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 | FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968 Volume XVII Eastern Europe Department of State |
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| 162. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, July 9, 1968, 11-11:40 a.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 ROM. Confidential. Drafted by Kaplan and approved in S on July 11. The meeting was held in the Secretary's office. The source text is labeled "Part II of III;" a memorandum of the portion of their conversation dealing with Vietnam is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Romania, Cables, Vol. 3. A July 10 memorandum from Read to Shlaudeman, attached to the source text, noted that at the request of Secretary Rusk no notes were taken for the portion of the conversation dealing with a heavy water plant. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS Romania: US: 1. Birladeanu's Visit Deputy Premier Birladeanu thanked the Secretary and US Government for a well-organized US visit which had been both useful and educational. His hosts throughout the country had been most hospitable and forthcoming. Birladeanu expressed his satisfaction with the joint statement he and Dr. Hornig had just issued, adding, however, that he considered it to be a declaration of intent rather than a solid program./2/ The statement now needs concrete expression. /2/Birladeanu was in the United States with a team of six Romanian scientists at the invitation of Donald F. Hornig, President Johnson's Special Assistant for Science and Technology. For text of their joint statement, see Department of State Bulletin, August 12, 1968, pp. 178-179. The Secretary noted that the cooperation and hospitality Birladeanu received had been spontaneous and genuine. He considered that the joint statement was a foundation on which a structure of cooperation and practical expression can be built. The Secretary reemphasized the US policy of promoting such cooperation. Commenting further, the Secretary said that this US desire for cooperation with Romania would almost certainly be reaffirmed as national policy by our next President, whoever he is. 2. Heavy Water Plant Birladeanu repeated the Romanian position that a US decision on whether to authorize the sale of a heavy water plant to Romania was of overriding immediate importance to his government, which intended to base its nuclear power complex on a natural uranium-heavy water model. Emphasizing that he was speaking confidentially and off-the-rec-ord, the Secretary said that the outlook for US authorization had improved. He said that he had been personally involved in this matter, as had President Johnson, and that the US Government favored the sale on national policy grounds. Birladeanu would understand that there had been sensitive political problems over this issue. Repeating that he was passing this information on a personal basis, the Secretary said that approval now seemed possible before September. 3. Computers Birladeanu asked if the Department of State would support and assist Romania in obtaining medium-sized computers. He stressed that any computers or technology obtained in the United States would be used only in the national economy and that there would be no question of strategic application. The Secretary noted that the Department of Commerce actually approved such applications. He cited a refusal, in which he had concurred, of authorization of a sale to France on grounds that the equipment in question had almost exclusive application to the French military program. Three agencies--State, Defense, and Commerce--are actually involved. At the Secretary's request for further comments, Mr. Kaplan added that Executive Branch judgments could be made only on the basis of specific applications for export licenses, which we did not yet have. The Secretary said that any US firm that would be involved would understand how to proceed, and he recommended that firm information be provided. Noting that he could not speak for the firms, the Secretary said that he was nevertheless inclined to encourage Birladeanu on this issue unless specific unpredictable problems were to arise. 3. Fellowships for Romanian Scientists Birladeanu asked the Secretary about expanding opportunities for Romanian students and scientists to study and work in the United States. The Secretary replied that Birladeanu's question really had two parts. The first is whether the Romanians would be welcome here. The answer would be affirmative, the Secretary said, but Birladeanu should realize that the US Government could not guarantee acceptances by specific institutions. The Secretary recalled that when he was at the Rockefeller Institute, 80 percent of 300-odd foreign applicants wanted to go to Harvard. This was clearly impossible and impractical. The second part of the question is financial. Who pays? The Secretary noted that already-limited US Government funds for exchanges had been cut 25 percent by Congress. He suggested that the Romanians examine possibilities of raising funds on their own. One possibility, for example, would be for the Romanian Government to set aside 10 percent of the income derived from US tourists. It would be a great deal easier for us, the Secretary said, if the Romanians would do something like this and also increase the number of fellowships available for Americans in Romania. Birladeanu said that the Romanian government was prepared to pay some expenses in Romanian currency. He mentioned an earlier conversation in which Chairman Seaborg of the Atomic Energy Commission had suggested that the "Atoms in Action" exhibit could generate hard currency for exchanges of specialists in the nuclear field. The Secretary reiterated our desire to expand exchanges. He noted, however, that the practical problems still needed to be worked out. He cited the possibility that exchanges might be generated in the atomic energy field if the heavy water plant deal is consummated. Romanian specialists would presumably have to come here for training.
163. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, August 23, 1968. /1/Source: Department of State, Bohlen Files: Lot 74 D 379, Memoranda of Conversation--General. Confidential. Drafted by Kaplan and approved in G on August 27. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS Romania: United States: Ambassador Bogdan said he was calling without specific instructions to exchange views on the Czechoslovak situation. Mr. Bohlen said that he wanted Ambassador Bogdan to know that the Secretary desired to maintain communication with him whenever conditions warranted. Ambassador Bogdan should feel free to call the Secretary directly in case anything warranted such contact. Mr. Bohlen asked if the Romanians could confirm rumors of troop movements affecting their country. Ambassador Bogdan said he knew nothing of this and had received no information on it. Ambassador Bohlen asked whether "full mobilization" had taken place in Romania. Ambassador Bogdan again replied that he had no word of this. Ambassador Bohlen said that the world was indignant over the Soviet invasion, and he wondered who, other than the participants and two Asian Communist regimes, actually supported it. In a brief exchange of views about the actual decision-making process in Moscow, Ambassador Bohlen conjectured that the decision to intervene militarily may have been made at the last moment and on the basis of a plea from Ulbricht and some developments in Czechoslovakia. To a question by Ambassador Bohlen concerning the Romanian role in the Warsaw Pact, Ambassador Bogdan replied that there was no Romanian intention of leaving it. On the contrary, he thought it would be most useful for Romania to remain in the organization. Ambassador Bogdan reiterated the Romanian position on the Czechoslovak affair as a "clear-cut stand in which Romania states its firm opposition." He said that the Romanian leaders had not approached the other Warsaw Pact members about the invasion. Summing up the U.S. view, Ambassador Bohlen reiterated the substance of the President's statement./2/ He added that there had never been any question of spheres of influence, either at Yalta or now. Ambassador Bohlen handed Ambassador Bogdan a Department press release to this effect./3/ Ambassador Bohlen reiterated the Department's and the Secretary's desire to stay in close touch on these developments. /2/For text of the President's August 21 statement, see Department of State Bulletin, September 9, 1968, p. 261. /3/Department of State press release No. 196, August 23; not found.
164. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Leddy) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/ Washington, August 24, 1968. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Romania, Cables, Vol. 3. Secret. Drafted by Beaudry. SUBJECT EUR is giving consideration to the following possible lines of action, on a contingency basis, in the event of Soviet invasion of Romania: 1. Increase in NATO vigilance measures bringing them to the visible level. 2. Return to Europe of United States air and ground forces currently being returned under "reforger" and "crested cap". 3. Reinforcement of the Berlin garrison. 4. Preparations permitting us to extend military assistance to Yugoslavia if Tito requests it. 5. Beefing up of the naval forces in the Mediterranean with additional Marine elements. 6. Take public action to inhibit further cultural, scientific and other contacts with the USSR and the other occupying powers.
165. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, August 30, 1968, 9 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Bohlen Files: Lot 74 D 379. Secret; Limdis. No drafting information is on source text; the memorandum was approved in S on September 3. The meeting was held in Secretary Rusk's office. For a telegraphic report of this meeting, see Document 90. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS The Secretary Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador The Secretary noted that the Ambassador had asked to see him August 31 and inquired whether or not he could take up now the matter for which he had asked for an appointment. The Ambassador looked somewhat surprised but said he had been instructed to make an oral communication, a copy of which is attached./2/ He said he had been instructed to see either the President or the Secretary. /2/Not attached. A copy is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Walt Rostow Files, Czech 1968. When the Ambassador had finished his oral statement, the Secretary reminded him that at their last meeting he had referred to disturbing reports in regard to Romania./3/ /3/See Document 87. The Ambassador said he had reported his conversation but had received no reply. The Secretary said that we continue to get reports that were disturbing and that in the last 24 hours we had received a number of reports of troop movements, incidents on the frontier, etc. He asked whether the Ambassador had any basis on which he could give him assurances that action against Romania was not intended. Dobrynin said he had no official information but that he personally doubted that any such action was contemplated. The Secretary said that if such action were contemplated, he wished in the name of all humanity to ask that it not be done. The results of such action on world affairs would be incalculable. Dobrynin inquired if the Romanians felt the same way. He referred to reports that the Romanian Ambassador had called in the Department. The Secretary said we had no reports whatever from the Romanians. He wished, however, to underline the gravity of this problem. We were deeply concerned. He hoped the Ambassador would not misinterpret his moderate manner. Our attitude was based upon well-known principles that had motivated us throughout our history. Our attitude on Czechoslovakia was not related to our bilateral relations with that country which were not particularly good. We believed, however, that every country, large or small, had a right to national existence. We respect that among our NATO allies and we thought the Soviets should respect it among their Warsaw Pact allies. We cannot understand how the state interests of the Soviet Union were involved in any way that would justify military action. Czechoslovakia was not going to leave the Warsaw Pact or join NATO and no one was threatening them. We wished to express in strongest terms the expectation that the Soviet Union does not contemplate the further use of military force against any countries of Eastern Europe. The Secretary said he wished again to underline the seriousness with which we took the Ambassador's statement to the President on August 20/4/ and repeated today, that the Soviet Union did not intend in any way to threaten the state interests of the US. He wished to point out that among these interests was Berlin. Frankly, we did not trust Ulbricht. We wished to emphasize the gravity of any move with respect to Berlin in the current situation. He also wished to point out that the thoughts he had expressed carried the authority of the President with whom he had just talked by telephone. The Secretary said he would be available any time, day or night, if the Ambassador had anything to say to him. /4/See Document 80. Dobrynin asked if he could report that he had made his oral statement and that the Secretary would study it and comment later. The Secretary agreed but said he could say now with respect to the reference in the statement to revanchist and imperialist threats to socialist countries that there was no such threat, no CIA plot, there was no intrusion into any of these countries in a manner hostile to the Soviet Union. We could not accept a statement that revanchists or imperialists were carrying out any threat to any of these countries. Dobrynin referred to a UPI statement on the ticker and wondered whether this was officially inspired. It had referred to a possible meeting between Kosygin and the President as well as to the effect of Czech developments upon our cultural relations. The Secretary said he would have to look at the stories before he could comment but he urged the Ambassador not to confuse any such reports with what he had said to him this evening. He said the President had been trying to make clear our attitudes on Czechoslovakia but he had also wished to keep our options open. The President thought that the Soviet action against Czechoslovakia was a great mistake on the part of the Soviet Union and that the US respects the right of a small country even though it was one with which our relations were not good, but the President still thinks that there are major problems that need attention. The President had had many phone calls and direct statements made to him that we were not strong enough on Czechoslovakia. If there were additional actions of this kind, it would be a great tragedy. The Secretary said that the American people are pretty mad about the Czechoslovakian affair. Anything that happened between our two great countries could be tragic for the whole world.
166. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Romania/1/ Washington, August 31, 1968, 2147Z. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-1 COMBLOC-CZECH. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Drafted by Kaplan and approved by Leddy. Repeated to Moscow, Belgrade, and Prague. 231372. Subject: Bogdan-Leddy Conversation. 1. In uninstructed call which, however, approved by Foreign Minister Manescu, Romanian Ambassador Bogdan inquired August 31 as to nature any new evidence on Soviet intentions which may have triggered Presidential statement August 30./2/ Leddy replied that military-type evidence remained inconclusive but that, on basis potentially ominous request by Dobrynin for appointment with Secretary for August 31 morning and similar requests by Soviets in certain other capitals, Secretary had decided call in Dobrynin evening August 30./3/ Our concern over possibility Soviets might intervene in Romania had led to last-minute inclusion of Eastern European portion of President's speech. /2/For text of President Johnson's August 30 speech, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968-69, Book II, pp. 917-920. /3/See Document 165. 2. Leddy briefly characterized Dobrynin oral statement defending Soviet action in Czechoslovakia and read aloud pertinent last paragraph giving first priority to defending socialism. (Deptel 231323)/4/ /4/Dated August 31. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-1 COMBLOC-CZECH) 3. Leddy informed Bogdan of general theme of Dobrynin's communication and partial substance Secretary's remarks on Romania reported Deptel 231337./5/ Main points mentioned by Leddy were: (a) Secretary said various reports received during past 24 hours had been disturbing. (b) Dobrynin replied he had no information. (c) Secretary said if Soviets contemplated invasion of Romania, we ask in name of humanity, that it not be done and that such action would have incalculable effects on world situation. (d) Secretary emphasized to Dobrynin none of reports re possible invasion to which we had referred had come from Romanians. /5/Document 90. 4. Bogdan appreciated info and said Manescu had planned depart Bucharest in order receive UK Foreign Secretary Stewart in Bucharest next week but had decided remain New York until situation clearer. Rusk
167. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, September 1, 1968, 0344Z. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Czech Crisis. Secret. Received at the LBJ Ranch on August 31 at 11:01 p.m., CDT. CAP 82331. Subject: Rusk-Dobrynin meeting. State 231374./2/ /2/Telegram 231374, September 1, provided a summary of the August 30 Rusk-Dobrynin conversation and the August 31 Leddy-Bogdan conversation to NATO capitals. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-1 COMBLOC-CZECH) 1. Soviet Amb Dobrynin at his request called on Secretary at home evening Aug 31 shortly before 8 pm EDT. Dobrynin's oral communication was in effect official message in response to Secretary's request for assurance from the Soviets regarding Rumania and the Secretary's warning on Berlin. 2. Dobrynin said that fears and rumors regarding Soviet military moves against Rumania were completely without foundation and also that there would be no such moves against Berlin. 3. Regarding Berlin, however, Dobrynin said that Tag der Heimat was kind of demonstration in Berlin that created problems for the Soviets which US should take seriously into account.
