NOTE: External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views contained therein.
| The State Department web site below is a permanent electronic archive of information released prior to January 20, 2001. Please see www.state.gov for material released since President George W. Bush took office on that date. This site is not updated so external links may no longer function. Contact us with any questions about finding information. NOTE: External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views contained therein. |
 | FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968 Volume XVII Eastern Europe Department of State |
 | |
| 156. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ New York, June 23, 1967. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 ROM. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Lisle and approved in S on June 26. The meeting was held during the Secretary's dinner at the Waldorf Astoria. Rusk and Maurer were in New York for the U.N. General Assembly meeting. Memoranda of their discussion of the Middle East and Vietnam are ibid., POL 7 ROM and POL 27 VIET S, respectively. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS Premier Maurer The Secretary Ambassador Pedersen Over the dinner table, after discussion of China and Viet-Nam, the Premier introduced the subject of US-Romanian relations. He wished to speak very frankly. The Romanians would like to see these relations closer, particularly from the economic point of view. Romania did not seek aid of any kind. It wishes only normal trade. This is extremely important to Romania. Diversification of Romanian economic relations is a guarantee of Romanian independence and sovereignty. Romania's independent economic development enables it to be master in its own house. In previous talks with the United States, the Romanians have met with full understanding. In practice, they have met with many difficulties. Clearly the Romanians cannot pay the United States for what it needs from it in dollars. It can pay only in the products of its labor. This is the great problem in US-Romanian relations. The Secretary expressed agreement as to the importance of mutual relations and the directions in which we should move. There are two problems which arise, not out of anything Romania has done but out of a broader context. We have asked the Congress for authority to give Most Favored Nation treatment. There will probably be hearings this year, but in the atmosphere of Viet-Nam we have very great problems not related to Romania. As to credits, the Secretary expressed hope that any Romanian difficulties were only temporary. He understood there was the problem of a glass factory (the Romanians all nodded vigorously). We are now asking the Congress for an extension of the lending authority of the Exim Bank. The Secretary explained the problem of the Fiat guarantees in the Congress./2/ He asked the Romanians to be patient on credits for a glass factory until the Congress has acted. /2/On October 6, 1966, President Johnson announced that the Export-Import Bank would provide guarantees for Italian credit for the purchase of machine tools to be installed in a Fiat automobile factory in Togliattigrad, USSR. The credits were to support the largest East-West trade arrangement executed since the Russian Revolution. The following year the Senate blocked any U.S. participation. Fiat found credit elsewhere. The Premier remarked that when Romanian peasants don't like something they scratch behind their ears. (He scratched behind his ear.) The Secretary commented that he knew the Romanians would not like his reply, but, after all, trade was expanding. Maurer replied, "Not enough." To the Secretary's comment that after all democracy was a difficult form of government, Maurer rejoined that there were different forms of democracy and that we had built a very complex system for ourselves. The Secretary emphasized again that the Romanians should not draw any negative conclusions as to our policy toward Romania from our current legislative difficulties. Maurer expressed understanding. He believed the United States appreciated as a positive political element the desire of Romania to be independent. The Secretary, referring to his talks with Foreign Minister Manescu in previous years, reflected that perhaps he had at times given unduly encouraging views and had then encountered difficulties in carrying them out. He was sure, however, that once we had the appropriate authority the problem of MFN could be worked out quite readily. Foreign Minister Manescu said he always fully reported on his discussions and that his government was fully aware of the difficulties in the United States. However, there would be measures that could be taken if the United States gave due attention to the Prime Minister's observations on Viet-Nam. The Prime Minister expressed complete satisfaction with the discussion and said he was not pessimistic as to the evolution of our relations. The Secretary said he was not at all pessimistic. He did not want to emphasize ideology. However, the Premier should understand the attitude of the American people. Since World War II we have had 250,000 dead and wounded, in the Berlin Airlift, in Korea, in Southeast Asia, and elsewhere. Only in recent years have the American people come to realize that just as there are differences in the capitalist world, so are there differences in the socialist world. It is not an answer to denounce "all those capitalists" or "all those communists." The Secretary recounted how Presidents Kennedy and Johnson and their Secretary of State had pursued every channel of possible agreement within the last six years. He mentioned particularly the Civil Aviation Agreement, the consular treaty, the Space