and afford them on own time schedule. We are convinced that pressure from us now would not be welcome. If Finns decide they can afford Drakens and US must make judgment as to whether Finns may have Falcon system, hope following considerations will be weighed: 1. While fact F-5 less sophisticated than Draken might make it less provocative sui generis, any US aircraft is a priori more provocative than one from Finland's neutral neighbor. 2. While the possibility of a full drive-out of Migs with the Drakens is a long-shot, it is at least that. It is much less conceivable that American aircraft would ever replace the Migs. 3. Drakens with the Falcon system would give both Sweden and the US a valuable hold on the Finnish military posture. Commitments which we both might extract as to security and utilization would give the Finns a useful bulwark against any Soviet pressure for Finnish-Soviet Air Force collaboration. 4. We have not had reason to date to question Finnish military security or faithfulness to commitments US. 5. A denial of the Falcon system would run the risk of interpretation as crude pressure to force acceptance of the F-5, and inflate the chances of the Mig-21D. If, as is quite possible, Finns find Drakens to be beyond their means, would hope US would then have attractive F-5 offer to make which would meet the Mig-21D competition. AIRA and [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] concur in these recommendations. Ingram
207. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Munitions Control (Margrave) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs (Kitchen)/1/ Washington, January 11, 1965. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12-5 FIN-SWE. Secret. SUBJECT On December 29, I received a copy of a memorandum from Bill Tyler to you on the above subject./2/ After expressing his strong support for meeting Finnish interest in Falcon-equipped Drakens, he asks several questions concerning the Falcon missile system which, as you know, is of U.S. origin. /2/A copy of the memorandum is ibid. I have now been able to obtain the following information which addresses points raised by Mr. Tyler on the equipment itself: (a) The Falcon missile system provided to the Swedish Government is a modified version of the U.S. Air Force air-to-air missile, the GAR-11. The modification as furnished, however, continues to provide a capability in excess of that of any known foreign system, including that provided to NATO. The classification of components is Secret and "Very Sensitive" Confidential. The Air Force advises, in addition, that further modification of the system is not technically feasible without negating the basic capability of the equipment. (b) Air Force intelligence advises, moreover, that the Soviet Union utilizes an air-to-air missile system which is inferior to that provided to the Swedes. Accordingly, compromise of this equipment would contribute to Soviet air defense state-of-the-art. Access to its componentry and technical data would, as well, provide the Soviets with the means for devising a system to counter current U.S. Air Force air-to-air missile capabilities. The Air Force conclusion that release of the Falcon missile to Finland would be harmful to U.S. interests is inter alia predicated on the fact that both the Swedish HM-55 and the U.S. GAR-11 contain advanced technology currently unique to Western equipment. Although the above solely seeks to address equipment sensitivity, necessarily, concern with respect to the Finnish security system has the most direct relevance in the premises. Should the Department consider it to be sufficiently worthwhile, I can arrange for the US-MICC to assess the capability of the Finnish security program to protect U.S.-origin classified equipment and information.
208. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Finland/1/ Washington, March 12, 1965, 12:13 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 FIN. Confidential. Drafted by Barr, approved in BNA, and cleared by Creel. Repeated to Oslo, Copenhagen, Stockholm, Moscow, and Paris for USRO. 284. Following based on uncleared memcon./2/ FYI. Noforn. During call on Secretary today Finnish Ambassador Munkki conveyed on "instructions highest authority" assurance Kekkonen Feb 24 speech/3/ did not indicate any change Finnish foreign policy. Munkki added following points: /2/A copy of the memorandum of conversation is ibid., POL 7 US/RUSK. /3/In his speech, Kekkonen stated that the proposed NATO Multilateral Force (MLF) would endanger peace, and expressed Finnish concern about the plan. 1. Shortness of time precluded Kekkonen elaborating on remarks. Concentrated form thus allows some people read things into speech which not there. 2. Kekkonen did not intend go beyond Swedish and Norwegian position on MLF. All Scandinavians anxious about any innovation that increases tension. 3. Kekkonen had to note that, without regard intrinsic aspects MLF, Soviets attacked plan on two occasions (presumably Mikoyan speeches in Helsinki and Moscow) strongly indicating establishment MLF would increase tensions. 4. Absolutely no connection between Kekkonen speech and FCP-CPSU meeting Moscow. FCP has no influence over GOF policy. Secretary replied we know beyond doubt that MLF cannot lead to nuclear proliferation or placement nuclear weapons under German national control. If this is genuine Soviet fear it will prove groundless and we will help explain this to USSR when details MLF worked out. If real Soviet objection is to MLF as move binding NATO powers more closely together, we unable to be of help. Secretary continued that MLF, like other NATO measures and unlike Warsaw Pact military measures, has been subject free and open discussion. Referred to stationing Soviet missiles in Warsaw Pact countries as possible Soviet version MLF which accomplished in secrecy and without open discussion. Rusk
209. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State/1/ Helsinki, June 1, 1966, 2248Z./2/ /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, ORG 7 S. Secret. Repeated to Copenhagen, Moscow, Olso, Reykjavik, and Stockholm. /2/Beginning in spring of 1965, the dates and transmission times of all incoming Department of State telegrams were in six-figure date-time-groups. The "Z" refers to Greenwich mean time. Secto 11. 1. At Secretary's meeting with President Kekkonen June 1 President stated emphatically that there would be no change in Finnish foreign policy as result elections and formation new government. He added that election results had surprised victors and defeated alike and suggested that regardless of exaggerated promises made by Social Democrats in course of election campaign no substantial change in prospect with respect economic and social policies since resources simply not available for expansion of social expenditures. He mentioned in this connection continuing Finnish balance of payments problem. 2. Secretary told President that in conversations with Prime Minister Paasio and FonMin Karjalainen he had stressed President Johnson's concern with need for expanded world food production by all countries in effort meet growing world needs. He had also discussed our concern with success of Kennedy Round. In this connection Secretary pointed out that unless there is some progress by February it will be very difficult to obtain Congressional approval for extension of Trade Expansion Act. Secretary said we had been working hard with EEC countries who were key to problem. Unless we are able to take step forward we are in danger of going backward. President Kennedy had made far reaching decision in seeking and obtaining legislative authority represented by Trade Expansion Act. Congressional disillusionment and rising protectionist sentiment could produce reaction none of us wants. Kekkonen, while expressing general agreement with importance of progress of Kennedy Round negotiations remarked that six months is a short period in which to achieve results. Secretary replied that the EEC countries have been marking time for the past four years. 3. The Secretary asked for Kekkonen's comments on the new leadership in the Sov Union. Kekkonen replied that he had had a warm personal relationship with Khrushchev but noted, approvingly, that the new Sov leaders appeared disposed to follow a calm, practical and unsentimental foreign policy. He said that Viet Nam and Germany are two preoccupations of the Sov leaders. So far as Viet Nam is concerned the Sov Union may be not unpleased with current United States involvement but concerned that it might expand and involve them. He thought that Sov concern about Germany is somewhat less acute now that the prospect of MLF seems to have receded. 4. The Secretary in discussing Viet Nam reviewed our efforts to persuade the other side to come to the conference table and the efforts which we have made to this end with Moscow, Hanoi and Peking and in virtually all world capitals. He also referred to the lack of positive response to our two bombing pauses. We are still ready to negotiate but at the same time we remain faithful to our commitments and will not be pushed out of Southeast Asia. If the aggressor rejects peace we are prepared to do what is required. 5. The Secretary suggested that in his opinion a sound position for a non-aligned or neutral country to adopt is support for a settlement on the basis of the 1954 and 1962 agreements/3/ and for differences regarding these agreements to be resolved peacefully rather than by force. /3/Reference is to the July 1954 Geneva Accords and the Declaration and Protocol on the Neutrality of Laos, signed at Geneva on July 23, 1962. 6. Kekkonen said Finland has been in close touch with the other Scandinavian countries and is mindful that there may come a time when some initiative will be helpful in promoting a settlement of the Viet Nam problem. He indicated that in his view that time has not yet come. 7. Amb Llewellyn Thompson referred to the recent purges in Communist China and asked whether the Finnish Ambassador in Peking had submitted an analysis of the significance of these developments. Kekkonen replied that there had been no detailed report from the Finnish Ambassador as yet. He added that the Ambassador, who is a particularly able observer, believes the Sino-Sov dispute has now passed the point of no return. In this connection he noted that in his previous discussions with the Soviet leaders they had avoided commenting on the Sov differences with Communist China. On his last visit to Moscow, however, Brezhnev, in response to his question, said that Sino-Soviet government relations were bad and party relations broken. Kekkonen told the Secretary that Kosygin will be visiting Finland from June 13 until June 18. Rusk
210. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, July 12, 1966, 4:30 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL FIN-US. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Titus. The meeting was held in Stoessel's office. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS Olavi Munkki, Ambassador of Finland Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., Acting Assistant Secretary, EUR Ambassador Munkki reported that, from the Finnish point of view, the Secretary's recent trip to Finland (May 31-June 2) was a complete success. The discussions between the Secretary and President Kekkonen, as well as members of the newly formed coalition government, were useful and friendly even if the principals did not agree in detail on everything. The Ambassador did not dwell on the Kosygin visit to Finland (June 13-18) since Foreign Minister Karjalainen reported fully on the visit to Ambassador Tyler Thompson on June 27./2/ When Mr. Stoessel noted that the cancellation of Kosygin's visit to Sweden and Polyansky's early return to Moscow from Ottawa apparently was caused by the need to deal with the continuing Warsaw Pact problems and the early August session of the Supreme Soviet, the Ambassador observed that Polyansky was, in his opinion, a "coming man." He expressed surprise that Kosygin dealt with unusual frankness with the Peking-Moscow rift during his press conference in Helsinki, when he admitted that relations were very bad and that party relations were non-existent. /2/Reported in telegram 489 from Helsinki, June 27. (Ibid., POL 7 USSR) In reply to Mr. Stoessel's question about the real significance of the Kosygin visit to Finland, Mr. Munkki described it simply as a confirmation of the amicable relations which have characterized the recent relations of the two countries. Ambassador Munkki put the best possible light on the participation of Communists in the Finnish Government for the first time since 1948. As he had predicted just before leaving Washington on May 25 (government formed May 27) the three Communist-front SKDL members received non-critical positions in the Finance, Social Affairs, and Transport and Public Works Ministries. They thus will have to deal with such unpleasant problems as civil service wage policy and with price administration. The representation of the SKDL in the Cabinet also gives added security of tenure to a government which will have to undertake some unpopular measures. Mr. Stoessel noted that President Kekkonen had visited Norway shortly after the Kosygin visit, but the Ambassador offered no further information than that it was a successful fishing trip. Replying to the Ambassador's inquiry about the Brussels Ministerial Meeting, Mr. Stoessel reviewed briefly the decisions taken at this meeting. He noted the continuing interest here, as well as among our NATO partners, in increased contacts with Eastern Europe. He confirmed that the idea of a European Security Conference, such as the Danes had suggested, had been rejected by the other NATO members as premature and that apparently De Gaulle had reacted coolly to a similar proposal made during his visit to Moscow. Ambassador Munkki agreed that such a conference would not be fruitful in the absence of more concrete advance plans to solve the present division of Europe. In his opinion, matters would improve if the West German Social Democrats got a larger voice in Bonn. He added that President Kekkonen and Foreign Minister Karjalainen were very unhappy over West German Defense Minister Von Hassel's recent comment that the Finnish-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance (1948)/3/ was only an amicable agreement without obligations. /3/For text, see 48 UNTS 149. The Ambassador said that there is much pessimism in Finland over the prospects for the Kennedy Round, particularly over the intransigence of the Six. For Finland, he said, the big question is paper and pulp. Finland, of course, accepts the principles of the Kennedy Round but feels that it must have some of its own interests recognized, at least in matters affecting pulp and paper. Mr. Munkki noted, perhaps prematurely, he said, that Finnair President Korhonen will be negotiating with Douglas Aircraft Co. for the purchase of two of the "stretched" DC-8's, with an option for a third, costing about $20 million altogether. If the sale can be arranged the first plane would be delivered in 1968 and the second in 1969. Unfortunately, the news of Finnair's interest in the DC-8 leaked to the press and the British already have started their sales offensive for the Super VC-10. This will make for a touchy situation for, although Finnair prefers the enlarged DC-8, the British are willing to use Finland's export surplus with Britain as a lever to develop sales of the VC-10.
211. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, November 29, 1968, noon. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL FIN-US. Confidential. Drafted by Klebenov. The meeting was held in Leddy's office. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS Ambassador of Finland, Olavi Munkki Assistant Secretary John M. Leddy Ambassador Munkki said that he had requested the meeting because he planned to leave Washington for a vacation in the Caribbean and Finland, and would be away until the first of the year. The Ambassador said that he had conveyed his Government's views on European economic integration to Deputy Assistant Secretary Greenwald during his November 12 meeting./2/ Turning to the recent EFTA Ministerial Meeting,/3/ the Ambassador said that Finland was ready to discuss a relationship between EFTA and the EC, but that the Finnish Government wanted to make clear its view that any agreement reached must be in accord with the GATT. The Ambassador said that his Government did not find the French proposal interesting, particularly as it did not include paper. The Ambassador summarized the Finnish attitude as cooperative but reserved. He noted that the Swiss appeared to be the most eager on this matter. /2/No memorandum of conversation was found. /3/The meeting was held in Vienna November 21-22. The Ambassador said that, after the Brussels NATO Ministerial Meeting,/4/ there had been a considerable amount of concern in Finland because of press speculation that had placed Finland in the "grey area." The Ambassador noted that the Moscow press was now writing on this topic. Mr. Leddy told the Ambassador that all of the NATO governments are aware of Finland's sensitivities in this regard. He agreed that the press speculation, both here and in Europe, had been less than helpful. He noted that the Bonn release had also proven detrimental. The USSR, he observed, was particularly sensitive to this sort of statement. Mr. Leddy stressed that great care had been taken in the drafting of the NATO communiqué to avoid the sort of misinterpretation in which some sectors of the press were now indulging. /4/The NAC Ministerial Meeting was held November 15-16. For text of the NATO declaration, see Department of State Bulletin, December 9, 1968, pp. 595-597. Ambassador Munkki said that he wished to express his appreciation for the assurances given his Embassy by EUR/SCAN to the effect that, newspaper speculation to the contrary, there was little cause for Finland's fear that it had been placed in the "grey area" at the Brussels NATO meeting. Notwithstanding such formal assurances, the Ambassador said that Foreign Minister Karjalainen had asked if he could have a transcript or summary of the Secretary's address in Brussels. Mr. Leddy told the Ambassador that he did not think it would be possible to provide the Foreign Minister with a text of the Secretary's NATO address. He said that he would, however, discuss the matter with the Secretary and, if the latter agreed, give Ambassador Munkki an oral statement that might be helpful to him. The Ambassador then raised the matter of the interview given by Herman Kahn on French television, in which Mr. Kahn, President of the Hudson Institute, stated that the United States had withdrawn its protection from Finland and had, in effect, dropped Finland off the map. The Ambassador asked what, if any, were Mr. Kahn's connections with the State Department. Mr. Leddy said that he would attempt to get the text of Mr. Kahn's remarks and that, subsequently, he might be able to comment on this matter. Ambassador Munkki next informed Mr. Leddy that the Non-Proliferation Treaty is now before the Finnish Parliament. Approval, he said, is expected before Christmas. Mr. Leddy, in reply to the Ambassador's question about U.S. ratification, said that he did not know if there would be a special session of the Senate. The treaty would, he said, be the Senate's first order of business when it did convene./5/ Both the President-elect and the Senate leadership place high importance on the treaty. There was no doubt but that the treaty would be approved by a large majority. The Soviet Union will not, he said, move on this matter until the United States acts. Mr. Leddy explained that, while there was very little debate involved in Soviet approval, the USSR appears to like to maintain a sort of parity in such matters, as they did when they matched our delay in ratifying the consular convention. /5/The Senate approved the treaty on March 13, 1969. For text, see 21 UST 483. In reply to the Ambassador's question about the Balkan situation, Mr. Leddy said that we had no information at present that would lead us to anticipate any new developments in this area. Mr. Leddy said that the Yugoslavians are still quite concerned. Mr. Leddy noted that the recent Bucharest meeting of the Warsaw Pact and the reported Romanian agreement to allow maneuvers in their country next year may have served to satisfy the USSR. Mr. Leddy, in reply to a question from the Ambassador, said that the recent Dobrynin protest to Mr. Katzenbach, concerning NATO and the Mediterranean, was not surprising./6/ The protest consisted of the usual Russian arguments; i.e., why does the U.S. maintain a fleet far from home in the Mediterranean, etc. We do not, Mr. Leddy noted, attach too much importance to such protests. /6/Documentation regarding the Soviet protest is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume XIV. The Ambassador noted that Dobrynin appears ready to return home. He had, the Ambassador said, asked the Finns about shipping facilities for household goods. As the meeting ended, Mr. Leddy said that we would be communicating with the Ambassador during the coming week concerning the Foreign Minister's request for a copy of the Secretary's NATO address and the Herman Kahn interview./7/ /7/The pertinent passage of the Kahn interview (taped in New York by BBC and the French Television Service, ORTF) was obtained December 3 and passed to the Ambassador. In addition, Amembassy Helsinki was instructed to tell the Foreign Office that Mr. Kahn is not an official of this Government and that his occasional service as a DOD consult-ant does not mean that his views reflect American military policy thinking. A partial text of the Kahn interview is attached. [Footnote in the source text. The text is not printed. In his interview Kahn stated: "For example, if the Russians attacked Finland, I would be surprised if the Americans intervened. We have crossed the country off the map."] [end of document] Volume XVII Index | Foreign Relations Online | Historian's Office | |