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 | FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968 Volume XVII Eastern Europe Department of State |
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| From July through September 1967, President Johnson and President Tito exchanged a series of letters concerning the crisis in the Middle East. The exchange was initiated by President Tito at a July 27 meeting with Chief Justice Earl Warren at which he gave Warren a message for the President. Tito's approach was prompted by the June "Six-Day War" between Israel and a coalition of Arab states. The Tito-Johnson correspondence concerned the possible terms of a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Copies of the correspondence are in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Heads of State Correspondence, Yugoslavia. Other documentation relating to the Yugoslav initiative is ibid., Country File, Yugoslavia, Memos, Vol. 2.; ibid., NSC Histories, Middle East Crisis; Department of State, Central Files, POL 17 YUGO-US; and ibid., Yugoslav Desk Files; Lot 78 D 198, Per 4.
185. Telegram From the Embassy in Yugoslavia to the Department of State/1/ Belgrade, July 15, 1967, 1144Z. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL US-YUGO. Confidential. Repeated to Zagreb. 146. 1. During meeting with FonMin Nikezic yesterday, I raised question of our bilateral relations. In much the same vein as conversation with Amb Crnobrnja day before (Belgrade's 140)/2/ I referred to atmosphere of mistrust and apprehension which seemed to permeate Yugoslav officialdom and press and increasing tendency to regard USG as deus ex machina responsible for world events which seem to have raised so much alarm here. USG had shown in many ways its desire to maintain good relations with Yugoslavia and I was constantly being assured here that GOY was similarly interested in good relations. Repetition of charges re "US aggression" and "US imperialism" in official utterances and press, however, could hardly advance this objective. I pointed to history of US-Yugoslav relations since 1948 which should have convinced Yugoslavs of sincerity of our intentions. US public cannot fail to be aware of present Yugoslav attitude toward US and this in turn could affect whole scale of our relations. /2/Dated July 14. (Ibid.) 2. Nicezic said that many factors were involved in formulation of public and official opinion which in turn affect conduct of foreign policy. He was fully aware of points I had made and said FonOff frequently found itself in position of trying to moderate government's views in much the same way as State Dept is required to do from time to time. Recent events in world, culminating in Greek coup d'etat and ME crisis had alarmed many people in Yugoslavia, however, and caused conclusions to be drawn which may or may not be fully justified. He spoke about Greece particularly, noting that new Greek Govt is noisily anti-Communist and has indulged in various actions which would not indicate any desire to maintain good relations with Yugoslavia. GOY on other hand wished to maintain good relations with all neighboring states. It is assumed here therefore that for reasons intimately connected with its effort to remain in power Greek Govt deliberately fosters illusion of threat from Communist neighbors. Over and above this there is some reason to suspect that Greece might have designs on Albania which, of course, would be of vital interest to Yugoslavia. I tried to dissuade him from this line of thinking, observing that preoccupation with internal affairs should make it obvious that Greece is in no position or mood to carry out foolhardy military adventures. 3. Nikezic was very affable and frank throughout our conversation. He said present atmosphere which I had commented on and which he also deplored as affecting adversely relations with the US would doubtless begin to be dispelled with settlement of Middle Eastern problem. He expressed an interest in seeing me again before I leave for Washington and before he departs on a month's holiday. Elbrick
186. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, September 27, 1967, 3 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 17 YUGO-US. Confidential. Drafted by Wilson and approved in S/AH on October 5. The meeting was held in Harriman's office. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS Foreign United States Ambassador Crnobrnja's call on Governor Harriman was an initial courtesy call made at Ambassador Crnobrnja's request. Governor Harriman welcomed Ambassador Crnobrnja and recalled his friendly and fruitful association with President Tito which had begun during the Second World War. The Governor next discussed his previous meeting with Ambassador Crnobrnja which had taken place in 1965 when Governor Harriman visited Tito at Brioni and Ambassador Crnobrnja was Secretary General to Tito./2/ /2/A memorandum of conversation of their July 28, 1965, meeting was sent to the Department of State as an attachment to airgram A-05 from Belgrade, July 30, 1965. (Ibid., POL 7 US/HARRIMAN) The discussion centered on the Vietnam war. Governor Harriman then expressed appreciation of Yugoslavia's initiative and effort directed at encouraging movement toward a Near East settlement./3/ /3/See Document 184. The Governor then commented on the very significant role Yugoslavia had played in shaping the course of relations between countries in the Socialist Camp. In this connection, Governor Harriman regarded the terms under which Yugoslavia reentered into normal relations with the USSR in 1956 as equally significant politically as Tito's break with Stalin in 1948. Governor Harriman expanded on this by saying that the terms of Yugoslavia's reentry into normal relations with the USSR were Yugoslavia's terms of independence--political, military, economic and ideologic, and that the pattern of these has increasingly set the pattern for relations desired by other Eastern European countries with the USSR. Ambassador Crnobrnja was obviously pleased to hear this. He then asked the Governor's opinion regarding the thesis being put forward in some quarters that, as US-USSR relations develop favorably, US interest in Yugoslavia declines. The Governor answered that this thesis was wrong. He said that favorable development of US-Soviet relations increased opportunities for better relations between the US and Yugoslavia as well as between the US and other Eastern European countries. Governor Harriman explained that Yugoslavia, as a member of the Socialist Camp, was more or less obliged to side with the USSR when major issues arose between the US and the USSR. The Governor continued that, in such instances, US-Yugoslav relations could suffer setbacks. Ambassador Crnobrnja immediately protested that, on issues between the US and the USSR, Yugoslavia had been entirely free and would remain entirely independent in making up its mind. Ambassador Crnobrnja went on to say that President Tito had stressed the hope to him just before his departure for Washington that the US and the USSR would always appreciate the extraordinary responsibilities they shared regarding the vastly destructive weapons in their hands. The Governor answered that this was very much the case and that Glassboro and the NPT were evidences of mutual US-USSR concern in this regard./4/ The Governor added that he doubted the Russians would again want to face a showdown of the sort they brought upon themselves by their Cuban gamble. /4/For documentation on the Johnson-Kosygin summit meeting at Glassboro, New Jersey, June 22 and 24, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume XIV. When the conversation turned to Viet-Nam, Governor Harriman emphasized the very large turnout for the recent elections in South Viet-Nam./5/ He also expressed the hope that Yugoslavia would use its best offices to encourage meaningful negotiations directed at ending the conflict. /5/September 4. When the subject of Yugoslav-FRG relations arose, Ambassador Crnobrnja said that the door was open unconditionally on the Yugoslav side for resumption of diplomatic relations. Ambassador Crnobrnja indicated that there had been some talks on this subject and that the ball was in Bonn's court. At the close, Governor Harriman said that, although he did not have any day to day operating responsibility connected with US-Yugoslav relations, he would always be ready to receive Ambassador Crnobrnja should matters arise on which he might be interested. Before saying good-bye, the Governor showed Ambassador Crnobrnja some photographs in his office which had been taken with President Tito and Madame Broz on Vanga.
