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 | FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968 Volume XVII Eastern Europe Department of State |
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| 106. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ SecDel/MC/20 New York, December 4, 1964, 9:30 a.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Confidential. Drafted by Givan and approved in S on December 15. The source text is labeled "Part II of III." Separate memoranda of the conversation dealing with the General Assembly session, U.S.-Soviet consultations, and Europe are ibid. The meeting was held at USUN. SECRETARY'S DELEGATION TO THE NINETEENTH SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS U.S. Hungary Peter thanked the Secretary for the opportunity to see him, and the officials of the State Department who had initiated and organized the appointment. He felt he should excuse himself for taking the Secretary's time, but their talk might have some importance for both sides. The very fact of their meeting has implications. The Secretary said he hoped bilateral relations could move along. Our representatives are talking over matters of much interest to us; this may take a little time to develop momentum, but let us try. When we can move, let us do so; if there are pockets of stubborn resistance, we can by-pass them. We will be glad to review our bilateral relations as a whole. We will look at trade questions broadly in the new session of Congress. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee is working hard on this and there is growing interest in the business community. The Committee will probably hold hearings in the first quarter of next year. Whether there will be legislative amendments, for instance to extend Most Favored Nation status, will depend on the Committee's study and also on whether the general atmosphere continues to improve. We recognize that opportunities for trade are limited as long as the MFN door is closed. Meanwhile both sides can give thought to trade possibilities from the point of view of demand and markets. This is not necessarily easy for us, since our trade is organized on a private basis and our government cannot tell businessmen what to buy and sell. From the Hungarian point of view, tourism would seem to be an area where some expansion would be possible quickly. There is a backlog of interest among American tourists in Hungary and neighboring areas where travel has been difficult for the past 20 years. If tourism increases, we hope the Hungarian Government will earmark some of its proceeds for tourists coming our way. We are in the tourist business too. Peter agreed that this was a good possibility. He said it is helpful to have this meeting to obtain personal impressions about the Secretary. If trade possibilities increase, this would facilitate an improvement in relations. MFN status would be helpful generally, not merely for trade. The Secretary said we are looking in that direction. Whether there is now legislation will probably be affected by Soviet decisions on various outstanding issues such as lend-lease. The Secretary asked whether the agricultural situation in Hungary is good. Peter said it was better and that Hungary appreciates the attitude taken by the U.S. last year on wheat sales. The Secretary said we were glad to be helpful. Peter said no doubt refugee groups had objected. The Secretary said we have several different generations of refugees. Those from 1956-57 seem to be more moderate in their views than some who came earlier. The Secretary said he had had some contact with Hungarian students when he was with the Rockefeller Foundation, and when he was in Budapest in 1957 he had found a lively interest among doctors, scientists, and others in technical and cultural exchanges, not only with the U.S. but with other European countries. Perhaps there is some possibility of increased contacts. Mr. Siscoe is looking into this now in Budapest. An increase in exchanges would benefit everybody.
107. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, February 13, 1965, 11:45 a.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 HUNG. Confidential. Drafted by Squire on February 15. The meeting was held in Tyler's office. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS U.S. Hungary Hungarian Chargé Radvanyi, summoned to the Department by Assistant Secretary Tyler, appeared at 11:45 a.m. February 13 with Second Secretary Szluka. Mr. Tyler informed Radvanyi that he was sorry to have to broach a subject not particularly pleasant, and one which he had hoped would not arise at this stage in our efforts to improve relations. He had been informed,/2/ Mr. Tyler continued, of a demonstration which had been staged against the US Legation in Budapest. The demonstration lasted about 45 minutes, from 10:00 a.m. to 10:45 a.m. There had been a crowd of about 1000 persons, which included a number of Asiatic and African students as well as Cubans carrying anti-American placards. According to a message from our Legation we had received a warning 10 minutes prior to the event by telephone, from the Protocol Section of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Protocol had warned that a demonstration was pending and that the Ministry would endeavor to provide the Legation with adequate police protection. The police arrived, however, only after all the lower windows of the Legation had been smashed, after ink had been thrown at the premises, and after two cars belonging to staff members of the Legation had been completely wrecked. The first floor theater and snack bar were penetrated briefly and the furniture thrown about; the US seal was pulled down from the front door. /2/In telegram 508 from