NOTE: External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views contained therein.
| The State Department web site below is a permanent electronic archive of information released prior to January 20, 2001. Please see www.state.gov for material released since President George W. Bush took office on that date. This site is not updated so external links may no longer function. Contact us with any questions about finding information. NOTE: External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views contained therein. |
 | FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968 Volume XVII Eastern Europe Department of State |
 | |
| 67. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Rostow) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/ Washington, July 20, 1968. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CZECH-USSR. Secret; Exdis. The source text bears no drafting information but is initialed by Rostow. A copy of this memorandum was sent to the White House. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, State Department, Vol. 14) SUBJECT I The possibility of Russian military intervention in Czechoslovakia is a matter of basic concern to the United States. Ambassador Thompson and others think the risk is increasing. Such an event could well torpedo the NPT and set back the trend towards détente in Europe. Its effect on our relations with the Soviet Union would probably reduce the chance for a peaceful settlement in the Middle East and Viet-Nam, although it is conceivable that the Russians would make concessions in those two areas in return for our neutrality with regard to Czechoslovakia. On net, Soviet armed intervention in Czechoslovakia would probably change the political atmosphere fundamentally in ways that could harm our interests. If the Czech government and people resist and call on the UN and NATO for help, we could be put in an extraordinarily dangerous dilemma. It would be difficult to explain why the UN Charter protects Korea against aggression, but not Czechoslovakia. Czechoslovakia is surely in the Soviet sphere of influence. But that fact hardly justifies murder in broad daylight. And if fighting broke out in Eastern Europe, the evolution of events could get completely out of hand. We should not forget that Russian soldiers fought with the Hungarian revolutionaries in 1956. On the other hand, if the Soviets hesitate and withdraw, allowing the process of liberalization to proceed in Eastern Europe, the political atmosphere should improve fundamentally, in ways most favorable to us. Poland would almost surely follow the Czech example. Ulbricht would be isolated. New possibilities for a settlement in Europe would be opened. We could hope for a toning down of Soviet imperialism in the Middle East and elsewhere. The Soviet leaders responsible for the failure of Soviet policy in Eastern Europe might well be thrown out, as Khrushchev was, to be replaced by leaders who would at least be weaker for a time than the present group. Since we have an immense national interest in a Russian decision not to intervene, and would face unforeseeable risks if they do, I believe that we should seriously consider the British suggestion of doing everything possible at this point to deter the Russians from such a step. The contrary argument is that any expression of interest on our part would convince the Russians that we are behind Czech policy, and would harden their decision to wipe out a dangerous heresy with their tanks. I think much depends on what we say and who says it. I have always felt that Dulles' public statement in 1956/2/ (that we would under no circumstances move in Eastern Europe) was a profound mistake. At a minimum, uncertainty on that point would have been preferable. We must not make any threats in this situation, or take positions that would confirm Russian suspicions. But we might still be able to affect the decision by carefully planned, and entirely conciliatory secret messages. /2/Apparently a reference to Eisenhower's October 31, 1956, statement; see footnote 4, Document 60. Furthermore, we have made great exertions to revitalize NATO and re-launch it as a body for serious political consultations. We should not ignore NATO with regard to a major event affecting European security. I believe the British suggestion in that regard should be followed up, not only at the level of the Permanent Representatives, but through a meeting of higher officials in Brussels, to be followed, if intervention occurs, by the establishment of an action group representing a number of interested governments in Washington. (You will recall that the NATO Resolution of December 1967/3/ contemplated political working groups of less than all the NATO members to concert policy on problems outside the NATO defense area, strictly defined.) /3/For text, see Department of State Bulletin, January 8, 1968, pp. 49-52. II In view of the shortness of time, I recommend that we follow up Bob McCloskey's denial of C.I.A. activity in Czechoslovakia/4/ with an aide-mémoire protesting the Soviet press charges that we are fomenting counter-revolution in Czechoslovakia. When the note is delivered, several additional points could be made orally. The British, and, if possible the French, the Italians, the Belgians and the Dutch could be encouraged to weigh in as well. And we should have a NATO meeting at the ministerial or near ministerial level within a week. /4/Not further identified. Our aim at this point is deterrence. We should also be examining contingency plans, on an urgent basis. The aide-mémoire could make these essential points: A. We are deeply concerned by charges in the Soviet press that the United States has participated in any way in the internal affairs of Czechoslovakia, or had any part whatever in recent political events in that country. The fact that such charges have been made, and made publicly, can only heighten tension. B. We can assure the Soviet government most categorically that we have done nothing in Czechoslovakia, and have played no part in these events. Our position on Czechoslovakia is a matter of record. It has been and remains our policy to respect in every way the independence and integrity of all states. We ask only that others exercise parallel restraint. C. We hope and believe that rumors of Soviet military intervention in Czechoslovakia are equally unfounded. Such a step could set in train tendencies whose consequences it would be nearly impossible to predict. It would be irresponsible on our part if we did not bring to the attention of the Soviet government our conviction that such a course would imperil recent progress towards détente, and intensify the futile and burdensome arms race. D. It is our conviction, on the contrary, that the present trend towards détente represents the profound national interests of the United States and, we hope and believe, those of the Soviet Union as well. It is in no one's interest to reverse that trend. We believe that the path towards a secure and peaceful settlement in Europe is that represented by our proposals, and those of the other members of NATO, for a gradual and agreed reduction of tension and military risks in Europe and elsewhere. E. We understand and respect the concerns of the Soviet Union for its security. In that connection, we call attention to the proposals for balanced and mutual force reductions made at the recent Reykjavik meeting of the NATO Ministerial Council./5/ And we reaffirm our willingness to consider Soviet proposals to improve their own and Western European security, in terms both of conventional and nuclear arms, in ways that could impose lesser dangers and burdens on us both. /5/The North Atlantic Council met in Reykjavik June 24-25. For text of the statement on mutual and balanced force reductions, see Department of State Bulletin, July 15, 1968, p. 77. For documentation, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XIII, Document 312. It might be preferable to make point