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 | FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968 Volume XVII Eastern Europe Department of State |
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| 124. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Policy Planning Council (Owen) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/ Washington, November 1, 1966. /1/Source: Department of State, Polish Desk Files: Lot 71 D 158, Pol 1966. Secret. SUBJECT These impressions are based on a very small sample of Polish opinion; I talked seriously to about a dozen people, divided about equally between government and non-government. 1. Polish Concerns. Virtually every conversation began and ended with one subject: the security of the Polish state. Shadowed by a history of four partitions, Poles of every type and persuasion--in and out of government--express or reflect their fear that this time, too, Poland will not endure. One remark is worth quoting: When a Polish official and I were discussing whether Polish inheritance taxes might permit accumulation of an estate over several generations, he smiled and added: "Yes, but our country never seems to last long enough to make this worthwhile." You have the feeling that you are talking to people living in a house that has collapsed about them several times; they are constantly looking at the roof and the walls--in this case, at their geography. Sandwiched in between Germany and Russia, they can hardly be blamed if they worry about a fifth partition. Polish concerns seem more of a product of this history and geography than of the obsessive hatred of Germany I expected to find. When I said to a Polish newspaperman, before the monument to the dead of the Ghetto, that this was a monument not only to the crimes of one nation but to the moral weakness of man, I was surprised at his agreement. Herb Kaiser (Embassy) mentioned that the Ambassador, visiting Auschwitz at Yom Kippur, had written in the visitor's book: "No one of us innocent." The newspaperman said that most thoughtful Poles were of the same view, though it was hard to persuade the average man. Poles evidently don't like or trust Germans, but there's much more than this to their security concerns. Even when memories of wartime horrors have faded, the hard facts of geography will remain--and the history of a millenium in which no Polish generation was spared war, or foreign rule, or both. 2. Polish Remedies. When you ask Poles how their security concerns could be met by long-term change, they say something like this: "Dissolve both blocs; limit armaments in Central Europe; exchange security guarantees; and create a new security organization in Europe to police the result." The object of all this, they make clear, is to create a system which will permit East and West to concentrate on the really serious business of jointly sitting on Germany, instead of wasting their time opposing each other. But this will be a long time coming, they acknowledge; in fact, you get the impression they are sceptical it will happen at all. In the meantime, they say, limited security measures should be initiated in Central Europe. Hence the Rapacki and Gomulka Plans. If we don't like these proposals, they ask, why don't we make counter-proposals? There is real Polish bitterness on this point--the more so since they don't seem to expect us, in fact, to take their concerns in this field more seriously in the future than they believe we have in the past. 3. Result. The net result is a people who do not believe that the existing situation assures their security, yet who do not see any likely alternative in sight. This is a prescription for worry--and worry is what Poles do. This worry makes it easier, I would suppose, for the hardnosed types who run the country to stay in power and to block moves toward reconciliation with Germany (let alone, more basic changes in the European status quo). 4. Prospect. Polish security concerns are rooted in their perception of the kind of world they live in: a world of national states, each rapaciously seeking narrow national advantage, at the expense of others. This is the way Poland's neighbors have always acted (and it is the way that Poland has acted toward its neighbors, when it could). It is difficult for Poles to conceive a different kind of Europe. Until they do, I would guess that they will remain obsessed by concerns over their security--given the facts of their geography. Our task should be to convey to thoughtful Poles a different vision of the future: one in which the concept of wider communities has so clearly replaced nationalism as to make it evident, even to this stubborn and heroic people, that wars for national territorial gain have become as unlikely as wars between feudal lords were after the decline of feudalism. The best way to make this vision convincing is to help bring it into being--by trying to create viable alternatives to nationalism in the West, in the East, and in East-West relations./2/ /2/The conventional wisdom is that nationalism is a good thing in Eastern Europe, because it reduces Soviet influence. My guess is that this process has gone about as far as it is likely to go for some time. The more important effect of nationalism, from here on out, may well be to strengthen objections, among Germany's Eastern neighbors, to German reunification. [Footnote in the source text.] The ambiguity in Polish reactions to Western European integration is striking. They fear its effect on Polish trade or that it may become a cloak for German hegemony; they agree that if it proceeds far enough to subsume German nationalism it will have been a good thing for Poland. They are puzzled by the process of community-building; it is unlike anything in their experience; they watch it with an odd mixture of fascination and scepticism. That such a Western Europe should be clearly linked to the US, in the present situation, is questioned by few in Poland. Community building in the East is not a wholly new thought to them. They toy with the idea of seeking a greater measure of economic integration among the "northern tier"--Poland, Czechoslovakia, and perhaps Hungary. They quickly add, however, that the Soviet Union would never permit it. They are also interested in building a structure of multilateral East-West cooperation. They argue strongly for strengthening the Economic Commission for Europe. The President's speech/3/ held out the vision of a Europe which was more stable and secure because it was built on a foundation of such communities, rather than merely national states rolling around loosely. It was well received, but I wonder how much of this message got through to the Poles. My guess is that it will have to be repeated many times and in many different ways. /3/Reference is to President Johnson's October 7 address to editorial writers. For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966, pp. 1125-1130. If the vision can be made convincing; if thoughtful Poles can see the structure of a new Europe taking shape, in which what one Pole called "our old-fashioned nationalism" is no longer a sure clue to national interest; if Germany can dramatize this change by renouncing the Oder-Neisse--then deep changes in the Polish view of the kind of world they are living in might over the long run gradually make still further changes possible. 