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 | FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968 Volume XVII Eastern Europe Department of State |
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| 77. Telegram From the Embassy in Czechoslovakia to the Department of State/1/ Prague, August 4, 1968, 1130Z. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CZECH. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Belgrade, Berlin, Bonn, Bucharest, Budapest, Moscow, Munich, USNATO, Sofia, Warsaw, and USUN. 2825. Subj: Assessment of Czech-Soviet confrontation. 1. Dubcek regime can take considerable credit for saving its skin at Cierna and for staring down the Soviet threat of force. We understand this is what actually happened at first meetings, when Dubcek stood up against personal attack and Svoboda said he would resign if Soviets insisted on troop stationing in Czechoslovakia. Czechs also seem to have essentially preserved their ability to pursue their own domestic program. 2. Czechs however paid heavy verbal price in language of Bratislava Declaration/2/ (see below), which if nothing else clearly implies that Czechs will hew closely to Soviet foreign policy line. They also agreed at Cierna to hold down anti-Soviet material in media and reportedly agreed to restrict emergence of new political groups; both concessions spell trouble for Dubcek group's relations with progressive domestic allies. Additional concessions may have been made and not yet brought to light, e.g. on Soviet military presence here or on personnel adjustments (either removal of progressives or retention of others). /2/Soviet, Czech, and Eastern European Communist leaders met at Bratislava on August 3. For the text of their communiqué, issued on August 4, see Remington, Winter in Prague, pp. 265-261. For extracts, see Department of State Bulletin, September 9, 1968, p. 264. 3. We regard following as principal Czech concessions in Bratislava Declaration: a. Acceptance of proposition that high international tension exists and that "subversive activity of imperialism" requires strengthening Communist unity; b. International obligation of all to defend socialist achievements, which provides possible future justification for intervention in Czechoslovakia or demands for tighter CSCP control; c. Recognition that leading role of CPs is under attack and that "extraordinary vigilance" is needed in this regard; d. Agreement to "harmonize and coordinate" foreign activities in context sharp criticism US, West Germany and Israeli "ruling circles;" e. Acknowledgement that in face international tension marked by growth of revanchist forces in West Germany, political and military cooperation in Warsaw Pact must be strengthened. 4. The passing of this latest crisis will assuredly be welcomed with relief here but will also give rise to much questioning as to what kind of deals were made with Czechoslovakia's hard-line ideological opponents. Reinstitution of terminology of cold war could provide cover for special measures which may be demanded in name of European Communist solidarity and security. The setting and atmosphere would thus be beyond Czech regime's control. 5. Meeting organized by students in Prague Old Town Square last night indicated questions already being raised; one prominent placard demanded that truth be told about Bratislava. Perhaps Dubcek speech scheduled tonight and public rally we understand being planned for tomorrow evening will help clarify matters. Tito and Ceausescu visits--if latter in fact still comes after reading communiqué--could also provide enlightenment on where Czechs now stand./3/ /3/President Tito of Yugoslavia visited Prague August 9-11; President Ceausescu of Romania visited Prague August 15-16. 6. Communiqué will be difficult for us to handle publicly since we can hardly extract much joy from its invidious language. Perhaps Department could express satisfaction that costly crisis, which was provoked artificially as means of pressure against small state, seems to be surmounted. We would hope the Cierna meeting will enable the Czechoslovak nation to pursue its self-development insofar as possible in accord with its people's wishes. Beam
LBJ Ranch, Texas, August 10, 1968, 12:25 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson Notes of Meetings. No classification marking. Prepared by Tom Johnson. NOTES ON BRIEFING OF FORMER VICE PRESIDENT NIXON Those attending the briefing were: The President CIA Director Helms: Czechoslovakia is eased, not over. The Czechs want to reduce commitment to Warsaw Pact. Czechoslovakia made certain assurances. Prague meeting will take place in September. Soviets seek to bring about reforms. Nixon: Is it your opinion that the Soviets can't let this happen? Secretary Rusk: The problem is if both sides can move along so Czechoslovakia can progress and the Soviets can take care of its problems with its students, visitors. Nixon: Will pressure be kept on? CIA Director Helms: Yes. The situation will continue to be a tense one. Nixon: The best line publicly is that this is a sensitive situation. We have sympathy but to say anything would not be helpful. Secretary Rusk: That is right. Governor Agnew: What is the relation of this to the Jewish question? CIA Director Helms: No anti-semitism in Czechoslovakia. Nixon: The Czech government goes to great pains to show Jewish cemetery. It is no problem. It is a problem in Poland. Secretary Rusk: Don't give the Russians a pretext for action. We've been tough on the USSR privately, not in public. [Here follow 4 pages of discussion of the Near East and Vietnam.]
79. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, August 19, 1968. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CZECH. Secret; Exdis. Drafted and initialed by Rostow on August 20. The source text is labeled "Part IV of IV." SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS At the Secretary's dinner on the Honey Fitz, on August 19, Ambassador Dobrynin invited Under Secretary Rostow to withdraw for a private talk. The topics covered are treated in separate memoranda./2/ /2/Not found. Rostow commented that the Soviet decisions at Cierna seemed wise to us, and potentially very important. Dobrynin said these were matters of great difficulty for his government. Rostow said we understood that, and had tried, as the Secretary had made clear to him, not to make the problem more complex. Dobrynin said that that was appreciated. Rostow said we thought the NATO proposals at Reykjavik were constructive, and he hoped they were being carefully considered in this connection. Dobrynin asked how far those proposals went. Rostow said we had no official position on that question, but remarked on a personal basis that he thought they would find we were willing to examine any issue they wished to raise in the field of balanced and mutual force reduction, arms limitation, and European security, in the interest of reducing tensions and promoting détente.
Washington, August 20, 1968, 8:15-8:42 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Transcripts of Cabinet Room Meetings. No classification marking. The text printed here contains revisions that were made after the editor listened to the recording of the conversation. The recording is ibid., Recording of Meeting Between President Johnson, Ambassador Dobrynin, and Walt Rostow, August 20, 1968, 8:17-8:42 p.m. [Tape FC002, Side A]. Summary of Meeting in Cabinet Room, Tuesday, August 20, 1968 With the President, Soviet Ambassador Anatoli F. Dobrynin and Walt Rostow, 8:15 p.m. to 8:42 p.m. The President started off the meeting by asking Ambassador Dobrynin how he had been and asked about Mr. Kosygin. He then told him that he had night before last seen a color movie at the ranch which was very good. The movie was one taken at Glassboro when the President met with Kosygin. Mr. Dobrynin said that he would have liked to have seen it and the President told him that it was good of both Kosygin and of him. The President said it was particularly good when he was talking to the crowd which had assembled outside the house. Mr. Dobrynin said it was probably the students. The President said: "And you could have thought he was a . . . " Mr. Rostow spoke up and said "A campaigner." The President said: "Well, you would have thought he could be a County Judge of New Jersey, or President of the United States or anybody." Mr. Dobrynin laughed at this statement by the President. The President said it was colorful because the children were in red, blue, and green--different colors. Mr. Dobrynin asked the President if he had ever seen a Youth Parade (he was not sure what the name was) and he said it was a pageant and very colorful and a huge gathering. He said it was an interesting thing to see. The President told Walt Rostow that Dean Rusk was going to be on television at 9 o'clock and that he ought to watch it. The President said he had just been down to have his hair cut because he did not have a barber at the ranch, to which Mr. Dobrynin said "Why not?" They both laughed. Mr. Dobrynin then asked the President if he would be at the ranch long. The President had told him he was leaving in the morning for the ranch. He said he would be there unless President Eisenhower died. He said he would have to be there the second day and possibly the third--it's a six day affair. He said on the fifth day, however, they would take him out to Kansas and the President said he did not know whether he would go out there or not. The President said that President Eisenhower had had another attack that day. Mr. Dobrynin said: "He still has a strong heart because so many heart attacks, and he still survives. It's unbelievable." The President told Mr. Dobrynin that he (the President) had had one heart attack and he almost did not make it. He said his blood pressure went to zero at once and they counted him out. He said they just thought he was gone. Mr. Dobrynin said: "This is very dangerous . . . in the old country they used to give some stimulant or something. Otherwise they couldn't do anything. There was no surgery, anything specific. They couldn't do it--especially not at his age. And today, even in my own country, now we have very nice surgeons--but . . . until now there wasn't a single operation." The President said this was going to open up all new, different and complex problems. Mr. Dobrynin said: "This is the point." The President then offered Mr. Dobrynin a Fresca and asked him if he had ever drunk this drink. Mr. Dobrynin said: "No, is it a strong one?" The President told him that it contained no alcohol and had no calories and Mr. Dobrynin wanted to know how he did it. The President said he had to lose some weight and that he had lost about seven or eight pounds. Mr. Dobrynin said: "Now, Mr. President, I have an urgent instruction from my government to tell you about serious business. I will read it." The President asked him to read a little louder--that he was a little hard of hearing but was so vain he would not wear a hearing aid. Mr. Dobrynin went on to say: "Kosygin asked me personally to visit you and to say the following on behalf of my government. I will read this; what I am instructed to say: 'The Government of the Soviet Union considers it necessary to inform, personally, President Johnson about the following. In connection with the further aggravation of the situation which was created by a conspiracy of the external and internal forces of aggression against the existing social order in Czechoslovakia and against the statehood established by the constitution of that government, the government of Czechoslovakia Socialist Republic approached the allied states, the Soviet Union among them, with a request of rendering direct assistance, including the assistance of military forces. 