NOTE: External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views contained therein.
| The State Department web site below is a permanent electronic archive of information released prior to January 20, 2001. Please see www.state.gov for material released since President George W. Bush took office on that date. This site is not updated so external links may no longer function. Contact us with any questions about finding information. NOTE: External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views contained therein. |
 | FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968 Volume XVII Eastern Europe Department of State |
 | |
| Hungary 100. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, January 13, 1964. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL HUNG-US. Confidential. Drafted by Squire on January 16. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS Hungarian Chargé Radvanyi called at his request at 11:00 a.m. January 13, 1964. After preliminary amenities, he handed Mr. Vedeler two "Reminders" each concerning the desire of a person considered Hungarian by the Hungarian authorities to return to Hungary from the US./2/ Radvanyi alluded briefly to the possibility that a consular convention between Hungary and the US might obviate similar problems, which were presently faced both by Hungary and by the US. /2/Not further identified. Radvanyi then referred to the recent talks between Governor Harriman and Hungarian First Deputy Foreign Minister Peter Mod (December 14, 1963)/3/ and the general state of US-Hungarian relations. He added that negotiations appeared desirable at this time between the US and Hungary. He asked if the Department had noted the significance of Mod's remarks to Governor Harriman that Hungary was willing to consider a general settlement of claims with the US. Mr. Vedeler assured Radvanyi that we had indeed noticed this point and were taking it into account. Radvanyi said that a "Polish type" of settlement was desirable, since Hungary would probably be facing fairly substantial claims which it would be hard pressed to pay under the Rumanian or Bulgarian formula. In other words, negotiations, which he felt might require some time, would need to take into account a prospect of increasing trade between Hungary and the US since only through such trade could Hungary expect to raise the necessary dollar sums to make payments on a general claims settlement (Radvanyi indicated that Hungary would seek compensation for the stock of the Babolna horsebreeding farm, which he alleged had been dispersed in the US). /3/The Department of State reported on this meeting in telegram 304 to Budapest, December 14, 1963. (Department of State, Central Files, POL HUNG-US) Mr. Vedeler asked what progress had Hungary made in settling the problem of meat inspection requirements for export of its meat products to the US. Radvanyi said that this question was now in the hands of the technicians, and that by late February the Hungarian agricultural authorities would transmit evidence of Hungarian inspection standards to the US Department of Agriculture. In this respect he wondered if the US would agree to the establishment in New York of a one-man office representing Agrimpex to handle commercial sales of meat to the US, much as the Yugoslav and Polish trade offices in New York handled their respective exports. The office could be "temporary", would be strictly commercial, and would not be a part of the Hungarian Legation's Commercial Counselor's office. Mr. Vedeler said that the Department would look into the matter. It was emphasized to Radvanyi that no MFN treatment of Hungary was possible under existing legislation. In turning to another subject, Mr. Vedeler referred to various press reports about possible withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary and asked the Hungarian Charge whether he believed there was any basis for such reports. Radvanyi replied that he had no official knowledge of any proposed withdrawal, but that it was not impossible. Radvanyi thought personally that such a withdrawal was unlikely since the troops were mostly technical forces concerned with such matters as air defense under the Warsaw Pact and included very little infantry. Soviet forces were unnecessary for internal security in Hungary and there could be no question on this score. Besides, the average Hungarian, Radvanyi claimed, did not mind seeing Soviet forces remain in Hungary in order to minimize the