11. National Intelligence Estimate/1/

NIE 11-9-64

Washington, February 19, 1964.

/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, O/DDI Registry: Job 79-R01012A. Secret. Submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence and concurred in by the United States Intelligence Board.

SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY

The Problem

To estimate developments in Soviet foreign policy over the next year or so.

Conclusions

A. An accumulation of serious internal and external problems led the Soviets by mid-1963 to make the shift in their foreign policy course signaled by the test ban treaty. The Cuban missile crisis, by its dramatic demonstration of the unfavorable relations of power, had forced a reappraisal of risks and opportunities for advance against the West. Internal economic difficulties were mounting and were sharpened by the burden of the arms race. The increasingly strident Chinese challenge to the Soviet leadership also stimulated the search for a new approach. (Paras. 1-9)

B. We believe that Khrushchev considers the present period inauspicious for direct pressures against the West and has adopted the relaxation of tensions as the main theme of his policy. He will probably avoid inflaming such sensitive issues as Berlin, or any others which carry the risk of direct confrontation with the US. He probably hopes that in an improved international climate he can hold down defense costs, gain time to concentrate on internal and bloc problems, and encourage the West to grant the credits he needs. At the same time, he expects this line to aggravate Western differences, which tend to emerge more strongly when the Soviet threat appears to fade. To sustain the improved climate, the Soviets are likely to complete current negotiations for certain bilateral agreements with the US and seek limited understandings on disarmament and other matters. (Paras. 14-15, 17-18, 24-25, 27-29)

C. Nevertheless, the Soviets do not intend to curb their anti-Western policies in the underdeveloped world or to forego opportunities which might appear there. In fact, Khrushchev expects the relaxation of East-West tensions to increase the number of unstable situations which the Soviet can exploit. The Soviet interest in doing so is reinforced by competition with Communist China for leadership of the "national liberation struggle." In addition, it is always possible that developments not initiated by the Soviets will require a demonstration of "firmness" on their part. Cuba is a prime example of this kind of contingency; Castro is in a position to embroil the USSR in serious situations with the US which would call for the Soviets to provide strong support for Cuba, although they will clearly wish to avoid another confrontation like that of 1962. (Paras. 16, 19, 20-21, 29-31)

D. The Soviets probably intend to follow their present policies for some time. Khrushchev with his customary optimism, however, almost certainly looks forward to the time when, having coped with his current problems, he can return to a more offensive course. In our view the factors which led to the adoption of present Soviet policies are not transitory; there is a good chance that Khrushchev underestimates his present difficulties and that these policies will tend to be stretched out beyond the relatively short period of this estimate. This does not mean that the present improvement in the international atmosphere is likely to evolve over a longer time into a more serious search for basic settlements with the West. More fundamental changes in the Soviet outlook than any now in prospect would be needed before the Soviets could bring themselves to such a course. (Para. 23)

Discussion

1. In our last NIE on Soviet foreign policy,/2/ we viewed the Soviet leaders as caught up by indecision, hesitating in the face of the stark realities brought home by their failure in the Cuban missile crisis. This crisis had demonstrated not only the new dimensions of US power but also US skill and determination in wielding it. In the aftermath, the Soviet leaders were still confronted by the very problems which their Cuban missile venture had been intended to solve. The overall balance of power between East and West remained unfavorable. The economic strains of the arms competition loomed as costly as ever. The Chinese challenge to Soviet authority was growing in breadth and depth.

/2/NIE 11-63, "Main Trends in Soviet Foreign Policy," dated 22 May 1963. Secret. [Footnote in the source text. For text, see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. V, Document 326.]

2. By mid-1963 it became apparent that a new overall approach to these various problems had been reached, at least in principle. In the economic sphere, short-term plans for 1964-1965 were to be revised in order to shift sizeable amounts of resources to the chemical industry. Consistent with this new turn of economic policy was a shift in East-West tactics, manifested in Khrushchev's concessions to the Western position on the limited test ban. Almost simultaneously, the Soviets confronted the Chinese with a strong counterattack. The net result of these new moves was a notable relaxation of East-West tensions, some limited accords between East and West, and a significant widening of the gap between the USSR and China.

I. Factors Affecting the Soviet Outlook

3. The considerations which led to this tactical turning of mid-1963 were, we believe, quite fundamental in character. They flowed from an accumulation of problems, partly inherent in the development of the USSR and the Bloc, and partly the specific byproduct of the generally offensive line of policy Khrushchev had pursued since he opened the Berlin crisis in 1958. These considerations are not merely transitory and will almost certainly continue to influence the Soviet policy outlook for some time.