'The Soviet Government repeatedly stated that the events in Czechoslovakia and around it involve vital interests of the Soviet Union and of a number of other states tied by appropriate treaty obligations, and that the threat to the Socialist order in Czechoslovakia constitutes at the same time a threat to the foundations of European peace and world security. In view of this, the Soviet Government and the Governments of the allied countries have taken a joint decision to satisfy the request of the Government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic rendering necessary assistance to the Czechoslovak people. Accordingly, the Soviet military units received orders to enter the territory of Czechoslovakia. Of course, they will be withdrawn without delay from the territory of Czechoslovak Socialist Republic as soon as the present threat to the security is eliminated and they come to the conclusion that there is no need in further presence of the allied forces. We would like President Johnson to know that our steps, which are being taken upon the request of the Czechoslovak Government are dictated fully by the concern to strengthen peace and in no degree do they involve state interests of the United States or any other state. We proceed from the fact that the current events should not harm the Soviet-American relations to the development of which the Soviet Government as before attaches great importance.' This is what I was asked to tell you." The President said: "I would like to take it and read it and study it and I appreciate very much your bringing it to me and I will review it in the morning with Secretary Rusk and we will be back in touch with you." Mr. Dobrynin thanked the President. The President then asked if it were in English and Mr. Dobrynin said it was not, but that he could tell him afterwards if he would like it. The President said that frankly he had missed a word or two here and there. He asked Mr. Rostow how he would summarize it and Mr. Rostow said: "As I understand it, the Soviet Government informs you, Mr. President, that they and other states have taken a collective decision at the request of the Government of Czechoslovakia to introduce military forces into Czechoslovakia because of a threat defined by the Czech Government; that those forces will remain until the threat to the Czech Government has passed, and be withdrawn. It is the hope of the Soviet Government that this will not interfere with US-Soviet relations and that there is no threat to the United States or to the interests of peace in Europe. In fact, it is stated that these moves should stabilize the peace in Europe." The President replied: "Our position with regard to the problem that exists in Czechoslovakia is as represented by Secretary Rusk and I trust that you understand that the position that he explained in detail to you is my view, and the views of this Government, and is the honest and absolutely correct attitude that we have taken. Although I have seen a good many other interpretations and predictions and evaluations, Secretary Rusk, at my instruction, asked you to come in to see him and told you frankly and honestly, looking directly in your eyes, what our position was and you can rely on it./2/ /2/Apparently a reference to the Rusk-Dobrynin meeting of July 22; see Document 70. "I didn't hear the conversation between you and Secretary Rusk but I have such confidence in him that I know he related to you what I asked him to and I don't want there to be any doubt about our attitude." Mr. Dobrynin said: "No. This message refers to you. I know what you told him to say and it is very clear." The President asked Mr. Dobrynin what had been done about his announcement and he said they had had no word yet./3/ /3/Reference is to a joint announcement of a visit by President Johnson to the Soviet Union. The President went on to say: "Well, I have all these problems about all these folks I have got to talk to beforehand. And I thought I would have them at breakfast at 8:00 o'clock and we'd stay from 8 to 10 at breakfast and I would do it so they wouldn't shout to high heaven that I gave them no information." Mr. Rostow said that it had been our understanding that the joint announcement would be made at 10 o'clock tomorrow. The President continued: "There are four changes. I had to sit down with various people and assure them at 10:00--they would all be in the same room at 10:00 o'clock--but at 10:00, the Soviet Union will say this and we will say this. And I gathered from the announcement that I received that--I think your expression of it when I got off the airplane last night in Detroit--it said that it is acceptable, or there is no objection in Moscow if the American side desires it--if the American side desires it--and announce in the nearest time--I don't know what that means--in the nearest time about the coming visit. Now the language that they suggested, I understand that you and Secretary Rusk had a little adjustment, just a little leeway, about the same thing." Mr. Dobrynin replied: "Yes, but you see, Mr. President, sometimes