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 | FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968 Volume XVII Eastern Europe Department of State |
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| 86. Memorandum From the Department of State Executive Secretary (Read) to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow)/1/ Washington, August 23, 1968. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-1 COMBLOC-CZECH. Secret. Drafted by Myerson and cleared by Leddy. SUBJECT After careful review, we have concluded that our present course of mobilizing world opinion through the United Nations offers the best hope at this time of influencing the Soviets toward moderation in the present crisis. We are in close touch with all the allies through the North Atlantic Council and consultations on the crisis are continuing. In the Department's view, however, an initiative for a NATO Heads of Government meeting, or any dramatic action in NATO, would be inadvisable at present for the following reasons: 1. It would divert the world's attention from the UN effort without, in all probability, producing any concrete action that would cause the Soviets to modify their present course. 2. It would tend to place the Soviet invasion in a cold war context, lessening the moral impact on the non-aligned and dissident communist nations. 3. The Soviets might even gain a propaganda advantage since they have sought to conjure up a NATO and German plot against Czechoslovakia. 4. Most of the allies favor the UN approach, and some at least would be most reluctant to participate in a NATO Heads of Government meeting. Similar reasons militate against a Tripartite (US, UK, France) or Quadripartite Heads of Government meeting at this time. The French Foreign Minister told Ambassador Shriver on August 21 of his opposition to "formal consultations" between the US, the UK and France, since these could only result in a "meaningless declaration" which would be useless. There are even more cogent reasons why a top-level meeting including the FRG would be inadvisable at this time. These include the fact that, historically, the Germans are viewed by many of the Eastern Europeans, including the Czechs, with suspicion. We consider it important, nevertheless, that while the public spotlight remains focused on New York, the US take action with the allies to demonstrate its leadership in regard to the Czech crisis. We think the best approach would be for the President to send personal messages to Heads of Government of all other NATO countries. We shall be submitting a recommended text for such messages covering a number of points in our current position on the crisis. Such messages would also emphasize the importance of NATO and allied consultations in the present situation. Secretary Rusk concurs with this memorandum. There is enclosed a paper analyzing these questions in more detail./2/ /2/The enclosure, a paper entitled "Courses of Action in the Czechoslovak Crisis," is not printed. BHR
87. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, August 23, 1968. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-1 COMBLOC-CZECH. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Thompson. A notation on the source text reads: "SecDef has seen." SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS The Secretary said he had asked the Ambassador to come in for a very informal chat about current problems. He began by referring to his talk with the Ambassador early in the week on developments in Czechoslovakia./2/ The Secretary said that he came from Georgia and was sometimes referred to as soft spoken in manner. He wondered whether the Ambassador had in any way been misled by the manner in which he had discussed the Czechoslovakia problem, and whether the Ambassador had fully understood the significance of what the Secretary had told him about reaction in this country and the possible effect of Czechoslovakia developments on Soviet-American relations. /2/See Document 82. The Ambassador said he had fully understood the Secretary's remarks. He said that the decision which his Government had made was obviously not an easy one. The reaction in the United States and for that matter in certain Communist parties had been clearly predictable. He had personally thought that a solution to the Czech problem had been found, but something must have happened to change the situation. In speculating on what this might be the Secretary referred to Herr Ulbricht's visit to Czechoslovakia./3/ Dobrynin said that Soviet policy was not determined by Herr Ulbricht or anyone else. East Germany was of course an important member of the Warsaw Pact, but the Soviets knew how to say no to Herr Ulbricht. Later in the conversation Ambassador Thompson speculated on the role of the Czechoslovakia press in effecting the Soviet reaction, and Ambassador Dobrynin acknowledged that this was certainly a factor. Ambassador Dobrynin said that his counselor had returned from Moscow last weekend, and had told him that most of the Soviet leaders were on vacation. Dobrynin had been on the verge of asking permission to accompany his wife and daughter when they return to the Soviet Union next Tuesday. He indicated he had received word of the change in Soviet policy only a short time before he had informed the President about it. /3/Ulbricht met with Dubcek at Karlovy Vary, Czechoslovakia, on August 12. When the Secretary indicated that he had been surprised by the Soviet action, Dobrynin attempted to justify it largely on the basis of internal developments in Czechoslovakia. The Secretary said that we had seen no indications that Czechoslovakia intended