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 | FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968 Volume XVII Eastern Europe Department of State |
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| 57. Telegram From the Embassy in Czechoslovakia to the Department of State/1/ Prague, March 25, 1968, 1600Z. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 CZECH. Confidential. Repeated to Belgrade, Bonn, Bucharest, Budapest, London, Moscow, Paris, Sofia, Vienna, Warsaw, Munich, and Berlin. 1667. Subject: After the fall. 1. For first time in history, a Communist regime has purged top leader by bringing popular pressure to bear on him. The occasion warrants reflection on what this means for Czechoslovakia and for US interests. 2. While Novotny's fall was necessary to progressive coalition's objectives as well as symbolically important, it by no means solves coalition's problems. As coalition attempts cope with selection new President, weeding out remaining Novotnyites, and working out and trying implement action program, it faces two principal sources of friction: a. Members of the coalition--e.g., Kolders and Cerniks--who are getting or may get cold feet about unbridled democratization and who might join forces with those conservatives who manage to save their positions; b. Possibility that democratization will run out of control, leading to dangerous demands (e.g., for neutrality or takeover by non-Communists) by significant organizations, embarrassing mass demonstrations, or violence. 3. To take latter difficulty first, one obvious factor is that Czechs are not Poles or Hungarians. Neither history nor popular attitudes thus far in crisis suggest that Czechs as a nation will lose their heads. Small minority may stridently urge extreme ideas, but majority would probably remain passive, and if coalition (it may still be too early to call it a regime) is able to continue to give vocal minority chance to blow off steam seems unlikely that trouble would arise on that score. Students have been significant plus on progressive side and may become even more politically active, but their restraint thus far (especially in Prague) has been noteworthy and it seems unlikely they would deliberately endanger regime they felt was working in right direction. Slovaks are historically less averse to taking risks but will probably be occupied with discussions of federalism at least in immediate future. 4. More immediate prospect of resistance is from proponents of caution and conservatism working within framework of victorious coalition. Cernik has suggested that adoption of action program should bring discussion to an end; if new [garble] tries to do so it will alienate its more progressive supporters and possibly open way for new political crisis. In any case coalition will be highly vulnerable to dissension in its ranks when it begins dealing with specific issues. For example there are signs that trade unions may come to life and if so they will certainly cast critical eye on some aspects of economic reform; probable desire of economic reformers to sit firmly on trade unions in such case could put them at odds with political reformers who may welcome trade unions as independent force. Czech-Slovak problems are obviously another fertile field for manipulations to break up the coalition. 5. Obvious question mark is Moscow's attitude. Embassy Moscow is in better position to judge but as of today following Dubcek's return from Dresden/2/ certain Czechs are giving some colleagues, especially the British, the impression they have turned the corner with the Soviets insofar as concerns present reliability and intent. Still in question is the effect of compounded events in Czechoslovakia and Poland, enlivened by memories of 1956, and probably plied by hysterical East Germans. The Soviets of course have powerful economic (to say nothing of military) levers at their fingertips, but will they attempt to use them in a drastic way? Or, more to the point, will Czechoslovakia give cause to use them? It can be hoped that lessons were learned on all sides from 1956, and it can be expected that Prague will do its utmost to avoid any high risk foreign policy moves. What cannot be predicted is ultimate scope of domestic democratization and Soviet reaction thereto. /2/He was attending a March 23 meeting of Communist Party leaders. 6. The reawakening of political life which we are witnessing will not easily be stopped. In fact, leaders of coalition apparently do not expect that genie of open public discussion which they let loose to bring Novotny down will now meekly return to its bottle; they seem prepared to live with their genie and to use it as instrument for working out solutions to overwhelming problems which face their country. We still remain skeptical that genuine democracy can successfully be restored in Czechoslovakia behind Communist facade. But without yielding to apocalyptic prophecy, it is obvious that consequences of even partial success would reach far beyond the borders of this small country. 7. Trend here is obviously in US interest and Embassy believes we should ponder what can be done to encourage it. Embassy will offer suggestions in later tel./3/ /3/The Embassy forwarded its suggestions regarding a U.S. low profile in response to changes in Czechoslovakia in telegram 1693 from Prague, March 29. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 CZECH) Beam
