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 | FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968 Volume XVII Eastern Europe Department of State |
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| Czechoslovakia
37. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, February 19, 1964. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 17 CZECH-US. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Davis on February 25. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS Ambassador Duda telephoned me last week to invite me to lunch today at 1:00 o'clock at Sans Souci restaurant. This was his first invitation to me for a t#te-a-t#te lunch and from the tenor of his remarks, I judged he was not acting on instructions but only on his personal initiative. He mentioned no other substantive matters than bilateral issues between Czechoslovakia and the United States. Economic and Financial Agreement He asked my opinion when we might move ahead to complete the Economic and Financial Agreement. I said, as he knew, most questions had been settled, but there remained the technical question of the transfer of the gold. The French had given their assent but the British had not as yet, though we had asked them to do so. He professed not to know about the British position and asserted that the Czechs had always considered this a bilateral matter. I pointed out that the question of the gold required the assent of the Tripartite Commission./2/ /2/The Tripartite Commission of the United States, United Kingdom, and France was created at the end of World War II to oversee the restoration of property looted from occupied nations by the Germans. Trade Ambassador Duda asked my personal opinion about the prospects of MFN for Czechoslovakia over the long run, saying he realized it was not possible in an election year. I gave him the standard line. He remarked that Czech trade with the United States had grown in recent years but that only 4% of Czech imports from the United States was heavy machinery. He said they were interested in increasing their purchases of machinery, particularly in the chemical field and were likewise interested in stimulating exports of machinery to the United States. He said they had been thinking of sending a delegation of specialists in machinery to the United States for the purpose of exploring possibilities. He did not pursue the subject and I gave him no encouragement. Consular Convention Ambassador Duda referred to the Czechoslovak approach to the Department in 1960-61 in regard to opening consulates in the United States and asked what I thought of the prospect. I said I remembered my conversation with former Ambassador Ruzek on this and we had proposed first to negotiate a consular convention./3/ After some inconclusive discussion, I told Ambassador Duda it was not "excluded" that we could discuss simultaneously opening of consulates and a consular convention. He emphasized he had no instructions to speak on this matter. /3/Negotiations led to a December 1961 initialing of a note ad referendum. The United States subsequently informed Czechoslovakia that after further review of the draft text of the agreement it would not proceed to signature. (Beam, Multiple Exposure, pp. 178-180) Cultural Exchanges Ambassador Duda mentioned the desirability of increasing exchanges in the cultural field but presented no concrete ideas. It is possible he may ask to see Mr. Siscoe when he returns from Moscow.
38. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ New York, November 18, 1964. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CZECH. Confidential. Drafted by Sonnenfeldt. SUBJECT" Czech Affairs, Czech Relations with USSR, Czech Foreign Relations, UN Financing Issue PARTICIPANTS In a wide-ranging talk over lunch, Vejvoda made the following points. 1. The Czechs were hopeful that the changes in Moscow would not affect them adversely,/2/ though Vejvoda would not speculate beyond the next Soviet party congress which he anticipated some time next summer or fall. In answer to a question he said that Khrushchev's visit to the CSR last August/3/ had come as a surprise to the Czechs. His purpose had been to give recognition to the Slovak uprising at the end of World War II (thus correcting earlier Soviet attitudes), and to encourage improvement in Czech-Slovak relations while giving strong support to Novotny's position. Novotny's position has been further strengthened by his decision to express himself favorably about Khrushchev following the latter's fall. This was seen in Czechoslovakia as a sign of independence. Vejvoda indicated that Novotny's failure to go to Moscow for the October Revolution anniversary was another gesture in this direction, noting that while it was true there was a presidential election in Prague on November 12, Novotny had no particular worry about winning it. /2/Reference is to the ouster on October 15 of Nikita Khrushchev as Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union and First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party by a group led by Leonid Brezhnev. /3/August 27-September 5. Vejvoda was on the whole optimistic about the policies of the new Soviet leaders so far as his own country's interests were concerned, noting that Brezhnev was well known and liked in Prague. (Vejvoda confirmed, incidentally, that Mrs. Brezhnev and Mrs. Khrushchev were at Karlovy Vary at the time of Khrushchev's ouster.) He did not think the recent promotion of Shelepin, former head of the KGB, to be a full Presidium member was worrisome. He thought Shelepin had been put in to moderate the police. Vejvoda qualified his general optimism by some remarks about the possibility of Sino-Soviet accommodation, which he felt sure would occur if the US attempted to "isolate" the USSR. (This was evidently a reference to US policy on the UN financing issue.)/4/ Undertones of worry about a possible change in Soviet policy also appeared in a bantering reply to a question regarding Soviet intentions to ratify Charter amendments for the enlargement of UN Councils. Vejvoda said he thought the Soviets would do so unless Chou En-lai had persuaded them otherwise. He said Yugoslavia and Albania, for opposite reasons, were most worried about the implications of Khrushchev's fall. /4/The Soviet Union insisted on its right to contribute only to U.N. activities of which it approved. The United States insisted that it pay its full assessed contribution. 2. In a discussion of Czech cultural developments, Vejvoda stressed the flourishing experimental theater in Prague. Asked how the Party felt about this, he stated that Party Secretary Koucky, who implements but does not make policy in this field, tried to steer a middle course between the beatniks and the dogmatists. He said the Prague theater was a great attraction for West German tourists whom the Czechs welcome for currency reasons along with the Austrians who visit Brno and Bratislava on one day trips. (Vejvoda denied that many West Germans came to Czechoslovakia to meet East German relatives, indicating that GDR nationals were not in any case particularly welcome nor easily able to leave East Germany.) Asked whether there would be a return flow of Czech visitors to the FRG and Austria, Vejvoda expressed doubt not, he said, because the Czechs feared defections but because of their hard currency problem. This led him to remark that defection was a tough personal problem for the individuals involved but that for his part he wished that such individuals would think not only about their own desires but also about the fact that every defection caused the dogmatists at home to clamp down on those who stay behind. The evolution toward greater intellectual scope and freedom gets set back through such incidents. 