Budapest, February 13. (Ibid.) It was particularly significant, Mr. Tyler continued, that an organizer of the demonstration, a Hungarian, was overheard at the end of the mob action instructing Asiatic and African students to "return to the house" where they would be formally thanked for their participation. Mr. Tyler informed Chargé Radvanyi that Mr. O'Shaughnessy had already lodged a strong protest in Budapest, and had asked the Hungarian Government to pay for the damages which had resulted from this demonstration. The US Government noted that the notice given to our Legation about the demonstration was inadequate, and that police protection was inadequate. The US noted further the participation of Hungarians in the demonstration, the fact that windows were broken, cars wrecked, the Legation penetrated and the US seal had been torn down. Mr. Tyler added that very frankly he was surprised that this demonstration had been organized and permitted at a time when we were making useful progress together to resolve our outstanding problems. We were all the more surprised since, to our knowledge, this was the first time such a demonstration had occurred in Budapest since the war. The US was also mindful of the fact that there had recently been demonstrations in countries which were immediate neighbors of Hungary to the north and south, but that these demonstrations did not result in damages against our diplomatic establishments as in Hungary. Mr. Tyler then said that he took this opportunity to remind Mr. Radvanyi of the statement made three days ago by President Johnson, on February 10, regarding the demonstration against the American Embassy in Moscow. He then read the President's statement./3/ /3/For text of the February 10 statement, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965, Book I, p. 170. Mr. Tyler informed Mr. Radvanyi he would appreciate his informing the Hungarian Government that the US feels that this demonstration and what happened as a result is an unfortunate matter. The US considers that Hungary should have afforded the US Legation effective protection. The participation of Hungarians in the demonstration and in an organizing role gave a particularly unfortunate aspect to the whole thing. The report that African and Asian students were to go "back to the house" to be formally thanked for their participation made a most unfavorable impression on the US. Mr. Radvanyi said that according to his information the Hungarian authorities had done everything possible to protect the US Legation. He said that he would hesitate to mention all the demonstrations which had taken place against Hungarian official premises in the US. Mr. Tyler interjected to say that he hoped Mr. Radvanyi was not implying that Hungarian windows had been broken, cars wrecked or seals torn down. Mr. Radvanyi said that of course he would inform his Government very promptly of what Mr. Tyler had said. Mr. Tyler concluded that he felt bound to tell Mr. Radvanyi that this demonstration was not helpful to the improvement of US-Hungarian relations, and that we supported the protest made by the US Legation in Budapest./4/ /4/In telegram 469 to Budapest, February 16, the Department reported: "U.S. Government at highest levels greatly disturbed by current demonstrations which have assumed form of impermissible mob violence," and commented: "Culpability Hungarian Government in this incident apparent." The Charge was instructed to stress U.S. concern and was informed that further discussions of outstanding bilateral issues would be suspended. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-8 HUNG)
108. Airgram From the Legation in Hungary to the Department of State/1/ A-137 Budapest, August 31, 1965. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL HUNG-US. Confidential. Drafted by Tims. Repeated to Belgrade, Bucharest, Prague, Sofia, Warsaw, Moscow, Munich, and Vienna. SUBJECT The Hungarian Government makes Vietnam the most conspicuous issue in its relations with the United States at the moment. Like other East European Communist governments, the Kádár regime has conducted a strong campaign of denunciation against US policy in Southeast Asia ever since the Vietnamese crisis entered its present phase last February. The regime permitted a destructive attack on the American Legation by Asian students at that time and has subsequently called on the Hungarian people almost daily, through the press, radio, and mass meetings, to show their solidarity with the Vietnamese against the American "aggressors." It has repeatedly pledged Hungarian "volunteers" to fight against the US in Vietnam in case of need. The campaign casts a large cloud over the US-Hungarian official talks for normalization of relations that got under way last year. The tone and scope of the Hungarian official anti-US propaganda is hardly compatible with any initiatives from the Hungarian side on behalf of normalization. Foreign Ministry officials have, indeed, told us that Vietnam makes progress in our bilateral talks difficult. Hungarian cultural-exchange authorities have cited today's East-West political situation to us as their reason for refusing to discuss plans for cultural reciprocity at this time. Thus the regime is keeping in line with Moscow in the "freeze" that the Soviets have applied to cultural and other relations with the United States, apropos of Vietnam. The only positive event here during this entire period has been the US participation for the first time in the Budapest International Fair, last May--and this was an event to which the Hungarians had invited us long before the Vietnamese crisis arose. Moreover, the enthusiastic response of the Hungarian people to the American display there, at a moment when their government