E orally, rather than in a note or aide-mémoire. Stressing our force reduction proposals too much could strengthen the hand of those in the Soviet Union who oppose "bridge-building" and détente as imperialist tricks to subvert Eastern Europe. On the other hand, the first sentence of E should be put on the record, if we give the Soviets any piece of paper. On balance, I recommend that E be kept in. III I recommend also that the Soviet invitation to Averell Harriman be taken up at once. He would be going, obviously, to discuss Viet-Nam. Such a visit could be interpreted as a signal that we don't care what the Soviets do in Czechoslovakia, but will pursue détente through thick or thin. We should therefore make it clear to the Russians, privately, that we are sending Averell on the assumption that there will be no basic change in the political situation, or in the relationship among states. He would, of course, be instructed to follow up at the highest level on the implications of our aide-mémoire with respect to NPT, the arms race, and other issues that would inevitably be affected by a Soviet military move in Czechoslovakia. IV I attach great importance to working with our NATO allies in this situation. If we are to succeed in building up NATO as an active collaborator on issues beyond the military defense of Europe, we must miss no opportunity to involve NATO, or the more active members, in responsible consultations with us. In retrospect, I think the NATO dimension has been the weakest element in our Middle East diplomacy. I realize that NATO consultations on the situation in Eastern Europe will be a striking sign. But why should we hesitate to give strong signals, so long as we avoid threats we do not intend to carry out? The Soviets are having all kinds of meetings on the subject. The outcome of the struggle between the Soviets and the Czechs will affect political and security conditions in Europe for years to come. It would be ridiculous to hesitate about being seen to consult with our European allies on a subject that vitally and directly concerns their political environment, as well as ours. V We are preparing a scenario of preliminary political consultations about the line we are proposing here with our allies, with other interested countries, with neutrals, and with Roumania, Yugoslavia, Hungary, and perhaps Poland. We should also consider having some Senators of both parties make statesmanlike speeches on the subject at this stage./6/ /6/In a July 20 informal memorandum, attached to the source text, Rostow commented: "My feeling is that the time for possible deterrence is very short--a matter of four or five days."
68. Telegram From the Embassy in Czechoslovakia to the Department of State/1/ Prague, July 22, 1968, 1710Z. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 CZECH. Confidential; Priority; Exdis. 2682. 1. Notice question has been asked whether US is in touch with Czech leaders during current crisis (Belgrade 3725)./2/ The answer is that the prospects for meaningful contact are not very good and this appears to be by Czech choice. Smrkovsky is probably the most approachable among the hierarchy but he is too shrewd to become involved with us without checking with the Foreign Ministry which would put things back in present sterile channel. /2/Dated June 20. (Ibid.) 2. It is on my conscience whether we should indicate we would be prepared to help in any way regime thought fit. This could be done through informal inquiry to Snejdarek, Director of Institute for International Politics and Economics, who seems to stand close to important party circles or through Austrians whose standing is now probably highest among Western countries. My feeling of the moment is that we should not undertake this move. Once it got into formal channels we would run the risk of being charged with hypocrisy since Czechs could claim they have made it amply clear what they wish from U.S., namely the elimination of alleged economic discrimination. 3. Believe Czechs are realistic in realizing limits on US action, i.e., no military support or massive economic aid. They are aware of reciprocal inhibitions stemming from Viet-Nam war. Cool official relations also enhance their standing in Communist camp. They know in any case they can count on considerable benefit of US public understanding. Secretary's statement was helpful in making this point./3/ /3/Not further identified. 4. Despite Western press stories playing up alleged concern over US-Soviet tacit collusion over Czechoslovakia, regime does not seem to be too unhappy with present US stance, viz., rude Pravo article yesterday (Prague 2672)/4/ citing US-Soviet cooperation as contribution to moderating of cold war. Article incidentally served purpose of refuting Soviet insinuations of US interest in instigating local unrest. /4/The file citation for this telegram, dated July 21, is missing from the microfilm finding aid. 5. We are not impressed by influence other Western countries can bring to bear on present situation. For time being Czechs seem to prefer handling their troubles within the Communist orbit. But suggestion I have to offer is VOA might play up US public reaction somewhat more as legitimate news, stopping short of making this possible issue with Soviets. Beam
69. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/ Moscow, July 22, 1968, 1720Z. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CZECH. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to Prague. A copy of this telegram was passed to President Johnson by Rostow on July 23, with the annotation: "Herewith Tommy Thompson's current evaluation of Czech affair." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, USSR, Cables, Vol. 21) 4751. 1. Although there are many pros and cons I am convinced that our present posture on Czech affair is the correct one particularly in absence any request from Czechs for a change. They should be in the best position to judge effects of any actions or statements on our part. Any appeal to the Soviets would necessarily reveal weakness of our position by what we would not and could not say. Moreover, I believe that on balance such appeal would strengthen the hands of the hardliners rather than those who oppose intervention. 2. Soviets have left themselves little ground to retreat and have already paid a big price in the Communist as well as the free world by their crude handling of this affair. If Czechs face them down, Soviet prestige will suffer and other members of the camp will be encouraged toward greater independence. If they use force the free world will be deeply shocked, NATO strengthened, hope of reducing military expend-iture by agreement with US jeopardized, etc. Moreover internal dissatisfaction with Soviet leadership would increase. Their only hope is that Czechs will back down and even if this happens, as it may well do, Soviet efforts to unify Communist camp under their leadership will be thwarted. In Soviet practice serious errors demand at least a scapegoat and regardless of how the Czech affair comes out this may well be the beginning of a process leading to the fall of Brezhnev, Suslov and others. Thompson
70. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, July 22, 1968. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-1 COMBLOC-CZECH. Secret; Nodis. Drafted and initialed by Bohlen and approved in S on July 24. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Ambassador of USSR The Secretary The Secretary said he had asked Ambassador Dobrynin to come to see him because he had just been in Honolulu and while there and on the way back had been informed of a series of articles in Soviet newspapers and on Soviet radio which seemed to imply U.S. involvement in the Czech situation. He said he had no paper to give the Ambassador but would merely make an oral statement. The Secretary went on to say that he wished to express the seriousness with which the U.S. regarded accusations of this kind. For example, he referred to an article in Pravda on July 19 in which it spoke of a NATO Western plot against Czechoslovakia involving the Pentagon and CIA. He wished to state emphatically that there was absolutely no truth in this allegation. A further statement in regard to arms caches had appeared in the Soviet press and he had even seen something questioning the authenticity of these arms caches by some Czechs. He referred to a Bulgarian newspaper account which indicated one of the arms caches had been barely concealed, thereby suggesting it had been placed there for easier detection. He referred also to a Moscow radio broadcast of July 22 of an alleged plot by Bonn and the U.S. in regard to Czechoslovakia. The Secretary went on to say that no one knew better than members of the Soviet Embassy the restraint the U.S. had exercised in regard to Czech developments. He said we had not wished to involve ourselves directly in this matter, that the U.S. had been attempting to develop better relationships with Eastern European countries as well as with the Soviet Union. However, in regard to these current charges he would like to make three points: 1) They were emphatically not true; 2) They were creating in this country a considerable amount of agitation in political circles in regard to the Czech situation. Congressmen and Senators were making statements and becoming very concerned about them. (Dobrynin here intervened and said--"were we causing this?") The Secretary said these charges against the U.S. had created a part of this agitation. He mentioned that Mr. Bohlen had been asked to appear in Executive Session of the Sub-Committee on Europe of the House Foreign Affairs Committee to discuss the Czech situation./2/ /2/No copy of the testimony was found. 3) The feelings of the American people were perfectly understandable in matters of this kind. In fact they go back to Thomas Jefferson and the Declaration of Independence (which parenthetically the Secretary said ante-dated Karl Marx by about one hundred years) that set forth the right of peoples to order their own affairs themselves. The U.S. Government had not sought to involve itself in this situation, but there should be no misapprehension as to the feelings and sympathies of the American people. The Secretary mentioned that this was the first time that anybody had spoken officially to Ambassador Dobrynin about the Czech situation. He added that the U.S. Government had not wished to point out that undoubtedly the Soviet Government had a highly professional intelligence service which would make it clear that there was absolutely no truth to these allegations. We therefore were entitled to wonder what particular purpose was being achieved in their dissemination and whether or not this might be a pretext to lay a basis for some future action against Czechoslovakia. If this happened we would deeply regret it and it could not possibly have anything but a very negative effect on our relations, all the more so if the U.S. was to be presented as a scapegoat. The Secretary said that both he and the President took these allegations very seriously and hoped that the Ambassador would be able to obtain from his government an explanation of these totally erroneous charges. He then asked the Ambassador if he had any questions. The Ambassador said he could only say there was no question of any form of pretext or excuse. Beyond that he could only say that he would report this matter to his government. The Secretary then discussed how it would be handled with the press. (The Secretary had received a telephone call to say the Ambassador's car had been seen by the press.) He said that we were planning to state that the Secretary had asked the Ambassador to come in to take up with him the charges appearing in the Soviet press, to refute them, and to ask for an explanation. Dobrynin said he thought that this was perhaps a little too detailed but had no suggestions as to how to handle it. Comment: Dobrynin appeared to be considerably worried, possibly due to the U.S. démarche but most likely by the general state of affairs in regard to Czechoslovakia. He was distinctly not his usual genial self.
71. Memorandum From Robert Ginsburgh of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow)/1/ Washington, July 23, 1968. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Czechoslovakia, Memos, Vol. 2. Top Secret. Walt: Here are Bill Lemnitzer's answers to the two questions you raised with me yesterday. The four major conclusions which emerge are: --Czech defection would weaken the Warsaw Pact threat to Western Europe--but probably not enough to justify reduction of current NATO forces. --Czech neutralization would justify some reduction in NATO force levels--dependent on our confidence that the Czechs would remain neutral in the event of war. --Forces for possible intervention in Czechoslovakia could involve 1 U.S. brigade, 2 French divisions, and 2 FRG divisions. --Employment of anything more than 1 brigade ought to be accompanied by NATO mobilization, which would require six months to reach planned force levels. G
Washington, July 24, 1968, 1:30-3:50 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings. Top Secret. The meeting was held on the second floor of the mansion. NOTES OF THE MEETING OF THE PRESIDENT WITHHIS FOREIGN POLICY ADVISERS AT LUNCH Attending the meeting were: The President [Here follow 1-1/2 pages of discussion on the Vietnam war.] The Czechoslovakian situation Mr. Rostow: The Soviets will not move militarily against them, I do not think. I told House we are on the Czech side./2/ /2/Apparently in either an informal meeting or executive session. No printed volumes of House Foreign Affairs Committee hearings include testimony by Rostow. We should hold off on "Most Favored Nations" legislation in order not to cause a problem for the Czechs. The continuing resolution--what does it do to DoD, Foreign Aid, Foreign Policy things. See what kind of resolution they will get. [Here follows 1/2 page of discussion on German nuclear consultations.] Secretary Rusk: We saw the Czech situation as nearly over. The real crisis has subsided. We don't want to spoil the deal. [Here follows 1/2-page of discussion of the sale of tanks to Belgium and the Geneva disarmament talks.]
73. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Bohlen) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/ Washington, July 26, 1968. /1/Source: Department of State, Bohlen Files: Lot 73 D 374, Memos Drafted in G. Secret. Drafted by Bohlen. SUBJECT While of course it is not conclusive I must say I don't like the tone of the Soviet and Satellite press in regard to Czechoslovakia. Not only is the tone shriller, but for the first time an authoritative Soviet journal, i.e., Pravda, has stated that there is going on in Prague preparations for a coup which the Czech leaders do not seem to be aware of, and that action is necessary to forestall this coup. There is also a reference in the Red Star to the fact that the combat readiness of the Soviet army increases day by day and hour by hour. There has been no announcement made of the date of the Politburo meetings, and there is even an indication in an American correspondent's story from Moscow that diplomatic circles there are beginning to wonder if the meetings would come off. There is also the increased Soviet mobilization and the report that at least two, if not three, Soviet divisions moved south from the Berlin area towards the Czech border. Of course this could all be part of the war of nerves, but I think something to watch is whether or not there is any serious indication that the proposed meeting is off. I find the military preparations somewhat excessive for a war of nerves, and it could be that in addition to making final preparation for a move into Czechoslovakia the Soviets are preparing for any eventuality which might arise. The foregoing is pure speculation, but I thought I should tell you that I think the scene has darkened a bit since yesterday.