3. Referring to CEMA, Vejvoda did not think it was going anywhere very fast. He said that Czechoslovakia was the only country that had really shown an interest in bloc integration efforts, along with the Soviets, and that even Poland was dubious. He indicated the Czechs were disenchanted with their forward role and would look increasingly for trade relations with the West. He saw little future in economic relations with the southeast European communist countries. In connection with economic matters, he said that the Czechs had suffered severely from the Sino-Soviet split because they had lost one of their best markets, including that for their inferior products, like second-rate shoes, which no-one but the Chinese would take. He said the Chinese had been good trading partners, delivering needed raw materials and even hard currency punctually. Vejvoda observed that the Czech man in the street was quite resentful of economic assistance to African countries, which were poor credit risks. But Cuba was popular both for romantic reasons and because it supplied tropical fruit which were a luxury in a small landlocked country like his own. Vejvoda did not deny that there had been problems over economic relations with Cuba but stressed that at the time of the 1962 missile crisis there had been a lot of sympathy for Castro because he seemed to have suffered the same fate as the Czechs did in 1938. Vejvoda said he had always suspected that the whole missile episode had been pre-arranged by the US and the USSR--a notion on which he was strongly challenged. 4. On German issues, Vejvoda said that Berlin was Khrushchev's greatest failure. He had thought he had the power to get a free city but instead got himself into a military confrontation. The Czechs were especially bitter over this (despite their general approval of Khrushchev) because it had obliged them to undertake a major mobilization, including industrial, in 1961 in order to put the totally unready Czech army into some semblance of fighting shape. Vejvoda attributed Czech economic problems in great part to the dislocations produced by this mobilization (plus the simultaneous disappearance of the Chinese market). He thought that the Wall, however regrettable for the people of Berlin, had stabilized the German situation and enabled Khrushchev to terminate his Berlin gambit. He thought too that the East German regime had managed to improve the lot of the people following the Wall, though he did not contradict a comment that of all the Communist parties in Eastern Europe the SED had attracted the most odious individuals to its ranks. Vejvoda said the Czechs had not been worried by the contemplated Khrushchev visit to the FRG, noting in this connection the Czechs' own interest in good relations with Bonn. He pointed out that even in the days when Czech propaganda heaped abuse on Adenauer, they had always indicated their interest in trade and normal relations. 5. Referring to the current visit here of a Czech writers' group (whose itinerary, he said, the Czech travel organization had badly bungled), Vejvoda mentioned that some of the Jewish members of the group had sought to make contact with Jewish writers here. He said anti-semitism was minimal in Czechoslovakia, though at one time, after the war, anti-German feeling had also been directed at German-speaking Jews. He pointed out that Defense Minister Lomsky was Jewish and expressed his belief that there was no discrimination against Jews so far as professional and official jobs were concerned. He thought US "propaganda" exaggerated anti-semitism in the USSR, though he admitted that it did exist there historically. He did not think that Czech Jews had ever attempted to urge the Soviets to curb anti-semitism. 6. In mentioning Lomsky, Vejvoda got to talking about former Defense Minister Svoboda who is now apparently the head of the military academy. Svoboda was put to work as an accountant in a cooperative after being purged in 1948. Some time later, Vejvoda thought in 1952, a Soviet delegation came to Prague and some of its members who had known Svoboda in the USSR during the war asked about him rather insistently. Eventually the Czech authorities agreed to produce him and sent an official to Svoboda's apartment to locate him. He had Mrs. Svoboda pull out one of Svoboda's general's uniforms and went off to the cooperative where he told Svoboda to put on the uniform and go to meet his Soviet friends, but instructed him not to mention his low estate. Svoboda performed as instructed and thereafter was gradually rehabilitated. 7. Vejvoda several times urged the US to conduct an active policy of contacts with the east, especially through trade and cultural exchange. He said US policy could greatly affect the further development of Sino-Soviet relations. He felt that most US officials had the correct attitude toward Eastern Europe but that some still seemed to feel that the East European countries could be split off from the USSR and their communist regimes removed. This he said was unrealistic and the expression of views along these lines hampered the development of relations. His attention was called to President Johnson's references to bridge-building and to the abiding US interest in seeing greater independence and liberty come to the peoples of Eastern Europe. The US considered the satellite status inflicted upon the East Europeans after the war repugnant but had always recognized the legitimate interest of the Soviets and East Europeans in friendly relations with each other. Vejvoda said that Czech-Soviet friendship was traditional--even Benes had been accused of being a Communist because of his desire for good relations with Moscow--and that there would always be close relations. 8. Vejvoda thought that most of the foreign ministers from the Bloc, including Gromyko, would be coming to the General Assembly. David, however, had a prior commitment in Paris which would delay his arrival here./5/ Vejvoda said that David's talks in Paris would go beyond economic matters and observed that Czechoslovakia held recent French cultural accomplishments in high regard and was desirous of deepening relations in this field. /5/David arrived in New York on November 27. 9. On Article 19, Vejvoda deplored the current impasse and expressed the view that the Soviets would not pay up under pressure. Reminded that the US position was not motivated by the desire to bring pressure on the Soviet Union but by our view of the role of the UN, Vejvoda acknowledged that the Soviets had missed opportunities to avoid the present situation. He stressed that the Soviets wished to preserve Security Council prerogatives in the peacekeeping field and not to weaken them by accepting the system of Assembly assessments for peacekeeping. He thought that the only hope now was to act on Soviet suggestions for a working group to consider future peacekeeping moral-ities while postponing a showdown. He was again reminded that US proposals in this field had been on the table since March and that Soviet responses had been utterly uncompromising. It was suggested to him that the new Soviet leadership could quite plausibly have backed off from Khrushchev's untenable position when it came to power. He indicated that the French were urging the Soviets to stand firm while the developing countries were giving contradictory advice. Some expressed the view that the Soviets could not give in under pressure while others were concerned that the US and Soviets would get together to curb the role of the Assembly. Vejvoda implied that the Czechs here had tried to explain the firmness of the US position, including the domestic reasons for it, to the Soviets and to the Foreign Ministry in Prague. He hinted that his delegation had even raised with Prague the possibility that Czechoslovakia pay its arrears, but had been overruled. Prague had replied that "for the time being" it would support the USSR.
39. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ SecDel/MC/29 New York, December 10, 1964, noon. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 17 CZECH. Confidential. Drafted by Givan and approved in S on December 17. The meeting was held at the U.S. Mission. The source text is labeled "Part 2 of 2;" a separate memorandum of conversation dealing with the MLF is ibid. SECRETARY'S DELEGATION TO THE NINETEENTH SESSIONOF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS U.S. Czechoslovakia Foreign Minister David noted a certain modest development in peaceful bilateral relations, notably in trade, cultural exchanges and tourism, since he had talked with the Secretary in September 1963./2/ The GOC has tried to move forward and has taken certain steps. Jamming of VOA broadcasts has ceased. Medals have been awarded U.S. citizens who participated in the Slovak uprising. Visa issuance has been simplified and emigration procedures have been revised. There is also an agreement on patents. They are agreeable to some exchanges in the agricultural field and to further development of cultural exchanges. David thought it would also be useful to establish an exchange of economic delegations. He noted that three groups of U.S. Congressmen toured Czechoslovakia recently; he thought they were satisfied with their visits. Tourism has increased since 1963 and the GOC is trying to send outstanding people as exchange visitors. /2/The Rusk-David meeting was reported in Secto 12 from USUN, September 25, 1963. (Ibid., Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 2313) Despite these positive phenomena, David thought it necessary to say that a number of problems remain for which solutions are not being pressed forward. He had in mind in particular the conclusion of an agreement on financial matters. He recalled that at their last meeting the Secretary had said that they should lock their experts in a room until they reached a solution, in the manner of a papal election. The GOC presented a draft agreement in March 1964 but has noted no progress since then. David thought the time had come to sit down and sign the agreement, which has an important bearing on the general development of relations. Another problem, David said, concerned bilateral trade. Trade has increased a little but significant improvement depends on American policies. The GOC is interested in developing trade with many countries and has reached a number of agreements in this field. It is important to restore the MFN relationship that was suspended in 1951./3/ Without MFN they cannot imagine any substantial trade development. /3/On October 2, 1951, President Truman suspended Czechoslovakia's MFN status under the provisions of the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951. For text of the announcement, see Department of State Bulletin, October 15, 1951, pp. 621-624. The Czechs think, further, that trade relations are one of the most significant means of improving general relations between states. David noted that a Chamber of Commerce Delegation would visit the U.S. in the first quarter of 1965. David said a third problem related to the restricted areas for official travel./4/ They expressed their view by note last year: they think the restrictions are not good for bilateral relations, are discriminatory and do not reflect a realistic evaluation of the situation. They ask that the restrictions be removed. They understand that the problem has been considered within the USG and hope the Secretary will say something about its status. They would not like to take a similar measure in Czechoslovakia. /4/On November 12, 1963, the Department of State imposed travel restrictions on Eastern European diplomats resident in the United States. For text of the Department's statement and the note presented to the Czech Embassy, see ibid., December 2, 1963, p. 860. The Secretary repeated an observation President Johnson had made yesterday to Gromyko,/5/ namely that we wish to explore every possibility of reaching further agreements with Eastern European countries. This attitude toward Eastern Europe was one of the issues in our elections. President Johnson's view of Eastern Europe was that we should keep our guard up but our hand out. The American people decided in effect that we ought to explore possibilities of further agreements. With regard to Czechoslovakia we are prepared to move ahead to see how our relations can be improved. We have noted with satisfaction the modest improvement of the past year or two. The Secretary said he wished to compliment Ambassador Duda for his alertness in keeping in touch with ways of improving our relations. The Secretary would not concede that the initiatives all came from one direction, but this was of no great consequence. /5/A memorandum of President Johnson's December 9 conversation with Gromyko is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume XIV. The Secretary thought the exchange program should be developed further and saw no obstacle to this. He agreed that MFN is the key to significant trade improvement. The executive branch and Congress are taking a new look at this problem and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee is studying it. There are increased indications of interest among our business and economic groups and the State Department has encouraged their interest. But MFN will require legislation and there are certain obstacles in the way of an easy and quick change in the law. For example, it is important for us to reach a settlement of our lend-lease problem with the USSR. Consideration of such legislation will also be influenced somewhat by the general relations and atmosphere between the Warsaw Pact countries and NATO countries. We hope this atmosphere will be favorable so far as it affects this legislation. Some steps can be taken without legislation, however, and we will do what we can. The Secretary said he was interested to note that some Americans showed increased interest in buying in Czechoslovakia. We will work with Congress on this question. The Secretary could not make a firm prediction when Congress would consider the question or what the outcome would be, but he was personally optimistic. Meanwhile there is one area in the economic field where rapid growth is possible, namely tourism. The American tourist has a great interest in visiting countries he has not seen before. In the post-war period relatively few American tourists have gone to Czechoslovakia, so there is a considerable reservoir of tourist interest. The actions of the GOC in this field have been constructive and will encourage further development. We hope the GOC will earmark part of its income from tourism for Czechoslovaks to visit the U.S., since we are in the tourist business too. On the financial agreement, the Secretary said he was frankly embarrassed to find out this morning that he was personally uninformed about its status at the moment. He would phone the Department and get a message to David on this point. If the Secretary was not personally satisfied with the answer the Department gave him he would ask again. On travel restrictions, the Secretary said he would speak quite frankly. The problem rose in a new form in the last two or three years because of certain activities of Warsaw Pact missions which we found difficult to accept. These activities had to do with our intercontinental missile sites. In arranging travel certain representatives left normal routes and