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 | FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968 Volume XVII Eastern Europe Department of State |
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| 93. Summary Notes of the 590th Meeting of the National Security Council/1/ Washington, September 4, 1968, 5-7:25 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings File, Vol. 5. Secret; Sensitive; For the President Only. The source text bears no drafting information. U.S., Europe and the Czechoslovakian Crisis The President: The purpose of the meeting is to assess the impact of the Czechoslovakian crisis, to discuss how we can use the crisis to strengthen Western European defense and NATO, and to talk about our relations with the Russians and Eastern Europeans. Secretary Rusk will summarize the issues and possible ways of dealing with them. Secretary Clifford will talk about the defense of Western Europe and the new disposition of Soviet troops in Central Europe. Director Helms and Secretary Rusk will give us their views on the German reaction to the crisis. The press has already printed that the State Department was recommending additional reassurances to the Germans even before Secretary Rusk had made any recommendation to the President. Secretary Fowler will speak on the financial problems. If we speak out about a threatening situation and the situation does develop, we are accused of over-reacting. If we don't speak out and a serious situation does develop, then we are accused of not having done what we should have done. This is what happened following an indirect mention of the Romanian situation in the speech of last Friday./2/ /2/August 30; see footnote 2, Document 91. More meetings of the NSC should be held in the next few weeks so that all of the members may be fully informed on current foreign problems. All requests of political candidates for briefings are to be granted. Mr. Temple/3/ and Mr. Rostow are to clear Administration responses to requests for positions on foreign problems coming from candidates, advisors, task forces, etc. /3/Larry E. Temple, Special Counsel to the President. Secretary Rusk: The gravity of the current situation cannot be overstated in view of the very high costs the Soviet government was willing to pay for intervening in Czechoslovakia. The situation in Czechoslovakia has been developing since 1967. Dubcek gained power over conservative Communist Party members in January, 1968. Press censorship was lifted and other reforms were initiated. Dissension between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union rose rapidly. The summer maneuvers of the Warsaw Pact were used to build up military pressure against the Dubcek government in the hope that the liberals would slow down the reform campaign. The day of the Soviet invasion, the President met with Ambassador Dobrynin at 8:15 p.m. and then with the NSC later that evening. Decisions were reached at the NSC meeting to take the Czech case to the United Nations immediately and on a response to the oral message Dobrynin delivered earlier. The response to Dobrynin's message emphasized two points: a. Jefferson's quotation about governments based on the consent of the governed, and b. Denial that there was any U.S. or NATO attempt to intervene in Czechoslovakia as alleged by Moscow. Dobrynin had said that U.S. state interests were not affected by the Soviet action. In response he was told that U.S. interests are involved in Berlin where we are committed to prevent the city being overrun by the Russians. Although the Soviet military effort went smoothly, the Russians badly miscalculated the political reaction in Czechoslovakia. All Czechs opposed the movement of Soviet troops into their country. Their performance and discipline were superb. The Russians were unable to organize a puppet government to take over and legitimatize their invasion. Opposition outside Czechoslovakia to the Soviet move was world-wide and very strong. The President: Asked to interrupt the meeting to deal with a proposed press release on the admission of Czech refugees to the United States. The statement was read. (Copy attached at Tab A)/4/ /4/Not printed. The statement was not released. Secretary Rusk: The United States must grant refuge to those Czechs who want to leave their country or who are now outside and do not wish to return. The number is not large. We have to open our doors because if we do not, the refugees might return to Czechoslovakia and oppose the existing government. This would not be in our interest. Ambassador Thompson: We should not encourage Czechoslovakian refugees to come to the United States but only welcome them. If we appear to be urging them to come to the United States, the Soviet Union could use this policy to argue that we are, in fact, intervening in Czechoslovakian affairs. Secretary Fowler: Are the borders of Czechoslovakia now open? Are we by this statement inviting another Berlin Wall? The President: We can accept those who desire to come to the United States but not encourage them to come. Director Marks: The draft statement would be read by the refugees as encouragement to come to the United States. Ambassador Thompson: We should say no more than that the long-standing U.S. policy of offering asylum to political refugees remains unchanged. We should not appear to be accepting the entire burden because we want the Europeans to accept some of the refugees. Secretary Fowler: The statement should say no more than that our asylum policy is unchanged. Ambassador Cleveland: We should try for a uniform allied policy toward refugees. Mr. Leddy: The humanitarian aspect is overriding. Let all refugees come who so wish. The refugees cannot resist in Czechoslovakia. The Soviets would like to have liberals, intellectuals, etc. leave Czechoslovakia. The Vice President: Agreed with Secretary Rusk. We have to say something. We should reiterate our long-standing policy. Inevitably, many people will compare what we