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 | FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968 Volume XVII Eastern Europe Department of State |
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| 149. Telegram From the Embassy in Romania to the Department of State/1/ Bucharest, March 18, 1965, 4 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 RUM. Confidential. Repeated to Paris. 590. Paris A-1859 to Department and Department CA-9208./2/ Embassy finds Iacobescu's comments most pertinent and believes he is on the level. Though possibly somewhat over-dramatized for effect, his statements closely reflect sentiments shared in official circles here. No question that there is very real concern within Rumanian Government how long it can continue get away with independent policies in face of possibly tightening Soviet pressures and that government is actively seeking extensive reassurance in West particularly through strengthening economic and other ties with US. Also clear this one of major reasons why Rumanians attach such importance to successful outcome current financial and industrial talks in US. As Rumanian officials have recently indicated to us, eyes not only of Rumanian Government but of entire Communist bloc are now directed toward our response in these matters to test whether we really mean business in applying policy of bridge-building and differentiated approaches in Eastern Europe. Moreover effectiveness of RPRs continuing independent policies will be judged in no small measure in terms of our reaction. /2/Airgram A-1859 from Paris was not found. Circular airgram CA-9208, March 12, is ibid., UNESCO 22-20 RUM. Iacobescu's comments conform to recently established Rumanian pattern more candid discussions with Western delegations in major international organizations as well as growing effort strengthen relations with such organizations including some in which RPR not necessarily member state (i.e. IMF, IBRD, GATT, and EEC). In Embassy's view attempts by Rumanians to continue develop own course demand thoughtful and positive response to such approaches by all US agencies along lines indicated Department's CA-9208. Iacobescu would seem be contact well worth pursuing and same would apply to Valentin Lipatti, new Rumanian Permanent Representative to UNESCO. Crawford
150. Minutes of Meeting of the Export Control Review Board/1/ Washington, April 1, 1965, 4:15 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 10. Secret. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS Members Invitees In Attendance Secretary Connor opened the meeting by summarizing the cases before the Board./2/ They concern: /2/The cases are more specifically listed in the Executive Secretary's Summary of Facts and Arguments, dated February 4, 1965. [Footnote in the source text.] (a) Advanced catalyst material for use in making high octane gasoline. Formerly this catalyst was approved for export to bloc countries, but in 1964 technicians found that the U.S. catalyst is superior to foreign material, and since then it has been denied. In October 1964, State concurred in denying a quantity to the USSR. (b) Advanced catalyst technology in written and oral form, to teach Rumania how to make most efficient use of the catalyst material. Commerce technicians find this technology goes well beyond normal operating and maintenance instructions; would contribute significantly to fund of technical knowledge of catalysts generally. (c) Advanced petroleum exploration equipment--Nine cases involving various kinds, all containing extractable technology, and important to help Rumania conduct deep drilling operations. Vastly superior to anything available abroad, and would enable Rumania to deep drill for needed additional supplies of oil. (d) Anti-knock compound. Available abroad in comparable quality and ample quantity. However, important to increase octane rating of gasoline. Rumania supplies North Viet Nam with 20% of its gasoline, and other petroleum products. Secretary Connor noted that at the ACEP (Assistant-Secretary-Level committee), Defense, Interior, and Commerce had recommended denial. State had recommended approval and appealed to the ECRB. He, accordingly, asked Secretary Rusk to state his position. Deputy Secretary Vance interjected at this point that he and Secretary McNamara do not necessarily agree with the position taken by the Defense representatives at the earlier meeting. Secretary Rusk began by observing that none of these cases concern COCOM embargo items. Accordingly, the question is whether the U.S. should be more restrictive toward Rumania than the other COCOM countries. He does not believe it is in our national interest to be so restrictive in trade matters. There have in the last year been many changes in Rumania's relations with the USSR and the West. They have gone to the edge of the cliff in showing their independence of Moscow. Evidences of this nature are as follows: 1. Rumania has undertaken an educational program to bring home to its people their 15 years of exploitation by the USSR. 2. The Russian language is no longer being taught in the schools. 3. Rumania has raised the issue of recovering Bessarabia from the USSR, a sensitive point to the latter. 4. Rumania has granted a major amnesty to political prisoners. 5. Rumania has promised to respect a U.S. passport as assurance of safe exit for U.S. visitors, regardless of claims of dual nationality, old political crimes, etc. 6. Rumanian officials have made official visits to most major West European countries in pursuit of friendly trade and other relations. 7. Rumanian officials did not attend the recent Moscow conference. 8. On U.S. actions in Viet Nam, Rumania has been as quiet as any Communist State. No demonstrations have occurred; protests have been restrained. 9. The new Rumanian prime minister is anti-USSR and pro-Rumanian nationalism, apparently following the course of his recently deceased predecessor, Gheorghe Maurer. 10. In Secretary Rusk's own dealings with the Rumanian foreign minister, the latter has shown in outstanding ways his country's desire to be independent of the USSR--even to the point of wanting to have the same number of talks with Secretary Rusk as the USSR's representative. 