58. Memorandum From the Ambassador to Czechoslovakia (Beam) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Bohlen)/1/ Washington, April 26, 1968. /1/Source: Department of State, SIG Records: Lot 70 D 263, SIG Memo No. 70. Confidential. Drafted by Beam. Copies were sent to Harriman, Meeker, Solomon, Campbell, and Lisle. Beam was in Washington for consultations. A handwritten note on the source text by Bohlen reads: "I agree with this approach. CEB" SUBJECT Discussion: When I saw the Under Secretary last week he asked me to follow up with you a suggestion to have a new look at the above question. He thought that alternate possibilities should be explored in the light of recent events in Czechoslovakia. Mr. Katzenbach suggested Governor Harriman be informed and consulted in view of his concern with our nationalization claims against Czechoslovakia in 1964. Accordingly, a copy of this paper is being sent to him, as well as to other interested parties in the Department. The crux of the matter is that against the background of earlier negotiations with us, the Czech Government is mounting a major campaign for the return of some $22 million of monetary gold looted by the Nazis. This gold is now held in US, UK and French custody, but we have refused to agree to its release pending a settlement of our nationalization claims and other outstanding financial matters. The Czechs insist that we concluded an agreement in December 1961/2/ (which, in principle, we did) whereby we would have accepted some $11-12 million in payment of our claims (this sum representing $9 million from our sale of the American steel mill purchased by but denied to the Czechs, plus $2 million in an additional Czech contribution, but at the cost of $8 million to the Czechs because of the loss suffered by them in our sale of the steel mill); that we have repudiated this agreement as well as the work accomplished in the earlier negotiations started in 1955; and that we have created a new and unacceptable situation in our latest proposal of November 7, 1967/3/ which increased our claims fourfold to a total of $44 million. /2/See footnote 3, Document 37. /3/See Document 52. The above proposal does, however, offer the Czechs certain benefits in a seven-year stretch-out repayment period and in a possible windfall of some $5 million and a continuing half-million dollars annually due in dollar payments to US social security annuitants in Czechoslovakia. Our proposal nevertheless lacks an essential adjunct to make it negotiable, namely, our restoration of MFN which we are unable to provide because of the non-enactment of the East-West trade legislation. In my view, we possess two guarantees, or bargaining levers, to secure satisfaction of our citizens' legitimate claims, namely, non-release of the gold and the negotiating value of an eventual restoration of MFN. I seriously question whether it is necessary to hold both of these in our hands at the present time. I am firmly convinced that the second factor will be decisive and that we will not get a claims settlement of anywhere near the amount we are asking until we can exploit the prospect of restoring MFN. By continuing our present course we put ourselves in the position of receiving nothing more for our claimants for the foreseeable future, while we bring down on ourselves the odium of blocking the return of gold looted from the Czechs by their Nazi invaders. Palliatives, such as trying to reach partial settlements through offsets on blocked accounts, may help a little but not very much, as long as the main issues remain at an impasse. Real heat is likely to build up against us later this year when Czechoslovakia observes the 50th anniversary of its founding (in Pittsburgh) as a nation. There are cogent political reasons for trying to do better, especially when our aim should be to differentiate in the new regime's favor and to develop relations which could promote our influence and interests in the Communist world. Recommendation: That as and when new discussions become possible, we attempt to renegotiate the agreement of December 1961 whereby: (1) We would accept as a partial settlement and as an installment on our claims an amount in the order of the $2 million in new money offered by the Czechs in December 1961. (Actually we should try for a higher figure in view of the easements included in our November 7, 1967 proposal which should be retained.) (2) We would agree to the release of the monetary gold on condition it were recognized that a final claims settlement remained open for future negotiation. (Here we would make it bluntly clear that MFN would not be granted until such a settlement were reached.) Final Justification: A precedent for this approach exists in the UK agreement with the Czechs to consent to the release of the gold against payment of 1 million pounds on account on British nationalization claims. In our case, we would gain the benefits: (1) of receiving an immediate increment (which could satisfy most of the individual small claimants); and (2) of divesting ourselves of a political embarrassment while retaining at the same time the essential bargaining lever of MFN.
59. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany/1/ Washington, April 27, 1968, 0045Z. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 CZECH. Confidential. Drafted by Batjer; cleared by Lisle, L, and E; and approved by Stoessel. Repeated to Prague, London, Paris, Moscow, Warsaw, Sofia, Budapest, Bucharest, Belgrade, Brussels for Petrow, USNATO, and Berlin. 154242. Ref: Bonn 11211./2/ /2/Telegram 11211, April 24, reported German Foreign Ministry comments on Czechoslovakia's financial position. (Ibid.) 1. Czech situation under close consideration. Contingencies involving possible Czech appeals to US for economic support have been studied. Under present legislative restrictions (no aid, PL-480, Exim loans or guarantees, MFN tariff treatment), regrettably our ability to respond in such circumstances is limited. Also this connection Czechoslovakia is substantial supplier of arms to North Viet-Nam. 2. Major US-Czech issue of gold/claims settlement remains. Czechs have indicated they will respond negatively to our November 1967 proposal for settlement this issue./3/ We will carefully consider Czech response but are not prepared to consent, as Czechs desire, to release Nazi-looted Czech gold until there is satisfactory settlement of US financial claims. Gold is our only effective leverage for such settlement. /3/See Documents 52 and 56. 3. With regard possibility West European countries, including FRG, extending financial assistance to Czechs, we would encourage such action. 4. Our position on Czech developments is to make clear informally and discreetly to Czechs on appropriate occasions that we welcome steps they are taking toward liberalization. We believe it advisable to avoid any steps at this time likely to embarrass new leadership in its internal course or its delicate relationships with Soviet Union and other EE neighbors. 5. When appropriate, you may inform FRG and others of our position. Western Embassies here well briefed regarding our position and legislative limitations vis-à-vis financial assistance to Czechoslovakia. Rusk
60. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Rostow) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/ Washington, May 10, 1968. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CZECH-USSR. Secret; Exdis. Copies were sent to Bohlen and Leddy. In a May 11 note attached to the source text, Under Secretary Katzenbach commented: "I disagree strongly with both the analysis and the recommendations. So do the other senior officials of the Government with whom I have talked generally on this subject." Rusk wrote on Katzenbach's note: "So do I. DR" SUBJECT I have thought further about our conversation yesterday./2/ /2/No record of this conversation has been found. I conclude that it would be a serious mistake not to give the Soviets a private signal of concern about troop movements near Czechoslovakia./3/ /3/Soviet forces stationed in Poland had carried out troop maneuvers near the border with Czechoslovakia at the beginning of May. 1. In retrospect, our failure to deter the Communist takeover in Czechoslovakia in 1948 was one of the most serious mistakes of our foreign policy since the war. Firm diplomatic action then--a period of our nuclear monopoly--could well have prevented the Cold War. Similarly, our public statement in 1956 that we would not intervene gave the Soviets a full license./4/ Obviously, the situation has profoundly changed. /4/Apparently a reference to President Eisenhower's October 31, 1956, national address on the Hungarian and Suez crises. For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1956, pp. 453-455 and 648-650. 2. What is at stake now is the process of movement towards détente--the policy of the President's speech of October 7, 1966;/5/ the NATO resolution of last December accepting the Harmel Exercise Report;/6/ the German Eastern policy; and the possibility of real improvement in the political climate in Europe, leading to mutual and balanced force reductions. Progress in this direction would be set back if the Soviets intervened in Czechoslovakia. I simply do not agree that Soviet efforts in Eastern Europe would fail to stamp out liberal trends. They have long since proved their capacity to keep the animals tame by police methods, and their willingness to do so. /5/For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966, Book II, pp. 1125-1130. The President expressed his desire to improve relations with the countries of Eastern Europe. /6/For text of the communiqué and the Harmel report on the future of NATO, see Department of State Bulletin, January 8, 1968, pp. 49-52. 3. The Russians must be hesitating. The moment to give them a deterrent signal is therefore now. It will be too late once they cross the border. 4. We should use the occasion to the maximum to fortify our European and NATO relations, accelerating the processes which have been started during the last year. I therefore recommend: (1) that the President and you see Dobrynin together, preferably today (a) to ask the Soviets what these reports mean; (b) to express the hope that they do not portend any change in the policy of movement towards détente. We could say that we have no intention of interfering in the internal affairs of Czechoslovakia, and hope that the Soviets will continue to pursue the same policy; that the present process of improving the political climate step by step is the only possible path to true détente in Europe, including the possibility of reaching an accommodation on the German question; that the use of force in Europe would set in motion processes we cannot now foresee, but which perhaps neither of us could control; (2) that we use our new machinery of political consultation in Europe to consult intensively with our NATO allies about all aspects of these events; (3) that we consider setting up a high-level special group of NATO allies--of those who wish to do so--here in Washington, to remain in continuous touch with us on the implication of these events, and to develop together proposals of policy for dealing with them; (4) that the NATO military side examine these problems intensively, and be prepared to go on an alert or to make other appropriate demonstrations which might be warranted; (5) that the President consider the advisability of sending messages to Wilson, Kiesinger and de Gaulle asking for their views on the significance of these events and offering to review together, perhaps at the Ministerial level, the policies which should be pursued as the situation evolves. Effective consultation with our principal NATO allies over a matter so vital to the future of Europe would seem crucial if there is to be any future growth of the Alliance.
61. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State/1/ Bonn, May 10, 1968, 1936Z. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CZECH. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to USNATO, Prague, Munich, USEUCOM, USAREUR, and USAFE. 11943. Subj: Czechoslovakia. 1. I know that urgent attention is being given in the Department to the question of what the reaction should be in the event of Soviet military intervention in Czechoslovakia. This is also the case in the FRG and the FonOff has already asked us what the US will do if the Czech Government should request our assistance. Under the circumstances, I wish to set down relevant considerations as seen from here. 2. It is inevitable, of course, to recall the Hungarian experience. A major difference in the case of Czechoslovakia, however, is the presence of substantial US forces in Germany. This means that, contrary to the Hungarian case, we could in theory signal our support for the Czech Government by moving our troops closer to the Czech border or, indeed, cross the border to assist the Czechs in warding off a Soviet attack. I cannot, of course, on the basis of my responsibilities in Germany, make any significant contribution to whether this is desirable per se. Not only Germany but NATO would be deeply involved. 3. There is now a different attitude on the part of the German Government on dealing with the Soviets than was true a few years ago. The coalition's Eastern policy is not the same as that of previous governments. FonOff Acting Assistant Secretary Sahm raised the matter with us in a very preliminary way, and the view he conveyed can be summarized as follows: (a) the FRG must avoid any involvement internally in Czechoslovakia and (b) the United States should not undertake any action re Czechoslovakia from Germany, i.e., the utilization of any US forces stationed here. During the meeting this afternoon on border security (reported by septel)/2/ Sahm, after a direct telephone call from State Secretary Duckwitz, emphasized the German wish that the United States fully respect German sovereignty in planning for a Czech emergency. Sahm also suggested that we review very carefully the output of Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty, and RIAS during the current period. He clearly meant that any statements emanating from German soil which might seem to constitute intervention in the Czech situation should be avoided. /2/Telegram 11942 from Bonn, May 10. (Ibid, DEF 1-1 GER-W) 4. If the likelihood of Soviet military intervention increases, I believe that there should be further high level discussion with the FRG in order to insure that our thinking and planning on how to meet any crisis that might arise are running parallel. My present assessment--which still requires testing at a high German level--is that it would be unrealistic for us to think in terms of countermeasures involving action in or from Germany even if we were inclined in this direction./3/ /3/In telegram 11943 to Bonn, May 11, the Department of State responded that it would seek to avoid any military provocation by U.S. forces within Germany and was restraining the content of broadcasts in an effort to avoid any pretext for Soviet military action in Czechoslovakia. (Ibid.) McGhee
62. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization/1/ Washington, May 11, 1968, 0126Z. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CZECH. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Myerson, cleared by EUR/RPM and Stoessel, and approved by Katzenbach. 162669. NATUS. For Ambassador Cleveland from the Under Secretary. Subject: Czechoslovakia. 1. In context of our overall review of Czech situation, we have been considering how best to handle NATO interest. On the one hand, situation requires great prudence. Developments of past few days obviously reinforce earlier NAC and POLADs discussions pointing to need for extreme caution on the part of Western countries and perforce NATO as an institution. On the other hand, we wish to avail ourselves in all appropriate ways of NATO facilities for information exchange and consultation. 2. Under these circumstances, you should be guided by following which you may convey to Brosio or others of your colleagues as Washington thinking: A. Using its routine NAC and POLADs procedures, NATO should maintain closest possible watch on situation and pool information and views from capitals as much as possible. (We are making every effort to keep you up to date for this purpose, including material for Situation Center.) B. We believe anything that has appearance of unusual concern, for example, special NAC session should be avoided due to visibility. C. As of now, we think public comments of any kind are risky and almost certainly would do more harm than good. Therefore any response to press queries, even on background basis, should be limited to fact that NATO is naturally following the situation through its normal consultation process. 3. We assume that under established procedures NATO military authority are also watching things closely from standpoint of their own plans and intelligence analysis. Rusk