when you make . . . in my impression, the text the Secretary gave me yesterday at midnight, there is no difference really. But the question is, when does the United States, or the President of the United States, Mr. Johnson, wish to continue . . ." The President said "what we propose is to announce at 10:00 o'clock our time and whatever time it is there--6:00 o'clock their time. Look, while we're at it, I would like to touch a base or two, you see. And in order to touch a base, I have to get people to come in 35 miles to Washington. And I thought I'd do it at the breakfast table, and over breakfast I would say: This is what is going to be said when we finish the breakfast." Mr. Rostow pointed out that there were two issues that the Presidium would have to set. "The President's suggestion was, raised the question--would things move quicker if we accepted your language. But my guess is you have two issues that have to go to higher authority: One, the exact time of the announcement, and two, the exact language. So that any check-back, there had to be a check-back with Moscow on the time, Mr. President." Mr. Dobrynin said: "So I will try, Mr. President, to get back tomorrow morning." The President told him there was no rush, for him to go on and do the best he could. The President then directed his remarks to Mr. Rostow and said they ought to get their drinks down--that he didn't mind, but he just did not want them to think they all were in there drunk. The President went on to say that Mr. Rayburn used to say that he would never take a drink before the House adjourned in the afternoon because if they had a big fight or something and they had a roll call and he had to get up in the chair, he said just as sure as he did, he would trip his toe and someone would say he is drunk again. They all laughed and the President asked Mr. Dobrynin if he knew Mr. Rayburn and he said, yes, for a long time. The President said that Mr. Rayburn and his father were deskmates in the Legislature before the President was born. Mr. Dobrynin said: "That would be in Texas? Now I see." The President continued: "The old Capitol that was built was the original Capitol that was destroyed when we were a Republic. You see we were a Republic, an Independent State, before we came in to the Union in 1845. We won our independence in 1856 from Mexico, and from 1836 until 1845, a nine year period, we were an independent Republic." Mr. Dobrynin asked why it called Lone Star. The President pointed out that that's the flag--that we had a lone star flag and that we were known as the Lone Star State. Mr. Dobrynin said: "Did you know the song the Yellow Rose of Texas?" The President said: "Yes, that was during the Civil War. One of the better Commanders, the Hood Brigade. My grandfather was a member of it, and they went into battle with the flag flying and the boys singing the Yellow Rose of Texas. It's a good marching hymn. It gets you excited, and so on and so forth." Mr. Dobrynin asked if we had an official state song or flower. The President replied that we have the bluebonnet as our state flower but he did not know what our state song was. Mr. Rostow laughingly said that if the President didn't know, he certainly didn't. The President asked Mr. Dobrynin if it was his impression that this meeting be around the first of the month and he replied that was his understanding--the first of the month--the first three days--between the first and the tenth of October. The President said he had a grandson or a granddaughter that was expected during that period. Mr. Dobrynin said: "Ah, you will bring her along . . . But you see, in your case, in America when somebody is born here, he automatically becomes an American citizen. In our case it is not so." [Here follow comments by the President on his family.] The President then switched to a more serious note and said there were many subjects that needed to be discussed and that he thought they were very free to do that now and that he thought their meeting in Glassboro was good. He said he enjoyed it very much. He thought it was good for our people and for their people also. He went on to say: "I thought the reception they gave Mr. Kosygin was really unusual. Ten years ago you wouldn't have thought that could happen." "I was here ten years ago" Dobrynin said, "so I know how the situation was." Mr. Dobrynin went on to say: "For him it was a caution he had no chance to see more than New York and New Jersey. He is very connected with the university. He would like to see for himself, because he is the head of the whole economy of the Soviet Union . . . All the responsibility of dealing with those buildings, dams, those huge dams, factories . . . He said--in New York I would like to see both bad and good sides." The President said--"We have many misfortunes and lots have problems, but one of the fortunate things that's happened to both countries is that we have been blessed with good men like Thompson in Moscow who tells us what it is without prejudice or without any hatred or without any ambition or personal attempt to satisfy me or our Government. I want you to do the same thing with your people. It would be good for this country and for your country too, if we had men of quality like you and Thompson." Mr. Dobrynin thanked the President very much. The President went on to say: "Yes, one Ambassador sometimes can change the fate of the world. And a lot of times Tommy Thompson says to me--well, just a minute." The President asked Mr. Dobrynin to let us know about the other thing because he wanted to have the breakfast date. Mr. Dobrynin said: "Thank you very much, and good luck."