5. Conclusion. The most impressive man I met in Poland was a professor of moral philosophy (Professor Kolakowski, who has since reportedly been expelled from the Communist Party for his courage and creative thought). He spoke of his main concern for the future: "What will our young people believe in? "Socialism--no one takes that seriously as an ideology. "Religion--its hold will decline as the present generation is succeeded by a younger generation born to city life. (He may be right, but I was struck by the large proportion of young people, presumably born to city life--men as well as women--in church in Warsaw.) "That leaves nationalism. A generation of nationalist technocrats frightens me. Such a generation will be defenseless against temptations; it will not build anything great. Polish youth needs to be given something larger than this to believe in." He was speaking in terms of a need for moral goals, but the point has wider relevance. Perhaps the goal of building a Europe in which the new concept of communities could replace the outmoded concept of destructive nationalism could be made exciting enough to help fill some of the moral vacuum he feared. Henry Owen/4/ /4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
125. Telegram From Francis M. Bator of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson, in Texas/1/ Washington, December 26, 1966. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Poland, Memos, Vol. 2. Secret. The telegram, sent through Rostow, was received at the LBJ Ranch at 12:45 p.m. CAP 661333. FYI: I am sending by wire because it may be useful for John/2/ to have a decision by tomorrow, Tuesday, December 27, when he returns to Warsaw. /2/Ambassador Gronouski. Subject: Polish currency package. You will recall that in your October speech to the editorial writers/3/ you announced that "the Secretary of State is reviewing the possibility of easing the burden of Polish debts to the U.S. through expenditures of our Polish currency holdings which will be mutually beneficial to both countries." /3/See footnote 3, Document 124. At Tab A is a Katzenbach memo/4/ asking you to approve a package for negotiation with the Poles. Specifically: /4/Not printed. --We would postpone $21.75 million of the $39.2 million the Poles owe us during January 2, 1967-January 2, 1968. (The $39.2 million they would have to pay if we did not postpone represents a big hump in the repayment schedule--it is four times what they had to pay us in 1966, and twice what they will have to pay annually after 1968.) --They and we would agree to use the postponed $21.75 million, over the next several years: (1) for a $9.5 million/10 year English language teaching program in Poland, perhaps manned by young Americans and administered by our universities; and (2) to help pay for U.S. cultural exchange programs in Poland and elsewhere; for the operating expenses of the U.S. Embassy in Warsaw; international travel by U.S. officials from and through Poland, etc. The Poles would also agree to a firm date for negotiations on defaulted prewar bonds; to concessions on the use of other U.S.-owned zloties by U.S. tourists and businessmen, and on some other minor issues between us. A short precise account of the proposed deal is at Tab B.4 The only part that would show up explicitly as a line-item appropriation in the budget is the English language training program, at an annual $950,000 in Polish zloties. Balance of Payments We would by and large neutralize the balance of payments effects by a side agreement with the Poles that they would increase imports from the U.S. during 1967 by an amount equal to the postponed payment. We would use their recent level of U.S. imports as a base. This is not fool proof protection, but we can police it well enough to reduce the likely leakage to negligible amounts. Executive Branch Positions The package has been formally approved by all the NAC agencies, with Treasury in the chair, as well as Agriculture. Gronouski--who has been pushing very hard for something like this--thinks we are offering too little and asking too much. (An English language program, perhaps with young Americans running around Poland, would be a hard pill for Gomulka to swallow.) John may turn out to be right, and if so, we will come back to you. But the rest of us think that the proposal is balanced enough to be worth a try. The Congress We know that Senator Mansfield thinks "this a modest program . . . in the right direction." On the other hand, Senator Gruening has written State opposing any such deal./5/ His letter was full of misconceptions, and State will try to straighten him out--at least on the facts. (He will not be back in town until January, but his office knows we have been trying to reach him about this.) /5/The letter was not found. In addition, and not surprisingly, Paul Findley is opposed./6/ Otherwise we know of no Congressional reactions--despite the reference in your speech. To avoid the risk of stimulating opposition--especially since you have already given a public signal that you are planning to do something like this--Nick Katzenbach decided against taking further soundings before asking for your approval. /6/On October 18, Representative Paul Findley (R-IL), leading a coalition of Republicans and Southern Democrats, inserted language in legislation for the charter of the Export-Import Bank that prohibited the Bank from guaranteeing loans to any Communist nation. In a subsequent legislative conference with the Senate, the language of the Findley amendment was modified to permit a Presidential waiver in cases where the President judged a loan to be in the national interest. Timing I am afraid we need your decision on whether we can begin negotiating with the Poles before January 2. The first '67 installment of the Polish debt ($9 million) is due on the 2nd. If you authorize us to start talking with the Poles, we will offer them a three month postponement on $4.7 million--the portion which would become a part of the final rollover package if the negotiation is successful. Recommendation As a bridge builder I would vote for this. The English language program is a first-rate idea and the cost of the entire package is not great. Politically, we face the usual risk of helping a Communist country which is making a fuss about Viet Nam, and giving Hanoi some help--the usual dilemma of maintaining a balanced Presidential posture. (If, during the course of the negotiations, the Poles go in for unusual pyrotechnics on Viet Nam, we can always back off. They will be told that no U.S. proposals are final until a deal is struck.) Francis M. Bator OK to open negotiations with the Poles on the package as outlined /7/There is no indication on the source text of President Johnson's decision.
126. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Warsaw, February 9, 1967. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 POL-US. Confidential. Drafted by Gronouski. Transmitted as enclosure 1 to airgram A-528 from Warsaw, March 2. The meeting was held at the Polish Foreign Office. PARTICIPANTS Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers' Meeting. I opened the conversation by asking Mr. Winiewicz about all the rumors we had heard about a conference going on here in Warsaw. He said yes, there was; it would end today and the people would leave tonight. I said "Only a one-day conference?" He said no, it started yesterday morning. He then went on to say that this is a normal ministerial level conference that takes place a couple times a year and that it did not arise, as some people suspected, as a result of the diplomatic agreement between Romania and the Federal Republic of Germany./2/ The meeting is not a result of this; it would have happened anyway. I said I presumed there would be some discussion of the Romanian-FRG agreement; he said they will discuss it but he wanted to make clear this was not the occasion for the conference. He went on to say that he wouldn't be a bit surprised, however, if the Romanians had hastened their diplomatic accord with West Germany in order to have it de facto prior to the conference. He said there would be no communiqué issued on the meeting other than the fact it occurred. /2/An apparent reference to the technical cooperation agreement between Romania and the Federal Republic of Germany. For text, see 642 UNTS 47. Relations with West Germany. I then asked him how this whole developing picture with West Germany is ultimately going to affect Poland. I said I could at least visualize the possibility that the Soviet Union, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, and Czechoslovakia could very well at some time in the future have diplomatic relations, leaving Poland and the GDR out in the cold. He responded that it did not surprise the Poles to find Romania according diplomatic relations to West Germany. He said the Poles have always felt that those countries which did not have the bad experience with Germany that Poland had, specifically Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary, would have a different attitude toward relations with West Germany than they do. He emphasized that many Poles have expected this for a long time. On two or three occasions he emphasized Bulgaria, bringing in Hungary as a third possibility, suggesting that Bulgaria is the next likely candidate for relations with the FRG. He said on the broader question of West German-Polish relations, they have to look at this in the light of the history of their attitudes. He said from the time of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and West Germany in 1955 until the period 1957-58, the Poles repeatedly expressed willingness to have diplomatic relations with West Germany with no conditions, but their advances in this direction were rebuffed by the Germans. He referred to an interview with a British publication which Gomulka had in the late '50s in which he expressed an understanding that it is very hard for any nation to digest defeat. He said even though we remember this as having been the defeat of Hitler, the Poles appreciate that for the masses of German people it was a defeat for the German nation. Poles were very sympathetic toward establishing diplomatic relations in that period; after 1958, as world conditions changed, especially after '59 when Germany started showing an interest in atomic weapons which they had not previously shown, the Polish position was altered to the extent that they insisted on recognition of the Oder-Neisse line as a precondition. At that time, Gomulka realized that of course the border could be formally recognized only in the peace treaty, but he insisted on de facto recognition. They also hoped at that time that all Western powers, including the U.S., would give de facto recognition as deGaulle did to the Oder-Neisse line because they felt that this would make it easier for the German authorities to sell it to the German people; they still think it is a mistake for the Western powers not to take a lead on this matter. I pointed out that sometimes it is very costly for a country's friends to attempt to take the lead in matters of this sort; that in terms of internal politics it could create a situation where the opposition to the German leadership could argue that Germans were not running their own foreign policy but were being forced into an action by their allies. I said he ought to consider the possibility that it is better in the long run to have Germany take its own initiatives in these matters. He then went on to say that conditions have quite significantly changed in the early '60s because things have settled down in the East German regime. East Germany has developed into something quite different in the '60s compared to what it was between '55-'60. It has become stable responsible government and has to be reckoned with. I raised the question of what were the real conditions that Poland had for diplomatic relations with West Germany. I said I knew he had mentioned three things but I had a feeling that the Oder-Neisse line was the most significant and this feeling had been supported by conversations with people in Poland in the last six months who have distinguished between normalization of relations and diplomatic recognition. I had a feeling that of the three conditions which he keeps raising that the Oder-Neisse line is the fundamental one and is the one on which most importance is placed. He said it is true there is distinction between normalization of relations and diplomatic recognition, and then he put a different twist on it. He said they will do all they can to normalize relations; just this morning he had signed off on an approval for an invitation from a group of Polish youth to a group of Christian-Democratic youth to spend their vacation in Poland; he talked about trade and cultural relations which they are interested in developing. What they could not accept, he said, is the German notion that they represent all of the people who were in the German borders in '37. He said, "Look what this means!" There is a law on the books which says that any German that engages in communist activities is violating German law and that means a man like Kmiecik, one of their reporters who was born in Berlin, cannot technically set foot on German soil because he could be arrested for engaging in communist activities on the theory that he is still a