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 | FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968 Volume XVII Eastern Europe Department of State |
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| Poland 116. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, January 16, 1964. /1/Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Confidential. Drafted by Kaiser on January 17 and approved in U on January 22. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS U.S. EE--Mr. Kaiser Polish Modrzewski declared that this was an important opportunity to speak about bilateral and multilateral problems. He was pleased that the PL-480/2/ negotiations were beginning to move as the conclusion of a PL-480 agreement was important for Poland in its effort to plan its imports of grain and other commodities from the US. Last year the grain market had become somewhat crowded because of Soviet wheat purchases on world markets. Poland, he said, wants to increase its imports from the US as well as its exports. He was anxious to know the views of the US with respect to the future development of its trade with Poland. /2/For text of P.L. 480, the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, see 68 Stat. 454. Mr. Ball commented that the US is interested in maintaining a close relationship with Poland. The US is also interested in having Poland progress from PL-480 transactions to commercial purchases of agricultural commodities in the US. Modrzewski then expressed the deep appreciation of his Government for the favorable action on MFN./3/ Poland desires short term and other credits from the US for the purchase of agricultural and other products. Although competition for the sale of industrial products in Western Europe was severe, Poland could compete because of the good progress it had made in this area. Poland wishes to expand its exports to the US. Last year Polish exports to the US were probably slightly higher than the year before despite the uncertainty about MFN and the boycott campaign in the US which he now understands has died down. /3/Section 402 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1963 (P.L. 88-205), approved on December 16, 1963, authorized the President to restore most-favored-nation status to Poland and Yugoslavia. Mr. Ball said the US seeks to discourage such actions as the boycott but it cannot always control them. Modrzewski explained that Poland wants to expand its exports to the US in order to be able to meet its debt which will represent an increasingly heavy burden. Poland enjoys and wants to keep its good reputation for meeting its debts. Mr. Ball then mentioned as a limiting factor Poland's unsettled bond debt to Americans. Modrzewski said Poland is aware of this matter, but Poland is still poor. Poland has to be careful about assuming a new schedule of debt. In response to Mr. Ball's inquiry, Modrzewski said Poland's agricultural production last year was better than the year before. Until the end of October the situation seemed very bad but more recently there were indications that the situation was not so bad as previously supposed. The real difficulty stemmed from 1962 when about 2 million pigs and a large number of cattle had been lost. It was now necessary to regain these losses. This year Poland was buying more than 2-1/2 million tons of grain abroad. Although Poland is supposed to receive 400,000 tons of grain annually from the USSR and had in fact received 800,000 in the last few years, Poland had received nothing this year. This month Poland had purchased for cash 150,000 tons of wheat in the US. For the still developing Polish economy these cash purchases abroad are difficult. Grain imports are structural for Poland. The Polish harvest determines the amount of required imports which might vary anywhere from 2-3 million tons. Poland wants to be a regular buyer in the US. Modrzewski said he understands the interest of the US in having Poland increase its commercial purchases in the US. He wondered, however, whether it would be possible to continue PL-480 transactions. Mr. Ball said he would not want to rule out that possibility. The Poles now have our present PL-480 offer. We realize that the shift to commercial purchases is not achieved overnight and that the shift has to be progressive. We are willing to consider the matter sympathetically. Modrzewski commented that for planning purposes, the delay in proceeding with a new PL-480 agreement was unfortunate. Mr. Ball regretted the delay and said the US is interested in Poland's problem and looked toward the evolution of our relationship. The US is in the meantime interested in developing its trade with Poland. Modrzewski then inquired about the Kennedy Round and declared that Poland is interested in participating. Mr. Ball said he was pleased to hear this. Since the US maintains an MFN relationship with Poland, we are interested in the possibilities of Poland's developing a closer relationship with the GATT. In answer to Modrzewski's question, Mr. Ball said the US approves of Poland's desire to participate in the Kennedy Round.
117. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, June 9, 1964, 11:30 a.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Tims and approved in S on June 16. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS US Poland Following a discussion of Poland's role in the Laotian crisis,/2/ the Secretary turned to US-Polish bilateral relations and specifically raised the question of the Polish Government's inaction, to date, on its prewar indebtedness to American bondholders. This matter was previously mentioned by Under Secretary Ball in a talk here with Polish Deputy Foreign Trade Minister Modrzewski last January,/3/ and the Secretary expressed the hope to Ambassador Drozniak that, now that the Most-Favored-Nation issue had been favorably settled,/4/ the Polish Government could make progress on the troublesome question of bondholders' claims and get it out of the way. The Ambassador replied that he indeed would take the matter up upon returning to Warsaw this week. He added that Polish export sales in the US had suffered last year, affecting Poland's ability to pay, and that they wanted to be more sure of this ability before undertaking an obligation to the bondholders. /2/The memorandum of this portion of the conversation, transmitted in Unsec 30 to Warsaw, June 9, is ibid., Central Files, POL POL-US. /3/See Document 116. /4/On March 26, President Johnson directed Secretary Rusk to report to Congress that Poland's MFN status would be continued under the provisions of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962. For text of the President's memorandum and statement, see Department of State Bulletin, April 20, 1964, pp. 626-628. The Secretary asked whether Polish trade here had not recently begun to take an upward trend again and whether tourism had not increased, remarking that the latter seemed one of the best ways for Poland to increase its dollar earnings. The Ambassador replied that they had some hope of increased trade here this year and that the tourist outlook was indeed better than last year, partly because of an improved political situation in the world. He pointed out, however, that Poland was handicapped in offering adequate tourist facilities, being a war-damaged country with many other pressing economic priorities. The Secretary said he would make a purely personal comment on this. American tourists like comfortable lodging while abroad, and in ministering to this taste our hotel chains have constituted a stimulus to tourism around the world. As an example, the Hilton chain has contributed managerial services under arrangements with local hotels in various countries. Would such arrangements be incompatible with the socialist system? Would they not rather be a very practical kind of marriage between capitalism and socialism, noninjurious to either side? The Ambassador smilingly replied that the proposed Hilton hotel in Budapest seemed to offer the answer, and that he would seek further comments on this subject while in Warsaw. He added that his Government had even considered building a Coca Cola plant. Ambassador Drozniak went on to comment that US-Polish bilateral economic relations were confronted by no major difficulties at present but that there were certain remaining obstacles, including the Battle Act and the Johnson Act./5/ He inquired whether there was any prospect of the latter being amended. The Secretary replied that this was in the realm of speculation and would depend on the coming elections as well as other factors; there was no possibility of such legislation being amended in the present session of Congress, and he could not answer for the next session. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee was studying these and related questions of our foreign trade, and there was interest also on the part of private groups. He felt he could express mild optimism. /5/For text of the Battle Act, the Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951, P.L. 218, see 65 Stat. 644. The Johnson Debt Default Act, signed April 13, 1934, prohibited financial transactions with any foreign government in default of its obligations to the United States. (48 Stat. 574) It was amended on July 31, 1945, to exempt foreign governments that were members of both the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development from some of its provisions. (59 Stat. 516) In conclusion Ambassador Drozniak mentioned his government's hope of negotiating another PL-480 agreement with the US next fall, and said he had been gratified in discussing this with Assistant Secretary Tyler to find that the latter saw no obstacle to US consideration of a Polish proposal along this line early in the fall, since that would be the most propitious time from the viewpoint of Poland's planning requirements. The Secretary replied that he knew of no reason why Poland could not raise the matter with us at that time.
118. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State/1/ Warsaw, November 19, 1964, noon. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 POL. Confidential; Limdis. Repeated to Moscow and Prague. 1136. Following information results from hour long conversation evening November 18 between Embassy officer and candidate member PZPR CC Mieczyslaw Rakowski: 1. Gomulka for more than year had objected Khrushchev handling Moscow-Peking differences. Gomulka spoke to Khrushchev several times and attempted advise him but Khrushchev failed to listen. Gomulka also held views different from Khrushchev regarding relations with West Germany but this relatively minor matter. Within PZPR there were those who predicted Khrushchev's removal as early as February of this year. Removal, according to Rakowski, stimulated almost completely by domestic problems and differences of opinion within CSPU regarding how handle them./2/ /2/Nikita S. Khrushchev was removed from his post of Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union on October 15. 