Washington, July 27, 1968, 3-4:30 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Transcripts of Cabinet Room Meetings. No classification marking. The source text comprises pages 28-32 of a 34-page transcript. The text printed here contains revisions that were made after the editor listened to the recording of the conversation. The recording is ibid., Recording of Meeting Between President Johnson, Senator Dirksen, and Secretary Rusk, July 27, 1968, 3-4:30 p.m. [Tape FC002, Side B]. Meeting in Cabinet Room, Saturday, July 26 [27], 1968, With the President and Senator Dirksen. They Were Joined Later by Secretary Rusk From 3:00 to 4:30./2/ /2/The correct date, July 27, is from the President's Daily Diary. (Ibid.) The diary also indicates that Rusk joined the meeting at 3:45 p.m. [Here follow 28 pages of discussion of domestic politics.] Dirksen: How the hell did the Wall Street Journal ever write that editorial on the subject of Czechoslovakia? To do anything there looks very dim. Rusk: Any time you want to call me, just pick up the phone and call me because the situation changes on a daily basis. The issues between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union are really fundamental issues. The Soviets are deeply concerned about the future of the entire Communist world in Eastern Europe as a result of what is happening in Czechoslovakia. They raised the question on the monopolization of the Communist Party. The Czechs raised the question on the arrangements within the solidarity of the Warsaw Pact. They have eliminated censorship to the extent that there is more free expression now in Czechoslovakia than there has ever been present in any Communist country including Yugoslavia. I think the Soviets are concerned both on the security grounds of a country that is on their border and also borders on the west. But they're even more concerned about the possibility of contagion--how is Czechoslovakia affecting Poland, Hungary, West and East Germany and even the Soviet Union itself where they have important troubles with their young people and with their nationalities. Our people who visit the Soviet Union or live there say there's enormous apathy around Moscow. It is just like a dead lump of dough and it's stirring all through that part of the world. Matter of fact, John Foster Dulles used to talk about this possibility in '53 and '54. Now publicly we've taken the line that these charges by the Soviet Union that we are somehow concocting this thing in Czechoslovakia are false. The Soviet Union knows them to be false and that, of course, the Soviet Union knows what the American people think about an issue of this sort when it is raised anywhere in the world. We think people ought to determine their own affairs. Privately we have been much more stiff than that with them and have specifically said so. Now look, if you're trying to build up a pretext by your charges against us for action against Czechoslovakia, cut it out because that's going to have very serious effect on our relations. They denied they're doing it which is sort of interesting, but nevertheless now on the problem that he will face down there during at least three or four days will be how to handle it in such a way not to get in the way of the Czechs, not to hurt the Czechs. Now we've been told by the Czechs this is their final remark that they consider that our public handling of this question has been about right from their point of view. If we would go on much more dramatically in supporting the Czechs this would create real problems for them in their attempt to deal with the Russians. Now there is another reason why we might want to be a little careful about this problem. The chances are that the Czechs will make some compromises here to keep the Russians off their backs. It may be we pledge fidelity to the Warsaw pact, it may be some changes in personnel, it may be the reimposition of censorship. We just don't know. But you just might want--before you lock up any comments you make about Eastern Europe, you just might want to give me or give Chip Bohlen a telephone call and see if there are any later developments that could possibly have any bearing on what you are thinking about. On the general idea of détente--this thing the so called détente--there's very little basis for any generalization on it. On the one side we have such things as the civil air agreement and the Consular Agreement, the Space Treaty and the nonproliferation treaty and the possibility of talks on the strategic offensive and defensive missiles. But on the other hand you have got Berlin and Germany and Vietnam and the Middle East so you've got many dangerous questions that have not been resolved. So one can't speak of détente, one can't speak of the opposite. It's pragmatic kind of situations. [Here follow 1-1/2 pages of discussion of domestic politics and Vietnam.]
Washington, July 29, 1968, 7-8 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Transcripts of Cabinet Room Meetings. No classification marking. The text printed here contains revisions that were made after the editor listened to the recording of the conversation. The recording is ibid., Recording of a Meeting Between President Johnson, Secretary Rusk, and Secretary Clifford, July 29, 1968, 7-8 p.m. [Tape FC001, Side A]. Cabinet Room Meeting of Monday, July 29, 1968, 7:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m. With the President, Secretary Rusk and Secretary Clifford and Tom Johnson Clifford: You've got to look at it, too, of the possibility of there being some serious danger inherent in it. One quick reaction I would have would be that if by chance Czechoslovakia is still a pending problem, I don't believe I'd go near Kosygin during the time that Czechoslovakia is still hot. I don't. You could get caught up in that and I'm just afraid it would be difficult for you to extricate yourself. You could have a talk with Kosygin and the day you talked with him Soviet troops could move on Czechoslovakia or the day after you left, troops could move in Czechoslovakia. It would be, they'd be tied together in some way, whether that would suit Kosygin's attitude or not, I don't know. I think that we have to be careful about the reasons why the President was seeing Kosygin at this time. Is it because the President has a new plan that he is taking to Kosygin vis-à-vis Vietnam? Is there something new he wants to take to him? Is it because the President's concerned about the Middle East--some development there? Is he concerned about NATO? You know there's so much cooking right now. As far as starting off with Kosygin on a discussion of strategic limitation and ultimate reduction, I don't know. Right at this time, Mr. President, I wonder whether that's advisable. These are going to be long, difficult, exceedingly complex negotiations. Whether the President and Kosygin can do anything much at the very beginning of it, I don't know. I think that the general approach would be, well--I just wonder what they can do about it. And I think we have to be careful. The time that the President selects to see Kosygin. I would hope that there'd be a time when we didn't have a situation quite as inflammable as it is. I'm thinking of the Czechoslovakian problem. I think that's a terribly difficult problem. I know we can't get in it. I feel some concern that we can. Czechoslovakia is supposedly a free country and they can be under the heel just like