need for Hungarian conscripts. In his opinion, withdrawal of Soviet forces from Hungary would be contingent on some international security arrangement such as a NATO-Warsaw Pact Non-aggression agreement. Mr. Vedeler suggested that it was difficult to see any operational or strategic purpose in the retention of Soviet troops in Hungary given the nature of modern military weapons. The absence of Soviet forces from Czechoslovakia and their withdrawal from Bulgaria and Rumania would support this view. At this point, Chargé Radvanyi casually mentioned that he was pleased to report that as of January 1, 1964, the Hungarian Government had ceased jamming of the VOA, RFE and BBC radio broadcasts to Hungary. (The Department later learned that Hungarian Second Secretary Istvan Varga told Mr. Carl Sharek of USIA the same thing at approximately the same time.) As to VOA, Hungary found this official organ to be a "serious" station: he intimated, however, that the Department might seek to have VOA be "more objective". Mr. Vedeler expressed gratification at the official information conveyed by Mr. Radvanyi that the Hungarian authorities were stopping the jamming of broadcasts. Both Mr. Vedeler and Mr. Squire noted that VOA endeavored to be entirely factual in its reporting and dealt to a great extent with American life and developments. As to RFE, Radvanyi said that Premier Kadar had decided to cease jamming of this station to bring some humor into the life of Hungarians, since RFE broadcasts were so ridiculous they could not be taken seriously. In his personal estimation, the Charge continued, RFE would probably not continue for more than a year. The Department's representatives indicated that while RFE was not an official organization they could not agree with this estimate. Radvanyi next adverted to Cardinal Mindszenty. The US, he said, should put pressure on the Vatican to find a solution of the case. It was unfortunate that there was no provision in the Catholic Church for the pensioning of Cardinals, he continued, since this might permit a solution of the issue. The US should play a leading part in the settlement of the Mindszenty problem. Mr. Vedeler pointed out that the primary responsibility in any solution of the problem lay with the Hungarian government and the Vatican. He referred in this connection to the statement of Mr. Mod in his conversation with Governor Harriman that negotiations were in progress between Budapest and the Vatican on this and other Church-State matters. Radvanyi indicated that these talks were not progressing very speedily. In a discussion of cultural exchanges, there was agreement that gradual progress had been made during the past year. Mr. Vedeler asked what impressions the Charge had of the success of the recent visits to Budapest of Messrs. Steinbeck and Albee. Radvanyi said that he was uninformed about these visits except in a general way. He mentioned the successful visit to the US of First Deputy Minister of Agriculture Janos Hont, and the favorable articles which Hont had written recently in "Nepszabadsag". Both Mr. Vedeler and Charge Radvanyi believed that satisfactory steps, often of a non-official character, were being taken in the cultural and exchanges field without any written agreements or protocols between the US and Hungary, and that this pragmatic approach was the best in dealing with these activities. Radvanyi then asked how the US viewed the travel to the US of MTI Director General Sandor Barcs, who would come as the private guest of the AP. Mr. Vedeler said that the trip seemed to be an excellent idea, particularly since we knew something of the importance of Barcs at Budapest. Radvanyi confirmed the fact of Barcs' influence within the Hungarian Government. In conclusion, Radvanyi noted that he was contemplating arranging for the visit of Istvan Tompe, Head of the Hungarian Radio and Television, to the US. Tompe was also a close personal friend of Premier Kadar and had modernized news coverage on the Hungarian Radio and Television. Now the Hungarian radio carried much better news than did the Hungarian newspapers, and in much more objective fashion. He intimated that it might be possible during a visit by Tompe here to arrange a meeting between him and the authorities responsible for Hungarian broadcasts of VOA, and perhaps even arrange network exchanges. Mr. Vedeler said that we would be interested to see whether such a visit would be worked out. The meeting lasted slightly over one hour.