63. Telegram From the Embassy in Czechoslovakia to the Department of State/1/ Prague, May 28, 1968, 1735Z. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CZECH-US. Confidential; Limdis. 2237. Subj: Call on Foreign Minister. 1. I called on Foreign Minister Hajek this morning. Sixth Section Chief Trhlik also present but did not, except as noted, take part in conversation. Talk lasting over hour dominated by gold/claims issue. In this specific connection as well as his general tone Hajek cast something of pall on hope I expressed for better relations. 2. I began talk by stating US following Czechoslovak developments with constructive interest and intensive study at all government levels, and that our reaction both public and official has been restrained, taking account of Czech problems. Noting US policy response to changes such as these tends to be calm and deliberate, I stated movement likely to be in future rather than immediate and pointed out I had brought back nothing definitive from Washington although we hoped talks on substantive matters could begin weeks or even days. 3. Hajek replied that my report afforded "certain hope" for improvement in relations, present level of which not very high, in fact "far from normal." He asserted, however--a point he repeated later--that improvement up to us. He said he had returned to MFA after several years' absence to find same US-CSSR bilateral problems as in 1962 and professed to see not only no progress but even "certain deterioration" and hardening of US position in areas where Czechs wanted to cooperate in removing obstacles. 4. I observed it unfortunate when tone from past leaves us with many problems but said we now should work for improved atmosphere. I noted there have been some changes for better: expansion of mutually beneficial private and government-sponsored exchanges, progress in some technical and scientific areas including relaxation of US export licensing restrictions, and recent air agreement which we look forward to signing and believe will help augment commerce and traffic between our countries. 5. Hajek said he did not want to dwell on obstacles to better relations arising from world situation, of which Viet-Nam major example; he merely noted Czechs definitely opposed to US activity in Viet-Nam "which we consider aggressive" and hope for peace settlement. He wanted to discuss outstanding bilateral issues, especially gold/claims question; this topic occupied bulk of ensuing conversation. 6. Hajek began by stating he thought Czechs had sufficiently impressed on my predecessors their attitude on question. He gave his view of history of talks, including 1961 agreed principles and apparent US loss of interest in fulfilling settlement in early 1962. He noted Secretary told David in March that year/2/ that US not interested because of CSSR attitude toward Cuba and similarly alluded to political obstacles in subsequent meetings with Czech FonMin. However, he said, US never raised question over content of proposed settlement until November 1967 when it apparently rejected everything previously agreed upon and proposed starting again at 1955 position without, however, giving reason. He said he did not doubt sincerity of US expression of good will but could not see how it reconcilable with American position on this problem. /2/For a memorandum of this conversation, see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. XVI, Document 11. 7. I agreed that conclusions on principles reached in 1961,/3/ but said that during next three years Czechs had engaged in haggling over formulation of agreement. In meantime Foreign Claims Commission on basis of evidence had arrived at adjudication of $72 million which was far out of line with $12 million envisaged in 1961 paper. New situation arose with strong understandable reactions from claimants and Congress. We had negotiated 1961 principles sincerely and in good faith but later came up against a political fact of life, namely they could not be implemented under changed conditions. Reviewing major provisions of alternative US proposal,/4/ I said they afforded Czechs significant benefits, especially as regards deferred payments, and should be acceptable for consideration. I emphasized Department seriously interested in breaking out of impasse. /3/A statement of principles regarding the settlement of claims and other economic problems was signed in Prague by Ambassador Wailes and Foreign Minister David on December 8, 1961. See ibid., Document 12. /4/See Document 52. 8. Hajek took up question of insufficiency of proposed claims settlement, stating he found it hard to believe this could have been overlooked in 6-year period before 1961 agreement. He alleged it sounded like pretext rather than real reason not to go forward with agreement, and would have hard time explaining it to his government, Czechoslovak National Assembly and public if new negotiations to open on basis of raised claim figure. 9. In any case, he continued, Czechs did not accept linkage of gold return and claims, because former represented giving back "what is ours." He said for US to link its obligation to return gold under 1946 agreement with something else is perhaps without precedent, in any case not fair way to treat issue. Gold was taken from Czechoslovakia in difficult circumstances brought about by Western Powers (reverting to subject later he alleged US official documents in Foreign Relations series proved US involved in pressure resulting in Munich Agreement), and US has responsibility to liquidate effects of World War II. Instead it is trying through gold to exert pressure on small country. (He alleged US behavior in this instance suggested to him Fulbright book on Arrogance of Power; I rejected this recourse to an unofficial critic as unfair, subjective and out of place in our discussion.) 