to leave the Warsaw Pact or conduct itself in any way other than as a member of the socialist camp. Dobrynin said that in his view it had become clear that Dubcek was a weak leader who was allowing things to drift, and that in these circumstances the right was steadily gaining influence, and the Soviets thought that Dubcek was losing control of the situation. These developments were leading in the direction of a situation in which Czechoslovakia would no longer be a member of the Warsaw Pact. Dobrynin emphasized that the Czech economic reforms had nothing to do with the case as the Soviets considered that this was a matter for them alone to decide. When the Secretary again referred to the possible effect of recent developments on Soviet-American relations, Dobrynin said that he could tell the Secretary that he had received instructions to say, in case the subject were raised, that the Soviet Union desired to continue to make progress upon the bilateral questions with which they had been dealing before the recent Czech events. He referred specifically to the peaceful uses of atomic energy and the strategic missile problem. He understood that it would probably be impossible for the United States to proceed immediately in these matters while the international situation was still so unclear. Without wishing to press the Secretary he wondered whether as a matter of policy, unrelated to timing, the United States would also wish to proceed to deal with these problems. The Secretary said that his reply would have to consist of two statements. The first was that from the beginning of his administration the President was profoundly and passionately interested in advancing the cause of peace and in promoting better relations and better understanding between our two countries. We of course had differences, and some of these would remain but in this atomic age the President considered it essential to do everything he could to diminish dangers of conflict. The Secretary mentioned that the President had today met with the Congressional leadership. Many of these men had been scattered about the country, and their reactions reflected the serious impression which the Czech developments had had on the American people. It appeared that the President would be subject to strong criticism for his efforts in building better relations with the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, he could assure the Ambassador of the President's deep commitment to the cause of peace. The second part of his answer was that at the present stage he simply could not say what the policy of the United States would be upon the problems under discussion with the Soviet Union. The Secretary expressed the hope that President Svoboda's visit to Moscow would be successful./4/ Dobrynin said that Svoboda would stay on until the next day when he would return to Czechoslovakia. The Secretary raised the question of the safety of the Czech leaders,/5/ and Dobrynin said that while of course he had no specific information, he was convinced that no harm would come to Dubcek or the other Czech personalities. In this connection the Secretary referred to the Czech radio broadcast commenting on the composition of the Czech delegation that had gone to Moscow. /4/Svoboda visited Moscow August 23-27. /5/Dubcek, Prime Minister Cernik, and three other Czech leaders were seized and flown to Moscow during the invasion. The Secretary mentioned that the President had gone to the Ranch. We had received in the last few hours a number of alarming rumors about a possible Soviet invasion of Romania. The Secretary emphasized that these rumors had not come to us from the Romanians. The Ambassador would surely be aware of what the effect such action would have upon the United States opinion coming on top of the recent Soviet action in Czechoslovakia. The Secretary expected the President to telephone him as soon as he arrived at the Ranch and received these reports, and the Secretary did not know what he should reply. He asked whether Dobrynin had any information on this subject. Dobrynin said he had neither seen nor heard any indication whatever of any contemplated Soviet action against Romania, and did not believe that there was anything to these rumors. On the contrary, he referred to the warm greetings which the Soviet leadership had sent to the Romanian leaders on the occasion of their National holiday./6/ /6/August 23. The Secretary concluded the conversation by stating that he did not contemplate informing the press of Ambassador Dobrynin's visit. Additional Points Covered in Secretary's Conversation with Ambassador Dobrynin, August 23, 1968 The Secretary referred to the statement Ambassador Dobrynin had made to President Johnson when informing him of Soviet action in Czechoslovakia to the effect that nothing was contemplated which would affect the vital interest of the United States. The Secretary said we had noted this statement very carefully and assumed that it was meant to be taken quite seriously. Ambassador Dobrynin confirmed that this was indeed the case. Ambassador Thompson asked Dobrynin how long he thought the jamming of our broadcasts would go on. Dobrynin said he thought the jamming quite probably was related to the debates in the Security Council and mentioned that Ambassador Ball had used some very strong language. In discussing the Soviet action in Czechoslovakia, Ambassador Dobrynin said the Soviet troops had obviously had strict orders not to respond to provocations until absolutely necessary. He mentioned one incident in which some Czechs had deliberately crashed an automobile into a Soviet tank and then had taken pictures of it.