4. The Strategic Balance. The course on which Soviet policy launched in 1957-1958 was built on the expectation that the USSR, for the first time in the post-war struggle, was about to acquire a major advantage in strategic weapons. Khrushchev was evidently persuaded by this prospect to believe that the West could be forced into concessions. The intervening five years have demonstrated, however, not only that the US was capable of resisting this challenge, but also that in the field of strategic weapons it could outpace the USSR. The Soviets found that the heavy cost of the intensified arms race was incompatible with Khrushchev's commitment both to a high growth rate to overtake the US economy and to a more rapid improvement in Soviet living conditions. By 1962, US military and intelligence programs led to a situation in which both sides, and indeed much of world opinion, understood that the strategic advantage did not lie with the USSR, even though the ability of the USSR to damage the US was increasing. The Cuban missile venture was an attempt to achieve a quick and relatively inexpensive advance in both the substance and the image of Soviet power. Its failure has left the Soviets little choice but to find ways to contain the arms race and reduce its burden on the Soviet economy.

5. Economic Policy. To a major degree, the present more moderate general line adopted by Khrushchev reflects the strains in the Soviet economy. Economic strength is only one ingredient in the balance of power, but Khrushchev has made it a key area of competition in his peaceful coexistence strategy. As the Soviet leaders contrast their own economic difficulties and the economic malaise in much of Eastern Europe with the vitality of Western Europe and the upturn in American economic growth rates, they have little reason for optimism. Because of the nature of these economic problems, they were bound to encroach on Soviet foreign relations.

6. The Soviets have adopted a new economic course which requires a major shift of resources; their aims are to stimulate agriculture, modernize industry, and revive the rate of economic growth. Moreover, the magnitude of the new investment effort for the chemical industry bears directly on Soviet relations with the West. The Soviets cannot provide the equipment needed for their chemical program without extensive purchases abroad; their hard currency deficits and the decline of their gold reserves oblige them to seek long-term credits for the necessary equipment. An effort to stimulate Western competition for orders from the USSR on long-term credit is already under way. There are signs that preliminary understandings have been reached with the British and Italians. The Soviets almost certainly hope that one important breakthrough in the Western front will cause the other advanced industrial countries to fall into line.

7. Even a sharp increase in imports from the West, however, would not deal with a principal cause of Soviet difficulties--the heavy burden of military spending. We have estimated that the Soviets will make every effort to hold down rising military costs;/3/ the announced reduction of the defense budget, though modest, symbolizes the direction Khrushchev proposes to follow, and some force reductions are apparently intended. Progress along this line of economies in the defense establishment, however, depends greatly on a proper international climate. Khrushchev's hopes to support his civilian investment program through Western credits and through savings from defense argue for some degree of restraint in his relations with the West.

/3/SNIE 11-5-64, "Soviet Economic Problems and Outlook," dated 8 January 1964. Secret. [Footnote in the source text. Printed as Document 4.]

8. The Problem of China. As they survey their international position, the Soviets are confronted by a third long-term problem. The vicious exploitation of the Cuban missile crisis by the Chinese deepened the Sino-Soviet dispute, and their subsequent attacks expanded to almost every facet of Soviet foreign and domestic policy. In counterattacking, the Soviets sought to use the test ban as an issue on which to isolate China in world and even Communist opinion. This, however, proved illusory; trade and other contacts between China and Western Europe have increased in recent months, and Peiping's influence in the Communist world has, if anything, grown. The Soviets considered convening an international Communist conference to condemn China, but abandoned the idea, at least temporarily on learning that several key parties had grave reservations about such action.

9. The Soviet leaders appear now to have concluded that they will be locked in a severe struggle with China for a protracted period. They have evidently decided to pursue their own interests regardless of inevitable Chinese criticism, and despite the cost of further deterioration in Sino-Soviet relations and consequent fracturing of the international movement. The test ban treaty was an important manifestation that, on certain issues, the Soviets view their interests as paralleling those of the West rather than those of their Communist ally. Indeed, the Soviets are also prepared to use other issues as weapons against China, for example an agreement against dissemination of nuclear weapons and techniques, or an international pact for peaceful resolution of territorial disputes.