was trying to whip up popular condemnation of the US, must only have strengthened the regime's prejudice against opening the doors to any substantial increase of American cultural influence. But while Vietnam has been a factor in the current Hungarian "go slow" policy toward our bilateral relations, it appears to be more of an additional reason than an original one for this policy. The Kádár regime has, in fact, taken a cautious, slow approach to normalization from the start and has indicated a hard bargaining posture. Foreign Ministry officials from the outset of our talks have stressed the view that it is mainly up to the United States to make the political and trade concessions on which normal relations will depend. The Hungarians took a non-committal or negative position on official cultural exchanges initially as well as later, and the Foreign Ministry indicated its touchiness toward even the suggestion of a possible future USIA operation in Hungary. In other fields, the Ministry has never responded to US proposals regarding useful steps that might be taken toward improved relations, such as permitting a relatively small number of dual nationals to emigrate from Hungary to the US, and the abolition of arbitrary ceilings on our diplomatic missions. With regard to negotiation of US financial claims against Hungary, the Hungarian side by raising large counterclaims indicated that it was prepared to take a tough stand and to protract the bargaining process for years, if need be, in order to obtain favorable terms. The official Hungarian attitude to date suggests that while the Kádár regime would like to obtain the prestige and other benefits of fully normal relations with the United States, it hopes to do so at the smallest possible cost. The regime is quite conscious of the avowed US interest in building "bridges" to Eastern Europe for the purpose of exerting political leverage in this part of the world, and of the Administration's plans for seeking East-West trade legislation for this purpose; and it will be watching carefully to see what the American side is prepared to offer. With regard to cultural and other relations, the Hungarian leadership is quite willing, in its desire for Western technical information, to take advantage of such opportunities as the Ford Foundation grants--currently enabling several dozen Hungarians to train in the United States--but is clearly not anxious to move into a program of official exchanges of a kind that would sharply increase the American presence in Hungary. In view of these various considerations it seems likely that the Hungarian Government will continue to proceed very cautiously and cagily in its negotiations of "normalization" with the United States. It will doubtless continue to stall on any conspicuous normalization proposals as long as East-West tensions (and Moscow's example) call for this, and will use Vietnam as an excuse for dragging its feet. The Hungarians are careful not to shut any doors, however, and to maintain correct, even friendly official relations at the personal level regardless of the current propaganda campaign against our "imperialism." They will undoubtedly be ready to bargain with us more actively, though always shrewdly, for the advantages they seek, the moment any relaxation appears in East-West affairs. For the Chargé d'Affaires a.i.
109. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ US/MC/60 New York, October 6, 1966. /1/Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 347, CF 85. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Niles and approved in S on October 27. The source text is labeled "Part I of II;" a separate memorandum of the portion of the conversation dealing with trade is ibid. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS United States Hungary Peter asked the Secretary to accept his most sincere condolences on Mr. O'Shaughnessy's death./2/ He said he knew that Mr. O'Shaughnessy had suffered from a heart ailment, but he had no idea that it was so serious. The Secretary said he appreciated Peter's expressions of sympathy. /2/O'Shaughnessy died of a heart attack on September 24 in Budapest. Peter than asked the Secretary whether the United States planned to send another Chargé d'Affaires to Budapest, or whether it might be possible for Hungary and the United States to exchange ambassadors. The Secretary replied that he wished to consider this question but reminded Peter of the special problem which might well stand in the way of such a development. Peter remarked that it would be "useful" to get rid of that obstacle. When the Secretary observed that the United States thought that the Vatican was working for a solution to the problem, Peter replied that the Vatican was really not interested in a solution. He claimed that the Vatican regards the present situation as the best possible, particularly since the presence of Cardinal Mindszenty in Rome could be a major embarrassment. Peter said that the Hungarian Government was in contact with the Vatican, and he suggested that US intervention with the Vatican would be useful. He repeated his earlier statement that the Vatican did not appear to be interested in a solution, and the Secretary said that he would review the problem. Peter asked whether Cardinal Mindszenty's presence posed an insurmountable obstacle for the exchange of ambassadors. The Secretary replied that the required Senatorial approval for ambassadorial appointments did pose a problem in the case of Hungary. Peter replied that he had the impression that the Secretary was able to control the Senate. The Secretary laughed and said that Mr. Radványi had been misleading his authorities in Budapest if Peter thought the Administration was able to control the Senate.
110. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Hungary/1/ Washington, June 6, 1967, 7:24 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL HUNG-US. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Kecskemethy and McKisson, cleared by Stoessel, and approved by Lisle. The Legation was raised to Embassy status on November 28, 1966. 208645. 1. Sandor Jozan, Acting Hungarian Chargé, called at his request on McKisson at 2:30 P.M. June 6 to convey following oral representations on instructions GOH. Jozan said two incidents had occurred recently which do not contribute to improved US-Hungarian relations and which GOH considered unfriendly. First was publicizing Bernat defection,/2/ despite assurances previously given that Department did not plan initiate publicity in case. Second matter involved separate telephone calls to two members Hungarian UN Mission on June 1 and 2 by anonymous male callers who attempted induce them to defect. Jozan said, in response queries by Department officer, that he not aware identities of UN Mission personnel involved and added that callers did not identify selves in any way. /2/Erno Bernat, Third Secretary of the Hungarian Legation, defected in June. Documentation relating to his defection is ibid., POL 30 HUNG. 2. Department officer stated that Department had refrained in entire good faith from initiating publicity on Bernat case. However, in wake of Radvanyi case,/3/ fact of Bernat defection became known to some members of press through sources not known to Department, and new situation arose when press addressed direct inquiries to Department on subject. Department, in such circumstances, could not properly deny or misrepresent essential facts in case. Information made available in response such press queries was accurate, limited to essential facts, and not aimed at exploiting case for propaganda purposes. /3/Janos Radvanyi, Chargé d'Affaires, defected in May. Documentation relating to his defection is ibid. 3. Re telephone calls to Hungarian Mission personnel, McKisson expressed concern and regret that Hungarian personnel had been subjected such improper approaches but added that it was his firm conviction that such calls were the work of individual "cranks" and that there was no reason whatsoever to attribute such harassments to US officials. Department officer expressed his hope Hungarian Embassy and Hungarian UN Mission would report all such harassments promptly to US authorities and affirmed US concern and readiness take all possible steps to investigate and, wherever possible, prevent recurrence such acts. 4. Department officer also took opportunity to reiterate with regard Szabo,/4/ Bernat, and Radvanyi cases that all three individuals had acted entirely on own initiative and voluntarily without prior knowledge or inducement by US authorities. Expressed hope that GOH, despite concern it might feel in these matters, would seek, as US has sought, prevent them from having adverse effect on US-Hungarian relations generally. US, for its part, looked toward improvement relations and progress toward settlement outstanding bilateral problems and issues. /4/Laszlo Szabo, Second Secretary of the Hungarian Embassy in the United Kingdom, defected in October 1965. 5. Jozan expressed understanding and appreciation for statement Department's views and made no effort at rebuttal or further comment. Rusk
111. Telegram From the Embassy in Hungary to the Department of State/1/ Budapest, October 3, 1967, 1420Z./2/ /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL HUNG-US. Confidential. Repeated to Bonn for Hillenbrand and to Belgrade for Leddy. Martin J. Hillenbrand was appointed Ambassador to Hungary on September 12 and presented his credentials on October 30. /2/Beginning in spring of 1965, the dates and transmission times of all incoming Department of State telegrams were in six-figure date-time-groups. The "Z" refers to Greenwich mean time. 438. 1. US-Hungarian relations were reviewed in two hour meeting between Assistant Secretary Leddy and Deputy Foreign Minister Bela Szilagyi Sep 27./3/ At Szilagyi's request Leddy outlined US views, including administration's aim of continuing to seek East-West trade legislation and belief that meanwhile improvement in bilateral relations possible in several fields such as cultural and scientific exchanges and consular affairs. He reminded the Deputy Foreign Minister that President's ability to offer Hungary most-favored-nation treatment is blocked at present by absence Congressional authorization, which in turn is influenced by political opposition against trading with countries that assist North Vietnam. /3/A memorandum of their conversation was transmitted to the Department of State as an enclosure to airgram A-127 from Budapest, October 8. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 HUNG-US) 2. Szilagyi thanked Leddy for views and in turn outlined GOH standpoint. He said Hungarian-US relations are disturbed at two levels: (1) On world level, by US aggression against Hungary's North Vietnamese friends, US policies in Middle East, Cuba, etc., and US role in European security question; (2) at bilateral level, by US trade discrimination against Hungary, inability to finish claims negotiations (which he attributed to US barriers to normal trade), US travel restrictions, and such incidents as recent defections Hungarian diplomats, which, he said, remains "serious hindrance to performance normal work of Hungarian Mission in Washington." Szilagyi elaborated standard GOH line re Vietnam at great length, including necessity of unconditional cessation bombing, though he was unable offer opinion what would happen if US stopped latter. Similarly, re European situation, in response to Leddy statement that US hopes Eastern Europe governments will give receptive consideration to constructive E-W initiatives of Kiesinger-Brandt coalition, Szilagyi rehearsed familiar East bloc skepticism toward Bonn policies and stressed Hungarian support of GDR. 3. On bilateral relations, Szilagyi referred in passing to attacks by Hungarian émigré organizations and "US supported Radio Free Europe" as additional obstacles to normalization, but reverted to US trade discrimination as principal impediment from GOH viewpoint. In this connection he brought up and emphasized the point that even if MFN were extended, GOH would regard trade with US as problematic, even risky basis on which to found long range plans. He cited current Congressional proposals to withdraw MFN status from Poland as proof of unreliability of US East-West trade policy Tims