88. Telegram From the Embassy in Czechoslovakia to the Department of State/1/ Prague, August 24, 1968, 1600Z. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-1 COMBLOC-CZECH. Confidential; Immediate. Repeated to Bonn, London, Paris, Moscow, Munich, USNATO, and USUN. 3163. Subj: Czechoslovak situation. 1. As occupation goes into fourth day, following is situation as viewed from here. 2. This is bizarre kind of occupation. Although occupying forces have taken over key points they have not established martial law (except in some provincial cities), have not imposed military government, and have not yet installed puppet government. Legally constituted government claims to be still in being: 22 out of about 30 Ministers attended Cabinet meeting yesterday, apparently in Hradcany Castle. National Assembly claims to be in continuing session in its own building. Communist Party organs not only continuing to operate but managed to convene Party Congress under noses of occupying forces despite fact that Congress severely complicates Soviets' problems in installing compliant regime./2/ Several district and regional committees have announced they will respect new CC elected by Congress. /2/The August 22 meeting called by the Prague Party Committee reaffirmed loyalty to Dubcek and the other captured leaders and organized a 1-hour general protest strike on August 23. 3. Much credit for remarkable cohesion of Czechoslovaks in present situation must go to brave and competent individuals manning numerous radio stations, many of which seem to have at least nine lives. Hazards and operational difficulties, including jamming, continuing to increase, but at least nine transmitters, including two in Prague and two in Slovakia, could be heard at various times last night. Press has also performed well, publishing numerous special editions (presumably under highly adverse circumstances) which are handed out on street corners. 4. Population in Prague has conducted itself very well. Nonacceptance of occupation has been demonstrated in unmistakable and in some cases ingenious ways. Downtown area was almost completely plastered with placards yesterday (many have disappeared this morning, either as result of rain or clean-up by Soviets during curfew). Last night we saw new neon sign in bright light district which read simply "Dubcek." On advice radio stations which anticipating [garble] street signs and house numbers have completely disappeared in some districts of city. Actions of population and slogans (including many which equate Soviets with Fascists) are highly provocative, but with few exceptions people have been able to avoid provoking extreme reaction by occupiers. Widespread calls for neutrality represents wishful thinking which could embarrass reformist leaders seeking realistic solution. Cancellation of mass demonstration late Thursday afternoon with enforcement by young Czechs is best example of self-discipline practiced by population. Silent clearing of streets during general strike at noon yesterday also impressive. 5. Public transportation in Prague is reduced and few private cars are in circulation, probably because of gasoline unavailability (gas stations no longer operating). Most shops remained closed through yesterday but are beginning to open this morning. Prague factories were open yesterday but did not seem to be working. Food still available in limited supplies, for which long queues wait, but we have seen little evidence of obvious hoarding. 6. Scene [Serene?] attitude of Soviets perplexing in many respects. Except for resistance and firing first day in vicinity Prague Radio building (Embtel 3054)/3/ they have not used much muscle and sporadic apparently aimless firing may primarily be intended as reminder of military presence. At beginning Prague populace inclined to talk to soldiers asking them why they were here but this has stopped and silent contempt treatment may be making troops edgy. /3/Telegram 3054, August 21, summarized Prague radio reports on the Czech situation. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-1 COMBLOC-CZECH) 7. Czechoslovakia presents remarkable demonstration of a country running itself without an effective central government. Main direction so far being provided by strong party elements controlling clandestine radios. Interesting Soviets have not used their own means of issuing proclamations and their decisions, which have to be heeded, such as curfew, are carried on resistance radios. In some other cities, notably Pilzen which has been observed, accommodations of mutual non-interference have been worked out between commanders and local party chiefs. Lacking a Quisling administration Soviets were obviously unprepared to take over the country and had not called forward conventional instruments of occupation such as a pervasive secret police and military government commands. 8. All of this, reinforced by calm determined attitude of population and avoidance of anti-Soviet excesses, places Czech reformist (and non resistance) Communists in stronger political position than could have been expected under occupation conditions. This is apparently their belief, at any rate, and widespread belief many Czechoslovaks. If "new government" just announced by TASS does not reflect overwhelming popular strength of reformists it will have difficulty establishing its authority without continued Soviet military presence. Beam
89. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, August 27, 1968. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-1 COMBLOC-CZECH. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Thompson and approved in S/S on August 28. The meeting was held at the Soviet Embassy. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS I had lunch today with Ambassador Dobrynin pursuant to an invitation which he had issued last Friday. In the course of the conversation, I said I was still baffled by what had triggered the Soviet decision to invade. He said he was also curious but doubted if he would find out until the next time he was in Moscow. I said that it was clear that there had been a Politburo meeting on the weekend but there was some doubt as to whether there had actually been a meeting of the Central Committee. He replied that it was quite clear that it had been and that a decision of this sort would require such a meeting. I said that I assumed that some of the members would not have been able to get there on time, and he replied that obviously the people on the other side of the country had been unable to be present. When I remarked that I thought that their military had carried out their side of the operation more effectively than the political side, he said, "You better not say that around Moscow." When I inquired how he would interpret the word, "temporarily," with respect to the length of stay of the Soviet troops, he replied that he thought this would depend entirely upon how successful the Czechs were in carrying out the agreement. The Soviets would obviously like to make this period as short as possible. He stated that he thought the basic problem was the Soviet concern that the Communist party was losing control and mentioned in passing the type of thing that was appearing in the Czech press as well as the activities of non-Communist party groups. I said that speaking frankly and personally there seemed to have been a serious misjudgment of the situation. He referred to the fact that the Soviets under Stalin had suffered much more than the Czechs ever had from the cult of personality but that the recent outcry in Czechoslovakia had been quite different from the reaction in the Soviet Union after the denunciation of Stalin. The Czechs were beginning to blame everything that had happened on the Communist party and to say that there had been nothing good accomplished. I pointed out that there was an element of nationalism involved in the case of Czechoslovakia that was absent in the case of the Soviet Union. He admitted that this was true.
90. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization/1/ Washington, August 31, 1968, 1552Z. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-1 COMBLOC-CZECH. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Drafted by Leddy and Thompson and approved by Rusk. Also sent to London, Paris, Bonn, Rome, Brussels, The Hague, and Ottawa and repeated to USUN, Bucharest, Moscow, Prague, and Belgrade. 231337. 1. Following is substance of Secretary's conversation with Soviet Amb. Dobrynin at which latter gave "oral statement" transmitted State 231323./2/ /2/Dated August 31. (Ibid.) The statement was a defense of Soviet conduct in invading Czechoslovakia. A copy is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Walt Rostow Files, Czech 1968. The text of the statement was transmitted to the President in Texas in telegram CAP 82309, August 30, 10:41 p.m. (Ibid., Rusk/Dobrynin) For a memorandum of this conversation, which was held at 9 p.m. on August 30, see Document 165. 2. For Action Addressees you may provide senior local official with text of oral statement and substance this message orally. Begin report. Secretary noted that Ambassador had asked to see him August 31 and inquired whether or not he could take up now the matter for which he had asked for an appointment. Ambassador looked somewhat surprised but said that he had been instructed to make an oral communication. He said he had been instructed to see either the President or the Secretary. When the Ambassador had finished his oral statement, the Secretary reminded him that at their last meeting he had referred to disturbing reports in regard to Romania./3/ /3/See Document 87. The Ambassador said he had reported his conversation but had received no reply. The Secretary said that we continue to get reports that were disturbing and that in the last 24 hours we had received a number of reports of troop movements, incidents on the frontier, etc. He asked whether the Ambassador had any basis on which he could give him assurances that action against Romania was not intended. Dobrynin said he had no official information but that he personally doubted that any such action was contemplated. The Secretary said that if such action were contemplated, he wished in the name of all humanity to ask that it not be done. The results of such action on world affairs would be incalculable. Dobrynin inquired if the Romanians felt the same way. The Secretary said we had no reports whatever from the Romanians. He wished, however, to underline the gravity of this problem. We were deeply concerned. Our attitude was based upon well-known principles that had motivated us throughout our history. Our attitude on Czechoslovakia was not related to our bilateral relations with that country which were not particularly good. We believed, however, that every country, large or small, had a right to national existence. We respect that among our NATO allies and we thought the Soviets should respect it among their Warsaw Pact allies. We cannot understand how the state interests of the Soviet Union were involved in any way that would justify military action. Czechoslovakia was not going to leave the Warsaw Pact or join NATO and no one was threatening them. The Secretary said he wished again to underline the seriousness with which we took the Ambassador's statement to the President on Aug. 20, and repeated today, that the Soviet Union did not intend in any way to threaten the state interests of the US. He wished to point out that among these interests was Berlin. Frankly, we did not trust Ulbricht. We wished to emphasize the gravity of any move with respect to Berlin in the current situation. He also wished to point out that the thoughts he had expressed carried the authority of the President with whom he had just talked by telephone./4/ The Secretary said he would be available any time, day or night, if the Ambassador had anything to say to him. /4/No record of this telephone conversation was found. Dobrynin asked if he could report that he had made his oral statement and that the Secretary would study it and comment later. The Secretary agreed but said he could say now with respect to the reference in the statement to revanchist and imperialist threats to socialist countries that there was no such threat, no CIA plot, there was no intrusion into any of these countries in a manner hostile to the Soviet Union. We could not accept a statement that revanchists or imperialists were carrying out any threat to any of these countries. End report./5/ /5/Dobrynin and Rusk met again on August 31; see Document 167. Rusk
91. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson, in Texas/1/ Washington, August 31, 1968, 1801Z. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 92. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. CAP 82323. Herewith a draft letter to Kosygin as cleared by Sec. Rusk and Sec. Clifford. Sec Rusk was comfortable with this draft. He wondered out loud whether it might be delayed, especially since Thompson and Bohlen are in Maryland two hours away and he would have preferred their going over it. I said the only urgency I could perceive was: --a quick follow-up to your speech/2/ and his talk with Dobrynin last night,/3/ and /2/For text of President Johnson's August 30 speech to the Milk Producers annual convention at San Antonio, Texas, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968-69, Book II, pp. 917-920. /3/See Document 90. --the possibility that if anything were to happen in Rumania, it might happen in the week beginning September 2. I would suggest that, for the record, you proceed with this letter which sends a clear message without making matters worse between US and the Soviet Union. But I would also suggest you might wish to chat with Sec. Rusk when you have considered the text. Dear Mr. Chairman: In the spirit of our frank and friendly talks at Glassboro, I wish to underline what Secretary Rusk said to Ambassador Dobrynin last night and what I said at San Antonio. The concept we explored at Glassboro was one in which the United States and the Soviet Union carefully avoided pressing against each other's vital interests; avoided being drawn into conflict by others; worked towards the maximum number of bilateral agreements judged by each nation to be in its interest and the common interest; and constructed agreements--bilateral or working with others--which would reduce the possibilities of conflict and danger on the world scene. Looking back over the year after Glassboro, I believe we had reason to feel we were making some progress. But the application of Soviet military power in Czechoslovakia and the reports we are receiving of further military movements in Eastern Europe are sources of deep disquiet. No evidence has come to me which suggests that events in Czechoslovakia or elsewhere in Eastern Europe have in any way constituted a security threat to the Soviet Union. On this matter, the policy of the United States and of our NATO allies has, moreover, been clear: We ourselves have no desire or intention of taking any action in Eastern Europe which might threaten the security of the Soviet Union. On the contrary, we have been working towards the possibility that NATO and the Warsaw Pact might negotiate mutual troop withdrawals or reductions and gradually ameliorate the confrontation in Central Europe and open the way towards stable peace in that critical area. Therefore, I deeply believe what I said last night: I see no issues that we confront or that the Soviet Union confronts which cannot be better settled by patient negotiation than by the application of military power. I hold that view with respect to Southeast Asia and the Middle East as well as Europe. It is against that background that I wish to tell you of the depth of the concern felt in our government and by our people about events in Eastern Europe. Twice in your lifetime and mine world war has come upon us, triggered by events in Eastern Europe. In 1914 this happened without anyone really intending it to happen. The forces that are set in motion when military power is applied are sometimes extremely hard to control and may lead humanity down paths which no man and no government intends. At this moment, therefore, I urge you and your colleagues to pause and consider whether we might not turn back towards the path we explored at Glassboro. What has already happened in Czechoslovakia has made this more difficult. But I would hope that the Soviet Union and the other nations which joined in bringing their forces into Czechoslovakia, will promptly find it possible to withdraw them, as Ambassador Dobrynin's oral message to me of August 20 indicated would happen./4/ As Secretary Rusk emphasized to Ambassador Dobrynin, I would hope that your government would hold its hand, if it is the case that a military movement is contemplated against Rumania or any other country in Eastern Europe. /4/See Document 80. I would also hope that there is no misunderstanding in Moscow or elsewhere about our election processes and debates in the United States. I know that sometimes they can convey to others a wrong impression of division and distraction. But there is, I know, a deep and united sentiment in the United States against the movement of arms and men across international frontiers. I send you this message because the peace of the world depends peculiarly on the policies of the United States and the USSR. The facts of life are such that this responsibility is imposed on both of us. This responsibility requires that we be in frank and frequent contact on matters affecting the peace of the world./5/ /5/There is no evidence the letter was sent.