Treaty, hopefully a nonproliferation treaty and, again, hopefully, legislation for expansion of East-West trade. We are trying to find a way to limit the development of both offensive and defensive weapons. There is no one more serious about organizing the peace than the United States. We know the extent of destructive power in the hands of frail human beings. We will in any case do our duty, what we have to do, but we know that to cage the beast of nuclear power is the greatest task of man. We seek to organize a genuine peace. The Premier replied that the Romanians base their policy on the assumption that the United States is genuinely interested in peace. If they didn't believe that, there would be no use in a frank discussion. However the Romanians don't always approve the means the United States relies on to achieve its purposes. However, one of us or another, or both, may be mistaken as to the means. The Premier expressed complete agreement with the Secretary's suggestion that we should continue to exchange ideas, that both sides can learn something in such an exchange and perhaps new ideas would emerge. The Secretary noted that we were only halfway in our discussion with Premier Kosygin./3/ The discussion of June 23 proved to be more than a mere courtesy visit. There will be a further discussion and perhaps clarification of some of the issues. /3/For documentation on the Johnson-Kosygin meetings at Glassboro, New Jersey, June 23 and 25, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume XIV. The Premier hoped that this would be so. He holds Kosygin in great esteem. Kosygin is tenacious but a man with whom one can talk. Maurer has no reason always to be happy with him. Maurer has given Kosygin annoyance and Kosygin has given Maurer annoyance. Maurer hopes that solutions will be found which can have only good effects on international life. The Secretary discussed the manner in which a hostile nature could make allies of us all. Science and technology open the way of cooperation. There are many matters of interest to all men independent of ideology and individual interest. There is no communist cholera or communist plague. All people need water. Wheat rust is a common problem. The Premier said the importance of the explosive nature of scientific development and its penetration into production could not be exaggerated. We might be on the eve of a time when goods will be so abundant that their exchange value will become null. The leader in this process is the United States. Maurer does not know who will be the leader in the next stage but he thought that from the Marxist point of view the United States was the leader of the movement of capitalist society to its dialectical antithesis. The discussion ended with the Secretary noting the manner in which starting from a highly individualistic point of view we had developed the concept of social responsibility for the welfare of the individual. Perhaps Romania could find a way by which the value of the individual could be fully recognized in a socialist system.
157. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, June 26, 1967. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL RUM-US. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Stoessel. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS Romanian Side: U.S. Side: The Prime Minister began by expressing his great appreciation to the President for taking time from a busy schedule to receive him. He noted that he had recently had a long discussion with Secretary Rusk in New York on matters of common interest and that these talks had been very successful./2/ /2/See Document 156. The Prime Minister said that he had talked in the first instance with Secretary Rusk about the Middle East, where they seemed to have found a similarity of views due to the fact that both felt that everything possible should be done to obtain peace in the Middle East and that this was a question which must be approached in a realistic spirit, avoiding excessive claims. They had also exchanged views about Viet-Nam. The Prime Minister had told the Secretary very frankly of the Romanian desire to have the Viet-Namese question settled. It is troublesome to Romania and to everyone; it is, in fact, particularly troublesome for the smaller countries. Viet-Nam is a hot-bed of danger, which the Prime Minister felt could do damage to Romanian desires for freedom and independence. The Prime Minister said he would be pleased if the President could understand the special interest of Romania in settling the Viet-Namese problem. The Prime Minister wished to make his views quite plain. He believed that a way had to be found for American troops to be withdrawn from Viet-Nam. He understood that, in this, Romanian attitudes were different from those of the United States; however, he had the impression that the Secretary had understood the Romanian viewpoint, which sprang from the desire of Romania for freedom and independence. Tension anywhere in the world creates difficulties for smaller countries and the possibilities for achieving independence become more restricted. The Prime Minister commented that he thought there was less similarity between the U.S. and Romania on Viet-Nam than there was about the Middle East. The Prime Minister had taken up a third subject with Secretary Rusk, that of relations between our two countries. He had pointed to the Romanian desire that these relations expand, particularly in the sphere of economic relations and scientific and technical cooperation. He was well aware that the U.S., as a large country, had nothing to gain from exchanges with such a small country as Romania. On the contrary, Romania would stand to gain and that, indeed, was the Romanian purpose, since the economic development of