11. Rumania is allowing an American hotel to be built. This is the kind of trend that was very noticeable at one period in Yugoslavia, and in another period in Poland. We should be ready to respond favorably to that trend here as we did in the cases of Yugoslavia and Poland. On this basis, it is in our interest to take a forthcoming attitude on trade relations with Rumania. If we seem to close the door to them in areas like this where we have discretion--even before any Congressional problems have to be faced on such necessarily legislative matters as MFN treatment--then we will be injecting an unrequired negative element. That would not be in our interest, especially as the same kinds of items, even though with less sophistication, are available. Thus it is our interest to license these cases as a means of keeping the doors open, of stimulating their favorable responses toward our policies, and of encouraging normal relations between our two countries. Secretary Connor observed that foreign deep drilling equipment is not of the same kind as ours; that our technicians have found ours to be vastly superior. Secretary Udall said that the U.S. drilling equipment is substantially better in quality than that made in other countries. We would be giving Rumania here something not available to them elsewhere. Secretary Connor asked Mr. Cline to inform the members regarding Rumania's shipping of petroleum products to North Viet Nam, Communist China, and Cuba. Mr. Cline replied, as follows: In 1963, Rumania supplied somewhat less than 20% of North Viet Nam's petroleum products, with the USSR providing the balance. In 1964, the Rumanian share was 17%. For 1965, we have only one report to date, 500 tons of lubricants in one February shipment. The Rumanian shipments were primarily of motor and diesel fuels, but there is no evidence of kerosene or jet fuels. It was shipped by sea to North Viet Nam. There is no evidence the Rumanian shipments have ceased. Some free world countries do supply North Viet Nam substantial amounts of other kinds of goods, but no free world country is known to be supplying petroleum products to North Viet Nam. Rumania also shipped substantial amounts of petroleum products to Communist China, including 160,000 tons in 1964. This was primarily motor gas, kerosene, lubricants, and jet fuel./3/ The only free world shipments of petroleum to Communist China were by Iran in 1964. /3/At the meeting Mr. Cline inadvertently said there was a "relatively small amount of jet fuel." This is now corrected as the amount was fairly substantial. [Footnote in the source text.] Rumania ships very little petroleum products to Cuba, but did send Cuba substantial amounts of oil drilling equipment, about $2 million by the end of 1964. Oil exploration work is proceeding there, but not with much success. the Rumanian equipment is for drilling to about 3,500 meters. Deputy Secretary Vance said the key issue to him is whether Rumania has promised not to copy or reexport our equipment. Secretary Rusk replied that Rumania did so promise us in the negotiations last summer. Secretary Connor observed that the Rumanian promises do not appear to go all the way. Rumania has promised the U.S. products, designs and technology will not be transshipped or reexported, and that U.S. products will not be copied. However, Rumania's promise does not bar it from using our designs and technology to make products and sell them abroad. Also Rumania can incorporate into its own oil drilling equipment advanced features of U.S. equipment without actually copying same, and then sell their equipment anywhere. Secretary Udall added that U.S. oil industry representatives believe that the USSR is very much in need of advanced deep drilling equipment and that Rumania could not hold our equipment and technology away from the USSR, even if Rumania desired to live up to its promise to us. The U.S. oil industry is very much concerned about the effects of increased free world sales of Rumanian and Soviet petroleum products and takes a hard line against our supplying them with our best technology and equipment. Accordingly, he could not support an approval decision in these cases against the objections of the U.S. oil industry unless he could tell them that the Rumanian assurances can safely be relied on. The members at this point generally discussed the question of how long it would take Rumania to produce and export equipment based on copying or adopting ideas from our equipment. Deputy Secretary Vance thought it would take them 2 or 3 years, by which time we would have even better equipment in production. Mr. Hockersmith said that the length of time would vary, depending on the particular kind of equipment. Secretary Udall agreed. Mr. Cline, in response to a question, said that the equipment the Rumanians are seeking from us is more advanced than anything the USSR and other bloc countries presently have. He also noted that in 1964 Rumania signed a new agreement with the USSR to exchange technical know-how in oil, chemical and other industrial fields. Rumania's 1965 Trade Agreement with Communist China includes exports of petroleum equipment. Secretary Connor asked whether Rumania could or would attempt to hold U.S. technology and products against demands by the USSR, to the extent of resisting force. Secretary Rusk replied that the Rumanians have been behaving toward the USSR generally as though they are sure the time is past in which a country like Hungary would be held by Russian force. We have good reason to believe the Rumanians consider it is in their national interest to adhere to their assurances to us. After all, they want from us much more than the items involved in these cases. However, it is, of course, possible that the USSR could go in openly or otherwise and try to get our technology and equipment, and it could not be guaranteed that Rumania would resist or be successful in such effort. Secretary Rusk went on to say that Rumania is not taking an active role in carrying out CEMA agreements. In response to a question from Secretary Connor, Secretary Rusk agreed that none of the items in question was on the Shopping List of last summer./4/ However, he said, we expected they would be adding other things from time to time. /4/See Documents 142-144. Secretary Udall asked how, if these cases were approved, we could describe to Rumania the meaning of our approval from a diplomatic standpoint. Could we say that you are on trial; that more will be approved, if you show you are trustworthy. Secretary Rusk replied that we have reason to trust Rumania already. They are the most independent of all Communist countries relative to CEMA requirements, and they are most interested in increasing their trade with the West. However, he agreed that we could explain to Rumania that we consider these items important and are counting on their assurances being kept. He reiterated that Rumania has an interest in having much larger trade with us than in just these items. Secretary Connor observed that it is hard to call Rumania's desire to buy these items "trade". The variety of items is so small, and the quantities are limited to a few. This suggests they are only interested in samples to acquire our technology. If we approve these cases, we will be helping them to update their oil industry with the best U.S. technology, and at a cheap price. In response to a question from Secretary Rusk, Secretary Connor agreed that we license this same equipment for use in oil fields throughout the free world. However, he noted that in most of those areas the companies engaged in the exploration and drilling are affiliated with U.S. interests. In response to Secretary Connor's request for his views, Secretary Udall said that the U.S. petroleum industry and officials of his department take a hard line on selling Rumania and other bloc countries our advanced technology and advanced equipment containing extractable technology. "Maybe I'm softer", he said, "but I tend, on the basis of the discussion so far, to defer to State, if State feels so strongly about these cases for foreign policy reasons." Secretary Connor replied that this is not his attitude. He would, before favoring