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 | FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968 Volume XVII Eastern Europe Department of State |
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| Romania 139. Telegram From the Legation in Romania to the Department of State/1/ Bucharest, February 26, 1964, 3 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL RUM-US. Confidential. 573. Had cordial hour and half talk with Foreign Minister Manescu evening February 24. Discussion dealt mainly with Rumanian-American relations. Highlights follow: 1. Manescu's relations with Secretary Rusk. Manescu spoke at length and with warm appreciation of their frank and useful discussions last fall/2/ and hoped they would be resumed upon next annual visit to UNGA. However he did not want to let dialogue lapse until he next saw Secretary. For this reason he had asked see me and would like do so again from time to time. He would always be available for general discussions and could assure me as Bodnaras had recently done that "other top leaders will be equally accessible" should I wish to see them. I thanked Manescu and told him Secretary has spoken to me in same warm terms of his pleasure at their candid talks and his desire renew them whenever possible. I conveyed Secretary's personal greetings and Manescu reciprocated. We agreed meet periodically for talks ourselves. /2/A memorandum of their conversation is in Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. XVI, Document 23. 2. Visit of agricultural experts. Manescu said Secretary had told him to approach him directly if he had something special on his mind, and for this reason having received Moghioros' urgent expression of interest in sending to U.S. four agricultural experts for observation of practical farm work, he had sent Minister Balaceanu to see Secretary personally about it. He said Rumanian Legation had meanwhile reported somewhat favorable reactions from Agriculture Department but nothing more concrete. I told him I had nothing to add but knew request (Department telegram 382)/3/ being given every possible consideration. /3/Telegram 382, February 5, reported that the Government of Romania had requested permission to send four agricultural specialists to the United States for study purposes. (Department of State, Central Files, AGR 7 RUM) 3. Presidents Kennedy and Johnson. Manescu spoke with great feeling about President Kennedy's qualities as man and statesman and said Rumanians generally pleased and reassured by what they have observed of President Johnson's approach to international problems. President Kennedy had introduced new tone and more objective approach to relations with Eastern Europe which continue very much in evidence. During his tenure Rumanian-American relations had much improved. Atmosphere still steadily improving and as example new tone he cited approvingly Secretary's reply when recently asked whether certain countries could be regarded as "satellites" that his colleagues had advised that "socialist countries" better usage. Manescu thought perhaps he could take some credit for influencing Secretary's views this regard. I observed that Rumania's recent record of independent thought and action had unquestionably affected his thinking and Manescu laughingly assented. 4. Trade. I told Manescu that President Kennedy had been most interested in economic developments in Eastern Europe and its foreign trade, which were matters of pressing interest to Rumania, and that President had not only initiated review of our trade policy toward Eastern Europe generally but given impetus to special review policy toward Rumania. I elaborated somewhat upon his role this regard following Gheorghiu-Dej's talk with Secretary Freeman and my talk with President last August./4/ I told Manescu that as consequence these discussions, and as direct result Rumania's stress over past year on "national independence and sovereignty" in pursuit its economic policy and other objectives, we had been drawing up revised trade policy for Eastern Europe and within its framework separate trade program for Rumania. I said two matters currently receiving jointly top-level consideration and Rumania only socialist country for which separate program now being envisaged. I said we plan invite Gaston-Marin; visit would give everyone fine opportunity for wide ranging talks. He said there are many urgent matters because of planning requirements and several "which President Gheorghiu-Dej singled out to Secretary Freeman are of particular urgency and importance" (i.e. synthetic rubber plants). He was glad note American del from International General Electric Company is now here and understands talks going well (group is negotiating possible $10 million deal for methane gas turbines). /4/Secretary of Agriculture Orville Freeman visited Romania August 3-5, 1963. The Legation reported on his visit in airgram A-41 from Bucharest, August 8, 1963. (Ibid., POL 2-1 RUM) Crawford arrived in Washington on August 7, 1963; his meeting with the President was not further identified. 5. Consular Cases. Manescu said he heard I had very interesting talk with Bodnaras and we had even discussed our consular cases. I said I was most gratified have Bodnaras assure me that all consular cases I raised with Manescu last May will eventually be resolved. Manescu said what Bodnaras told me was of course "authoritative" and he could now confirm they are "moving to resolve all cases I had raised in their totality." He cited number of 372. I said that seemed go beyond 267 cases listed in my démarche. Manescu said 372 was figure he was given (presumably covers our 267 plus other family members) and action being taken "as matter of principle for humanitarian reasons." I said this information highly gratifying and I knew how much it would be welcomed in Washington. I then raised question two Galdau boys who had not been allowed accompany their mother to join father. Manescu checked list, verified that case disapproved, but promised it will be reexamined. I thanked him and expressed hope same attitude will be adopted in cases of others not necessarily on our lists who also may desire join close relatives in U.S. Manescu said they will continue take same approach in such cases. (Indeed since November 1963, 11 relatives of American citizens plus 11 more members of their families have received exit documents even though not on Legation's lists.)/5/ /5/In telegram 581 from Bucharest, February 29, Crawford reported that Manescu had assured him that Gheorghiu-Dej had authorized a quick resolution of all consular cases raised by the United States. (Ibid., POL RUM-US) 6. Level of missions. Manescu then raised question of level of missions which he reminded me had discussed with Secretary and asked for my views. I repeated what I told Malita as reported paragraph 1, Legtel 567,/6/ as well as what I proposed tell Manescu in numbered paragraph 4 of Legtel 556./7/ I stressed as my personal view that once all consular cases were settled they would probably not have to wait long for our decision and therefore what he had just told me this regard was particularly relevant and would be carefully studied in Washington. I also emphasized we approached question in each of three Balkan countries in light of status of our individual relations with each country and would make separate decisions accordingly. Manescu agreed with this approach and expressed satisfaction with what I had say generally on subject. /6/In telegram 567, February 21, Crawford reported that he told Malita that a settlement of the consular cases would bring quick U.S. action on