81. Notes of Emergency Meeting of the National Security Council/1/ Washington, August 20, 1968, 10:15 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings. Secret. A transcript of this meeting is ibid., Transcripts. Those attending the meeting were: Secretary Rusk: This surprises me. Secretary Clifford: It does me too. General Wheeler: Ambassador Bohlen was uneasy about this. CIA Director Helms: This was what their big meeting was about today. Walt Rostow: The evidence is: (1) Withdrew Soviets' planes to Poland. (2) Brought them back. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. (4) Maneuvers. CIA Director Helms: On 14 August exercise started. General Wheeler: Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria and USSR troops have moved in: 23 aircraft into Poland Walt Rostow: Aircraft: 50 in Czechoslovakia Prague domestic radio tells people not to resist. The President: I asked you to come here because of the alarm of the last few hours. Ambassador Dobrynin called me late today with a very "urgent" message. He read from a long-hand note. (Insert A)/2/ /2/A copy of the Soviet note is ibid. For text of the note, see Document 80. I told him we would give it our attention. He said they were invading Czechoslovakia because the Czechs had asked them to come in. I notified the Secretary of State and called this NSC meeting to analyze these actions and try to determine what our national interest is. It is one country invading another Communist country. It is aggression. There is danger in aggression anywhere. We need to give immediate thought to timing of meeting with Soviets. The agenda is more full now than before. We must discuss all problems before us. Is October agreeable or should we meet earlier. There are serious questions: (1) Can we talk now after this. (2) Does our presence look as though we condone this movement. It demonstrates the difficulty the platform committee has in working out strategy at the Hilton Hotel. What do we do? Secretary Rusk: First, I am surprised by the timing of this action. I am disappointed, particularly in light of their favorable messages on (1) nuclear explosion (2) strategic missile talks (3) your meeting./3/ This shows they hold the USA in contempt. /3/The messages are in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Trip to the Soviet Union. Walt Rostow: Read FBIS 07 Bulletin. (Insert B)/4/ /4/Not found. Secretary Rusk: We do not know yet if the Czechs will raise a voice. There is not a great deal we can do if they don't. We could support the Czechs in the United Nations and through USIA. If we do they can put pressure on the West, particularly Berlin. Khrushchev called Berlin the testicles of the West and when he wanted to create pressure he squeezed there. Secretary Rusk: Draft reply to Dobrynin read./5/ /5/See Document 82. We have a public problem as well. We must decide what moral force and political force we should bring to bear. The big question is what the Czech reaction will be. I would not move ahead in next day or so. The President: We should talk to Dobrynin tonight. Secretary Rusk: For the press to know I call him in to give him our views it will be good to position ourselves publicly. Walt Rostow: There are two points in Rusk's statement. The President: I am amazed that Dobrynin told me it was at the request of the Czech government and the Czech government was never told. We must talk to him about the other announcement. The President: We reviewed information and information given by Ambassador Dobrynin. The President instructed Rusk to ask Dobrynin in to discuss this matter. The Secretary could say: (a) Astonished at this news. (b) Not opportune time to make announcement tomorrow. Tell allies we are dismayed and outline what should be anticipated. Secretary Clifford: They had first meeting. It seemed to go well. They had a meeting of the Warsaw Pact countries. I am not clear as to the reason the Soviets took this action. The President: We have been fearful that they lost so much face they had to return. They could not stand to move in until the other ducks were in a row. CIA Director Helms: It is not what has happened but what has not happened. They wanted to see if the Czechs would clamp down on the press. They did not. The President: Wasn't this hard to swallow? CIA Director Helms: Yes. Military exercises were designed to see how the troops could move in. The President: Should the Secretary talk to Dobrynin tonight? CIA Director Helms: Yes. Secretary Clifford: Czechoslovakia is just one piece on the chessboard. This march will have effects on Poland, Bulgaria, Rumania and Hungary. We must visualize what effect this will have on other countries. Secretary Clifford: I agree we have to speak to Dobrynin. We have to delay this announcement. The President: This seems strange in light of (a) peaceful uses of atomic energy and (b) the scheduled Geneva meeting. (c) The scheduled Geneva announcement. Then this bombshell. Secretary Clifford: It may be that Supreme Soviet rumblings caused this. Ambassador Ball: They have been concerned about the internal structure of the Warsaw Pact and