112. Telegram From the Embassy in Hungary to the Department of State/1/ Budapest, November 20, 1967, 1600Z. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL HUNG-US. Confidential. Repeated to Bonn, Berlin, Munich, Belgrade, Bucharest, Moscow, Prague, Sofia, and Warsaw. 626. 1. During 45 minute discussion this morning with FonMin Peter, I went over the areas in which progress might be made in moving towards solution of at least some of our outstanding problems with the Hungarian Government. Starting from the general philosophy outlined in the President's speech of Oct 7 1966,/2/ I expressed the conviction that, despite admitted differences, we could most usefully come to grips with the issues between us on a pragmatic case by case basis, and noted that in our conversation on Nov 17 Prime Minister Fock/3/ had concurred in this general approach. /2/For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966, pp. 1125-1130. /3/Hillenbrand reported on this meeting in telegram 622 from Budapest, November 17. (Department of State, Central Files, POL HUNG-US) 2. Under consular matters, stated that we would be prepared to negotiate a consular convention with the Hungarian Government. This would serve a mutually useful purpose, regularize the handling of cases involving our respective nationals, and make a contribution to tourism. In this context, cited Csala case,/4/ noting that it was a current irritant in our relations and expressing the hope that the Hungarian Government would move toward its early resolution. /4/Csala, an American citizen of Hungarian birth, was arrested, convicted of espionage in March 1966, and sentenced to 6 years in prison. He was released in October 1968. 3. Under cultural contacts, observed that, as Lisle had already told Nagy, we were prepared rescind our Sept 1 1955 restrictions if the Hungarian Govt took reciprocal action. We hoped that greater scope could be given us in field of media exchanges, e.g. circulation of cultural bulletin and publications such as "Amerika", now distributed in USSR and Poland, and mutual exchange of radio and television programs. Added that regularization of arrangements for treatment of performing artists would also be useful, as would increased scope for US participation in English-language instruction programs. Expressed concern that, precisely at this juncture the Hungarian authorities had seen fit to cancel IUCTG exchange program, and urged that Hungarian Govt consider whether it would not wish restore this program. 4. In economic area, noted that while Congress had not granted the President requested authority to grant most-favored-nation treatment to countries as Hungary, we had taken earlier action to liberalize export license controls, would as usual participate in next year's International Trade Fair in Budapest, were discussing with appropriate Hungarian authorities American sanitary requirements affecting Hungarian meat exports to US, and were prepared exchange patent gazettes. Also noted that, while the situation was difficult, we hoped take up again at a suitable time question of financial claims. 5. Finally, in area of diplomatic problems, raised question of Embassy personnel ceilings and travel restrictions along lines indicated in Deptels 56033 and 71229./5/ /5/Telegram 56033, October 16, and telegram 71229, November 17. (Both in Department of State, Central Files, POL HUNG-US) 6. In concluding presentation, observed that, in many of these areas, Hungarian practice was more stringent than that of other socialist countries. We hope begin discussion of details with Hungarian authorities soon, and assumed that FonMin would appropriately instruct Deputy FonMin Szilagyi and Ambassador Hazi (head of Dept V) who would presumably have to bear main burden, in this sense. 7. In response, Foreign Minister said that he too could accept the general approach which had been outlined, that is, to negotiate on a pragmatic case by case basis in an effort to achieve specific improvements. Hungarian Govt would be prepared to discuss anything US wished to raise. He had to point out, however, that Hungarian authorities could not overlook the general international situation. They could not come to any agreements with the US of a political nature which would be misinterpreted by Hungarian people and their allies as representing tacit acceptance of US actions which government did not approve. Hungary must maintain posture of sincerity and consistency in this respect. When I asked him how he defined political agreements, since the four areas which I had described were essentially non-political, Peter indicated that particularly cultural field tended have political overtones. Moreover, too lenient treatment in Csala case would be misunderstood by Hungarian people under present circumstances. Should specific actions occur which would contribute towards an improvement of relations, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs might be able exercise more influence in the case. 8. In his view, Peter continued, the economic field seemed particularly suitable for progress at this point. Anything which would contribute to increased trade between Hungary and the US would be all to the good, and would lead to a real betterment of relations. He personally saw no reason why we should not make another effort to move towards a claims settlement, although the Hungarian negotiators, after the abortive round last spring, had reported to him that negotiations had reached a dead end. In any event, Hungarian Govt would be pleased to resume negotiations on claims at any time the US wishes. 