Hungary was. I don't know for instance whether somebody might decide to bring this up in the Security Council in the UN--Czechoslovakia. Maybe some member of the Security Council could decide to bring it up. That would tend to exaggerate it. So, a second point I'm making is to sound a note of basic caution about going to see Kosygin right at this time. I think it must be watched with great care. The third point I have: After Dean left Saturday afternoon, I just noted down thoughts that I had. Just in my own handwriting--I've not given them even to the girls. The third point I'd like to make has to do with the Convention. [Here follow 4 pages of discussion of the Democratic National Convention and Vietnam.] [Clifford:] This is very prominent in my mind, as I look ahead. At this time, Mr. President, with the condition existing in Czechoslovakia, with existing in Vietnam we're waiting for the other shoe to drop over there, I can see more danger in a visit with Kosygin at this time, then I can see benefit. Now I think there will come a time when the President can see Kosygin. Right now it just seems to me that it's tempting fate too severely. President: What time do you see that it could come? Clifford: Well, I think there'll be a resolution of the problem in Czechoslovakia. These things don't go on indefinitely. The President is still President. Let's see, August, September, October, November, December, you're still President for six months, until the 20th of January. That's almost six months off. I don't know, it could be in a week. President: You think it would probably be all right to have meetings in November and December? Clifford: It wouldn't bother me a bit. It wouldn't bother me a bit. You're going right on being President and you're not bothering with politics. The fact that there's some new man or something, that wouldn't bother me a particle. I think in maybe a week, it could be a week. Czechoslovakia would be resolved one way or another. It could be two weeks, or three weeks, but I think it's going to be resolved that this thing has gotten so acute now, so inflammatory, that I think they're going to lance this abscess one way or another and I think it will be out of the way. Now, I think that we will all learn during the month of August whether there's going to be another series of attacks from the enemy in Vietnam. Maybe it will come and maybe it won't, and I think we get that out of the way so that that doesn't get too involved in it. It wouldn't disturb me at all if the talks on strategic weapons control were to start at some other level. It's going to go on for some time. I don't know that it has too much significance in having it started by Kosygin and the President and I'm not even sure that it's particularly valuable to just confine it to that at the starting. I think that the President when he goes to see, or arranges to see Kosygin under the proper circumstances in which Kosygin's comfortable, I would hope the two of you would be able to sit down and cover the entire mosaic of our problems. An announcement could be made ahead of time to that effect and something after it that could come out. Right now I believe that if I were Kosygin with this real nose bleed on my hands with Czechoslovakia I think almost the last person I would want to see right now would be President Johnson. President: Yes, I think there is something to that. I'm not necessarily trying to help him though. Rusk: Well, Mr. President, I'd like to comment very briefly. President: I agree. Let me comment on what Clark is saying. I think there is no reason why we have to act until the Czechoslovakia situation is cleared. As I indicated, that's number one. I don't know how. If it's two weeks, that's another matter. I would expect maybe it wouldn't be that long. I don't know. I can't tell. But I don't think it's essential. We don't say that I don't think that the President and Kosygin sit down together. We have though for four years urged this step upon them and we finally got them to agree now that there will be a meeting within a month or a month and a half. I would like to forthrightly respond to that and accept it and give him my views of what ought to happen. And I think there may be some merit in the four days of the Convention there waiting until it's over with, I don't care. And it may be that he won't want to start at this level. I'd rather think he wouldn't. Although I would like to because I would think that that would be the way. But if not, if you want to modify that part of it if that is a--, then you might say, or at the Foreign Minister level. One or the other of us ought to start it off. And I'm willing to rewrite the letter and use his phrase--not ours. Rusk: Month, month and a half. President: Yes, and I'm willing to and also add that if this doesn't suit you, that we'd be glad for the Foreign Ministers to start it off. We do think it is of sufficient importance. The very first proposal that we made to the Soviet Union we insisted on time and date and place and subject. There is so much that is pending that needs the attention of both countries. What I'm terribly afraid of is--I'm afraid that by our sitting with our hands in our pockets, just merrily, merrily going along, just reacting to all of their initiatives and their propaganda and their party line that we just finally catch ourselves just signing on which we have been doing most of the time and I think we're likely to be doing it again. I think we'll be having a Council meeting here in a week or so and everybody will pretty well agree in general that we ought to cut out something else we're doing in deference to these folks. That is what I am fearful of. Rusk: Well, I agree with Clark. I think you do, too, about the possible connection between this Czechoslovakia business. I think, myself, that the chances are-- President: We won't have waited today if it hadn't agreed on that. Rusk: That's right. That's right. I think we're likely to see here some sort of answer on the Czech business before then. President: I think so. Rusk: We did put in this draft: "If the general situation permits," a phrase that would cover the Czech business in our minds that if things really start in Czechoslovakia we'd just ourselves pull back even if Kosygin accepted this. President: That is what that was intended to do. But I don't think that we even need to dispatch the letter until we see a little clearer than we do now. Rusk: That's right. President: I said that last weekend and I didn't ask for this meeting today. Rusk: I asked for it. Now on this other--what would such a meeting be about. I think that we can make it pretty clear that it is about offensive and defensive missiles. That is a question which everybody knows the President's worked on very hard and worked on it personally. He tried very hard at Glassboro to get these talks started. He's also worked hard on the non-proliferation treaty which has in it an obligation on the part of the nuclear powers to get going and negotiate in good faith the elimination of the arms race. So from that point of view it seems to me that it would militate in favor of the President's launching these discussions. There's another factor and that is that, Clark, you may not like this one particularly. I think if the President initiated the discussions, this would be a sign to what General Eisenhower called the military industrial complex that Goddamn it, getting an