168. Telegram From the Embassy in Romania to the Department of State/1/ Bucharest, September 1, 1968, 1125Z. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL ROM-US. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Repeated to Belgrade, Moscow, and Prague. 2410. Subj: Call on Acting FonMin Sandru. Ref State 231374./2/ /2/See footnote 2, Document 167. 1. At my request I saw Sandru at 1030 Sept 1 and followed almost identical scenario as in Bogdan-Leddy conversation described reftel in informing Romanian Govt background of President's remarks on Eastern Europe Aug 30 and Secretary's conversation Aug 30 and 31 pertaining to Romania./3/ /3/Regarding the Rusk-Dobrynin talks of August 30 and 31, see Documents 165 and 167. Regarding President Johnson's remarks, see footnote 3, Document 166. 2. In briefly describing Dobrynin oral statement defending Soviet action in Czechoslovakia, I read aloud to Sandru first paragraph of statement as well as pertinent last paragraph giving first priority to defending socialism. 3. I said in communicating these facts, we were not attempting to evaluate Dobrynin message. 4. Sandru thanked me for this information and said he was sure Romanian Govt would appreciate it./4/ /4/In telegram 2409 from Bucharest, September 1, the Embassy reported that in the course of his conversation with the Ambassador, Sandru stated that his government had no information on troop concentrations on Romania's borders and denied that any border incidents had occurred. (Department of State, Central Files, POL ROM-US) Davis
169. Telegram From the Embassy in Romania to the Department of State/1/ Washington, September 6, 1968, 1620Z. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 ROM. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to Belgrade, Berlin, Bonn, Budapest, London, Moscow, Munich, USUN, USNATO, Paris, Prague, Sofia, and Warsaw. 2478. Subject: Meeting with FonMin Manescu. 1. Manescu received me for fifty minutes at 1530 Sept 6 and in response my initial query for his views current situation now that he had been back in Romania for few days made following points: A. Manescu had just seen President Ceausescu and Premier Maurer and they again asked Manescu transmit through me, as Manescu had done through Ball in Sept/2/ appreciation of Romanian government and of themselves personally for President's Aug 30 statement which they considered wise and efficacious. Manescu said statement had had "cooling" effect on a dangerous curve which might have led to the worst. /2/In telegram 6368 from USUN, September 3, Ball reported that he had "met briefly" with Manescu the previous day. Manescu "was basically relaxed though not unconcerned" about the possibility of Soviet intervention. (Ibid., POL 27-1 COMBLOC-CZECH) B. Danger was not completely over and it was important that this statement, which President said was not on behalf of any particular administration but the position of the United States, should not be allowed to die, to be discarded or pigeonholed. Manescu did not presume to advise on how this could be done but Romanian leaders thought statement still served useful purpose. C. Though Manescu's first meeting with Ball had been noted in Romanian press, last one had not nor had President's statement -- all for "obvious reasons." Nevertheless he could assure me that Romanians not just government were aware of this statement and the Soviet reaction thereto in Washington and elsewhere and they appreciated what President had done. D. Manescu paid tribute to Secretary for making point to Dobrynin that US information and actions not based on anything Romanians had said. E. Romania remained faithful to its commitments but otherwise was determined to make its own decisions in its own interests as it saw them without any dictation from outside. It desired to have good relations with all states. Whether Romania had relations with this or that state was a question only for Romania. G. Expressed his own deep appreciation for understanding and treatment he had experienced in New York especially for part played by Secretary, Ambassador Ball and Buffum. 2. I gave Manescu gist of Yugoslav and Romanian reports of Soviet troop deployments in Hungary and Bulgaria as well as our evaluation of these reports contained State 232256./3/ Nevertheless I would like to have his views. Manescu replied that as he had said before "danger was not over." Romania remained watchful. However, Manescu neither confirmed nor denied these reports. But he asserted firmly that Romania was determined to defend itself against invasion. /3/Telegram 232256, September 4, forwarded Yugoslav and Romanian reports on Warsaw Pact troop movements. (Ibid., POL 27-1 RUM) 3. Referring to report (Bucharest 2477)/4/ coming to Embassy's attention only this morning that Soviets had delivered "ultimatum" two days ago demanding cessation of provocative statements by Romanians and permission for Soviet troops to transit Romania to Bulgaria, Manescu replied saying first alleged Soviet request for joint maneuvers on Romanian soil had been subject discussion with Ball on Sept 2. He said it true that one or two years ago small limited joint maneuver had been held in Romania. He could now say on authority of Ceausescu that no such request had been received from USSR recently. As for this morning's report reaching Embassy Romania would not and could not change its attitude toward invasion of Czechoslovakia for to do so would be to invite similar action against itself, he denied knowledge of reported request for transit of Soviet troops to Bulgaria but said he would nevertheless convey this report to Ceausescu and Maurer. Manescu commented that natural in dangerous situation people should become somewhat alarmed and he specifically referred to especially large purchases of sugar and flour by population. /4/Telegram 2477, September 6, reported signs of Romanian apprehension regarding Soviet intentions. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Romania, Cables, Vol. 3) 4. Comment: I have little doubt that Manescu came from seeing Ceausescu and Maurer as he was five minutes late for our appointment and had sent his secretary-interpreter Celac to waiting room who explained Manescu had been delayed at Council of Ministers. Manescu, while outwardly calm and measured in expressing his views, appeared clearly worried that, as he put it, "danger was not entirely over." Davis
170. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ SecDel/MC/13 New York, October 1, 1968, 1:15-3:15 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 70 D 418, CF 320. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Kaplan and approved in S on October 14. The meeting was held during the Secretary's luncheon at the Waldorf Towers. The source text is labeled "Part I of II;" part II of the discussion dealing with Vietnam is ibid., Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. SECRETARY'S DELEGATION TO THE TWENTY-THIRD SESSION SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS Romania: United States: Reviewing the situation and sequence of events in late August, Secretary Rusk said that there had been insufficient time for consultation with the Romanian Government prior to his meetings with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin and the President's speech of August 30. We had had sophisticated information that day which we did not at all like, and our failure to contact the Romanians was surely not intended to be discourteous. The Secretary recalled that the Soviets had come back to us within 24 hours of his August 30 meeting with Dobrynin with assurances, for whatever they were worth, that they would not invade Romania. Minister Manescu reiterated his understanding of this situation and repeated the Romanian Government's appreciation for our efforts. The Secretary told Minister Manescu that, in these contacts with the Soviets, we had made completely clear that none of the information on which our concern was based had come from Romanian sources. Manescu expressed his gratitude, adding that it would have been a matter of considerable concern had such assurances not been given to the Soviets. He reviewed his contacts with Ambassadors Ball and Buffum during the late August-early September period. He said that although the Romanian Government, for understandable reasons of its own, had not published the President's Texas statement of August 30, the Romanian people were well aware of it via foreign radio. The Secretary said that we are not entirely sure of what is on the minds of the Soviet leaders at present. He thought that they may be frightened of their own idea of peaceful coexistence and that they certainly were displaying little understanding of the US motivation in building bridges to the Soviet Union and other countries of Eastern Europe. Against this background, the Secretary said he would refrain from mentioning Romania and Yugoslavia specifically in his October 2 speech before the UNGA, although he intended to mention Czechoslovakia and the important September 26 article in Pravda on the alleged Soviet right to intervene in the affairs of other nations./2/ The Secretary said that we consider that we have categorical assurances from the USSR and prefer, therefore, not to cast public doubt on this in our UNGA statement. /2/Reference is to the Brezhnev Doctrine; see footnote 4, Document 23. For text of Secretary Rusk's speech, see Department of State Bulletin, October 21, 1968, pp. 405-410. Manescu said that the Czechoslovaks had gotten themselves into an impossible position, both domestically and internationally, and had not known what to do. One of the real tragedies of the Czechoslovak situation was that, throughout the Dubcek period since January 1968, the Czechoslovaks had still considered the Soviets to be their best friends. Their euphoric attitude had been very clear during the visit he had made with President Ceausescu to Prague a short time before the invasion. The Secretary said that a repeat performance by the Soviets in Romania would elicit a much stronger Western reaction than had been evident in the case of Czechoslovakia. The Secretary said the Romanians had these cards in their hands: 1) the attitude of the Romanian people, 2) the conscience of the Soviets and their Warsaw Pact followers, 3) the fact that an invasion of Romania would risk a fundamental breach of relations between the USSR and the West, and 4) the predictably furious response of world public opinion. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that Ambassador Dobrynin had told him only two weeks before the invasion that the fundamental question for the USSR was the Communist Party leadership in the countries of Eastern Europe. The Secretary added--and Minister Manescu agreed--that the Romanians posed no problem in this regard. The Secretary expressed US concern over the fact that, for the first time in several years, we did not know what was on the Soviet mind. He found it significant that the Soviet leaders had not spoken out on the Eastern European situation but that the only Soviet reaction had come in what amounted to anonymous articles. It seems clear that the Soviets continue to want some kind of bilateral relationship with the US, the Secretary said, but they must realize that actions such as those taken toward Czechoslovakia make this extremely difficult. The Soviets, in fact, had specifically asked that nuclear missile talks continue. The Secretary asked whether it would be better from the Romanian standpoint to have tensions reduced or to maintain them for an indefinite period. Manescu replied that the major issues raised by the Soviet threat should be kept alive while the local situation in Eastern Europe is permitted to calm down. The US, Manescu said, must make clear, though not in a cold war spirit, that the Soviets cannot do as they please. The Secretary replied that we have conveyed this message privately and that a judgment as to whether to make a public challenge of it depends on an assessment of whether it would be helpful or not. Minister Manescu recalled that two prominent Westerners, Foreign Ministers Stewart and Harmel, had come to Romania since the invasion for long-scheduled visits. He appreciated this and said that normal East-West relations of this type should be maintained. Ambassador Buffum asked whether the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia should be a separate agenda item at the UN or whether the subject should be discussed generally. Minister Manescu replied that it would be neither wise nor useful to try for an agenda item.The Secretary said that, although there would be considerable attention to this subject in the general debate, that there would be problems with a separate item. The Czechoslovaks themselves would oppose it, and many of the other 125 members would take that as a comfortable answer. It would be unwise to have a special item with a bad vote. Minister Manescu was not entirely certain that the vote would be bad but thought that the Czecho-slovak representatives would be placed in an unfavorable position in that they would no longer appear to have the right to resort to UN bodies when an actual need arose. Secretary Rusk, speaking personally and privately, informed Minister Manescu that Ambassador Duda had called on him to request that the Soviet invasion not be a special item. Duda had said that the Czechoslovaks would have more maneuverability if the subject were discussed in more general terms./3/ Manescu said that the new Czechoslovak Ambassador to the UN, Cernik, had made the same point. /3/See Document 95. Manescu said he hoped that the Secretary's scheduled speech of October 2 would not "unleash the dogs of cold war." The Secretary replied that he would speak with his usual unfailing courtesy. Minister Manescu said that was what he was afraid of.