187. Telegram From the Embassy in Yugoslavia to the Department of State/1/ Belgrade, December 29, 1967, 1605Z. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 17 YUGO-US. Confidential. 1843. Ref State 89175./2/ For the Secretary. Subject: Call of Yugoslav Ambassador Crnobrnja. /2/Telegram 89175, December 23, reported on talks between Secretary Rusk and Yugoslav Ambassador Crnobrnja aimed at improving U.S.-Yugoslav relations. (Ibid.) 1. It would appear from uncleared memcon covering your talk with Ambassador Crnobrnja on December 22 that latter attempted to place onus on US for stagnation of our bilateral relations in 1967. It is true that certain developments have caused Yugoslavs to sense in recent US policy a growing disinterest in Yugoslavia. Nevertheless, Crnobrnja must recognize that maintenance of good relations is not unilateral proposition and that course of our relations in year just ending cannot be disassociated from exceedingly hostile attitude toward USG and distorted picture of its actions and objectives which GOY, Party and press have presented on virtually every international issue involving vital US interests most particularly Viet-Nam, on which they have maintained well-orchestrated anti-US campaign. Tito himself used word "genocide" in describing US activities there. Good faith and integrity of US and President Johnson personally seeking peaceful and honorable solution in Viet-Nam are frequently questioned. Hostile, anti-US posture referred to above cannot help but be officially inspired or at least sanctioned and I have on various occasions stressed to Yugoslav officials the harmful effect of this to friendly public attitude on our bilateral relations and its incompatibility with their frequently expressed desire for better relations with US. 2. Given our long-range objectives, US administration has (rightly in my view) maintained steadfast course toward Yugoslavia despite differing views on international issues. Fact of matter, however, is that Yugoslavia's antagonistic posture toward US policies and activities abroad has not gone unnoticed in Congress. Congressional concern with Viet-Nam, as well as Cuba, has inevitably affected Yugoslavia which does conduct a small degree of trade with Cuba and which is (to the best of our knowledge) sending only plasma and medical supplies and equipment to the North Vietnamese and, through latter, to Viet Cong. 3. Despite critical attitude and suspicions of GOY toward our policies and actions abroad, our bilateral relations have remained remarkably stable and demonstrated a good deal of forbearance on our part. During this year, for example, we have renegotiated a three-year cotton-textile agreement,/3/ extended a 40 million dollar CCC line of credit for importation of wheat and cotton, concluded an agreement on agricultural research projects,/4/ maintained exchanges on both governmental and private levels, initiated an exchange of correspondence between two Chiefs of State,/5/ and arranged visits by Chief Justice Warren, Governor Harriman and Asst. Secy Leddy. /3/For text of this agreement, concluded with an exchange of notes at Belgrade on September 26, 1967, and entered into force on January 1, 1968, see 18 UST 2827. /4/Not further identified. /5/See Document 184. 4. For the immediate future, I believe that the most promising areas for an expansion and enrichment of our relations lie in fields of commercial activities, including private investment in Yugoslavia, and increased scientific, technical and cultural exchanges. We have already made effort to advance our commercial relations by exchange of trade delegations and it would be useful not [now?] to investigate possibilities of US private investment here as well as industrial cooperation between US and Yugoslavia business enterprises. At same time, I have advised appropriate Yugoslav officials that the attraction of American buyers and investors to Yugoslavia is responsibility of Yugoslavs themselves and they cannot depend on others to do their selling job for them. 5. I note that you may be seeing Crnobrnja again early in the new year./6/ These observations are submitted in the thought that you might find them useful at such time as you may resume discussion of our bilateral relations. /6/Rusk met Crnobrnja on January 5, 1968, for a discussion of Southeast Asia. The meeting was reported in telegram 94524 to Belgrade, January 6 (Department of State, Central Files, POL 17 YUGO-US) Elbrick
188. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, May 6, 1968. /1/Source; Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Yugoslavia, Cables. No classification marking. SUBJECT At Tab A/2/ is Nick Katzenbach's memo recommending that you determine it is in the national interest for the Export-Import Bank to extend credits, guarantees, and insurance for U.S. exports to Yugoslavia. If you make this finding, you should also sign the attached draft letters notifying the Congress./2/ /2/Not printed. Harold Linder concurs in this recommendation. You have already made this determination for Yugoslavia for Export-Import Bank guarantees. This determination has been required since 1964 under the Foreign Aid and Related Agencies Appropriation Act. Since that time, the Export-Import Bank has extended guarantees on $66 million of U.S. exports to Yugoslavia. A new determination is now needed because of the Tower-Hickenlooper amendment to the Export-Import Act of 1968. This amendment prohibits Export-Import Bank participation in transactions involving communist countries unless the President determines it is in the national interest. Under the Tower-Hickenlooper amendment, your finding in favor of Yugoslavia would permit the Export-Import Bank to extend credits as well as guarantees. Under the Appropriations Act only guarantees are permitted. The legal question of which act takes precedence is open. If you make the national determination in favor of Yugoslavia, the Export-Import Bank would consult with the House Appropriations Committee before making a loan (rather than guaranteeing a loan) under the broader provisions of the Tower-Hickenlooper amendment. Katzenbach has concluded that the Fino amendment--which prohibits Export-Import Bank financing on transactions with any country whose government supplies goods or services to North Vietnam--is not applicable to Yugoslavia. This conclusion is supported by the legislative history. Fino said on the House floor that his amendment would not affect Yugoslavia. Katzenbach's memo reviews the arguments for continuing Export-Import Bank financing for Yugoslavia. In brief, it is good foreign policy and good business. Bill Macomber said that he does not expect any significant fuss on the Hill. Neither does Linder. I concur in the recommendation. Walt If you approve, you should sign the attached letter of notification to the Congress/3/ /3/This option is checked. A copy of the letter is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Yugoslavia, Cables.
189. Information Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Springsteen) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/ Washington, June 11, 1968. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Yugoslavia, Cables. Confidential. Drafted by Beaudry and Wilson and cleared by Grossman. SUBJECT Ambassador Crnobrnja called on John Leddy June 6 and raised two subjects related to US-Yugoslav relations: The Ambassador is still unhappy about the fact that Governor Reagan proclaimed April 10 as "Croatian Independence Day." After the Ambassador first raised this with you, Win Brown wrote to Reagan pointing out the unfortunate connotation of April 10 which was the anniversary of the establishment of the Nazi puppet state in Croatia. We have not heard from Governor Reagan but we told Crnobrnja that we had information to the effect that Americans of Yugoslav origin in California have been making their displeasure at this action known to the Governor. The Ambassador also raised the question of issuing a U.S. visa to former King Peter of Yugoslavia. He complained that Peter makes unfortunate political statements about Yugoslavia whenever he visits this country. Crnobrnja asked that we not issue Peter another visa. We have looked into this visa question. While there is no reason for us to deny a visa to former King Peter, he has on occasion disregarded our admonition to avoid political statements while in the United States as a temporary visitor for pleasure. Although some of his statements have caused us embarrassment in our relations with Yugoslavia, they have on the whole been relatively moderate. Further we have no evidence that Peter is planning a trip at this time. The Yugoslav Ambassador explained his approach on both of these subjects as stemming from a desire to improve U.S./Yugoslav relations and requested that we bring these points to your attention and also to the President's attention./2/ /2/A copy of this memorandum was sent to the White House. An annotation on the covering memorandum from Benjamin Read of the Executive Secretariat to Rostow, attached to the source text, reads: "No action required. File. N Davis, 2/14/68 [sic]".