10. Soviet policy is complicated, however, by the competition with China in the underdeveloped areas. The Soviets cannot afford to appear less interested than China in militant struggle and must therefore present their policies in a revolutionary and anti-Western context. At the same time, the Soviets cannot afford to let this aspect of their policy damage their relations with existing regimes. In some instances, the pressure of Chinese competition may cause the Soviets to act more rapidly and vigorously than they might otherwise do. On some occasions, the Soviets may also resort to sharper tactics to undercut the Chinese, but we doubt that the Chinese factor alone would persuade the Soviets to take greater risks than otherwise seemed warranted. In general, the Chinese attempt to compete with the Soviets in exploiting opportunities in the underdeveloped areas imposes some limits on Soviet efforts to improve relations with the West.

11. Eastern Europe. The weakening of Soviet authority in Eastern Europe, which has been apparent for some time, has been greatly stimulated by the Sino-Soviet conflict. The Rumanians, for example, have successfully used the dispute as one lever in their own controversy with the Soviets. The trend is clearly for the East European regimes to look more to their own interests, although none has yet done this so forthrightly as the Rumanians. The Soviets will encounter increasingly difficult problems in Eastern Europe and the cohesiveness of the Soviet Bloc will suffer. Some regimes might balk at an increase in tensions which would damage their own economic dealings with the West. They might regard Cuba as more of a burden than an asset, or regard the struggle in the underdeveloped areas as a secondary issue. Some, like the Poles and East Germans, show nervousness over Soviet attitudes on certain arms control measures. The Soviets have already found it difficult to subordinate the Eastern European economies to the USSR, and the chances of organizing CEMA as a solid front against the Common Market have dwindled.

12. One important consequence of these developing trends is their impact on East Germany's position in Eastern Europe. If the other regimes proceed, however haltingly, toward a liberalization of controls, a greater degree of autonomy from Moscow, and an increase in Western contacts, East Germany will come under great pressures to follow suit. Failure to keep in step with the other regimes risks isolation and possibly similar pressures within the country as well. Moreover, in the Soviet view, if the East German regime could gain in acceptability and increase contacts and exchanges without serious internal troubles, it would become a much more suitable instrument of Soviet policy in Germany. At some point the increase of normal contacts might even make the East German proposal for confederation seem more plausible. However, the process of liberalization in East Germany is an extremely delicate one which could lead to serious instability, and the Soviets would not feel free to push it very far or fast.

13. Internal Soviet Politics. Khrushchev's internal position is now probably stronger and his freedom of action apparently greater than a year ago. In the first months of 1963, it seemed that his authority had been checked, and that he felt it necessary to modify some of his policies. His ability to reconsolidate his position was probably due in part to the illness of Frol Kozlov, who, in retrospect, seems to have been a key figure in the internal contention. The viciousness of Chinese attacks, particularly in raising the sensitive question of border adjustments with the USSR, may have also helped Khrushchev. At any rate, the question of how to deal with some of the issues under debate evidently has been settled in Khrushchev's favor. The state of Soviet agriculture, however, is a continuing liability, and problems affecting allocation of economic resources are still open. Nevertheless, we believe that on the whole Khrushchev's general position now seems strong enough so that internal politicking will not affect foreign policy in a major way over the next year or so.

14. Developments in the West. Khrushchev may also believe that he has grounds for confidence because of the signs of disunity in the Western Alliance. The Soviets probably believe the current frictions in the West, which are limited during periods of tension, will develop into more significant differences if the Soviets show a more amiable countenance. The divisions between the US and France are widening. At the same time, the Soviets see a new set of leaders in Europe and the US, and they are of course aware that further changes may be forthcoming after elections in the US and UK and next year in West Germany. The Communist parties of Western Europe have moved toward the "popular front" tactic, and the Soviets are probably encouraged to believe that important changes in the atmosphere of European politics may take place that would further undermine the solidarity of the Western Alliance.