raising the level of diplomatic missions. (Ibid.) /7/In telegram 556, February 15, Crawford reported that he would tell Manescu that raising the level of diplomatic representation between the two states should reflect a normalization of relations and that the only major issue between the two states was the question of exit visas for divided families. (Ibid.) I reminded Manescu there were other issues on which we also hoped see progress soon: (1) Consular convention; we welcomed Rumania's agreement conclude convention but were still waiting for their draft. Manescu said we will have it shortly and they will be prepared pursue talks in Washington. (2) Travel restrictions. I said we were still awaiting Rumanian reply our note proposing mutual waiver travel notification requirement, with certain zones to be closed for travel in both countries./8/ We considered proposal strictly reciprocal and its adoption would constitute further step toward improved relations. Manescu objected that our closed areas were proportionately much larger than theirs (spoke of third of American territory as compared with 2 percent Rumanian territory). I said I thought about third our territory was proscribed to Soviet travel on reciprocal basis but only 12 percent or so to Rumanian travel. I also believed Rumanian closed area including frontier zones was somewhat larger than he indicated. In fact I had been under impression American and Rumanian closed areas were roughly proportionate and suggested their experts might take another look at relative proportions. Manescu agreed do so. (Would appreciate Department doing same and advising me.)/9/ Manescu also objected our regulations made it hard for Rumanian Legation personnel to get to seashore. Perhaps most important was that we had charged them with acting on behalf of Russians, and they resented this because they acting on own behalf. I reminded him of Secretary's words that sophisticated appraisal of situation was required. Manescu said matter might be worked out and they would give it further thought. /8/For text of the note, November 12, 1963, to the diplomatic missions in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Romania, see Department of State Bulletin, December 2, 1963, p. 860. /9/In telegram 413 to Bucharest, February 27, the Department of State instructed the Legation to ask for a map outlining areas in which travel restrictions were imposed on U.S. diplomats, noting that such information had been provided to the Romanian Legation in the United States. (Department of State, Central Files, POL RUM-US) (3) New Chancery. I alerted Manescu we might be coming soon with formal request for assistance buy or build new Chancery. He said they had same problem in Washington with lovely Chancery but too small and impractical. They had thought of buying Cuban Embassy but problems arose and they now thinking of building new Chancery. We could discuss their desires and ours, and they would be prepared give us all possible aid here. In conclusion Manescu philosophized about recent steady progress in our relations and observed Rumanian Government anticipates considerably expanded relations with U.S. in next several years. He repeated how much he values his personal relationship with Secretary Rusk and said some complimentary things about Legation's role. He said that more you get to know us, more you will realize that though we are cautious--"because we have had series of foreign bosses throughout our history we have learned to be"--we are also self-respecting and speak out for ourselves and if we are treated well we respond in kind. I told him that Americans have long been nurtured in very qualities of self-respect and independent-mindedness of which he spoke and it is precisely these qualities we most respect in others and to which we have traditionally found it easiest to respond. We agreed that talk was most useful and we will have other talks from time to time. Noteworthy that this talk held at Manescu's own initiative. He could not have been more affable and fact he refrained from any reference to subject Department telegram 391/10/ underlines evident desire introduce no jarring note at this stage when more important developments pending in our relations. Manescu looked rested after two months absence but still under treatment for duodenal ulcer. /10/Telegram 391 to Bucharest, February 13, reported on a U.S. grant of asylum to a Romanian diplomat and subsequent discussions with the Romanians regarding the defection. (Ibid., POL 30 RUM) Full report by airgram./11/ /11/Airgram A-212 from Bucharest, February 28. (Ibid., POL 15-1 RUM) Crawford
140. Telegram From the Legation in Romania to the Department of State/1/ Bucharest, March 5, 1964, 4 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL RUM-US. Confidential. Repeated to Moscow, Hong Kong, Vienna, Prague, Budapest, Sofia, Warsaw, London, Paris, Bonn, Belgrade, Munich, and Berlin. 592. Legtel 591./2/ In discussion with FonMin Manescu on other matters March 3, I asked if he cared comment on recent departure to Peiping of Rumanian party delegation headed by Premier Maurer. Manescu said he could say nothing on substance of talks because they had only begun. However, he could amplify somewhat on background. He said in fields of ideology and foreign relations Rumania agrees with Soviet Union on many questions but disagrees on others, and she also agrees with Communist China on some but disagrees on others. As I was aware, there had been serious developments affecting unity of socialist camp and Rumania had her own ideas on this important matter. She wished do what she could improve situation and so had decided accept Chinese Communist invitation for discussions. I asked whether invitation was of long standing or comparatively recent (point raised Moscow's 2727 repeated Bucharest 33)./3/ Manescu said comparatively recent and Rumanian acceptance quite recent in light developing situation. /2/Telegram 591, March 5, reported on Manescu's reaction to a personal message from Secretary Rusk, and on discussions about the consular cases, educational exchange, and economic assistance for Romania. (Ibid., POL US-RUM) The text of Rusk's message was transmitted as an enclosure to airgram A-221 from Bucharest, March 6. (Ibid., POL 17 RUM-US) /3/Telegram 2727 from Moscow, March 2, reported that Pravda had carried a story regarding the visit of Romanian leaders to the People's Republic of China. (Ibid., POL 7 RUM) Manescu went on say he must underline that regardless her views on unity of socialist camp, Rumania firmly supports policy peaceful coexistence and wants good relations with all states. In particular Rumania now seeks develop good relations with US and is pleased with how they are going. He said we must realize that Rumania makes her decisions slowly and deliberately, after much careful thought, but once she has done so adheres to them, and that she keeps her promises and one can count on her word. I said I did not question this and was not much surprised by his description of Rumania's position or by decision send delegation to Communist China. Rumanian approach seemed to me to have been expressed clearly enough in Premier Maurer's article of last November in "Problems of Peace and Socialism," and Bodnaras had warned me Rumanians not exactly orthodox and we can expect see further examples of unorthodoxy. Manescu grinned and said Maurer article sums up their approach in nutshell. (Maurer's article, of course, expounded Rumania's distinctive position on Sino-Soviet dispute and related matters. Maurer restated Rumanian support for peaceful coexistence line in relations with West, and this connection indirectly criticized Chinese for polemics. However, Maurer also stressed equality socialist states and parties and failed acknowledge Soviet vanguard role; condemned interference by one party in affairs another, in manner which could imply interference by USSR; and called on "all" parties in Sino-Soviet dispute to end public controversy and prepare for world Communist conference. General thrust was that Rumania favors closer relations with West and looser relations with erstwhile center of Communist world.) Elaborating upon Manescu's comments on Chinese invitation, MFA Director Soviet and East European Affairs Petrescu has since told me invitation extended early January. Petrescu confirmed Rumanian decision accept reached but some days ago, adding "Rumania made her own decision." That decision evidently reached without Soviet approval further borne out by Indian Ambassador who asked Soviet Ambassador Zhegalin point blank whether USSR consulted on trip and Zhegalin replied "no". Press so far merely reports initial talks held in "friendly atmosphere" and notes subsequent sightseeing. Crawford
