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 | FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968 Volume XVII Eastern Europe Department of State |
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| 32. Airgram From the Legation in Bulgaria to the Department of State/1/ A-285 Sofia, January 26, 1966. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 2-3 BUL. Secret. Drafted by Davis and Tuch. Repeated to Moscow, Warsaw, Prague, Budapest, Bucharest, Berlin, Paris for USRO, Munich, and Vienna. SUBJECT REF /2/This circular airgram requested an annual political-economic assessment of the host country. (Ibid., 2-3 BUL) Relations between Bulgaria and the United States have improved. They are reminiscent, however, of the first smiles one gets from a few-months-old baby. One is not entirely sure whether the smile is real or simply a gas pain. Draft NSAM 304/3/ lays down three criteria for our "differentiated policy" toward the countries of Eastern Europe: (1) internal liberalization; (2) national independence; and (3) progress in re-association with the West. It might be useful to comment on Bulgaria's progress under each of these headings. /3/Document 4. 1. Internal Liberalization. A year ago we reported "no concrete evidence of political liberalization."/4/ It is probably fair to say that there has been some in 1965. The regime's new economic theses give greater autonomy to individual enterprises. Although the reform leaves numerous strings available to an economically jittery regime, it places Bulgaria among the moderately progressive regimes of Eastern Europe--according to an RFE analysis alongside Czechoslovakia and somewhat ahead of the USSR, Poland and East Germany. Since last spring the regime has allowed private craftsmen to engage in business more freely. If the regime holds prices steady, the wage hikes announced at the end of the year may help the population. The presence in Bulgaria during 1965 of a million foreign tourists--equivalent to one-eighth the population of the country--has had an impact. Reportedly foreign tourists were put up in 1,500 private homes in Sofia; Western newspapers were available in Black Sea resorts; a rent-a-car service was established; etc. The regime exhorts its citizens to caution, but the Bulgarians' desire for the economic benefits of tourism inexorably force some acceptance of increased contact with the West. So, too, does the contact which accompanies Western trade. /4/Airgram A-274 from Sofia, January 24, 1965. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 2 BUL) There have been a few other signs: a satirical political review last summer, a few more political jokes on the radio, two or three mildly "daring" plays during the past couple of seasons, comments by foreign visitors over the past year or two about "less fear," progressively more private cars over the past several years, a report from RFE that "mail from Bulgaria has now begun to reach RFE," absence in the press over the past six months of reported prison sentences for telling political jokes and death penalties for black-marketeering, no recent reports of deportations, a contemporary art show put on this year while permission was refused last year, a report that Bulgaria, together with Czechoslovakia, has started to authorize the sale of state-owned houses to private buyers, etc. The atmosphere is of a slight easing. The abortive plot last April/5/ does not seem to have reversed this cautious, unconfident inching liberalization. The plot seems to have been more episode than earthquake. Apparently the plotters wished to move closer to the Yugoslav example. Apparently they inspired considerable popular sympathy. Apparently they were poorly organized. The regime tried to play down the affair, giving light sentences. In its wake, the security organs were reorganized and party control within the army was tightened. The security forces in Bulgaria are probably now even more closely coordinated with the Soviets than before and enjoy the technical sophistication which this support implies. Prime Minister Zhivkov has told me openly that the Bulgarians are increasing resources devoted to "counterintelligence" against us. /5/On April 22, 1965, the Bulgarian press reported that the Bulgarian Government had uncovered and defeated a plot led by a senior Communist Party official and the commander of the Sofia military garrison. 2. National Independence from the USSR. A year ago we reported that the Bulgarian leadership had given "no indication that the example of independent nationalism set by nearby Rumania had any appeal whatsoever." The generality of Bulgaria's satellite status still holds, but one has to be a trifle less categorical. The Bulgarian effort to improve relations with Yugoslavia and Rumania has produced some verbal movement. In successive joint communiqués with Tito and Ceausescu, Zhivkov subscribed to the idea of "independent parties" and "non-interference" in the internal affairs of the various Communist states. This is not the first time Zhivkov has played the chameleon. Nevertheless, these publicized statements affect the atmosphere within the Communist Party here, and more nationalistic elements have a peg on which to hang their arguments. Apart from Bulgaria's over-touted historical and cultural affinity to the Soviet Union, her economic situation ties her to the USSR in Zhivkov's phrase, "in life and death." With two billion dollars in Soviet credits since World War II, Bulgaria is industrializing--having climbed from an industrial production representing 15% of the total in 1939 to over 50% at the present time. Bulgaria will soon be importing over 40% of her expanding energy needs--mostly