171. Intelligence Information Cable/1/ [document number not declassified] Bucharest, November 21, 1968. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Romania, Possible Warsaw Pact Invasion. Secret; No Foreign Dissemination; Controlled Dissemination; No Dissemination Abroad; Background Use Only. COUNTRY DOI SUBJECT ACQ SOURCE 1. On 20 November 1968 a senior member of the [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] to the United Nations who is known to be affiliated [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] intelligence discussed current Rumanian-Soviet relations. The [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] official stated that at the present time the discussions between Rumania and the USSR concerning military matters, notably the presence of Warsaw Pact troops in Rumania, have reached a critical stage. In these discussions which have involved a recent trip to Moscow (29-30 October 1968) by the Rumanian Minister of the Armed Forces, Colonel General Ion Ionita, and simultaneous negotiations in Moscow and Bucharest, the Soviet Union has requested: a. The right to station troops permanently in Rumania; b. Rumanian approval of the passage of Soviet troops through Rumania at any time at the request of the USSR; and c. Rumanian approval for the conduct of Warsaw Pact maneuvers in Rumania in the near future. 2. The [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] stated that in their negotiations with the Rumanian Government the Soviet officials had emphasized the following considerations: a. That as a Warsaw Pact member Rumania is obligated to cooperate with the other Warsaw Pact members in undertaking actions aimed at furthering the objectives of the Warsaw Pact; all three items raised with Rumania fall in this category. b. The actions in question must be undertaken in the near future and not postponed because they constitute essential portions of the military dispositions necessary to protect the Warsaw Pact area from "possible military movement from the direction of Yugoslavia." 3. The [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] stated that the Rumanian Government currently finds itself in a very difficult situation vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, but [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] the government does not intend to accede to the three requests by the USSR. 4. Field dissem: None (also sent USUN).
172. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union/1/ Washington, November 23, 1968, 1926Z. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL EUR E. Confidential; Exdis. Drafted by Toon and approved by Katzenbach. Also sent to USNATO and repeated to Belgrade, Bucharest, and London. 276992. When Under Secretary saw Soviet Ambassador November 22 on another matter, he touched briefly on the current situation in Eastern Europe. Under Secretary said that rumors of increased military activity in Eastern Europe had come to our attention, that as was his practice he had no wish to make official démarche on basis of rumors and that he would prefer to rely on assurances given Secretary by Dobrynin in late August with regard to other possible Soviet moves in Eastern Europe following the invasion of Czechoslovakia./2/ Dobrynin asked if Under Secretary were questioning assurances of late August in which case he would formally ask Moscow if they were still valid. Under Secretary said he was not questioning assurances and asked if there were any question in Dobrynin's mind with regard to their continuing validity. Dobrynin said that he had no doubt that the statements he made to the Secretary in late August remained valid. /2/See Document 167. Rusk
173. Airgram From the Embassy in Romania to the Department of State/1/ A-517 Bucharest, December 9, 1968. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 ROM. Confidential. Drafted by deMartino. Repeated to Belgrade, Berlin, Bonn, Budapest, London, Moscow, Munich, USNATO, Paris, Prague, Sofia, and Warsaw. SUBJECT REF /2/Airgram A-473, October 24, reported on the continuity of Romania's national Communist policies in the wake of the Czech invasion. (Ibid., POL 27-1 COMBLOC-CZECH) Summary The following review of the Romanian situation is an updated and slightly expanded version of a briefing paper prepared for Mr. James Lowenstein, Consultant to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, who visited here on November 28-30. It expresses the view, already set forth in the airgram under reference, that the Romanians are determined to hold to the essentials of national communism. Introduction It is clear that the Soviets are trying to take maximum advantage of the invasion of Czechoslovakia in order to consolidate their hold on Eastern Europe including Romania. The Romanians are under indirect pressure resulting from the logic of the situation, namely that the Soviets are willing to use force in Eastern Europe in order to achieve their objectives. They are also under direct pressure in terms of Soviet demands on a number of important substantive issues (in this connection, we would not be at all surprised if the most recent spate of rumors of an imminent invasion of Romania had not been deliberately encouraged by the Soviets in order to frighten the Romanians into making substantive concessions). The new situation in Eastern Europe has had significant effects on the internal scene where the Romanians are looking for increased support from the population. And, of course, it has also affected foreign policy where, to a limited degree, the Romanians are lying low, although otherwise acting in accordance with the precepts of national communism. Internal Situation One of the main characteristics of the internal situation is the continuation of the regime's highly controlled and gradual liberalization despite (one might even say because of) the new situation in Eastern Europe. This can be noted in a number of areas. In internal security affairs, the Secret Police continue to be on a short leash, there have been several