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 | FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968 Volume XVII Eastern Europe Department of State |
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| 133. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, May 28, 1968, 4 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL POL-US. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Martin. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS Ambassador Michalowski said that he was returning to Warsaw for consultation and, before going, he wanted to have a general discussion of bilateral relations. He realized that current relations were less than fully satisfactory but thought it important that there be no further deterioration. Mr. Stoessel agreed that we seem to be at a low point and said we quite frankly have a problem resulting from the "anti-Zionist" campaign in Poland./2/ We are under considerable pressure to make statements or take other actions which might have an unfavorable impact but have so far been able to resist those pressures. /2/Following student demonstrations in March 1968, the ultra-nationalist "Partisan" faction of the Polish Communist Party attacked the "Zionism" of certain members of the Polish Government and Party and called for their removal. A purge of Jewish and more liberal Party members followed. An estimated one-half of the small Polish Jewish community applied for visas to Israel. At a July meeting of the Communist Party, First Secre- tary Gomulka condemned anti-Semitism. However, the Partisan faction remained strong and Gomulka was forced to give ground to its demands at a November Party congress. Gomulka finally put an end to the anti-Zionist campaign in February 1969. Ambassador Michalowski denied that anti-Semitism was involved in events in Poland and said a "great deal of fuss has been created because 60 or 70 people lost their jobs." He said that while "unpleasant things happen from time to time," many of the people fired were not Jewish. He believed an "anti-Polish campaign" had been mounted by Jewish interests which resented Poland's policy in the Mid-East War last June. He feared, however, that the reaction of Congress to these pressures might have an effect on MFN treatment for Polish trade with the United States. He said he was aware that the U.S. Administration had taken a firm stand on this matter in the past and asked if there was likely to be any yielding now. Mr. Stoessel replied we believe MFN should not be given or taken away on such a basis and we would certainly oppose any Congressional action affecting Poland. At the same time, it would be most helpful if this "anti-Zionist" agitation were to die away. Ambassador Michalowski said there were other fields in which he would like to see more done. He regretted the ending of the IMG program in Poland and thought it was most unfortunate that American books, films and plays were unavailable to Polish audiences because of a lack of foreign exchange. He also noted that an inspection team from the U.S. Department of Agriculture had recently found three Polish slaughter-houses below standard for meat exports to the United States and he wanted to make clear that the Polish Government would move rapidly to improve conditions to have them restored to our list. The Polish Government accepts our reports on them and will comply with our recommendations immediately. Ambassador Gronouski said we have other small problems at the moment including Polish requests for us to pay certain shipping costs in hard currency. He hoped that problem would be resolved "before it becomes a cancer." There is also the question of use of Polish zlotys for research facilities at the Krakow hospital. He thought it should be possible to arrive at some "middle ground" between the Polish position that near-end zlotys must be used and our position that they should come from the far end of the debt repayment schedule. He thought this type of relationship should not be allowed to lapse and noted that construction of these facilities would involve a hard currency input of about $600,000. He was sorry that the outlook for the English-teaching program was not optimistic but realized the problems were on our side and not with Poland. Ambassador Gronouski (who joined the conversation at this point) said he thought Ambassador Michalowski was going back into a most interesting political situation in Warsaw and he wondered what changes were to be expected. He thought Interior Minister Moczar's star was rising now and he would probably occupy a more important Party position in the near future. For the long term, however, he thought Katowice Party First Secretary Gierek will rise in importance and he may eventually replace Gomulka. Ambassador Michalowski said that although the country is changing, he expects a realignment of the leadership and not a new leadership. He did not believe Gomulka would be replaced in the near future. Ambassador Gronouski agreed that Gomulka would probably remain in office but thought he did not have "the kind of control" he had formerly exercised. He said there was a great deal of ferment in Warsaw and had even heard that Ambassador Michalowski might not return from his consultation. Ambassador Michalowski shrugged and said that would be all right with him since his time here had not been particularly happy. On the way down in the elevator after the meeting, Ambassador Michalowski said he thought it would be most unfortunate if Ambassador Gronouski were not replaced soon./3/ He thought that if the post were left vacant, it would be misunderstood as a political decision "particularly if my post were vacant at the same time." /3/Ambassador Gronouski left post on May 26. Ambassador Stoessel presented his credentials on September 12.
134. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson, in Texas/1/ Washington, July 9, 1968, 1536Z. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Poland, Memos, Vol. 3. Confidential. Received at the LBJ Ranch at 11:50 a.m. CDT. CAP 81592. Following is a memo from Nick Katzenbach recommending a Presidential statement condemning anti-Semitism in Poland as a substitute for Congressional action withdrawing most favored nation from Poland. Congressman Farbstein will probably offer his amendment to the Foreign Aid Act withdrawing most favored nation from Poland on Thursday. He has not made known his specific language. In the Senate, Dodd last week introduced a sense of the Senate resolution calling of the President to withdraw most favored nation from Poland until such time as the Polish Government changes its anti-Semitic, anti-student, and anti-intellectual policies. Mandatory withdrawal of most favored nation from Poland now would not be effective foreign policy and would not help the Jews in Poland. I believe Nick's recommendation is well worth a try. Tell Katzenbach to go ahead/2/ /2/This option is checked. For the President from Katzenbach Subject: Polish Jews and most favored nation I have learned that Congressman Farbstein intends, within the next few days, to offer an amendment to the foreign aid bill withdrawing most favored nation from Poland. He will argue that Poland no longer deserves preferential tariff treatment because of government-inspired anti-Semitism. Unless we take immediate action, I expect the amendment to pass. This would be unfortunate because: --It could lead the Polish Government to more restrictive measures against Jews. --It would harm our relations with Poland, and make it extremely difficult to return most favored nation treatment to Poland in the future. --It would limit the powers of the President. I have talked to Herman Edelsberg, of B'nai B'rith, who is one of the Jewish leaders encouraging Farbstein to introduce the amendment. He, in turn, has talked to Myer Feldman and other Jewish leaders. Edelsberg tells me that Farbstein is too far down the road now to pull back. But he also says that he and his colleagues can probably prevent passage of the amendment (by avoiding a roll call vote) if he can assure proponents of the measure (including Farbstein) that there will be a strong Presidential statement--within the next several weeks, but after the foreign aid bill has passed--condemning anti-Semitism in Poland. Although I am not sure the amendment can be blocked, I think this tactic is well worth the effort. A Presidential statement would be politically useful at home, and far less harmful to our relations with Poland and to the well-being of Polish Jews than would Congressional action withdrawing most favored nation. If the Jewish leaders cannot prevent passage of the amendment, there will be no need for a Presidential statement. If you agree, I will tell Edelsberg that you are prepared to make a public statement of concern about the plight of Jews in Poland. (You could do this: 1) at a press conference; 2) before a group of Jewish leaders; or 3) in response to a letter--which we would generate--from a group of Jewish leaders.) I also would call in the Polish Ambassador and explain to him that: --We will try to head off withdrawal of most favored nation, but the responsibility for the public outcry which this amendment represents rests wholly on the shoulders of the Polish Government. --The President has decided that, if we are able to prevent most favored nation withdrawal, he must issue a strong statement condemning anti-Semitism in Poland. --If the Polish Government fails to heed our warning, the most favored nation issue will certainly come up again in the next session of Congress. At that time there will be no way to prevent the passage of an amendment which would be in the interests of neither of us. Draft Presidential statement follows: "For many generations the American and Polish peoples have shared common aspirations for human rights and dignity. High among these rights stand freedom of religious faith and freedom from discrimination based on origin. We know the human suffering that follows the suppression and violation of these rights. Like millions of other Americans, I have read with deep concern of recent developments in Poland. These reports make it clear that many of the relatively few Jews left in Poland now live in uncertainty and fear. Actions by the Polish Government, whatever may have been their purpose and motivation, have resulted in the dismissal from positions not only in government but in professional life of people of Jewish faith or origin. The world needs no reminder of how anti-Semitism can spread like a pestilence, leaving horror and tragedy in its wake. The lessons of history remain too vivid and too stark to ever again permit civilized nations to make innocent men the victims of political stratagems or maneuvering. Together with my countrymen, I condemn anti-Semitism wherever it may exist, whatever form it may take, whatever it may be called. I call on the Polish Government, and on men of good will everywhere, to join with me in this condemnation."/3/ /3/President Johnson mentioned the resurgence of anti-Semitism in his September 10 remarks at the 125th annual meeting of the B'nai B'rith. For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968-69, Book II, pp. 944-950.
135. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Leddy) to the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach)/1/ Washington, September 4, 1968. /1/Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 74 D 164. Confidential. Drafted by Lisle. A notation on the source text reads: "U suggests you advise Ives at lunch we are working on this proposal. It needs refinement." SUBJECT 1. Many, perhaps most, of the members of the Congress resuming its session today will wish to express in various ways their indignation against the Powers that invaded and continue to occupy Czechoslovakia. The result may be Congressional action for withdrawing MFN from Poland, the only one of the invading countries enjoying this advantage. It has been suggested that we recommend to the President that he take the initiative in suspending MFN to Poland without waiting for possible Congressional action. 2. This proposal has certain advantages: A. It might blunt the force of the Congressional attack and thus prevent more extreme action such as an embargo. B. Presidential action could keep alive the option on the part of the President independently to restore MFN to Poland when the time was appropriate. (An opinion from L that this is legally possible is attached.)/2/ /2/Not printed. C. It would demonstrate that the Executive has used its arguments in the past on the desirability of flexibility in our relations to the Communist countries in good faith. It would show that the Administration while willing to give under appropriate conditions is also ready to withdraw. D. It would show that the Executive is willing to forego substantial economic advantage both in trade and in possible loss of payments by the Poles on their long-term debt (see paragraph 3B below) by a gesture expressing the moral revulsion of the United States. 3. On the other hand, there are a number of disadvantages. I believe the first two of these most important. The others although less so are enumerated as of substantial cumulative weight. A. Withdrawal of MFN from Poland would be a clear violation of our international obligations under GATT of which Poland is a member. Withdrawal of MFN by act of Congress would equally be a violation of GATT. The international impact of such a violation of an international obligation, however (only a year after we had supported the accession of Poland to GATT) on the initiative of the Executive charged with the primary responsibility for the conduct of foreign affairs, would be far greater than if it were an act forced on the Administration by the actions of the Congress. B. Withdrawing MFN from Poland would be a serious act having substantial impact on our bilateral relations, including possible withholding by Poland of payments on its claims settlement with which MFN had been linked and conceivably on its other long-term obligations as well. This strong action would be taken against a Soviet puppet. Would not members of the Congress contrast this action with the economic "pinpricks" likely to be taken by the Executive against the Soviet Union? Would not the demand then arise in the Congress that the punishment fit the crime by more extreme action against the Soviet Union, the prime actor, such as an embargo on trade? C. To the extent that preemptive action would seem to many Congressmen a transparent device to ward off Congressional action of a less limited character, it would fail to have that effect. D. The Administration would presumably support its action on one or both of two grounds, its punitive character and its possible effect on Polish conduct in the future, perhaps by inducing the Poles to withdraw their occupying forces from Czechoslovakia. Even ignoring the fact that the Poles presumably had and will have little opportunity for control of their own behavior in this case, use of the argument would run into the Congressional question of why we had not taken this action earlier to combat Polish support of North Viet-Nam. We have consistently taken the position that withdrawal of MFN could have no effect on Polish Vietnamese policy and might even intensify Polish "anti-Zionist" actions with all their anti-Semitic implications. E. Preemptive action by the Executive on MFN would be inconsistent with the position heretofore consistently taken by Administration spokesmen in public speeches and otherwise emphasizing the broad political advantages of trade and the importance, even under adverse conditions, of pushing ahead with the long-term advantages to be derived from it (impact on society, greater realism, strengthening of pragmatic forces). We have also emphasized the long-term effect of measures such as this in creating uncertainties among businessmen. F. While it would be of course legally possible for the Administration to lift the suspension at an appropriate later time, this would in fact be politically difficult if not impossible unless current conditions had substantially changed. G. Our objectives could be better achieved by attempting to have any Congressional act suspending MFN, if such action should seem inevitable, subjected to a provision that the suspension could be lifted at such time that the President would find this to the national interest. If absolutely necessary this could be coupled with the requirement that he find that the conditions which led to suspension (invasion and continued occupation of Czechoslovakia, "anti-Zionism" with its anti-Semitic implications if this should be involved in the Congressional action) no longer existed. 