about not destroying the relationship with the United States. This occurred just before the Democratic convention, just as Hungarian invasion occurred before election. We can't be idle in the United Nations about this. General Wheeler: There is no military action we can take. We do not have the forces to do it. This approach is cynical to the Nth degree. They have had CPX exercise and troops on the border. I think this message is an insult to the United States. They say keep your hands off. Dean (Secretary Rusk) should say the future course of US-USSR relations depends on how this is handled. The President: A. Do we send for him? B. Do we say no announcement? C. Do we say we are utterly dismayed by it. D. Cannot reconcile his statement with other statements we've received. Secretary Rusk: Czechoslovakia is 3rd arms supplier to Vietnam. General Wheeler: That is because they were told to. Secretary Clifford: Bus/6/ gets to the heart of this matter. They may be sincerely conciliatory. Suppose there is no combat. Suppose there is a pullout. They had a lot of troops in there two weeks ago. /6/General Wheeler. The President: I sympathize with General Wheeler's views. We do not have to say what we feel. 1. Call in Dobrynin. 2. Tell him we won't make announcement. 3. Tell him we asked Council to meet. The Vice President: We need to show caution. The Czechs touched the heart of the Communist revolution. All you can do is snort and talk.
82. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Czechoslovakia/1/ Washington, August 21, 1968, 0855Z. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-1 COMBLOC-CZECH. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Batjer, cleared in S/S and CTF, and approved by Leddy. 224693. 1. At Assistant Secretary Leddy's invitation Czech Ambassador Duda came to Department early morning August 21. Leddy said he wished to inform Ambassador of action taken in Washington regarding Czech crisis. 2. Following delivery to the President by Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin of message (Duda given copy to read, but not to keep), President held meeting of National Security Council to discuss matter. As a result of meeting he asked the Secretary to call in Ambassador Dobrynin to communicate to him the points set forth below. 3. Secretary Rusk met with Dobrynin at approximately 11:30 p.m., August 20 and stated the following:/2/ /2/No other record of the Rusk-Dobrynin conversation was found. The message communicated to the President by Dobrynin had been received by the US Government with deep concern. There were certain points which puzzle us and on which we feel we do not have adequate information. The US failed to understand the reference in this message to the "request of the Government of Czechoslovakia Socialist Republic" for assistance by military forces from the Soviet Union and other socialist countries in the light of the broadcasts from Prague saying that the Warsaw Pact forces were entering Czechoslovakia without the knowledge of the President of the National Assembly (Smrkovsky), the Prime Minister (Cernik), the Chairman of the Czechoslovak Communist Party (Dubcek) and the President of the Republic (Svoboda). The US Government does not understand the reference in the message to "external . . . forces of aggression against the existing social order in Czechoslovakia." The Secretary said that the US has no information to support the idea that any non-socialist country is involved in, or is contemplating, any aggression against Czechoslovakia. 4. Ambassador expressed gratitude for information. Said he uninformed and could not comment. Rusk
83. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/ Moscow, August 21, 1968, 1935Z. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-1 COMBLOC-CZECH. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Repeated to USUN. 5178. Subject: Invasion of Czechoslovakia. 1. I would like in this telegram to provide some preliminary thoughts on meaning of invasion as seen from here, subject to views of Ambassador Thompson. 2. It must first be said that invasion took all friendly diplomats here by surprise. Some had expected it in earlier stage of crisis. None with whom we have talked thought it particularly likely following Bratislava Declaration, which seemed offer a face-saving device for all concerned. 3. There is consequently considerable speculation that Soviet leadership itself shifted from a minority to a majority favoring invasion in interval following Bratislava meeting. Story was current this evening among diplomats that as late as August 19 Kosygin and Podgorny (sic), summoned hastily from vacation, were confronted with new majority decision in Politburo for intervention. This story is not confirmed, and all reports of Politburo views and actions must be considered suspect in absence firm intelligence. Their relevance to what has happened will no doubt be clarified only in time, if then. 4. Alternative hypothesis is that decision to intervene was taken at or immediately following Bratislava meeting. According this hypothesis, Bratislava Declaration was from outset purely tactical compromise papering over differences so fundamental that Soviets recognized they were unbridgeable under Dubcek leadership. Invasion was consequently timed to achieve maximum psychological and tactical surprise (which was in fact achieved). 