German citizen engaged in subversive activity. He said he wasn't saying the Germans would do it; but the law is on the books and that, combined with the fact that many Poles fall under the sole representation thesis, means that technically they are in jeopardy. Relations with East Germany. He went on to describe their relations with East Germany, saying that they are most concerned about isolating East Germany and creating the impression that all its friends have abandoned it. When a nation becomes isolated it does irrational things and we can't afford to take that chance. A cornerstone of Polish policy must be not to give the East Germans the feeling that their friends have abandoned them. He talked again about the question of irrational activities and in this discussion he made mention of two things: first, that East Germany's statements will become more and more irrational if they are isolated and, second, that any hope for the development of exchanges and relations between East and West Germany which Poles encourage will diminish as the GDR becomes more and more irrational: conversations, trade, things of that sort. So, he said, "We must not abandon East Germany and we cannot therefore accept the sole representation claim as far as it applies to East Germans." He thought the question of atomic weapons would be solved by the nonproliferation treaty. He thus returned to the proposition that there is a distinction between normalization of relations and diplomatic recognition. He indicated that the Poles were unwilling at this time to move ahead and establish diplomatic relations before the conditions for normalizing relations were met. Zloty Package. I discussed with Winiewicz the zloty package, pointing out that in the present climate this is of course very difficult for us to digest, but that I was very happy that I got solid backing from the Administration on it. I went over the package and said I thought the conditions that it imposed on the Poles were reasonable ones they could accept without too much concern. I said I did not want to suggest that passing of that part of the program which must go before Congress would be easy, but I expressed confidence that there is a lot of strength behind the President's East-West program, some of it not as publicity conscious as some of its opponents, and my best estimate was that the bill would pass. Even if it didn't, I thought it was highly important that it be brought before Congress because I regarded the Administration program on East-West relations as being in the long run as fundamental as that which is currently occupying our attention--the Viet-Nam question. For three reasons I thought the zloty proposal should be brought before Congress quickly: 1) because anything that isn't in the legislative hopper by the first of May had no chance for a thorough hearing; 2) I think it can pass; and 3) even if it doesn't pass it is highly important in terms of development of attitudes in the U.S. toward East-West relations that this issue be brought before the public in a practical, tangible way. I said I was hopeful that Poles would do what they could to get the thing moving. I knew Trampczynski had been busy and probably he hadn't had time to give it full consideration, but the sooner we can get this out the sooner we can get it before the Congress. He said he was glad to have this brought up and went on to say how much he appreciated knowing my attitude. At 9:00 o'clock last night he said he attended a meeting where the question was raised whether it was worthwhile in the present climate to pursue zloty package negotiations at all: Paul Findley was brought up at this meeting as typical of resistance to this kind of thing./3/ "They asked my judgment of it, and my judgment was that we should go ahead with it," Winiewicz added. He said it will be very valuable to have my judgment and he would take this up immediately with Trampczynski when the latter returns from Moscow this afternoon. He emphasized that the powers-that-be will be interested in my judgment. /3/See footnote 7, Document 125. I said there would be brickbats and I would get a few myself, but I thought it was worth it. The President and the Administration is genuinely interested in putting substance into the building-bridges philosophy and if we can't come forward with this program now I think it will be an irretrievable loss in the development of the Administration's East-West trade philosophy. Consular Negotiations. The consular negotiations were dismissed almost out of hand as being held up because the Poles are waiting to see what the Senate does with the Soviet Consular Convention. Ford Foundation Program. I discussed the history of the Ford Foundation program, relating my part in getting Stone and Birecki together last fall and my conversation with Birecki a week or so ago, my understanding that Birecki was to invite Stone here and the way the invitation turned out. I expressed my judgment that Stone and Birecki were very close and there was no reason in the world why this wasn't back on the track now; it just needs some catalyst to get it moving. I was reasonably convinced Stone was interested, I knew it was of value to Poland. I noted that Czechoslovakia had just signed an agreement with Ford. At any rate, I was very hopeful that this could get back on the track and felt there was every possibility it would if reasonable heads prevailed. I said that despite Viet-Nam and many problems on both sides of the Atlantic, many of us were interested in maintaining as high a level of bilateral relations as possible; I referred to the Ford Foundation program as being non-governmental but symbolic of these relations. He said he would take this over personally; he had already talked to Jack Fisher about it and he knew Stone was as interested as Poland was. Zloty Travel Proposal. I then raised the zloty travel proposal we had made on September 16, pointing out its importance to the many zloty-financed research programs (agricultural, medical, fishing, etc.) currently underway in Poland. I described the research in summary fashion. I suggested that maintaining this research was important in its own right as in terms of maintaining level of bilateral relations. I said it would be most unfortunate if programs deteriorated for lack of travel funds. I said I could understand why they had waited to see the whole zloty proposal before acting on this element, but hoped that now the whole package was before them they would approve this part immediately. He expressed surprise that it had not already been resolved and said he would take this up himself.