criss-crossed small country roads in, through, and around sites. Reciprocity was not involved for some of the Warsaw Pact countries because they did not have sites in their territory. We are under no misapprehension where this information was going. Had we not taken steps to insure that such activity was stopped, we would have been in great difficulty and the Warsaw Pact countries would have regarded us as children. However, we would look into the matter again and see whether improvement is possible. This question should not be considered a thermometer of our general relations but as a matter to be thoroughly understood on both sides. We will hope there can be some improvements. If Ambassador Duda personally has difficulty the Secretary would be glad to discuss the matter personally and facilitate his travel if he can. The trouble is that Ambassador of Czechoslovakia is not the only one waiting to travel. David thanked the Secretary for all he had said and looked forward to trade expansion. He would repeat, however, that MFN is an obstacle. The Secretary said he agreed. David said they would now wait with interest for news from us. He believes many Americans are interested in buying Czech goods and he does not know why they should be deprived. Why should Americans not have the best beer in the world, frankfurters, Prague ham, glassware etc.? The Secretary said he agreed there is a market here for such products. At the same time, David said, there is interest in American goods; no one has to persuade Czechoslovaks that American production and technology have reached a high level. As for the solution of financial issues, he believed this agreement is ready for signature; the experts are waiting and have nothing more to do. The Secretary said that was his understanding but he would like to find out more about it. David said old matters should be liquidated. The GOC has liquidated problems with a number of countries, which has proved to be of mutual benefit. As for the third problem, travel restrictions, David begged the Secretary to give his attention to this matter so that it also would be liquidated. The restrictions really hamper their people, not only in their work but by making their life more difficult. Americans stationed in Prague have no such troubles. The Czechoslovak Ambassadors to the U.S. and UN and their colleagues have no task except to improve relations. The Secretary said he had tried to be very frank about the essence of this problem. We will see what can be done. As the Secretary accompanied David to the elevator, the latter referred to U.S. citizen Alois Vesely now under charges in Czechoslovakia./6/ David said that in a few days the GOC would take action in this case that would reflect the desire of both countries to improve their relations. /6/Alois Vesely, a U.S. citizen, was arrested on November 24 during a visit to his native village on charges of spying for France in 1948-1949. Following a U.S. protest, he was expelled from Czechoslovakia on December 11.
40. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, December 18, 1964. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, AV 9 CZECH-US. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Styles on December 21. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS The meeting was requested by Messrs. Murin and Vransky who had accepted an invitation to visit the U.S. in connection with the 20th anniversary of ICAO. Mr. Murin opened the discussion by recalling the recent talks between CSA and PAA which had led to an interline agreement between them. He said he wished to explore three subjects further, as follows: CSA charter flights to U.S. Mr. Murin said that CSA was considering operating a few irregular flights to the U.S. next summer in connection with the Czech athletic games held every five years in Prague (from July 1 to 4, 1965). Approximately ten flights might be involved, and they would all consist of plane-load charters, rather than split charters or individually-ticketed arrangements. Their purpose would be to attract persons of Czech origin living in the U.S. who had an interest in seeing the games. In response to questions, Mr. Murin and Mr. Majsajdr said that Czechoslovakia had liberalized tourist controls greatly in the past year and they described several of the measures taken. There were not as many Czechs who had an interest in visits to the U.S.; most of these were relatives of persons living in the U.S. There was some discussion of charter concepts. Mr. Wharton said that, as a member of IATA, CSA would be familiar with the rules. Mr. Murin indicated he understood these concepts. Mr. Ferguson asked whether Czechoslovakia would allow a U.S. airline to do the same thing proposed by CSA. Mr. Murin replied that Czech civil aviation policy was based on reciprocity. He noted that Czechoslovakia was party to all the international agreements in the aviation field. Mr. Murin asked whether he could characterize the discussion as indicating there were no major obstacles to the CSA proposal for charter flights. Mr. Ferguson responded in the affirmative./2/ /2/In telegram 1110 to Prague, April 1, 1965, the Department of State reported that difficulties in arranging Czech charter flights had arisen because the aircraft CSA proposed to use were the property of Cuban Airlines and thus subject to seizure under Cuban Assets Control Regulations. (Ibid.) Scheduled service to U.S. Mr. Murin said that Czechoslovakia wanted to "prepare conditions" for scheduled CSA service to the U.S. and he understood that PAA was interested in service to Prague. Although nothing had been decided, he wished to raise this matter now to determine what problems there might be. The purpose of such air services would be to foster relations between the two countries and encourage exchange visits. An air transport services agreement already existed. The two airlines had concluded an interline agreement and PAA had stationed a representative in Prague. This step-by-step approach might create conditions for profitable services. Mr. Ferguson said he could not answer this question as fully as he could the first subject of non-scheduled service. He said that, although the two countries had an agreement on paper, the U.S. would want to reexamine it to determine whether it was still adequate. After that, the two countries could discuss the subject further. Mr. Murin agreed that the agreement should be re-examined, but he noted that operations had taken place under it for a number of years and that Article 8 provided a ready means for amending the route annex. After saying that the U.S. would wish to study the whole agreement, not merely the route annex, Mr. Ferguson said that the U.S. would communicate its views on this question to Mr. Majsajdr. Mr. Murin said he hoped negotiations could begin within the next year./3/ /3/Pan American inaugurated New York-Prague service on July 17, 1965. Other questions Mr. Murin raised two other questions. He asked whether CSA could station one of its representatives in New York. After some discussion, it was concluded this was not an aviation matter as such, and that CSA could use the establishment of the CEDOK office in New York both as a precedent and as an example of how to establish a CSA office. Mr. Murin also asked if the U.S. would approve the lease of jet aircraft to CSA. Mr. Wharton said that there are no general obstacles to the leasing of aircraft if certain conditions are filled, and that the U.S. lessor would be aware of these conditions. Mr. Ferguson noted that it was the responsibility of the U.S. lessor, not the foreign lessee, to obtain CAB approval. Therefore, CSA should look to the U.S. lessor to determine whether U.S. approval could be obtained. Mr. Ferguson said that Czechoslovakia should be aware that the CAB has statutory responsibility for the regulation of the economic aspects of aviation, both domestic and foreign, but that the State Department take a prominent role with respect to foreign airlines because of the international relations aspects. The U.S. Government thus speaks with one voice on such matters. Mr. Murin felt that this informal exchange was a good start toward "normalizing" aviation relations between the two countries.