2. If one compares Gomulka and Novotny, then Rakowski believes Gomulka can be said have supported Khrushchev's removal and Novotny did not. 3. Gomulka's attitude regarding Moscow-Peking differences have placed him in strong position with ChiComs. This not because Gomulka pro-ChiCom in dispute but because he long on record trying change Khrushchev's tactics in dealing with ChiComs. 4. Rakowski claimed he firm supporter of Gomulka but said recognized Gomulka has narrow outlook some topics. Conceded even within PZPR these increased critical opinions regarding Gomulka. Said his (Rakowski's) newspaper, Polityka, has more conservative editorial policy now than two years ago. Claimed this caused by political realities brought on by changes within PZPR since 1959. 5. Regarding current trial of "distributors of pro-Chinese pamphlet" (Embtel 1123),/3/ Rakowski said Kazimiesz Mijal influential figure behind pamphlet. Said Mijal would probably never be brought trial because political ramifications trial would have within PZPR. /3/Telegram 1123 from Warsaw, November 18, reported on closed political trials in Poland. (Ibid., POL 29 POL) 6. Rakowski refused comment on what Presidium changes in CPSU might indicate. Said however that strength of "conservatives" and "liberals" within CPSU very near equal. Said if election possible among CPSU members results would not reveal margin anything like President Johnson succeeded gaining over Senator Goldwater. Cabot
119. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State/1/ Warsaw, November 24, 1964, 5 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL POL-US. Confidential; Priority. 1171. I had long talk with Winiewicz today on general subject of bridge building. Talk was cordial but rather vague. I pointed out that in my previous conversation with him on November 2, I had expressed interest in bridge building (Embtel 997)./2/ Now that President Johnson had won overwhelming popular mandate and had a Congress which would presumably be more amenable to his wishes than last one, time seemed to be particularly propitious for a little effort on both sides to improve relations. /2/Telegram 997 from Warsaw, November 3, also reported on Polish reaction to Khrushchev's ouster as Soviet leader. (Ibid., POL 15 USSR) We briefly discussed Rusk meeting with Rapacki and he indicated they would suggest about December 9 in New York for it./3/ /3/See Document 120. Winiewicz referred to decisions of Polish authorities to permit Atoms for Peace and Kennedy exhibits. He thought this was clear evidence of Polish agreement with our positive position. He said Jaroszewicz had telephoned him immediately after his conversation with me (Embtel 1139)/4/ to ask a lot of questions. Jaroszewicz was now having study prepared of possibilities for increased trade with US and nothing further could be said until study completed. We discussed at some length Jaroszewicz's desire for more diversified Polish exports, particularly of machinery. /4/Telegram 1139 from Warsaw, November 19, reported on Cabot's discussion on the topic of "bridge building" with Vice President Jarosewicz. (Department of State, Central Files, POL POL-US) Regarding President Johnson's policy of "bridge building," see Document 4. Winiewicz then went into considerable detail about Polish misgivings regarding MLF. He said that Poles had noted with concern ever increasing influence of West Germany in NATO. He said that Rapacki had spoken of this to Rusk on previous occasions and suggested that he would doubtless wish to mention it again. I pointed out that it was precisely because of tensions and unresolved questions that we felt this was appropriate time to build bridges. We could not now say what could be accomplished but we could start. This seemed to strike responsive chord. We discussed PL 480 at some length. He showed positive interest in possibility of another agreement under Title IV but he was worried about terms we would impose. I said I could tell him nothing about them but would suggest an inquiry on their part. Winiewicz spoke with appreciation of McCloskey's statement regarding Polish-American relations./5/ He was rather critical of recent Frankel articles. He said that when he had reported in highest quarters after our previous conversation his assurances to me that Poland also desired better relations, he had been told that he had been quite right in giving me these assurances without even consulting higher authority. /5/At a November 18 press conference, Department of State spokesman Robert McCloskey stated that U.S.-Polish relations "continue to be good." The Embassy reported on Polish reaction to this statement in airgram A-536 from Warsaw, November 25. (Ibid., POL 2-1 POL) I carefully left door open for further discussion. Cabot
120. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ SecDel/MC/42 New York, December 10, 1964, 5 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL UK. Confidential. Drafted by Glenn and approved in S on January 8, 1965. The source text is labeled "Part 1 of 2;" a second memoranda of conversation dealing with Southeast Asia is ibid., Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 2448. The meeting was held at USUN. SECRETARY'S DELEGATION TO THE NINETEENTH SESSION OF THE SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS US Poland After an exchange of pleasantries the Secretary asked Mr. Rapacki what the latter considered to be the main political problem of interest to Poland. Mr. Rapacki said that this was, as usual, Germany. However, this time there was a new wrinkle, the MLF. Mr. Rapacki is not familiar with the precise status of the MLF, nor with the new UK proposals./2/ However, he feels that the very idea of the MLF would amount to a disruption of the balance of power in Europe, from both the military and political points of view. Under such circumstances it would become necessary for the countries of the Eastern Bloc to do something to re-establish the balance. This might include steps which otherwise they would not wish to take. Mr. Rapacki is familiar with the various parts of the scheme which are