92. Paper Prepared in the Department of State/1/ Washington, undated. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-1 COMBLOC-CZECH. Secret. The source text bears no drafting information, but in a September 3 memorandum to Bromley Smith of the NSC Staff, accompanying the source text, John P. Walsh, Acting Executive Secretary, noted that Rusk had approved the paper for submission to the September 4 meeting of the National Security Council. NSC PAPER THE UNITED STATES, EUROPE, AND THE I. Introduction The Czechoslovak crisis has raised grave issues for the United States and its Western European allies. It has cast into question such matters as the future of détente, the defensive capability of Western Europe, and the future of Communism and the independent states of Eastern Europe. The purpose of this paper is to examine the issues and the current and prospective means for meeting these problems by the United States and its allies. II. Détente The August 20-21 occupation of Czechoslovakia by the Warsaw Pact provided a cold douche for the future of détente, or the progressive rapprochement of East and West. In the late Sixties, the achievement of détente had become an important objective in the policies of most Western European nations as well as the United States. It had become a key element in the work program of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. But its assumed basis was seriously undermined by the Czechoslovak crisis. Most Western nations have reacted with strong expressions of disgust at, and disapproval of, the Warsaw Pact occupation of independent Czechoslovakia. There was almost universal support for the United Nations consideration of this problem and approbation for the resolution supported by the majority in the Security Council./2/ /2/For text of the draft resolution submitted by the United States and seven other nations to the Security Council, August 22, U.N. doc. S/8767, see Department of State Bulletin, September 9, 1968, p. 274. The Soviet Union vetoed the resolution on August 23. To give further meaning to their disapproval, most Western nations undertook to limit contacts with the Soviets and the occupying powers of the Warsaw Pact, and cancelled plans or proposed visits in the political and cultural fields. As the repression of Czechoslovakia continues, with the possibility of the installation of a de facto occupation regime, the deterioration of East-West contacts may well continue. These relatively limited actions do not necessarily preclude the possibility of return in due course to the pursuit of détente. The present disposition of many European nations is to avoid actions which might impair the eventual resumption of closer relations with the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe. The positions of the United Kingdom and the Government of France on this score are particularly apparent. US actions have so far generally paralleled those of its Western European allies. For the time being we are seeking a balanced approach that will satisfy the immediate objective of expressing censure of Soviet action without destroying overnight our longer-range goals. In the cultural field we propose the following criteria: a. Cancel or postpone highly visible exchanges susceptible to being interpreted as evidence of goodwill or friendship toward the invading powers. (For example, the trip of the Minnesota Band to Russia.) b. We do not propose disrupting low-visibility exchanges already in progress. (For example, graduate students, individual scientists and researchers already on study tours.) But we should discourage new initiatives. c. We should avoid across-the-board restrictive measures, such as indiscriminate restrictions on travel that could be construed as a return to the cold war. d. We should maintain exchange activities with Czechoslovakia to the extent possible, and with the still-independent state of Romania. In Czechoslovakia, for instance, we should participate in the Trade Fair at Brno if the Czechoslovak Government decides to hold it. In the political and economic fields similar criteria should prevail. We are considering cancelling or discouraging activities such as the second inaugural flight of Aeroflot. We might continue certain scientific and technical activities which are of special interest to us, such as oceanographic research and the renegotiation of the US-USSR Atlantic Fisheries Agreement. In the area of peace and security, important decisions will need to be taken. For example, should we agree to open missile talks at any definite early date. Similar decisions involve US participation in the solar eclipse experimentation in the USSR, US-USSR discussions on peaceful nuclear devices, etc. In the economic area we should discourage the development of new commercial activities with the aggressor states, and we are considering a curtailment of export licenses. III. The Defense of Western Europe The movement of Warsaw Pact forces into Czechoslovakia and the continuing occupation of that country has obviously affected the military situation in Europe. The status quo has been changed. There are larger military forces present in Central Europe than at any time since the post-war period. The military occupation of Czechoslovakia puts Soviet forces in a country where they have not been since World War II. There is no assurance as yet that the Warsaw Pact forces will soon return to their deployment where they existed six weeks ago. The changed East-West military situation in Europe is of significance to the security of the United States and its allies. In the light of these developments we are reviewing with our allies what the implications may be for existing arrangements to provide for our common security. The principal forum for this review will be NATO. Since the onset of the Czech crisis, the NATO posture has combined three essential elements: (a) vigilance by the NATO political and military authorities; (b) a low public profile while the spotlight was on the United Nations; and (c) intensified consultations among the Allies regarding implications of the situation for Western security interests. As a result of NATO consultations a number of issues