do for Czech refugees with what we did for Hungarian refugees. Secretary Clifford: What did we do following the Hungarian crisis? (Several recalled that thousands of Hungarian refugees came to the United States. Private organizations raised substantial sums to make possible the resettlement of Hungarians in the U.S.) Director Helms: The statement as read was acceptable. The President: Read a revised statement, commenting that he thought the State Department coordinated such statements. He suggested that the draft be further worked on taking into account all views expressed, and sent back for approval. Secretary Rusk: Last week there were disturbing indicators and press reports that the Russians might invade Romania, states other than Czechoslovakia, possibly even Yugoslavia. Read the evidence we had Friday, August 30. (Copy attached at Tab B)/5/ /5/Not found with the source text. Ambassador Dobrynin Friday evening asked for an appointment for Saturday morning without mentioning the nature of his business. It was possible that his Saturday call would be to inform us of a Soviet move into Romania. The President in his Friday speech referred to the rumors and issued a warning against another invasion. Dobrynin was asked to call Friday night to deliver his message rather than wait until the next day. The message dealt with the Czechoslovak situation. During this call, Dobrynin was asked about reports that the Russians were going to invade Romania. He was told that such a move would have incalculable consequences. Dobrynin said he was without instructions but, as he had said previously, he personally doubted the Russians would move into Romania./6/ /6/See Document 90. Saturday evening Dobrynin dropped by to say that Moscow had informed him that reports of an invasion of Romania were without foundation. This was interpreted to be reassurance that there would be no intervention in Romania. When asked, Dobrynin said his comments applied to Berlin as well, although he went on to mention many Berlin developments which the Soviets consider unsatisfactory./7/ /7/See Document 167. Intelligence available Saturday evening indicated that the Russians were not going to move into Romania. The answer from the Soviet Union to our question about Romania came promptly after the President's Friday speech in San Antonio./8/ Moscow had decided to hold down further troop movements for the present. However, no one can be sure that the Soviets won't hit Berlin and Romania in the days ahead. /8/See footnote 2, Document 91. General Wheeler: 19 Soviet divisions could move into Romania with two or three days notice. This force could quickly overwhelm any Romanian opposition. There would be little intelligence warning. The movement of Soviet planes, however, we would be able to detect. Secretary Rusk: The Romanians have not been whipping up false scares. We have been careful, in talking to the Russians, to make clear that our sources of intelligence are not Romanian. We informed the Romanians of what we had done. The Romanian Foreign Minister has been in New York. Ambassador Ball will report on his conversation with him./9/ /9/Telegram 6368 from USUN, September 3, reported that Ball had met briefly with Manescu the previous day and had found him "basically relaxed though not unconcerned" regarding Soviet intentions toward Romania. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-1 COMBLOC-CZECH) Ball and Manescu also met on August 27. In telegram 6344 from USUN, August 30, Ball reported that while Manescu was neither "agitated or concerned" about a Soviet invasion, he hoped that the United States would underline the cost of such a move to the Soviets. (Ibid.) It is important that everyone know we have never had any understanding with the Soviet Union about respective spheres of influence as De Gaulle alleges. The current difficulty arises out of Soviet violation of the Yalta agreement, not out of that agreement itself which called for free elections in Eastern Europe. There is a great difference between the Warsaw Pact and NATO with respect to internal affairs of members. NATO is operative only in the event of international aggression and grants no rights to a member to intervene in the affairs of another. The Soviet Union is actively trying to put across the idea that its invasion of Czechoslovakia should not affect its bilateral relations with us. We have a difficult problem of handling the American people as well as others throughout the world who would not approve if we act as if nothing had happened. We have cancelled numerous activities of a good-will nature such as a visit of the Minnesota band to the USSR and a second inaugural flight to the U.S. of a Soviet civilian airliner. On the other hand, Soviet action against Czechoslovakia has not eliminated many major world problems involving the USSR and the U.S. such as the Middle East, strategic missile control, and Vietnam. We must not mislead the Soviet Union, the American people, or our allies. The Soviet Union is trying to carry on business as usual with us. For example, they have told us they have ratified the Astronaut Treaty. Western Europe reacted with shock following the Soviet invasion but it has not broken off trade relations with the USSR. Many European states have cancelled good-will projects. NATO must consider the new Soviet deployments in Eastern Europe. There is a real need to reassure the Alliance. The President: The members of the Council should know that when the Russians invaded Czechoslovakia, they took measures to insure that they would not be blocked. No further mention of this activity should be made but it is brought up for the benefit of those who are optimistic about the Russian willingness to improve relations and reach agreements. (This apparently was a reference to the Soviet missile alert on the day of the invasion.) Secretary Rusk: The effect of the Soviet action on the policy of détente has been serious. NATO members must consult with each other and be