4. In my view, the strong balance of arguments weighs against preemptive action by the Executive to suspend MFN. I believe we should instead direct our efforts to ensuring that any Congressional action taken to suspend MFN be coupled with a grant of authority to the President giving him the right to lift the suspension at such time that he found such action would be to the national interest.
136. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State/1/ Warsaw, September 17, 1968, 1505Z. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-1 COMBLOC-CZECH. Confidential. Repeated to Belgrade, Bucharest, Budapest, Moscow, Prague, Sofia, Munich, USNATO, and Poznan. 4540. Subject: Effect of Czechoslovak crisis on Polish scene. Ref: Warsaw 4300./2/ /2/Telegram 4300, August 21, analyzed the implications for Poland of the Czech crisis. (Ibid.) 1. Effects of intervention in Czechoslovakia will certainly be felt in Poland for some time to come. Most important short-term consequences of recent events will probably be general clamping down of lid in Poland. Long-term consequences are not so clear, however. Following are some implications for various elements in political scene here. 2. Party--Immediate effect of Warsaw Pact joint actions against Czechoslovakia is to strengthen Gomulka's position within party. His leadership has sustained serious challenge over past fifteen months from "nationalist" and ambitious younger elements of party. He had appeared to lose ground following "March events"/3/ of this year. Though he succeeded in reasserting himself in May and June, published discussions at July Plenum showed there was no consensus on major issues and, in fact, there existed considerable turmoil in party. Speculation was rife that Gomulka might again lose ground to his challengers at November Party Congress. Now, however, those who may have argued within party councils for change in the guard and/or greater autonomy from Moscow might well lie low for time being. Soviets can hardly tolerate at this moment any rocking of Polish boat. Gomulka would not in any case give up without fierce struggle, in which he would presumably be able to count on Soviet support. However, long-term prospects are not so clear; Polish regime has been increasingly exposed as Soviet satellite by willy-nilly identifying itself with Soviet international adventures and miscalculations. /3/See footnote 2, Document 133. 3. Armed Forces--Military has not in recent times played well-defined role of its own in Polish politics, except to extent that some individual military officers have been identified with "Partisans" and that military has also purged itself of "Zionists" of alleged doubtful loyalty. It is conceivable that differences exist within military leadership on political aspects of Czech venture, as was true during aftermath of Arab-Israeli war. Fact that First Deputy Chief of Army's main political administration (Gen. Czapla) found it necessary to go to Czechoslovakia two weeks ago to talk to Polish troops on spot (Warsaw 4316)/4/ may tie in with rumors of low morale among Polish occupying forces. Reading between lines in press leads to strong suspicion political "Commissars" will have some difficulty in future with military elements who experienced truth in Czechoslovakia. It is not impossible that coming weeks or months will bring further shake-up in military hierarchy, like those which followed Arab-Israeli war last year and Polish student demonstrations this spring. /4/Telegram 4316, August 26, reported Polish press comments on Czechoslovakia. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-1 COMBLOC-CZECH) 4. Intellectuals--From representative sampling, Embassy concludes that Polish intelligentsia (cultural and technical) has all along strongly sympathized with liberalizing trends in Czechoslovakia and feels considerable shame and disgust at Polish complicity in invasion of Czechoslovakia. However, apart from leaflet reported in Warsaw 4320,/5/ which is probably work of Warsaw intellectuals or students, we know of no active manifestations of solidarity with Czechoslovakia. /5/Dated August 27. (Ibid.) 5. Students--Regime has been fortunate in that Czechoslovak crisis came to head during vacation season when students are scattered. What will happen when academic year begins and students are concentrated again in Warsaw, Krakow and elsewhere is difficult to foresee. We cannot discount possibility that there will be attempts to organize protests. However, odds will be strongly against potentially dissident students. Steam may well have gone out of Czechoslovak crisis by time students get together. Regime organs will certainly be more than