9. Before I left, Peter requested that my presentation be summarized in aide-mémoire to be furnished to him as soon as feasible. I agreed and hope to have delivered to him start of business tomorrow morning. Text will be forwarded by airgram./6/ /6/A copy of the aide-mémoire was transmitted to the Department of State as an enclosure to airgram A-189 from Budapest, November 26. (Ibid.) 10. Comment: In possible effort to appear more forthcoming than realities may actually permit, Peter may have been dispensing a certain amount of soft soap. Both he and Fock have emphasized their complete acceptance of pragmatic case by case approach towards resolution of outstanding problems between Hungary and US, despite the international situation to which they make reference in stock phrases. Neither Fock nor Peter brought up subject of Viet-Nam by name, a degree of forebearance which I had not expected but significance of which should not be overemphasized in evaluating actual prospects. 11. As soon as Szilagyi and Hazi return from their trip to Western Europe, Embassy will approach them with view to opening detailed discussions. We must expect, however, that any progress in achieving even minimal US objectives will follow a very measured pace. Hungarian authorities are unlikely overlook fact that, upon analysis, balance of practical advantage in nearly all of areas indicated other than those economic ones in which progress is least likely, falls on side of US. We may, however, expect a small initial gesture or two. Hillenbrand
113. Telegram From the Embassy in Hungary to the Department of State/1/ Budapest, November 30, 1967, 1626Z. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL HUNG-US. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Bonn, Berlin, Belgrade, Bucharest, Moscow, Munich, Prague, Sofia, and Warsaw. 663. Subject: Conversation with Party First Secretary Janos Kadar. 1. My introductory call today on Party First Secretary Janos Kadar lasted one hour and ten minutes. He obviously wanted to go beyond the usual exchange of pleasantries for such an occasion, and after a few minutes launched into a long, somewhat discursive but obviously prepared statement of how he saw the state of relations between US and Hungary. There was no false modesty, and he spoke with the assurance of someone who is not only party boss but the real power in this country. 2. Kadar began by welcoming fact that US had sent its first Ambassador to Hungary. This was useful step, although fact that it had taken nearly a year to accomplish after initial announcement was in itself indicative of our current difficulties. When last December US had proposed a date for announcement of mutual raising of diplomatic establishments to Embassy rank, this date by accident happened to coincide with an important party congress in Budapest. When it was suggested that it might be inopportune to make such an announcement at that time, he had brushed this objection aside, since he sincerely believed the value of establishing full relations with the US and saw no reason to qualify such a step, or to postpone its public announcement, merely because of a party meeting. The great majority of the Hungarian people undoubtedly support better relations with the US, and this was a fact that any Hungarian leader had to take into account. 3. He had been fully informed of my previous discussions with Hungarian officials including that yesterday with Parliament President Kallai (reported A-199 Nov 30, 1967),/2/ Kadar continued, and had taken note of the statements made. The task of a new Ambassador in Budapest would in some respects be pleasant but in other respects difficult. It would be pleasant because the Hungarian authorities were prepared to deal sympathetically with outstanding problems between the two countries in an effort to dispose of those which would be solved. They would be polite and helpful in every legitimate way. The Ambassador's role would, however, be difficult because of the admitted differences between Hungary and the US on major issues. He recalled that a school friend of his who had planned to become a diplomat had once lent him a manual for students of diplomacy. From this he had learned that a primary function of diplomacy was to strive to achieve peaceful solutions of outstanding problems. In this sense, the US would find that the Hungarian Government practiced diplomacy in its best form. He wanted us to know that the Hungarian authorities were really sincere in their espousal of peaceful coexistence as the only rational approach today between countries whose systems were based on differing theories of society. It might not have been possible to say this 20 years ago, when the force of ideologies was much more intense, but the basic problem today was to avoid the outbreak of nuclear war between the two superpowers. /2/Not printed. (Ibid., POL 15-1 HUNG) 4. He did not want to belabor the past, Kadar observed, but he did want to bring to my attention two problems between Hungary and the US which he felt it useful to examine for their illustrative value. The first of these was the Mindszenty case (his remarks on this subject are being reported in a separate Limdis telegram to Dept)./3/ The second was the handling of the Hungarian question in the UN. He referred to a chance meeting which he had had in 1963 with Governor Harriman (then Under Secretary of State) at the Moscow Sports Stadium. He had compared the situation at that time as similar to two boxers who had been slugging at each other for seven rounds (from 1956 to 1963). Neither could hope to knock the other out, neither was prepared to