Romania was a most important element in her striving for independence. However, even if economic relations with Romania were not especially important for the U.S., perhaps Romania's political independence would be something of interest to the U.S. The Prime Minister said that some of the Secretary's views on bilateral relations had been encouraging, while some had not been so encouraging. He had told the Prime Minister of the desire of the U.S. to develop relations with Romania, but he had pointed out difficulties in this regard which derived from the present international situation. These concern certain agreements which had been concluded between our two countries several years ago on the basis of mutual advantage. These had contemplated the use of credits, either short or long term. With regard to one of the projects which was dear to the Prime Minister's heart, the purchase of a glass plant from the U.S., the Secretary had said that there might be problems because of the danger that the Congress might not make it possible for the Export-Import Bank to extend credit to socialist countries. The Prime Minister could understand that there might be some problems about which nothing could be done. However, he very much hoped that the glass plant project could go through, since this was an important element in Romanian planning. The Prime Minister said that, to the extent that the President could contribute to developing U.S-Romanian relations, he thought this would be a useful step in the context of improved international relations generally and fulfilling obligations toward the human community. The President said that the Secretary had reported to him on his talk with the Prime Minister and he could not add very much to what the Secretary had already said. The President regretted that Romania and the U.S. had different approaches to the problem of Viet-Nam, although he appreciated the reasonable position of Romania. The President said that those closest to the problem feel differently about it than those farther away. This might make us understand the problem better but, on the other hand, it might also make us less objective. In any event, the President appreciated the candid and frank remarks of the Prime Minister. The President said that we are very anxious for U.S. troops to leave Viet-Nam, which they will do as soon as the North Viet-Namese troops leave the country. We do not feel that we can run away and leave the South Viet-Namese to face the aggressors. We have an alliance with South Viet-Nam and we will help to defend the country when it is attacked. So far as the political structure in South Viet-Nam is concerned, we favor elections which could be supervised by any objective group. We do not believe that we have the right, even though an ally, to tell the people of South Viet-Nam what kind of government they should have. They should have the right to vote freely and to choose their own leaders. Whether we like the leaders or not is unimportant; the main thing is that there should be honest, free elections. We do not wish to fight North Viet-Nam. It takes two to make a fight. If North Viet-Nam would stay behind the line, if they would stop sending troops and supplies into South Viet-Nam and stop the violence there, then we would turn the buildings, hangars and construction that have been built in South Viet-Nam into schools and hospitals, and we would bring our troops home within six months, as we have said we would do. We know that no country wants troops of a foreign power on its soil. If the North Viet-Namese troops would stay on their own soil, then our troops would stay in the United States. However, if North Viet-Nam insists on using power and on saying that "might makes right", then we will resist. The President said that we are not trying to reform the North Viet-Namese Government, but they are invading South Viet-Nam. Four or five divisions are ready to enter South Viet-Nam as soon as we stop bombing. We are not trying to destroy North Viet-Nam nor to invade their land. All we ask is that they stay in their country and we in ours. If anyone can get Ho Chi Minh to send his troops home and cease the infiltration and violence, then the Americans will go home, but we are not prepared to raise the white flag of surrender and to let the aggressors win. Just as we do not wish to destroy North Viet-Nam, we do not want war with China or to change the system of government in China. We hope that China will join the society of nations. We have no designs on her territory or her philosophy. All we want to do is to trade with China and get along with her to the extent that she will permit. The President appreciated the Prime Minister's approach to these matters and his desire to talk about them. We wish to be friendly with the Rumanian people. We would like to see the East-West Trade Bill passed as well as the Export-Import Bank legislation so that our relations could be improved./3/ /3/S-1155, a bill authorizing a 5-year extension of the Export-Import Bank became involved in a 1967 Congressional debate on trade policy. In 1968, Congress approved S-1155 as P.L. 90-267, extending the Export-Import Bank for 5 years. The Congress failed to act on HR-17551, the Trade Expansion Act of 1968. The President understood the desires of Romania to seek better living conditions for its people. Although countries may have different views on various matters, there are many things which we have in common. All of us have problems with ignorance, poverty and disease and we should all work together as brothers to fight these enemies rather than each other. The President commented that Congress sometimes did not have as liberal a view as he did about some of these things, but he thought that if Members of Congress