10. I said we both could agree that history of gold negotiations unfortunate, but that 1967 proposal could not have been surprise, since we had told Czech Embassy two years before we could not go through with principles. Czech right to gold never in question, but US claimants have substantial equal right to satisfactory settlement of their claims and natural linkage exists between two questions in overall settlement of outstanding economic and financial matters. Precedent exists for setoff of assets of negotiating countries in similar negotiations, e.g., US-Yugoslav and US-Bulgaria. 11. I warned Hajek we had been very restrained in voicing our grievance against Czech Government in non-fulfillment of claims. Compulsion to state our case fully would only exacerbate matters and could hopefully be avoided pending rational consideration of a new approach. 12. Hajek observed we both working for our respective governments and conceded I could not force Washington into offering something different in new proposals. However, he said, those working on those proposals should be aware of lack of understanding and bitterness is CSSR over US position up to now. He professed little hope for future talks, alleging Czechs could only look forward to protracted dealing and possible settlement which might be repudiated "as you repudiated 1961 agreement." Thus, he said, he would be grateful if my optimism were fulfilled but he personally could not share it. In general, he said, Czechs knew big, rich US did not need their trade, and they in turn could live without their gold or MFN (he mentioned MFN issue only once in passing during whole conversation). But it would be better if US claimants got what their government considered adequate in 1961 and Czechs got their gold; then relations could develop more fully. 13. Other points: (A) I asked for a definitive report on Jordan case,/5/ noting I had talked with JDC and they anxious for complete story. Hajek referred question to Trhlik who said case still under investigation but FMA would approach "proper authorities" for another interim report. (B) Hajek asked about reply to CSSR request for extradition of "former General Sejna," stating US knew about his criminal activity and political background, neither of which should reinforce his request for political asylum. I replied case still under consideration and information supplied by Czechs taken into account. /5/Charles Jordan, European representative of the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, disappeared and was murdered during an August 1967 visit to Prague. His body was recovered on August 20. In 1975, a Czech intelligence agency defector informed a U.S. Senate committee that Jordan had been killed by Palestinian terrorists while under Czech security surveillance. (Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Internal Security, Communist Bloc Intelligence Activities in the U.S. Hearings, November 18, 1975 (Washington, 1976), pp. 1-64) 14. In conclusion I noted that in receiving me the President wished to inform himself regarding Czech developments and that Secretary hopes to meet Hajek at UNGA, urging in the meantime we try to reach practical solutions. Hajek responded to latter point that he hoped talks with Secretary would be different from his predecessor's when atmosphere pleasant but nothing happened afterward on outstanding issues./6/ /6/In telegram 2238 from Prague, May 29, Beam noted: "It is particularly apparent from my talk with Hajek that Czechs believe they have found an effective anti-US issue in gold question." He commented: "It probably suits their purpose to use such an issue to uphold their standing in Communist world and to prevent natural pro-American sympathies throughout the country from lending support to ultra-liberal wing in present reform movement." (Department of State, Central Files, POL CZECH-US) Beam
On June 20, 1968, Assistant Secretary of State Leddy and Ambassador Duda exchanged letters that made U.S. annuitants living in Czechoslovakia eligible for Social Security and other benefit payments. Leddy also informed Duda that the United States was considering liberalization of its trade controls as applied to Czechoslovakia and would be submitting new proposals on the gold issue. The Assistant Secretary handed the Ambassador a note outlining U.S. plans. The text with commentary was transmitted in telegram 188016 to Prague, June 21. (Department of State, Central Files, POL CZECH-US)
65. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/ Moscow, July 11, 1968, 1520Z. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CZECH. Confidential. Repeated to Budapest, Warsaw, Sofia, London, Berlin, Bucharest, Bonn, USNATO, Prague, Belgrade, Paris, and Munich. 4614. Subj: USSR-Czechoslovakia. 1. Summary. As Czech CP Congress approaches, Soviets apparently increasing pressure on Dubcek leadership to contain "democratization." This reflects growing concern not only over danger of contamination other EEs with resultant adverse effects on their foreign as well as domestic policies, but also over possible reverberations in USSR itself. 2. Despite reported Brezhnev's tearful protestations to Smrkovsky's delegation/2/ that Soviets did not even think of interfering in Czech internal affairs, they obviously attempting to do just that. Most dramatic evidence this effort are, of course, delay in departure Soviet troops after Warsaw Pact exercise and recent letters to CPCS from Soviet, East German, Polish, Hungarian, and Bulgarian CPs. After brief lull in press polemic with Czechs following Kosygin's "rest and cure" at Karlovy Vary, Soviets have also intensified their public campaign against proponents of liberalization in Czechoslovakia, with implied threat they would come to support true defenders of socialism. /2/The Chairman of the Czech National Assembly led a parliamentary delegation to Moscow June 4-15. He met with Brezhnev on June 14. 