usually vigilant with memory of "March events" in Poland still fresh and with example of Czech students' behavior before them. Polish students themselves may be skeptical about utility of protest actions in view of way their protests last March were turned against them and exploited for internal party purposes. Their most militant leaders of last spring are, in any case, in jail. 6. Church--So far, church has not spoken out on events in Czechoslovakia. Although we take it for granted that church hierarchy is strongly opposed to Polish participation in Warsaw Pact action against Czechoslovakia on moral and patriotic grounds, we believe that church will be cautious about expressing its views in public. Church leaders may well conclude that it would not be in church's best interests here to enter fruitless debate with regime on issue of relations with another socialist state or on merits of internal Czech liberalization process (led, after all, by Communists). Church may well prefer to save its ammunition for issues of more immediate concern to it. 7. Workers--In aftermath of Czech crisis Poland has not witnessed anything comparable to series of factory rallies organized in support of government at time of March events. Those manifestations of solidarity which have occurred with some regularity have mainly taken the form of letters, greetings and gifts directed towards "heroic" Polish soldiers in the field. Absence of any serious attempt by regime to evoke working class endorsement for its stand may indicate that government considers the workers at best apathetic or at worst uncooperative on this issue. Regime has clearly chosen to rely more on emotive power of its arguments (threat of FRG) to justify its actions and probably has decided not to use Czech affair to dissipate momentum needed among the workers for the pre-Congress campaign. 8. Poland's Foreign Relations--Poland's participation in Warsaw Pact actions will have at least temporary chilling effect on its foreign relations, above all with Western Europe and US. WE countries have already taken measures to cancel visits or other joint activities planned for near future to indicate their displeasure. Most dramatic of such actions is indefinite postponement by French of Gomulka September visit to Paris. Poland's careful efforts over recent years to cultivate smaller European countries (Scandinavia and Benelux in particular) and gain sympathetic hearing for its view on Germany, European security and European boundary problems appear for moment, at least to have suffered severe setback. Whenever Poles begin picking up threads again they will no longer enjoy psychological advantage as leading victims of Nazi wartime brutality and as first East European country to liberalize its internal structure in 1956. Wellspring of special sympathy which Poles enjoy in West Europe, in other words, has probably run dry, at least temporarily. It had already been significantly reduced by increasing illiberalism of Gomulka regime in recent years, stubborn rigidity on Central European issues, increasingly vocal subservience to Moscow line on all international matters, and above all outbreak of internal anti-Semitism earlier this year. Absence of Foreign Minister and current demoralization of Polish Foreign Service will not help in coping with problem. 9. Conclusions--Unhappy as large sections of Polish public may be over Czechoslovak affair, we are not aware of any significant protest actions and hardly anticipate any. In short run at least, we expect tightening of regime controls. Gomulka will in all likelihood be able to take advantage of current atmosphere to maintain his position in party and possibly win back some lost ground through PZPR Congress in November. However, this immediate prospect does not necessarily correspond to longer range trends. 10. To be sure, Gomulka may use his Czech windfall to pick off his potential rivals and opponents in party leadership and so maintain his predominant position indefinitely. However, younger, less dogmatic, more nationalistic elements of party--those who have been challenging Gomulka's establishment since last March student unrest--do not appear despondent re prospects following Czech invasion. While some are skilled and pragmatic, they do not necessarily sympathize with Czech democracy, liberalism and economic reform. At this stage "the game" is more nihilistic: That of making room nearer top of power structure and occupying it. Today it is Zionists and revisionists who must make room; tomorrow, their protectors (Gomulka establishment) must yield. Moreover, top contenders, Moczar and Gierek, appreciate that under Polish international and domestic conditions only way to climb to top is on Gomulka's back. If Gomulka's long-term authority and respect are debilitated along way by involvement in unpopular affairs--like anti-Zionist campaign, clamp-down on students and intellectuals, and Czech invasion--so much the better. 11. Power struggle in Poland continues with Czech occupation constituting temporary windfall for Gomulka. Final chapter Czech occupation and its influence on future Soviet leadership and behavior not yet written. Outcome in Prague and Moscow will be major factors influencing eventual political course and leadership pattern in Poland. Stoessel
