Foreign Relations of the United States 1964-1968, Volume XIV, Soviet Union Released by the Office of the Historian Documents 11-18
11. National Intelligence Estimate/1/
NIE
11-9-64 Washington,
February 19, 1964. /1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, O/DDI
Registry: Job 79-R01012A. Secret. Submitted by the Director of Central
Intelligence and concurred in by the United States Intelligence
Board. SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY The
Problem To estimate
developments in Soviet foreign policy over the next year or so.
Conclusions A. An
accumulation of serious internal and external problems led the Soviets by
mid-1963 to make the shift in their foreign policy course signaled by the
test ban treaty. The Cuban missile crisis, by its dramatic demonstration
of the unfavorable relations of power, had forced a reappraisal of risks
and opportunities for advance against the West. Internal economic
difficulties were mounting and were sharpened by the burden of the arms
race. The increasingly strident Chinese challenge to the Soviet leadership
also stimulated the search for a new approach. (Paras. 1-9) B. We believe
that Khrushchev considers the present period inauspicious for direct
pressures against the West and has adopted the relaxation of tensions as
the main theme of his policy. He will probably avoid inflaming such
sensitive issues as Berlin, or any others which carry the risk of direct
confrontation with the US. He probably hopes that in an improved
international climate he can hold down defense costs, gain time to
concentrate on internal and bloc problems, and encourage the West to grant
the credits he needs. At the same time, he expects this line to aggravate
Western differences, which tend to emerge more strongly when the Soviet
threat appears to fade. To sustain the improved climate, the Soviets are
likely to complete current negotiations for certain bilateral agreements
with the US and seek limited understandings on disarmament and other
matters. (Paras. 14-15, 17-18, 24-25, 27-29) C. Nevertheless,
the Soviets do not intend to curb their anti-Western policies in the
underdeveloped world or to forego opportunities which might appear there.
In fact, Khrushchev expects the relaxation of East-West tensions to
increase the number of unstable situations which the Soviet can exploit.
The Soviet interest in doing so is reinforced by competition with
Communist China for leadership of the "national liberation struggle." In
addition, it is always possible that developments not initiated by the
Soviets will require a demonstration of "firmness" on their part. Cuba is
a prime example of this kind of contingency; Castro is in a position to
embroil the USSR in serious situations with the US which would call for
the Soviets to provide strong support for Cuba, although they will clearly
wish to avoid another confrontation like that of 1962. (Paras. 16, 19,
20-21, 29-31) D. The Soviets
probably intend to follow their present policies for some time. Khrushchev
with his customary optimism, however, almost certainly looks forward to
the time when, having coped with his current problems, he can return to a
more offensive course. In our view the factors which led to the adoption
of present Soviet policies are not transitory; there is a good chance that
Khrushchev underestimates his present difficulties and that these policies
will tend to be stretched out beyond the relatively short period of this
estimate. This does not mean that the present improvement in the
international atmosphere is likely to evolve over a longer time into a
more serious search for basic settlements with the West. More fundamental
changes in the Soviet outlook than any now in prospect would be needed
before the Soviets could bring themselves to such a course. (Para. 23)
Discussion 1. In our last
NIE on Soviet foreign policy,/2/
we viewed the Soviet leaders as caught up by indecision, hesitating
in the face of the stark realities brought home by their failure in the
Cuban missile crisis. This crisis had demonstrated not only the new
dimensions of US power but also US skill and determination in wielding it.
In the aftermath, the Soviet leaders were still confronted by the very
problems which their Cuban missile venture had been intended to solve. The
overall balance of power between East and West remained unfavorable. The
economic strains of the arms competition loomed as costly as ever. The
Chinese challenge to Soviet authority was growing in breadth and depth.
/2/NIE 11-63, "Main Trends in Soviet Foreign Policy,"
dated 22 May 1963. Secret. [Footnote in the source text. For text, see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. V, Document
326.] 2. By mid-1963
it became apparent that a new overall approach to these various problems
had been reached, at least in principle. In the economic sphere,
short-term plans for 1964-1965 were to be revised in order to shift
sizeable amounts of resources to the chemical industry. Consistent with
this new turn of economic policy was a shift in East-West tactics,
manifested in Khrushchev's concessions to the Western position on the
limited test ban. Almost simultaneously, the Soviets confronted the
Chinese with a strong counterattack. The net result of these new moves was
a notable relaxation of East-West tensions, some limited accords between
East and West, and a significant widening of the gap between the USSR and
China. I. Factors Affecting the Soviet Outlook
3. The
considerations which led to this tactical turning of mid-1963 were, we
believe, quite fundamental in character. They flowed from an accumulation
of problems, partly inherent in the development of the USSR and the Bloc,
and partly the specific byproduct of the generally offensive line of
policy Khrushchev had pursued since he opened the Berlin crisis in 1958.
These considerations are not merely transitory and will almost certainly
continue to influence the Soviet policy outlook for some time. 4. The Strategic Balance. The course on which Soviet
policy launched in 1957-1958 was built on the expectation that the USSR,
for the first time in the post-war struggle, was about to acquire a major
advantage in strategic weapons. Khrushchev was evidently persuaded by this
prospect to believe that the West could be forced into concessions. The
intervening five years have demonstrated, however, not only that the US
was capable of resisting this challenge, but also that in the field of
strategic weapons it could outpace the USSR. The Soviets found that the
heavy cost of the intensified arms race was incompatible with Khrushchev's
commitment both to a high growth rate to overtake the US economy and to a
more rapid improvement in Soviet living conditions. By 1962, US military
and intelligence programs led to a situation in which both sides, and
indeed much of world opinion, understood that the strategic advantage did
not lie with the USSR, even though the ability of the USSR to damage the
US was increasing. The Cuban missile venture was an attempt to achieve a
quick and relatively inexpensive advance in both the substance and the
image of Soviet power. Its failure has left the Soviets little choice but
to find ways to contain the arms race and reduce its burden on the Soviet
economy. 5. Economic Policy. To a major degree, the present
more moderate general line adopted by Khrushchev reflects the strains in
the Soviet economy. Economic strength is only one ingredient in the
balance of power, but Khrushchev has made it a key area of competition in
his peaceful coexistence strategy. As the Soviet leaders contrast their
own economic difficulties and the economic malaise in much of Eastern
Europe with the vitality of Western Europe and the upturn in American
economic growth rates, they have little reason for optimism. Because of
the nature of these economic problems, they were bound to encroach on
Soviet foreign relations. 6. The Soviets
have adopted a new economic course which requires a major shift of
resources; their aims are to stimulate agriculture, modernize industry,
and revive the rate of economic growth. Moreover, the magnitude of the new
investment effort for the chemical industry bears directly on Soviet
relations with the West. The Soviets cannot provide the equipment needed
for their chemical program without extensive purchases abroad; their hard
currency deficits and the decline of their gold reserves oblige them to
seek long-term credits for the necessary equipment. An effort to stimulate
Western competition for orders from the USSR on long-term credit is
already under way. There are signs that preliminary understandings have
been reached with the British and Italians. The Soviets almost certainly
hope that one important breakthrough in the Western front will cause the
other advanced industrial countries to fall into line. 7. Even a sharp
increase in imports from the West, however, would not deal with a
principal cause of Soviet difficulties--the heavy burden of military
spending. We have estimated that the Soviets will make every effort to
hold down rising military costs;/3/ the announced reduction of the defense
budget, though modest, symbolizes the direction Khrushchev proposes to
follow, and some force reductions are apparently intended. Progress along
this line of economies in the defense establishment, however, depends
greatly on a proper international climate. Khrushchev's hopes to support
his civilian investment program through Western credits and through
savings from defense argue for some degree of restraint in his relations
with the West. /3/SNIE 11-5-64, "Soviet Economic Problems and
Outlook," dated 8 January 1964. Secret. [Footnote in the source text.