seen consulting. High level NATO meetings will be necessary. As to the future of NATO, it may be necessary to extend now the life of the treaty beyond 1969. The problem is what can we do to reassure NATO members that the treaty will not disappear in 1969 which does not require Senate approval and does not commit the new President. The President: We must not forget that a large number of Senators not long ago favored a substantial immediate reduction in the level of U.S. forces deployed in Europe. Some wanted to reduce this number to 50,000. Secretary Rusk: The country will now have to debate again the amount of its resources which it is willing to commit to keeping peace in the world. There is some isolationism in the United States. As NATO was warned at its last meeting held in Iceland, fears of the Soviet leaders as they face a changing world create a dangerous attitude in Moscow. Ambassador Thompson: The Soviet leaders decided to intervene in Czechoslovakia because they felt their power position in the USSR was threatened. 1. The Czech system was going democratic. For example, press censorship was abolished. 2. The other Warsaw Pact powers, especially East Germany and Poland, were worried as to the effect in their countries of the Czech liberal reforms. 3. The Czechs were printing, for the first time, suppressed accounts of the horrors of the Stalin regime. The Kremlin leaders were acutely embarrassed. 4. The Czechs were requesting financial backing from the USSR which came to a very large sum. 5. The Soviets concluded Dubcek couldn't retain control of the Czech reform elements and that the result would cause serious difficulties for other European Communist states and even within the Soviet Union itself. We do not know what triggered the Soviet action. 1. East German Chairman Ulbricht reported to the Soviets following his August visit to Prague. He may have expressed his deep concern over developments in Czechoslovakia and their harmful effect in East Germany. 2. Brezhnev may have realized that the majority of the Kremlin leaders was shifting and therefore changed his position to that of supporting an invasion. 3. Soviet military leaders may have pressured the Politburo on grounds of the security of the USSR. 4. The Kremlin may have decided that Dubcek either could not or would not carry out agreements reached earlier. We do not know of any secret agreement reached in Moscow with Dubcek. Nor do we know whether Dubcek can carry out the terms of the agreement reached with the Russians. It is very clear that the Russians totally misjudged the reaction of the Czech people to the invasion of their country by Warsaw Pact troops. The Soviets are unlikely to invade Romania. There is no current threat to the Communist system in Romania. The situation is quite different from the threat to Soviet and Communist power which was rising in Czechoslovakia. [Here follow 8 pages of discussion of the impact of the Czech invasion on NATO and the war in Vietnam. The portion of the memorandum dealing with NATO is printed in volume XIII, Document 324.]
94. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/ Moscow, September 23, 1968, 1410Z. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-1 COMBLOC-CZECH. Secret. Repeated to USUN, USNATO, Paris, London, Bonn, Belgrade, Budapest, Prague, Sofia, Warsaw, and Bucharest. 5633. Ref: US NATO 4825./2/ /2/Telegram 4825 from USNATO, September 21, reported on the discussions at a special meeting of the NATO political advisers on events in Czechoslovakia. (Ibid.) 1. Soviet invasion Czechoslovakia was brutal act of aggression. NATO must of course take account of redeployment Soviet troops as well as indication of dominant hard line trend in Soviet Politburo. 2. However, I believe that Soviets regard their move against Czechoslovakia as defensive in sense that they were meeting what they considered a threat to the existing Communist order as well as a possible eventual defection of a bloc member. Their concentration on West Germany in their propaganda is natural as this is the only defense of their action which carries conviction with their own people and they doubtless consider that FRG's Eastern policy at least contributed to Czech developments. 3. I continue to believe that use of force against Romania or Yugoslavia most unlikely, although they will certainly keep up the pressure on both. 4. An important indicator of Soviet policy will be their decision on whether or not they decide to go ahead with world Communist meeting in November. Indefinite postponement is most likely, but if they proceed they will surely have to withdraw substantial number of their forces from Czechoslovakia before such meeting./3/ /3/International Communist "consultations" were held in Moscow December 2-6, 1969. 5. So far it does not appear that Czech leaders are willing or able to meet fully what Soviets appear to consider their minimum requirements. If this situation persists, uncertain whether Soviets will accept partial compliance or attempt to bring about change in Czech leadership and possibly cow opposition by wholesale arrests. Their commitment not to interfere in Czech internal affairs will not deter them if they decide a purge is their best course. Thompson
95. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Czechoslovakia/1/ Washington, September 25, 1968, 1440Z. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-1 COMBLOC-CZECH. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Batjer and cleared by Lisle, Leddy, and Moffat. Also sent to USUN. 244534. 1. Czech Ambassador Duda urgently requested and was given appointment with Secretary September 24. 2. Duda said, under instructions from his Government, he wished raise two matters in connection with international aspects of recent events in Czechoslovakia. A. UN Action--His Government has concluded from press reports and information transmitted by Czech UN Mission that US is giving thought to supporting discussions in UNGA on recent Czech events. There are indications that Czechoslovakia might even be put on agenda as separate item. His Government believes such action, whether discussion in general debate or item on agenda, would not help Czechoslovakia but would cause harm. Discussions have been held with other socialist countries involved and in opinion his Government there has been solution to difficulties. Therefore, raising this subject in UNGA would not only harm Czechoslovakia but all other countries. Czech Government is also of opinion that anything which would plunge world into cold war, such as debate of Czechoslovak issue in UN, should be avoided. Czech Government therefore requests that attempts to put Czech item on agenda or to discuss Czechoslovak events in UNGA be stopped. B. NPT--Duda prefaced his remarks on NPT by stating that US Congressional action on ratification of NPT is clearly an internal matter and Czechoslovak Government does not wish in any way to interfere in internal affairs of US. Because Czech Government has noticed that certain Members of Congress have asked for postponement of ratification because of developments in Czechoslovakia, it wishes to restate its position on NPT. Czechoslovak Government strongly supports NPT. This has been made clear in statements by leading Czechoslovak officials and by fact that, on instructions from President Svoboda which were approved by Government, he, Ambassador Duda, had signed NPT here in Washington. Czech Government's position on and support for NPT has been emphasized both in Geneva and New York. Duda concluded that, in his Government's view, there is no logical link between Czechoslovak events and NPT. 3. UN Action--Secretary responded that he would note Ambassador's statement on behalf of Czechoslovak Government with regard to raising Czechoslovak events in UN. His statement would be taken into account in developing our judgment on how best to handle problem in UNGA. There was, however, no possibility that General Assembly would remain silent on this issue whether it appears as item on agenda or is given major attention in general debate. It will be discussed for following reasons: A. Sympathy in most parts of world is with Czechoslovak people and there is no way of preventing discussion of Czech developments despite previous differences which may have existed between Czech Government and other governments. B. Our judgment will be based on our national interests. We have a national interest in rights guaranteed under UN Charter as they pertain to member countries. We are deeply concerned about world order. If Charter rights of member countries are not observed, structure of world order will be disrupted. This could lead to a nuclear war. Our national interests are based on peace and right of all countries to develop in their own way and have this right respected. There are about 120 smaller countries and four to five great powers. With this combination it is easy to see what could happen if rights of all guaranteed under UN Charter are not observed. The guarantees of UN Charter are vital to US national interest. C. As member of NATO our national interests are also involved for security reasons. There are now several hundreds of thousands of Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia, including Soviet forces along the frontier with West Germany. The Soviet intentions are not clear, and what is prudence in this situation? What are the capabilities? All these questions must be considered in addition to Czech Government's position. D. Peaceful coexistence among socialist countries also concerns our national interests, particularly when this involves judgments which are being made in Moscow. These judgments concern the whole world. Similar action such as that taken in Czechoslovakia could happen elsewhere. World opinion must try to have an influence on these decisions. Nations must make their positions clear so there are no miscalculations on part of any nation. US takes these matters seriously but has no interest in returning to cold war period. We have deep interest in peace, in standards of conduct among nations, and how military forces are deployed. E. Secretary concluded his comments on UN situation by repeating that views of Czechoslovak Government would be taken into account when formulating our position with regard to discussions in UNGA. 5./2/ NPT--Secretary stated NPT is of major importance to USG. He observed that one nation with nuclear power is too many; five, many times too many; and 20, beyond the comprehension of modern man. NPT is not a bilateral matter between US and Soviet Union. These two nations are not customers for nuclear arms. If there were no Soviet Union, USG would still be for NPT. These are views of President and Secretary. Both have made their views clear to Congress. If someone had been seeking way to sabotage NPT, no better way could have been found than to move Soviet troops into Czechoslovakia. This is connection between NPT and events in Czechoslovakia. Prior to these events, six or perhaps eight Members of Congress would have been against NPT. Now there are strong feelings with regard to events in Eastern Europe. American public is indignant and shocked and one way of expressing this indignation is by using NPT as a target. Secretary then asked Duda to inform his Government that President and Secretary are in favor of NPT and are working for its ratification but recent events in Eastern Europe have created obstacles to its ratification. /2/There is no numbered paragraph 4. 6. Duda thanked Secretary for his remarks and said that if Czechoslovakia is to preserve any of gains made after January an atmosphere of peace is absolutely necessary. 7. When Secretary privately asked Duda if the reason he had stressed that his Government did not wish to interfere in internal affairs of US during this election period was because Czechoslovak leadership in fact would prefer to see ratification of NPT put off, Ambassador Duda replied Czechoslovak Government meant exactly what it said. He added Secretary should not try to read between the lines. Rusk