capitulate, and neither could ultimately hope to gain very much from the contest. Hungary was not prepared to come on its knees to the US, and he knew the US was not prepared to assume this posture before Hungary. As I knew, he went on, the UN problem had now been solved in an acceptable way. If we approached current problems in the same spirit which had finally led to a solution of the Hungarian question in the UN, based upon realistic acceptance of the facts of life, then there was good possibility of advancing towards agreement in other areas. /3/Telegram 665 from Budapest, December 1. (Ibid., SOC 12-1 HUNG) 5. The system which existed in Hungary today is a reality, Kadar stressed with some emphasis, and it is a fact that it will remain. Compared to the feudal conditions which had existed in the country until the end of World War II, the present system was certainly far superior for the masses of the Hungarian people, who had previously lived in abject poverty. He was willing to concede that many in the US would undoubtedly still like to change the system in Hungary, and he would be the first to admit that he would like to make some changes in the American system. However, as a realist, he recognized that this was out of the question. Mutual recognition of each other's systems as facts of life was basic premise of peaceful coexistence. Both sides would, of course, indulge in propaganda against each other, but firm and realistic acceptance of this truth would not let the possibilities of improving our relations be submerged by such propaganda. 6. Kadar said that he did not want to spoil the cordiality of this initial talk by any pointed references to Viet-Nam, but he did want to observe that, while the US might win further victories there, it could not in the final result be victorious. 7. He concluded his remarks (which by surreptitiously glancing at my watch I timed as lasting 55 minutes) by reiterating his pleasure at the establishment of relations at the Ambassadorial level between Hungary and the US, his hope that I would have a pleasant stay in Budapest, and that both sides would mutually make a genuine contribution towards better relations between our countries. 8. I responded by noting that he had indicated he had received a full report of my previous discussions with Hungarian officials, and I would therefore not repeat what he already knew. As I had pointed out in my previous talks, the basic framework of current American policy towards countries such as Hungary was set forth in the President's speech of Oct. 7, 1966, and I hoped that, in the spirit of the speech and of his own remarks about the desirability of coming to grips with the problems between us we could move towards a solution of at least some of them. I hoped soon to begin talks with Deputy Foreign Minister Szilagyi, after his return to Budapest early in December, on the various matters which I had raised with Foreign Minister Peter and which had been incorporated in an aide-mémoire sent to the Foreign Minister./4/ I finally observed that our objective in Viet-Nam was not to be victorious in the sense of desiring conquest of the country, but to achieve the limited objectives which had been set forth in numerous statements by American leaders. /4/See footnote 6, Document 112. 9. Comment: Although Kadar's remarks fell pretty much in the same pattern as those of my previous conversations with Hungarian leaders, I report them here at some length because they represent, I believe, the first contact in recent years between an American official and the undisputed leader of this country. Kadar was in an obviously relaxed, good humored, sometimes semi-ironic mood. He was well-briefed and had apparently carefully thought out the line of argument he wished to use. He seemed to enjoy playing the role of a confident leader big enough to forget the past, and hopeful for betterment of Hungarian-American relations though very mindful of present difficulties. Hillenbrand
114. Telegram From the Embassy in Hungary to the Department of State/1/ Budapest, August 27, 1968, 1210Z. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 2 HUNG. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Bonn, London, Paris, Vienna, USNATO, Berlin, Belgrade, Bucharest, Moscow, Munich, Prague, Sofia, and Warsaw. 1814. Subject: Hungary after the Czech events. 1. In seeking to assess the implications for Hungary of its participation in military occupation of Czechoslovakia, one is struck by the general popular mood of dismay at the turn of events, by the seeming discomfort of most officials, and by the cliche-laden sterility of arguments by which the press and other media are attempting to justify action taken. Whatever may have been the actual role in influencing events of the meeting between Kadar and Dubcek on Aug. 18 (Budapest 1796),/2/ no one is claiming that Hungarian leaders tried to the end to prevent military intervention. The essentially satellite character of Hungarian policy in the crunch is all too painfully clear. /2/Not found. 2. There are rumors circulating in Budapest that Kadar's personal position is in danger given his early endorsement of reformist developments in Czechoslovakia, his widely-publicized mediatory role, and his apparently only last-minute conversion to need for forceful measures. He has certainly been left in an exposed position and his prestige is bound to suffer seriously. We doubt, however, that his actual position as Party First Secretary is in any significant danger at this time from putatively ascendant hard-liners, and there is no indication that he is losing control of Hungarian Party apparatus. 