Printed as Document 4.] 8. The Problem of China. As they survey their
international position, the Soviets are confronted by a third long-term
problem. The vicious exploitation of the Cuban missile crisis by the
Chinese deepened the Sino-Soviet dispute, and their subsequent attacks
expanded to almost every facet of Soviet foreign and domestic policy. In
counterattacking, the Soviets sought to use the test ban as an issue on
which to isolate China in world and even Communist opinion. This, however,
proved illusory; trade and other contacts between China and Western Europe
have increased in recent months, and Peiping's influence in the Communist
world has, if anything, grown. The Soviets considered convening an
international Communist conference to condemn China, but abandoned the
idea, at least temporarily on learning that several key parties had grave
reservations about such action. 9. The Soviet
leaders appear now to have concluded that they will be locked in a severe
struggle with China for a protracted period. They have evidently decided
to pursue their own interests regardless of inevitable Chinese criticism,
and despite the cost of further deterioration in Sino-Soviet relations and
consequent fracturing of the international movement. The test ban treaty
was an important manifestation that, on certain issues, the Soviets view
their interests as paralleling those of the West rather than those of
their Communist ally. Indeed, the Soviets are also prepared to use other
issues as weapons against China, for example an agreement against
dissemination of nuclear weapons and techniques, or an international pact
for peaceful resolution of territorial disputes. 10. Soviet
policy is complicated, however, by the competition with China in the
underdeveloped areas. The Soviets cannot afford to appear less interested
than China in militant struggle and must therefore present their policies
in a revolutionary and anti-Western context. At the same time, the Soviets
cannot afford to let this aspect of their policy damage their relations
with existing regimes. In some instances, the pressure of Chinese
competition may cause the Soviets to act more rapidly and vigorously than
they might otherwise do. On some occasions, the Soviets may also resort to
sharper tactics to undercut the Chinese, but we doubt that the Chinese
factor alone would persuade the Soviets to take greater risks than
otherwise seemed warranted. In general, the Chinese attempt to compete
with the Soviets in exploiting opportunities in the underdeveloped areas
imposes some limits on Soviet efforts to improve relations with the West.
11. Eastern Europe. The weakening of Soviet authority
in Eastern Europe, which has been apparent for some time, has been greatly
stimulated by the Sino-Soviet conflict. The Rumanians, for example, have
successfully used the dispute as one lever in their own controversy with
the Soviets. The trend is clearly for the East European regimes to look
more to their own interests, although none has yet done this so
forthrightly as the Rumanians. The Soviets will encounter increasingly
difficult problems in Eastern Europe and the cohesiveness of the Soviet
Bloc will suffer. Some regimes might balk at an increase in tensions which
would damage their own economic dealings with the West. They might regard
Cuba as more of a burden than an asset, or regard the struggle in the
underdeveloped areas as a secondary issue. Some, like the Poles and East
Germans, show nervousness over Soviet attitudes on certain arms control
measures. The Soviets have already found it difficult to subordinate the
Eastern European economies to the USSR, and the chances of organizing CEMA
as a solid front against the Common Market have dwindled. 12. One
important consequence of these developing trends is their impact on East
Germany's position in Eastern Europe. If the other regimes proceed,
however haltingly, toward a liberalization of controls, a greater degree
of autonomy from Moscow, and an increase in Western contacts, East Germany
will come under great pressures to follow suit. Failure to keep in step
with the other regimes risks isolation and possibly similar pressures
within the country as well. Moreover, in the Soviet view, if the East
German regime could gain in acceptability and increase contacts and
exchanges without serious internal troubles, it would become a much more
suitable instrument of Soviet policy in Germany. At some point the
increase of normal contacts might even make the East German proposal for
confederation seem more plausible. However, the process of liberalization
in East Germany is an extremely delicate one which could lead to serious
instability, and the Soviets would not feel free to push it very far or
fast. 13. Internal Soviet Politics. Khrushchev's internal
position is now probably stronger and his freedom of action apparently
greater than a year ago. In the first months of 1963, it seemed that his
authority had been checked, and that he felt it necessary to modify some
of his policies. His ability to reconsolidate his position was probably
due in part to the illness of Frol Kozlov, who, in retrospect, seems to
have been a key figure in the internal contention. The viciousness of
Chinese attacks, particularly in raising the sensitive question of border
adjustments with the USSR, may have also helped Khrushchev. At any rate,
the question of how to deal with some of the issues under debate evidently
has been settled in Khrushchev's favor. The state of Soviet agriculture,
however, is a continuing liability, and problems affecting allocation of
economic resources are still open. Nevertheless, we believe that on the
whole Khrushchev's general position now seems strong enough so that
internal politicking will not affect foreign policy in a major way over
the next year or so. 14. Developments in the West. Khrushchev may also
believe that he has grounds for confidence because of the signs of
disunity in the Western Alliance. The Soviets probably believe the current
frictions in the West, which are limited during periods of tension, will
develop into more significant differences if the Soviets show a more
amiable countenance. The divisions between the US and France are widening.