designed to prevent a West German takeover of nuclear weapons. However, he feels that there are no guarantees that such schemes will succeed and he fears that the scheme rapidly will bring about a German finger on the trigger. This is a fear which even the Western nations should share, and in fact, do share. The Germans are past masters at taking advantage of dissensions between their allies, whether such dissensions arise for financial or other reasons. Therefore, the MLF is bound at the very least to exacerbate the relations between the two blocs and deepen the distrust between them--the very opposite of what Poland would wish to see happen. Moreover, Poland opposes all proliferation of nuclear weapons and considers the MLF as a step toward such proliferation. /2/Reference is to a December 16 statement to Parliament by Prime Minister Wilson offering an Atlantic Nuclear Force as an alternative to the MLF. The Secretary stated that he understood the interest of Poland in these questions. He feels, however, that the MLF should give the fullest guarantees against the proliferation of nuclear weapons. U.S. policy has always sought a permanent settlement of the problems of Central Europe and ultimately, disarmament in Europe and elsewhere. We do not see how a permanent solution could be found in Europe unless the nations of that continent, and in particular the two groups of the German population, are allowed to determine fully and freely their own future. Such an expression may or may not lead to an agreement to the unification of Germany, but it must constitute an expression of the free will of the people of Germany which will provide a basis for permanent solutions, possibly including disarmament. With regard to nuclear weapons within NATO and the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the United States has never agreed to do anything which would favor such proliferation; it even opposed the French wishes in that area. On the other hand, we do not know what has happened in the Warsaw Pact. Nations of the Warsaw Pact have openly exhibited in parades weapons capable of carrying nuclear warheads, one which would be exceedingly inefficient for the delivery of conventional warheads. Another point is that there are two ways for a nation to become involved in a nuclear situation. One of these is to possess nuclear weapons. The other one is to be a potential target of nuclear weapons, and there are many of the Western nations which are well within reach of nuclear weapons poised in Europe. It is because of such a situation that the MLF idea has been put forward. Mr. Rapacki asked the Secretary why the latter mentioned only Western nations. The Secretary said that a way must be found to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons, and the U.S. believes the MLF provides one such way. The question is not only one of direct proliferation but also of testing. Moreover, the question of proliferation is not one which concerns only Germany, it is one which concerns many nations outside of NATO, such as Sweden, Switzerland and countries of Europe. It is because of the danger of this type of proliferation that the U.S. has been thinking of new types of measures. It should be remembered that the U.S. has proven its opposition to proliferation, even at the expense of irking some of its Allies. We do not know, however, what the Soviet Union has done in this respect. Some of the Soviet leaders had announced that they had given nuclear fuel to China; this may have contributed to the recent Chinese explosion./3/ /3/In October, China carried out nuclear tests in Sinkiang Province. For text of President Johnson's statement announcing the Chinese tests, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963-64, Book II, pp. 1377-1380. Mr. Rapacki said that in regard to the question of proliferation of nuclear weapons, Poland could certainly not be accused of any misdeeds since it neither had nor wanted such weapons. He knew little about rockets except that there are nuclear-tipped rockets stationed in West Germany. Poland has made a proposal for eliminating such weapons from Europe and has attempted to make it more acceptable by broadening the zone from which such weapons would be eliminated./4/ Mr. Rapacki was of the opinion that the MLF will lead to proliferation even if this is not the purpose of those who came up with the idea. He reiterated his view that there are guarantees against German control and his opinion of West German ability in playing their partners one against the other. Even if no independent nuclear strength for Germany is now planned the result will be to bring Germany closer to it and under such circumstances it is possible that, irrespective of their wishes, the Warsaw Pact nations would also become involved in such a proliferation. The Polish suggestion would be that steps toward relaxation of tensions might better be obtained through an immediate freeze of nuclear (and possibly other) weapons at the present levels, than by their gradual elimination from a certain zone. A plan of this sort, if accepted, could then be joined by other nations. The extent of the zone of armaments freeze could also be something open to negotiation, though it seems quite difficult to see how the Soviet Union could be included in it. In any case Mr. Rapacki does not feel entitled to speak in the name of the Great Powers. /4/Reference is to the Rapacki Plan, first proposed by Rapacki in an October 2, 1957, address before the U.N. General Assembly. For text, see U.N. doc. A/PV 697. On March 28, 1962, he submitted to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee in Geneva another revised plan for a nuclear-free zone in Europe; for text, see Documents on Disarmament, 1962, vol. I, pp. 201-205. In regard to German unification, Mr. Rapacki feels that such steps as the MLF postponed rather than improved the prospects of it. The only realistic way to envisage such a unification is through an historical process which would be based on step-by-step agreement