could hear the Prime Minister, or could hear Chairman Kosygin, then they might change their views. The President was determined to work to improve relations with Romania. He told the story of Charles Lamb who, when asked if he knew the author of a book he had not enjoyed, said that he did not know the author but if he knew him he would like him. The President thought that it had been helpful for the Prime Minister to visit the United Nations, to talk with Secretary Rusk, and to come to the White House. The President said that Mr. Katzenbach would be glad to consider in a detailed way such questions as the glass factory which the Prime Minister had mentioned. The President wished to approach such problems with a desire to reach an understanding. Even though Romania is a small country, the President said the United States was very interested in its relationship with us. We feel an obligation upon the United States to do what is right in the world. Although we may sometimes make mistakes, we do our best. We would like to improve trade with Romania and to see an improvement in the welfare of Romania. He looked to the day when there were no great differences between us. The President said what we want most from Romania is not trade or approval but that Romania would try to understand the United States. The President said that the Prime Minister was going to visit other countries and that he was at liberty to describe the conversation he had had with the President and to quote whatever he had said, if this would be useful. The President said he would like to talk with the Chinese about a non-proliferation treaty and to work out ground rules so that we can avoid nuclear war. He repeated that we would like to bring our troops home from Viet-Nam and he said that if the Prime Minister could persuade Ho Chi Minh to withdraw his troops, the Prime Minister could promise to produce the President the next morning to begin negotiations. However, it takes two to negotiate and we cannot do it all ourselves. Whenever Ho Chi Minh is ready, the President would be ready and he will talk about anything that Ho Chi Minh wants to talk about. The President wants to stop the war but he cannot stop just his half of the war. The Prime Minister said that he was very pleased with what he had heard from the President. While he might not agree with everything the President had said, he did not wish to argue any points in detail. As the President probably knew, Romania did not limit herself to expressing her views to the United States. She has spoken of her views previously to other countries and will do so in the future. The Prime Minister noted that he would be in Peking on July 3. The Prime Minister hoped that the President did not think that Romania aspired to playing an important role in international debate. All that Romania wished was to be master in its own house. As it happens, this ideal for Romania cannot be achieved when there is a crisis of tension in the world. Then countries are told to get together, to renounce some of their sovereignty and some of their independence and to obey the command of another state. The Prime Minister said that these actions endanger what Romania has won, and which they wish to preserve at all costs. It is this consideration which causes Romania to interfere in problems which really are beyond her and to try to settle them. The Prime Minister noted that this was his first visit in the U.S., but he said that since hostilities began in Viet-Nam he had visited there four times. This shows that whatever Romania does springs from a belief that difficult problems should be resolved. He thought this was the President's belief as well. The Prime Minister said that it was helpful to him to have heard the President's views. He did not know what use he would make of them--that remained to be seen. The President said he understood and that he had been happy to hear the Prime Minister's comments and to give him ours. He hoped to achieve an understanding based on all the information available, since a man is only as good as his information. The President said that it would be the height of folly, it would be prehistoric and like a cave man's approach, for the United States to want to go to war with China. Nothing was farther from his mind. The President said that about 30 million people in the U.S. live in poverty. He felt we should spend money to help them rather than spending money on bombs. He also hoped that part of our budget now spent on military expenditures could be used for the economic development of the Mekong Delta. We want Indonesia to be free. We wish the same for Japan, Korea, the Philippines and other countries. We do not wish to impose our views on them and we honestly want them to decide their future. The President hoped the Prime Minister would understand the United States better as a result of his visit. Now he knew more about what we were thinking and could tell others. The visit ended with repeated thanks by the Prime Minister for the President's courtesy in receiving him. Following the visit, the President and Romanian party went to the Rose Garden for photographs. During a brief exchange on this occasion, the Prime Minister mentioned that Foreign Minister Manescu probably would be the President of the next General Assembly of the United Nations. The President said that he would be a good man and that we had heard good things about him. In a brief statement to journalists in the White House press room following the interview with the President, the Prime Minister said that he had presented his respects to the President and that they had had a useful and frank exchange on topical questions. He said that he was leaving with a particularly strong memory of a great leader and a great state.