At the same time, the Soviets see a new set of leaders in Europe and the
US, and they are of course aware that further changes may be forthcoming
after elections in the US and UK and next year in West Germany. The
Communist parties of Western Europe have moved toward the "popular front"
tactic, and the Soviets are probably encouraged to believe that important
changes in the atmosphere of European politics may take place that would
further undermine the solidarity of the Western Alliance. 15. The
increasing strains in the Western Alliance come at a time when the Soviets
are already keenly aware that a renewal of pressure tactics offers little
promise for immediate gains and perhaps higher risks in the aftermath of
the Cuban crisis. The current more moderate approach therefore recommends
itself on grounds both of prudence and of opportunity. Even if Khrushchev
expects no early success by moving along this way, he probably believes
that existing differences in the West can be greatly aggravated and
perhaps even a new and rewarding opening created for the USSR.
Specifically, Khrushchev is likely to concentrate on the UK to break the
front on Western credits and to effectively oppose the MLF. The opening to
the left in Italy and the prospect of a Labor Government in Britain may
persuade Khrushchev that the MLF can be checked and perhaps even that some
progress can be made toward Soviet objectives in Germany. De Gaulle,
however, remains a great question mark, since the Soviets are obviously
pleased by the difficulties he causes in NATO but at the same time
concerned that his nuclear capability should eventually become available
to Germany. In any case, Khrushchev looks forward to a period in which
Soviet diplomacy can operate more effectively against the unity of the
Western Alliance. 16. The Underdeveloped Areas. The Soviets seem to
have made some new assessments of their policies in these areas. In the
late 1950's, the decline of Western influence in traditional areas of
predominance such as the Middle East and Africa encouraged the Soviets to
believe that they could not only rapidly replace the West but lay the
groundwork for Communist control. By 1960-1961, however, they had run into
repeated troubles. They suffered setbacks and lost influence, and their
earlier efforts showed only limited political gains. Recent events in
Latin America, Asia, and Africa, however, have probably revived their
confidence that new opportunities are emerging. Moreover, it has always
been their view that a relaxation of East-West tensions was not intended
to curb Soviet exploitation of such opportunities. Indeed, one of the
arguments that Khrushchev has made for the policy of peaceful coexistence
was precisely that it would increase the number of unstable situations
which the Soviets could turn to their advantage. II. General Strategy 17. The basic
factors which led the Soviets to seek a reduction in cold war tensions
make it likely that this more moderate approach will continue for some
time. Khrushchev probably considers this the most promising way to obtain
economic concessions, to gain time to concentrate on internal problems,
and to foster Western divisions. A serious deterioration in East-West
relations would undercut internal policies, particularly any retrenchment
in military spending, and would demolish the carefully built up case
against the Chinese. 18. Accordingly,
Soviet diplomacy will be active over a broad range of issues which hold
some promise of agreement with the West. Partly in order to sustain the
present atmosphere, the Soviets will probably move for completion this
spring of the bilateral negotiations with the US on cultural relations, on
civil aviation, and on consular matters. They probably regard the period
between now and the US elections, however, as a difficult one in which to
reach any important political agreements. The Soviets have already
evidenced some concern over the recent change in the US leadership, and
their view of US politics is greatly influenced by a belief that
proponents of accommodation are in constant conflict with advocates of
bellicosity. At the present time, they have a substantial propaganda and
prestige investment in the proposition that new and favorable trends
emerged under President Kennedy. 19. This more
cautious approach applies mainly to situations over which the Soviets have
firm control. To some degree it also influences their responses to new
situations not of their own making. But we believe that the Soviets do not
consider that the current mood of détente with the West is incompatible
with a more forward and thrusting policy in the underdeveloped world; they
hope this mood may even inhibit Western responses. They have lately
involved themselves in developments in Cyprus and East Africa while at the
same time soliciting credits in London. In the underdeveloped world
generally the Soviets will continue to exploit trouble spots against
Western interests, and to build up their own positions of influence.
Nevertheless, in exploiting such situations, we believe that the Soviets
will seek to avoid direct confrontations with the Western powers.
20. Cuba. Such contradictory tendencies in Soviet
policy are notably apparent in Cuba. Over the past year the Soviets have
worked to defuse the Cuban situation by withdrawing Soviet troop
contingents. They have also urged Castro to take up a more conciliatory
attitude and have paid for this by enlarging their economic support. They
appear prepared to take the risk of turning over the SAM system to Castro,
in the expectation that it will not provoke a serious crisis with the US.
However, much of their calculation has rested on Khrushchev's estimate of
the late President's intentions and personal statements and the Soviets
are probably now concerned that the US may bring new pressures on Castro's
regime. 21. The hope of
placing some inhibition on US actions against Castro gives the Soviets
another strong reason for keeping down East-West tensions. We think that
Khrushchev will make an effort to restrain Castro from direct clashes with
the US. But the Soviets will be under intermittent pressure from Castro to
adopt a more active policy in supporting and exploiting revolutionary
situations in Latin America, particularly in view of new tensions in the
Caribbean. Castro is in a position to embroil the Soviets with the US, and
Khrushchev would find it extremely embarrassing to abandon Cuba. A sharp
crisis, therefore, would create a serious dilemma for Khrushchev. We
believe that in this event the Soviets would feel obliged to sacrifice
improved relations with the US in order to provide support for Castro,
although they would not go so far as to renew the kind of confrontation
produced by the 1962 missile crisis. 22. The Succession. Another key uncertainty
surrounding future Soviet policy stems from the succession to Khrushchev.
Even in the Soviet system, the style, skill and conceptions of the top
leaders play a major role in the determination of choices and in the
effectiveness with which policies are prosecuted. The Soviet party appears
to be little better equipped to designate a clear successor than when
Stalin died, and another power struggle is likely. We know little of the
individual policy views of the potential successors, and it would not be
unreasonable to assume that they diverge from Khrushchev in some respects.
It is possible that a succession struggle could begin to affect the
conduct of policy even before Khrushchev's departure, should he become
incapacitated or his mental and physical powers deteriorate./4/ /4/For a more detailed discussion of the succession
question see NIE 11-63, "Main Trends in Soviet Foreign Policy," 22 May
1963. Secret (Paras 42-47). [Footnote in the source text.] 23. The Longer Run. A longer term estimate is more
difficult and uncertain, not only because of the succession question but
also because of the way the Soviet leaders are likely to view the factors
conditioning their policies. There is some evidence that they regard the
present as a transitional period during which the struggle with the West
is being carried forward mainly by the internal strengthening of the USSR.