101. Telegram From the Legation in Hungary to the Department of State/1/ Budapest, January 21, 1964, 4 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL HUNG-US. Confidential. 439. Apparent phasing out of jamming will further favorable image GOH attempting create of progressive country taking broad set of initiatives improve relations with West. Initiatives involving USG may be in areas of maximum favorable international impact where GOH can move independently or in collaboration with USSR while leaving untouched residue hard core problems affecting operating position Legation (property, personnel etc) and hampering USG effectiveness generally within Hungary. Other moves involving USG that should not surprise us would be thinning out or removal Soviet troops, withdrawal conspicuous surveillance of Legation, and piecemeal approaches toward settling old debts and claims. Latter might include approach to US bankers to settle old $6 million default with view making it easier for Hungarians do business with US private sector and banks. All of this would be to the good. We should, however, take measures to assure that accurate image of USG posture is widely known during all this and keep pressure on GOH to move in all areas in which USG interested. To counteract, for example, foreign and local press play that Mod recently told Under Secretary Harriman that GOH ready to discuss all outstanding issues, we suggest media (including SPO Vienna) be used to disseminate following ideas: In Washington and Budapest USG has identified outstanding US-Hungarian problems of bilateral character involved in improvement relations; has taken initiatives to point [to?] essential elements of some of these and invited GOH response; and has expressed willingness to discuss others. These same points might also usefully be gotten across to diplomatic corps when suitable opportunities arise. Jones
102. Telegram From the Legation in Hungary to the Department of State/1/ Budapest, February 26, 1964, 3 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL HUNG-US. Secret. 514. Reference: Legation telegram 504; Legation A-3; Legation telegram 513./2/ /2/Telegram 504, February 23, reported on a Hungarian note proposing a settlement of outstanding differences between the two states. (Ibid.) Airgram A-3, July 3, 1963, reported on U.S. cultural programming in Hungary. (Ibid., CUL 11 HUNG) Telegram 513, February 26, analyzed the enlarged meeting of the Hungarian Communist Party's Central Committee. (Ibid., E 8 HUNG) 1. Szilagyi's note comes against background of continued accent on economic problems, cautious GOH optimism on Vatican-Church negotiations, and semi-official indications Khrushchev expected here Liberation Day, April 4 (accompanied by still unsubstantiated rumors he will announce troop withdrawal)./3/ Szilagyi's proposal fits into this background of possible developments that could set stage for improved relations with US. It may not be entirely coincidental that Szilagyi's estimate six weeks to two months to agree on agenda brings us to Liberation Day. /3/Khrushchev visited Hungary March 31-April 9. 2. We believe it desirable to respond to Hungarian note in context Davis talking paper October 1962./4/ Thus continuity US posture toward Hungary will be underlined and suggestion disabused that something new on our part has suddenly appeared in US-Hungarian relations. By appropriate reference to Davis paper, we can continue to take note of Mindszenty problem and possible exchange of Ministers/5/ (in which Hungary presumably particularly interested) while addressing ourselves to those problems capable of earlier bilateral resolution. Within that context we believe agenda might best be proposed with general caption headings with illustrative examples that will include items still open that were originally listed in Davis paper together with new items that have subsequently developed. Broad headings might be Legation operations, economic, cultural and consular. /4/See Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. XVI, Document 15. /5/The United States withdrew its Minister following the suppression of the Hungarian revolution of 1956. 3. Legation operational problems should be approached on general proposition that normal relations call for normally functioning and adequately safeguarded diplomatic establishment. To that end present arbitrary limitation size American staff should be eliminated, status of US-owned property in Budapest should be regularized, authorization obtained for leased line to Vienna, and right established to bring in Marine guards. Experience recent months has underlined urgent need for Marine guards for adequate security as long as we occupy present buildings. 4. Economic problems should include settlement financial claims and receptive USG posture toward practical problems now facing Hungary in increasing trade such as meat inspection, more expeditious and liberal (non-strategic) licensing, permission to open sales office in US, certificates of origin, et cetera. Hungarians have clearly indicated here they will attempt to link financial settlement with expanded trade. Key to latter in their eyes is MFN and to lesser degree, annual trade negotiations patterned after those with Western European countries. These negotiations have led to trade agreements setting forth broad set of trade targets and may eventually serve as useful models in developing and controlling trade with Hungary. While Hungarians have not specifically said so, we believe they have in mind Polish model where grant MFN linked with financial settlement. 