from the USSR. Bulgaria's foreign trade is 50% with the Soviet Union and, even in the other direction, Bulgaria ranks as the USSR's fourth largest trading partner. Zhivkov is neither a Tito--with flare and following--nor a Sekou Toure--who, for Guinea's independence, gloriously defied economics and common sense. More like the East German regime, the Bulgarian Communists need USSR support to stay afloat. There are a few signs that Bulgaria may be playing a bit cozy with the Soviets of late,/6/ but the prospect is for Bulgaria to remain Moscow's reliable satellite. /6/The Legation was interested to see a recent INR Research Memorandum which said that "there emerged signs of possible strain in Bulgarian-Soviet relations." We do not yet see clear evidence of this here, although the pros and cons of this possibility are discussed in the Legation's A-286 of January 26, 1966. [Footnote in the source text. The INR Research Memorandum was not identified. Airgram A-286 is in Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 BUL-USSR.] 3. Progress in Re-association with the West. During the past year Bulgaria has developed its ties with both the neutralist world and Western Europe. Zhivkov's trip to the UAR and Ethiopia/7/ was but one example of this trend. Bulgaria is trying to branch out, and even has a few dizzy economic dreams. Among these were a 37 million dollar loan to the UAR; a joint banking enterprise in Beirut; multifarious and dubious economic activities in Ethiopia, negotiations for mammoth Japanese-built tanker ways in Burgas, talk of a joint British-Bulgarian hotel complex on the Black Sea, feelers for U.N. technical assistance (including some American specialists), etc. /7/October 1965. Zhivkov continued the policy of improved relations with Greece and Turkey. The Bulgarian Government has made an effort, albeit with lapses, to develop more cordial political, cultural and economic relations with France, Italy, the Benelux countries and Great Britain, probably in that order. Trade and tourism from West Germany produce an impressive balance of about 40 million dollars in each direction. However, Bulgaria faces an uphill struggle in trade with the West, as it must sell more and more non-agricultural products as its economy changes and expands. If Bulgaria's trade with the West fails to grow apace, Bulgaria will automatically slip further into the Soviet and CEMA trade embrace. 4. Relations with the United States. A year ago it looked as if there was no way to go but up. Our year-end assessment spoke of "a hardened Bulgarian attitude", inactivity, stagnation, dwindling contacts, increased police operations against the Legation, the manhandling of US personnel on three occasions, minimized US-Bulgarian contact, pressure to extend closed zones, and the second assault in a year on the Chancery. If anything, the first months of this year saw movement further down. The Bulgarians reacted to the extension of the Vietnamese War with still another assault on the Legation offices and, for the first time, on the Residence. The early months of 1965 also saw imposition of still further travel controls, violently offensive anti-American propaganda in the windows next to the Legation (including exultation over American soldiers' coffins) and the rejection of cultural exchanges. After a probable low point early this spring, relations appear to have slowly improved. It might be added that the Bulgarians have been excruciatingly cautious in any moves that might be described as constructive. Why? First, there is the Soviet tie and America's role as the Socialist Camp's great enemy. There is the ten year hiatus in American-Bulgarian relations and their legacy of suspicion. Moreover, other Western diplomats note a general Bulgarian passivity and inertia, perhaps a result of long-standing isolation and backwardness. The Bulgarians may not be advanced enough to sense and appreciate their need of contact with the West. They may be afraid of it--like the eminent Bulgarian solid-state physicist who recently came to America as an exchangee and found he was at "graduate-student level." While the Bulgarians desire Western embassies here, they would like them to nestle like parsley--decorative and irrelevant. What signs of movement have there been? There has been no repetition of the destructive attacks on the Legation since last February--the longest period without them since 1963. There has been a resumption of more normal--for a Communist country--official and social contact between Bulgarians and Legation personnel. (Last November Legation officers hosted 14 occasions at which 58 Bulgarians attended.) Access to Bulgarian officials, including the Prime Minister, has been facilitated. The police "blockade" of the American Legation offices has been mitigated, although intimidation and post visit interrogation no doubt continue. Casual visitors--the man who saw his daughter's picture in our window, the woman who wants to buy a Christmas card, or the student who wants to borrow a book--have increased from virtually none to one or two a day. In the past year the consular business of the Legation has doubled (citizenship cases from 24 to 65, immigrant visas from 7 to 17, and non-immigrant visas from 123 to 321). The Bulgarians gave agreement in principle early in the year to negotiate a Consular Convention, although they have not yet followed through. In November and December the first of two of some 18 hardship visa and citizenship cases were moved toward solution. In the economic field, the first substantial Bulgarian deals with American firms and their European affiliates were made. These included a 15 million dollar contract with the