137. Memorandum for the Record/1/ Washington, September 17, 1968. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Poland, Memos, Vol. 3. Confidential. Drafted by Nathaniel Davis. SUBJECT Ambassador Michalowski called me on the phone and suggested lunch. When I countered by suggesting a day some time in the future, Ambassador Michalowski asked if he could call on me in my office. I checked with the State Department, and he came by at 3:00 p.m. today. Ambassador Michalowski opened the conversation by asking what the prospects were of getting back on the track in our bilateral relations. I asked if he had read the President's B'nai B'rith speech, in which the President made clear that a great deal would depend on the actions of the occupying powers in Czechoslovakia from now on./2/ /2/For text of President Johnson's September 10 speech, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968-69, Book II, pp. 944-950. I asked Ambassador Michalowski when the Polish Government expected to withdraw its troops. Ambassador Michalowski said that, having paid the price, the Warsaw Pact allies could not withdraw until they were "sure" that their essential objectives would not again be endangered. In talking about the relationship between the Czechs and Moscow, he indicated the Czechs were far from docile or under control. Michalowski said his expectation was that the Czechs and Soviets would end up making some sort of agreement which would result in the stationing of two or three Soviet divisions on the western border. He spent some minutes describing how the intervention had become necessary--essentially because the Dubcek regime was allowing counter-revolutionary forces to run rampant and vital Warsaw Pact security interests were at stake. He described Dubcek as honest and a "beautiful" personality, but without the strength to defend Communism that Gomulka had in 1956. I said I could not agree with Ambassador Michalowski's explanations. If anything seemed clear from the period between January and August, it was that the Czechoslovak Government and people were determined to remain in the Warsaw Pact and to discharge their commitments to it. They had even admitted large numbers of Soviet troops into Czechoslovakia for maneuvers--only to have those troops misused against them. The American Government had been scrupulous in giving no occasion for anyone to believe we were trying to take advantage of Czech developments. Our relationship to the Czechoslovak Government--a Communist regime committed to the Warsaw Pact--had been extremely reserved--even on bilateral issues such as gold and claims. Michalowski smiled wryly, and said perhaps we didn't want the gold to fall into the hands of the occupying powers. Michalowski readily acknowledged that the American Government's position prior to August 20 had been "correct." I remarked that the stories of American "green berets" and arms caches were the purest nonsense. Ambassador Michalowski said that this was the sort of thing governments sometimes said in such circumstances, and did not dispute the matter. I remarked that the anti-Semitism in the Polish press and TV did not help matters. Michalowski said there had been one speech by Moczar and an article or two, but the policy of Gomulka and the responsible leaders of the government was firmly against such manifestations. When a remark slipped by, Mr. Randal of the New York Times could be counted on to pick it up. I asked whether the removal of Jewish Poles from government and party offices had altogether ceased. Michalowski said he knew of no removals since last spring. Michalowski said the Eastern European countries had been willing to work constructively on bilateral matters in spite of the bombing of a socialist ally in Vietnam. We should now show the same constructive attitude with the shoe on the other foot. I said the cases were not analogous. Our bombing of North Vietnam had followed a massive intervention by North Vietnam in the South. Michalowski said every action is a reaction to something. Michalowski said he had called on Congressman Zablocki yesterday, as well as a number of other Polish-Americans. So far as he could tell, the Polish-American community hoped that cultural and economic relations with Poland would continue. I said this was not my understanding of the reaction of Polish-Americans, and other Americans of Eastern European origin. The White House was getting a lot of mail advocating strong measures, and many Congressmen and other public figures felt the same way. Michalowski asked why we didn't respond to a political act politically and not vent our feelings on cultural exchanges which benefited our peoples, or economic measures which would make it difficult to rebuild our relationship later. He particularly mentioned MFN, and said much depended on the vigor of U.S. Government action to save this vital link to Poland's and America's future relationship. If MFN were lost, the Poles would retaliate; and we would be in a downward spiral. I said I was not at all confident what would happen with MFN. I said I thought it did not so much depend on the U.S. Government as on the future course of action of the Polish Government and its Warsaw Pact allies in Czechoslovakia. Michalowski said he hoped we would not take a position that a resumption of detente would depend on the abolition of censorship in Czechoslovakia. I said that there seemed