3. We have had reports from good sources that some of the Hungarian troops which were first sent in to Czechoslovakia have had to be replaced by new units. Apparently the troops, who were stationed in Hungarian-speaking area of Slovakia, became infected with views of local population. It can be assumed that the returning troops will bring back their own version of the occupation and that this will filter out to the population at large, which is in any case highly skeptical of regime's explanation of events. This incident is symptomatic of domestic problem facing the regime as a result of Czech events which is likely to persist and continue to give trouble. 4. Clearly, so far as Kadar's position is concerned, as well as internal developments in Hungary generally and the whole complex of Hungarian relations with both Communist and Western countries, much will depend on the actual outcome of Czech situation and any repercussions this may have on Soviet leadership situation and Soviet policy. Until smoke has dissipated it will be difficult to see clear directions in these key areas. 5. There is little doubt, however, that Czech developments will seriously impede efforts which Hungarians have made to improve relations with West generally, at least in the short run. This may come about not so much as result of Hungarian unwillingness to pursue such a course as lack of Western receptivity. The Hungarians may indeed try to press their efforts to improve bilateral relations Western countries, and even be prepared to make concessions to this end, as if to compensate for their role in the occupation of Czechoslovakia. 6. Among all the current rumors and reports, we are struck by one hard fact, namely the intensity and sharpness of Hungarian press criticism of Romania and specifically of Ceausescu's role. Weekend Hungarian press carried several extremely harsh criticisms of Romanians, in effect equating their role to that of NATO countries. We note that press shifted its ground August 27, muting attacks on Romania and turning to criticism of Yugoslavia. It would seem that there will be a palpable deterioration in Hungarian relations with Romania and Yugoslavia. In case of Romania especially, such a climate is likely to revive latent nationalist differences centered on always sensitive Transylvania problem. If only in this sense, Czech events mark a new stage in complex relationships in Balkan politics. 7. Postscript. Current Budapest joke: Question: What are the five armies doing in Czechoslovakia? Answer: They're trying to find the guy who invited them. Hillenbrand
115. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, October 17, 1968, 11 a.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 17 HUNG-US. Confidential. Drafted by Tihany. The conversation was held in Leddy's office. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS Janos Nagy, Hungarian Ambassador John M. Leddy, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs Ambassador Nagy's introductory call on Mr. Leddy lasted 12 minutes. In order to avoid a repetition of the tactic used by the Ambassador during his call on Mr. Lisle (see Lisle-Nagy memcon dated October 15, 1968),/2/ which was to blur the issue by introducing Viet-Nam in response to our opening expression of disapproval regarding Warsaw Pact action in Czechoslovakia, Mr. Leddy took the initiative by first mentioning Viet-Nam and then proceeding to Czechoslovakia. He told the Ambassador that, because of his wearisome conversation with Deputy Foreign Minister Szilagyi in Budapest a year ago,/3/ he was familiar and also in disagreement with the Hungarian Government's views on Viet-Nam. Next focussing on the events of last August, Mr. Leddy tersely explained that our efforts toward détente with Bloc countries, including Hungary, which have borne some fruit in the case of the Soviet Union, would now have to proceed more slowly and with more difficulty owing to Czechoslovakia. /2/Not printed. (Ibid., POL 17 HUNG-US) /3/See Document 111. The Ambassador said he realized that his arrival in Washington occurred in a situation marked by difficulties but that his efforts would be directed toward contributing to an improvement rather than to a deterioration of the situation. Mr. Leddy expressed approval of this intent and mentioned that among the various bilateral problems awaiting solution that of the mission personnel ceilings, in Washington and Budapest, could probably be handled most rapidly. We were interested for security reasons, he added, in assigning five Marines to our Embassy at Budapest. Ambassador Nagy agreed that the matter of personnel ceilings posed a problem easy to handle. He continued to say that his Government did not tie in this problem with any other outstanding issue. "My need for increased staffing," he added, "is not in Washington but beyond the capital city." This oblique reference to the Hungarian desire to open consulates in New York and Cleveland (see Lisle-Nagy memcon dated October 15, 1968)/4/ drew the comment from Mr. Leddy that "this was not our case." On the other hand, Mr. Leddy continued, we were concerned about two protection cases in Hungary, those of Andrew Csala and Henrietta Blueye. Release of these imprisoned Americans would mark progress toward improved relations, he said. /4/Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 17 HUNG-US) The Ambassador promptly replied that Mr. Csala would be released the following day (October 18) and that our Embassy at Budapest was so informed today. He was not familiar with the Blueye case but felt hopeful as to its outcome as well. Mr. Leddy said that Csala's imminent release was good news, indeed, and expressed his appreciation. When the Ambassador next took up the subject of US-Hungarian trade, Mr. Leddy agreed that our inability to grant MFN should not prevent some expansion of trade through promotional activities. He mentioned, as an example, the Bulgarian Embassy's current drive to popularize Bulgarian wines in this country. The Ambassador appeared interested. Mr. Leddy terminated the conversation by wishing the Ambassador well in his new assignment. [Continue with the next documents] Volume XVII Index | Foreign Relations Online | Historian's Office | |