190. Telegram From the Embassy in Yugoslavia to the Department of State/1/ Belgrade, August 14, 1968, 1050Z. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 YUGO. Confidential. Repeated to Prague, Bucharest, Budapest, Moscow, Sofia, Warsaw, Berlin, USNATO, and Zagreb. 3998. Subject: Acting FonSec comments on Tito visit to Prague. 1. In my call yesterday on Acting State Secretary for Foreign Affairs Pavicevic I asked for his assessment of Tito's visit to Prague. Pavicevic said it was too early to provide any details because delegation was still on Brioni (he had talked to them only by telephone) and FonOff members were so preoccupied with writing reports that he had not had any opportunity to talk with them. 2. Following is substance of Pavicevic's ensuing remarks: A. Prague meeting: In general, Yugoslav delegation satisfied with visit considering it a success despite fact it was a "working" visit of Party delegation. Popular demonstrations of goodwill toward Yugoslav delegation were enormous. Visit represented culmination Yugoslav efforts to assist Czechoslovakia. Yugoslav position at Prague was extremely delicate, primarily because one of purposes of visit was to assist Czechs whose position vis-à-vis Moscow also was most delicate. Yugoslavs were at great pains to do nothing or say nothing at Prague that could provide even slightest pretext for direct intervention on part of Soviets or complicate Dubcek's life any more than it now is. Visit originally had been planned to take place under different circumstances; thus, visit had different scope and purpose; even so it was useful. Yugoslavs and Czechs both pleased. B. Bilateral relations: Yugoslav-Czechoslovak bilateral relations will be strengthened, mostly in economic field, but there will be nothing spectacular. Many indiscreet questions put to Tito at his Saturday night press conference, among them being one inquiring about possibility of military pact between Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia is not interested in any such arrangements, its past experience in this field having been "very bad." C. Czech problems: Main Czech task now is to move along with implementation of reforms and party program in preparation for Party Congress next month. They must have time to do this; this is dependent upon internal strength of Party leadership and its willingness to face up to serious problems. We should not expect too much from Czechs at first, especially, we should have no illusions about their capacity for achievement in foreign policy field. Change will come but it will have to be slow. Even now as Ulbricht is in Czechoslovakia, Soviet troops are maneuvering along frontier. These maneuvers do not stem from any threat to peace in Western Europe or from heating up of US-USSR relations but rather are directly related to developments in Czechoslovakia. D. Cierna and Bratislava: Czechs were firm at Cierna and no concessions were made to "Five." No secret agreements were made and no secret documents involved. Soviets after Warsaw meeting needed way out of dead-end street and Czechs needed respite to continue along path of reform. Soviets are to be congratulated for way they worked things out; Czechs are to be congratulated because they have won right to continue along path of internal reform. They have also won recognition again of validity of principle regarding independence, sovereignty, and non-interference in internal affairs as cornerstone of relations between socialist states. Bratislava Declaration/2/ is "all-sided" which can be cited to prove almost any point of view. Thus, Czechs must be extremely careful in way they proceed along path of reform. Yugoslavs are happy worst is over and military clash averted. Realistically, we must expect differences to crop up from time to time between Prague and "Five" but this is becoming only normal in relations within socialist world. Main point is how these differences are solved. /2/For text of the Bratislava Declaration issued on August 4 after a meeting of Soviet, Czech, and Eastern European Communist leaders, see Remington, Winter in Prague, pp. 256-261. For extracts, see Department of State Bulletin, September 9, 1968, p. 264. E. Soviet change of tactics at Cierna: I asked Pavicevic why Yugoslavs thought Soviets had suddenly appeared to change their tactics when at one point they seemed bent on military intervention. Pavicevic smilingly observed that perhaps I ought to ask Soviet Ambassador who was scheduled to call on him immediately after me, "but then I am afraid you would not get an answer." He said he thought Soviets were [garble--finally?] convinced that to intervene directly would: (1) cause disruption of relative detente in Europe; (2) deprive them of support of major parties in international Communist movement all of whom vehemently opposed Soviet intervention; (3) have a disastrous effect on upcoming Moscow Conference of ComParties when already several parties, including Yugoslavia, had indicated they would not participate; (4) be a serious setback to Soviet prestige among the non-aligned countries; and (5) set back currently improving US-Soviet relations. Pavicevic observed that all key foreign CP's (i.e., all those except Warsaw "Five") were opposed to intervention and that for first time in international Communist world USSR was "isolated"; its only support came from parties (e.g. West German, one of Greek splinters, etc.) with no power or influence. Nevertheless, Soviets made great contribution in finding way out of direct clash. F. US policy in Czech crisis: Pavicevic said it was Yugoslav assessment that US policy had been correct one. He said it was very wise to avoid any action which could be used by USSR as pretext for intervention. FRG was wise also to cancel its maneuvers. Even when there were no provocative acts there were difficulties. Look at discovery of arms cache. "Now who do you suppose put those arms there?", Pavicevic asked rhetorically. 3. Towards close of conversation I noted that at his press conference Tito was asked how he would describe his reaction to Prague talks, "satisfied" or "very satisfied."/3/ Was there any nuance in that reply? Pavicevic said that he was "very satisfied." He implied that part of Yugoslav problem in making public statements on Tito visit to Prague was to avoid provocation to Soviet side. /3/Tito held his press conference on August 11. 4. There is no doubt that Yugoslav delegation during visit to Prague was aware of supreme delicacy of its mission. It was extremely careful apparently not to cause trouble for Dubcek internally or to further complicate his relations with "Five." While full-scale press and TV coverage of tumultuous welcome accorded Yugoslav delegation had salubrious effect at home, Tito both at airport in Prague and on arrival in Zagreb was careful not appear to be returning home in triumph. This accounts for rather low key comment at both places that "we think we have done useful job." Elbrick
191. Telegram From the Embassy in Yugoslavia to the Department of State/1/ Belgrade, August 23, 1968, 1225Z. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-1 COMBLOC-CZECH. Confidential; Priority. 4089. 1. My meeting with Tito this morning lasted one hour. During course of conversation he reviewed Yugoslav position with respect to Czechoslovakia and repeated firm support for objectives Dubcek government. He was frank in denouncing Soviet armed intervention, describing it as complete surprise to GOY, and deplored Soviet disregard of basic principles which should govern relations between states, saying Soviet prestige throughout world had suffered a grievous setback. Yugoslavia, he said, would continue to try to maintain normal relations with Warsaw Pact group but he was emphatic in stating Yugoslavia would firmly adhere to principles already publicly expressed. He asked my opinion of present state of Yugoslav-American relations and seemed satisfied with my answer. He did not pursue this point of suggesting material or moral support though I have impression this may come later. He volunteered to receive me at any time if my government should require any information or clarification of Yugoslav position and implied hope that I would be available if Yugoslav Govt had any suggestions to make. Full report of conversation being cabled./2/ /2/Telegram 4093 from Belgrade, August 23. (Ibid.) 2. In view of tense situation in this area I feel it would be unwise to return to US on home leave and consultation as originally planned and have cancelled any such plans for time being. Elbrick
192. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, August 29, 1968, 3:45 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL US-YUGO. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Wilson and approved in S on September 3. The meeting was held in Secretary Rusk's office. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS Foreign United States Secretary Rusk received Yugoslav Ambassador Crnobrnja for one hour on afternoon August 29. On August 27, Ambassador Crnobrnja had requested an appointment following his return from local leave. The conversation concerned Czechoslovakia and related matters. Ambassador Crnobrnja began by saying that Yugoslavia discredited the theory of "revanchist plot" against Czechoslovakia. It seemed clear that the Soviets wanted to stop the process of democratic and human development in Czechoslovakia out of concern that a "chain reaction" might affect other areas of the socialist world. Yugoslavia was confident that Czechoslovakia had a socialist leadership. Yugoslavia believes it inherent for the body of socialist society to proceed to "more human goals" just as other human societies are doing. Yugoslavia sensed no threat to socialism in Czechoslovakia. Yugoslavia would not, however, exclude the existence of anti-socialist activity in Czechoslovakia and believed that this activity may have had better chance for expression in the more liberal Czechoslovakia of recent months. However, liberalization had strengthened forces of socialism in Czechoslovakia to a much greater degree. Regarding the Moscow communiqué,/2/ Ambassador Crnobrnja did not know whether it should be called an "agreement", but Yugoslavia considers it as having been accepted by legally constituted representatives of the Czech people. In a way, this orients Yugoslavia's present position. Yugoslavia believes that the Czech leaders should be allowed to assess what the Moscow agreement means in all its consequences and aspects with a view to deciding on its future treatment. The very fact that the Moscow talks took place means a lot politically. Perhaps the holding of talks was contrary to what the Soviets had anticipated. Yugoslavia considers the exemplary conduct of the Czech people to have been the greatest help in saving what was saved. All credit should go to the Czech people and world public opinion. /2/For text of the communiqué and protocol issued in Moscow on August 27, see Remington, Winter in Prague, pp. 376-382. Ambassador Crnobrnja continued that Czechoslovak events were of great significance not only for today but for tomorrow. They were tragic but were lessons for many states including Yugoslavia. Ambassador Crnobrnja saw one danger. If the Moscow agreement should lead to a split in the Czech people, disaster would follow. Solidarity of the Czech people remains the strongest ally for achieving Czech goals. Neither the Czechs nor the Yugoslavs have a more powerful political weapon than national solidarity. Unity in Yugoslavia is as good as in the 1948-51 period. Unity is also good in Romania. These are great and promising factors. Yugoslavia is neither frightened nor worried. If the need should come, the Yugoslav people know what they will do. They will defend their independence. Under no condition will they stay quiet. On the contrary, where relations with socialist states are concerned, the justification for defense would be even greater. Crnobrnja asked the Secretary's assessment regarding Czechoslovak events and their effect on East-West relations, bridge building, and US-USSR discussions on vital problems. The Secretary said we had felt well informed at all stages regarding the deployment of Soviet and other forces in the area of Czechoslovakia as well as the nature of the maneuvers under way. It was clear that the maneuvers were intended to put pressure on Czechoslovakia. We did not have advance information of the Soviet decision to move into Czechoslovakia, but we did know that a move could be started at a moment's notice. The decision to move must have been a very difficult one for the Soviets. Internal Czech developments must have seemed a very real threat to the Soviets for, as Ambassador Crnobrnja had said, they might have "infected" the USSR itself. The Secretary made it clear that there was no US-USSR understanding, tacit or otherwise, regarding Czechoslovakia. He said he had told Ambassador Dobrynin several weeks ago about our feelings concerning the independence of states and had emphasized the reaction would be severe if the independence of Czechoslovakia were threatened./3/ The Secretary had particularly protested what appeared to be a Soviet effort to create pretext for intervention out of a myth of a Western plot against Czechoslovakia. /3/See Document 70. The Secretary continued that NATO and the Warsaw Pact both knew that an attack by one against a country of the other would lead to war. NATO, however, does not recognize the right of Warsaw Pact countries to occupy the territory of a Warsaw Pact member. This could not happen within NATO. We gather that Moscow's black propaganda organs have been trying to manufacture the myth of a US-USSR understanding on Czechoslovakia. The Secretary stressed the outstanding conduct of the Czech people and the extraordinary strength of world reaction in the face of the invasion of Czechoslovakia. The US had not whipped up this reaction; it had been immediate and spontaneous. The Soviets were probably surprised by the strength of this reaction, all the more so because they tend to attach more weight to propaganda than most countries do. What happens in Czechoslovakia is of serious concern for the United States. Not because we have had particularly good relations with the Czechs, though. On the contrary, Prague over the years has been one of the capitals most active in promoting "world revolution". Czech arms today are killing our men in Viet-Nam. Our concern relates to the elementary point that, unless a small nation can live unmolested there can be no peace in the world. Spheres of influence can never prove satisfactory in achieving this condition, since the concept of spheres of influence understands a "master race" within a sphere of influence. We therefore subscribe to the principles set forth in the UN Charter whereby every nation, large or small, has a right to its own national existence. The Secretary continued that we were watching the situation as it related to Romania and Yugoslavia. We have not seen the kind of build up of forces which we clearly saw with regard to Czechoslovakia. However, if Yugoslavia obtains information suggesting a build up and Yugoslavia discreetly advises us of it, we will check the information as we have the means to do so. The Secretary commented that we had noted considerable lack of enthusiasm for the actions against Czechoslovakia within the countries which had provided token units for invasion and occupation. Secretary Rusk said that the situation in Czechoslovakia had been achieved through a significant deployment of Soviet troops to the south and west. Soviet troops were now on the Bavarian border. We have an immediate interest in the length of stay of these troops, because NATO must consider what this means with regard to the strength and deployment of NATO forces. Earlier this year at Reykjavik the NATO ministers had supported the possibility of a reduction of forces in central Europe./4/ Now this possibility was reversed by the Soviet move into Czechoslovakia. /4/The NAC Ministerial Meeting was held at Reykjavik June 24-25. For text of the NATO declaration, see Department of State Bulletin, July 15, 1968, pp. 75-77. The Secretary stressed that we respected the way in which Yugoslavia had expressed itself on the Czech events. We felt that the fact that some socialist states had spoken out strongly had been a matter of great importance in helping the Czechs to preserve something. If the USSR now were to proceed against socialist states making this critical response, a very grave situation could develop. Romania's geographic position and Yugoslavia's, to an even greater degree, made this subject a matter of great interest to NATO. A further extension of Soviet forces would be a matter of very grave concern to NATO. Pointing to a map of Europe, the Secretary noted that, for instance, there were now no Soviet forces in the Adriatic area. The Secretary said that the Czech events had had a serious effect on US-USSR bilateral relations. Previously we had