141. Telegram From the Legation in Romania to the Department of State/1/ Bucharest, May 12, 1964, 6 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 RUM. Confidential. Repeated to Belgrade, Bonn, Budapest, Hong Kong, London, Moscow, Paris, Prague, Rome, Sofia, Vienna, Warsaw, Berlin, and Munich. 850. Legation telegram 782./2/ Summary follows of Legation's A-268/3/ pouched today which analyzes significance April 22 declaration RWP Central Committee in context related recent Rumanian actions on international scene. /2/Telegram 782, April 27, reported and analyzed the Romanian Communist Party's declaration on the Sino-Soviet conflict. (Ibid.) /3/Airgram A-268, May 12, reported on the new approach that Romania was taking in foreign affairs as part of its changing "national" Communist policy. (Ibid., POL 2 RUM) As Legation commented reference telegram, declaration represents pronouncement Rumania's right and intent to exercise national independence and equality in Communist world. In essence, it constitutes resounding proclamation of emancipation from satellite status and marks emergence of what may be justly termed new and original form national Communism. Leading up to declaration, Rumanian nationalism has been expressed in several remarkable developments over past year: (1) Rumania has firmly resisted Soviet moves establish supra-national agencies and more binding economic specialization within CEMA. As result, bulk of Moscow's program--aimed at strengthening Soviet political controls as well as economic efficiency in Eastern Europe--has been stymied. USSR and like-minded CEMA members have been forced to turn increasingly to bilateral and trilateral forms cooperation, and Rumania has increasingly alienated itself from CEMA policies and organizational arrangements. (2) Rumania's food-for-machines trade with West continues unabated and should increase, despite contrary pressure from some CEMA partners. Rumania seeks obtain advanced technology in West which CEMA partners either unwilling or unable to supply, but this trade also provides Rumania with strong material base for pursuance independent political relations with USSR. Rumania has also acted to improve political relations with Western powers, including US. (3) Rumania has taken number of steps to reduce Soviet cultural and political influence on home front and currently is quietly proceeding with extensive amnesty. These moves probably designed win popular support and lay political foundation internally for broader assertion Rumanian independence. (4) Rumania has pursued line on Sino-Soviet split increasingly in defiance Moscow's wishes and skillfully used split to advance own interest. Rumanian leaders have seized on Moscow's critical involvement with Peiping to push independent economic policies. Moreover, in progressive moves, they have directly exploited dispute to show through non-involvement that they need not fiddle to Soviet tune, through independent statements and mediation that they have right and will to take independent action, and through declaration that they intend to follow own path and reject Moscow as center world Communism. Latter point is declaration's central thesis and purpose. In various formulations, it stresses that "diversity" (i.e. polycentrism) among Communist states is natural and essential, that "each party has exclusive right independently to work out its own political line," and that no party "has privileged position or can impose its line or opinions on other parties." This bold denial Soviet hegemony is reinforced by declaration's total silence on CPSU vanguard role. Also, declaration considerably sharpens Rumanian stance on earlier key issues, by explicitly stating opposition to CEMA supranationalism, by condemning Moscow and Peiping equally for polemics, and by squarely opposing Soviet call for international conference to "rebuff" Chinese. In light declaration, Rumania's independent economic line should be regarded as part of general effort to place its political as well as economic relations with erstwhile master on new basis. Rumania seems intent on having full direction over its internal affairs as well as right set own foreign policies when its national interests deviate from Moscow's, and on gaining acceptance principle Moscow no longer "Rome" of Communist movement. Economic self-interest and opportunistic exploitation Sino-Soviet dispute are probably main motivating forces this development, but cohesiveness of long-established home-grown Communist leadership doubtless another important factor. There may also be further clarifying elements which not yet fully apparent stemming from past Soviet interference in Rumanian Party affairs. Despite many uncertainties, Legation believes Rumania's nascent national Communism likely to grow. Soviet pressures in response declaration would probably widen gap between Moscow and Bucharest. Other Rumanian trends point toward widening differences. I have already submitted (Legation telegram 795)/4/ several recommendations re negotiating position for Gaston-Marin talks in light issuance declaration. One of these--establishment special Rumanian general license list close if not equal to Polish list--seems to me to be particularly pertinent in view of fact declaration apparently goes further than former Polish public statements in rejecting Moscow's claim to leadership Communist world. After Gaston-Marin talks held, I believe Department should carefully assess foregoing developments as well as results of talks to determine whether any steps beyond those now taken in coming months. [sic] /4/Telegram 795, April 29, forwarded Crawford's evaluation of the impact of the Romanian declaration on the Sino-Soviet conflict on upcoming U.S.-Romanian talks. (Ibid., FT 1 RUM-US) Crawford
142. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, May 18, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Romania, Cables, Vol. 1. Confidential. Drafted by Trezise and approved in M. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS United States Rumania Gaston-Marin began an extended statement by expressing his appreciation for the invitation to the representatives of the Rumanian People's Republic "in order to analyze," as he put it, "with representatives of the United States new ways of broadening Rumanian-American relations." He offered special thanks to Governor Harriman for his helpfulness in making the visit possible. He went on that the Rumanian leaders had noted with great interest his report of his conversations with Governor Harriman in November,/2/ particularly the thought that it would be possible gradually to develop US-Rumanian relations along constructive lines. Gaston-Marin considered the invitation to make the present visit the first specific response of the new Administration in Washington. He had found that there had been much interest here in developments within the RPR and in Rumanian economic development. He was confident that the American authorities understood what the RPR stood for within the Socialist camp and on the world plane: a policy of national independence and a policy of maintaining a Rumanian position on all problems in accordance with Rumanian national interests. /2/See Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. XVI, Document 26. If this was the American understanding of Rumanian policy, as Gaston-Marin was sure it was, then it corresponded with reality. Independence is indeed the foundation of Rumanian national policy. The regime has always been devoted to Rumanian independence and to the development of Rumania in the interests of its own people. This has never been an easy policy to conduct, and there was a time under Stalin when they were badly inhibited. However, they have been taking steady steps in this direction. True independence, nevertheless, cannot be achieved without acquiring an independent economic base. This they are now pursuing, and we can help. Today, the principles of Rumanian policy in relation to both Socialist and Western countries, have been made quite clear. The recent declaration on the part of the authorities of the RPR laid out certain fundamentals: 1. On the major international problem--that of the relationship between the communist and capitalist world--the RPR stands squarely with the USSR in favoring peaceful coexistence and the solution of all international problems through negotiations. But Rumania does not consider itself a passive participant, merely ratifying or rejecting positions taken by larger powers. It considers itself an active member of the world community, able to present its own points of view, and to argue them to the extent of its own capabilities. At the UNGA and at Geneva, for example, the RPR has recently offered its quiet independent notions on a nuclear free zone and on the question of broadening international trade./3/ /3/Regarding Romanian participation in disarmament discussions, see U.N. doc. A/5371, "Report of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament for the period January 21 to September 17, 1964." Regarding Romanian participation in trade discussions, see Proceedings of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Geneva, 1964 (8 volumes). 2. The RPR does not favor a break between Communist China and the Soviet Union. It considers that such a break would worsen the international situation. Rumania has no illusions about the possibility of eliminating differences within the Socialist camp, but it hopes to contribute to the possibilities of a settlement by a negotiation of the major problems within the Socialist group. 3. In the field of economic relations, the RPR has declared itself in favor of the principles of non-interference, equality, mutual respect, and the defense of national sovereignty and independence. These principles are considered general in their application. If they are not observed, there can be no political independence for Rumania. The RPR has established a substantial modern industrial sector, which Minister Crawford had observed. It now intends to modernize and improve its agricultural sector; for this task it has already learned much from the US. But agriculture, Gaston-Marin observed, "does not give us a big headache" (presumably, unlike the USSR and other Eastern European states). 4. The RPR line for the future is to continue to develop its economy rapidly and on a broad scale. It intends to exploit Rumanian raw materials intensively so as to raise the Rumanian standard of living, which still lags behind, not only the U.S. but also Rumania's European neighbors. 5. Foreign trade is expected to have an important part in Rumania's economic development. The RPR intends to orient its economic relations in a diversified way so as to avoid possible pressure or difficulties. The development of economic relations with the US is seen in this context. Earlier talks with American officials have given the Rumanians hope that we can make progress in this respect. 6. Gaston-Marin recalled that Governor Harriman had said that the US had no desire to harm the relations between Rumania and the Soviet Union. This opinion had been noted approvingly by the Rumanian leadership. He wishes to say that two sets of realities must be considered in dealing with Rumania. First, that Rumania is a Socialist state, has reached a certain level of Socialist development and cannot turn back, and will continue to pursue friendly relations with the USSR. Second, that "the great power to the East" is a very strong power, and "not only a friend of Rumania but a neighbor." The US, Gaston-Marin thought, understood realistically what this meant. Gaston-Marin went on to say that his group was in Washington to promote expanded trade with the United States. Rumania wishes to import certain industrial items and to further consolidate Rumania's independence. It wished to be granted only the conditions granted to other countries. If trade was to be expanded, export licenses would be needed, of course. Also necessary, would be the possibility of greater Rumanian exports to the US, so as to earn the means of payment of import from the US, and financial credits, such as were available from other Western countries. At this point, Gaston-Marin turned to the question of publicity about Rumania in the United States. It is important, he said, not to make "too much noise" for that "could affect certain people." It is desirable not to exaggerate events in Rumania. In particular, the less publicity about Rumanian independence at this juncture, the better. Overattention to this in foreign press could harm rather than help our future relations. For the moment, Rumania would like to be placed after Yugoslavia and Poland among the Eastern European countries, in the public eye. "Our aspirations for independence can best be achieved not by noisy and insistent publicity but by a quiet and constructive development in Rumania's relations with the US and the West." The important thing, Gaston-Marin concluded, is cooperation with Rumania in the field of economic affairs. This does not mean, he said, that importance is not granted to other bilateral problems. Rumania is ready to find for these problems solutions acceptable to both parties. Gaston-Marin ended his comments which had been based on extensive written notes, by referring to the nuclear power plant included on the list of installations that Rumania had provided us. He said that the RPR had asked the Soviet Union for a nuclear power plant but had been told that delivery would not be possible until after 1970. The Rumanians had had preliminary but inconclusive conversations with the UK as well. The RPR five-year plan calls for a 500 megawatt nuclear station. Their present power grid is too much dependent on oil and gas, raw materials needed for the chemical industry. Rumania has uranium which it prefers to put into electric power rather than into fissionable material. It would be an important contribution to the power sector of the Rumanian economy if the US could see fit to sell Rumania a nuclear power plant. Governor Harriman responded that US policy favors a friendly relationship between