French Schneider group of which about half will go to Litwin and Standard Oil of Ohio. This will also bring to Bulgaria the first supervising American engineers since the War. Other contracts include a Coca-Cola plant, and the renovation of some tobacco factories--bringing American Machine and Foundry about two million dollars. The year 1965 also saw the first American chartered aircraft bringing tourists to Varna, and the first Bulgarian merchant ship calling at a U.S. port. In the public affairs and exchanges field, there has been some motion. Exchanges have worked out in the field of English teaching, medicine and agriculture. The Bulgarians have expressed interest in a library science exchange. The exchange program between the Inter-University Committee on Travel Grants and the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences is continuing. The Bulgarians have arranged substantive programs for such diverse visitors as composer Peter Mennin, poet William Snodgrass and Judge William Henry. A number of American journalists have come, with a Sulzberger interview with Zhivkov, a similar offer to Daniel Schorr (he declined because, on checking, he found it probably wouldn't be used on CBS) and the first direct American news broadcast from Bulgaria in recent years by Ed Morgan (for technical reasons, of unusable quality). Radio Sofia used VOA materials (without attribution) for the first time and the Bulgarian authorities, after some back and forth, permitted the American Minister to go on nation-wide radio-TV on July 4, as Mrs. Anderson had done before. Vituperative anti-American window displays next to the Legation have not been in evidence for the past three months, contrary to previous practice. The Bulgarians have not interfered with the expanding circulation of the Legation's Bulgarian language Cultural Bulletin--now up from 1,000 to 2,000 copies. The Bulgarians also did not obstruct a lecture this month in the Legation's ground floor library--the first time the library has been put to this use since November 1964. The Bulgarians have not so far interfered with the initial mailing of the Legation's new Bulgarian Science Bulletin, the first issue of which was put out this month. The Bulgarians have offered us a good site for the 1966 Plovdiv Fair. The Legation's expanded book presentation program has not been impeded; and a gift of books to the National Library resulted in an exhibit of the gift books in the library's permanent exhibit hall. There has been no instance since last spring of an announced exchange being canceled, although two American exhibit proposals were rejected on the flimsiest of excuses. The Bulgarians have been unresponsive to American offers of performing artists and ensembles. Net impression: some improvement. 5. Conclusion. To return to the three criteria of NSAM 304, the past year has seen cautious movement toward internal liberalization, a continuance of Bulgaria's satellite role, and some progress in re-association with the West and the United States in particular. Bulgaria is not totally among-the-missing in East Europe's "quiet revolution"; but it is among the most quiet, and among the least daring. The mounting gravity of the Vietnam War provides something between an excuse and a reason for Bulgaria's caution and negativism. A certain passivity and harvest of isolation were added brakes. Actually, Bulgaria's conservatism has had some positive results. It is an interesting incidental fact that Bulgaria's collective farmers still legally own their own land. Bulgaria never did a root and branch Marxist revision of its English language textbooks. Bulgaria never renamed George Washington Street in Sofia or Franklin Roosevelt Street in Plovdiv, never came under Article 19 of the U.N. Charter, never imposed a ceiling on American diplomatic staffs, and never instituted a system of prior travel notification for attaches or others. It settled its outstanding financial claims with us, and does not stand afoul of the Johnson Act. It adheres to the Berne Copyright Union, and only this year ratified outstanding revisions to the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property. Assuming that in the future the trend continues up, we envisage two phases of development in our relations. In the first phase we shall continue to seek progress towards a Consular Convention, resolution of outstanding citizenship and visa cases, progressively freer access to our offices, continued protection of the Legation, expanded official and social contact and increased exchanges. On all these counts there has been progress in 1965, but not a complete resolution. Our request for reciprocal radio rights, a moderation of anti-American propaganda next to the Legation, and multiple entry diplomatic visas fall into this "Phase I" category. When both sides are ready for larger steps, we may hope to turn to a cessation of VOA jamming, a substantially more ambitious exchange and public affairs program, the introduction of American newspapers, a general moderation of anti-American propaganda, reciprocal reduction of travel restrictions, and closer Bulgarian adherence to general norms of international dealing in trade and other fields. Among the things America can offer is Most Favored Nation treatment, greater cooperation in trade, review of our attitude toward PL 480 and credit; and possible elevation of the status of the two countries' missions. Of all these possibilities, MFN is what the Bulgarians really want most from us. Our success with the East-West Trade Bill will be crucially important for our prospective relations with this country. Whether or not we decide ultimately to negotiate with Bulgaria regarding MFN, the fate of the bill in Congress will greatly influence the psychological atmosphere here. Our opportunities may be greatest at present on the psychological front. We believe expansion of exchanges in both directions is to our advantage as a stimulant to meaningful contact and means of impact. In the exchange field, the Bulgarians have been passive, reluctant and disorganized. But we, too, need a more positive attitude, more vigor, more interest and more willingness to give deft leadership to the U.S. private sector. In another context, Freud once said that the lines of cleavage are in every crystal, but you don't see them until the crystal breaks. We must apply our wedges where we can; and chip away at Bulgarian backwardness, isolation, and fear. Nathaniel Davis
33. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Sofia, November 2, 1966, 4 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL BUL-US. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Tuch and McSweeney. Transmitted as Enclosure 1 to airgram A-168 from Sofia, November 8. The meeting was held in Zhivkov's office. Davis left post on May 20, 1966, and President Johnson nominated John M. McSweeney as Minister to Bulgaria on September 16. He presented his credentials on October 26. The Legation in Sofia was raised to Embassy status on November 28; McSweeney was promoted to Ambassador on April 5, 1967. PARTICIPANTS Minister McSweeney was making his initial call on Chairman Zhivkov. After Minister McSweeney had expressed his pleasure at being in Bulgaria and meeting the Prime Minister, he stated that he had had conversations with Bulgarian Minister Gerasimov before he left Washington and, after his arrival here, with Foreign Minister Bashev and with Chairman Traykov upon the presentation of credentials./2/ He was pleased that Chairman Traykov had made the statement that Bulgaria was ready to do what it can to improve relations between the two countries within the framework of the present situation. /2/Telegram 441 from Sofia, October 10, reported on the talks with Bashev. (Ibid.) McSweeney reported on his meeting with Traykov in airgram A-498, April 22. (Ibid., POL 17-1 US-BUL) Minister McSweeney noted that he and Minister Gerasimov had found they were in general agreement that there were two main areas in our bilateral relations where some concrete progress had been made and can be made in the future. The first was in the field of trade. He felt that it would not be useful on this occasion to delve into the history of our trade relations, the historical background of the question the Bulgarians referred to as "discrimination" in trade, nor into the details of our legislative processes. He merely wanted to mention those things that had been done which he felt would have a favorable impact on our trade relations. First was the President's proposal of the East-West Trade Bill to the Congress which would give him the discretionary authority to extend MFN to all the countries of Eastern Europe. This bill was not considered in the Congress at the last session, but it will be introduced for consideration in the next session. Minister McSweeney recalled that Senator Magnuson, during his conversation with the Prime Minister,/3/ had voiced his strong support for this bill. Secondly, the US had extended a $10 million CCC credit for Bulgarian purchases of feed grains. Thirdly, the President had made an important speech on October 7, 1966, which concerned itself with relations with Eastern Europe in which he again voiced his desire to improve these relations./4/ Toward that end the Commerce Department had removed some 400 items from the list of strategic commodities for which licenses had previously to be obtained; and the President, with the support of the Congress, extended Ex-Im Bank guarantees to those countries in Eastern Europe which had not had these previously. Further he had expressed his determination to press for enactment of the East-West trade legislation. Minister McSweeney said these are facts which, if they do not give all that one might want to improve our trade relations, were certainly concrete indications of the direction in which the US is moving. /3/Senator Magnuson visited Bulgaria September 27-30 as President Johnson's representative to the Plovdiv Fair, which was held September 15-October 2. He met with Zhivkov on September 28. A memorandum of their conversation was transmitted as an attachment to airgram A-127, October 11. (Ibid., LEG 7 Magnuson) /4/For text of the speech, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966, Book II, pp. 1125-1130. The second broad area, Minister McSweeney stated, in which he thought we could expand our mutual relationship was in cultural exchanges--the exchange of people, information and ideas in order to spread the knowledge of our respective countries and people. He was pleased to note, Minister McSweeney continued, that there had also been some progress in exchanges in both directions to which the GOB had contributed. Minister McSweeney mentioned the Electric Power Delegation,/5/ the visit of Senator Magnuson, the visit of the US Trade Delegation,/6/ US participation in the Plovdiv Fair and Bulgarian assistance in obtaining exit visas for a number of hardship cases as evidence of this forward movement. He stated that he did not want to go into detail, that he hoped to have discussions on various matters with the respective officials of the Bulgarian Government, that he hoped to contribute to progress in our bilateral relations, and that he hoped for Chairman Zhivkov's support. /5/This visit has not been identified. /6/October 1-15. Prime Minister Zhivkov first proposed a toast wishing the