15. The increasing strains in the Western Alliance come at a time when the Soviets are already keenly aware that a renewal of pressure tactics offers little promise for immediate gains and perhaps higher risks in the aftermath of the Cuban crisis. The current more moderate approach therefore recommends itself on grounds both of prudence and of opportunity. Even if Khrushchev expects no early success by moving along this way, he probably believes that existing differences in the West can be greatly aggravated and perhaps even a new and rewarding opening created for the USSR. Specifically, Khrushchev is likely to concentrate on the UK to break the front on Western credits and to effectively oppose the MLF. The opening to the left in Italy and the prospect of a Labor Government in Britain may persuade Khrushchev that the MLF can be checked and perhaps even that some progress can be made toward Soviet objectives in Germany. De Gaulle, however, remains a great question mark, since the Soviets are obviously pleased by the difficulties he causes in NATO but at the same time concerned that his nuclear capability should eventually become available to Germany. In any case, Khrushchev looks forward to a period in which Soviet diplomacy can operate more effectively against the unity of the Western Alliance.

16. The Underdeveloped Areas. The Soviets seem to have made some new assessments of their policies in these areas. In the late 1950's, the decline of Western influence in traditional areas of predominance such as the Middle East and Africa encouraged the Soviets to believe that they could not only rapidly replace the West but lay the groundwork for Communist control. By 1960-1961, however, they had run into repeated troubles. They suffered setbacks and lost influence, and their earlier efforts showed only limited political gains. Recent events in Latin America, Asia, and Africa, however, have probably revived their confidence that new opportunities are emerging. Moreover, it has always been their view that a relaxation of East-West tensions was not intended to curb Soviet exploitation of such opportunities. Indeed, one of the arguments that Khrushchev has made for the policy of peaceful coexistence was precisely that it would increase the number of unstable situations which the Soviets could turn to their advantage.

II. General Strategy

17. The basic factors which led the Soviets to seek a reduction in cold war tensions make it likely that this more moderate approach will continue for some time. Khrushchev probably considers this the most promising way to obtain economic concessions, to gain time to concentrate on internal problems, and to foster Western divisions. A serious deterioration in East-West relations would undercut internal policies, particularly any retrenchment in military spending, and would demolish the carefully built up case against the Chinese.

18. Accordingly, Soviet diplomacy will be active over a broad range of issues which hold some promise of agreement with the West. Partly in order to sustain the present atmosphere, the Soviets will probably move for completion this spring of the bilateral negotiations with the US on cultural relations, on civil aviation, and on consular matters. They probably regard the period between now and the US elections, however, as a difficult one in which to reach any important political agreements. The Soviets have already evidenced some concern over the recent change in the US leadership, and their view of US politics is greatly influenced by a belief that proponents of accommodation are in constant conflict with advocates of bellicosity. At the present time, they have a substantial propaganda and prestige investment in the proposition that new and favorable trends emerged under President Kennedy.

19. This more cautious approach applies mainly to situations over which the Soviets have firm control. To some degree it also influences their responses to new situations not of their own making. But we believe that the Soviets do not consider that the current mood of dtente with the West is incompatible with a more forward and thrusting policy in the underdeveloped world; they hope this mood may even inhibit Western responses. They have lately involved themselves in developments in Cyprus and East Africa while at the same time soliciting credits in London. In the underdeveloped world generally the Soviets will continue to exploit trouble spots against Western interests, and to build up their own positions of influence. Nevertheless, in exploiting such situations, we believe that the Soviets will seek to avoid direct confrontations with the Western powers.

20. Cuba. Such contradictory tendencies in Soviet policy are notably apparent in Cuba. Over the past year the Soviets have worked to defuse the Cuban situation by withdrawing Soviet troop contingents. They have also urged Castro to take up a more conciliatory attitude and have paid for this by enlarging their economic support. They appear prepared to take the risk of turning over the SAM system to Castro, in the expectation that it will not provoke a serious crisis with the US. However, much of their calculation has rested on Khrushchev's estimate of the late President's intentions and personal statements and the Soviets are probably now concerned that the US may bring new pressures on Castro's regime.

21. The hope of placing some inhibition on US actions against Castro gives the Soviets another strong reason for keeping down East-West tensions. We think that Khrushchev will make an effort to restrain Castro from direct clashes with the US. But the Soviets will be under intermittent pressure from Castro to adopt a more active policy in supporting and exploiting revolutionary situations in Latin America, particularly in view of new tensions in the Caribbean. Castro is in a position to embroil the Soviets with the US, and Khrushchev would find it extremely embarrassing to abandon Cuba. A sharp crisis, therefore, would create a serious dilemma for Khrushchev. We believe that in this event the Soviets would feel obliged to sacrifice improved relations with the US in order to provide support for Castro, although they would not go so far as to renew the kind of confrontation produced by the 1962 missile crisis.