41. Telegram From the Embassy in Czechoslovakia to the Department of State/1/ Prague, September 27, 1965, 0730Z./2/ /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, AV 12-2 CZECH. Confidential. Repeated to London. /2/Beginning in spring of 1965, the dates and transmission times of all incoming Department of State telegrams were in six-figure date-time-groups. The "Z" refers to Greenwich mean time. 466. Embassy tel 1434, London's 1240./3/ Pan Am representative Wenzel says that at technical level Czechs have concluded they don't want to go through with purchase of Soviet IL 62 craft scheduled for 1967 delivery. Uncertainty that such aircraft would obtain air worthiness certificates big factor in decision. This introduces possibility Czechs will now seriously enter market for Western aircraft. /3/Telegram 1434 from Prague, May 13, reported that the prospects for Western sales to an expanding CSA "appear remote for financial, operational and political reasons." (Department of State, Central Files, AV 12-2 CZECH) Telegram 1240 from London, September 21, reported on British efforts to sell VC-10 aircraft in Eastern Europe. (Ibid., AV 12-2 EUR-E) Air Attaché sees some profit to Czechs in using same type aircraft that Pan Am uses in flying here thereby reducing maintenance problem in Prague and eventually in US if CSA receives permission for flights. They have already made some overtures to Wenzel about joint training program in engine maintenance of Western craft. However, credit might loom as factor influencing Czechs to British or French planes. This is thinking CSA technical level and top level Ministry not yet sold. Horsey
42. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, November 12, 1965, 10:30 a.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 17 CZECH-US. Confidential. Drafted by Schiffman and approved in S on November 29. The meeting was held in Rusk's office. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS United States Czechoslovakia Ambassador Duda called on the Secretary at his own request to inquire regarding the current status of 1) the financial and claims settlement and 2) the question of travel restrictions on Czechoslovak diplomats. The Secretary had promised Minister David to look into these two bilateral problems,/2/ Dr. Duda said, and he wished to learn the results of the review. Ambassador Duda said that he did not think he needed to restate the Czechoslovak position on these two questions. /2/Rusk and David met on October 6 during the U.N. General Assembly session. Memoranda of their conversation are ibid., Conference Files: Lot 66 D 347, CF 2548. The Secretary replied that he was familiar with the Czechoslovak views on these subjects. With regard to the travel restrictions, the Secretary said that it is a complicated matter, requiring a review with other Departments of the Government, and that at this time he could say nothing new on the subject. Insofar as the claims settlement is concerned, the Secretary said that we have had a sharp critical reaction to the proposed draft agreement from claimants and some Congressmen. He said that the reaction was based in part on the very large discrepancy between the settlements we have concluded with other East European countries and the proposed settlement with Czechoslovakia. The Secretary then cited the following percentages we have obtained in the claims settlements with other countries: Yugoslavia (1948)--91%, Yugoslavia (1964)--60% (estimated), Romania (1960)--40%, Bulgaria (1963)--75%, Poland (1960)--50%, (estimated), Czechoslovakia (1964) proposed--16% (approx.). The Secretary went on to say that major resistance to the settlement with Czechoslovakia resulted from its being way out of line with other agreements and that we could not move ahead on the present basis. To force the issue on the basis of the present draft agreement in the face of strong opposition would create an impediment to our broader policy objectives and to our intentions in the area of East-West trade. The Secretary suggested that "my colleagues in the Department could review the subject" with the Ambassador to see what were the possibilities in this matter. The Secretary added, after we have had access to the appropriate Congressional Committees and ascertained their thinking, we would be in a better position to act. Ambassador Duda said that he would report the Secretary's remarks to Minister David, but that at this time he wished to make two points: 1. Negotiations for the agreement had extended over a period of about ten years and there were few people around who were directly involved. He was one of those few. In the course of the long negotiations, when the lump sum claims settlement for nationalized property was under discussion, the amount was never presented as a problem by the American side and there was no indication of dissatisfaction with the settlement, the basic provisions of which were agreed upon in 1958. We acted in good faith, Dr. Duda said, that we were in agreement with the American Government on the terms of the settlement and that the American Ambassador in Prague had full powers to negotiate. The Secretary interjected that the agreement was a tentative draft, which Dr. Duda acknowledged. 2. The second point Dr. Duda wished to make was related to the gold question as a part of the agreement. Under the prevailing circumstances, Ambassador Duda said, we agreed to make the gold question part of the package, although it was not strictly a bilateral matter. He added that the Nazi-looted gold was to be returned to Czechoslovakia under the Paris agreement. Although Czechoslovakia has been able to live without the gold for twenty years and could do so for another twenty years, they regard the blocking of the recovery of the gold by the United States as a very sensitive political question, transcending its economic importance, because of the close connection of the gold problem with the Munich agreement and the German question. The Secretary replied that he was familiar with the Czechoslovak position in this regard, that he did not wish to enter into a legal discussion of the matter, but that there were obligations of varying kinds on both sides which have a bearing on each other. The Secretary added that the stakes in our relations are greater in the field of bilateral trade, which should be developed on a positive basis and in the broader context of East-West trade relations. The Secretary said that we would like to see the question of the financial and claims settlement out of the way and suggested that Ambassador Duda may wish to discuss the matter further with Mr. Leddy, to which the Ambassador agreed. The meeting took place in a cordial atmosphere.