been in contact with Moscow on very important matters. The Soviets must have known that their action in Czechoslovakia would damage bilateral relations. Public opinion and Congressional reaction were important factors and now were negative toward the USSR. The great pity is that efforts at détente have been blocked while at the same time problems have not evaporated. The questions of missiles, Viet-Nam, and the Near East remain. We must think more about what all this means. The Russians are presumably doing the same. The Secretary wondered what the move into Czechoslovakia signifies regarding the USSR. Does it represent a step backward on other matters as well? What were the dynamics of the situation leading to the decision to move into Czechoslovakia? We don't know. The Soviets know how to maintain silence better than we do. If one were to interpret this move as irresponsible or impulsive or taken out of fear, it is distressing to think of the decisions which might be taken by a capital having as much destructive power at its disposal as Moscow. Does it mean that irrational action is possible? The Secretary added that the US has not been engaged in any way in any shape or form of mischief in Czechoslovakia. There has been no CIA activity and no arms infiltration. The Secretary said that, whereas his predecessor John Foster Dulles talked about a rollback in central Europe, the present Administration has wanted to improve relations with Eastern Europe and the USSR by bridge building. The purpose has been to bring about broader serenity in the world. We have not wanted bridge building to set one state against another. It has been notable, however, that in recent months, the USSR had been speaking negatively about bridge building. Within the USSR, comment had been quite bitter on the subject. We have been especially resentful about the theory of an "imperialist threat" which has been pushed by the Soviets. In concluding this portion of his remarks, the Secretary again invited Ambassador Crnobrnja to have his government submit any information suggesting the development of a threatening situation for Yugoslavia. The Secretary pointed out in this connection that, with regard to Czechoslovakia, the Soviets obviously felt their interests so fundamental that they were willing to make major sacrifices regarding détente, US-USSR bilateral relations, world popular opinion, and harmony within the family of communist parties. Ambassador Crnobrnja thanked the Secretary for these views and turned to the subject of US-Yugoslav bilateral relations. Ambassador Crnobrnja said that Yugoslavia had no particular requests to make and did not want to take advantage of the situation in this connection. Yugoslavia did not want to irritate the USSR even though Yugoslav-Soviet relations had already deteriorated and would probably deteriorate further. He said, however, that it would be most unfortunate if developments were to lead to paralysis in US-Yugoslav relations. He stressed that Yugoslavia wanted to continue to proceed with the gradual development of relations in areas of "real business". In this connection, he said that Yugoslavia soon would probably join Intelsat. Yugoslavia would do so because it saw real business advantage in doing so. The US might attach other importance to the matter. He said that Yugoslavia, as a small power, wanted to avoid any action suggesting that it was within a sphere of influence. It wanted to live freely and make its own decisions. The Secretary concluded by answering that we did not believe that the Czech situation would have a negative influence on US-Yugoslav relations. We certainly did not want to create difficulties or embarrassment for Yugoslavia. He agreed that the US and Yugoslavia should proceed with matters in which they have a common interest. Public opinion was favorable.
193. Telegram From the Embassy in Yugoslavia to the Department of State/1/ Belgrade, September 14, 1968, 0730Z. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15-1 YUGO. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to Bucharest, Budapest, Moscow, Prague, Sofia, Zagreb, and USNATO. 4348. 1. Yugoslav-American, who over years has had good access to Tito and his Secretary-General Vlado Popovic, called on Political Counselor September 13 to report on "interesting aspects" of Tito's remarks to him during two-day stay on Brioni (September 8-9). Among more important views attributed to Tito are following: A. GOY will not ask for military assistance from US for time being. GOY has enough arms for present. Military threat is not immediate but of longer range. Soviet presence on Adriatic adjacent to Italy and Greece would be intolerable for West which will once again have to assist small socialist country against attacks from other socialist countries. Since GOY cannot read Moscow's intentions but is convinced of its malevolence towards Yugoslavia, latter will have to remain in almost permanent state of military readiness for long time to come. B. Military preparedness steps already taken and some yet to come are most expensive as also was assistance to Czech tourists granted by GOY. These expenditures have come out of funds set aside by GOY to implement economic and social reform. Tito very much fears Moscow's method of retaliation against Yugoslavia will be via economic sanctions. Large proportion of Yugoslav textile and shoe industries heavily reliant on Soviet market. Almost all of rolling stock manufactured in Yugoslavia goes to USSR. Shipbuilding industry heavily reliant on Soviet orders. USSR owes Yugoslavia great deal of money, Tito said, lamenting fact it was not other way around. Some adjustments must be made. Objectives of economic and social reforms will not be abandoned, but pace of progress towards these objectives will be slowed down. C. Yugoslavs will have to completely re-examine and reassess their positions (e.g., ideological, foreign policy, internal political and economic) in light of new situation created by Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. New era in international relations and relations among ComParties ushered in by WP invasion of friendly socialist country. New principles have been applied in relations between socialist and other states which are alien to principles and objectives of socialism. Some hope exists for future in light of almost universal condemnation by important ComParties throughout world of WP intervention. Role of Italian and French parties in this connection most important. D. Tito is furious with UAR in general and with Nasser in particular because of lack of support from that sector. Doubts relations with UAR will ever be same because of "unprincipled behavior" in bowing to necessity to acquire arms from Moscow. E. Yugoslavs are disillusioned and shocked by Soviet behavior and relations between GOY and USSR will never be same. There is no more trust. Yugoslavs would like to maintain relations with WP countries on "correct" basis for economic reasons but don't know whether this can be done in dealings with irresponsible and unpredictable Russians. 2. At one juncture while having lunch with Popovic source noted presence of many Generals in next room, among them C/S Sumonja and Babic, Tito's military advisor. Source laughingly observed that a NATO meeting must be in offing. Popovic laughed and in reply said, "no, not NATO, Balkan Pact."/2/ Source said he trusted Yugoslav Generals would not get dust from treaty all over clean uniforms provoking laugh from Popovic. Source observed (probably reflecting own view) that Balkan Pact is "back door to NATO." /2/The Treaty of Bled, signed by Greece, Turkey, and Yugoslavia on August 9, 1954, established the Balkan Pact. For text, see American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955: Basic Documents, vol. I, pp. 1235-1239. 3. Comment. We tend to regard this report as authentic and credible since much of it is substantiated by information at our disposal from other sources. However, this is first time we have had any intimation of Tito's views on arms supply, strategic probabilities, and need for overall reappraisal. Elbrick