require consideration. These are outlined below. A. Proposals for high-level NATO meetings Following a period of speculation and trial balloons--including Kiesinger's public mention of a Heads of Government meeting/3/--the British on August 30 took the initiative. They have sought our views on two alternative proposals. Both take account of the fact that Defense Ministers of seven NATO countries are already scheduled to meet in Bonn, October 10-11, as the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG). /3/Apparently a reference to Kiesinger's August 25 call for a NATO summit on Czechoslovakia. The first alternative envisages postponing the NPG until the end of October or early November, advancing the date of the usual year-end NATO meeting to the end of October or early November, and holding both sessions in Brussels. The result would be a stock-taking meeting of Foreign and Defense Ministers to consider defense and political matters arising from the crisis. Like the normal December meeting, fourteen countries would meet to examine defense issues while the French would join them later to examine political problems. In the course of the three (or four) day session, the seven-nation NPG would meet for a day. The second alternative involves simply broadening the presently scheduled (October) NPG meeting to include all Defense Ministers (except presumably the French). The British favor the first alternative on political, psychological and practical grounds. It would permit a maximum amount of business to be transacted and avoid a "nuclear affairs" meeting as NATO's first major response to the Czech crisis. A key question, in either case, is whether the necessary groundwork can be laid in time to permit Ministers to take substantive decisions. A meeting without concrete results could be disappointing for NATO as an organization and for public opinion. Another possible course would be to hold a special meeting of Foreign and Defense Ministers towards the end of September to issue a new program of work for NATO. The usual year-end meeting would be held in December. A September meeting would have the advantage of an early public response by NATO to the crisis. B. General Alliance policy on East-West Relations In connection with any special meeting, Ministers would have to decide whether the Czech crisis--and Soviet and Warsaw Pact policies demonstrated by recent events--call for any changes in Alliance policy objectives as stated in the Harmel Report (on future tasks of the Alliance), the Reykjavik declaration on mutual force reductions, or other public pronouncements (such as on strategic concept) issued by NATO over the past two years. Our aim, and presumably that of all Member Governments (with France a possible exception) would be to seek a strong public reaffirmation of the Alliance--its defense and deterrent role--while maintaining the long-range commitment to improved East-West relations. C. Strengthening NATO by extending the North Atlantic Treaty Italy has suggested--although not yet by formal proposal--that Member Governments consider strengthening the Treaty by formal action to ascertain extended life for NATO. Such action would make clear the Allies intent to refrain from exercising the right of withdrawal for an additional period of years (say, ten) beyond 1969. (Article 13 provides that, after the Treaty has been in force for twenty years, a signatory state can withdraw on one year's notice.) The Allied Governments could act on this problem either by amending the Treaty or issuing individual declarations of intent to refrain from exercising the withdrawal right for, say, ten more years. Greater assurance about the Alliance's future would have favorable impact on (a) overall US-European relations and (b) specific issues, including the Non-Proliferation Treaty. This subject may arise in preliminary fashion, at least in the corridors, at any special NATO meeting held in the near future. Our current position is that the Alliance will continue and need not be subject to formal action. The Czechoslovak crisis raises issue of need for a more formal commitment. D. NATO force levels and planning NATO is presently considering an urgent Military Committee proposal that member governments defer any further force reductions or redeployments pending NATO review of the overall situation. This proposal gives the United States difficulty because of the current examination of further economies in our defense establishment in Europe. Beyond this immediate question, NATO must now reexamine its entire force posture and dispositions in Europe in light of such factors as what the invasion of Czechoslovakia showed about Soviet and Warsaw Pact operations and capabilities, and the fact that Soviet forces will probably be stationed on Czechoslovakia's western frontier for an indefinite period. Apart from other US objectives that may emerge as a result of study, we will want to seek increased European contributions to their own defense. This could include improvement of reserves, equipment, and mobilization capabilities as well as any changes in standing forces. E. NATO strategy, crisis and alert procedures NATO's present strategic concept based on "flexible response" and "forward defense" is unlikely to be altered fundamentally as a result of the Czech crisis. But certain aspects, notably the doctrine of political warning time, will have to be reexamined. The doctrine envisages that, prior to any overt Warsaw Pact action against NATO, there would be a period of heightened tension and warning permitting the Allies to take necessary reinforcement measures. Closely related to the foregoing, some at least of the Allies will want reexamination of the reinforcement times, strategic mobility for redeploying US forces to Europe, NATO alert and crisis procedures, and the efficiency of the early warning radar system covering the Central Front. F. The Mediterranean While the Czech crisis has focussed attention on the NATO Central Front, concern about Soviet pressures against Romania and Yugoslavia raises anew the problem of Mediterranean security. At the June meeting in Reykjavik NATO Ministers gave various directives aimed at improving