to be a range of possibilities--on one hand respect for Czech sovereignty, or at least the non-interference in internal affairs which seemed to be called for in the Moscow Agreements, and on the other a blood bath, police terror, and an occupation regime. I could not make prescriptions, but was merely pointing out that the world--including America--could not fail to respond one way or the other to the future course of events in Czechoslovakia. Michalowski said he felt reassured by Kuznetsov's arrival in Prague. He said he believes things are on the road to normalization, and we will see an improvement in the situation--not a degeneration. Michalowski mentioned that a move to boycott Polish products had so far been narrowly averted. I said I was not at all sure there wouldn't be further efforts by an aroused American public. Michalowski said he hoped the American Government would not end up whipping the little countries, while business went on as usual with Moscow. He said the Polish Government had simply been participating in something it had to do. The decisions for the future would be made in Moscow. I said I couldn't help but believe Mr. Gomulka had some influence in Moscow--particularly if reports of divided councils in the Kremlin had any truth to them. Michalowski said there had been deep divisions and hard arguments in the Kremlin, and the Polish Government did have a voice, but the basic decision was Moscow's. I asked Michalowski what he had meant by his statement that we should respond politically, and not in the economic and cultural field. He answered: "Oh, perhaps by sending me home and withdrawing Mr. Stoessel--something like that." He indicated his mission had been one tragedy and disappointment after another. If he had known what was in store, he would never have come. I said I realized that Ambassador Michalowski personally must find the present situation an unhappy one. We parted by exchanging hopes that our next meeting would be in better circumstances. Michalowski said he was even then on his way to protest the shootings directed against a Polish ship in Miami./3/ /3/On September 16, a Polish ship bound for Mexico was hit by a shell fired by a recoilless rifle. ND
138. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State/1/ Warsaw, December 11, 1968, 1579Z. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 POL-US. Secret. 5366. Subject: US policy toward Poland. 1. Following comments and recommendations concerning US policy toward Poland are submitted with thought that they may be useful in context of policy reviews taking place during transition period. 2. Begin summary. While recognizing Poland's current position as staunch Warsaw Pact ally of USSR ruled by doctrinaire, conservative Communist regime, I believe that evolutionary trends inevitably will continue develop here as in other areas of Eastern Europe. To encourage such trends, to enhance US influence and to promote in long term better relations between Poland and West, we recommend continued, low-visibility, student, professor and technical exchanges; expanded use of PL-480 funds for English language teaching and research projects; revamping VOA broadcasts; and reinstitution some form of Media Guarantee Program. We also favor maintenance of MFN for Poland, competitive commercial credits, renewed efforts conclude consular convention, and encouragement of Polish participation in international organizations. Lastly, we believe it would be helpful if US, in consultation with FRG, could take public position recognizing de facto permanency of present Polish western boundaries. End summary. 3. Poland's political situation and prospects. Recent Fifth Congress of Polish Communist Party reaffirmed Gomulka's leadership and gave strong support to program emphasizing loyalty to USSR "for better or worse," and conservative policies relating to internal political and economic life. Re international affairs, regime stresses hostility to FRG, necessity of recognizing status quo in Europe, and Soviet preeminence in Eastern Europe. Conservative line and continued leadership of Gomulka are supported by USSR, which wishes stability in Poland, and reflect desire of Polish regime to damp down and absorb internal stresses in wake of "March events" and Czechoslovakia. 4. However, despite lid imposed by Fifth Congress, there is tension and maneuver in dynamics of internal politics. Younger elements, both party and non-party, are pushing for recognition, and nationalist themes continue to be voiced although in muted fashion. Regardless of personal fortunes such individual pretenders as Gierek and Moczar, pressures for less doctrinaire approach to political and economic problems facing Poland exist and are certain to increase. Although Soviets as well as Gomulka and his cohorts will attempt to restrain such pressures, and may be successful in short run, I am persuaded that over long term evolutionary trends in Poland as well as elsewhere in Eastern Europe cannot be contained. It should be our policy to contribute discreetly but effectively to develop such trends. 