on such measures as disarmament and which little-by-little would create realistic conditions under which unity could be obtained. Unfortunately, drawing West Germany deeper into military responsibilities encourages the West German Government to take attitudes which cause concern among its neighbors and thus bring the situation into a vicious circle. The Secretary wondered if there might perhaps be possibilities of bringing in all of these measures together; bringing about the possibilities for reunification at the same time as discussion of armaments freeze and similar measures. Mr. Rapacki admitted that these problems are connected. However, the beginning should be made with various disarmament steps and not with the question of reunification. First there must be a détente in which the two German nations would participate. The other questions would then find their solutions. The Secretary said that it is rather the failure to solve the fundamental problem of Central Europe which is the cause of the armaments tension and the disruption of equilibrium. This is something we are not responsible for. It would be difficult to wait for historical processes to take care of the armaments race and the pressing dangers of the moment. Mr. Rapacki agreed with the necessity of doing something rapidly in order to decrease both the danger to peace and the armaments race. Clearly the military and the political problems are connected. The present situation does not help toward the solution, but on the contrary deepens the opposition between the two blocs. The main irritants are certain attitudes on the part of the West German Government and in general on the part of the Western allies. Only France recognizes the present Polish-German border as being final. Also West Germany acquires more and more power within NATO. Mr. Rapacki does not consider West Germany as being a monolith of revenge-seekers. He realizes that there are various shadings of opinion in Germany and that many German groups seek peace. Unfortunately the present policies do not encourage such groups but on the contrary those intent on revenge. Steps toward a solution of problems should begin with a freeze, followed perhaps by disarmament measures. If this path is followed, then a situation might follow which will bring together the two Germanies. Otherwise the separation between them is bound to deepen. To speak quite frankly, Poland does not desire a common border with West Germany. Even if the majority of the East German people were to express themselves for unification it would find such a solution not acceptable. Free elections would not be acceptable because of such a possibility. East Germany for the moment must be maintained because it is working very hard to win its people away from the militaristic and nationalistic traditions of Germany. Unfortunately West Germany pursues policies which keep alive those traditions. The Secretary thanked Mr. Rapacki for his expression of his views. He felt on the contrary that if the German problem is resolved, and thus if security for Poland is established under the fullest guarantee by the United States and by others, the result would be an improvement in economic and social relations which is desired by all. Such a solution would give Poland more security than she has known for two or three centuries. Mr. Rapacki said that German unity might perhaps be brought about by an historical process but no guarantee could be strong enough for such unity to take place now. Poland after all had the strongest of guaranties in 1939 and then lost six million people. The Secretary mentioned that the United States had participated in two world wars in which it did not find itself on the same side as Germany. Nevertheless he recognized that Poland had a very special experience in this field. He asked Mr. Rapacki how the relations between Poland and West Germany were developing and whether they were improving. Mr. Rapacki said the economic relations were increasing and some cultural relations existed. Further development depends on the German Government. In all frankness, however, in the present situation great political improvements are unlikely.
121. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State/1/ Warsaw, January 12, 1965, 10 a.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL POL-US. Confidential; Limdis. 1410. I have been somewhat disappointed by lack of any specific implementation of President's wishes to build bridges in Poland. Consular negotiations are proceeding satisfactorily if somewhat slowly but hardest points remain to be decided. We must bear in mind that there is strong evidence that during past year Poles and Russians have not seen eye to eye in number of situations: 1. Russia wanted to withdraw from co-chairmanship in Southeast Asia. Poles claim they have so far successfully dissuaded them. 2. Poles were very disturbed at Khrushchev's idea of visiting West Germany. 3. Evidence suggests that Russians were unenthusiastic about Gomulka plan./2/ /2/Reference is to Gomulka's call for a freeze on nuclear weapons in Central Europe. Rapacki formally presented the details of the proposal at a March 5, 1964, press conference. 4. Poles were undoubtedly disturbed at way Khrushchev was ousted. 