approval, wish to know what effects our approval would have on Rumania's oil industry, as well as its relations with both the Soviet bloc and the West. What course would our equipment enable Rumania to pursue? What avenues of independence would it open for Rumania that it presently does not have? "I see arguments on both sides", he said. "I would not vote yea with enthusiasm as I presently have reservations about Rumania's intentions." Deputy Secretary Vance then expressed the views of his department. He said that Secretary McNamara and he generally favor sales unless there are strong reasons against. On the drilling equipment he saw no strong reason for denial and would vote yea. The same for the catalyst material and anti-knock compound. As to the catalyst technology he said he was still uncertain, believing that a few more questions needed to be answered. Secretary Rusk then expressed his Department's views. He said that he would not have recommended approval of these cases two years ago, but so much has happened in Rumania in the last year regarding its relations with the USSR and the West. Therefore he would now "nudge the Rumanian development along" by approving these cases since they are among the several kinds of items Rumania is looking for from us. Responding to a question about whether MFN is one of the items that Rumania wants from us, and whether we would ask Congress to allow MFN to be given to Rumania if she pays her debts to us, Secretary Rusk said he hoped the U.S. would be able to give MFN treatment to imports from particular countries after we settle with them whatever has to be settled. Secretary Connor then said that he was opposed to approving the oil field equipment and the catalyst technology. He also did not like the implications regarding possible use by North Viet Nam of Rumanian gasoline that might be upgraded with the U.S. anti-knock compound, but he would approve it in a spirit of compromise, to give Rumania some of the items they have ordered. He would also approve the catalyst material. Deputy Secretary Vance asked about the importance of the U.S. catalyst technology. Mr. Wyman explained that Mr. Englehart had admitted to him that the U.S. catalyst material is superior to that available from France and other countries, and that the U.S. technology regarding its use is the best. Mr. Englehart was really not interested in selling Rumania the technology, but only the material. He had filed the application for the technology only because his competitor had applied to sell the technology too. At this point there was a general discussion of the catalyst use technology and the reason for its importance, and regarding the technology extractable from the petroleum drilling equipment. Secretary Rusk asked Secretary Connor whether his indicated opposition to approval of the drilling equipment and the catalyst technology applied only to Rumania, or extended to any country that might be a competitor of the U.S. Secretary Connor replied that he drew a distinction between free world and Soviet bloc competitors of the U.S., noting that this distinction is called for by Section 3(a) of the Export Control Act. Regarding Rumania, he asked Mr. Cline for pertinent figures and then emphasized that Rumania exports half the petroleum products it produces, and over half of that goes to other Soviet bloc countries. Next to the USSR, Rumania is the largest supplier of oil products to the bloc, with the USSR receiving most of Rumania's exports to the bloc. Secretary Connor asked Secretary Rusk whether we would supply oil directly to North Viet Nam. Secretary Rusk replied that we have no trade with North Viet Nam, but that if we were to take sanctions against Rumania because she sells oil to North Viet Nam we would have to do the same regarding a number of free world countries that also ship to North Viet Nam. Secretary Connor asked Mr. Cline whether the free world countries are known to be shipping oil or other militarily important materials to North Viet Nam. Mr. Cline replied that there is no evidence of free world shipments of petroleum products or commodities which would make a direct contribution to the military. Secretary Udall read from a report showing that Rumania's sales of oil to the free world are important to enable Rumania to earn the funds with which to buy machines and other items from the West. He suggested that from this standpoint helping Rumania increase its sales of oil to the West is beneficial to our interests. Secretary Rusk said that the U.S. has since 1945 been trying to get the Soviet bloc to learn to live peacefully with the West. The late Secretary Dulles in 1953-54 had dreamed of the day when we would have the kind of opportunity we have today to encourage a bloc country like Rumania to loosen its ties to the USSR and make friendly ties with us. If we give up the opportunity that approval of these cases gives us, we may lose the chance to help break the tight control of the USSR over the bloc countries, and may thus impair the prospects for long-term peaceful coexistence. He noted that other free world countries like West Germany are moving now to improve their relations with the various East European Communist countries. Secretary Connor said he still did not believe that as the official charged with responsibility for administering the Export Control Act he could properly approve the catalyst technology and drilling equipment cases. However, he said, "I can, of course, be overruled by the President." Secretary Rusk replied that he would ask the President to consider this matter. Deputy Secretary Vance asked whether the French would be likely to sell their catalyst technology and catalyst to Rumania if we refuse to sell our technology along with the catalyst material. Secretary Connor replied that this would not necessarily occur. The discussion then turned to the question of what limits, if any, Secretary Rusk would put on exports to Rumania. Secretary Rusk indicated that, with possibly some exceptions, he would approve everything not on the COCOM embargo list. Secretary Connor observed that he could not think of anything not on the COCOM list, but which we control, which could be more important than advanced equipment and technology for oil exploration and production. Secretary Connor then concluded the discussion by saying he would approve the catalyst material case (Englehart) and the Ethyl anti-knock case, and would deny the catalyst technology and petroleum exploration equipment cases. Mr. Thau asked if the cases to be approved could be acted on by BIC without waiting the Presidential review of the other cases. Secretary Connor approved and the other members concurred. Mr. Hockersmith called attention to a recent application by Universal Oil Products Co. (Case No. 65378) to sell a quantity of catalyst material to Rumania. He asked if this could also be approved. Secretary Connor agreed and the others concurred. (The meeting adjourned at 5:10 p.m.) The following day Secretary Connor determined to hold up approval of the anti-knock case for Presidential consideration along with the others because of the Viet Nam possibilities. This change was communicated informally to the interested departments.