5. What seems readily estimable, on basis our conversations this evening, is that many countries under emotional impact of events find Soviet action so repugnant that their bilateral relations are likely to suffer at all levels; that November international conference of Communist Parties faces virtually insuperable odds; that underdeveloped third world countries will have second thoughts as to Soviet connections; and that East-West détente has suffered significant setback. 6. What is less clear is internal impact of this event. Knowledge that regime has resorted to military force against ally accused of ideological deviation cannot but add [garble] to already strident demands on Soviet population for orthodoxy and conformity. We anticipate that in near term Soviet population will conform. Over longer term, consequences for leadership are unpredictable. Some heads could fall unless there was greater support for intervention than most diplomats believe possible. 7. Our own posture poses difficult problems given urgency and importance of bilateral and multilateral issues needing resolution. For the short term, however, it seems to us indispensable that we condemn invasion in strongest terms and avoid any action which could be construed as mitigating that condemnation. That applies not only to Soviet Union but to its four collaborators. 8. Department pass as desired. Swank
84. Notes of Cabinet Meeting/1/ Washington, August 22, 1968, 12:16-1:50 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings. Top Secret. A covering memorandum from Tom Johnson to the President lists the 35 participants and noted the time of the meeting. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room at the White House. President: Czech situation. 1. We did not assume there would be no military intervention. 2. There was massing of troops on the borders. 3. Thompson said they would go to any length to push Czechs back to pre-January site. 4. Tuesday lunch included item on Soviet Central Committee meeting. 5. At 7:05 --Dobrynin asked for meeting --Rostow told Rusk --Read Soviet message --Rusk sent message to DNC meeting --Asked for NSC meeting --Rusk called in Dobrynin --Ball instructed to talk to other nations in UN. Yesterday morning we formalized a statement./2/ /2/For text of the August 21 U.S. statement, see Department of State Bulletin, September 9, 1968, p. 261. --We have no commitment to intervene militarily. --It would not be in Czech interests or ours. --The "Cold War" is not over. --Our relations with Soviets are in transition. --We would go anywhere at anytime to further interests of peace. --We have thought at times we have made progress. --We have the NPT, Outer Space agreement and the Consular Treaty. --Soviets thought a pause would enable them to do something in Vietnam. We tried a 37-day pause in the bombing. --There are some plusses and some minuses. --We have been disillusioned if not deceived. Secretary Rusk: The political costs the Soviets would have to pay was one reason we thought they would not move. A decision was made on Monday. If there were military intervention, there would be a world war. In the Security Council the matter was inscribed, 13-2. India, Pakistan and Algeria voted to put it on the agenda. Only two voted against it. They were the Soviet Union and Hungary. There would be 80-90 votes on this issue in the General Assembly. This action has created violent world reaction. The National Assembly can speak. The President and the Foreign Minister can also. As far as the relation between Czechoslovakia and Vietnam--I see no direct relationship. I hope members of the Cabinet will not get into this. Secretary Wirtz:/3/ I agree Czechoslovakia and Vietnam are different situations. /3/Secretary of Labor William W. Wirtz. There is confusion in the peoples' minds. The Czechs spoke to the world as though people do not recognize the difference between this and Vietnam. Sixty five percent of the people in the world wish us well in Vietnam. Vice President: I was shocked to find Galbraith talking as though it was one and the same. President: I want the Cabinet to have all the information that is available to me. We want to achieve peace. Secretary Clifford: JCS maintain watch over the Soviet Union. They followed the meetings of the Czechs with the Warsaw Pact countries. They understand the dangers. They watched the exercises on the border. The Warsaw nations had rehearsed it. Planes moved in. Elements of 26 different divisions took part. They went into radio silence. Dobrynin's message was the first notice. There is no basis for resistance on the part of Czechs. We have no mutual assistance pacts. We do have an understanding with West Germany. This action on the part of the Soviet Union may be helpful to us in not getting the troop cutback in Europe. [Here follow 3 pages of discussion of Vietnam.]