5. Poles have openly shown their differences with Russians over way to treat Communist China. I do not think these differences are of fundamental significance. Poles in own protection must remain loyal allies of Russia. Nevertheless, they do suggest that Poles might desire second string to their bow and might be willing to find it in West. It would seem to me the part of wisdom to encourage them to do this. This view is reinforced by fact that until unfortunate Carey incident (Embtel 1405),/3/ Poles recently have been rather forthcoming with us. I refer to their acceptance of the Atoms and Kennedy exhibits, the quick agreements on IMG, and the generally friendly tenor of the consular negotiations. /3/Telegram 1405 from Warsaw, November 1, reported that Poland had declared a U.S. military attaché persona non grata. (Department of State, Central Files, PER WARSAW) I recognize that it is not easy to come up with ways of conciliating Poles without running into more important adverse effects. Nevertheless, I do believe that we might urgently examine possibility of taking one or more of following steps: 1. To restore legal possibility for Poland to make Title I PL 480 purchases or alternatively to hint more strongly that we would be prepared to enter into a favorable Title IV contract with them. 2. To offer to open one or more US ports to Polish shipping in connection with negotiation of satisfactory consular convention (Embtel 1245)./4/ /4/Telegram 1245 from Warsaw, December 11, reported that talks on a consular convention were moving at a good pace. (Ibid., CON 4 POL-US) 3. To abolish in US travel restrictions on Polish civilian officials. Any one of these three steps would, I believe, have favorable effect locally. I must point out that having talked at some length about bridge building some time ago, we shall lose our momentum if we do not now take steps quickly to implement it. I also note that in the Secretary's second talk with Rapacki no mention was made of bridge building. We have no record of the first./5/ It seems to me important to get this project moving again. /5/The second talk is recorded in Document 120; regarding the first talk, dealing with Vietnam, see footnote 1 thereto. Cabot
122. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State/1/ Warsaw, June 20, 1966, 1335Z./2/ /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 17 POL-US. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Bucharest, Budapest, Prague, Sofia, and USUN. /2/Beginning in spring of 1965, the dates and transmission times of all incoming Department of State telegrams were in six-figure date-time-groups. The "Z" refers to Greenwich mean time. 2230. Please pass White House, Defense. Deptel 1930; Embtel 2226./3/ /3/Telegram 1930 to Warsaw, June 16, transmitted the Department of State's request for comments on the expulsion of U.S. attachés. Telegram 2226 from Warsaw, June 18, reported that Embassy comments would be sent on June 20. (Both in Department of State, Central Files, POL 17 POL-US) 1. I am convinced that our reaction to expulsion of Engbretson and Ochs,/4/ and Polish proposal to limit number of military attachés and enlisted men, must not be permitted to spill over into and jeopardize our economic and cultural programs and objectives. /4/On April 6-7, Polish police used physical force to detain and seize property belonging to U.S. military attachés. Following a U.S. protest and Polish reply that was deemed unsatisfactory, the United States on May 4 expelled a Polish air attaché. On May 13, the Polish Government declared three U.S. attaches persona non grata. The United States responded on May 20 by declaring two Polish attaches persona non grata. 2. Our negotiating position difficult because (A) We apparently have greater interest in maintaining military attaché and enlisted staff in Poland than Poles have in keeping them in U.S. (B) Those officials who are currently prevailing in Polish handling of attaché incident appear to be hard-liners bent on deteriorating U.S.-Polish relations. In contrast to our position and that of many responsible Polish officials, they would be pleased to see attaché matter adversely affect U.S.-Polish economic and cultural relations. (C) Our principal weapons of retaliation are in economic field. We could hurt Poles by ending MFN treatment, limiting size of their commercial staff in U.S., refusing them CCC credits, etc. However, use of such weapons would be self-defeating; these would be negative acts with adverse effects on our own foreign policy objectives. 3. Use of such economic weapons would be detrimental to our interests because: (A) Not only here, but elsewhere in Eastern Europe, long-range trend is running in our favor, primarily because of economic pressures: for trade, for internal economic reorganization and liberalization, and for improved standard of living. Another factor is growing influence of economic pragmatists, many of whom are in high-level policymaking posts, who understand glaring deficiencies in prevailing economic system. Our long-range interests are served by expanding rather than reducing our economic cooperation and involvement, by supporting these trends toward economic liberalization and people in leadership who are sympathetic to and give direction to these trends. (B) Development of our economic relations with Poland has been prime example to other EE countries. Our retaliating in economic area would be used to depict U.S. as unreliable partner and would adversely affect our efforts for improved economic and cultural relations in other EE countries. They are well aware of sudden unexpected U.S. actions in past which unsettled U.S.-Polish economic relations, i.e. in 1964, withdrawal Poland's eligibility for Title I PL-480 purchases and, in 1962, Congressional action to remove Poland's MFN status. Prague, Budapest, Bucharest, and Sofia would eye with increased suspicion a USG that talks "bridge building" but acts in the opposite fashion. They would be much more inclined to view such action as a capricious shift in U.S. policy rather than outgrowth of military attaché incident. (C) It would seriously undercut our position of leadership and influence with our NATO Allies, most of whom are now committed to a resolution of the Central European impasse, including expansion of economic relations with the EE countries. The French could quite persuasively point to this as evidence that the U.S. fails to understand needs and aspirations of nations of Europe, East and West. They could logically argue that at very time when U.S. and many of its NATO Allies are talking of NATO as an instrument of East-West détente, the U.S. in its bilateral relations with its major EE trading partner is moving in opposite direction. (D) Such action would inevitably result in Polish retaliation. Our USIS staff and projects would be most likely targets. Cultural, student, and other exchanges, which have been so effective in increasing presence and influence of U.S. in Poland, would be curtailed. We might also look for cancellation of our foreign claims settlement agreement, particularly if MFN were terminated. 