43. Telegram From the Embassy in Czechoslovakia to the Department of State/1/ Prague, October 22, 1965. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 CZECH. Confidential. The source text does not indicate a time of transmission; the telegram was received at 7:10 a.m. 604. Fluidity of Czech policy in relation to Western countries in general, and to US in particular, is theme of several reports reaching Embassy in last few days. At least one was almost certainly intended to reach policy-making levels in our government. Reports are premised on disappointment of Czech leadership at results of Moscow visit September, especially in relation to long-term trading needs of Czechoslovakia. (See also our A-180/2/ and other reports to same effect.) Seemingly planted report (mentioned above) said that Czechs had as result been given blank check to make best arrangements they could with West. Two reports (including Ruzek of MFA speaking with me on October 19) indicated that it was important under present circumstances for US to make positive gesture demonstrating that advocates of such Western orientation will meet with constructive response. /2/Airgram A-180, October 18, reported Czech dissatisfaction with talks in Moscow on economic assistance. (Ibid., POL 7 CZECH) These reports are similar in content (and possibly in original motivation) to one cited in Embtel 652 of 10 November 1964./3/ If (as I suspect) they are genuine and really reflect view of significant section of leadership, they may refer only to Czech need for Western wheat. In any case I think it is in interest of long-term US policy towards Eastern Europe to take them at face value and as referring to overall policy. We shall not for long time see here dramatic shift from pro-Soviet alignment, such as occurred in Rumania, but there have been small signs and subtle changes of attitudes which suggest that Czechs, too, are asserting their national interest more than in past. There has been, moreover, striking degree of internal liberalization in past two or three years, and far-reaching reforms in economy are going forward, if somewhat haltingly. We have so far given very little sign that we recognize that there has been any change at all since Stalinist days. /3/Telegram 652 from Prague reported the "furious" Czech reaction to the ouster of Khrushchev. (Ibid., POL 15 USSR) I therefore renew recommendation which I have made through informal channel that we take significant positive step forward such as signature (or other forward-looking action) of long-pending financial-claims agreement or approval of pending application for export license for synthetic rubber technology such as I believe was recently approved for Poland. Both actions would also have certain incidental advantages to specific American interests. Horsey
44. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ SecDel/MC/50 New York, October 6, 1966, 10 a.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 67 D 586, CF 85. Confidential. Drafted by Dean and approved in S on October 17. The meeting was held at USUN. SECRETARY'S DELEGATION TO THE TWENTY-FIRST SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY SUBJECT /2/Memoranda of the other portions of the Rusk-David conversation concerning Vietnam and Germany are ibid. PARTICIPANTS U.S. Czechoslovakia 1. Minister David said he greatly welcomed this annual opportunity to discuss questions of mutual interest. He wanted to raise a number of bilateral questions, then discuss Viet-Nam and the German problem. 2. Minister David said there had been a moderate increase in Czech-American trade. This had been helped by visits on both sides; another American business group was expected in Prague soon. But Czechoslovakia was limited in its capacity to work toward further increase of trade since it had no representation in New York, the center of most commercial dealings. The Embassy's commercial section was located in Washington, out of the commercial mainstream of the country. Minister David asked whether it would not be possible to station in New York a few of the personnel of the commercial section of the Czechoslovakian Embassy in Washington as a subsection of the Embassy, not a separate, independent commercial representatives office. The Secretary took note of the fact that the establishment of a commercial representatives office had been included in the draft of the financial agreement between the two countries. He said in the given context he did not find the Czechoslovak request extraordinary, but that he would look into the matter further after his return to Washington. 3. Minister David said there had been a marked increase in scientific and cultural exchange between the two countries, which was definitely a positive trend in their relations. Czechoslovak films had received high critical recognition and a number of awards. The Czechoslovak government was considering a number of exhibits in the U.S.; among these were an exhibit of medieval Jewish religious art, drawings of children who had been in the Theresienstadt concentration camp and works of Czechoslovak modern artists. The Minister said this favorable development could be much greater if some old outstanding issues were resolved. One was the financial and property claims agreement, which had been initialed by the U.S. side but not concluded. The second was granting of Most Favored Nation treatment to Czechoslovakia. Solution of these problems would result in a great increase in trade and contacts. Without solution, there would be limits to progress in these fields. 4. The Secretary replied that since he and the Minister had last seen each other, the President had proposed to the Congress East-West trade legislation which would permit granting MFN treatment to individual countries. According to our constitution, this legislation must originate in our House of Representatives. The Secretary said, for the Minister's private use only and not for public circulation, he had been told by Congressional leaders that they were not prepared to take up the trade legislation before the pending Congressional elections but would be prepared to do so after the elections. This was a political factor beyond the control of the executive branch in the American system. We expected Congressional hearings on the bill to begin in January or February. Meanwhile, we were trying quietly to build up support for the legislation among various public groups including business and trade union circles; visits of American businessmen to Czechoslovakia like that mentioned by the Minister could be helpful in this sense. 