rehabilitations of people sentenced in the 1950's, the emphasis in speeches is on socialist legality, and the latest Grand National Assembly session (November 11-13) passed a new Code of Criminal Procedure which on the face of it is a better guarantee of individual rights than the previous one. In addition, the regime shows every sign of relaxing somewhat its stringent restrictions on travel abroad. In the cultural sphere, although the official line sounds very conservative, in practice the regime seems to be increasingly tolerant of unorthodox art and varying trends in literature. As for the economic sphere, the search for efficiency is no doubt an important factor in the continued quiet work behind the scenes on a limited degree of economic decentralization. Decentralization is also one of the key aspects of the reform of higher education, implemented at the beginning of October, as a result of which the universities and other institutes of higher education will exercise some of the powers previously exercised by the Ministry of Education. No doubt the regime believes that steady (albeit very limited) progress in the direction of internal relaxation will win it a greater measure of popular support. The search for increased support is also behind the recent measures affecting the minorities. Following an RCP Plenum in October, county and central nationality councils of the Hungarians and the Germans were established. (There are also county, Ukrainian and Serbian councils.) Although their functions have been only vaguely defined in official speeches, this is a gesture of considerable significance. As for the intellectuals, Ceausescu's recent speeches (at the Universities of Cluj and Iasi) showed his concern for their preoccupations and a significant number of intellectuals have been elected to leading positions in the new Front of Socialist Unity which serves to symbolize and (so the regime hopes) to encourage national unity. Foreign Affairs The attempt of the Soviets to consolidate their hold over the socialist camp is taking place in a number of different contexts. They are trying to "strengthen" or "tighten up" the Warsaw Pact. Although we know very little about the detailed proposals, we have reports of varying reliability that at one time or another the Soviets have demanded integrated military units, more power for the Warsaw Pact Commander-in-Chief, increasing the size of the Romanian Armed Forces, and increasing the standardization of equipment throughout the Warsaw Pact countries. They have also been pressing for Warsaw Pact maneuvers in Romania. The Romanians will probably cooperate to some extent on some of these demands, and Romanian agreement to beefing up or tightening up the Warsaw Pact is in fact a concession since the Romanians would prefer that there not be any pacts at all in Europe and, short of that, that the Warsaw Pact organization be as quiescent as possible. However, we do not anticipate that the Romanians will be willing to give up national control of their Armed Forces to any significant degree. Certainly, this would be inconsistent with Ceausescu's categorical rejection in his November 29 speech of any renunciation of sovereignty in the Warsaw Pact context (Bucharest 3174)./3/ Moreover, we gather that in compensation for their willingness to play along on some matters, the Romanians are pressing for a greater Eastern European voice in Warsaw Pact affairs. As far as maneuvers in Romania go, we have it on very good authority that they have agreed in principle to such maneuvers in 1969, but this agreement is subject to a government-to-government agreement specifying the exact duration and location of the exercise and the size of the forces participating therein. /3/Dated December 2. (Ibid., POL 15-1 ROM) The Soviets and their allies also seem eager once again to try to enhance the authority of CEMA, although here we know even less about their specific proposals. In any event, Romanian opposition to giving CEMA supranational powers was flatly reasserted by Ceausescu in the speech referred to above. The Soviets have succeeded in obtaining the agreement of many communist parties, including the Romanians, to holding a World Communist Conference in Moscow in May of next year. Romanian agreement to a conference at any specific time is indeed a concession since all along the Romanian argument has been that while a conference is desirable in principle, in practice the conditions are not propitious (this is a reference to the refusal of the Chinese and some other communist parties to have anything to do with it). Perhaps the Romanians felt they could make this concession more readily now that the Italian, Austrian and French CP's had agreed to hold the meeting. In any event, the real measure of Romanian willingness to be conciliatory on this issue is not so much whether they attend a conference as whether they agree to a binding line which would have an adverse effect on their relations with Peking and other communist parties opposed to Moscow or independent of Moscow and on their relations with the FRG and the West in general. The thrust and tone of Ceausescu's comments on the world communist movement in his November 29 speech make it very unlikely, in our opinion, that the Romanians would adhere to such a line. Meanwhile, the pattern of Romanian foreign relations continues much as usual. Although in the immediate aftermath of the invasion of Czechoslovakia the Romanians were perhaps sensitive to the visibility of their ties with West Germany, Israel and the United States, at the present time relations with these three countries are normal and insofar as the United States is concerned they are, if anything, improved. Thus, there is a breakthrough on the issuance of visas for Romanians emigrating to the United States, and the just-signed Cultural and Atomic Energy Agreements and the Agreement with IREX reflect the Romanian desire to expand cultural and scientific relations with us. In addition, negotiations are about to start on a civil air agreement between Romania