158. Airgram From the Embassy in Romania to the Department of State/1/ A-181 Bucharest, January 19, 1968. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 ROM. Confidential. Drafted by deMartino. Repeated to Belgrade, Berlin, Bonn, Budapest, London, Moscow, Munich, Paris, Prague, Rome, Sofia, and Warsaw. SUBJECT Summary A review of Romanian foreign policy suggests that the Romanians will continue along well established lines, although they may make some concessions--more of a formal than a substantive nature--to Moscow. Will Romanian foreign policy in 1968 be more cautious than in 1967? The question is valid in view of the developments of the past year. Very recently, reliable information came to light that Moscow and other bloc countries have been exerting economic pressure on Romania (Bucharest 901)./2/ To the extent that these pressures include a Soviet refusal to buy Romanian oil drilling rigs, the materials published here on the 1968 Romanian-Soviet trade protocol (signed December 30, 1967) do not indicate that the pressure is off. We had long assumed that Romania was under strong pressure, but the only evidence was indirect and circumstantial: the logic of the situation (Romania's defiance of Moscow in establishing diplomatic relations with West Germany, staying away from the conference of European Communist Parties at Karlovy Vary, and refusing to join in the bloc position on the Middle East), Romanian accusations or intimations of interference in internal affairs by unidentified parties (in particular, Ceausescu's article in RCP Central Committee daily Scinteia of May 7), and the evident irritation of Moscow and other bloc countries toward Romania (as reflected, inter alia, in the propaganda against nationalism). /2/Telegram 901, December 22, 1967, reported on Soviet economic pressures on Romania. (Ibid., E 1 RUM-USSR) In addition, Romanian internal policy is perhaps a complicating factor for its foreign policy. The changes approved by the RCP National Conference imply a broad personnel reshuffle in the central and local Party and State apparatus. They also imply a reduction in the size of this apparatus. While some will be promoted, many will lose out in the process. The prospect of such changes presumably is a dismal one for many if not most of the Party apparatchiks. And the need to grapple with this problem is perhaps responsible for the evident caution of the leadership in moving ahead on the economic reform, witness the introduction of a slow schedule of implementation at the RCP National Conference, the blurring of responsibilities for economic activities at the local level, and the carte blanche enabling law passed by the Grand National Assembly. In passing, it is perhaps worth noting that none of the measures approved by the Conference are likely to stir up any compensating popular enthusiasm. Whether Moscow and its allies can or will try to capitalize on the dissatisfaction which presumably will develop in the ranks of the Romanian Communist Party remains to be seen. (In theory they could take advantage of the vast number of contacts with Romanians which constantly take place--exchanges of Party, State, and mass organization delegations--to strengthen such dissatisfaction.) All that is said here is that, notwithstanding the show of unity toward Moscow implicit in the continued presence of the "old guard" leaders in the top Party organs, Romania will be more vulnerable to outside pressure than before. To a degree, Romania's foreign policy in 1968 will depend upon the foreign policy initiatives of the Soviet Union. But only to a degree. Regardless of what the Soviets do or do not do, the Romanians are busy steadily decreasing their economic and political dependence on Moscow and its allies. In the communist world, they have done their best to maintain a facade of cordial relations with Communist China and Albania and they have assiduously cultivated other countries and parties which tend to assert their independence from Moscow. Cuba is a recent case in point. A more long-standing example is Yugoslavia. The Romanians have been very active in trying to restore the excellent rapport which existed between them and the Yugoslavs before Ceausescu and Tito fell out on the Middle East question. At the same time, the Romanians have expanded their ties with the West and with the less-developed countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. They have also made the most of international forums (notably the UN) and regional groupings (e.g., the Group of Nine and the Balkans). Since these activities are vital to the consolidation of their independence, the Romanians will surely continue along these lines in 1968. The Soviet Union, for its part, seems determined to press ahead with a variety of policies the Romanians abhor: attacking "Mao and his clique", isolating West Germany from Eastern Europe, siding with the Arab countries against Israel, promoting conferences of communist parties, and, perhaps, "strengthening" the Warsaw Pact. The presumed Soviet interest in renewing the Soviet-Romanian Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance/3/ and concluding a non-proliferation treaty also present difficulties for the Romanians. /3/For text, see 48 UNTS 189. Barring a substantial deterioration in East-West relations, the Romanians will not allow Moscow to impair their relations with third parties. They will not attack Communist China nor will they join in any condemnation of West Germany or Israel. (Romanian participation in the December 19-21 meeting of Eastern European foreign ministers on the Middle East does not reflect a change in the Romanian position. Evidently, the price of Romanian participation was a communiqué consistent with the line taken in Romania's formal statements on the subject.) The Romanians could not afford to follow Moscow in these matters. On the other questions, however, there is more room for maneuver. Unquestionably, the Romanians would prefer to stay away from