3. Following their attack on Cisar (Moscow 4268),/3/ Soviets seized upon letter Czech People's Militia to Soviet Ambassador Prague as pretext for well-publicized meetings throughout USSR expressing support for defenders of socialism and condemning "anti-socialist" elements in Czechoslovakia. This campaign included July 7 Pravda denunciation of Mlada Fronta's reaction to meetings, which ended with statement that "our Czech class brothers can always count on full understanding and support Soviet people." Czech Embassy here also receiving from one to two hundred letters a day from Soviet citizenry endorsing Czech militia letter, and even Koucky expressed to British Ambassador his annoyance at action Soviet Government in stimulating such letters. /3/Apparently an incorrect reference. Telegram 4268 from Moscow, June 14, reported on the makeup of a Soviet scientific delegation. (Department of State, Central Files, SCI 40-3 IAEA) 4. Continuing Soviet attacks on Czech liberals, yesterday's Literaturnaya Gazeta carried extremely sharp attack on Vaculik and his "2000 Words" declaration./4/ Article accuses Vaculik of attempting promote "hot summer" of chaos and disorganization in Czechoslovakia, of hating Communist Party and "truly popular democracy," and of seeking establish "pure democracy" designed deprive CPCS of power. "2000 Words" labeled as provocative, anti-Communist, and counter-revolutionary program. Echoing Kirilenko's remark in Bologna that "no one has right close his eyes" to danger caused by imperialist attempts subvert socialist countries from within, article states "watershed" between "healthy" and "anti-socialist, in essence counter-revolutionary" forces increasingly evident in Czechoslovakia, and expresses bewilderment "2000 Words" published by four Prague papers and in effect supported by National Front President Kriegel on TV June 28. /4/A June 27 manifesto written by Ludvik Vaculik and signed by 70 prominent Czech intellectuals calling for a speed-up in democratization and denouncing party rule under the Novotny regime. For text, see Times Literary Supplement, July 18, 1968. 5. While Literaturnaya Gazeta focused its attack on Vaculik personally, and in fact suggested he had had some difficulty in finding signers for declaration, today's Pravda article by Aleksandrov states "2000 Words" not isolated phenomenon but evidence growing activity rightists and outright counter-revolutionary forces in Czechoslovakia. Indeed, in asserting tactics used by these forces similar to and even more devious than those employed by Hungarian counter-revolutionaries in 1956, article implies Czechoslovakia on verge of anti-Communist revolt. Although Aleksandrov notes that "healthy" forces in CPCS regard "2000 Words" as open attack against socialist system, against leading role CPCS, and against friendship between Czechoslovakia and USSR, as well as other socialist countries, he also deplores "equivocal" stand taken by some of Czech leaders and attacks Prace, Zemedelske Noviny, Mlada Fronta, and Prague radio and TV for influencing public opinion in favor declaration. Pointing out other socialist countries closely watching Czech developments, Aleksandrov refers to Soviet meetings in support Czech Militia's letter, and cites criticism of "2000 Words" voiced by Rabotincheka Delo and Nepsabadszag. In what sounds like strong warning to Dubcek leadership, article expresses "confidence" Czech Communists will be able give resolute rebuff to reactionary, anti-socialist forces and ensure further development of country on road of socialism and friendship with all socialist states. Similar to Pravda July 7 denunciation of Mlada Fronta, it ends with ominous statement that in their struggle for strengthening socialism "working class and all working people of Czechoslovakia can always count on understanding and full support Soviet people." 6. Another device used by Soviet press in criticizing Czech developments is to identify FRG with objectives pursued by Czech liberals. Latest piece along such lines, perhaps prompted by Ziak's suggestion Brandt visit Prague (Bonn 14142),/5/ was July 5 Izvestiya article accusing Bonn of seeking spread deviously falsified interpretations of Marxism in effort split EE's among themselves and from USSR. /5/Telegram 14142 from Bonn, July 5, reported that the Czech Vice Foreign Minister had expressed a desire for a visit by Willy Brandt to Czechoslovakia. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 GER W) 7. Last, but not least, Soviets' concern about Czech situation and their effort put pressure on Dubcek evident from Brezhnev's speeches on occasion Kadar visit and at reception military academies graduates July 8. Soviets probably do not hope be able turn clock back in Czechoslovakia, but they clearly making every effort stop it. Thompson