5. Cultural problems should include lifting present restrictions distribution of informational material and providing basis for more activity in this field here. We have in mind broader daily distribution of US wireless bulletin, monthly distribution of some sort cultural bulletin, and more use of films. In this same context we believe possibility of IMG agreement might be tabled. No GOH permission required for Legation library. On performing arts and exchanges we should be prepared to discuss generally while preserving our own maneuverability. All of this we would seek to accomplish without getting involved in overall formal cultural agreement. There have been some low level indications, however, that Hungary would like some sort cultural agreement for its prestige. 6. Consular problems should include reunion of families of both dual nationals and non-US citizens. We now have lists mentioned in Legation A-301/6/ and they contain 29 and 60 names respectively for each category. They would be submitted when negotiations get under way. Does Department feel time has come for tabling either draft new consular convention or some sort understanding designed to provide Legation notification and access rights to visiting Americans under arrest? /6/Dated February 16. (Department of State, Central Files, PT 9-11 HUNG) In view of background of events against which Szilagyi's note was submitted, we believe we should keep ball in Hungary court and make a reasonably prompt reply. We assume Washington will draft note in reply and provide appropriate instructions in connection with Szilagyi's procedural suggestions. Advise if anything further desired of this Legation. Jones
103. Telegram From the Legation in Hungary to the Department of State/1/ Budapest, March 11, 1964, 1 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, SOC 12-1 HUNG. Secret; Limdis. 547. Department's telegrams 427, 428./2/ Our written response on President's behalf to Cardinal's letter of February 4/3/ was delivered March 11 as authorized 427. In course subsequent conversation, "statement" as modified 428 was gone over with Cardinal. He put statement in context past messages conveyed to him orally. /2/Telegram 427, March 9, transmitted the text of a reply to Mindszenty's letter to the President to be delivered by Jones. Telegram 428, March 9, provided instructions for delivery of the message. (Both ibid.) /3/In this letter, Mindszenty outlined his personal history, gave his view of his legal position, and explained the conditions he would set with Hungarian authorities as the basis for an agreement under which he would leave the Legation. (Ibid., Hungarian Desk Files: Lot 75 D 45, January-June 1964) Cardinal professed to be satisfied with written response upon seeing clause "this refuge remains available to you so long as consideration for your personal safety and freedom requires such an arrangement". Once having assured himself on availability of refuge, he did not appear to focus on contents of statement even though he did appear to read it. In hour and half talk Cardinal made three principal points: 1. Preoccupied with position of five bishops in Hungary who not allowed in their diocese and with position of bishops in Slovakia, for which he says he is responsible, who may be in similar position. Fears reported church state negotiations will not protect interests of these old faithful members of clergy for whom he feels responsible. Vatican appears to him to be too disposed to arrive at accommodations with EE regimes. 2. As long as there is smallest percentage of chance of change in Hungary, feels he should hold himself available to play his constitutional role when appropriate time comes. Saying he did not know what lay in the future, he recalled that one of his predecessors, Yorgys Zechenyi, lived to be 107 years old. 3. Described attitude of Vatican and USG as two key factors in his position. Vatican's plan to have him come to Rome would represent a "careless" attitude on his part toward his responsibilities here and to loyal priests for whose appointments he had been responsible. While he did not think GOH would arrest him now if he left Legation, to either return to his native village or be subject to living conditions of priests who had been faithful to him would be intolerable. He professed to find satisfication in nature of written response given him that asylum in American Legation continued to be available. We took suitable opportunity to point out to Cardinal that, while we were sympathetic to humane considerations prompting his feelings, USG not competent to deal with problems involving church and primacy. We called his attention to relevant portions of statement bearing on these and expressed gratification that he would shortly be able to discuss these problems in depth with a representative of Vatican. With respect to availability of asylum, we called his attention to terms and conditions in statement and to our government's hope that reasonable solution could be found to problem of refuge. He did not appear to really focus on statement as whole or on portions to which we called his special attention. At end he thanked us for letter and its "supplement." Statement not left with him. Jones
104. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security (Bundy) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, April 14, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Hungary, Memos, Vol. 1. Secret. Secretary Rusk is asking for your approval to accept a Hungarian offer to initiate confidential bilateral discussions looking toward the establishment of more normal relations between the U.S. and Hungary./2/ /2/An April 8 memorandum from the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State requesting approval to proceed with negotiations is ibid. If successful, these talks could produce several immediate and specific benefits, including: (1) the settlement of claims by American citizens for losses suffered from Hungarian nationalization and/or acquisition of American-owned property; (2) improved protection for American citizens in Hungary through the establishment of mutually acceptable consular arrangements; (3) rejoining of families separated since the Communist takeover, and more particularly in the wake of the 1956 revolution; (4) some increased trade; and (5) greater contacts between Americans and Hungarians resulting from improved diplomatic relations. In a larger sense there is a long range and substantial advantage that could accrue from an improved American presence in Budapest. Hungary has perhaps gone farther than any other satellite in de-Stalinizing the Communist system and the movement in that direction continues. With strong representation there, the United States would be in a better position than it now is to take advantage of this situation and make its views and influence felt and understood. On balance, it seems clearly in our interest to accept the Hungarian offer for these discussions and if you approve, they could get under way in Budapest on or about May 15. McG. B. Approved /3/President Johnson checked this option. A checkmark after "Approved," initialed by Bundy, is dated April 21. In telegram 500 to Budapest, April 21, the Department of State forwarded the text of a note offering to begin discussions on or about May 15 in Budapest. (Department of State, Central Files, POL HUNG-US) In telegram 695 from Budapest, April 30, Jones reported that he had delivered the note. (Ibid.)
105. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, September 10, 1964. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 2 HUNG. Confidential. Drafted by Squire. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS On September 10, 1964, at 3:00 p.m., Hungarian émigré leaders Ferenc Nagy and Monsignor Bela Varga called on Mr. Davis at their request. Msgr. Varga opened his remarks by noting that, although he could not speak for the entire Hungarian Committee, he and Mr. Nagy were in agreement with US policy towards Hungary. The US policy of building bridges to Eastern Europe had impelled Mr. Nagy and himself to go to Europe to observe its effect, particularly, the reaction of Hungarians. He was glad to say that the news from Hungary in this regard was very good. Hungarians had hope in America and were waiting for America not to start a war or a revolution but to make even further progress in inducing peaceful liberalization in Hungary. After spending considerable time in Vienna talking to the stream of travelers coming out of Hungary, Msgr. Varga said that he had gone alone to Rome, where conversations with Vatican officials showed that the Vatican's policy was parallel to that of the US, namely aimed toward inducing the liberalization of Hungary's internal regime. Mr. Nagy noted that since this US policy towards the EE countries had first been presented by Assistant Secretary Tyler in late 1962 and later reiterated even more strongly by Deputy Under Secretary Harriman before the European Subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee,/2/ he and Msgr. Varga had supported that policy in a positive fashion. Indeed Mr. Nagy and Msgr. Varga favored closer US-Hungarian contacts because they realized that no matter how long Communist regimes lasted the Hungarian people needed to survive under the best obtainable economic and moral conditions. Among the émigrés, opinions were divided. It was needless to say that some exiles felt it was better not to sell grain to Hungary, for they feared this helped the Government and thus tended to lengthen the rule of the Communists. He and Msgr. Varga were not of that opinion, however. While he did not know what future events would bring real changes in the form of Hungary's Government, in the meantime the Hungarian people must live and survive. The Hungarian population situation was particularly bad since, according to the latest UN