5. US image in Poland. There is broadly based sentiment of good will toward US in Poland resulting from many factors, including numerous family ties with relatives in US, admiration for US as technologically advanced country of democracy and opportunity, and respect for US as leader of non-Communist world. Young people in particular tend regard US with sympathy as most modern state endowed with highest standard of living. At same time, regime propaganda pictures US as imperialist power trying to act as world's policeman (Viet-Nam) and internal conflicts in US are played up. While this propaganda is not in itself very convincing, it is all-pervasive, persistent, and its effectiveness is increasing as cultural, media and other contacts with US are reduced. To counter regime propaganda and to maintain and if possible enhance good US image in Poland, we should aim at improving our cultural, informational, and scientific programs in Poland. 6. With these elements in mind, we recommend following (to be elaborated in year-end policy assessment): A. Exchange and cooperative programs: (1) Expand government-sponsored, long-term student and professor exchanges; (2) encourage further institution-sponsored programs, such as Academy of Sciences, Stanford University, and projected Kansas University English language exchange; (3) develop new PL-480 cooperative and research projects in scientific fields; (4) continue efforts obtain Congressional approval for ten-year English program, and meanwhile expand current English-teaching program; (5) augment present facilities and exchanges with Krakow Children's Hospital; (6) encourage Ford Foundation's joint-project concept and further foundation exchanges, like Kosciuszko; and (7) support international cooperative programs, like current FAO/UNDP projects. B. Media: (1) Develop new program to replace former IMG (International Media Guarantee); (2) enter 1969 Warsaw Book Fair and Poznan Trade Fair; (3) utilize in Poland results of Yugoslav book reprint program; (4) foster US-Polish university book exchange; and (5) target Polish language VOA programs to an increasing extent on youth. C. Consular convention: We have had indications recently that Poles would like to conclude negotiations on consular convention (separate report will be submitted) and we recommend reopening discussions on this subject. D. Trade: Believing that our economic as well as political interests are furthered through East-West engagement, multi-lateralism and improvement BOP situation, we recommend: (1) maintenance MFN; (2) flexible US trade policy including industrial credits at least up to Berne Convention limits to East European countries and competitive CCC credits; (3) realistic strategic licensing; (4) resumption normal commercial promotion activities; and (5) discreet encouragement meaningful Polish participation in international bodies such as GATT and ECE, and increased contact wherever feasible between Poland and other East European countries and OECD. 7. Oder-Neisse line. I am aware of difficult and complicated nature of this problem, particularly from standpoint of our relations with FRG. Also, I am under no illusions that US--and even FRG--recognition of boundary would result in immediate improvement basic FRG-Polish relations or related East-West security and political problems. However, I am impressed with insistence and effectiveness of Polish propaganda re impermanent nature of western frontiers, and I am also impressed with fact that no responsible Western official seems to believe that significant alteration in Oder-Neisse boundary will be feasible or that FRG recognition at some later date can be traded for anything worthwhile. 8. In this situation, I feel that we should prepare ground for time when US spokesman could issue statement expressing our confidence that delimitation of boundaries of reunified Germany in a peace treaty would reflect factual situation east of the Oder-Neisse. 9. Timing and exact wording obviously would have to be worked out with FRG and other Allies with greatest care, possibly associating it with some significant measure or statement relating to European security and Western Alliance. Ideally it should follow or be in conjunction with statement by FRG itself concerning various aspects its Eastern policy. Probably no time is an ideal time for such a step in so far as US-FRG relations are concerned; but I believe it would pay dividends in terms of lessening impact of Communist propaganda and in injecting realism into important aspect of East-West relations, thereby furthering our long-range interests in Europe. 10. Conclusion. We recognize of course, that in post-Czechoslovakia period, and with general tightening of ideological screws in Eastern Europe, it is not politically desirable nor would it be effective for us to undertake broad-gauged program of "bridge-building" initiatives toward Poland or others of Warsaw Pact Five. Nevertheless, we should continue to play for long term in pursuing program of type outlined above, which, in discreet and non-ostentatious manner, is aimed at furthering evolutionary trends in Poland and building on already broad base of sympathetic regard for us. 11. Enunciation of new US stand on frontiers, while admittedly a more far-reaching and complicated political move, in my view could be influential in this part of Eastern Europe in lessening impact of one major element of Communist propaganda line and conceivably in preparing way for more rational Polish-FRG relations. Stoessel [Continue with the next documents] Volume XVII Index | Foreign Relations Online | Historian's Office | |