96. Telegram From the Embassy in Czechoslovakia to the Department of State/1/ Prague, October 26, 1968, 1130Z. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CZECH. Confidential. Repeated to Bonn, Budapest, Bucharest, Moscow, Munich, Sofia, and Warsaw. 4037. 1. Prevailing atmosphere here and apparently throughout country is one of unrelieved gloom which 50th anniversary celebrations unlikely to dissipate. 2. Cause is not so much current effect of Soviet intervention which until now has not greatly disturbed everyday life but what Soviets have done to break nation's spirit. Hitherto irrepressible film producers who fared well even under Novotny view future with foreboding. Communist member South Bohemian National Council privately predicted that even though situation unlikely to return to pre-January conditions, necessary will is lacking to tackle problems calling for immediate action. 3. On larger scale, problems include federalization which has brought out latent animosities, economic reform which under best of circumstances requires strong direction and sacrifice, and party reorganization where certain tendencies toward self-destruction fostered by Soviet interference seem especially manifest. While Soviets obviously bent on producing pliant party and government leadership, it gives one reason to wonder how they envisage country is to be run without provoking kind of deterioration which will eventually redound to their disadvantage. 4. Positive factor from our standpoint is that while leaders' statements have been cheerless and in varying degrees submissive, they still enjoy large degree of popular confidence with significant external Communist support and may continue to do so as long as they stick together. Furthermore resistance spirit is strong in many quarters and is capable of asserting itself in ingenious ways, short of being stopped by mass arrests. 5. Question is what we can do to offer encouragement. An anti-Russian campaign would revive drooping morale even though we realize the validity of other considerations. Point to keep in mind is that under new circumstances anything we say or do by way of encouragement in this context is not likely to complicate situation for regime or do it harm. 6. It seems to us that ending UNGA general debate/2/ we should try to find new ways to focus attention on Czechoslovakia, shifting emphasis to current blatant forms of Soviet intervention in internal affairs. Apart from non-justification of presence in Czechoslovakia of Soviet troops on basis of unequal treaty, Western spokesmen and media can play up continued presence troops above any agreed figure and outside of reserved areas. Type of gradual withdrawal of surplus troops presaged in Kosygin's statement at October 16 treaty signing is obvious intervention in domestic affairs, re-enacting on greater scale the delayed withdrawal of maneuver forces in June-July, and is completely unjustified in terms of Soviet and bloc security. Such surplus forces demonstrate that real mission of Soviet troops is political intervention. /2/At the request of the Czech Government, the question of the Soviet invasion was withdrawn from the Security Council agenda on August 27. Thereafter U.S. representatives used discussions on issues inscribed on the calendars of the General Assembly and its subcommittees to highlight Soviet aggression. Secretary Rusk condemned Soviet behavior in his October 2 address to the General Assembly. For text, see Department of State Bulletin, October 21, 1968, pp. 405-410. 7. Publicity can be given to recent activities of Soviet officers in participating in political meeting at which current leadership is criticized, attempting to interfere with schools, and detaining local and foreign citizens without authority. Firm US public statements on order of those during past six weeks on Eastern Europe, Berlin, US and NATO contingency defense planning would continue to stress broad issues, as would further indications that US ready to resume dialogue on world security issues when Soviets abandon acts and dogmas alien to world community of independent and diverse nations. Until such indications received, US stance toward Soviets politically and socially would still be rather distant although it could conceivably soften slightly toward certain Pact allies when they have removed all troops from Czechoslovakia. 8. On a government-to-government basis we owe the Czechs very little since they have only caused us trouble and do not wish to be liked by us. On the other hand we feel it is in our interest to keep alive the objectives which the reformists, although Communists, were seeking to achieve and which are bound historically to have lasting repercussions. Meanwhile, we should go on treating Czechoslovakia as independent country until proven otherwise, maintaining normal relations wherever possible and, in any event, continuing and hopefully strengthening contacts and exchanges of all kinds. Beam
97. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, November 15, 1968. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-1 COMBLOC-CZECH. Confidential. Drafted by Toon. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS I spoke briefly with Ambassador Duda at today's luncheon for Nat Davis, hosted by the Yugoslav Ambassador. I asked the Ambassador what his views were on the current situation in Czechoslovakia. He said he was not yet pessimistic. He felt that the recent student demonstrations/2/ were unfortunate because they had given rise to additional pressures on the Dubcek government to bring the populace into line. He hoped that such incidents would not recur since they could only cause serious problems for Dubcek and the survival of what he stands for. /2/Apparent reference to anti-Soviet demonstrations by students on October 28 and November 7 and a 3-day strike of students in early November. The Ambassador said that he hoped "the events of last summer" would not prove to be an obstacle in the process of diminishing tension between Washington and Moscow, which had been in train before the invasion. I told the Ambassador that certainly the Soviet behavior in Czechoslovakia had had an adverse effect on our relations with Moscow and, among other things, had delayed progress in working out agreements in areas of mutual interest. The Ambassador wondered if we contemplated an early start to the missile talks since he felt it was not in either our interest or the interest of the Czechoslovak people to delay them further because of our reaction to the events of last summer. I told the Ambassador that we did indeed consider the missile talks to be in our interest as well as in the interest of world peace and security and we would move on the talks at an appropriate time. We did not feel that the time was yet propitious. The Ambassador asked me about Mr. McNamara's visit to Moscow, and particularly about his conversation with Mr. Kosygin./3/ I briefed the Ambassador on the background of the visit, stressing that Mr. McNamara had stopped in Moscow for purely sightseeing purposes en route to Kabul on World Bank business. After his arrival, the Soviet Foreign Office had informed our Embassy that Mr. Kosygin would be prepared to see Mr. McNamara and, of course, Mr. McNamara readily agreed. There had been no pre-arrangement between ourselves and the Soviets for this appointment; it was completely at Soviet initiative. In response to the Ambassador's query, I confirmed that the subject of missile talks had been raised in the discussion. /3/A memorandum of McNamara's conversation with Kosygin is scheduled for publication in volume XIV. Ambassador Duda asked if Czechoslovakia had been mentioned, and I said that my recollection was that the subject of Czechoslovakia had not come up at all.
98. Telegram From the Embassy in Czechoslovakia to the Department of State/1/ Prague, November 18, 1968, 1630Z. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, FN 19 CZECH. Confidential; Limdis. Repeated to Brussels. 4235. Ref: State 272356./2/ Subject: Gold/Claims. /2/Telegram 272356, November 15, reported a Czech request to renew discussions on economic issues that remained outstanding between the two nations. (Ibid., E 4 CZECH-US) 1. At a reception November 14 CODEL Gore/Pell Ambassador Trhlik of FonMin proposed time had come "to exchange papers" on gold/claims, particularly since Czech May 2 note/3/ had not been answered by US. He said "Russians who are looking over our shoulder" had taxed Czechs with being remiss in not pressing for return of gold while at same time US was developing relations through increasing number of visits both ways. I replied Czechs need have no fear of inability to show they had more than defended their interests, and possibly to their detriment by refusing to consider a reasonable increase in payment of nationalization claims. /3/The note was transmitted as an attachment to airgram A-500 from Prague, May 3. (Ibid., FN 19) 2. Trhlik did not refer as did Pribyl to supposition that US was ready to offer proposal on August 21 but said he assumed gold/claims question had lost priority among matters receiving US attention. I said this was probably so because of transition taking place between US administrations. I pointed out this was occurring in orderly fashion whereas Czech Government itself seemed to be victim not only of transition but disruption brought about by outside forces. Trhlik then said he assumed that no action on US Government's part likely before at least early next year and I agreed this was a probability. 3. Jaromir Balcar, Stalinist Vice President of Czech Chamber of Commerce, told me Cyrus Eaton, Jr. had informed him that chances of MFN restoration now more favorable in view of US popular sympathy for Czechoslovakia and he asked me whether this was correct. I replied I strongly doubted validity of this assumption, saying that while our admiration and sympathy were undiminished, MFN was more likely to be tied politically to resolution of the Viet-Nam war in which Czechoslovakia had aided our enemies, but all of us should of course work for early peaceful conclusion. 4. Comment: Believe that on purely practical grounds Czechs should be strongly discouraged from pressing major econ-financial problems at this time although I would favor offering in due course new proposal along lines of that contemplated for presentation August 21, should local situation sort itself out in tolerable fashion. If only as debating point reference could in meantime be made on some occasion to ominous nature of Soviet interest described above./4/ /4/In telegram 291897 to Prague, December 24, the Department of State responded that the Soviet invasion had caused the United States to suspend a new proposal for settling the gold and claims issues and that the U.S. position would be considered again after the new year. (Ibid., FN 19 CZECH) Beam
99. Airgram From the Embassy in Czechoslovakia to the Department of State/1/ A-902 Prague, November 29, 1968. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CZECH-US. Confidential. Drafted by Beam. SUBJECT Despite its depressing progress the turnabout in Czechoslovakia has not yet come to a definitive conclusion and may still be susceptible to positive influence. Below are offered some tentative opinions and suggestions dealing in outline with some of the problems which may arise during the transition period through which both the US and Czechoslovak administrations are passing, each in its different way. The Present Scene The setting is provided in the story of what can and did go wrong in a unique attempt to reform a Communist system. The abuses of the 1950s and of the Novotny regime cried out for inevitable correction. Even the Soviets apparently recognized the more obvious inefficiencies and were prepared to admit change. When Novotny's control disintegrated about a year ago, pent up pressures and reactions broke loose which became more than the means of getting rid of a repugnant personality but grew rather into a movement with sweeping objectives. For this credit (or in any event, responsibility) goes to the media people, intelligentsia and some worker elements (almost all Communists) who first supported and then impelled the successor leadership on uncharted paths. The new leaders were composed of well-intentioned Party officials whose hands were relatively clean and many of whom had suffered from Stalinist excesses but who in part were inexperienced in national politics and not especially well versed in an understanding of power. A flowering of demands for reform of all kinds--economic, the rehabilitation of persons injured by the past, proposals for drastic federal reorganization--all added up to a burden which a strong stable leadership would have found it hard to carry out even if unmolested from the outside. In shorthand, the main components which challenged the Communist system--and no experiment has yet been permitted to show whether Communism can survive changes of this kind--were: (1) abolition of censorship; (2) almost unlimited freedom of travel abroad; (3) voting by secret ballot with some choice among candidates; (4) a measure of freedom of assembly and association; (5) a ceding of Party dominance to allow a form of parliamentary rule in which other groups could effectively join; and (6) a more tolerant view of East/West confrontations over Germany and the Middle East. An emphasis on human rights was a by-product of all these aims, giving larger meaning to the principle of rule by law. The short-lived Action Program, which was propagated by Communists who had no idea of abolishing total public ownership, was beginning to create a sense of participation, bringing the Party popular credit for the first time in decades. For whatever reasons the Soviets intervened--whether for fear of contagion in other countries or because they saw Czechoslovakia eventually slipping away from their strategic control--their brutal invasion compounded the shock of being deprived of a promised new way of life. The shape of politics remains unsettled, even after the last November 14-17 plenum. The Soviet-supported elements on the one hand seek to push reform back into the mold envisaged a year ago, namely that it should lead to a correction of abuses--largely economic--within an orthodox framework. (It is interesting that prominence is now being given to moderate administrators such as Strougal and Cernik who were mentioned as potential leaders at that time and who probably would have succeeded to Novotny's positions if the Slovak political revolt had not brought Dubcek to the top.) On the other hand the movement to fulfill the larger aspirations of giving Communism "a human and democratic face" still strongly survives. Even with Dubcek becoming more of a fading symbol, it remains a factor in the continuing political struggle. For the nearest future we are largely limited to efforts outside Czechoslovakia. Although unsolicited, our sympathy and continued concern can encourage the hard core of popular resistance without being provocative. This may be important in stiffening the backs of the leaders who probably have more to fear from direct Soviet bullying than from pressures by their conservative opposition, which is publicly discredited and acts chiefly in response to Soviet instigation. As the Soviets seek to bend the Czechs to their will, we should publicize instances of interference and repression of human rights. Even having been stifled, the Czechoslovak reform experiment will have an enduring effect on inter-Communist relationships and the Soviet world position. The manner of its repression has impaired Soviet standing to our advantage. With due consideration to specific matters of US-Czechoslovak interest, that advantage can best be pursued by keeping alive world concern over Soviet methods and by encouraging positive Czechoslovak internal forces. Bilateral Issues The timing for a reactivation of bilateral relations depends somewhat on the course of the internal political struggle but more importantly upon the establishment of the government which will emerge from this process and the effects of federalization. Both are unlikely to assume clearer form until early next year. In the area of foreign policy the Czechs may now be expected to follow an unswerving Soviet/Warsaw Five line, but given Czechoslovak minimal influence in foreign affairs, this is not of major consequence to us, except with respect to their aid to North Viet-Nam, which again may be a matter entirely of their own choice. Historically, US-Czech relations have been difficult since the war (nationalization of foreign property and Benes's Pan-Slavism were obstacles even before the Communist takeover). Czech officials describe current relations as poor and show little wish for improvement except in fields of unilateral advantage to them. Although contacts were easier during the period of high reform, the benefits to us were largely indirect since the attention of the leaders and their supporters remained focussed on internal affairs. A need for friends where they can be found these days has produced a moderation in anti-American polemics and a politer tone of discourse, but the regime retains its essentially Communist outlook towards the US. A complex of intractable economic/financial problems form the hard core of present difficulties, consisting mainly of the following elements: (1) Our refusal to return some $20 million of Nazi-looted monetary gold until a satisfactory settlement of US nationalization claims is reached. The gold, which is held tripartitely by the US, UK and France, cannot be set off directly against the claims but it is still our main bargaining counter. (2) The claims themselves amount to a US-adjudicated value of $72 million on which we are prepared to accept a $44 million payment. The matter is complicated