Khrushchev has repeatedly stressed over the past year that economic
problems now take priority over political affairs, and most recently
Soviet spokesmen have suggested that the USSR's present position is
analogous to the 1920's when Lenin introduced his New Economic Policy. It
is doubtful, therefore, that the Soviet leaders regard their setbacks as
more than temporary. It would be quite characteristic of Khrushchev to be
optimistic and assume that he can solve his problems relatively soon and
then return to the political offensive. Even if the USSR continues to be
plagued by significant sources of economic weakness and an erosion of its
authority in the international Communist movement, Khrushchev is likely to
rationalize these trends and only defer his expectations of regaining the
momentum of the late 1950's. Largely because of this attitude, the Soviet
leaders probably will not feel under any pressure to seek a major
accommodation with the West, with all the great concessions this would
entail. We think that it is possible, however, that the present tactical
phase will be stretched out beyond the period which Khrushchev probably
envisages. III. Tactics in the Near Term 24. Disarmament. As a result of the test ban, we
think the chances for further limited agreements have improved. Economic
pressures alone are a strong incentive for Khrushchev to take further
steps to stabilize the arms race. The revival of partial measures rather
than emphasis on general disarmament signifies a more realistic approach.
However, the program outlined by Khrushchev in the past months
concentrates on agreements of symbolic political significance without
offering important concessions on basic issues. The Soviets probably do
not see much chance for any very broad or significant agreements in the
near term, not only because of the US elections but mainly because most of
their own proposals still lead back to the German question or cut across
NATO's military planning, including programs for nuclear sharing.
25. Regardless
of the progress made toward formal agreements, a new approach has been
gaining ground in Soviet pronouncements, illustrated by Khrushchev's
statement on "a policy of mutual example in the curtailment of the arms
race." Under this formula, the Soviets apparently hope that overt steps by
one side will ease the way for corresponding steps by the other. This
approach has the obvious advantages of maintaining control over the pace
and scope of such steps and of avoiding formal commitments and
verification procedures. Moreover, the Soviets can apply this approach to
areas where the US would find it politically difficult or undesirable to
take reciprocal measures, especially in Central Europe. 26. Berlin and Germany. Any relaxation of tensions
implies, above all, a Soviet willingness to forego heavy pressures and
threats to the Western position in Berlin. Currently, the Soviets have in
fact not only relaxed their pressures, but have taken new steps to bring
their Berlin and German policies into line with the broader effort to rely
more on negotiations. Throughout last year the Soviets undertook various
approaches suggesting a policy of experimentation and probing to find a
new direction along which Soviet policy could work. The establishment of
contacts and negotiations between West Berlin and East Germany represents
the first concrete result, and probably indicates the way the Soviets hope
to play the Berlin question for the near term. 27. We do not
foresee a major crisis over Berlin this year. Instead, it is likely that
the Soviets and East Germans will try to work for partial agreements,
preferably by dealing directly with Bonn or the West Berlin authorities.
They apparently now see some new opportunity to advance their aims of
creating an independent political entity in West Berlin and gaining a
measure of acceptance for Ulbricht's regime. Even if no specific
agreements are forthcoming, the Soviets probably hope that with elections
next year in West Germany, the Socialists and Christian Democrats can be
encouraged to compete in taking a new and more flexible approach to
Eastern policy. Soviet overtures to the new Chancellor in Bonn are also to
be expected. It is also possible that the Soviets might revive direct
talks with the US; if so, they will probably further modify their
proposals for a nonaggression pact to provide some guarantees for West
Berlin and its access. 28. Despite the
new flexibility in the Soviet approach and the lessening of tensions
surrounding the Berlin issue, there is as yet no evidence that the Soviets
have made any fundamental changes of position. Indeed, it is doubtful that
the Soviet leaders would consider that their economic difficulties or
troubles with China require them to make the concessions which would be
necessary for a broad German settlement. This does not preclude a
temporary stabilization of the Berlin problem, though the Soviets need not
enter into agreements to keep the situation quiet. As long as there is no
settlement, however, incidents are inevitable, and the Soviets will not
hesitate to chip away at the allied position by trying to exact small
concessions as the price for continued restraint. For these reasons, it is
unlikely that a more serious search for an East-West settlement in Europe
will develop. 29. The Underdeveloped Areas. Soviet policy toward
the underdeveloped countries will continue to be marked by a high degree
of opportunism. The Soviets probably count on an increase in recent
manifestations of tension and instability in various parts of the world,
developments which though often not of Communist making are almost
invariably unfavorable to the Western powers. They have already made it
clear that the limited rapprochement with the West does not apply to the
underdeveloped areas. They will not wish to forego opportunities there
which the Chinese might seize upon. On the other hand, they will try to
avoid the more direct and obvious forms of intervention in order not to
compromise the general line of their policy toward the Western powers.
They probably foresee a long period of ferment which can be turned to
Soviet advantage with a minimum of involvement on their part and a low
risk of direct clashes with the US. 30. A foreign
aid program will continue to be a major instrument of Soviet policy for
the developing countries. Economic assistance, however, has been reduced
from the previous high levels of the late 1950's and stricter criteria
have been applied in the choice of recipients. The limited political gains
derived from this program and the psychological atmosphere created by
economic difficulties at home probably contribute to a reluctance to
undertake major new commitments in unproven territory. Military aid,
however, which sometimes promises quicker returns, will continue to loom
large in Soviet calculations, and we expect the circle of clients to
expand. 31. Efforts at
subversion continue, as evidenced by recent revelations of Soviet
involvement in the Congo and Communist activity in East Africa. The
Soviets almost certainly realize that in many of the underdeveloped states
the fabric of authority is extremely thin, sometimes offering
opportunities for even small Communist groups without mass backing to
achieve power by sudden coups. In most cases, however, the Soviets will
continue to see their objectives as better served by supporting
non-Communist nationalist leaders. Thus, despite the pressures of Chinese
competition, we do not foresee a general shift to a militant revolutionary
policy toward the underdeveloped world. 12. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to
the Department of State/1/ Moscow, February
28, 1964, 9 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 US-USSR. Confidential.