194. Memorandum for the Record/1/ Washington, September 23, 1968. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Yugoslavia, Cables. Confidential. Drafted by Nathaniel Davis on September 26. Copies were sent to Rostow, Ash, and Lisle. SUBJECT When I went to the International Club to hear Ambassador Bohlen on Czechoslovakia, I happened to sit next to Ambassador Crnobrnja. The Ambassador invited me to join him for supper after the speech. Ambassador Crnobrnja liked Mr. Bohlen's remarks--saying he was not surprised by them. When he pressed me for amplification of our policy toward the Czech crisis, I asked what he thought our policy should be. Ambassador Crnobrnja said we should work for a broad settlement of outstanding world issues, and move vigorously to prevent a return to the Cold War. We should seek a Vietnam settlement--for which we need a bombing halt, move toward a resolution of the Mid-East impasse, and advance on the disarmament front. Crnobrnja said he realized some of these prescriptions would be hard to take. On Vietnam, I said I was pretty sure American policy would be decided on its own merits and not linked to Czechoslovakia. Ambassador Crnobrnja said he had heard rumors very recently of some sort of understanding with the Soviets. I said that, so far as I knew, these were entirely untrue. Earlier reports along these lines were categorically denied by Secretary Rusk. Crnobrnja asked me what kind of role I thought the Soviets might play in a Vietnam settlement. I said I didn't know; but I was personally skeptical that the Soviets would force Hanoi's hand. I remarked that Hanoi must even now be considering whether to negotiate this fall with this Administration, or wait until next spring. How they would decide, I didn't know. Ambassador Crnobrnja remarked that he thought the North Vietnamese were seriously interested in a solution, but had a problem of confidence. I said I did not know the details of the Paris negotiation, but I was sure the other side knew how to make the seriousness of its interest clear if it really wanted to move forward. Regarding the Middle East, I said it sometimes looked as if we were expected simply to force the Israelis back to the June 4 lines./2/ Crnobrnja said that might be the Arab point of view, but he would not recommend it. He thought Nasser would also have to make real policy changes. (Crnobrnja seemed cool to Nasser. This may have been a reflection of Yugoslav annoyance at Nasser's reaction to the Czechoslovak invasion.) /2/Reference is to the borders existing between Israel and neighboring Arab states of United Arab Republic, Syria, and Jordan before the "Six-Day War" (June 5-11, 1967). Crnobrnja said we should pursue a policy of détente. When I pressed him, he seemed to be talking more about détente with Yugoslavia and the Third World than an immediate return to easy relations with the invading powers. He asked how worried I thought Yugoslavia should be, I said I thought Yugoslavia's position was different from Czechoslovakia's. After all, even Stalin had stopped short of military intervention. Yugoslavia had been non-aligned for 20 years. During that time the U.S. had given extensive economic and even military assistance. The Balkan Pact was probably a complicating factor in Russian thinking. (Crnobrnja promptly affirmed that it was still in effect.) Nevertheless, I realize a lot of things have come unstuck in Eastern Europe. Crnobrnja remarked on the signs of dissension and instability in the Soviet Politburo, but did not offer any specifics. He said that an indication of US support, interest and concern for Yugoslavia would be very helpful. In this connection he mentioned the arrival in Washington this weekend of Yugoslav Deputy Prime Minister Kiro Gligorov. While the formal purpose of Gligorov's trip is to attend meetings of the Bank and Fund, Crnobrnja made clear that the Yugoslav government was taking advantage of the occasion to send over a high-level official. He left the impression the Yugoslav government would appreciate a high-level reception. In response to my question, Crnobrnja said he did not have "any instructions" as to whether it was hoped Gligorov could see Secretary Rusk or the President. I said I could not speak for the attitude of senior US personalities, but I know that whatever appointments Mr. Gligorov requested would be most seriously considered. (The following day Crnobrnja called me, saying he had just received a telegram that morning indicating that Gligorov would like to meet Americans at the Cabinet level and also Walt Rostow if that were possible. I asked the Ambassador if he were conveying his request to the State Department, and he said yes, of course.) Crnobrnja gave no indication Gligorov was likely to request military assistance. What he talked about was general support and economic relations. Crnobrnja said there were a few matters which he was reluctant to mention--but US action would be very helpful. He said a Soviet request for four sonars was pending, and the Yugoslav government would be most appreciative if a way could be found to furnish them. The Mother and Child hospital has also been long pending. Crnobrnja said it would be very helpful if the US government could be more liberal in the use of dinars. (Crnobrnja did not elaborate on what he had in mind.) Lastly, the Ambassador said the Yugoslav government was pleased and gratified at the attitude shown by the IBRD and the Export-Import Bank. He hoped the US government would continue to keep a benign eye on this area of economic collaboration. Crnobrnja was agitated at the activities of Serb and Croat emigres. He said we had succeeded in damping down emigre denunciations of the Yugoslav government for a period of time after the bombing of the Embassy and Consulates. This showed we could do something if we really tried. I questioned whether we could do very much, and suggested that it may have been the emigres themselves who had pulled in their horns. Crnobrnja said many Yugoslavs--including his predecessor--had been disturbed over what they regarded as an American tendency to doubt that Yugoslavia was really independent and non-aligned. The Czech crisis had proved Yugoslav independence of action once again. I said the American government had never doubted this. The only time I could remember when there was concern about the balance and stability of Yugoslav policy was during a period of a month or two after the Mid-East war. We had the impression the Yugoslavs may have over-reacted to developments in Greece and elsewhere at the time. Crnobrnja promptly filled in the missing details, including fear of the Italian military dispositions, etc. He said he realized that there had been an over-reaction. Crnobrnja mentioned the slow decline of US economic assistance. I said this was not a reflection of a change in US attitude. Partly it was a reflection of increasing Yugoslav economic success and self-reliance. Crnobrnja observed that--even with its non-aligned posture--Yugoslavia was of some help to the West. For example, Italy must feel more secure with no Soviet naval base in the Bay of Kotor. Crnobrnja remarked somewhat gloomily that the Soviets were a great deal less understanding than the Americans. It was hard to be a small country. ND
195. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, October 4, 1968. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Yugoslavia, Memos, Vol. 2. No classification marking. Drafted by Davis and approved by Rostow. The meeting was held in the President's office at the White House. PARTICIPANTS Deputy Prime Minister Gligorov conveyed Marshal Tito's greetings, and said he wanted to assure the President of Yugoslavia's resoluteness in this time and her desire for friendly relations with the United States. The President said we also want to build better relations. We are distressed at recent events in Eastern Europe. We did all we could before the invasion of Czechoslovakia--which was a tragic act, against a country which only wanted to exercise its independence. The President said he had spoken out firmly about the situation in Eastern Europe. We had not sought any sort of alliance or pact with any Eastern European country, and the Soviets did not have reason to believe their security threatened. Students of history have noted that when aggressors taste blood, the appetite grows. The recent situation had not been totally unlike a quarter century ago. We are concerned, and determined that aggression not spread. The President continued that we are more concerned, perhaps, than some of our colleagues and friends. We know the consequences if aggression should win out. We were ready to talk on vital subjects with the Soviet Union just before the Czechoslovak invasion. We had vigorously pursued missile talks, agreed on the time and place, and were ready. The Soviet government fully realized the effect of its invasion. The