Minister a successful mission in Bulgaria. He stated that the GOB understands the steps that have been taken so far and that the GOB will respond positively to any American initiative. He felt, however, that US-Bulgarian relations were now in a cul-de-sac, that they were not developing properly but marking time. He stated that Bulgaria had developed its relations with Britain, France, Italy, Japan and Austria but not with the US. He asked who was responsible for this situation--the United States or Bulgaria? He stated that perhaps both sides were responsible, and that both sides would nave to make mutual concessions with the aim of finding solutions to their problems. He said that he is not an optimist but a "rough realist" and that perhaps for this reason he was ill-chosen to be a Prime Minister. However, he stated, the Minister can count on his and his Government's support in any effort to improve bilateral relations. Zhivkov stated that on the subject of Vietnam, Bulgaria would continue to voice its position that the United States is committing aggression against a fraternal socialist country. Bulgaria would state this position at the upcoming Party Congress and on other appropriate occasions, but, Zhivkov continued, Bulgaria takes account of the "actual situation" and will respond positively to any initiatives from the US in the bilateral field. He stated that he had spoken with many people inside and outside of Bulgaria and he follows the area of foreign relations closely. He reiterated that any positive steps by the US will be welcome and will be reciprocated by Bulgaria. He cautioned, however, that if both sides were to view the future through "rose-colored glasses," they would fail to improve relations. They must view the relationship by considering concrete things--"what can be done." He stated that he had a mandate both from the Central Committee of the BCP and the Government to respond to US initiatives and he would do so immediately. He then asked what can we do concretely right away? Can the US extend credits? Minister McSweeney stated that Bulgaria had an outstanding credit line of $10 million for feed grains right now and that Ex-Im Bank guarantees also were available now for all countries in Eastern Europe. Prime Minister Zhivkov asked whether Bulgaria could get immediate credit to buy either complete plants or to engage in a barter deal whereby they would purchase plants or equipment and pay in kind. He stated that in matters like this MFN is not of primary importance to Bulgaria but that he is interested in reaching concrete decisions. Minister McSweeney replied that there recently had been a number of representatives of leading New York banks in Sofia who had offered to extend credit lines. This was an indication of the American private sector's belief that things were moving forward. He continued by saying that we would probably have to start on a small scale since our problems in this field are of long standing, but that the US is prepared to consider proposals as they come up. On the subject of Vietnam, Minster McSweeney stated, our views are obviously different, and he would not try to convince Chairman Zhivkov at the present meeting that the US is right. He expected the GOB to continue to express its views on the subject. And he realized that the Chairman is well informed about international developments, but he wanted to recommend a careful reading of the communiqué of the Manila Conference./7/ It had been previously suggested that the American Government had been seeking something for itself in Vietnam. The communiqué shows clearly that the US wants to settle the problem and, as a practical step, is prepared to evacuate its military personnel within six months if the other side does the same. Minister McSweeney stated that to the extent that Chairman Zhivkov can use his influence to have the other side look at this proposal seriously, this would help efforts to achieve peace. Minister McSweeney emphasized that our readiness to withdraw is a fact. Mutual withdrawal can lead to a reduction in the war and make a political solution possible. /7/For text of the communiqué, released on October 25, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966, pp. 867-871. Chairman Zhivkov stated he wanted to emphasize that Bulgaria wishes to maintain normal relations--it is a small country, but that it has an active foreign and internal policy. He stated that it was in the mutual interest of both countries to have normal relations. He believed that the main question is to end "discrimination" starting with the economic field, and that after such "discrimination" had ended, both countries could turn to other sectors. He stated again that Bulgaria would welcome any steps on the part of the US to improve relations and that his Government would respond positively. But, he continued, the fact that the Department of State carries out "discrimination" against Bulgaria in trade creates major difficulties. He said that he cannot understand how cultural relations can be developed unless a solution is found to the problem of economic relations. He cited as an example that Bulgaria has more economic relations with Spain than with the US in spite of the character of the Spanish regime. He said that the US-Bulgarian dialogue had always revolved around the same problems ever since he became Prime Minister. "Discrimination" prevents establishing normal relations and interferes with normal contacts between Bulgarian and US officials. Bulgaria, he said, had no problems with France in spite of the fact that President DeGaulle's view of the world is not its own. Bulgaria has wide trade with West Germany although the two countries