and the United States. Romanian relations with other countries of the non-communist world are following the usual pattern, and Manescu's recent trip to Latin America shows that the Romanians are indeed anxious to further expand them. At the same time, Romanians remain neutral in the Sino-Soviet conflict and maintain their cordial relations with Peking. Conclusion Romanian national communism has already suffered some setback. This is certainly true to the extent that the Romanians are no longer saying loudly and openly what they really think about Czechoslovakia. It is also true to the extent that the Romanians, as noted above, presumably feel obliged to make some limited concessions of a substantive nature on important bloc issues (e.g. the Warsaw Pact and the World Communist Conference). The Romanian leadership itself, for all Ceausescu's assertiveness, must be uncertain to what extent it can salvage national communism such as it has developed since the early 1960's. Presumably, they hope that by trimming their sails for a while they will be able to ride out the storm. At this time, and assuming the Soviets do not bring military pressure to bear, we believe that the Romanians will hold on to the fundamentals of independence not only because freedom from control by Moscow is essential doctrine but because Ceausescu himself cannot afford, if he wishes to maintain his personal ascendancy, to go very far down the road of concessions. In addition, a number of factors are helping the Romanians to keep their noses above water. One of these is the disunity in the communist movement, and the continued opposition of important communist parties to Soviet policy toward Czechoslovakia. Another factor is the absence, so far, of a real revival of the East-West Cold War, the compulsions of which would greatly reduce Romanian freedom of maneuver. And, finally, there is the fact that the Czechs themselves are cooperating to a degree. If there were a bloodbath in Czechoslovakia and the Soviets imposed direct control there, the Romanians would feel under even greater pressure than now. Davis
174. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Romania/1/ Washington, December 12, 1968, 1828Z. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 17 ROM. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Tihany, cleared in EUR/RPM, and approved by Toon. Also sent to Moscow and USNATO. 286014. Subject: Secretary Rusk Receives Romanian Ambassador: European Questions. Following, based on uncleared memcon,/2/ is FYI, Noforn and subject to review. Secretary received Ambassador Bogdan at his request for 45 minutes morning December 10. Bogdan leaving for consultations and home leave December 11. Tour d'horizon covered following European topics: /2/Copies of the memoranda of conversation dealing with European affairs, the Middle East, and Vietnam are ibid., POL EUR, POL 27-ARAB ISR, and POL 27 VIET S, respectively. 1. Brezhnev Doctrine (BD). Secretary brought up and expressed concern about so-called BD./3/ We cannot accept, he explained, principle that relations among sovereign states of same system purely internal matter for Moscow. This could lead to titanic struggle among limited number of great powers. Some day BD could create problem for Romania. Ambassador should tell Foreign Minister Manescu, Secretary regrets press leak at recent NATO meeting due to indiscretion on part two delegations in revealing private discussion among Ministers, but does not apologize for discussing effect on NATO security of what happens outside NATO boundaries. Bogdan responded Romanian position on BD made clear several times, most recently in Ceausescu speech December 1, which asserted possibility participation in Warsaw Pact and membership in socialist community without diminished sovereignty. Personally, Bogdan remarked, he is interested in the recent discussion of NATO Ministers on subject whether Romania does or does not belong to "gray zone." Secretary replied press comment went too far. We do not intend expand area of NATO responsibilities, he explained, but cannot remain unconcerned when, as in the case of Czechoslovakia last summer, Soviet forces move forward west and south. Secretary and Ambassador agreed best present procedure is to continue work toward détente, in spite of difficulties, quietly and without fanfare, outside as well as inside UN. /3/See footnote 4, Document 23. 2. European Situation. Bogdan asked how Secretary views European situation after NATO November meeting. Secretary replied new element in situation is Soviet leaders' demonstrated ability make decisions for which heavy price must be paid: worsening of relations with Czechoslovakia, disruption of East-West relations, antagonizing world opinion. What does this mean? Ideological step backward? Fright over development of East-West coexistence? People capable making Czech-type decision also capable of facing world with other unpredictable decisions. This is why NATO must now improve quality of its forces. Europe is not third force between US and Soviet Union. Contention between these two powers not over polar bears in Arctic, but over security of Europe, which is primary issue. We have a national interest in reasonably correct relations between Eastern and Western Europe, even if we do not have as many illusions as some of our West European friends. We have a national interest as well in the future of Germany. 3. Germany. Bogdan asked how Secretary envisaged solution German question. Secretary replied solution will take time and will be work of German people themselves, East and West. Solution will be acceptable to US in case German people decide there should be two separate Germanys; also, if they agree two countries should come together. Bogdan commented unification of Germany of concern to Bucharest, indeed a difficult and painful subject, because there are Germans, both East and West, who are not interested in unification alone. Rusk [Continue with the next documents] Volume XVII Index | Foreign Relations Online | Historian's Office | |