agreement to limit offensive and defensive missiles is the national policy of the United States. We want people to think about how you do it and not think about how you'll avoid doing it. Looking ahead you look at these tens of billions that are going down this rat hole if we don't find an answer to this, you see. So there's an internal commitment involving the President's study. Now the danger is--the court of last resort getting it into session and Kosygin could turn up there with demands on Berlin or something--after all Khrushchev did drop the Berlin crisis in President Kennedy's lap when they met in Vienna. This did not happen in Glassboro partly because Kosygin was over here in the United Nations on a Middle East where, frying some fishes on his own at that time. And therefore, this was not racked up. There's little danger. I think it is not as great now as it might have been earlier if nothing had happened. So this is why--subject to Czechoslovakia--I myself come down on the balanced judgment that there would be real merit in the two meetings if it could be done under the appropriate circumstances. Clifford: I find no disagreement with that, Dean, I think that President Kennedy's meeting in Vienna with Khrushchev was a calamity. Rusk: It was. Clifford: Boy, it was a real zero from President Kennedy's standpoint. Clifford: Now I think conditions have changed. I think that the Soviets have shown an inclination to find some basis of cooperation with us. That's a very interesting sentence in the last letter of Kosygin that we will both find as we get into this that a savings can be effected to a very substantial degree. Rusk: I would be for the President having a chance to talk with him very informally without pretending that the main subject is about Vietnam and about the Middle East. Clifford: I would have no difficulty with that. President: You know originally I thought we ought to say there and I took it out. Rusk: Yes. President: This is not the only subject. Rusk: This refers now to--it will also give us a chance to discuss quietly and informally some of the problems or tensions that you referred to. President: That just polished up, the very [inaudible] the three matters that we wanted to talk about and that also left us a getting out place even on Czechoslovakia or any other developments after it was set. And I don't think I would want to specify that I would not want to attend a meeting. Now, I don't see that this would do the damage to the Democratic Party that Clark does. I have a different viewpoint. I think it's the best thing that we could do for the Democratic Party, whoever is nominated at that time. I don't think we necessarily need to go at that specific moment, but I think most of them will be pretty glad that we're having a meeting. I would just leave it more in his hands on the month to month and a half basis. Rusk: All right. President: But I think we could do that after we see the situation. Rusk: I would agree, too, that it would be of great benefit to the Democratic Party if it didn't take place on those very days that they were having their Convention. President: Well their Convention is going to have all the television every hour. This meeting is not going to be taking much of it. And I would doubt that he would set the meeting. I would just leave it and say anytime within the month or month and half he mentioned, it would be agreeable with us. I'd be pretty agreeable to hear suggestions. Rusk: All right. Clifford: Does he have in mind that the President would like to start it off, personally with Kosygin because he said nothing about that in his last reply. And the President I think said nothing about that in this one. Does he? President: Yes. Rusk: Yes. Clifford: Oh, I see. I didn't notice it. President: He understood at Glassboro that we were pressing on this very hard, a little history would help us. Khrushchev wrote to me in December '63 a rather broad long letter and we responded January the 16th, '64 in which we discussed the perils of armament in the world and the two powers poised at each other and how much it would cost us and how much good could be done if we could only approach this problem of disarmament and particularly if we could have some agreement that would bring about the non-proliferation treaty. That was number one on the list and we listed a series of reductions in our armed strength and in our future investments in armaments. And we stuck it right up to him and said that we very much want to do this and then we followed that with a series of specific moves where we reduced our atomic reactors and asked him to do likewise and he held off to the last moment until ours was announced. I was actually at the microphone speaking when he notified us that he would issue an announcement at the same time. We suggested 2 o'clock on Tuesday. I started speaking at one forty-five and we hadn't heard from him and about one fifty-five they brought us a note that he was going to announce it at 2 o'clock, right at the last minute. He went out and our people, we pursued this up until we went in there with our bombing in '65 and things kind of tapered off. At Glassboro it heated up again, very strong. And we took the initiative and just almost wrestled him to have a meeting and said anytime, anywhere we'll send our men to Moscow or we'll meet in Geneva or we'll come back to Glassboro. We'll do anything, but this we must do. We thought we got a tentative, implied acceptance then and we thought it would be rather soon. He got back and subsequently came along and implied it again. What did he say in that language we got back? We announced it the day Bobby Kennedy made a speech and we didn't call him up to find out he was going to speak the same day or not so they charged us with bad motives. You remember that don't you. Rusk: Yes, I remember it. President: There was some indication that they would meet with us again but they never would set a date. So we have kept shoving 'em all during that period. Now we've come along and Kosygin has said yes a month or six weeks. Now if we don't want to talk or if we are hesitant to talk or if we want to just let it go through the regular channels of Bill Foster at Geneva. That's one thing. That's now my view. It hasn't been for four years and I think this is most important we could ever do. Rusk: Mr. President, I tried to get Kosygin to accept McNamara in Moscow the following Wednesday after Glassboro. Well, they gave us that story--can't come then. Well then name a date. Pressed them very hard on this. President: Now, it's been a year, during that time he's put off and put off during that year. During that time I've had to go up with my budget and I've had to put the ABM in the budget to stick it, to hold firm and not weaken with everybody wanting to shimmy a little bit. And then when he got up, a lot want to run away from it after it gets up there, as you've observed with Symington, and so forth, the fight that went on in the Senate. And now he's still holding back one Goddamn year and not doing anything and finally when the Senate vote gets out of the way and it looks like we are going ahead, and we hold out the hand of peace here but the hand of strength here so we're going to go on, we don't want to do this we'd like to save this 50 billion that the two of us are spending, but he's just got no sense at all. We'll go on. We are not going to let you destroy us. We're not going