constantly insulted each other. He said that Bulgaria does not worry about VOA making propaganda threats. The main problem is the economic problem. On the subject of Vietnam, Chairman Zhivkov continued, the question is very complicated. US bombardment must be stopped and then both sides can proceed to negotiations. He stated that nobody told him to say this, but he wanted to say anyway that the US should stop bombing and that would be the way to bring about negotiations. If the Vietnam conflict were to grow it would be a terrible business, he continued. He had just returned from the Soviet Union where he had been shown the latest Soviet weapons and he had been told that US weapons and Soviet weapons were very similar in their characteristics and destructive capability. He said that he knew what US weapons could do and what Soviet weapons could do, and that if they were to come into contact with each other a catastrophe would result. He said that this is absurd and reiterated that US should stop its bombing whereafter talks could start. Minister McSweeney stated that the US had stopped bombing twice, but there had been no response from the other side. He said that a bomb is a bomb whether it is placed under a railroad tie or dropped from the sky. He stated that if there were some indication from the other side that it is prepared to reciprocate, something could be accomplished immediately. He reiterated that there is no one who wants to get the Vietnam conflict ended more than the US. Chairman Zhivkov replied that US propaganda states that North Vietnam has sent troops to the South. "It is nothing like this," he insisted. Bulgaria had recently had a delegation in North Vietnam of which Mr. Grozev had been a member. No North Vietnamese troops have been sent to South Vietnam, he said. North Vietnam does give material assistance to the South Vietnamese guerrilla forces, but this is a guerrilla war. As evidence that there are no North Vietnamese units in South Vietnam and that this is merely a guerrilla war, he cited the fact that not one town had been taken by North Vietnamese troops in the South. Minister McSweeney opined that this may either be a matter of tactics or a measure of lack of success of the North Vietnamese troops. He said that many North Vietnamese prisoners in camps in South Vietnam are good evidence of North Vietnamese direct participation. Chairman Zhivkov then acknowledged that there may be individual North Vietnamese helping in South Vietnam, but reasserted there are no military units. But, he continued, it is neither his mandate nor the Minister's mission to discuss this problem today. Minister McSweeney stated that during his tour of duty with the Strategic Air Command over two years ago he also had seen information about US and Soviet weapons similar to that which Chairman Zhivkov had evidently seen in the USSR. He stated that the US knows the dangers of nuclear war full well and that therefore it wanted to see the Vietnam problem resolved as quickly as possible. On that note the conversation ended with repeated expressions of mutual goodwill. The conversation lasted approximately 45 minutes and was conducted in a cordial and relaxed manner.
34. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State/1/ New York, October 3, 1967, 2103Z./2/ /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL BUL-US. Confidential; Limdis. Repeated to Sofia. Rusk and Bashev were attending the U.N. General Assembly Session. /2/Beginning in spring of 1965, the dates and transmission times of all incoming Department of State telegrams were in six-figure date-time-groups. The "Z" refers to Greenwich mean time. Secto 42. USUN 1165. Bulgarian-US Relations. Fol based on uncleared memcon,/3/ subject revision upon review, Noforn and FYI: /3/Memoranda of conversation are in Department of State, Central Files, POL BUL-US. 1. Secretary met today with Bulgarian FonMin Bashev at latter's initiative. Discussion of bilateral relations was in constructive and positive vein, with Bashev emphasizing his interest in concrete steps to develop relations despite difficulties which "international situation" poses (he did not mention Vietnam until Secretary raised question). 2. Bashev dwelt most of all on Bulgaria's interest in developing exports to US. He expressed understanding that action on MFN hampered by present international situation and did not press this question. He said Bulgaria interested in exports to US even at financial sacrifice, and requested some further public expression US Govt approval expanded trade to facilitate Bulgarian approaches to US business firms. Bashev mentioned specifically Bulgarian desire sell tobacco and wine and purchase complete industrial plants. 3. Bashev also mentioned Bulgarian interest expanding scientific, technological, industrial exchange. He envisaged no need to sign cultural agreement, which he said might restrict rather than develop cultural relations. 4. In reply, Secretary explained present situation with regard to MFN, emphasized US interest in developing trade relations now within framework present legislation, and assured Bashev of US readiness to take specific steps to improve relations. 5. Pouching memcon. Rusk
35. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, April 1, 1968. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL BUL-US. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Houston. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS Bulgarian Ambassador Luben Guerassimov Assistant Secretary John M. Leddy Departure of Tarabanov Ambassador Guerassimov first apologized for not having been able to keep the appointment he had requested with Mr. Leddy on March 27. He explained that UN Permanent Representative Tarabanov had been preparing to depart for Bulgaria on March 27 and that he had to confer with Tarabanov before the latter's departure. President Johnson's Speech Ambassador Guerassimov next asked if the statement of President Johnson that he would not be a candidate for re-election/2/ meant any change in the foreign policy of the US Government. /2/For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968, Book I, pp. 469-476. Mr. Leddy said that no change in the basic foreign policy of the US should be expected. The President said that he wanted to devote himself to working on the problems facing the country without getting involved himself in the election campaign. In respect to Viet Nam the President was going to try what many people had urged--a halt to bombing--to see if the expectations would come true that peace talks would start promptly and that no military advantage would be taken. Mr. Leddy expressed the hope that persons on the side of Hanoi who had spoken optimistically of what would happen if bombing were halted would now exert their influence to make their predictions come true. Ambassador Guerassimov said that perhaps Hanoi would want to delay any action to see who the new President would be. Mr. Leddy said that Hanoi would make a mistake if it decided to await the inauguration of a new President before responding to the bombing halt. US Attitude Towards Greece Noting that Bulgarian relations with Turkey had significantly improved with the just concluded Zhivkov trip to Turkey, the Ambassador asked how the US viewed the present Greek government. Mr. Leddy replied that if the Ambassador wished a detailed discussion on Greece, he should talk to Assistant Secretary Battle within whose area Greece fell. Mr. Leddy said that he was informed about Greece chiefly in the NATO context. As the Ambassador might guess, the US did not want to see Greece leave NATO. The US did want to see Greece return to constitutional government with traditional freedoms. The US did not feel there was anything to be gained by cutting relations with the present Greek government. Our policy was therefore to continue contacts, to exert such influence as we could and to hope that in time, constitutional government would be restored. Ambassador Guerassimov said that the present regime in Greece was reminiscent of that which existed there prior to World War I and was hindering the development of a better atmosphere in the Balkans. Bulgarian Interest in Technology Ambassador Guerassimov said that he had asked for the appointment in order to leave with Mr. Leddy copies of several documents which had been presented previously to various persons in Washington. These documents showed ways in which Bulgaria thought US-Bulgarian relations could develop. The documents were:/3/ /3/The documents were not found with the source text. 1. The Bulgarian draft of an exchange agreement between the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences and the National Academy of Sciences. 2. A list of factories which Bulgaria was negotiating to purchase in the US. 3. A list of licenses on which Bulgaria wanted information with a view of possible purchase. 4. A list of technical fields in which Bulgaria desired scientific-technical cooperation with the US (i.e. fields in which Bulgaria wished to have specialists receive industrial training in the US). 5. A list of certain scientific fields in which Bulgaria would like to have specialists receive academic training in the US. Mr. Leddy said that the documents would be studied and the Embassy advised of the Department's comments on them. Ambassador Guerassimov added that in addition to the persons who might come to the US under the projects mentioned in the lists, Bulgaria was in touch with the Department of Health, Education and Welfare about exchanges of medical personnel and Bulgarians were also making arrangements for technical training directly with various American universities. Topics on Which US Seeks Bulgarian Action Mr. Leddy told Ambassador Guerassimov that the US would like to hear from Bulgaria on several matters: the US-Bulgarian consular convention, the proposed agreement on reciprocal radio rights and the ending of Bulgarian jamming of Voice of America broadcasts. Ambassador Guerassimov said that the Embassy in Washington was not involved in the consular convention negotiations but that he would inform Sofia of Mr. Leddy's interest. He also said that he thought the US Embassy in Sofia had received some information on the jamming question. Mr. Leddy said that no satisfactory information had been received on jamming. Ambassador Guerassimov then brought up the recent reply of the Foreign Ministry to the Department's note of July 27, 1967 reducing the number of counties in the US closed to Bulgarian travel./4/ Mr. Houston said that the US Embassy had just reported receipt of a communication on this subject from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but had not had time to analyze it. /4/A copy of the note is in Department of State, Central Files, POL 17-2 BUL-US. Events in Czechoslovakia Mr. Leddy asked Ambassador Guerassimov for his views on the recent events in Czechoslovakia. The Ambassador replied that his only information on the events came from reading the Bulgarian press. He said that there was nothing new insofar as the Czechoslovak Party was concerned, as there had always been criticism within the Party and the replacement of no longer useful Party officials. He said that in his view, what was going on in Czechoslovakia was the realization of reform in public life and government.