151. Memorandum From David Klein of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/ Washington, April 20, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Rumania, Memos, Vol. 2. Top Secret; Sensitive. McGB-- SUBJECT With the end of the Firestone-Rumanian deal,/2/ it is more urgent now than before that we take a square look at the outstanding licenses for the Rumanian oil industry which have been blocked by the Department of Commerce. It is increasingly clear that neither the Secretary of Commerce nor Secretary Mann have looked carefully at the problems of Rumania to examine the characteristics which distinguish it from other Communist countries. (I have been assured that Mr. Mann's approved script for his interview with Firestone made the point of national interest far more strongly than Mr. Mann actually did and erected hurdles for Firestone which Mann did not use.) /2/On April 16, representatives of Firestone informed U.S. officials that they would withdraw from negotiations with the Romanian Government as a result of a well-organized U.S. campaign against sales to Romania. A memorandum of this conversation is ibid. It seems to me that this problem is worth a full-scale debate so that all parties concerned understand what this government's policy is and the operating guidelines can be set accordingly. The Firestone deal is over. (I understand Firestone has issued a statement this afternoon in Akron, Ohio, to that effect.) But we may be able to save some of the political pieces. It is not clear at this juncture just how the Rumanians read the cancellation action. Bucharest sent in a cable this morning indicating that Vietnam has left the pages of the Rumanian papers--which could indicate that the Rumanians consider the cancellation a reaction to their position on Vietnam. If that is so, one of the ways we might save some of the political gains of the last months is to move ahead with the pending licenses, demonstrating that there is still a special policy toward Rumania, but it requires a Rumanian quid for our quo. This would also give us some turn-around time during which we might look around for alternative sources to fill the gap left by Firestone. But as I indicated above, in the long term it is important to bring key members of the government (i.e., the Secretary of Commerce and the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs) into agreement with what has generally been understood to be this government's policy. And to be useful this has to be done immediately--if possible before this week is out. DK
152. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Romania/1/ Washington, May 16, 1966, 4:16 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 USSR. Confidential. Drafted in INR, cleared in EUR, and approved in INR. Also sent to Moscow and Paris for the Embassy and USNATO. 719. Subject: Brezhnev in Romania. Following is summary preliminary INR assessment recent Romanian policy developments sent to the Secretary on May 13: 1. Precise purpose Brezhnev's trip May 10-13 to Bucharest remains uncertain. Clear, however, that recrudescence of acute Soviet-Romanian differences involved. Most broadly, plain that Romanian party boss Ceausescu's long May 7 speech was a firm reiteration Romanian national independence with strong overtones of criticism of Soviet policies toward Romania all the way back to early 1920s. Outburst may well have been occasioned by Soviet pressures convoke Warsaw Pact meeting for purpose of trying once again coordinate Soviet and East European policies. Although any estimate of latest Soviet-Romanian summit must remain speculative, reports that Warsaw Pact meeting site moved from Bucharest suggests Soviet-Romanian deadlock persists. 2. Thrust of Ceausescu's May 7 speech made with fore-knowledge imminence Brezhnev's visit, indicated Romanian determination resist Soviet pressures probably renewed at 23rd Party Congress for Romania to rein in its ultra-nationalist lines in world communist affairs. Brezhnev and Kosygin had gone out of their way receive Romanian delegation before other East Europeans during Congress. Romanians nevertheless responded following the Congress with party plenum totally ignoring Soviet conclave. Then, in most anti-Soviet pronouncement since April 1964, Ceausescu on May 7 broke new ground by attacking Comintern and implicitly Soviet efforts to dictate Romanian Communist policy as far back as Lenin. In no less than nine places he indirectly refers to Bessarabian issue. While Romania obviously has no hopes for return Bessarabia, raising issue presumably designed illustrate depth Romanian nationalism for benefit both of Moscow and Romanian people. Finally, Ceausescu denounced military blocs as "incompatible with national sovereignty." While consistent with Communist attacks on Western alliances, coming from Rumanians this charge must appear to Moscow as directed against Warsaw Pact as well. 3. Romania's free-wheeling policies among the communist countries also must profoundly disturb Moscow. By adhering strictly to neutral stand in Sino-Soviet dispute, Romania has contributed significantly to torpedoing Soviet effort promote communist meeting to discuss Sino-Soviet conflict or coordinate aid to Vietnam. Romanian First Deputy Premier Bodnaras's May 5-11 official visit to Hanoi enabled Romania improve bilateral ties, while simultaneously maintaining separate bilateral ties with China and USSR. Chou En-lai's prospective visit to Romania comes against backdrop sharp increase in Peking's attacks on Soviet Union. 4. Insofar as Romania's nationalist policies create problems of communist coordination for USSR, there is net advantage to US. On other hand, Romania's maneuverability depends on outward appearance of solidarity with communist aims so that Bucharest has had to maintain good relations with China and increasingly better relations with DRV. Chou En-lai's reported visit May 18-23 to Romania and Bodnaras visit to DRV exemplify this aspect Romanian policy. Romania, in fact, has moved further in latter visit to anti-US position than at any time in past. Even so, Ceausescu held out hope for improved relations with US. Romania, it seems, still trying walk tightrope in overall policy of promoting good relations with all countries "irrespective of their political configuration." 5. Foregoing drafted before receipt of May 16 Moscow-dateline report that Romanians had recently sent circular note to Warsaw Pact members with detailed proposals for watering down organization. Although AFP story cannot be confirmed at this time, it appears to be clue that Romanians have taken one more step in their effort to disengage from tight Soviet control of Warsaw Pact, perhaps setting its latest demand as the price of attending a Political Consultative Committee meeting. Such move which may have triggered Brezhnev's trip would strengthen basic analysis set forth above. Rusk
153. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ SecDel/MC/51 New York, October 5, 1966, 8 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 347, CF 85. Confidential. The source text bears no drafting information; the memorandum was approved in S on October 18. The meeting was held in Rusk's quarters. The source text is labeled "Part IV of VI;" memoranda of this conversation dealing with Romanian-German relations, East-West relations, Vietnam, Manescu's travel, peacekeeping, and Cyprus are ibid. SECRETARY'S DELEGATION TO THE TWENTY-FIRST SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS U.S. Romanian Side The Secretary said that Assistant Secretary Solomon would be in Europe next week and that he might be able to pay a brief, informal visit to Romania to talk with trade representatives if the Foreign Minister thought this would be helpful. The Secretary said that he raised this matter since it was his hope that early in 1967 Congress will take up the East-West Trade Bill. Mr. Solomon will be one of the principal witnesses for the Administration, and it would be useful for him in talking with Congress if he had a chance to get the feel of the situation in Romania. The Foreign Minister responded that of course this could be arranged, and he wished all success to Mr. Solomon in connection with the Trade Bill. The Minister said this question of Mr. Solomon's visit led into a very important part of our bilateral relations, namely, that of trade. He understood that an important delegation of American industrialists would be coming to Romania soon. Also, talks have been held with Phillips Petroleum about obtaining a license for some of their processes. This showed that there was a possibility of purchasing licenses and equipment in the field of oil processing. The trouble started, however, with Romanian exports. In general, the Foreign Minister said, we are in a sad situation concerning trade. He asked that what he had to say be conveyed to the highest level of the American Government. Before he left Bucharest, he had talked with Secretary-General Ceausescu, who had said with regard to bilateral relations with the US, that Romania wished for normal relations with the US. Now, however, things were not going as smoothly as they should; the fact that Romania is unable to buy certain things it would like or to sell some products it wished to export shows that there are difficulties. All of this takes on a certain aspect of political pressure. The Minister recalled the Firestone deal which had almost been completed when rightist circles intervened and caused their arrangements to be canceled. This was hard to understand. The Minister knew that the Administration in the US was not free to do as it would like and that Congress is a problem. Nevertheless, the Minister is dealing with the Secretary and not with Congress. He had the impression that we might want the Romanians to change their regime, and if that happened, things would be easier. This is not the way to go about matters, however, the Minister said. Transactions should be considered strictly from the commercial point of view. In general, he thought the situation was rather strange. We seemed to be able to discuss various things in a constructive way and to understand each other's point of view, but still we were unable to move forward on trade. The Minister referred to Ceausescu's speech in which he had said that it is not any fault of Romania that relations with the US do not proceed as they should. The Secretary responded that the US Constitution was very complicated. It was drawn up by men who did not wish to give any element in the Government supreme power. The President does not control Congress, even when his party has a majority. Also, the Congress has a special responsibility in the field of foreign trade which is provided for in the Constitution. These are problems for the US to resolve, not the Romanians. The President hopes to resolve them and to make a good start this coming year. The Secretary said we have been told by key Congressional leaders that they will not take action on the Trade Bill until after the November elections. We don't agree with this position, but we must face facts. A second problem in the development of our trade relations, the Secretary said, was that we cannot give directions to private industry or labor unions. We deeply regretted what happened in the Firestone case. We had done our best to prevent this, but Firestone, of course, was free to do what it wanted. It turned out they were overly timid. All of these things created complications in our trade relations. However, problems which arise between systems of private enterprise and systems of socialism can be resolved, although this may take time. The Secretary noted that Romania's best customer was the FRG, which is a private enterprise system. The Secretary wondered what he, the President, or Assistant Secretary Solomon could do in the present circumstances before approval of the East-West Trade Bill. We can try to remove obstructions subject to administrative action, and we can encourage US businessmen to trade with Eastern Europe. We have done this. We can also advise Romania concerning opportunities in our markets for sale of its products. Frankly speaking, however, in the absence of most-favored-nation treatment, our tariff regulations are very severe. Manescu said he understood these problems, which he has known about for a long time. He wished to note, however, that a solution should not be sought by trying to persuade the Romanians to do things like the US or by the Romanians attempting to change the outlook of the United States to meet their views. While these may be desires on the part of both sides, they are Utopian; only life will show the way. The Secretary commented that we should put these ideological matters "in the corner." The Foreign Minister continued that, when Mr. Solomon comes to Bucharest, he will find people who are favorable toward trading with the US. Of course, trade cannot be at a very high level. The general outlook for trade between our two countries was that it will not be extraordinary in