President observed that the NPT was also important to the Russians--as well as the missile talks. So was a solution in the Middle East and Vietnam. Rather than move on these questions, however, the Soviets preferred to take the course they did, and to pursue the interest they regarded as more important. We shall have to wait and see, the President said. The Deputy Prime Minister should take Tito his regards. One of his regrets on leaving office was the fact that he had not had the opportunity to visit with Marshal Tito. The President knows the resolution of the Yugoslav people. They have gone through periods of the greatest difficulty, and they know the price they will have to pay to defend those things most important. The easy way has tragic consequences. The President said he certainly does not want to see more killing in the world. He had two boys in combat in Vietnam. But he appreciates how the appetite grows with success. The President asked Gligorov if he had any views. Gligorov said he believed the President's assessment was correct. Every nation and society must be determined to defend its independence. The Yugoslavs liberated themselves in World War II and know what the price is. Yugoslavia's President, its government and its nation are resolute, and we need have no doubts on that score. Yugoslavia spoke out immediately to condemn the aggression against Czechoslovakia. This is why Yugoslavia is the object of a campaign of vilification from the Soviet side. Gligorov said Yugoslavia is ready for any eventuality. Nevertheless, the last thing they wish for is a rupture of Soviet-American contacts--which are good. It is only through dialogue that the greatest powers can seek agreement and find solutions to the hardest questions. The two greatest powers have very great responsibilities. This is one thing. Another, however, is the importance of not suffocating the freedom of small nations. The Yugoslavs remember America's role in 1948. They greatly appreciate all we have done. We helped them defend their independence and helped them continue their economic development. Gligorov said he realized Yugoslavia and America do not agree on all subjects. Nevertheless, our cooperation and friendship have increased, even if the forms have changed. The President will find Yugoslavia has a policy of peace and cooperation. For that purpose Yugoslavia will pay any price. Often, Gligorov said, the Yugoslavs haven't been well understood. But there is no other way. The Yugoslavs believe they have a friend in the U.S. That was why Yugoslavia's government and President considered it useful to take advantage of Gligorov's presence in the U.S. to express these feelings. Gligorov said he realized he was not saying anything new. Gligorov said the Yugoslavs had chosen their own way in development and toward democracy. They are stimulating the initiative of their people. They are developing an economy open to the world. They are members of the Bank and Fund. They want private capital. This year Yugoslavia had ten million foreign tourists, 95% from the West. It is doubtful that there is any more open frontier in Europe than Yugoslavia's with Italy and Austria. Yugoslavia wants its own society and way of life. It is building and defending an open society. Gligorov said Yugoslavia is trying to build bridges to the "other world" in the West. This is along the lines of America's policy toward the East. Marshal Tito greatly appreciates the personal policy of the President. Gligorov said Marshal Tito appreciates the President's efforts to find an acceptable solution in Vietnam, and reach a reasonable settlement in the Middle East. Marshal Tito, according to Gligorov, considers Yugoslavia happy that she is not in the same position as in 1948, when she had to ask for grants of American aid. In the meantime, Yugoslavia has developed--and American aid helped greatly in this process. Now, said Gligorov, Yugoslavia can talk on the basis of partnership. Yugoslavia wants to develop its commerce. It wants U.S. capital, and welcomes joint ventures. Gligorov said he had put forward certain specific proposals during this visit, but would not bother the President with them. However, these proposals reflect Yugoslavia's desire to make her own contribution, and for future arrangements to correspond to the interests of both countries. American support would represent support for the independence of Yugoslavia and for Yugoslavia's independent position. The President said he could not anticipate events in Eastern Europe, and would not try to answer all Gligorov's points. We are watching the situation with the greatest care. The President said he was grateful for what Gligorov had to say, and for his visit. The President, in closing the conversation, said he would be happy to have any ideas Marshal Tito would like to give him on the Eastern European situation.
196. Telegram From the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) to the Department of State/1/ Belgrade, October 18, 1968, 1920Z. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Yugoslavia, Memos, Vol. 2. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Katzenbach was in Europe to attend a meeting of the Western European Union. 4720. Secun 5. For Secretary from Under Secretary. Subject: My meeting with Tito. 1. Burke Elbrick and I met with Tito today for one hour and a half. 2. I began by giving him President's warm regards, coupled with a word for word repeat of statement issued by President after Elbrick had seen him ("President has made very clear his continuing interest in Yugoslavia's independence, sovereignty and economic development")./2/ I emphasized to Tito that this was what President had released following Elbrick call. /2/The October 14 statement is summarized in The New York Times, October 18, 1968. 3. Tito then ran through his impressions of Soviet intentions, from time of his April visit to Moscow through Cierna meeting (this scenario has already been reported by Embassy)./3/ Tito said that he had told Soviets in Moscow that an invasion of Czechoslovakia would be a "catastrophe"; that he had been worried Soviets would move against Czechs until Cierna meeting, but that after that he decided Soviets had given up any ideas of use of force; ensuing invasion which occurred within fortnight of Bratislava meeting had shocked him. He spoke indignantly of "absurdity" of Soviet attempts to justify invasion, saying that charges that counter-revolution was taking place were completely unfounded. /3/Not further identified. 4. I tried to draw Tito out on who players had been in Soviet Politburo, but he was not responsive. (Later in conversation he did say that there had been some "disagreement" within Soviet Government over Czech invasion.) 5. Tito said that while he was still worried about Soviet intentions toward Yugoslavia, he did believe situation had "eased somewhat." (He seemed more relaxed about situation than had Acting Foreign Secretary Pavicevic in earlier conversation today.)/4/ He said only help Yugoslavia needs right now is economic, emphasizing necessity of carrying through Yugoslav economic reform with its important political and social implications. He also said that Yugoslavs had sufficient arms to equip 1.2 million men. /4/See Document 197. 6. I tried to draw Tito out on Jarring Mission/5/ and possibilities for an ME settlement but, although we talked about ME for some time, I got little new. At one point Tito said that Soviets have more influence on Nasser than he (Tito) does. He took usual GOY line on the ME, saying Israelis have not accepted UN resolution and that a solution should be imposed. I told him I thought Israelis had accepted resolution, and that an imposed solution simply would not work. At conclusion of this portion of conversation, Tito admitted that Jarring Mission may be vital to solution of ME problem. He expressed concern about what he interpreted to be signs of renewal hostilities, and said it is most important for Mediterranean area, the Balkans in particular, that problem be solved speedily. At this point he digressed somewhat, and said that no one wanted Balkans to again become a "powder-keg", referring with some heat to Bulgaria's pretensions to Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia which, in his view, were obviously inspired by Soviet Union to discomfit GOY. /5/Between January and May 1968, Gunnar Jarring, U.N. Special Representative in the Middle East, met with Arab and Israeli officials in Nicosia. After his return to New York, he continued secret discussions relating to a Middle East peace settlement at the United Nations. 