22. The Succession. Another key uncertainty surrounding future Soviet policy stems from the succession to Khrushchev. Even in the Soviet system, the style, skill and conceptions of the top leaders play a major role in the determination of choices and in the effectiveness with which policies are prosecuted. The Soviet party appears to be little better equipped to designate a clear successor than when Stalin died, and another power struggle is likely. We know little of the individual policy views of the potential successors, and it would not be unreasonable to assume that they diverge from Khrushchev in some respects. It is possible that a succession struggle could begin to affect the conduct of policy even before Khrushchev's departure, should he become incapacitated or his mental and physical powers deteriorate./4/

/4/For a more detailed discussion of the succession question see NIE 11-63, "Main Trends in Soviet Foreign Policy," 22 May 1963. Secret (Paras 42-47). [Footnote in the source text.]

23. The Longer Run. A longer term estimate is more difficult and uncertain, not only because of the succession question but also because of the way the Soviet leaders are likely to view the factors conditioning their policies. There is some evidence that they regard the present as a transitional period during which the struggle with the West is being carried forward mainly by the internal strengthening of the USSR. Khrushchev has repeatedly stressed over the past year that economic problems now take priority over political affairs, and most recently Soviet spokesmen have suggested that the USSR's present position is analogous to the 1920's when Lenin introduced his New Economic Policy. It is doubtful, therefore, that the Soviet leaders regard their setbacks as more than temporary. It would be quite characteristic of Khrushchev to be optimistic and assume that he can solve his problems relatively soon and then return to the political offensive. Even if the USSR continues to be plagued by significant sources of economic weakness and an erosion of its authority in the international Communist movement, Khrushchev is likely to rationalize these trends and only defer his expectations of regaining the momentum of the late 1950's. Largely because of this attitude, the Soviet leaders probably will not feel under any pressure to seek a major accommodation with the West, with all the great concessions this would entail. We think that it is possible, however, that the present tactical phase will be stretched out beyond the period which Khrushchev probably envisages.

III. Tactics in the Near Term

24. Disarmament. As a result of the test ban, we think the chances for further limited agreements have improved. Economic pressures alone are a strong incentive for Khrushchev to take further steps to stabilize the arms race. The revival of partial measures rather than emphasis on general disarmament signifies a more realistic approach. However, the program outlined by Khrushchev in the past months concentrates on agreements of symbolic political significance without offering important concessions on basic issues. The Soviets probably do not see much chance for any very broad or significant agreements in the near term, not only because of the US elections but mainly because most of their own proposals still lead back to the German question or cut across NATO's military planning, including programs for nuclear sharing.

25. Regardless of the progress made toward formal agreements, a new approach has been gaining ground in Soviet pronouncements, illustrated by Khrushchev's statement on "a policy of mutual example in the curtailment of the arms race." Under this formula, the Soviets apparently hope that overt steps by one side will ease the way for corresponding steps by the other. This approach has the obvious advantages of maintaining control over the pace and scope of such steps and of avoiding formal commitments and verification procedures. Moreover, the Soviets can apply this approach to areas where the US would find it politically difficult or undesirable to take reciprocal measures, especially in Central Europe.

26. Berlin and Germany. Any relaxation of tensions implies, above all, a Soviet willingness to forego heavy pressures and threats to the Western position in Berlin. Currently, the Soviets have in fact not only relaxed their pressures, but have taken new steps to bring their Berlin and German policies into line with the broader effort to rely more on negotiations. Throughout last year the Soviets undertook various approaches suggesting a policy of experimentation and probing to find a new direction along which Soviet policy could work. The establishment of contacts and negotiations between West Berlin and East Germany represents the first concrete result, and probably indicates the way the Soviets hope to play the Berlin question for the near term.

27. We do not foresee a major crisis over Berlin this year. Instead, it is likely that the Soviets and East Germans will try to work for partial agreements, preferably by dealing directly with Bonn or the West Berlin authorities. They apparently now see some new opportunity to advance their aims of creating an independent political entity in West Berlin and gaining a measure of acceptance for Ulbricht's regime. Even if no specific agreements are forthcoming, the Soviets probably hope that with elections next year in West Germany, the Socialists and Christian Democrats can be encouraged to compete in taking a new and more flexible approach to Eastern policy. Soviet overtures to the new Chancellor in Bonn are also to be expected. It is also possible that the Soviets might revive direct talks with the US; if so, they will probably further modify their proposals for a nonaggression pact to provide some guarantees for West Berlin and its access.