size; however, it will play a role in our relations. It is a question of living together and of establishing a basis on which to build. He predicted that Mr. Solomon would see that Romania wants better relations. The Secretary confirmed that we on our side are interested in better relations with Romania and do not wish to quarrel about ideological matters. Of course there are things about which we disagree, but there is no government in the world with which we agree on everything. He also wished to say that we are not indifferent to small amounts of trade. The Secretary noted that he had gone to Germany to speak to the Chancellor personally about buying American chickens. We are interested in these things, whatever the size of the deal--$100,000, $100 million, or $100 billion. We do not treat these matters lightly. The Secretary had noted that our exports to Romania had increased rapidly in recent times, whereas the imports from Romania had not gone up so fast. He was concerned about this and felt we should find a way to improve the situation. Mr. Solomon noted that our exports to Romania in the last six months amounted to $11 million--a result of our liberalized licensing policy. When the Foreign Minister asked how Romania could pay for imports from the US, the Secretary said that this could be done by tourism in part. Manescu replied that US tourists in Romania are very stingy. Most of them, he said, are of Romanian origin and stay with their relatives in Romania rather than in hotels. Ambassador Goldberg said that the Minister should put out of his head any idea that the Administration of the US or officials responsible for foreign policy have any concept that trade should be used as pressure in deciding differences of opinion between countries. He would not be honest if he said that there were no Congressmen who felt this way, but for the Administration, there was definitely no idea of political pressure or of imposing ideological conditions on trade. Referring to the world food crisis, the Secretary asked if Romania had a good harvest this year. Manescu answered affirmatively, saying there had been a good wheat crop and that corn and meat was also good. In response to questions, the Minister said that Romania's principal exports are oil, wood, furniture, plywood, chemical products and agricultural products, especially corn. Exports to Germany consisted largely of agricultural products, furniture and oil. As far as Romania's balance of payments is concerned, Manescu said that it is more or less in equilibrium.
154. Telegram From the Embassy in Romania to the Department of State/1/ Bucharest, January 23, 1967, 1500Z./2/ /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL RUM-US. Secret; Exdis. /2/Beginning in spring of 1965, the dates and transmission times of all incoming Department of State telegrams were in six-figure date-time-groups. The "Z" refers to Greenwich mean time. 892. 1. Annual hunt for chiefs diplomatic missions in Bucharest held over this past weekend for first time hosted by President Council of State Chivu Stoica instead of Prime Minister Maurer. FonMin Manescu was second ranking Romanian official present and by way of background both he and Stoica went out of their way during two-day hunt and at final banquet at Chisineu Cris before departure special train back to Bucharest Sunday evening to pay special attention and to make friendly gestures to me. 2. About two hours after departure of train and as I was preparing to retire Chief of Protocol MFA knocked on my compartment door around 10 p.m. and announced President Stoica would like to see me in his private car. There I found him with Manescu, the Secretary of the State Council, Geamanu, and interpreter Celac who usually accompanies Manescu on his annual visit to UN. As far as I am aware I was the only chief of mission during entire trip to be accorded this type of private meeting. After some social conversation talk inevitably turned to subjects our bilateral relations and Vietnam. 3. Manescu took initiative by asking whether Americans properly understood Romanian policy. I assured him that U.S. Government well informed on Romanian policies and actions taken by Romanian Government in support its independence during past years though there were individual members of Congress and segments of American people who were probably not so well informed. I referred in this connection to pessimistic reports that Congress might refuse to pass the administration's East-West Trade Bill this session thus continuing to deny Romanian trade MFN treatment. Stoica brushed this aside as something which would be solved in future; important thing was for U.S. to understand that Romania determined to follow independent course in its own national interest. 4. Manescu then began mildly complaining that I had not come to see him frequently, that while he profited by his discussion with "his friend" Secretary Rusk on occasions his visits to U.S., he never had had any follow up from me and he cited in particular the problem of Vietnam. He asked how many times I had taken initiative to call on high officials of Romanian Government and in this connection made reference to former British Ambassador in such a way that I can only assume he was implying that Romanians disappointed that I had never asked to call on Ceausescu. Glass was first Western Ambassador to call on Ceausescu which he did last January (see Embtel 734)/3/ on eve of departure for England of important Romanian economic delegation headed by First Deputy Prime Minister Birladeanu. Glass also called on Ceausescu prior to his definitive departure earlier this month. (Bucharest 828)/4/ I pointed out I had as customary for newly-arrived Ambassadors asked for and received appointments with whole series of top Romanian officials and last May I had called on him for general tour d'horizon subsequent to return of Bodnaras mission from Vietnam. True, Bodnaras had some two days later received me for first time (though he had been on my list of requested appointments submitted the previous December) a meeting which I assumed Manescu had arranged for which I thanked him. I had reported fully what Bodnaras had told me of his Vietnam visit. (Bucharest's 1095 May 27)/5/ But I had not come to see Manescu frequently because I had no business of a nature which warranted my demand on his rather heavy schedule. /3/Not found. /4/Dated January 2. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) /5/Dated May 27, 1966. (Ibid.) 5. Discussion then turned to Vietnam and we went over familiar ground with difference this time, which may be important, that Manescu (Stoica let Manescu conduct almost all conversation on Vietnam) in context of referring to necessity of cessation bombing North Vietnam in order that peace talks could begin said "You always say you must have signal as to what would happen. What I tell you is the signal." I probed as deeply as I could asking specifically whether this was based on recent contact with North Vietnamese. Manescu refused to be drawn out insisting that Romanians had continuous contact with them and that Romanians convinced information or "signal" he had given me was accurate. He specifically requested I convey this information to Washington. At one point during this dialogue Stoica intervened to emphasize that I should note Romania did not seek to blame either party for Vietnam situation; they were interested only in peaceful settlement of problem. Romanians realized U.S. prestige involved but Vietnamese had problem with "face" too. At another point both Stoica and Manescu responded in negative to my question whether import of what they telling me meant Romania offering to mediate. Conversation ended with Stoica and Manescu reiterating Romanian desire to have good relations with U.S. 6. Comment. I cannot know whether timing of meeting was calculated beforehand and based on new information from North Vietnamese or merely was conceived in the circumstance and they decided to have another "go" at the Americans on Vietnam. Nothing really new was said by any of us with exception of Manescu's emphasis on the "signal" which we were awaiting. 7. In light of this and taking into account implication in Manescu's remarks about my talking with high Romanian officials, Dept may wish consider instructing me to seek appointment with Ceausescu or Maurer or perhaps both together to go over Vietnam ground again and seek further clarification of why Romanians seem confident that cessation of bombing would bring about negotiations. Up to now I have deliberately refrained from seeking interview with Ceausescu, one, because he holds no government position only that of Secretary General of Communist Party and two, because I have always thought I should reserve such occasion for an urgent important subject or, as in the case of the British and since then of other Western Ambassadors, when a high level visit took place in Romania or a top Romanian delegation went to U.S. 8. If Dept thinks well of this idea I would go to Manescu and, referring to our conversation on train, ask on instructions to see Ceausescu or Maurer or perhaps both together in view importance which U.S. attaches to any development which could lead to Vietnam settlement. I suspect meeting would be quickly arranged and conceivably could throw more light on Manescu's statement./6/ /6/No response was found, but Davis met with Ceausescu on February 3; see Document 155. Davis
155. Airgram From the Embassy in Romania to the Department of State/1/ A-208 Bucharest, February 3, 1967. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL ROM-US. Confidential; Limdis. Drafted by Davis. SUBJECT At my meeting with Secretary General Ceausescu on January 31 I had referred to a question addressed me by Foreign Minister Manescu during a previous meeting whether the United States correctly understood Romanian policy./2/ I had assured Minister Manescu as I wished to do now that I was confident President Johnson and U.S. Government were well informed of and understood Romanian policies. I said the United States had followed with close interest the development of these policies in the last few years, particularly those in support of its national independence and in seeking actively to develop good relations with all countries. We thought Romanian policy generally sought to remove misunderstandings and to promote an atmosphere of détente which could make a contribution toward the establishment of lasting peace. /2/See Document 154. Ceausescu said I was correct in appraising Romanian policies. Romania was preoccupied with pursuing a policy of developing its economy and to assure the independence and sovereignty of the country and nation. These are the principles which guide Romania in relation to all countries. In current conditions these policies correspond to the general interest of peace. Ceausescu expressed belief that nations and national states will continue to have an important role to play in the life of international relations. "Life itself shows this," he said. A healthy international atmosphere must be based on trust and confidence between States, and this means respect for the independence and sovereignty of each individual nation and non-interference in internal affairs. Romania believes in development of good relations with all States irrespective of their social system. In Europe Romania has relations with all States with the exception of the Federal Republic of Germany, but this too will be solved. (Comment: As all the world knew and indeed was announced in the Romanian press on February 1, agreement had already been reached between Romania and the Federal Republic of Germany to establish diplomatic relations.) Ceausescu said this would contribute to the creation of a better atmosphere in Europe. At the same time, Romania sought to establish and maintain diplomatic relations with all States in every continent, and the results had been encouraging. Ceausescu then said he would like to say a few words about Romania's bilateral relations with the United States. One could say these were normal. We do have economic relations and diplomatic relations, and recently there have been various delegations which have visited Romania. One could still say relations were not so normal, especially economic. Trade exchanges between Romania and the United States amounted to only a few million dollars annually, while with the Federal Republic of Germany, with which Romania had no diplomatic relations, the annual trade turnover ran to hundreds of millions. This was also true of France, Italy and Japan where with the latter economic relations were developing rapidly. "Why is it harder to develop economic relations with the United States?" he asked. We have no bilateral problems either in the past or now. Perhaps on the U.S. side there are some problems, but Romania has no knowledge of them yet. Perhaps the presence of war (i.e., Vietnam) represents a "sort of hindrance", but still we could develop our economic relations. Relations between States