Washington, August 23, 1968, 1:07-3:06 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, Transcripts of Cabinet Room Meetings. No classification marking. Summary of Meeting in Cabinet Room, Friday, August 23, 1968 from 1:07 to 3:06 p.m. List of Those Attending Attached./2/ /2/Not found. Mr. Helms reported to the group that Rumanians were in a state of considerable apprehension because they were afraid that if Russia moved on Czechoslovakia, they would also have to move at the same time on Rumania. That explained the mobilization of Rumanian forces. He pointed out that Rumania had taken one of the strongest public positions on Czechoslovakia of any government in the world. He said we believe it is important to make clear that this is not just a bilateral issue between the Soviet Union and the United States, but it is a case of the Soviet Union against all the rest. General Wheeler said that Dubcek met with about sixty of his editors but apparently was unable to dissuade them to show their strength that would satisfy the Soviets. He said that while there would be no evidence, it was reasonable to speculate that there had been a shift between the Soviet politburo at that time in favor of intervention. He said you can sum it up what the Soviets' objectives were and are if you set the clock back. What it really amounts to is their concern about their own position, their own power. They already had lost Yugoslavia and Rumania has been going completely independent in foreign policy. But the thing that was particularly of concern to them in Czechoslovakia was the introduction of democracy into the Czech Communist Party and freedom of the press which General Wheeler thought was completely incompatible with the Communist system. Secretary Rusk said that they had not contemplated military action in support of Czechoslovakia in this situation--nor had Czechoslovakia asked for it or suggested it. In that situation, therefore, the most powerful weapon with the Soviet Union would seem to be unanimous--highly mobilized charged world reaction against this kind of thing. So in the very nature of their system, the Soviet Union pays special attention to propaganda aspects. Ambassador Ball took the matter up with the United Nations and he reported on his meetings with representatives of the United Nations. Secretary Clifford said that from the military standpoint the invasion of Czechoslovakia by the Soviets has been a very well planned, efficient, and sophisticated operation. They moved a great many planes and enormous number of men. They did it very efficiently. Clifford further stated that we must view it within the framework of the attention that the Defense Department and this Government has been giving to the Soviet Union in the past month for it's very clear that the Soviet Union is heading down the road to greater military strength. He said the matter reached a point of drama last October when at the meeting of the Supreme Soviet, the present regime announced that they were going to increase military expenditures for 1968 by 15 percent. Coupled with that was an announcement by the Soviets that they would increase outlays for science by 11 percent. We have come to know that that area carries a very heavy leading [loading?] of military expenditures. When these announcements were made, they indicated there would have to be cutbacks in the investment for agriculture and in non-military commodities. It appears clear now that the Soviet leaders with this increased military strength intend to find ways to increase that additional military power into political influence. Clifford went on to say that the Soviets appear to be engaged in a process of letting the world know that the Soviet Union can deliver its forces wherever it might choose to deliver them--say through the Mediterranean and throughout the European area. They have been engaged in a rather expensive ship-building program and even more dangerous to our own security is an exceedingly extensive and very sophisticated submarine-building program. He said that for those who have a degree of responsibility in this field to visualize the Czechoslovakian incident within a framework of a basic program wherein the Soviet Union is substantially increasing its military strength. The President then called on General Wheeler for his remarks. General Wheeler said that from the military point of view, the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia was quick, efficient, and effective. It was based upon very thorough planning. He reported they had command post exercise during a period from August 13-20 in which they went through all the necessary planning and practicing in the time and space factors to do precisely what they did. During the period of six to ten days Soviet divisions moved to the Czechoslovakia border. Three came from East Germany, one from Poland and two from the Carpathian military district of the USSR. On the 30th of June they held a Warsaw Pact exercise in Czechoslovakia and they had elements of four divisions that had actually moved into Czechoslovakia and the Czechs at least to some degree participated in the exercise. They also had similar exercises in Poland and East Germany. Later they moved more divisions up, having between 19 and 24 Warsaw Pact divisions. This would be somewhere between 190,000 and 250,000 men. Their actual intervention followed rather precisely the pattern of those command post exercises. General Wheeler pointed out that there are military disadvantages also as far as the Soviets are concerned. They had a sizeable number of units in Czechoslovakia--far more than they really needed to deal with the Czechs. But if fighting did break out there they would have losses and so on which would decrease their capability to engage in any other military adventure and that the Warsaw Pact had been weakened in a broad sense by the actual loss of the Czech armed forces to their cause and he would judge they would have little reliance in the remaining Armed forces under the present circumstances. He made the observation that the situation in Central Europe today indicates it would be less than prudent for us to further reduce the U.S. military presence there. On the other hand, he suggested that we should take the lead in maintaining our strength, improving it to the degree we can, and in urging our allies to improve their forces in certain areas where improvement is certainly needed. [Here follow 2 pages of discussion of Vietnam.] [Continue with the next documents] Volume XVII Index | Foreign Relations Online | Historian's Office | |