7. He inquired about Viet-Nam negotiations, saying he thought Viet-Nam solution is vital to resolution of other world problems. I told him I had seen Averell Harriman who was not able to report any progress to date. 8. Comment: In addition to conversation with Tito visit provided opportunity for me to exchange views with leading Yugoslav officials, including prominent members of legislative and executive branches of government. All have stressed long-term rather than immediate aspect of threat. They seem to recognize that situation does not call for classical variety of aid program and have asked for no commitments. They have shown special concern over Soviet plans for Balkan and Mediterranean areas, particularly with regard to foothold Soviets are gaining in Eastern Mediterranean. As emphasized by Acting Secretary Pavicevic in talks this morning Yugoslavs welcome any action on our part which would have a deterrent effect on Soviet aggression in this area of world. In this connection it seems pretty clear that Yugoslavs evaluate positively signals we have given Moscow this week beginning with statement made by Ambassador Elbrick after seeing President Monday and culminating in my visit today. 9. Yugoslavs naturally seeking to dramatize importance of visit to their own people but without saying anything specific re its significance. In this connection today, shortly after my talk with Tito, Office of President telephoned to ask if statement could be released that I had called and delivered personal message from President Johnson. I said I would prefer release to say I had conveyed President's warm greetings to President Tito but if they felt strongly about their formulation we would not object. In press backgrounder later this afternoon I emphasized that my visit was followup to earlier Gligorov visit to US and that my Paris speech/6/ gave me a good opportunity for a short visit to a country I had always wanted to see. I told them that I had presented President Johnson's regards to President Tito and that no commitments had been asked or offered. /6/For text of Katzenbach's October 15 address to the Western European Union, see Department of State Bulletin, November 11, 1968, pp. 489-493. Katzenbach
197. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization/1/ Washington, October 24, 1968, 2340Z./2/ /1/Source; Department of State, Central Files, ORG 1 U. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Wilson and approved by Lisle and in S/S, EUR, and U. 261357. Fol sent action SecState Oct 22 from Belgrade. "Belgrade 4736./3/ Exdis. For Under Secretary. Subj: Under Secretary's talk with Pavicevic. /2/Beginning in 1967, the dates and transmission times of all outgoing Department of State telegrams were in six-figure date-time-groups. The "Z" refers to Greenwich mean time. /3/A copy of telegram 4736 from Belgrade, October 22, is in Department of State, Central Files, ORG 7 U. 1. UnderSec's hour and half conversation Oct 18 with Pavicevic largely covered subjects on which Embassy has reported previously. This summary report transmits more significant, and in some instances fresh points made by Pavicevic on current situation in Eastern Europe. Of these the most pertinent for US is explicit suggestion (para 1E) that West make very clear to Moscow its interest in preservation of Yugoslavia as an independent and nonaligned country. A. Relations with USSR: Last April when Tito visited Moscow/4/ there were discussions about internal democratic development. Soviets said they saw no reason to change system which had been effective for 50 years. Discussion centered particularly on importance (from Soviet standpoint) of leading role of Party in internal life of country and centralized planning. Yugoslavs viewed Soviet statement on changes contemplated as step backward, especially since spring before there had been serious talk about necessity for reform. In past GOY had developed good relations with USSR confident that USSR was sincere in its professions [garble--friendship for] Yugoslavia and that it was unthinkable that USSR would attack another friendly socialist state. As result of this confidence GOY policy of nonalignment sometimes gave impression of "over-balance". However GOY was wrong, its confidence misplaced. Even during period of good relations there were signs Soviets sought change in GOY policy of nonalignment and independence. Main issues between Moscow and Belgrade have always been role of party in internal life and economic reform and these have been permanent sources of disagreement. Soviets have always disliked economic reform and role GOY has etched out for itself. Yugoslavia last month let Soviets know that if they had any aggressive intentions towards Yugoslavia they should know that people were prepared to fight them house-to-house if need be. /4/April 28-30. B. "Socialist commonwealth": Doctrine expressed by Gromyko at UNGA/5/ is most dangerous and clearly in violation of both international law and UN Charter. What, for instance, are geographic limits of "socialist commonwealth"? Yugoslavia believes Gromyko's unveiling of this doctrine at UNGA gives it an "explicit importance" and that regardless of Soviet intentions now this doctrine can be used in the future as a pretext for intervention anywhere Moscow finds a situation it does not like. /5/For text of Gromyko's October 3 speech, see U.N. doc. A/PV.1679. C. Soviet intentions: As result of developments since WP invasion of Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia is in dark re Soviet long-range intentions. They believe Soviets may well have aggressive intentions towards Balkans for both strategic and political reasons. Strategic reasons are same as they were at time of Tsars: Moscow seeks warm-water port and wishes to control land approaches to ME. Yugoslavs believe Soviets are only ones who gained powerwise in Arab-Israeli war of last year. Soviets have told Yugoslavs they in Mediterranean now and there has been no reaction from West. Political reasons stem from Soviet concern over implications of internal political, economic, and social system in Yugoslavia. D. Albania: GOY does not exclude possibility Soviets may move against Albania in effort to achieve strategic break-through and to settle old scores. If they should decide to do so Yugoslav sovereignty and independence would be threatened. One leader of WP country asked Yugoslavs what they would do in event Albania attacked Bulgaria. Yugos say they understood this question to mean exactly opposite of what was asked, i.e., what would they do if WP attacked Albania. E. Western interests in Balkans: GOY believes that in event of Soviet aggression against Yugoslavia West cannot afford to remain indifferent. GOY does not wish to say that support for Yugoslavia is 'vital' for that is a 'relative' term; it does believe, however, that it is most important for Western strategic interests. It is important that Moscow knows that West is not indifferent to what happens in Balkans. First deterrent is Moscow's recognition that Yugoslavs will fight, which poses dilemma. GOY anxious for Moscow to have as many dilemmas to think about as possible. Second deterrent would be evidence of Western interest in preserving GOY's independence and integrity. Two most important qualities of Yugoslavia's independence are its nonaligned policy and its internal system of government. Would be helpful if West could make very clear its interest in preservation of Yugoslavia as independent and nonaligned country. Besides public statements there are various ways, various channels that can be used. GOY appreciates friendly statements of high U.S. officials, including President, and friendly U.S. diplomatic gestures and counts on these as not being mere words. F. Economic relations with West: Development of good economic relations with West are important because: (1) they are pivotal to success of internal reform; (2) of political implications of success of reform both here and elsewhere; and (3) such relations are necessary for consolidation of Yugoslavia's international position. Military measures taken have been expensive. Military expenses in past have been expensive and are heavier now; they are going to be even heavier in future. 2. Full memcon follows by pouch./6/ Elbrick." /6/Not found. Rusk [Continue with the next documents] Volume XVII Index | Foreign Relations Online | Historian's Office | |