Repeated to London, Paris, Geneva, and USUN. 2692. I met with
Gromyko this morning for one and a half hours. Conversation covered not
only bilateral issues but full range of problems now occupying world stage
including disarmament, NAP, Cyprus, Laos, Cambodia. In his comments on
Cyprus and Laos Gromyko adhered faithfully to past Soviet line and shed no
new light on Soviet intentions but I had impression from his remarks on
disarmament that there is perhaps some flexibility in Soviet position,
particularly on bomber destruction proposal, which might foreshadow
possibility progress at Geneva. Balance of this message will cover
exchange of bilateral issues; I am reporting separately on broader topics
discussed./2/ /2/Reference is to telegram 2691 from Moscow,
February 28, which reported on NAP and disarmament, printed in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XI, Document
16; telegram 2693, February 28, which summarized the discussion on Cyprus
(National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files
1964-66, POL 23-8 CYP); and telegram 2690, February 28, which reported on
Laos and Cambodia, summarized in Foreign
Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XXVIII, Document 10. I started
conversation by noting considerable progress we had made on bilateral
issues since our last tour d'horizon in December. Specifically, we had
concluded a promising exchange agreement, we had agreed on a program for
cooperation in atomic energy and outer space fields, the Soviet had
accepted our proposal to begin bilateral discussions on satellite
communications problems, we had concluded a mutually beneficial wheat deal
and finally, we appeared to be on the threshold of an agreement on a
consular convention. With regard to
consular convention negotiations, Gromyko was aware that we had effected a
fundamental change in traditional US policy on immunities in order to
accommodate Soviet desires. This had not been an easy task for Washington
and we had been able to secure agreement of interested agencies on a new
position primarily on the understanding that the Soviet side would be
prepared to meet our position on balance of outstanding issues. Recent
attempts on the part of the Soviet side to amend certain convention
articles had therefore caused considerable concern in Washington. I had
only this morning received a message from Governor Harriman indicating
that such developments could cause serious difficulties, particularly re
ratification process./3/ I
hoped, therefore, that we could resolve current impasse through agreement
to original US language on disagreed articles. Gromyko said he had not
reviewed question in detail but he had impression that the negotiations
were proceeding well. /3/Telegram 2569 to Moscow, February 27. (National
Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, CON 4
US-USSR) With regard to
wheat deal Gromyko noted that the situation had improved within last few
days and he had understood from Dobrynin that this was primarily the
result of personal intervention by the President. The President's efforts
were deeply appreciated. I told Gromyko
that the Dept, and I personally, were unhappy at the delays in reaching
satisfactory settlement of the Soviet building problem in Washington. He
could be assured that the Dept would continue to use its influence in
bringing the issue to a satisfactory close although he would recognize
that our influence in the matter was somewhat limited. Gromyko expressed
appreciation for the Dept's interest and noted wryly that perhaps Dobrynin
should meet his house problem by erecting a large tent in Washington area
and play host to the district court judges without showing them excessive
hospitality. Finally, I told
Gromyko that while I was not informed on the most recent Washington
developments with regard to the civil air agreement I was sure that this
would be on my agenda for discussion in Washington. Meanwhile, I could
inform him that the Dept. was gratified to learn of the Soviet affirmative
action on our request for a leased-line. As I left
Gromyko I asked him casually if he could give me any information on
Khrushchev's travel plans, noting that I had heard rumors that he intended
to visit Egypt in the near future. Noting with some amusement that
obviously I had access to secret information, Gromyko said Khrushchev had
been invited to visit Egypt but until now no official statement on his
plans had been issued. I believe we can interpret his remarks to mean that
Khrushchev has in fact decided to visit Egypt in the spring and the
current rumors that he will attend the Aswan Dam ceremonies are thus
probably accurate. Kohler
13. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant
for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson/1/ Washington,
February 29, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File,
National Security Action Memorandums, NSAM 285. Confidential. This good report
from the Administrator of NASA/2/ is in response to your request made in
November to study and report on possible projects for substantive
cooperation with the Soviet Union on outer space. The report represents a
consensus among NASA, State, Defense, CIA, the Science Advisor, and the
Executive Secretary of the Space Council. /2/The report, "US-USSR Cooperation in Space Research
Programs," is ibid., NSAM 271. It was forwarded to the President by NASA
Administrator James Webb under cover of a January 31 memorandum which is
printed in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol.
XXXIV, Document 22. In brief, the
report contains guidelines to govern negotiations with the Soviet Union
that have a reasonable chance of success, yet protect our national
interests. It proposes a graduated approach calculated to develop mutual
confidence, exchange information, and lay the foundation for consultative
planning of specific projects. Careful consideration has been given to
cultivating favorable Congressional and public attitudes. The specific
proposals now being considered all relate to a joint program of unmanned
flight projects to support a manned lunar landing. No immediate
public action is recommended because we are in need of Soviet performance
on present agreements. We will continue to show interest, through the
existing Dryden-Blagonravov channel, in obtaining a positive Soviet answer
to the proposals for cooperation already made by President Kennedy and by
you. Meanwhile, we will watch the performance of the Soviet Union under
existing agreements. The
Administrator is keeping this program under his continuing personal review
and clearly understands your interest in it. He will keep you advised of
progress and may call upon you for further initiative sometime around the
first of May; by then the Soviet Union will have had ample opportunity to
make clear its intentions. Attached (Tab A)
is a National Security Action Memorandum for your signature, giving your
general endorsement to the report and recommendations./3/ /3/NSAM 285, issued March 3, is printed ibid.,
Document 25, together with other documentation on US-USSR space
cooperation during the Johnson administration. In an October 9, 1967,
memorandum to Vice President Humphrey, the Executive Secretary of the
National Aeronautics and Space Council painted a "gloomy picture" of
Soviet cooperation to that point but recommended that the United States
continue to approach the Soviets and not become "discouraged with the
small amount of progress made in past attempts." (Ibid., Document
61) Signed and
Approved/4/ /4/The President signed this option. McGeorge
Bundy/5/ /5/Printed from a copy that bears this typed
signature. 14. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Moscow, March 6,
1964, 10 a.m. /1/Source: National Archives and
Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, FT US-USSR.
Unclassified. Drafted by Krimer and Henry on March 9. The conversation was
held in Kosygin's office
at the Kremlin. A summary of the conversation was transmitted in telegram
2814 from Moscow, March 6. (Ibid., INCO-WHEAT 17
USSR-US) SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS U.S.S.R. U.S. Following an
initial exchange of greetings and introductions Deputy Chairman Kosygin
asked Under Secretary Martin how his visit to the U.S.S.R. had gone. Mr.