28. Despite the new flexibility in the Soviet approach and the lessening of tensions surrounding the Berlin issue, there is as yet no evidence that the Soviets have made any fundamental changes of position. Indeed, it is doubtful that the Soviet leaders would consider that their economic difficulties or troubles with China require them to make the concessions which would be necessary for a broad German settlement. This does not preclude a temporary stabilization of the Berlin problem, though the Soviets need not enter into agreements to keep the situation quiet. As long as there is no settlement, however, incidents are inevitable, and the Soviets will not hesitate to chip away at the allied position by trying to exact small concessions as the price for continued restraint. For these reasons, it is unlikely that a more serious search for an East-West settlement in Europe will develop.

29. The Underdeveloped Areas. Soviet policy toward the underdeveloped countries will continue to be marked by a high degree of opportunism. The Soviets probably count on an increase in recent manifestations of tension and instability in various parts of the world, developments which though often not of Communist making are almost invariably unfavorable to the Western powers. They have already made it clear that the limited rapprochement with the West does not apply to the underdeveloped areas. They will not wish to forego opportunities there which the Chinese might seize upon. On the other hand, they will try to avoid the more direct and obvious forms of intervention in order not to compromise the general line of their policy toward the Western powers. They probably foresee a long period of ferment which can be turned to Soviet advantage with a minimum of involvement on their part and a low risk of direct clashes with the US.

30. A foreign aid program will continue to be a major instrument of Soviet policy for the developing countries. Economic assistance, however, has been reduced from the previous high levels of the late 1950's and stricter criteria have been applied in the choice of recipients. The limited political gains derived from this program and the psychological atmosphere created by economic difficulties at home probably contribute to a reluctance to undertake major new commitments in unproven territory. Military aid, however, which sometimes promises quicker returns, will continue to loom large in Soviet calculations, and we expect the circle of clients to expand.

31. Efforts at subversion continue, as evidenced by recent revelations of Soviet involvement in the Congo and Communist activity in East Africa. The Soviets almost certainly realize that in many of the underdeveloped states the fabric of authority is extremely thin, sometimes offering opportunities for even small Communist groups without mass backing to achieve power by sudden coups. In most cases, however, the Soviets will continue to see their objectives as better served by supporting non-Communist nationalist leaders. Thus, despite the pressures of Chinese competition, we do not foresee a general shift to a militant revolutionary policy toward the underdeveloped world.

12. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/

Moscow, February 28, 1964, 9 p.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 US-USSR. Confidential. Repeated to London, Paris, Geneva, and USUN.

2692. I met with Gromyko this morning for one and a half hours. Conversation covered not only bilateral issues but full range of problems now occupying world stage including disarmament, NAP, Cyprus, Laos, Cambodia. In his comments on Cyprus and Laos Gromyko adhered faithfully to past Soviet line and shed no new light on Soviet intentions but I had impression from his remarks on disarmament that there is perhaps some flexibility in Soviet position, particularly on bomber destruction proposal, which might foreshadow possibility progress at Geneva. Balance of this message will cover exchange of bilateral issues; I am reporting separately on broader topics discussed./2/

/2/Reference is to telegram 2691 from Moscow, February 28, which reported on NAP and disarmament, printed in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XI, Document 16; telegram 2693, February 28, which summarized the discussion on Cyprus (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 23-8 CYP); and telegram 2690, February 28, which reported on Laos and Cambodia, summarized in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XXVIII, Document 10.

I started conversation by noting considerable progress we had made on bilateral issues since our last tour d'horizon in December. Specifically, we had concluded a promising exchange agreement, we had agreed on a program for cooperation in atomic energy and outer space fields, the Soviet had accepted our proposal to begin bilateral discussions on satellite communications problems, we had concluded a mutually beneficial wheat deal and finally, we appeared to be on the threshold of an agreement on a consular convention.

With regard to consular convention negotiations, Gromyko was aware that we had effected a fundamental change in traditional US policy on immunities in order to accommodate Soviet desires. This had not been an easy task for Washington and we had been able to secure agreement of interested agencies on a new position primarily on the understanding that the Soviet side would be prepared to meet our position on balance of outstanding issues. Recent attempts on the part of the Soviet side to amend certain convention articles had therefore caused considerable concern in Washington. I had only this morning received a message from Governor Harriman indicating that such developments could cause serious difficulties, particularly re ratification process./3/ I hoped, therefore, that we could resolve current impasse through agreement to original US language on disagreed articles. Gromyko said he had not reviewed question in detail but he had impression that the negotiations were proceeding well.