Rumania and the Soviet Union, as between all states. We have disliked the evidence of dependency within the Eastern European Bloc, and therefore we welcome what we have seen of Rumanian statements and Rumanian actions leading in the direction of national independence. President Kennedy had said last June in an important speech that the cause of world peace would be advanced if all countries would stop interfering in other countries./4/ Mr. Khrushchev had spoken very favorably of President Kennedy's remarks about non-interference but Governor Harriman observed that he had heard Soviet protestations about non-interference for many years and had found very little substance in them. Perhaps now Soviet relations with small states of Eastern Europe were changing, or the Soviets were allowing greater independ-ence to them. If so, we welcomed the change. /4/For text of President Kennedy's address in Frankfurt on June 25, 1963, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1963, pp. 516-521. Turning to the US-Rumanian relations, Governor Harriman made the following points: 1. The US understands that Rumania has a Socialist system. That is a matter for the Rumanians. It is no secret, however, that we believe in an open society, in which people are free to move as they please and to speak as they please. We understand that some of the other Eastern European states, including Hungary, have moved ahead of Rumania in terms of permitting personal freedom. We think that extension of freedom to the individual cannot fail but be helpful to international relations. 2. The US is ready to consider ways and means of increasing trade with Rumania. We will be able to take a broader view than in the past on export licenses, although no decisions can be taken in advance of discussion. Credits also can be discussed. We will need assurances from the Rumanian side about re-exports and about the end use of certain kinds of American equipment. 3. As far as imports from Rumania are concerned, the USG, of course, does not engage in purchases itself. It can only create the climate and environment in which trade is possible. The American authorities recognize that the absence of MFN treatment for Rumania can handicap Rumanian trade with the US. Governor Harriman said that it was necessary to be very frank, that there could be no early grant of MFN to Rumania. He did not wish to prophesy what might happen next year or in the future. He did observe that Poland and Yugoslavia now enjoyed MFN and that the US action toward these two countries might indicate something of the direction in which we could go. 4. As for press treatment of Rumania, the US Government, of course, has no control over newspapers and other media. He suggested that the Rumanians should understand that in a continental country like the US, public opinion often lags behind the reality of events. It had taken the American people a long time, for example, to fully grasp the deep difference between the US and the Soviet Union. Once public opinion had come to understand this difference, it was difficult to adjust to new situations. In these circumstances, we must expect that statements will be made in the US which are not always happy ones for our external relations. The Rumanians could be sure in any event that the USG had no wish to complicate relations between the USSR and Rumania and that authoritative comments to the press would reflect this basic position. 5. As for Soviet-Communist Chinese relations, Governor Harriman said, they are not our affair. We considered realistic Mr. Khrushchev's frank statement that Soviet policy is to avoid nuclear war, if at all possible. The Chinese Communists seem to be less realistic and we can only view this as unfortunate. We are unhappy over Communist Chinese attitude over the test ban treaty. The meeting ended with a brief exchange on trade matters. Gaston-Marin mentioned that because export licenses could not be obtained in the US, Rumania had bought rubber, synthetic fabric, and petroleum installations in Western Europe. In some cases, however, the European producers were less competent in mass production than were Americans and Rumania would like to talk seriously with a range of American firms about possibilities for buying plants and equipment here. Governor Harriman repeated what he had said earlier to the effect that we were willing to examine Rumania's requests and to make a positive beginning on improved trade relations. It was agreed by both sides that further private conversations might be desirable.
143. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security (Bundy) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, May 29, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memoranda to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 5. Secret. SUBJECT Our talks with the Rumanians are about over, and a communiqué (which the Rumanians are now checking with the Government in Bucharest, Tab A),/2/ announcing the results will be released Monday, June 1. We have considered whether there is advantage in a specific White House statement when this communiqué is issued, but on balance we do not see much money in it. Will you let me know if you have a different view? Essentially we achieved what we set out to get. Agreement has been reached on the following: /2/Tabs A, B, and C are not printed. For text of the U.S.-Romanian joint declaration, issued June 1, see Department of State Bulletin, June 15, 1964, pp. 924-926. 1. To expand Rumanian trade with the United States. Rumania will be authorized to buy 11 major industrial installations (Tab B) (out of an original shopping list of 15). They will be licensed individually and negotiations with private suppliers will be conducted on a case-by-case basis. For their part, the Rumanians have given us assurances that U.S. equipment will not be trans-shipped or re-exported, and technical data of U.S. origin will not be disclosed or otherwise transmitted without explicit U.S. approval (Tab C). Estimated value of these sales, if consummated, is $30 million a year. 2. To begin discussions on a consular agreement. 3. To expand cultural and information exchanges. 4. To work out plans for the establishment of tourist and commercial offices in Rumania and the U.S. 5. To raise diplomatic missions from legations to embassies. The Rumanians accepted virtually every condition we levied, and this despite the fact that we rejected their request for long-term credits and made clear that the most-favored-nation treatment would not be possible for some time, since this required a major legislative effort. As a collateral matter, the Rumanians promised to talk with representatives of U.S. holders of Rumanian dollar bonds (some issued prior to World War I), to assure them that their interest would be protected. (The Rumanians, however, insist they cannot make specific commitments on claim settlements at this time.) Perhaps the single most significant aspect of these talks was Rumania's determination to succeed in establishing a new and substantial relationship with the U.S.--an important factor in Rumania's drive for independence from Moscow. However, for Rumania's own reasons and political considerations here, there is an awareness on both sides that the pace of these developments cannot be forced. To succeed, there must be a gradualness and a logic about them, as well as evidence of continued Rumanian independence in international affairs and greater freedom for the Rumanian people--a point Averell Harriman intends to underscore before the talks are over. McG. B./3/ /3/Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.
144. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, July 16, 1964, 3 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Confidential. Drafted by Warker and approved in S on August 11. The meeting was held in the Secretary's office. The source text is labeled "Part I of IV Parts;" other memoranda of this conversation, dealing with East-West political relations and the visit of Foreign Minister Manescu to the United States, are ibid. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS US Rumania Minister Balaceanu said he had left Bucharest to return to the US on July 9 after three weeks of consultation with his Government. He said this consultation had involved intensive work on the means to carry forward promptly the agreements which had been reached between the US and Rumania during the talks held in Washington May 18-June 1 between delegations of the two Governments. The discussion of this subject was the main purpose of his call. After conveying warm greetings to the Secretary from Rumanian Foreign Minister Manescu, Mr. Balaceanu stressed that top Rumanian officials very much appreciated the good results achieved during the recent Washington talks and considered that a sound start had been made for improving relations between the two countries in the commercial field. He expressed appreciation for the steps the US had taken since the talks, citing the June 15 Presidential determination making Export-Import Bank credit guarantees available to Rumania/2/ for other than agricultural products and the publication by the Department of Commerce on July 14 of a special general licensing procedure for Rumania. He said that these steps reflected a desire on the part of the US to move forward on the agreements reached during the Washington talks. /2/For text, see Department of State Bulletin, July 6, 1964, pp. 26-27. As for the Rumanian side, the Minister said that Rumania would be sending about 10 technical experts to the US to discuss contract details with producers of equipment which Rumania was interested in purchasing from US firms and to arrange for the visit of US businessmen to Rumania to conclude the contracts. It was hoped that the first orders for US equipment could be placed by the beginning of August. The Minister said Rumania was also planning to send a number of expert personnel to the US to seek to expand the market for Rumanian goods in the US. Minister Balaceanu expressed the hope that he could count on the Secretary's assistance regarding Rumanian interest in purchasing a nuclear power reactor in the US, in arranging credits with the Export-Import Bank where he envisaged the need would be in the neighborhood of $40 million (excluding the nuclear reactor), and on the problem of most-favored-nation treatment for Rumania. He also expressed hope that the Secretary could assist in arranging Commodity Credit Corporation credits for Rumania for the purchase of agricultural commodities. On this point, the Minister noted that Rumanian officials had already talked in general terms with Secretary Freeman and Under Secretary Murphy to explain why Rumania needed such credits. Since Rumanian earnings from exports to the US were limited, a purchase on three-year CCC credit of commodities which Rumania produced in sufficient quantities to meet its own needs (e.g., edible vegetable oils) would enable Rumania to expand its exports of such commodities and use the proceeds to purchase other goods from the US. He said that Rumania was very strict in meeting its foreign payments obligations, and such transactions would help it to do so. The Secretary responded to the Minister's remarks by saying that the US intended to try to move on a constructive basis to carry forward the relations between the two countries. He noted that the President's action regarding Export-Import Bank guarantees and the Commerce Department's action on licensing were examples. As regards the most-favored-nation problem, the Secretary said that this would have to be considered later. The Secretary observed that the Rumanians might encounter certain US firms which would be reluctant to sell products to Rumania even though the Department of Commerce had approved export licenses for a particular transaction. He also noted that the announcement of a major transaction might occasion considerable comment and that any problems arising in this area would have to be faced. Concerning the Minister's idea of purchasing US agricultural commodities under CCC credit to replace exported Rumanian commodities of the same kind, the Secretary said that this type of transaction may present a problem but this could be explored.