the Budapest consultative conference of communist parties./4/ By implication at least, the proceedings will have a pro-Moscow, anti-Peking flavor. /4/The conference was held February 26-March 5. Since it is only a preparatory conference, however--and hence presumably will not produce "binding documents"--the Romanians may find it hard to stay away. If they attend (and the Yugoslav Embassy in Bucharest seems to think that they will), the Romanians presumably will use the occasion to reassert their well known views about the conditions under which communist conferences are desirable (along the lines of the Scinteia article of February 28, 1967). In connection with the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance with the Soviet Union, it is not clear whether the Romanians would prefer no treaty at all, an automatic five-year renewal of the treaty, or a new treaty. Whatever their motives, they seem to have decided to negotiate a new 20-year treaty. In so doing, one can assume that they will insist on acceptable wording and that the new treaty will neither heap abuse on the West Germans nor speak of the desirability of arriving at joint positions on international problems. This could be read as a further example of the determination of the Romanians to "stick to their guns", especially if the new treaty is not signed before the end of the first 20-year period, on February 4, 1968. The failure of the Romanians and Bulgarians to renew a similar treaty before the expiration of the first 20-year period on January 16, 1968 indicates that the Romanians are probably taking a firm position in their negotiations with Moscow. As regards NPT, it is difficult to tell just how seriously the Romanians view their own objections to it. Although NPT presents the same type of problems for Romania as for other non-nuclear countries, it is very likely that the purpose of surfacing their objections was to show Moscow that Bucharest must be consulted on such matters. If so, their signature of a non-proliferation treaty would not be as much of a concession as it might appear at first glance. As a matter of fact, we would not be surprised to see them end up by signing a non-proliferation treaty, particularly if many of the other non-nuclear powers are willing to sign it. As for the Warsaw Pact, it is not at all certain that we are in for another Soviet offensive directed toward "strengthening" the Warsaw Pact, although the latest Soviet communiqués with the East Germans and Romanians suggest that this may be the case. If so, the participation of Romania in the August 21-27 Warsaw Pact maneuvers in Bulgaria and the statement about strengthening the Warsaw Pact Organization in the joint communiqué with the Soviets would seem to imply a co-operative attitude on the part of the Romanians. On the other hand, some of their other activities seem to have the opposite implication. In 1967, the Romanian leadership emphasized the need for less reliance on traditional sources of arms supplies. The Romanians also organized a military exercise of their own on October 12-13 to which no Warsaw Pact observers were invited and sent lower-ranking delegates than those of other countries to the October 13-17 Warsaw Pact meeting in East Germany. On balance, we would judge that the Romanians would not be willing to go along with any Soviet proposal which, in substance, would increase Romanian involvement in Warsaw Pact affairs. We doubt very much that the Romanian willingness to compromise with the Soviets would go beyond the framework discussed above. At the most, in our judgment, the Romanians might make certain concessions which are more of a formal than a substantive nature--e.g., attendance at the Budapest conference, and, if this can be considered a concession, renewal of the bilateral treaty with the Soviet Union--while continuing to defend their national interests in dealing with Moscow and steadily building up the material and political basis of their independence. The determination to continue along well established lines was reflected in the joint communiqué signed with the Soviets on December 15 and, external pressures and internal uncertainties aside, would be the logical consequence of the fact that Ceausescu and his team have emerged stronger than ever from the RCP National Conference. Nonetheless, the extent of the Romanian willingness to compose [compromise?] with the Soviets will bear close watching. In formulating policy in the future, the Romanians will no doubt take account of the reactions of Moscow and its allies to Romania's rather dramatic assertion of independence in 1967. Presumably, they will also consider whether far-reaching internal changes should incite them to greater prudence in international affairs. Under these circumstances, more than ever the Romanians will be looking for signs that the West, and particularly the United States, is willing to expand its economic and political relationship with them. Neubert
159. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, April 11, 1968. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL ROM-US. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Stoessel. The meeting was held at Ambassador Bogdan's residence. A typed note on the source text indicates that this was a "draft." No cleared copy of the memorandum was found. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS We lunched April 11, at his invitation, with the Romanian Ambassador, who was not accompanied by any member of his staff. The following subjects of interest came up during our conversation. 