/3/Telegram 2569 to Moscow, February 27. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, CON 4 US-USSR)

With regard to wheat deal Gromyko noted that the situation had improved within last few days and he had understood from Dobrynin that this was primarily the result of personal intervention by the President. The President's efforts were deeply appreciated.

I told Gromyko that the Dept, and I personally, were unhappy at the delays in reaching satisfactory settlement of the Soviet building problem in Washington. He could be assured that the Dept would continue to use its influence in bringing the issue to a satisfactory close although he would recognize that our influence in the matter was somewhat limited. Gromyko expressed appreciation for the Dept's interest and noted wryly that perhaps Dobrynin should meet his house problem by erecting a large tent in Washington area and play host to the district court judges without showing them excessive hospitality.

Finally, I told Gromyko that while I was not informed on the most recent Washington developments with regard to the civil air agreement I was sure that this would be on my agenda for discussion in Washington. Meanwhile, I could inform him that the Dept. was gratified to learn of the Soviet affirmative action on our request for a leased-line.

As I left Gromyko I asked him casually if he could give me any information on Khrushchev's travel plans, noting that I had heard rumors that he intended to visit Egypt in the near future. Noting with some amusement that obviously I had access to secret information, Gromyko said Khrushchev had been invited to visit Egypt but until now no official statement on his plans had been issued. I believe we can interpret his remarks to mean that Khrushchev has in fact decided to visit Egypt in the spring and the current rumors that he will attend the Aswan Dam ceremonies are thus probably accurate.

Kohler

13. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, February 29, 1964.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, National Security Action Memorandums, NSAM 285. Confidential.

This good report from the Administrator of NASA/2/ is in response to your request made in November to study and report on possible projects for substantive cooperation with the Soviet Union on outer space. The report represents a consensus among NASA, State, Defense, CIA, the Science Advisor, and the Executive Secretary of the Space Council.

/2/The report, "US-USSR Cooperation in Space Research Programs," is ibid., NSAM 271. It was forwarded to the President by NASA Administrator James Webb under cover of a January 31 memorandum which is printed in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XXXIV, Document 22.

In brief, the report contains guidelines to govern negotiations with the Soviet Union that have a reasonable chance of success, yet protect our national interests. It proposes a graduated approach calculated to develop mutual confidence, exchange information, and lay the foundation for consultative planning of specific projects. Careful consideration has been given to cultivating favorable Congressional and public attitudes. The specific proposals now being considered all relate to a joint program of unmanned flight projects to support a manned lunar landing.

No immediate public action is recommended because we are in need of Soviet performance on present agreements. We will continue to show interest, through the existing Dryden-Blagonravov channel, in obtaining a positive Soviet answer to the proposals for cooperation already made by President Kennedy and by you. Meanwhile, we will watch the performance of the Soviet Union under existing agreements.

The Administrator is keeping this program under his continuing personal review and clearly understands your interest in it. He will keep you advised of progress and may call upon you for further initiative sometime around the first of May; by then the Soviet Union will have had ample opportunity to make clear its intentions.

Attached (Tab A) is a National Security Action Memorandum for your signature, giving your general endorsement to the report and recommendations./3/

/3/NSAM 285, issued March 3, is printed ibid., Document 25, together with other documentation on US-USSR space cooperation during the Johnson administration. In an October 9, 1967, memorandum to Vice President Humphrey, the Executive Secretary of the National Aeronautics and Space Council painted a "gloomy picture" of Soviet cooperation to that point but recommended that the United States continue to approach the Soviets and not become "discouraged with the small amount of progress made in past attempts." (Ibid., Document 61)

Signed and Approved/4/
Disapproved
Speak to me

/4/The President signed this option.