145. Telegram From the Embassy in Romania to the Department of State/1/ Bucharest, November 24, 1964, 11 a.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Romania, Cables, Vol. 2. Confidential; Limdis. Repeated to Moscow. The United States and Romania raised their respective diplomatic missions to the level of Embassy in August 1964. 583. Department pass Defense. Several events and remarks by Rumanian officials here suggest that development might be afoot concerning Rumania's relations with Warsaw Pact. (1) Unexplained nature of quarrel with Rumanian hosts which occurred during October-November visit here of Warsaw Pact Commander Marshal Grechko (Embtel 524, information Moscow 75 and Joint Weeka No. 23)./2/ /2/Telegram 524 from Bucharest, November 11, confirmed that the Romanian military had deliberately snubbed the November 7 Soviet reception celebrating the October Revolution. (Department of State, Central Files, POL RUM-USSR) Joint Weeka 23, November 7, reported on incidents between Soviet and Romanian officers during the visit of a Soviet military delegation. (Ibid., POL 2-1 RUM) (2) In November 19th interview with New York Times correspondent David Binder, MFA Press Director Francis Pacararu said Rumania member "socialist community" but stressed it against all pacts and blocs. As illustration Rumania's attitude, Pacararu cited maintenance good relations simultaneously with USSR and China, Yugoslavia and Albania, and Western powers. Though his remarks formally stayed within confines of Soviet line re desirability abolishing both NATO and Warsaw Pact, Pacararu seemed to imply unilateral Rumanian view its membership in Warsaw Pact unessential if not undesirable. (3) In November 21 conversation with US ARMA, two officers Foreign Liaison Office (former Military Attachés) of Armed Forces Ministry said if Rumania had its way it would not belong to any pact including Warsaw Pact and would be concerned only with defense its own frontiers. They concluded by stating Rumania maintains its military alliances with reluctance and their only concern is defense their own country. This first time US ARMA has heard FLO officers discuss Warsaw Pact or Rumania's participation in such. These two officers rarely say anything departing from Party line. (See also US ARMA CX-110-64)/3/ /3/Not found. Comment: Embassy continues to believe that Rumanian attempt to withdraw from Warsaw Pact at present juncture unlikely, as risks and liabilities would much outweigh potential gains. However if above developments, occurring within short time period, represent more than mere coincidence, they might reflect either (1) Rumanian decision to adopt political line regarding opposition to all military pacts as propaganda conditioner for long term goal of possible disassociation from Warsaw Pact, or (2) response to some as yet unrevealed Soviet pressure on Warsaw Pact matters. Though probably unrelated to foregoing, noteworthy that large conference has been in session at Central Committee Headquarters Building since November 18, judging by number and type of cars parked in special lot outside building. Latter in past has been reliable sign Central Committee Plenum in session. (However, Pacararu denied Plenum being held in conversation with Binder.) Crawford
146. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ SecDel/MC/21 New York, December 3, 1964, noon. /1/Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Confidential. Drafted by Givan and approved in S on December 15. The meeting was held at USUN. The source text is labeled "Part I of II;" a second memorandum of this conversation, dealing with Communist China, is ibid. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS U.S. Rumania Minister Manescu proposed that he begin by reviewing bilateral relations. He said he was satisfied that relations have improved and that the spirit in approaching mutual problems is good and equitable. Prospects are good, steps forward are being taken and he is most conscious of the support given by the Department of State and the Secretary personally. Moving to specific subjects, Manescu said his government has granted agreement to Mr. Crawford. Meanwhile Crawford has acted in his own capacity most tactfully and without preconceived ideas. He has assured himself of good conditions of work. The Secretary said he could verify that Crawford is most seriously interested in improving our relations. Manescu said another outstanding problem is the consular convention. This would be Rumania's first such agreement with a Western country. The draft has been approved by the Government and it has been handed to Crawford. Presumably talks will start this month in Washington. There will no doubt be some discussions, but there are no problems that are insurmountable. There is the possibility of an understanding. The Secretary said we would do our best too. Manescu said cultural exchange arrangements for 1965-66 are now being achieved which will increase present relations. There has been an important exchange of visits, including a group of American power experts. There is, finally, the problem of economic and trade relations. After the Gaston-Marin mission, Rumanian authorities took steps to see that all agreements arrived at would be effectively implemented. A team is to be sent to the U.S. soon to negotiate a large purchase of cotton. There are also 13 Rumanian specialists surveying the American market. Their preliminary results show some possibilities. American demand exists for Rumanian products. Some of this demand can be met now, some in the future by adapting production to special American requirements. Certain observations should be made, however, according to Manescu. For instance, the Export-Import Bank is showing some concern that orders for technical installations should not be given as a package, which raises problems of financing. In their view this concern is unfounded. A number of contracts are quite probable, including a catalytic cracking plant and a synthetic rubber plant. These will amount to about $100 million. This is not a great amount in relation to U.S. global figures, but American producers seem interested in selling these installations, and Rumania is interested in buying them. The contracts have not been concluded, however, because such a large amount is a problem for Rumania. Much or all of this could be covered by U.S. sales, but unfortunately the very high tariffs make sales almost impracticable. Where most favored nations pay 17 percent tariffs, Rumania must pay 40 percent. Concluding this subject, Manescu said the Rumanians are counting on increased understanding of this problem and on the fact that the present Administration operates under conditions that give it a freer hand to settle the issue and improve bilateral relations. In any event the existence of so many important problems shows that our relations cover a broad field. The Secretary replied that he fully recognized that trade opportunities are limited in the absence of an MFN relationship. Minister Manescu may know, however, that both the Executive and the Legislative Branches are actively taking up the problem of the bases of trade with Eastern Europe. Senator Fulbright is making an urgent and detailed study of the subject. The Secretary said he opened the hearings before the Senator's Committee a few months ago./2/ The Minister also knows that American businessmen are expressing more interest in changing the situation. Chambers of Commerce have taken up the issue and business groups have gone to Eastern Europe. The State Department is in close touch with these business leaders. /2/For text of Rusk's March 13 statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, see Department of State Bulletin, March 30, 1964, pp. 474-484. The Secretary said he personally hoped Congress would amend the legislation to permit us to extend MFN, but we cannot say exactly when this will happen. Congress will almost certainly take up the question early in the next session. In view of the need for legislation, there is a timing problem. There is also another factor involving timing. From the standpoint of the politics of trade, it would help if we could see some progress in GATT negotiations in connection with the Kennedy Round. Talking about tariff reductions across the board is easier politically than individual cases. Meanwhile we will do what we can where opportunities pre-sent themselves. This is what we did last July when we introduced general licensing procedures. We will do our best to handle the problem of the Export-Import Bank within the present legislation. We are prepared to extend some general licenses now that we were not prepared to extend three years ago. There is one field, the Secretary said, where quick improvement is possible--tourism. Americans have not been able to travel easily in Rumania and neighboring countries for 20 years and have accumulated a great backlog of interest in the area. From Rumania's point of view, the promotion of tourism could be very important. From our point of view, as tourism grows we would hope the Rumanians would earmark a part of their tourist proceeds to permit Rumanian tourists to come to the U.S. The Secretary said he would look into the Export-Import Bank problem when he returned to Washington. He said he was somewhat optimistic about the development of economic relations, although he recognized the importance of the MFN problem. We are both victims of history in this respect, but we will try to reverse it if we can. It would be useful if we could get certain Senators and Congressmen to visit Rumania next year. On this question Manescu said the Secretary would have his entire support.
147. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Romania/1/ Washington, January 5, 1965, 3:49 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 RUM. Confidential; Noforn. Drafted by Vedeler, cleared by Tyler, and approved by Davis. 541. Following summary of Secretary's conversation with FonMin Manescu is FYI and Noforn. It is subject to revision upon review. While Foreign Minister Manescu in Washington at completion his tour US he accepted luncheon with Secretary January 4. Other Rumanians present were Deputy Foreign Minister Malita, Ambassador Balaceanu, Pungan and Embassy DCM Baschiru. Manescu expressed his pleasure and warm appreciation in connection with tour he had just made. Expressions of satisfaction were exchanged concerning development of bilateral relations during past year. Secretary mentioned we appreciated speed with which Mr. Dej had received Ambassador Crawford for presentation of credentials after our request made; indicated our gratification at agreement on new series of exchange arrangements and at beginning of consular negotiations January 12; suggested prospect of some action in the trade field in coming months benefiting our bilateral economic relations; stressed possibilities of enlarging Rumania's dollar income through development tourism. Remainder of conversation devoted to world affairs, especially present crisis in UN over payment arrears and Article 19, and question of MLF and proliferation of nuclear weapons. Secretary presented US position on these issues emphasizing as to former strong US interest in and support of UN; our desire to save UN by avoiding both Soviet withdrawal and collapse of US public support UN because of inability to solve present payments problem; and our deliberate avoidance of prestige considerations in order to encourage solution of UN problem by a Soviet contribution however made. Manescu expressed some doubt solution would be reached by GA resumption January 18. He confirmed view Malita had already expressed to Tyler before the lunch, the Rumanians believed great power members less interested early solution than in utilizing present UN situation to avoid consideration of some of the more important problems. Re MLF Manescu followed line its realization would lead to proliferation nuclear weapons and way to attack nuclear arms problem was for five present nuclear powers to meet and reach agreements prohibiting use of nuclear weapons and for Warsaw Pact countries and NATO conclude non-aggression pact. Secretary strongly affirmed our record and our continued intention of opposing any form of nuclear dissemination. He made point MLF would serve interest of EE by insuring against other European states acquiring national nuclear weapons capabilities in future. Since any nuclear arrangements in NATO or Atlantic alliance would be public, EE had assurance against such national nuclear weapons capabilities whereas West knew nothing about what arrangements for nuclear weapons in EE Soviets might have made with EE countries. US ready to discuss with Soviets any such NATO arrangements in relation to any such Warsaw Pact arrangements but Soviets had shown no willingness to do so. These points evoked no real substantive response from Manescu, who seemed unprepared for, or reluctant to engage in, debate. Rusk
148. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, February 15, 1965, noon. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Rumania, Memos, Vol. 2. Confidential. Drafted by Warker and approved in U on February 25. The meeting was held in Ball's office. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS Mr. Linder said that EXIM was at the point of decision regarding the extension of credit guarantees to Rumania for the purchase of synthetic rubber plants and a catalytic cracker valued at $80-90 million. There are three problems remaining: 1. The Rumanians have given EXIM trade data and have agreed to give debt servicing data, provided EXIM agrees beforehand to approve the guarantees upon receipt of the debt data. EXIM cannot agree to this. The Rumanians have refused to provide data on invisibles or gold reserves. 2. EXIM has proposed that the contracts be financed with 15% cash payment and 85% on credit. Of the credit, EXIM would guarantee 85% and the balance was to have been assumed by the suppliers. EXIM would thus guarantee 72-1/4% of the contracts. The suppliers (Firestone and Universal Oil Products) are unwilling to share any of the credit risk. Their position is strengthened by the fact that they presently have no competition for the contracts. The 72-1/4% which EXIM is prepared to guarantee compares favorably with what Rumania is currently receiving from Western Europe. 3. EXIM has indications that the Rumanians are discussing various additional, large-scale equipment purchases with US suppliers, the value of which might be in the neighborhood of $70 to $90 million. This includes a $20 million fertilizer plant. The question is how far EXIM will be expected to go in giving consideration to applications for guarantees on these additional projects. The fertilizer plant might be feasible, but anything more would be very questionable. The Under Secretary commented that we were seeking in the rubber and cracking plant transaction to establish a commercial relationship with the Rumanians which we hope would develop further. Our purpose is principally political--to help peel Rumania off from the Soviet Bloc. The Rumanians have shown a willingness to give us financial information which they have not given to others, and we should be prepared to ease the Rumanians gradually toward a normal economic relationship with us. Mr. Johnson said he thought we should not at this time go much over $100 million without Rumania having more exports to the US. It was agreed that EXIM would seek the maximum balance-of-payments information from the Rumanians but would not insist on invisible data as a condition for concluding a deal on the rubber and cracking plants. It would also consider an application for credit guarantees on the fertilizer plant, but would press the Rumanians harder for information on invisibles before approving this transaction. EXIM would hold to its position of guaranteeing a maximum of 72-1/4% of the credit. Mr. Linder was confident this would present no difficulty, since the Rumanians were getting financed or guaranteed somewhat smaller percentages of the total cost in other Western countries. If the rubber, cracking and fertilizer plant transactions are concluded, EXIM would not consider further applications for guarantees for, say, a period of 18 months./2/ /2/In a memorandum to Bromley Smith of the NSC Staff, February 23, David Klein of the NSC commented: "Our negotiations with the Rumanians are not going very well. EXIM is being quite sticky and unnecessarily so. There is a continual problem here of making Mr. Linder understand what we are about." (Ibid., Rumania, Memos, Vol. 1) [Continue with the next documents] Volume XVII Index | Foreign Relations Online | Historian's Office | |