command arrangements, stand-by naval force dispositions, and surveillance activities. These were directed primarily at the increased Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean. Recent events may require review and/or speeding up of NATO work on security in the Mediterranean and on NATO's southeastern flank. G. The French attitude On all of the foregoing subjects, the French are in a special position for two reasons. First, they do not participate in most aspects of the integrated military system. Second, since the invasion of Czechoslovakia, de Gaulle has reaffirmed his policy of opposition to "blocs". As a corollary, the French have been negative on the idea of special high-level Western meetings--NATO, WEU, or European Community. In all probability, the French would, however, be represented at any Ministerial session of the North Atlantic Council. They would expect the Fourteen to meet without them for part of the session to deal with NATO military questions. The best hope for improving French cooperation in Eastern defense would probably be through practical steps--improved liaison with the NATO military or improvement of French forces in Germany. The Germans are probably in the best position to sound out the French on these questions. H. The key role of Germany The Federal Republic of Germany--on the Central Front with the largest land army of the continental allies--has been particularly hard hit by the Czechoslovak crisis. The actions of the Warsaw Pact aggressor states have thrown into question the German policy of seeking better relations with the countries of Eastern Europe. Moreover, the rapidity with which the Soviet Union, with little apparent warning, undertook this action, has shaken German confidence in the warning time principle of the NATO strategic concept. The Soviet actions have also caused a reexamination of the German attitude towards signature of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). While no public decision has been made on this subject the issue is obviously one now being subjected to re-appraisal. The Germans feel that to sign the NPT--with its duration--might well jeopardize their future security. The German press is heavy with charges of "super power complicity" in the Czechoslovak crisis and expressions of uneasy doubts of the ability of the US and other of Germany's allies to stand up to the Warsaw Pact. In addition, there is the problem of Berlin. The actions of the Warsaw Pact aggressor states, following upon the June actions of East Germany against Berlin, raise doubts in German minds about the future of that city which they regard as an important part of Free Germany. The result is a general malaise through Germany. Kiesinger reacted to this feeling in his recent interview when he urged a NATO summit meeting as a means of putting new life in NATO. Germany is key to the security of Europe and to the effective functioning of the NATO alliance. While the current malaise may be founded on emotionalism rather than fact, it remains true that Germany is uneasy and disturbed. Such an attitude can have a multiplier effect throughout Europe unless steps are taken now to reaffirm the solidity and efficacy of Western defense within NATO. In short, high-level review and reappraisal by NATO nations could well be an important ingredient in calming the German attitude. It could also be an important factor in the continuance of constructive US/German relations. IV. Communism and the Future of Independent States of Eastern Europe A. The Communist World The USSR has become increasingly isolated within the international Communist movement and has undercut its position of leadership because of its rigidity and inability to adjust to changing times. As things stand, the "Communist family" has now been reduced to "The Five": The USSR, Poland, Hungary, East Germany, and Bulgaria. Clearly this is too thin a margin of support even for Soviet foreign policy purposes. Moreover, the loyalty and stability of some of even these regimes is not beyond question. We may find that the domestic positions of Gomulka, and perhaps also of Kadar, have been weakened much more than now appears by their willingness to serve as the tools of Soviet intervention. B. Czechoslovakia The Soviet leaders may hope that a kind of balance can still somehow be struck in Czechoslovakia (as it has in different ways in Hungary and Poland, for example). This is far from certain. If the Czech leaders prove unable to keep order or if, keeping order, they end up with a sullen, despondent population that would leave the country as stagnant as it was before, Czechoslovakia may end up as little more than a Soviet military protectorate. Over the short-term at least, this would retard the whole process of normalization in Eastern Europe and perhaps even lead to more Soviet strong-arm actions against others who have not played the game by the Soviet script, e.g., Romania and, less likely, Yugoslavia. Any such eruption of Soviet imperial fury could have the most profound effect in the USSR itself, leading to greater domestic repression but possibly also an upheaval shaking the regime to its foundations. It could also engage Western interests directly. One possibility of a calmer evolution lies in the eventual emergence of a new type of Soviet leader who recognizes that Soviet interests are best served by having neighboring countries pursue their own aspirations and interests, including a healthy friendship with the USSR. C. Romania We are carefully following all reports bearing upon a possible military action against Romania by the Soviet Union. Contingency papers have been prepared in the eventuality of an attack. The President's strong statement on August 30 against further aggression/4/ and Secretary Rusk's warning to Dobrynin that night place the United States clearly on record and should leave no doubt in the Soviet mind as to our position. The response by Dobrynin on August 31/5/ may indicate that the Soviets have taken full account of the U.S. position. /4/See footnote 2, Document 91. /5/See Document 167. [Continue with the next documents] Volume XVII Index | Foreign Relations Online | Historian's Office | |