66. Paper Prepared in the Department of State/1/ Washington, July 12, 1968. /1/Source: Department of State, Bohlen Papers: Lot 74 D 379, Czech Contingency. Confidential. Drafted by Briggs. CONTINGENCY PAPER: UN AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA The current situation in Czechoslovakia may deteriorate to the point that UN involvement is inevitable, or desirable from the US point of view. This paper discusses how the UN might become involved; what the UN might hope to accomplish; and what role the US should take in the process. The sudden loss of Czechoslovakia's recently acquired freedom should the Soviets reassert control would inevitably provoke strong reactions in many parts of the world--even among those accustomed to the post-war division of Europe and more concerned with non-European colonial issues. According to Czechoslovakian announcement, Soviet forces now in Czechoslovakia are to begin their withdrawal on Saturday, July 13./2/ The question arises whether they actually will withdraw, and if they do not, what then may occur within Czechoslovakia. The desirability and probability of recourse to the UN depends on how the Soviets proceed. /2/Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces held military maneuvers in Czechoslovakia and other Eastern European states June 19-30. 1. How UN Might Become Involved The Soviet war of nerves now underway, accompanied by a Soviet refusal to withdraw its troops from Czechoslovakia or partial withdrawal and re-introduction might quickly lead to a confrontation between the two countries. We thus may be suddenly faced with a situation in which the Czech government appeals to the UN or other external sources for help, or violence flares. On the other hand, the issue may be somewhat less clearcut. It is possible, though unlikely, that the Soviets might replace the Dubcek regime with a pro-Moscow faction. It is possible that Dubcek is playing this on the side of the Russians. In either circumstance it might be difficult to engage the UN. Moreover, Dubcek might try to avoid UN involvement and keep the whole problem in a Warsaw Pact context. 2. Why the UN? Whatever efforts might be made by the Secretary General, the Security Council, or the General Assembly (as discussed below), the fact remains that the UN would not be able to take effective action against the Soviets. The primary purpose for involving the UN would be to expose Soviet brutality and catalyze international criticism of the Soviets, as a means of exerting some restraint on them. 3. Who Would Take the Lead? It would be preferable for Czechoslovakia itself, or a sympathetic Eastern European neighbor (Romania or Yugoslavia) to raise the issue at the UN. For the US to do so might risk the appearance of ulterior motives on our part, or of a cynical effort to manipulate a marginal matter to our own purposes. Possibly even worse would be for us to appear to be giving an implied commitment to help the Czechs. Nevertheless, in the event of outright Soviet intervention and Czech resistance, the US would probably take a leading role at the UN (if only because of domestic political pressures) either by introducing the question or by strongly supporting UN consideration if someone else moved first on Czechoslovakia's behalf. Because of Great Power involvement, the Secretary General would hesitate to undertake any role in the matter, especially on his own initiative. Because of the Soviet veto, the Security Council could not realistically take any meaningful decisions. Nevertheless, the first recourse would be to the Security Council, the appropriate UN organ. Assuming sufficient sympathy among the membership for the fate of this small Central European nation, the General Assembly might be able to come up with some useful recommendations. The degree to which the United States took an active role in the process would depend on the general UN reaction. 4. The UN Mechanism--How It Would Work. The SYG, the SC, and the GA Could All Be Engaged. a. Secretary General. Although at best it would have only marginal utility, the Secretary General might seek to exert his influence on Moscow, other Warsaw Pact capitals, and with the Third World to bring pressure to bear on the Soviets to cease interfering in Czech affairs. It is unlikely that if U Thant would agree to undertake such an effort he would succeed. b. Security Council. The Soviet veto would prevent the Council from reaching any decisions. The Council could discuss resolutions: --condemning the USSR for its intervention; --calling for a withdrawal of all foreign troops from Czechoslovakia; --asking the Secretary General, a UN representative, or a committee of inquiry to investigate and report back to the Council. Support for such action would depend on the actual circumstances, but we should be able to count on Denmark, Brazil, Paraguay, and Ethiopia, in addition to the UK, France, China and Canada. It is more difficult to anticipate the positions of Senegal, Pakistan and India, but if France supported the majority probably Senegal would go along too. The USSR would be supported by Hungary and Algeria. c. General Assembly. Although there are limits on how far we might be able to push the matter (including, as mentioned, the degree of sympathy among the general membership), going to the Assembly would have the advantage of subjecting the Soviet action to sharp public criticism. Whether or not Moscow were condemned the exercise would serve as a reminder of the true nature of communism and Soviet brutality. Moreover, on the basis of the Hungarian experience, the Assembly could profitably adopt a number of resolutions of a humanitarian nature, such as assistance to refugees. [Continue with the next documents] Volume XVII Index | Foreign Relations Online | Historian's Office | |