Kosygin said that he had been informed by Ambassador Dobrynin that the
Delegation was interested in visiting other ports such as Novorossiysk,
Klaipeda, etc., and that he had no objection and had issued the necessary
instructions. Mr. Martin
replied that he had come to the USSR in order to expedite the wheat
deliveries from the United States to the USSR and that all problems which
he had come to discuss had been satisfactorily resolved. He expressed his
gratitude for the efficient and cordial manner in which Mr. Kosygin's
ministers, Messrs. Bakayev and Patolichev, had cooperated in solving these
problems./2/ Mr. Martin
pointed out that since the Delegation's arrival in Moscow on Monday
afternoon it had not wasted any time but had been busy from morning until
late at night. The visit to Odessa had been most interesting and useful,
and the hospitality accorded the Delegation, as well as the technical
information furnished, could not have been any better. He repeated that
all major problems had been solved. In reply to Mr. Kosygin's invitation
to stay on and visit the Great Kremlin Palace, Mr. Martin said that he was
now anxious to return to Washington so that the problems at that end could
be handled expeditiously. /2/A memorandum of Martin's conversation with Patolichev on March
3 is ibid., FT 4 US-USSR. Mr. Kosygin said
that he admired American businessmen's efficiency and that Soviet
businessmen too were quite efficient, that unfortunately Americans did not
know them too well, in fact knew very little about the Soviet Union, its
great productive capacity in machine building, and that, while the present
wheat deal did constitute a beginning, actually very little trade was
being carried on between the United States and the USSR. When Secretary
Martin pointed out that in 1963 this trade had increased by 23% over the
preceding year, Mr. Kosygin stated that this was still a mere trickle. Why
could not this trade be expanded further in the same manner as had been
done between the USSR and the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of
Germany, Italy, Japan, and many other countries. He was surprised at the
fact that the American press and even government representatives, as well
as business circles took the position that the Soviet Union did not have
anything to sell to the United States. If the two leading powers in
today's world, leading in industry, technology, science, etc., could not
trade with each other, how did they expect to trade with countries of
Africa, Asia, etc. It seemed to him that one of the main reasons for this
lack of trade was American lack of information about Soviet industrial
capacity. He cited the following examples: The USSR was furnishing
machinery to many European countries but would like to receive similar
machinery orders from the United States. Another aspect of trade which was
being largely ignored was trade in licenses (i.e. patents and know-how).
He thought that a great deal could be done in this respect, but the USSR
was not interested in one-way trade only, a balance had to be established
which would make such trade profitable to both sides. He understood very
well that neither the United States nor the USSR were in the philanthrophy
business, trade had to be mutually profitable. Therefore, the United
States and the USSR should work together. This, of course, involved
long-term agreements such as had been concluded by the USSR with many
other countries; it further involved credits. The Soviet Union was also
selling machinery on credit to its customers. At this point
Mr. Martin, turning to Assistant Secretary Reynolds, told Mr. Kosygin that
Mr. Reynolds handled labor problems in the United States Government and
invited Mr. Reynolds to speak. Mr. Reynolds said that if Mr. Kosygin was
interested in some of the details of the United States economy, he would
like to tell him something about it. United States production was at an
all-time high with a gross national product of almost 600 billion per
annum. Nevertheless, the United States had certain problems such as
unemployment of 4.1 million or 5.6% of our total labor force. The United
States Government had recently put through a tax cut in the amount of 11
billion dollars in the expectation that it would result in increased
investment on the part of consumers. In this manner our Government hoped
to increase our gross national product by 35 billion dollars, and thereby
recoup the losses in tax revenues. Approximately 7 billion of the total
tax cut would wind up in the hands of working people. In addition, our
Government was taking steps to retrain people who had been displaced by
automation. Mr. Reynolds estimated that some 30,000 to 35,000 jobs per
week were being eliminated by automation so that retraining was an
important measure to combat further unemployment. He stated that in the
United States people were now working an average of 42 to 42 1/2 hours per
week, that the Government was opposed to a reduction of work-week hours,
but that unless the United States managed to solve the unemployment
problem in other ways, it might eventually have to consider a reduction of
work-week hours. Mr. Kosygin
pointed out that, while unemployment did not exist and never would exist
in the USSR, Soviet workers at the present time were working 7 hours a day
for 5 days and 6 hours on Saturday. The work week had been and was now
being reduced, indeed some factories had already gone to a 5-day 40 hour
week, but this kind of a change involved a loss of 1 hour per week or a
total of 52 hours a year. He said that in the Soviet Union wages had not
as yet reached a level mentioned by Secretary Reynolds earlier ($2.46 per
hour average industrial wage), but that there were many free services and
benefits which the Soviet worker received in addition to his wages; for
example, extremely low rent (as a matter of fact the Soviet housing
industry was being run at a loss, subsidized by the government budget),
free medical care, hospitalization, vacations, sanitoriums, etc. Education
was completely free regardless of the student's family origin. He pointed
to a decree of the Council of Ministers which was being published today
permitting pensioners to resume work without losing all of their pension.
He stressed that the Soviet trade unions played a most active part in the
management and economic and political life of the country. He pointed to
the fact that Soviet wages were gradually being increased without a
corresponding increase in prices. Mr. Reynolds
stated that for the past several years the United States had maintained a
fairly stable economy in a monetary sense; the wholesale price level had
risen only .5% since 1957, while the retail price level had been rising at
an average rate of .1% per month. Our economy was at an all time high, we
had added 100 billion dollars to the national product just in the last
three years. As to the social and medical services, Mr. Reynolds pointed
out that we consider it to be better for private industry to assume
responsibility for workers welfare. There were 60 billion dollars in
pension funds which were being used to supplement the Federal Government
pensions a retired worker receives. The United States had free and
independent trade unions which would this coming summer be involved in
negotiations with the automobile industry. The latter had had several very
good years, producing 7 million cars last year, and the unions now wanted
a larger share of the profits. But no one would benefit if both wages and
prices increased proportionately. Therefore the Government was interested
in maintaining stability of prices. Mr. Kosygin
stated that Soviet trade unions were even more free and independent, so
much so in fact that if he did not do a good job the trade unions would
not permit him to take a vacation. He went on to say that the Soviet Union
had no intention of producing as many autos as the United States, that in
the USSR production would be concentrated on buses and large taxi pools.
When Minister Bakayev pointed out that taxis were very cheap in the USSR,
Mr. Kosygin laughingly said that just the same Mr. Bakayev did not use
taxis but had his own car. He pointed out that in Siberia, for example,
the weather of 30-40 degrees below C. in winter presented special problems
for automobiles. He had a great deal of respect for the productivity of
American industry but had to point out that in some fields of Soviet
industry productivity was very high; a specific example was steel: 80
million tons of steel had been produced last year at low cost by a
continuous casting process which was being utilized more and more. He said
that a group of American businessmen had expressed interest in purchasing
the licenses for this process, but apparently nothing had come of it even
though such licenses had been sold to other Western countries. He went on
to mention the chemical industry, stating that in 1965 the USSR would
produce approximately 35 million tons of chemical fertilizer which would
be equal to the quantity produced in the United States. As for Soviet
agriculture, natural conditions in the Soviet Union were more difficult,
making it harder to equal United States agriculture in productivity per
man. Chairman Khrushchev had a great deal of admiration for American
agriculture and had become something of a specialist in it. Secretary Martin
pointed out that the Delegation included a representative of the United
States Department of Agriculture, Mr. Vickery, and that he had a great
deal of wheat for sale. To this Mr. Kosygin replied that Mr. Vickery
apparently worked with one hand only, selling, but did not use his other
hand for buying; he repeated that trade must be a two-way road. The discussion
turned to scientific exchanges and to the late President Kennedy's
proposal of a possible joint expedition to the moon. Mr. Kosygin said the
USSR and United States should not only go to the moon together but also
live here on earth together. Mr. Kosygin for a third time repeated his
desire to see increased U.S.-U.S.S.R. trade with a long-term trade
agreement and credits and stated that it was not enough to say that all
political problems must be solved before trade could be increased.