5. The Secretary said the financial and property claims agreement was to some extent linked with the MFN legislation. The previous draft agreement, which had been a working-level paper subject to Departmental approval, had, in addition to earlier payments from Czech properties here, provided for settlement through payment by Czechoslovakia of $2 million against total property claims; $20 million in gold would also be returned to Czechoslovakia. The amount to be paid by Czechoslovakia in this settlement was out of line with the American property claims, and the settlement as such was out of line with other similar settlements in Eastern Europe. The draft had encountered very severe opposition in Congress. If signed, it would have become an obstacle to conclusion of East-West trade legislation because the American claimants would have made their objections effectively felt in Congress. Consequently, as a minimum step, we must delay action on the agreement with Czechoslovakia. As a new chapter in Czechoslovakia-American relations developed, we would hope to find some way to proceed with the question without causing a political incident, which would be a set-back to our relations. 6. Minister David said that the negotiations had been a long time in the process. Each step by both sides had been carefully considered, the negotiators on both sides had been sincere. He said that the Czechoslovak side had all along had its own critics, who kept claiming that the Czech Foreign Ministry was not pushing hard enough and its claims were too low. As regarded the gold, it belonged to Czechoslovakia and had been stolen by Hitler. This fact was undisputed and the other members of the Tripartite Commission controlling disposal of the gold had expressed their agreement to its return to Czechoslovakia. The moral issue here was clear: the gold belonged to the Czechs, had been stolen by the Nazis, and should be returned to Czechoslovakia. Minister David said he was hesitant to make observations on the domestic political proc-ess of the U.S., but wasn't it possible that progress toward these agreements with Czechoslovakia before the elections might not actually have a favorable effect on the American electorate. 7. The Secretary said he would not debate the gold question. Our problems were procedural and political in character; we hoped in time to find a better solution. He said that American political leaders, who had to be the best judges of such matters, told him that sympathy or a favorable attitude does not have the same impact on the electorate and on election results as does opposition. More generally, it was true that the overall atmosphere in the United States had improved with regard to East-West relations. President Johnson had taken the initiative on this question on a number of occasions. The formulation of some of his statements may not have pleased the governments of Eastern Europe, but they had definitely helped to move public opinion.
45. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Czechoslovakia/1/ Washington, October 6, 1966, 12:49 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, AV 9 CZECH-US. Confidential. Drafted by Styles; cleared in E, EUR, L, H, and the Civil Aeronautics Board; and approved by Solomon. 60675. Ref: Prague 1793 and 481./2/ /2/Telegram 1793, June 29, summarized the contacts of a Czech note on revision of the 1946 bilateral air agreement. (Ibid., AV 6 US/PAA) Telegram 481, September 19, reported Pan American's plans for service to Czechoslovakia and requested information on Department plans for extending Pan American's landing rights. (Ibid.) 1. After careful consideration economic and political issues, USG has decided it would be in long-term US aviation interest and advance bridge-building concept to negotiate new air transport agreement with Czechoslovakia for U.S. and Czech airline services. However because Prague service holds little immediate commercial attraction to PAA based on poor operating results to date, US will want obtain best possible aviation deal and will thus be prepared to adopt firm bargaining position with Czechs. 2. We prefer new agreement, not merely amendment of 1946 agreement,/3/ because we would like Czech agreement be same as US agreements virtually all other countries. Such agreements include a principal and critical feature lacking in 1946 agreement with Czechs, namely, recognition right of airlines to decide in first instance amount of service (capacity) they will operate. Although 1946 agreement remains legally valid, we have tried downplay its operative usefulness by having present PAA service conducted "outside" that agreement and, in present situation, by calling for entirely new agreement. In final analysis, USG could denounce 1946 agreement, but we hope Czechs would not force issue to this extent. /3/For text of this agreement, signed in Prague on January 3, 1946, and entered into force on June 17, 1946, see 60 Stat. 1917. 3. Subject any views Embassy may wish express, it requested transmit note to MFA, text of which in following cable./4/ /4/Telegram 60676 to Prague, October 6. (Department of State, Central Files, AV 6 US/PAA) 4. Embassy may in its discretion impart orally flavor of this message. You may explain date earlier than November 15 out of question due other commitments. 5. US delegation would include Department and CAB representatives and airline industry observer, and be headed by Department officer. 6. FYI. If Czechs do not renew PAA's permission beyond October 31, Department would wish to reexamine US offer to negotiate on November 15 since we would not want to be bound in advance to talks held under inauspicious circumstances. This does not rule out talks on November 15, but merely leaves us room for maneuver./5/ End FYI. /5/In telegram 78442 to Prague, November 3, the Department of State commented: "interest in early aviation negotiations based primarily on desire to protect continuation PAA operation pending bilateral agreement. Understand that GOC has issued temporary indefinite permit to PAA. Therefore urgency from US viewpoint diluted." (Ibid.) Katzenbach
46. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, December 21, 1966, 4:30 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CZECH-US. Confidential. Drafted by Schiffman and approved in S on December 28. The conversation was held in Rusk's office. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS After the preliminary pleasantries, the Secretary said that he was disappointed to find on his return from the world tour he had just completed that the Kazan case is not yet settled./2/ Just as the Secretary was about to make his representations on the matter to Ambassador Duda, the Ambassador interjected and said that he himself had planned to see the Secretary in this regard and referred to the informal conversation he had had with the Secretary some time ago during a social occasion. The Ambassador said that he had reported the earlier conversation to the MFA, received a reply and wished to read it to the Secretary. /2/On October 31, a Soviet commercial aircraft in service from Moscow to Paris was diverted to Prague airport, where V. J. Kazan, a U.S. citizen of Czech origin, was forcibly removed from the aircraft and arrested on charges of espionage. In February 1967, Kazan was tried, convicted, sentenced to 8 years imprisonment by Czech courts, and then expelled from Czechoslovakia. In response to the Secretary's question whether he could leave a copy, the Ambassador said that it was "incomplete and in rough form". He would read it slowly. As you know, Duda said, Kazan is being charged with crimes which are punishable in all countries and on the basis of a court order issued in 1963. We are not going to suspend the application of Czech laws simply because Kazan is a US citizen. He will be brought to trial. To the Secretary's question whether the Ambassador knew when the trial will be held Duda replied: "No". Duda then said, we have proceeded in full conformity with international procedures and we have granted consular access. We are prepared to issue visas to Mrs. Kazan and to the father-in-law, Duda continued, and I presume that a request to see Kazan will receive favorable consideration. We have protested the exaggerated handling of the matter by the State Department and the US public, which is out of proportion to the importance of the issue. We cannot agree with the anti-Czechoslovak measures which have been taken, such as the withholding of visas and the unofficial but practical discouragement of travel./3/ The Kazan case is of a consular nature and will be handled as such and on its merits. Publicity, pressures, and retaliatory measures will only complicate a solution to the problem. We have no intention to permit this case to undermine our relations, but it is necessary that the court proceedings be permitted to take their course. /3/The United States had declined to issue visas to a Czech cultural exhibit group and indicated that a tightening of visa requirements for Czech citizens was a likely response to Kazan's seizure. In the past, Duda continued, we have received no cooperation from the US to our just requests involving questions affecting our bilateral relations. These have been seriously affected by the discrepancy between words and deeds. US statements that we are interested in normalizing relations are contradicted by the precipitous actions such as have been taken in this case. These are bound to affect relations adversely. US pronouncements are impaired by our unwillingness to sign the concluded financial/claims agreement and the yardstick of our sincerity is our unwillingness to return the Nazi-looted gold. In this context, the US image is not a good one and we are not going to prevent the public from learning the full facts of this matter. The Ambassador hoped that his statement clarified the Czech position in this matter. Referring to Duda's remark regarding a solution of the case, the Secretary asked what he meant by this. Duda replied that he had no authority to elaborate and added that he preferred to let the statement stand. He then said that the atmosphere engendered by a campaign in the press and by measures intended to exert pressure cannot but complicate the general atmosphere. The Secretary replied that there is a distinction between the general atmosphere and the fate of an individual. We know well the circumstances under which Kazan's detention took place, the Secretary said, and he proceeded to recount the details of the flight which was diverted from its normal northern route to make the unscheduled landing at Prague. The Secretary said this was a clear case of kidnapping by security agents. If Kazan had gone to Czechoslovakia voluntarily, the case would have been difficult enough, but under the circumstances this is a very special case. We cannot overlook this in terms of our general relations. Under our constitutional system the fate of an individual is of greatest concern. The Secretary then asked what would happen to the members of the family if we issued them passports to go to Czechoslovakia? Duda replied that he had no doubt they would be safe. The Secretary responded there was a major doubt about Kazan's safety, although he had had no intention of visiting Czechoslovakia. Duda replied that he had nothing to add to the Soviet statements on the landing of the plane "which are known to you". As to the safety of Americans and of the Kazan family there is no doubt, especially on the background of 30,000 to 40,000 American tourists a year who have visited Czechoslovakia without any major incidents. Duda repeated that the Kazan case has been magnified out of all proportion and to the point where it has overshadowed relations, whose improvement both sides strived to achieve. Duda then asked whether the Kazan incident is being used by some people here as a pretext to obstruct progress in US-Czech relations. The Secretary replied that this surely is not true of the President, himself, and the Executive in general. He said that we relied and will rely again on the assurances the Czechs have given us regarding the safety of American travelers, but this case presents us with a very special situation. The Secretary added that on his recent trip he had encountered many Senators and Congressmen, all of whom had questioned him and commented on the Kazan case. The Secretary also mentioned his lunch-eon with seven Congressmen earlier in the day who brought up the case. The Secretary then said to Duda: "I wish you would ask Foreign Minister David how he envisages a solution in the interest of better relations on both sides." The Secretary expressed the hope that David could reply to his question personally. He said he would withhold further comment until he received an answer from David, adding that he deliberately refrained from talking about the case at his press conference that afternoon. Duda promised to convey the Secretary's request to David, but added that he wished to stress again that any publicity and pressure will only tend to complicate developments. The meeting was concluded with the Secretary saying that he hoped to see Duda again when he had a reply from Minister David./4/ /4/David did not reply to Rusk's inquiry. In telegram 1149 from Prague, January 17, 1967, Beam reported that he had attempted to secure an official response from Czech Foreign Office officials without success. (Department of State, Central Files, POL CZECH-US) [Continue with the next documents] Volume XVII Index | Foreign Relations Online | Historian's Office | |