figures, Hungary had the lowest birthrate in the entire world. This was a reflection of the people's fear and uncertainty over tomorrow. /2/The text of the Tyler statement was not found. The reference to Harriman's testimony is apparently to a statement made to the House Foreign Affairs Committee in April 1964. For text, see House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Recent Developments in the Soviet Bloc, Part 2 (Washington, 1964), pp. 348-355. In order to be able to take a firm stand on policy toward Hungary, Mr. Nagy continued, it was necessary to know the opinion of Hungarians in Hungary. He was not concerned to represent the émigrés, he added, but rather the views of the Hungarian people at home. So he and Msgr. Varga went to Europe to meet Hungarians traveling abroad. They had collected a lot of information, little of it new, but all of it strengthening their conviction that they must give positive support to the US policy towards Hungary and Eastern Europe. In the process they had met a great many Hungarians, in Paris and in Vienna. None of the Hungarian visitors were afraid to talk to them. Mr. Nagy said that he and Msgr. Varga had asked each Hungarian with whom they had talked what their opinion was of US policy toward Hungary and of the idea of broadening economic and cultural relations between the two countries. The Hungarians were asked specifically if they believed that increased US-Hungarian contacts would strengthen the regime without being of real benefit to the Hungarian people. Not a single person opposed the US policy towards Hungary. Without exception workers, engineers, clerks and farmers asked them to help in bringing about negotiations between the US and Hungary. Mr. Nagy and Msgr. Varga of course told them that the US has a definite policy concerning relations and contacts. While it was true that in Hungary the process of liberalization and relaxation had progressed much further than in most other EE bloc countries, in Rumania the Government had taken certain steps towards asserting Rumanian independence of the USSR and these steps had made it possible for the US to reach certain understandings with Rumania. The US had not seen similar steps towards independence on the part of Kadar. Those Hungarian travelers interviewed by Mr. Nagy and Msgr. Varga were not happy at this explanation, and stated that it would be very difficult for Kadar to take similar steps in the near future because of his personal relationship with Khrushchev, the presence of Red Army units in Hungary, and the fact that "fellow travelers" in the regime such as Janos Peter (the Foreign Minister) were so subservient to Moscow. There were, moreover, no "great" men in the Hungarian Government who could be expected to visualize Hungary's future place in the international scene. The Hungarian travelers offered some detailed advice on economic projects that the US should foster for Hungary. It was suggested, for instance, that the US help Hungary process her bauxite into aluminum, which would give Hungary added use of her most abundant natural resource, lessen her economic dependence on Moscow where the bauxite (and alumina) is now processed on terms unfavorable to Hungary. To set up a smelting plant, the US would have to supply a power source to Hungary. If this were to be an atomic power plant, of the type talked about for Rumania, it would have the added advantage of giving Hungary a reason for keeping the Hungarian-mined uranium, now exported to the USSR, for Hungary's own consumption. In the cultural field, the Hungarian travelers urged an expansion of the US scholarship program for Hungarian students, but with close control of the selection of students in US hands. They suggested that the US should seek to influence the Hungarian Government to abolish the State Office for Church Affairs, which served not to help the churches in Hungary but only to corrupt them. In summary, Mr. Nagy noted that it was the opinion of Msgr. Varga and himself that it was indeed desirable to improve US-Hungarian relations, regardless of their basic belief that nothing short of complete independence would be acceptable for Hungary in the long run. Mr. Nagy added that it would be desirable that the US Government, in improving relations with Hungary, should get the idea across to the Hungarian people by radio or other means that the increased contacts were being undertaken for the sake of the people and that these contacts must of necessity be through the Government in order to reach the people. In answer to a question from Mr. Vedeler, Mr. Nagy indicated that in his opinion the most effective types of exchanges with Hungary would be student exchanges and an agreement to allow publications to enter both countries on a reciprocal basis. Mr. Davis thanked Mr. Nagy and Msgr. Varga for making their views known to the Department and said he was pleased to see that they agreed with the general outlines of US policy. The policy, Mr. Davis added, must be developed as occasion presented itself and this is what the US was doing. [Continue with the next documents] Volume XVII Index | Foreign Relations Online | Historian's Office | |