receive shape through many aspects of contact: trade, cultural, scientific, etc. Perhaps the United States and Romania were in the platonic stage, but, Ceausescu added with a smile, the platonic stage of love is short-lived. In developing relations and friendship, economic and scientific exchanges are important. Ceausescu said he wanted to be understood. Romania wanted to develop such relations to the extent the United States desired. What Romania cannot buy in the United States, it could buy elsewhere in Western Europe or from Japan. Romania does not lag behind in its economic development because of the lack of U.S. trade. Romania was not waiting. As they say, when conditions are ripe perhaps we can develop good relations. Romania understands when a government or businessmen do not desire to develop trade or to keep it at a certain level. We have no hard feelings. (Comment: Here, I think Ceausescu had in mind the failure of the negotiations with the Firestone Rubber Company for building synthetic rubber plants, though he did not specifically so state.) This does not have a negative effect on our relations with the United States. Ceausescu then turned to Europe and expressed the opinion that we knew Romanian views. Romania had "revolutionary opinion". Romania believes the Eastern European countries can develop relations with all countries without interference from abroad. Hence, Romania's position on military blocs and the presence of military troops. Romania was not against the policy of European countries developing their relations with the United States or other countries. But these can only be good when they are no longer based on military alliances or military bases. Ceausescu said the Romanians had an old saying that friends are good to have visit, but if they forget to leave then relations grow cooler. The withdrawal of U.S. and other troops from Europe would not cool relations but, on the contrary, strengthen them. But this is a future problem which must find a solution. The longer blocs remain, there will be continued danger to the peace, and that is why Romania believes that both NATO and the Warsaw Pact should be dissolved. This position was not directed against anyone, but was a requirement of the international situation. When this was accomplished it would help to improve relations and contribute to the establishment of a lasting peace. In reply, I expressed appreciation for his frankness in commenting on Romanian policies and our bilateral relations. First with regard to his comments on Europe, I said we could understand the Romanian position, but the question of the dissolution of the two existing military alliances depended upon the solution of the larger questions of European security and German reunification. This, in turn, depended to a large degree on the creation of mutual understanding and trust, about which Ceausescu had previously spoken, as well as solid agreements. I said I had already commented on the interest with which the United States followed Romanian policies of developing relations with all countries in support of its national independence and sovereignty. Turning to our bilateral relations, I said I wished to recall particularly the words of President Johnson in his State of the Union message in relation to U.S. policy toward the countries of Eastern Europe./3/ I said that in carrying out U.S. policy of developing better relations with these countries, we recognized there were points of disagreement, but where we disagreed we tried to do so quietly and seek out those areas where we could agree. We did not wish to continue a cold war but to end it. /3/For text of the President's 1967 State of the Union message, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1967, Book I, pp. 2-14. The United States sought to increase its contacts with Eastern Europe including Romania in all fields: economic, cultural, tourism, and scientific and educational exchanges. The Administration had proposed to Congress an East-West trade bill which would give the President authority to negotiate trade agreements including the granting of equal tariff treatment. Speaking frankly, based on my own talks with visiting Members of Congress and on reports the Embassy had from Washington, I was not optimistic that Congress would take favorable action in this session on an East-West trade bill. Here, the Vietnam war was, as Ceausescu had said, "a sort of hindrance". Nevertheless, I was encouraged for the development of our trade relations by the increasing number of American businessmen who had come to Romania during the last six months to talk with Romanian organizations and officials about trade. The Embassy did everything to encourage them. I then referred to the upcoming negotiations between Romania and the United States for the renewal of a two-year exchange arrangement. Our exchange programs, though modest, had been growing, and we hoped to improve them further during the next two years. I also noted the recent Romanian proposal for three groups of high-level Romanian officials as well as directors of enterprises to visit the United States for an extended period. I said we interpreted this as a good sign and that the Embassy was recommending to Washington that these groups be well received and a program arranged for them where they would be able to see everything and to talk with those they wished. Ceausescu concluded our meeting by saying basically he was an optimist both for peace in the world and for the development of good Romanian-United States relations. I remarked that Washington did not intend to give publicity to my meeting with the Secretary General, but should it become known, I intended to respond to inquiries from my diplomatic colleagues in Bucharest along the following lines: I would say I had requested this meeting after one year in Bucharest to review our bilateral relations and certain international problems of mutual interest. Ceausescu readily assented to this and volunteered that the Romanian Government would not publish the fact of our meeting. (Comment: It is customary for the Romanian press, at least with respect to meetings between Ceausescu and Western ambassadors, to note the fact of the meeting the morning after.) As Ceausescu indicated, the Romanian press of February 1 did not note our meeting the day before. Note: The Department may wish to send copies of this airgram to other interested posts. Davis [Continue with the next documents] Volume XVII Index | Foreign Relations Online | Historian's Office | |