4. As a corollary to rejecting use of negative economic weapons, we should develop instruments for positive negotiation. We should continually seek ways to mesh more closely U.S. and Polish economies with objective of strengthening hand of moderates in government by making it increasingly difficult and costly for the hardliners to prevail. Making available Ex-Im Bank credit guarantees, and thus permitting Poland to buy much needed U.S. machinery and equipment on normal credit terms, would increase Poland's dependence on U.S. economy. So would possibility of long-term agricultural credits which we were able to offer before Congress cut Poland out of PL-480 program in 1964. To same end we should offer some positive solution to problem arising out of Poland's 1967-68 dollar repayment hump which is at least partly result of our abruptly ending long-term PL-480 loans to Poland shortly after Poland committed itself in 1964 to $30 million 3-year agricultural commodity loan. In another area, a return to policy of bilateral reciprocity with respect to diplomatic travel restrictions would have positive appeal to Poles and strengthen hand of moderates in government by creating atmosphere of reduced tension and improved relations between our two governments. Also on our agenda, perhaps out of necessity more long-range than foregoing, should be repeal of relevant sections of Battle and Johnson Acts. These laws impede exercise of kind of positive diplomacy President Johnson has enunciated in his "building bridges" pronouncements. Their continued existence seriously damages case of moderate elements in governments of Eastern Europe. 5. Not because of attaché incident, but because they stand in their own right as elements of constructive U.S. policy, I believe we should act now on measures listed below. Their adoption will make it progressively easier for moderates to support better U.S.-Polish relations and resist actions designed to worsen them. Therefore I strongly urge we act now to: (a) Make available Ex-Im Bank credits to Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Bulgaria. (b) Authorize EE country Chiefs of Mission to enter bilateral negotiations to eliminate travel restrictions on diplomatic personnel. (c) Do everything possible to insure insertion of Presidential discretion clause into Findlay Amendment to Food for Freedom bill. (d) Offer Poles positive solution to 1967-68 dollar repayment hump, including: use of dollars due on 1964 three-year loan for current U.S.G. expenses; five-year re-scheduling of 1964 loan repayment (which would include replenishment of our travel fund); and English language teaching zloty project. Details will be spelled out in subsequent Embtel./5/ /5/Not further identified. 6. Our specific reaction to present attaché incident impasse should reflect thinking expressed in first five paras part one of this telegram./6/ In addition, reaction of DepFonMin Winiewicz and FonMin Rapacki to my earlier attempt to settle our problem, convinces me that we cannot rely upon either direct confrontation or appeals for moderation. Polish military and security officials seem determined, while FonMin, as reflected para 4 Embtel 1747,/7/ would be most happy to have continuing irritant vanish by eliminating both military staffs. Therefore, I now recommend that our strategy be to deemphasize issue and to extent possible let time and effect of positive action in other areas induce a more reasonable attitude. /6/Reference is to numbered paragraphs 1-5 above. /7/Not found. 7. Our first reaction should be to wait until the two attaché clerical replacements arrive in Warsaw. Timing of Polish visa authorization and other pertinent arrangements will provide guide to current atmosphere. In interim, we should implement para 5 this telegram to extent possible. 8. I would have Frankel in few days begin "ground rules" talks with Polish military liaison officer and suggest to Polish Embassy that they begin ground rule talks in Washington. 9. If we reach a point in coming weeks where we must formally respond to their Embtel 2181 proposal,/8/ I would say, in a firm but conciliatory manner, that we believe traditional U.S.-Polish practice permitting sending state determine diplomatic staff requirements should be preserved. Equality of strength in our various diplomatic and consular staffs has not been past practice. ConGen in Chicago is three times size of our Consulate Poznan. Polish 24-man trade mission is without U.S. equivalent in Poland. We would wish to preserve this tradition, and we make this point simply to point out reasonableness of traditional practice. /8/Telegram 2181 from Warsaw, June 11, reported on Polish readiness to close the attaché incidents and to negotiate a new agreement on the status of military personnel attached to the respective Embassies. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 17 POL-US) 10. I would also say that, while we are in no way compromising our prerogative to determine our own diplomatic staffs, it might be helpful for them to know that our own plans for the next year call for replacement of only two of the three attaches PNGd, drawing on Dept. suggestion para 2 Deptel 1794./9/ Also, while we cannot say what results will be, our evaluation of enlisted men needs during time our attaché officer strength is down to three, may result in not replacing one or perhaps two of enlisted men scheduled to leave early in 1967. (FYI--If this becomes necessary we would compensate by assignment additional administrative employee to Embassy Admin section and utilizing qualified working wife. End FYI) /9/Telegram 1794 to Warsaw, May 26, outlined U.S. proposals for resolving the status of Polish and U.S. military representatives. (Ibid.) 11. I strongly recommend acceptance above approach designed to preserve 10-year prerogative each country ascertain size own staff. If para 10 becomes operative, we would in effect tacitly accept temporary reduction attaché staff while preserving our right to make final determination our own requirements after atmosphere clears and procedures agreed upon. Prospects for resolving matter would improve by working on problem in calmer atmosphere and shifting attention to fruitful discussions of our recommendations in para 5. Hopefully, also, the ground rule discussion, if aggressively pursued, could contribute to reducing many of the frictions that have developed in the attaché field over the past few years./10/ /10/In telegram 1971 to Warsaw, June 24, the Department of State forwarded a draft response to Polish proposals prepared in the light of Gronouski's suggestions, and requested comment. (Ibid.) Gronouski
123. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ US/MC/33 New York, September 23, 1966. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Poland, Memos, Vol. 2. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Niles and approved in S on October 4. The meeting was held at USUN. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS Jozef Winiewicz, Deputy Foreign Minister After a lengthy discussion of Viet Nam (separate Memcon),/2/ Rapacki said that he would like to discuss the question of European security. He referred to recent press articles which argued that the reduction of the U.S. presence in Europe "to unknown limits" as a result of events in Southeast Asia would be welcomed by the Socialist countries. According to Rapacki, the writers of these articles must feel that the Socialist countries are "politically naive" and he stated that Poland is interested in "constructive" United States influence in promoting the peaceful development of Europe. He asked, rhetorically, how long the European situation could remain isolated from the world-wide trend toward increasing tensions. He observed that the relatively calm conditions in Europe were deceptive and could not last. According to Rapacki, the Southeast Asian situation could well have an adverse effect on conditions in Europe and, furthermore, none of the real dangers for European stability had been removed. In this regard, Rapacki repeated the traditional Polish charge that revanchist elements in the FRG are gaining strength and are showing an increasing desire for nuclear weapons to use in pressuring the "German Democratic Republic" and forcing a revision of European frontiers. In his only comment during the meeting, Winiewicz observed that the FRG wishes to "swallow" the "GDR." Rapacki stated that collective security measures are necessary to avert the danger posed by the FRG and the United States has a role to play in these efforts. /2/A copy of this memorandum of conversation is in Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Rapacki referred to Poland's 1964 proposal for a European Security Conference and said that intensive contacts with countries in both Eastern and Western Europe had led to some progress toward holding such a Conference. According to Rapacki, the Europeans generally agree that a Conference would be useful, but he acknowledged that much preparatory work was necessary. In his view, the Conference would consider the basic question of guaranteeing the security of individual states. With this obstacle out of the way, increased economic cooperation among European states would develop naturally. Political questions would be taken up only at the end of the process of normalization. Rapacki stressed the importance of European and world-wide non-proliferation agreements in ensuring peace. He mentioned the problem of NATO consultation on nuclear weapons and said that Poland was particularly concerned that these consultations should not lead to giving non-nuclear powers a voice in the use of nuclear weapons. He also emphasized Poland's interest in the reduction of conventional forces and suggested that a collective renunciation of the use of force in changing the status quo would be useful. In reply, the Secretary stressed that the United States was "utterly and completely" opposed to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. He cited our refusal to assist the French nuclear weapons program, with its consequences for US-French relations, as proof of our determination not to transfer nuclear weapons or technology. The Secretary pointed out, however, that the Warsaw Pact could not have a seat at the NATO table with a veto over NATO matters. When Rapacki expressed surprise at this statement, the Secretary said that some of Gromyko's objections to NATO procedures appeared to require a veto over NATO decisions. The Secretary said that the United States welcomed increased East-West contacts and informed Rapacki that the Administration planned to reintroduce the East-West trade bill early in 1967. He observed that the question of holding a European Security Conference was well worth discussing and stressed that the United States must be present when the great political problems of Central Europe are discussed. Rapacki asked whether the United States was really interested in these problems and said that our lack of interest in the Polish proposal for a Conference indicated that we were not. The Secretary pointed to our involvement in two world wars which originated in Central Europe as proof of our interest. He said that extensive preparations were required before a European Security Conference could be held since a conference which fails is worse than no conference. The Secretary expressed an interest in discussing this and other questions with Rapacki if time permitted before his return to Poland. Rapacki said that he planned to remain in New York through October 4 or 5 but that Winiewicz planned to stay somewhat longer. [Continue with the next documents] Volume XVII Index | Foreign Relations Online | Historian's Office | |