to let you be defended and us not defended. Then he comes up and says I'll see you in a month or month and a half. That's where we are. Then we say well we can't do it because we've got a Convention. That doesn't appeal to me. I'd go right back to him and say that you suggest a month or a month and a half and to me that is agreeable and a month or a month and a half is agreeable and we would suggest it on this level and if you're not satisfied, if you don't want to do it on that level, well then I'll arrange for the Foreign Ministers to meet. Rusk: All right. President: And then I'd let him say if he picks August 25th I wouldn't be worried. I don't think he will, but I'm sure that we can so arrange the agenda that we could get our man nominated and the American people would have all the Democratic Convention that they want. I think they will have. I think it will be the thing that is uppermost. We talked a lot with these folks. You have met with Gromyko a good many times. I have met with Gromyko and with Kosygin and it hasn't turned the world upside down. We know, just like Averell and Vance meeting with them over there, what I'm really worried about is they're more in command of our forces that I am. That's what really troubles me. These damned cables coming in like that. Because I read this record and I see these pictures and I see Javits get up and I see Morgan get up and I see all of them get up and I see the New York Times editorial and it just fits in to this whole damn facet. If I hadn't been watching it for four or five years I wouldn't be worried about it but it's not accidental. And I don't want to get hung on the rack. I just don't want to get caught on it. Rusk: All right. President: I want to make it so firm and loud I don't want my people to serve that up to me and then have Goldberg come along here and saying well as you know I felt this way. Rusk: They can well concentrate on trying to get another private meeting, get an answer from Hanoi. President: I think we'd better show them that it's just a few speeches and pressure are not going to do it. They are beginning to think we're jelly and we'll do it and I don't understand why he sent this wire after we told him how we felt about it. Rusk: The trouble is that negotiators habitually-- President: It's not negotiations, hell-- Rusk: Get action to take the next step. That's one of the problems about American negotiators they're always in a little bit more of a hurry than the other side. I think they also--Averell is making some judgments about politics here at home. President: A good deal and it looks like a good deal of it in Vietnam--the battle strategy too. Rusk: Mr. President, on the longer range negotiations for this thing I'd just like to put it in the back of your mind. I think Clark and I would agree that the two chief people from our respective departments might be Brown. He's very knowledgeable in this field. Clifford: Harold. Rusk: Harold Brown and Butch Fisher he's with ACDA. I think we also feel there ought to be a principal negotiator on top of them. Maybe in the State Department. A man from the Defense Department would be the principal negotiator on disarmament I think it would be a mistake and the Pentagon would feel it even more strongly than I for ACDA to be the number one fellow on this particular subject. Now one possibility would be to bring Tommy Thompson out of Moscow for these talks in Geneva and let him be there for three or four weeks for the first round. And then they're bound to close off the talks for awhile and study each other's position in more detail. Tommy is not doing a great deal in Moscow these days and he would be a in a position to follow up. So he would be one possibility. Another possibility would be that is after the Foreign Ministers review would get through with it, another possibility would be Chet Bowen [Chip Bohlen]. I think in terms of negotiations and this kind of thing. Tommy Thompson would be, in some respect, a more competent negotiator because he's very familiar with all of these matters having worked with the Pentagon for years in that Deputy job over in my shop. I just wanted to mention that to you, because other names may occur to you to head up the delegations but we would suggest a head of the delegation plus Brown and Fisher and their respective staffs. Clifford: We have to bring the Joint Chiefs along on this one, as you would know, they'd be very important and our record must be absolutely clear. They feel the responsibility, of course, as we all do, protecting the security of this country. They, I was telling Dean Saturday afternoon they paw the air when Bill Foster's name is mentioned. They think Bill is very soft and very fuzzy-headed. Now, Dean said, very frankly, well, anybody could be head of ACDA would be viewed in that light by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. President: Just one second. [The President left the room.] Rusk: My guess is the Russians will bite at the Foreign Ministers level like a [inaudible]. Clifford: You mean the ACDA, the Joint Chiefs of Staff problem? Rusk: No, I said if we go back to the Russians to say, Kosygin himself, if not the Foreign Minister, I think the Russians will bite at a Foreign Ministers meeting like a shot. Clifford: [whispering]: I don't think Kosygin will see the President now with all his difficulties. Rusk: Because I don't see much of a meeting between the two after November with the President-elect in the wings. I think it ought to be before November. I think so too, I think it should be before November. The problems the Russians have seem to be Peking with Kosygin and the President meeting and all. Clifford: I think they're awfully sensitive about this too. And of course, they'll get a hell of a lot of blast right now. Apparently, the President wants to start, however. Does he? Does he want to start? Rusk: Yeah. Clifford: Then, what is this alternative? What would the Foreign Ministers meet about. Just meet together to plan an agenda for the two? Rusk: Well, to deal with that, we would try to agree on some general principles. [The President re-entered the room.] And we would make a proposal that we're working on now. We'll have it up to the President shortly after April--August 7th we hope. Clifford: Just to finish this other point, if the President were to designate Bill Foster to be the chief negotiator then I think that he would be waited upon by Wheeler and the rest of the Joint Chiefs and I think they say we can't go along with it and there's no use taking on that kind of fight at the beginning I think. I believe they'd feel better about Butch Fisher than they feel about Bill Foster. I think they feel that Butch is a little harder nosed than Bill is. At the same time if you were to suggest that Butch Fisher was to be the chief negotiator I think that they'd be over here within the hour saying let us tell you why this must not be. Wheeler felt so strongly about it he called and made an appointment with me. He came and talked to me about it. Told about all the experiences that they had had with ACDA and it's one of those situations in which men get locked into a state of mind after a certain number of years. Now whether there's justification for it or not, I think it's beside the question. If it's a state of mind, it's one that we don't have to take on. [Here follow 6 pages of discussion on Congressional relations and defense-related issues.]
76. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/ Moscow, August 2, 1968, 1245Z. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CZECH-USSR. Secret. Repeated to Prague, Warsaw, Sofia, Budapest, Bucharest, Belgrade, Bonn, London, Paris, USUN, and USNATO. 4910. Subj: Czechoslovakia-Soviet relations: the long range view. 1. In view of the paucity of hard information, it is impossible to judge what actually happened at Cierna,/2/ although it would appear that both sides have made concessions. There follows an attempt to examine some of the more fundamental factors involved in the crisis which, while it claims no new insights, will, I hope, be useful in assessing the outcome when more information becomes available. /2/The Presidiums of the Soviet and Czech Communist Parties meet at Cierna, Czechoslovakia, July 25-August 1. For text of the communiqué issued on August 2, see Remington, Winter in Prague, p. 255. 2. Power: So far as the Soviet leaders are concerned, undoubtedly one, if not their most important, concern is the preservation of their own power. No one gets to the top in this system without an unhealthy interest in power, and they can excuse their pursuit of it by rationalizing that they and they alone can preserve the gains and advance the aims of Communism. Ever since Lenin, Communism has meant not only the exercise of power by a small group but also the exclusive right to decide who should hold it. With the very rare exceptions, such as Khrushchev's appeal to the Central Committee, this has been confined to the small group now called the Politburo. 3. The introduction of democratic processes in Czechoslovakia, even if confined to the party, would threaten to undermine the whole system. When freedom of the press and other forms of expression are added to this, it is clear that, unless reversed, what the Czechs will end up with is not what the Soviets mean by the term Marxism-Leninism. In other words, a fundamental change is in process. It is difficult to see how such a development could fail to have serious repercussions on the other bloc countries, including eventually the Soviet Union, or how the Soviet leaders can fail to consider it a serious threat to their hold on power. 4. Security: The strategic location of Czechoslovakia must certainly cause the Soviet military as well as political leaders concern over the possible loss of this salient in the center of their East European bunker zone. Although in an atomic age such considerations of geography have diminished significance, they can still be important for psychological reasons. For example, in a future Berlin crisis the unavailability of Czech territory would make Soviet threats less credible. Moreover if, as seems likely, the situation should develop where Soviets could not count upon Czech military forces, this would make Czechoslovakia a negative liability as Soviet forces would have to be earmarked to control it. 5. Another aspect of security is the loss of classified information that could leak out through a Czechoslovakia friendly to the West, and the operations there of foreign agents which the Soviet press has emphasized from the beginning of the crisis. Also of importance is the possibility of Czechoslovakia providing an escape route for East Germans, Poles and Hungarians desiring to reach the West. Regardless of Czech Government policy, I can't imagine soldiers in a relatively free Czechoslovakia shooting refugees fleeing across the Czech-German border. Even if soldiers could be brought to shoot escapees, I should think an underground railroad a likely possibility. It is possibly this aspect and the possibility of pressure on the Czech regime, other than a defense of the frontier, that the Soviets would have in mind in any demand to station Soviet troops on the Czech frontier with Western Germany. 6. Ideology: A great source of strength of Communism has always been its flat assertion that there is only one truth and that Communism provides all the answers. The appeal of this doctrine has already been badly shaken by the Yugoslav and Chinese heresies. For Czechoslovakia to add another would be to substitute a confusing maze of cloverleafs for the one clear and straight road to Communism. As their claim to be the true interpreters of the doctrine is the basis of the Soviet leadership's claim to power, any further doubt cast on the orthodox view of Communism is bound to be of great concern to the Soviet leaders. 7. The bloc: The Soviets have already shown the importance they attach to the scheduled November meeting of Communist Parties and their attempt to reassert their leadership over the Communist bloc as well as over Communist Parties in the free world. Their ability to do this was highly doubtful before their brutal pressure on the Czechs. Now it would appear to be out the window. If to Yugoslav independence and Romanian estrangement of foreign affairs is added a successful Czech revolt against Soviet dictation of the internal order, there could be little doubt that a further loosening of bloc ties would follow. On the other hand if the Soviets, by using whatever means are necessary, are able to restore an orthodox regime in Czechoslovakia, they could at least for a time hope to consolidate their hold over a smaller portion of the bloc. The eventual price they would have to pay for this would, however, doubtless be great, including their relations with non-ruling Communist Parties. 8. The past: An important factor in the Soviet attitude is their desire to avoid opening the skeletons in the closet to public view and to precipitate a showdown on the issue of Stalinism which they have with such effort and strain managed to avoid. Although the Czechs while under existing pressures may exercise sufficient voluntary restraint to defer this issue, it would seem inescapable if a free press continues to exist in Czechoslovakia. With the involvement of a number of current Soviet leaders in Stalin's crimes, Czech remarks touching on this issue are fighting words. 9. The future: While I will not in this message attempt to analyze the many cons to Soviet attempts to restore an orthodox order in Czechoslovakia, the foregoing considerations indicate, it seems to me, that for the Soviets to accept the proposed changes in that country would mean the beginning of the ultimate disintegration of the Soviet bloc. Inevitably Czechoslovakia would gradually be forced or be drawn to the other side of the Iron Curtain, especially if the Czechs are to solve their economic problems without massive economic aid from the Soviet Union. Thus the best the Soviets could hope for unless present trends are arrested would be a Czechoslovakia paying only lip service to the Warsaw Pact. Should the Poles or East Germans catch the infection, the entire Soviet position in Europe would be jeopardized. Furthermore, and there is no doubt in my mind that this is a primary consideration of the leadership, this infection would spread to the USSR and aggravate the problems of the present order. There are already numerous signs of the disaffection of intellectuals and youth, a widespread dissatisfaction with the role of the Communist Party in this country, as well as a rising feeling of nationalism in the various Soviet republics. 10. Conclusion: In view of the foregoing, it is my view that the Soviets will go to great lengths to push the Czechs back to something close to the pre-January situation. A factor difficult to judge in all this is the capability of the Soviet leadership to unite in support of a bold and risky policy. Their tendency has been to postpone, compromise or muddle through. Another is the ability of the Czech leadership to remain united and correctly judge how much they can get away with. I must confess that in the short run I am pessimistic that the two sides can find and maintain the right combination which will reconcile their conflicting needs and objectives. In the longer view, it seems to me that however the current crisis is dealt with the Soviets will be unable, even by temporizing, to maintain a system that is out of step with the times. 11. For the near future the levers in Soviet hands are not insignificant. They can continue the war of nerves with military threats and political pressure. They can play on Czechoslovak differences and exploit those elements in Czech society opposed to current trends. In view of heavy dependence of Czechoslovakia on the bloc, and particularly the Soviet Union, for raw material as well as markets, they can bring strong economic pressure. Although the effect of their recent tactics has been both to consolidate Dubcek's position and to limit his freedom of action, they could change their tactics and attempt to bring him down by exploiting the difficulties his regime will doubtless face in the next months. In the short term before the Czech Party Congress, the Soviets will likely seek to utilize these levers as fully as possible to try to avoid a situation where their options are reduced to either direct military action or tacit acceptance of the new Czechoslovakia with the consequences that will flow therefrom. Thompson [Continue with the next documents] Volume XVII Index | Foreign Relations Online | Historian's Office | |