by an $8 million loss sustained through the enforced sale by us to another country of a steel mill which the Czechs had purchased in the US and paid for in 1947. Another embarrassing circumstance for us is the fact we signed a paper in December 1961 recommending acceptance in principle of a settlement releasing the gold in return for a Czech payment of $11-12 million on claims. (3) Restoration of most-favored-nation treatment which was justifiably withdrawn from Czechoslovakia under 1951 conditions is now a sore point with the Czechs who denounce their exclusion as a discriminatory act. MFN is of course tied up with future East/West trade policy but its restoration to Czechoslovakia either separately or in conjunction with its extension to certain other Eastern European countries would seem necessary to enable the Czechs ultimately to pay for a claims settlement of the order we now insist upon. It will be recalled that just prior to the August invasion, US government approval had been obtained for a proposal whereby the Czechs would receive the gold upon payment of an installment on claims and would remit the balance up to an agreed total figure of $44 million in further annual installments following the restoration of MFN. Realistically the Czechs are probably as aware as we of the difficulty we would face in offering MFN before a resolution of Viet-Nam, but a formula of the kind previously approved (possibly leaving the final claims total to be determined when MFN is negotiated) would permit a reopening of discussions on an equitable basis which in turn would remove a major obstacle to even tolerable official relations. As regards other issues and projects affecting Czechoslovakia, their character can be identified by mention in the list of recommendations below. Their general purpose is to establish and maximize US influence within the limits posed by the fact Czechoslovakia is a Communist state now subject to a greater degree of Soviet control. In keeping with the approach suggested in this message, priority is given to political acts or gestures which might help preserve reformist gains, with other steps to be taken conjointly or to follow appropriately as conditions evolve. Recommendations (1) That the US maintain an active watching brief, indicating through opportune public statements and use of all media resources that we are closely following events in and affecting Czechoslovakia, especially signs of further Soviet interference and a curtailment of the benefits originally promised in the spring Action Program. News of the type now fully covered by the Western press is doubly effective when played back to Czechoslovakia, both in putting the Soviets on the defensive and also in stimulating popular pressure upon the leaders here to resist. Meanwhile we should continue to treat Czechoslovakia as a sovereign state until proven otherwise by nullifying Soviet actions. (2) That we proceed with exchange programs, showing our willingness to maintain and expand programs in which there is mutual interest. While two-way exchanges do not resolve basic problems they have helped create a better atmosphere, even though such is not acknowledged by Czech officials. (3) That we let it be known we will continue existing channels and modalities of trade under recently suggested more liberal export licensing procedures. Items with a critical interest can be scrutinized more closely, and in borderline cases assurances can be demanded that products are intended solely for non-military use and not for re-export. (4) That barring incidents and local disturbances before next spring, we then cease discouraging private travel, in order not to penalize the local tourist industry in which some US firms also have an interest. (5) That we proceed with the plan for the payment of US social security benefits, this being a decision which it would be difficult to withdraw. At the same time we should not be reluctant to urge that this step, whereby the Czechs will profit from some $5 million in back payments and about $400,000 in continuing annual payments, entitles us to favorable consideration for the settlement of some of our outstanding accounts. (6) That when the Czechoslovak federalized government takes shape in the spring, we consider presenting a gold/claims proposal along the lines of that approved in August. It should be amply clear to the US parties that they have small prospect of receiving final satisfaction of their claims until MFN is restored to Czechoslovakia, and in turn the Czechs should know that this event is unlikely to take place until Viet-Nam is no longer an issue. As for the return of the monetary gold, it would not be out of place to assure ourselves it would return to Czech and not Soviet custody. (7) That with the elevation of Slovakia to a federal state, we plan to reopen our consulate in Bratislava in the course of next year on a reciprocal basis permitting Czechoslovakia a consulate in the US. (8) Finally, we should, in New York as well as in Prague and Washington, encourage this regime, so long as it includes individuals who in any significant degree represent the aspirations of the Czechoslovak people, to develop a discreet dialogue with us. In retrospect one of the Dubcek regime's more significant oversights may have been the apparent lack of an "American policy" (except of course to seek return of the gold). Naively believing that failure to cultivate the US would reassure the Russians, Prague did not attempt a "Romanian gambit" (i.e., giving an impression of friendly ties with the US), and thus perhaps contributed to Moscow's assumption that mutual disinterest existed between Prague and Washington. To the extent the Czechoslovaks now or later attempt to remedy their lack of private dialogue with us, we should lend sympathetic and, when appropriate, high level ears. Department please pass as desired. Beam [Continue with the next documents] Volume XVII Index | Foreign Relations Online | Historian's Office | |