127. Airgram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State/1/ A-610 Warsaw, April 6, 1967. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 POL-US. Confidential. Drafted by Kaiser and approved by Jenkins on April 4. SUBJECT REF /2/Telegram 2366 from Warsaw, March 31, reported on the resumption of Ford Foundation programs in Poland. (Ibid., EDX POL-US) Telegram 2369 from Warsaw, March 31, reported on discussions with the Poles regarding the terms of U.S. economic assistance. (Ibid., AID 15-8 POL) In political terms the decision of the Polish Government to agree to the zloty package and to a resumption of the Ford Program after a lapse of four years is an important augury for the future course of U.S.-Polish relations./3/ The agreements are a milestone in that they signify a willingness by the Polish Government to permit some movement in our bilateral relations. In fact, the English language program, the key ingredient in the zloty agreement, and the Ford Exchange program open up the possibility for increasing the tempo of our relations. This prospect stands in contrast to the situation that has existed here in the past few years when U.S. efforts took on the character of a holding operation. We were mainly concerned with trying to prevent U.S.-Polish relations from freezing completely, as certain regime elements used Viet-Nam as a convenient excuse to immobilize bilateral relations. /3/For text of the agreements, signed in Washington on April 10 and 11, 1967, see 19 UST 7788. For about a year the Polish leadership, with Gomulka the ultimate decision maker, had been weighing the pros and cons of the elements contained in the zloty package. The decision to go ahead was not an easy one; economic advantages had to be measured against the implications of giving the U.S. an opportunity to expand its influence in Poland. Economic considerations apparently won out. Even though the zloty package provides relatively small financial relief for Poland, the amount was nevertheless significant to a country hard pressed for dollars. Probably more important to the Poles was the precedent they saw created by this agreement. For the first time both countries agreed upon a mutually desirable project to be financed by the U.S. Government-owned zloties which were about to fall due for conversion into dollars. The Poles probably consider this a prelude to finding other mutually attractive projects which would also ease Poland's indebtedness to the U.S. By agreeing to the zloty package and the Ford Program the Poles gave evidence that Viet-Nam does not completely bar improved bilateral relations. This implies a significant change inasmuch as the Poles have long insisted that Viet-Nam obstructs any significant development of bilateral contacts. It is remotely possible that familiarity with U.S. efforts to end the Viet-Nam war had a favorable impact on Polish decision makers. Undoubtedly, the view that Poland's national interests would be better served by these agreements was the most powerful consideration. Inherent in the Polish decision is an apparent willingness of the leadership to modify, or at least restrain, its suspicions and cynicism about U.S. purposes in Poland and to accept the zloty package as an example of a mutually beneficial agreement envisaged and achieved under the President's bridge-building policy. It now behooves us to implement as fully and as quickly as possible the agreements concluded. A possible result of Poland's decision to conclude these recent agreements with the U.S. is the likelihood of an early appointment of a new Polish Ambassador to Poland to succeed the late Ambassador Drozniak who died last October. By acting as it did last week the Polish Government provides a favorable backdrop for the appointment of a new Polish Ambassador./4/ /4/Jerzy Michalowski replaced Drozniak, who died of a heart attack November 1, 1966, in Washington. Michalowski presented his credentials to President Johnson on September 12. Memoranda of their conversation are in Department of State, Central Files, POL 17 POL-US. Gronouski
128. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, October 5, 1967. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 POL-US. Confidential. Drafted by Buell and approved in G on October 16. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS Ambassador Jerzy Michalowski requested this courtesy call on Ambassador Kohler. Ambassador Kohler countered Michalowski's modest observation about the minor role which Poland played in US foreign policy by pointing out that US-Polish relations had been a most significant factor in the formulation of US policy toward Eastern Europe as a whole. He noted specifically the granting of MFN and the Claims Settlement Agreement of 1960./2/ The initiation of the new relationship with Poland at that time was a "test case" between the Executive and the Congress. He said he hoped that the Ambassador would learn here how very real was the separation of powers and how complicated the Executive's relationship with the Congress could be. At the moment these relations were as difficult as he had seen in 36 years of service under both Republican and Democratic administrations. /2/For text of the Claims Settlement Agreement, signed in Washington on April 16, 1960, see 11 UST 1953. Most-favored-nation status was restored on March 26, 1964; see footnote 4, Document 117. Michalowski said that he hoped that the time would come when he could help in a change in US policy towards Europe. Ambassador Kohler asked for specifics, noting that our policy had been adaptable to European needs and that it appeared that we had reached a stage of stability in Europe. Michalowski demurred, calling it "an unstabilized balance" which could be upset if further steps were not taken. He noted particularly that the division of Germany was here to stay and that this fact should be recognized. Ambassador Kohler asked if the Poles believed the Germans were reconciled to it. Michalowski said they were advancing in this direction. Ambassador Kohler noted that we had persuaded the West Germans to a commitment in 1954 to renounce the use of force in any change of frontiers./3/ To this the Germans have adhered. He believed the aspirations of the German people on both sides would continue to be for unity, that it was folly to recognize the division and give the Germans the feeling of something imposed upon them, as was the case after Versailles. Michalowski said that by not bringing about a German reconciliation to the division of their country we were leaving them to expect the assistance of the US to change it. Ambassador Kohler said we had proved in 1961 and 1962 that we were prepared to fight to prevent any change being made by the other side but that we had also proved that we did not seek to change anyone else's position by force. He said that the major contributions to stability had not come from the Eastern but the Western side. Mr. Michalowski said that particularly in recent years there had been much more proof that the Eastern side was not going to change the situation by force. Ambassador Kohler agreed that this appeared to be so--since 1962. Michalowski said that if proof by both sides were furnished that no change was contemplated, the Germans would realize that their interests lay in taking advantage of the existing situation. /3/Article 7 of the Convention on Relations Between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany, as amended, signed in Paris on October 23, 1954. For text, see Documents on Germany, 1945-1970, pp. 425-430. Ambassador Kohler said he did not believe that the Poles appreciated the efforts of the new German Government under Kiesinger and Brandt in the direction of detente. On the contrary, the Eastern European leaders had called a meeting in Warsaw to condemn the Germans for their efforts to establish closer relationships with the East. Michalowski said this was to prevent a break in the solidarity of the Warsaw Pact countries and to prevent the weakening of the position of East Germany. Ambassador Kohler asked what would happen in East Germany when Ulbricht passes on. Michalowski said we should not pay too much attention to personalities. Ulbricht is not a Mao and even in Mao's case his removal would not change the basic situation. The trend since the death of Stalin has been away from personalities. Michalowski mentioned Polish continuing interest in a European Security Conference. Ambassador Kohler asked what kind of a conference he might have in mind. Would this not be directed against the American presence? Michalowski insisted that the Poles had never suggested that such a conference should exclude the United States. Any conference of this kind without the participation of the US would be absurd. If such a conference could establish the necessary basis for security, this of course, would make further USA military presence unnecessary. He said he did not hope for spectacular solutions, but that we could move ahead step by step. Ambassador Kohler asked after Gomulka, who Michalowski said had been "quiet" of late. Other Polish personalities of Ambassador Kohler's acquaintance were discussed briefly, such as Ochab and Jaroszewicz. Michalowski said he hoped that Jedrychowski (Chairman of the State Planning Commission), whose visit to the US had been called off several years ago because of the "world atmosphere", would be able to come provided this atmosphere improved.
129. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State/1/ Warsaw, October 31, 1967, 0935Z. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL POL-US. Confidential. Repeated to Prague. 1285. Ref: Warsaw 1235; 1240./2/ Pass USIA for IAS and ICS/E. /2/Neither found. 1. Ambassador called on Vice Foreign Minister Naszkowski Oct 30 to protest comparison of President Johnson with Hitler published in Trybuna Ludu Oct 27. In reply, Naszkowski defended such comparisons saying that U.S. escalation of Viet-Nam war produced corresponding escalation of Poles' feelings of revulsion and concern for world peace. "Cruelties" of U.S. methods of waging war in Viet-Nam remind us, he said, "of cruelties perpetrated by Nazis against Poles." When Ambassador rejected validity of such analogies, discussion ensued on Viet-Nam problem which proceeded along usual lines and ended inconclusively. 2. Ambassador also raised problem of Architecture USA exhibit (Warsaw 1240). Naszkowski emphasized that exhibit has been postponed, not canceled. We cannot have "great spectacular events" such as U.S. exhibit, he said, during period when Viet-Nam war is causing so much concern. Exhibit has therefore been postponed, he said, in hope that future developments will be more conducive to holding it. 3. Memcon follows by pouch./3/ /3/Transmitted in airgram A-303 from Warsaw, November 9. (Department of State, Central Files, POL POL-US) Gronouski
130. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, December 13 and 14, 1967. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 17 POL-US. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Stoessel on December 16. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS I saw the Ambassador and Szewczyk the evening of December 13 at a dinner at Szewczyk's home and had the opportunity to talk with both of them at some length. I also saw Ambassador Michalowski at the White House luncheon on December 14. Harmel Report/2/ /2/For text of the Harmel Report, "Future Tasks of the Alliance," see Department of State Bulletin, January 6, 1968, pp. 50-52. The Ambassador and Szewczyk were interested in the outcome of the NATO meeting at Brussels, particularly that part of the meeting which concerned the Harmel Report. They pressed me for details regarding it and for my views as to the significance of the Report. I provided an appropriate summary of the Report's conclusions, noting that one of the areas highlighted by the Report, concerning the future work of the Alliance, had to do with European security and a study of steps which could be taken in the direction of East-West reconciliation. The Ambassador remarked that the Belgian Foreign Minister had discussed his ideas on these subjects with Rapacki recently and that the Poles were very much interested in them. In response to the Ambassador's questions, I said that any committee set up by NATO to consider European security matters would be "open ended" and designed to study the problem and come up with recommendations for possible action; I did not anticipate that there would be any sweeping proposals for over-all negotiations on European security and that it seemed more likely that if anything was possible it would be in the form of small steps which would contribute toward reducing tensions. I thought, for example, that one of the most promising areas for action seemed to be the idea of renunciation of force declarations. The FRG seemed to be quite interested in this idea, but the reaction of some of her neighbors to the East did not seem very forthcoming. The Ambassador agreed that renunciation of force declarations could be useful, although it was important that they also include the GDR in some way which would not be discriminatory. He was not specific with regard to how the GDR should be brought into the renunciation of force package and did not indicate any conditions from the Polish side. I also discussed with the Ambassador and Szewczyk the general question of mutual force reductions in Europe. We covered generally familiar ground and they did not raise any new points. FRG-Polish Relations I talked at some length with Szewczyk on this subject, saying that I regretted the apparent Polish rigidity in this regard. Szewczyk commented that Poland was certainly not opposed to improving relations with the FRG but that it would be impossible to contemplate diplomatic relations so long as the FRG proclaimed the theory that it was the only entity qualified to speak for the German people. This was simply unacceptable to Poland, which had relations with the GDR. Szewczyk passed over rather lightly the Oder-Neisse problem and seemed primarily concerned about the FRG's claim to be the sole voice of Germany. I noted that Romania did not seem to have similar preoccupations and he acknowledged, somewhat ruefully, that Romania's views on the subject differed from those of Poland. Szewczyk added that, in fact, he did not see much urgency, from the Polish standpoint, in establishing diplomatic relations with the FRG, since he did not feel this would bring many advantages which Poland did not already enjoy. For example, Polish-FRG trade is increasing every year and cultural exchange and tourism is also on the upgrade. Viet-Nam The Ambassador was interested in possible moves by the United States on Viet-Nam in the UN. I said that this question was still under study and I did not know what the outcome would be. He observed that, in his view, any consideration of Viet-Nam in the UN would not produce an outcome favorable to the United States. It was certain, he felt, that the only resolution which could come from UN consideration would be one recommending immediate and indefinite cessation of the bombing. When I mentioned that there might possibly be some attractiveness to considering negotiations in the framework of a renewed Geneva Conference, the Ambassador said that this could only be feasible if agreement had been reached in advance by the US and the principal interested parties. If this were not the case, a reconvened Geneva Conference would simply be a shambles in which the intransigent views of the Chinese would predominate.
131. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Poland/1/ Washington, January 15, 1968, 2342Z./2/ /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 USSR. Confidential. Drafted by Jaffe, cleared in EUR, and approved by Sonnenfeldt. Repeated to Berlin, Moscow, and USNATO. /2/Beginning in 1967, the dates and transmission times of all outgoing Department of State telegrams were in six-figure date-time-groups. The "Z" refers to Greenwich mean time. 98888. Following is the gist of an Intelligence Note sent to the Secretary today: All three top Soviet leaders--Brezhnev, Kosygin, and Podgorny--went on an "unofficial," and clearly unusual, visit to Poland from January 12 to 14. While unannounced Polish-Soviet consultations on international affairs are not unusual, just-completed visit has all the earmarks of urgent Soviet intervention in Polish internal affairs. Rumors from Poland have indicated Poles were planning major Party and Government changes for near future. The most important of the rumored changes would have shifted Gomulka to specially created post of Party Chairman and made Silesian Party boss Gierek new Party First Secre-tary. Although under reported scheme, Gomulka would have remained in charge of all but internal economic policy--where pressure for younger, more efficient leadership is greatest--such a shift, coming within weeks after ouster of Czech Party boss Novotny, may have frightened Soviets. They generally dislike change and may particularly not want any more East European party shifts on eve of upcoming Budapest conference of communist parties. In addition, two such shifts within a short space of time in two neighboring communist parties could, in Moscow's and Ulbricht's view, seriously endanger position of the latter in East Germany. Whether Ulbricht asked the Soviets to intervene with the Poles, or whether Soviet leaders decided to do so on their own, is less important than likelihood that they did intervene and in collective strength. If we are right that a request for postponement of any change in Gomulka's Party position was principal reason for Soviet leaders' visit to Poland, they probably met with a sympathetic response. Gierek, only clear gainer from the supposedly planned shifts, did not take part in the talks, and all Poles who did probably themselves prefer to delay the changes as long as possible. The inclusion of all three top Soviet leaders strikes one as unusually heavy-handed. The example of 1956, when a much more critical situation existed and Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich, and Khrushchev all descended on the Polish capital only to find Gomulka already virtually installed as Polish Party First Secretary, would seem to have inhibited such an approach. Soviet practice in similar situations in Eastern Europe in recent years, such as the Czechoslovak crisis of December/January when only Brezhnev hurried to Prague, usually has appeared more circumspect. The Soviet leaders, however, have shown a somewhat special regard for Polish-Soviet relations as compared with their relations with other East European states. In addition the impulse to present a united front presumably motivated Soviet regime to send all three leaders. Action also suggests uncertainly in Soviet leadership on how to handle such situations and possibly reflects frustration over how little they were able to influence Czechoslovak shakeup. There is no reason to doubt communiqué that wide range of international questions was discussed and complete identity of views was displayed. Two issues of greatest interest to Poles--German policy and communist unity--are always on agenda when they get together with Soviets, but neither policy toward Germany nor Budapest communist conference scheduled for February seemed to call for additional top-level consultation at this time. In view of Poland's membership in the Cambodian, Laotian, and Vietnamese ICCs, current Southeast Asian issues were probably also discussed, but we do not know of differences of views between Poles and Soviets which would have necessitated top level consultations. Therefore, while we do not want to suggest that the visit was concerned solely with Polish internal affairs and the impact of Czechoslovak developments on the rest of Eastern Europe, we do believe these provided most pressing reasons for it. Rusk
132. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, May 17, 1968. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Poland, Memos, Vol. 2. Secret. A handwritten note on the source text reads: "Rec'd 5/18/68, 11:20 a.m." SUBJECT In the memorandum at Tab A,/2/ Nick Katzenbach recommends: /2/Not printed. 1. You authorize Attorney General Clark to be prepared to extend parole to Jewish Poles, and 2. You authorize Katzenbach to tell American-Jewish leaders in confidence that we are prepared to receive Jewish refugees from Poland without regard to quota limitations. Parole action may not be necessary--as current refugee provisions will probably enable us to give visas to any Polish Jews who can get out of that country. We have had some Congressional criticism of parole, and would prefer not to use this authority unless necessary. (Parole reduces delay and the need for supporting personal documentation. Technically, it could by-pass legal requirements on health, criminal records, Communist affiliation, etc.--but the State Department's intention is to require security checks and admit only Polish Jews who would otherwise be eligible as refugees.) As drafted, Nick Katzenbach's memorandum would have you authorize parole for "refugees from religious persecution in Poland." If there were a renewed attack on the Catholic Church, this could apply to Catholics as well as Jews. There is also a theoretical question whether such a parole should apply to Russian Jews or persecuted religious groups elsewhere. In any event this all represents contingency planning. If a parole action were taken, it would, of course, be violently denounced by the Polish Government and perhaps also be criticized by some Polish-Americans. Nevertheless, Ambassador Gronouski agrees with the arguments which override these considerations. Essentially, the argument for action now is: --to show the Jewish leadership in America that we are prepared to move; and --to head off a repetition of the Jews' deeply felt conviction that the U.S. Government failed to give visas in time to the desperately persecuted European Jews in the Nazi era. I recommend you approve Nick Katzenbach's recommendations on the following understanding: a. The Attorney General will extend parole only when refugee and other provisions of legislation prove inadequate to the need; b. Persons coming into the U.S. on parole will have had security checks and would be eligible under normal refugee provisions; and c. The parole action will technically apply to both Jewish and non-Jewish refugees from racial and religious persecution in Poland. Walt Katzenbach recommendations approved /3/The last option is checked. [Continue with the next documents] Volume XVII Index | Foreign Relations Online | Historian's Office | |