Improvement in political matters and in trade should be parallel. In
closing the conversation after another exchange of compliments, Secretary
Martin repeated his thanks for the cooperation and hospitality which had
been shown his Delegation by various Soviet Government officials./3/ /3/On March 12 Kohler reported that Kosygin had made
the same points to him on increasing trade with United States during a
conversation at the Tunisian Embassy. Kohler commented that the Soviets
appeared particularly interested in expanding U.S. purchases of Soviet
goods that might allow increased Soviet purchases of U.S. machinery.
(Telegram 2847 from Moscow; ibid., FT 1 US-USSR) 15. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington,
March 6, 1964, 6:42-7 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National
Security File, Country File, USSR, Vol. II. Secret; Limit Distribution.
Drafted and initialed by Kohler on April 7. The time of the meeting is
from the President's Daily
Diary. (Ibid.) SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS Having expected
an appointment on Saturday morning March 7 I rather tardily learned that
the President wished to see me on Friday evening, March 6. I arrived there
precisely at 6:00 p.m. and saw the President from 6:20 until 6:50 p.m. The
President came out with a visitor, greeted me by first name and invited me
into the office. He asked me first about the Soviet attitude toward his
administration. I replied that the Soviets had been very reassured by the
nature of his public statements after the assassination of President
Kennedy, by the first exchange of correspondence between him and Chairman
Khrushchev and by the President's talk with Deputy Chairman Mikoyan at the
time of the funeral./2/
The impression made by his statements had been reinforced by his moving
ahead with current business, notably the sending of FAA Chairman Najeeb
Halaby to Moscow to go ahead with the Air Agreement./3/ I said I was sure that Khrushchev had
hoped to be able to have a meeting with the President early in his
administration. I thought that he and the Russian leadership in general
now understood the President's constitutional problem and his
unwillingness to absent himself from the United States until after the
forthcoming elections. However, I believed that Khrushchev still regarded
his relationship with the President as not yet firmly established and
would not do so until he had had a chance to talk with him face to face. I
was, therefore, sure that the Chairman would be interested in moving
toward a meeting within a reasonable period after the elections. I
personally hoped that such a meeting would take place some time after the
elections, though I realized that this involved problems connected with
Allied relationships on which the Secretary would be advising
him. /2/For memoranda of
Mikoyan's conversations
with Johnson on November 26, 1963, see Foreign
Relations, 1961-1963, vol. V, Documents 380 and 381. /3/For a report on Halaby's trip to the Soviet Union, December
8-18, 1963, see ibid., Document 389. In reply to the
President's query I told him that I felt strongly that we should go ahead
with the Air Agreement and that the Russians put considerable significance
on this as a specific token of our readiness to proceed to practical
agreements. However, I understood that there were some doubts and
hesitations on this subject in Washington, notably on the part of
Assistant Secretary Mann./4/
I said I would be discussing this matter with the Secretary and
other officials involved during my consultations in Washington. /4/Assistant Secretary of State for
Inter-American Affairs Mann expressed his doubts in a February 13
memorandum to Rusk, stating that the signing of the U.S.-Soviet Civil Air
Agreement would undermine efforts to keep Cuba isolated and make more
difficult U.S. efforts to persuade Latin American and African countries to
deny landing and overflight rights to bloc aircraft. (National Archives
and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, AV 4 US-USSR) In
a February 5 memorandum to Rusk, Thompson sought to counter
Mann's views by
emphasizing the agreement's advantages, the greatest of which he thought was "a
psychological one. As a result of their quarrel with the Chinese
Communists, their internal economic difficulties, and the growing
independence of the Eastern European Communist countries, the Soviet
regime will be faced in the next year or two with some major decisions
which could basically influence Western relations for many years to come."
U.S. willingness to conclude bilateral agreements would help provide an
alternative to the Chinese hard line. (Ibid., S/AL Files: Lot 67 D 2,
Staff Memos, Ambassador Thompson) Rusk incorporated the views of both men
in Document 22. The President
asked about relationships between Moscow and Peiping and I repeated the
thesis of the Embassy in Moscow as to the national-interest nature of the
conflict, in terms of Russian unwillingness to share the wealth with the
Chinese Communists or to be led into a confrontation with the U.S. by
Chinese initiatives, as well as of the factors of the unsettled boundary
between the two countries and of the personal antipathy between Khrushchev
and Mao. The President
indicated great interest in Soviet policies toward Cuba and asked whether
Khrushchev did not understand that this was politically very difficult for
him. I replied that I thought Khrushchev did have some appreciation of the
domestic political aspects of this question and said that I was sure the
Chairman had cancelled a planned trip to Cuba in December in order not to
jeopardize his relationship with the President. I also said that I felt
confident that the Soviets had in fact removed all combat troops and that
they were moving toward a reduction in their training missions. However, I
pointed out that Cuba was practically the only success to which Khrushchev
could point in the foreign field for a long period of time. His
maintenance of his position in Cuba also had its importance in terms of
his world-wide conflict with the Chinese Communists for the allegiance of
the communist parties and for influence in the lesser developed
countries. The President
asked about Soviet attitudes towards the Republicans, with particular
respect to Messrs. Nixon and Goldwater. I said it would be no exaggeration
to say that the Soviets regarded and portrayed Mr. Nixon as their U.S.