1. Trade The Ambassador referred to the recent trade agreement signed in Ottawa between Romania and Canada./2/ This provided for Canada granting Romania MFN treatment in exchange for a general commitment on Romania's part to make purchases in Canada of no less than $9,000,000 annually. The Ambassador said this latter commitment had been very difficult for Romania to make since it was not the usual practice to provide such an undertaking; however, the Canadians had insisted on it. /2/For text of the agreement, signed on March 22, see 870 UNTS 9. With regard to US-Romanian economic relations, the Ambassador said he understood the problems caused by the current political situation in relation to Viet-Nam, although he hoped that progress could be made. In particular, he hoped that something could be done with regard to obtaining a synthetic rubber plant from Goodyear, a subject he had mentioned to the Under Secretary. 2. Nuclear Plant With reference to his recent urgent consultation in Bucharest, the Ambassador said this had been primarily to engage in discussions in his capital with regard to decisions which must be made in the near future concerning Romania's five-year plan. Of special concern in this regard is the planning for nuclear installations to produce electric power. Romania has decided to go in the direction of obtaining plants which can utilize Romanian uranium and this will involve obtaining heavy water plants. The Ambassador indicated that this subject had been taken up with the Canadians and that there was some interest in obtaining a heavy water plant from Canada, although the Canadians themselves had not had extensive practical experience in this field. The Ambassador recalled that Romania had approached a US concern sometime ago in connection with obtaining heavy water technology, but that this apparently had encountered some problems on the part of the American Government. Given the urgency of their own planning process, the Ambassador hoped that this question might be resolved favorably in the near future. Mr. Leddy noted that, with the progress which has been made concerning the NPT, it might be considered that we were in a new situation and it was conceivable that something could be done. In any case, he assured the Ambassador that we would take another look at the problem. 3. NPT There was some discussion of the visit to Washington of Deputy Foreign Minister Macovescu to present Romania's views on the NPT./3/ The Ambassador reiterated many of the points made by Mr. Macovescu, noting that, while Romania has a positive attitude toward the NPT, they are concerned about certain aspects of the proposed treaty. In some respects, the treaty seems to freeze many inequalities which presently exist between nuclears and non-nuclears. Also, Romania is concerned about possible adverse economic effects of the NPT and, in addition, believes that the formula which has been advanced to cover the question of assurances to non-nuclear states is inadequate. /3/Macovescu visited March 1. A memorandum of his conversation with Secretary Rusk is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Romania, Cables, Vol. 3. Mr. Leddy reviewed in some detail the many consultations we have had with interested countries about the NPT over a long period of time. These consultations became particularly intensive beginning in December 1966, when it appeared for the first time that the Soviets were serious about an NPT. As a result of these consultations, many improvements have been made in the draft treaty and our feeling is that many of the earlier concerns which countries have expressed have been met. For example, the FRG seems much less worried about the adverse economic effects of an NPT. We recognize that the draft is not a perfect instrument, but we feel that its approval by a large number of states would be a significant step forward. On the other hand, to open up the draft to a large number of amendments would risk having the project fail entirely. We are concerned that the momentum which has been built up for the NPT should not be lost and we therefore hope that following discussions at the resumed General Assembly there will be agreement to approve the treaty. 4. European Economic and Political Integration In response to the Ambassador's questions, Mr. Leddy said that he anticipated that economic integration in Western Europe would continue to be strengthened through the Common Market and that Great Britain eventually would join this organization. He foresaw an increase in contacts between Western Europe and the countries of Eastern Europe, but he did not think it was practical to expect that there would be an over-all integration between the two areas. Mr. Leddy stressed that he felt the Common Market is here to stay and that the Eastern European countries will have to deal with it to an increasing extent. Ambassador Bogdan acknowledged that this probably was the case, although he said Romania would prefer to deal bilaterally with other countries. There was a brief discussion of COMECON and the Ambassador seemed to deprecate the possibility that COMECON would play an important role vis-à-vis the Common Market. In this context, he stressed Romania's desire to be as independent as possible in all respects. 5. European Security Responding to the Ambassador's queries on this subject, we outlined our view that the process of achieving European security would be a slow one, proceeding by small steps with no practical possibility that one over-all conference would solve basic security problems. We also noted US interest in the question of European security which, after all, is part of a global problem. The Ambassador said he recognized the US interest in this subject and he noted that the Bucharest Declaration of July 1966/4/ had not commented specifically on the question of US participation in a European security conference but left this question vague. He felt that the US-Soviet presence in Europe was a fact which must be recognized. He thought it was desirable to change this situation and that such change was inevitable, but the question was how this change could get started in a political sense. He felt this was a complicated and difficult problem but that it should be given serious attention. /4/For text of the Bucharest Declaration on European Security, July 5, 1966, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966, pp. 351-359.
160. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Romania/1/ Washington, May 10, 1968, 1845Z./2/ /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Romania, Cables, Vol. 3. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Lisle and approved by Katzenbach. /2/Beginning in 1967, the dates and transmission times of all outgoing Department of State telegrams were in six-figure date-time-groups. The "Z" refers to Greenwich mean time. 161818. Subject: Czechoslovakia. 1. Following report sent by Ambassador Goldberg evening May 9: "At Secretary's request I sought out Fonmin Manescu at 5:30 PM to see if he had any info or reaction to current rumors re Czechoslovakia. Manescu said he had no info other than press reports and had not yet seen Czechs here but would later in evening. Nor had he consulted with his govt. In response his query I said I had no info other than press. Manescu then made following personal comments which he later said he would not object to being passed on to Secretary: Manescu was very concerned over lack of denial from either Soviet or Czech official sources of current stories about Soviet troop movements. He felt that if there were no official denial from both capitals within next two hours, along lines of 'imperialist fabrications,' situation would be very serious. He believes if confirmed situation would raise basic question whether any EE state can pursue a policy in any way independent of USSR. He hoped that if current stories are true that US would recognize not only the degree to which interests of all EE's are involved, but also that US interests would also be substantially prejudiced. So far as Romania is concerned Manescu believes there is no division in country or Government and they would stand against any intervention to last man." 2. Please try to elicit in any possible way comments on subject without reference to report and without giving any indication knowledge your part of Manescu's views. Rusk
161. Memorandum for the Record/1/ Washington, May 15, 1968. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 17-8 ROM. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Davis. SUBJECT I had lunch today with Ambassador Bogdan and Romanian DCM Iosif Gheorghiu, at Bogdan's invitation. I said we were sorry to hear of Birladeanu's illness and mentioned that I thought Dr. Hornig was proposing June 19 as a substitute date for the start of the visit. Bogdan was interested, and pleased about the visit. Bogdan described his recent trip to the West Coast. He had visited Seattle (the University of Washington), Portland, the San Francisco area (including the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, Berkeley, San Francisco State and Claremont as the guest of Fred Warner Neal), and Los Angeles (the Universal Studios, Disneyland, the Mayor's office, etc.). Apparently Bogdan had made a number of speeches, had rather little sleep, and enjoyed the experience. Bogdan said he had come back to Washington, only to turn around to visit the Goodyear people in Akron. He believes Goodyear has the best synthetic rubber process in the world, and is most interested in getting them to pick up the old Firestone project. Apparently the Goodyear people told Bogdan that synthetic rubber remains more expensive than natural rubber. They wonder why Romania really wants to put up such a plant. Bogdan indicated that foreign exchange was a consideration--as well as a certain desire for self-sufficiency (assuming one has the raw materials, which Romania does). Bogdan went on to acknowledge that Romania could hardly strive for autarky, but nevertheless had an interest in standing on its own two feet. Bogdan said the Goodyear people expressed some interest in a plant in Romania on the grounds that Romania's cheap natural resources might enable the plant to become competitive with natural rubber in Western Europe. Apparently there is some problem with the fact that Goodyear normally retains a controlling ownership interest in its plants constructed abroad. Concluding his discussion of the Goodyear visit, Bogdan expressed the strong hope that the U.S. would help convince the Goodyear management that it was worthwhile to send a representative to Romania to examine the prospects seriously. I asked Bogdan whether Romania was experiencing any licensing problems. He said none that he knew of except the question of the heavy water plant. I told Bogdan I knew that question was under active consideration. Answering a question of mine, Bogdan said the Romanians hope to buy the reactor itself from General Electric in Canada--adding that he presumed that firm had "some connection" with General Electric in the U.S. He said that--apart from the question whether the U.S. would be willing to sell a reactor--there was a foreign exchange advantage in making the reactor purchase in Canada rather than in the U.S. I asked Bogdan if the rubber and heavy water plants represented their high priority interests. He said there was a third--their desire to purchase a plant to make integrated circuits. Apparently they would like to buy it from IBM. The conversation turned to politics, and I asked Bogdan how he viewed the situation in New York. He said he had just been in New York talking with Foreign Minister Manescu. Bogdan's pitch was that the U.S. and USSR should accept at least a few amendments to the NPT in order to make the General Assembly debate a serious and responsible one, and not simply a rubber stamp. Bogdan was aware of the recent Mexican proposals and seemed quite interested in them. He also raised the question of Security Assurances, commenting that he realized the U.S and the USSR would have to stand together on any issue in the Security Council if the assurances were to have any meaning. I remarked that the question of security commitments was a very touchy one in the Congress. Bogdan acknowledged the danger of the NPT coming unraveled, but said we ought to be able to find a way to make some concessions to the desire of many nations to improve the treaty--without opening Pandora's Box. He expressed the view that everybody was now resigned to India not signing--although she might adhere at a later time. When he asked me if I agreed, I said I thought we still hoped that India would find it possible to sign. Bogdan repeated several times that Romania had no desire to obstruct proceedings--but hoped that at least a few changes could be made. When I asked him how long he thought the session in New York would last, he said "two to three more weeks." When I asked Bogdan what he thought about events in Czechoslovakia he answered: "That's the $64.00 question." He deprecated the importance of Soviet military moves, and said he was an optimist about the situation remaining under control. He said he had no information on the Moscow five-nation Summit. We briefly discussed the differences between the present situation in Czechoslovakia and Hungary in 1956--including the fact that Hungary had left the Warsaw Pact and had formed a government with a non-Communist majority. Bogdan's reaction was to recall that the Hungarians in 1956 had also set up placards on the Romanian border demanding the return of Transylvania. Nathaniel Davis/2/ /2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. [Continue with the next documents] Volume XVII Index | Foreign Relations Online | Historian's Office | |