36. Telegram From the Embassy in Bulgaria to the Department of State/1/ Sofia, September 20, 1968, 1525Z. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 BUL-USSR. Confidential. Repeated to Belgrade, Bucharest, Budapest, Moscow, Munich, Prague, Warsaw, USNATO, and Vienna. 1323. Subj: Bulgaria after Czechoslovakia. 1. Bulgarian policy appears primarily to be designed to keep Moscow well satisfied with Bulgarian support in all matters and, now, especially in Czechoslovakia. In this Bulgaria is running true to form. In other areas, the regime seems to be following a "watch and wait" line. Business as usual is the motto in contacts with most Westerners. The GOB has taken care not to close out the possibility of continuing to cultivate increased trade with almost any willing partner "regardless of differences in political system." Condemnation of the US, the FRG, Yugoslavia and other standard targets of criticism continues to be severe but by no means as extreme as it could become. On the other hand, as demonstrated by the recent announcement of new economic arrangements with the USSR, arrangements which promise to leave Bulgaria sunk even deeper in the Soviet embrace, the regime appears to have taken advantage of the present situation to squeeze more economic aid out of Moscow. 2. While the events in Czechoslovakia have clearly been unsettling to the population and a burden to the regime, the effects are probably somewhat less severe in Bulgaria than elsewhere in Eastern Europe. Postwar Bulgarian history is unmarked by shock comparable to the uprising in East Germany in 1953, the October events in Poland in 1956, and the Hungarian uprising of October 1956. Despite a degree of liberalization carried out slowly since 1956, the regime has remained essentially conservative and hence does not have to retreat very far now. Geographically, economically and socially, Bulgaria is further removed from the Czechoslovak events than any of the other four Warsaw Pact countries. The majority of Bulgarians are decent enough to regret what has happened in Czechoslovakia, but the intensity of their identification with the Czechoslovak people is not remarkable. 3. The regime is working along predictable lines to limit the damage to its moral position and that of the Soviet Union arising from the invasion. The plausibility of the arguments advanced is very low, including heavy dependence on such conceptual slogans as "machinations of Western imperialism." Even Pavlovian conditioned reactions should have difficulty with reference to "Morgans and Duponts," "Rockefeller and Franco" as somehow justifying use of Communist tanks to combat Communist words and ideas. That the Czechoslovak people as a whole sought to move away from the more oppressive aspects of Soviet-style socialism is probably widely accepted here. If, as we believe, large segments of Bulgarian public are seriously depressed by Czech events, it is because they are seen as harsh object lesson that any significant steps toward liberalization will be forcefully repressed by Moscow as an intolerable attempt to "restore capitalism and detach the country from the camp of socialism." 4. The regime's propaganda effort is probably intended more to persuade Moscow of Bulgarian loyalty than to win credibility among Bulgarians. For the latter the message is to stick with the regime, enjoy such increased material benefits as are being made available and forget any vagrant thought that any measure of liberality is to be expected in the near future in Bulgaria. 5. The Czechoslovak events have thus far brought no new signs of instability within the Bulgarian leadership. The presence of Zhivko Zhivkov alongside Todor Zhivkov at Moscow September 16 is not necessarily confirmation of his continued occupancy of the number two position, since he oversees economic matters, but we believe he retains this position in any case. 6. Assuming continued Warsaw Five occupation and a continuing stalemate between Soviet repression and passive resistance from "good soldier Schweiks" in Czechoslovakia, we would expect the GOB, Moscow permitting, to diminish its defensive and justificatory propaganda, and to treat the Czechoslovak repression more and more as an accomplished fact while turning to other provocative subjects such as Yugoslav Macedonia and "revisionism." 7. This is likely to be accompanied by an effort to return to "business as usual" in the form of trade, cultural and eventual renewed political exchanges with willing NATO and non-aligned countries, especially France, Italy (whose trade is in balance) and the smaller countries. Practical commercial and financial considerations coincide with political desirability to indicate no upsurge in economic activity with regard to the Federal Republic. 8. The revulsion felt in the U.S. for Bulgaria's collaboration, clearly manifested by cancellation of participation at the Plovdiv Trade Fair, and the resultant dimness of prospects for improved relations under current circumstances, might well tempt the GOB to indulge in some form of self-serving reprisal. This might include well-publicized trials of one or another "American spy" to demonstrate to Moscow Bulgaria's vigilance. (Recent rumors are to the effect that Dr. Sarafov, whose arrest as an "American agent" was recently reported (Sofia 1248),/2/ will soon be given the full public treatment.) /2/Telegram 1248, August 29, reported on Bulgarian announcements regarding a "Western" spy ring. (Ibid., POL 23-4 BUL) 9. Thus we look for a very cool political winter, during which the prescribed low visibility posture seems quite appropriate. McSweeney [Continue with the next documents] Volume XVII Index | Foreign Relations Online | Historian's Office | |