Enemy No. 1 and Senator Goldwater as the Devil Incarnate. I therefore
thought that they would try to stay strictly out of anything which might
be regarded as interference in U.S. politics, but that they particularly
would do nothing which they thought would facilitate the political
prospects of either of the gentlemen named. Shortly before
7:00 the President proposed that we go downstairs to the Mess Room to
attend a farewell party being given for Arthur M. Schlesinger,
Jr. 16. Editorial Note On March 10,
1964, Soviet aircraft intercepted and shot down a U.S. RB-66 aircraft in
East German airspace. President Johnson's reaction to the incident and
ensuing discussion in the White House are documented in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume XV,
Documents 19 and 20. On March 12 the 303 Committee reviewed the Joint
Reconnaissance Center's program and procedures with a view to detecting
missions with "an incident potential" but noted "that the RB-66 training
flight was not a part of the JRC program nor did this flight come under
JRC jurisdiction. However, the question of routine navigation and training
flights under local commanders was not considered as a separate entity for
purposes of this discussion." (Memorandum for the record; National
Security Council, 303 Committee, Minutes 1964) In its March 11
note protesting the intrusion, the Soviet Government claimed the "plane
had penetrated into G.D.R. territory with the special purpose of
conducting military reconnaissance." Ambassador at Large Thompson
categorically denied the assertion in his oral reply to Soviet Ambassador
Dobrynin the next day. For text of the Soviet note and a summary of the
U.S. reply, see American Foreign Policy: Current
Documents, 1964, pages 528-531. In a meeting with Dobrynin on March
19, Secretary of State Rusk expressed regret over the incident but
insisted the plane was not on any mission in East Germany. Rusk contended
that the Soviet military had acted too fast in shooting down the plane and
requested prompt return of the fliers. A memorandum of the conversation is
in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume XV,
Document 21. At a second meeting 2 days later, Dobrynin told Rusk that the
Soviet Government viewed with satisfaction his statement of regret and
would release the fliers soon. (Memorandum of conversation; Department of
State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330) The release
took place on March 27. The March 10
incident followed by only 6 weeks an incident in which a Soviet fighter
shot down a U.S. T-39 aircraft in East German airspace (see Document 9).
Chairman Khrushchev reviewed both incidents and expressed his displeasure
at the intrusions in an April 2 message to President Johnson (Document
21). 17. Intelligence Memorandum/1/ [document number not declassified] Washington,
March 19, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File,
Country File, USSR, Vol. II. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. Prepared by the
Directorate of Intelligence of the Central Intelligence Agency. THE
COMING STRUGGLE FOR POWER IN THE USSR Introduction and Conclusions Neither the
nature of the Soviet system nor the record of Soviet history suggests that
the USSR can undergo orderly dynastic change. There is no statute, no
article in the Constitution, which provides for the selection of a single
leader of the Soviet party and state. More important, there is no
tradition in Soviet politics of a systematic and harmonious succession;
there is, rather, a record on conflict over power and--as Stalin and
Khrushchev would testify--a pattern of the survival of the fittest. Thus,
when the supreme ruler dies, his heirs are likely to fall out, and the
USSR may then enter upon an extended period of policy debate and political
contention. It is not
possible, of course, to predict with precision or certainty the outcome of
the next succession crisis in the USSR. But, while neither we nor the
Soviets themselves can name the man who will someday succeed Khrushchev,
that man is probably at this moment sitting on the Presidium of the CPSU.
And, while we cannot identify the policies that this successor will follow
after his advent to power, the outline of these policies may already be at
least faintly visible in the murk of current Soviet political controversy
and in the changing form of Soviet society as a whole. Thus it is possible
to speculate about the political climate at the time of Khrushchev's
departure and to consider the nature of those who will seek to succeed
him. We have surmised
in the essay which follows that, while there are pronounced individual
differences between the men now at the top of the Soviet hierarchy, most
of them tend to look at the world through the eyes of the party
apparatchiki and represent collectively a fairly conservative body of
opinion. Some, although loyal followers of Khrushchev, seem to have a hard
time keeping up with him, and others, less devoted to Khrushchev, seem at
times to resist both his specific reforms and the general direction of his
policies. In the aftermath of Khrushchev's death, there may be a tendency
for the various contenders to divide into two groups, those who would to
one degree or another advocate a continuation of the Khrushchevian status
quo, and those who would perhaps disavow Khrushchev's reformism and
propose a return to more traditional ways of doing things, both at home
and abroad. Such a cleavage is already apparent in Soviet politics and
could become of much greater significance during the policy debates likely
to occur during a succession crisis. As was the case
after the death of Stalin, the battle for the top probably will be
centered on and conducted within the top echelons of the party during its
initial stages. The various contenders, however, will have to take account
of the interests of other groups in Soviet society (the government
apparatus, the military establishment, etc.) and, in time and under
certain circumstances, the role of these groups could come to have an
important, if indirect, bearing on the outcome of the struggle. Should,
for example, the voice of protest of the liberal intellectuals continue to
mount in intensity, and should the temper of the people become
increasingly receptive to such protest, one or another leader might deem
it profitable to champion the popular cause. Other "outside" pressures on
the contenders will almost certainly include the policies of the US and
Communist China. Although there is probably little that either country can
do to determine the course of the succession struggle, the attitudes and
intentions of both countries will be a major ingredient of debate, and the
political fortunes of the individual leaders and their factions will in
part rise and fall on the basis of the successes and failures of their
policies, including their foreign policies. The struggle for
succession is discussed in some detail in the paper which follows and is
considered under the following headings: The "Primacy" of
Politics over Economics /2/None of these sections, comprising 14 pages, nor
the 23 pages of biographic data, is printed. At Tab are
biographic data on some of the outstanding figures who may be involved in
the struggle for power. 18. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to
the Department of State/1/ Moscow, March
25, 1964, 2 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File,
Country File, USSR, Cables, Vol. II. Confidential. 2979. Approach
of Khrushchev's 70th birthday April 17 will presumably give rise to some
speculation in West about his possible retirement. In this connection,
pundits may well recall statement of February 27, 1963 that we could not
go on forever and attempt to rationalize that ideal time for step-down is
now. In Embassy's
view there seems little warrant for such speculation. We have never been
sure that there was much substance to Khrushchev's "retirement" statement
of last year, and if there was, it should be read as reflection
Khrushchev's shaky power position in post-Cuba period rather than of
indication Khrushchev's own desires. In any case, situation has changed
considerably. Even if Khrushchev should want to give up premiership and
become, perhaps, Chairman of Presidium of Supreme Soviet (which would
still enable him participate in future summit meetings), he could not
possibly step down now in face Chinese polemics against him
personally. May be noted
that as spring approaches this year Soviets are facing some unusually
serious problems apart from China. Winter wheat crop, which they are
banking on more than usual, may be possibly quite poor. Soviet youth and
labor are restless and food shortage has people disgruntled. Authorities
seem edging toward more repressive measures to improve discipline, as
perhaps implied in March 19 Izvestiya report
of Rudenko speech in Central Committee calling for "further strengthening
socialist legality and law and order". In sum, complex
of all these factors make it unlikely that Khrushchev will consider it
wise give up any of his present jobs in immediate future. Stoessel/2/ /2/Kohler was in Washington for
consultations. [Continue with the next documents]
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