McGeorge Bundy/5/

/5/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

14. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Moscow, March 6, 1964, 10 a.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, FT US-USSR. Unclassified. Drafted by Krimer and Henry on March 9. The conversation was held in Kosygin's office at the Kremlin. A summary of the conversation was transmitted in telegram 2814 from Moscow, March 6. (Ibid., INCO-WHEAT 17 USSR-US)

SUBJECT
U.S.-U.S.S.R. Trade, et cetera

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.S.R.
Mr. Aleksey Nikolayevich Kosygin, First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR
Viktor G. Bakayev, Minister of Merchant Marine
Yergeny A. Mikolinsky, Senior Captain of the General Administration of the Ministry of Merchant Marine (Interpreter)

U.S.
Clarence D. Martin, Jr., Under Secretary of Commerce
James J. Reynolds, Assistant Secretary of Labor
Joseph Kahn, President, Trans Eastern Associates, New York
Alfred Segal, Traffic Manager, American Trading and Production Corporation, New York
Martin I. Goodman, Maritime Administration
Raymond E. Vickery, Department of Agriculture
David Henry, Deputy Director, Office of Soviet Union Affairs, Department of State
William D. Krimer, Interpreter, Department of State
Richard E. Funkhouser, American Embassy, Moscow

Following an initial exchange of greetings and introductions Deputy Chairman Kosygin asked Under Secretary Martin how his visit to the U.S.S.R. had gone. Mr. Kosygin said that he had been informed by Ambassador Dobrynin that the Delegation was interested in visiting other ports such as Novorossiysk, Klaipeda, etc., and that he had no objection and had issued the necessary instructions.

Mr. Martin replied that he had come to the USSR in order to expedite the wheat deliveries from the United States to the USSR and that all problems which he had come to discuss had been satisfactorily resolved. He expressed his gratitude for the efficient and cordial manner in which Mr. Kosygin's ministers, Messrs. Bakayev and Patolichev, had cooperated in solving these problems./2/ Mr. Martin pointed out that since the Delegation's arrival in Moscow on Monday afternoon it had not wasted any time but had been busy from morning until late at night. The visit to Odessa had been most interesting and useful, and the hospitality accorded the Delegation, as well as the technical information furnished, could not have been any better. He repeated that all major problems had been solved. In reply to Mr. Kosygin's invitation to stay on and visit the Great Kremlin Palace, Mr. Martin said that he was now anxious to return to Washington so that the problems at that end could be handled expeditiously.

/2/A memorandum of Martin's conversation with Patolichev on March 3 is ibid., FT 4 US-USSR.

Mr. Kosygin said that he admired American businessmen's efficiency and that Soviet businessmen too were quite efficient, that unfortunately Americans did not know them too well, in fact knew very little about the Soviet Union, its great productive capacity in machine building, and that, while the present wheat deal did constitute a beginning, actually very little trade was being carried on between the United States and the USSR.

When Secretary Martin pointed out that in 1963 this trade had increased by 23% over the preceding year, Mr. Kosygin stated that this was still a mere trickle. Why could not this trade be expanded further in the same manner as had been done between the USSR and the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, and many other countries. He was surprised at the fact that the American press and even government representatives, as well as business circles took the position that the Soviet Union did not have anything to sell to the United States. If the two leading powers in today's world, leading in industry, technology, science, etc., could not trade with each other, how did they expect to trade with countries of Africa, Asia, etc. It seemed to him that one of the main reasons for this lack of trade was American lack of information about Soviet industrial capacity. He cited the following examples: The USSR was furnishing machinery to many European countries but would like to receive similar machinery orders from the United States. Another aspect of trade which was being largely ignored was trade in licenses (i.e. patents and know-how). He thought that a great deal could be done in this respect, but the USSR was not interested in one-way trade only, a balance had to be established which would make such trade profitable to both sides. He understood very well that neither the United States nor the USSR were in the philanthrophy business, trade had to be mutually profitable. Therefore, the United States and the USSR should work together. This, of course, involved long-term agreements such as had been concluded by the USSR with many other countries; it further involved credits. The Soviet Union was also selling machinery on credit to its customers.

At this point Mr. Martin, turning to Assistant Secretary Reynolds, told Mr. Kosygin that Mr. Reynolds handled labor problems in the United States Government and invited Mr. Reynolds to speak. Mr. Reynolds said that if Mr. Kosygin was interested in some of the details of the United States economy, he would like to tell him something about it. United States production was at an all-time high with a gross national product of almost 600 billion per annum. Nevertheless, the United States had certain problems such as unemployment of 4.1 million or 5.6% of our total labor force. The United States Government had recently put through a tax cut in the amount of 11 billion dollars in the expectation that it would result in increased investment on the part of consumers. In this manner our Government hoped to increase our gross national product by 35 billion dollars, and thereby recoup the losses in tax revenues. Approximately 7 billion of the total tax cut would wind up in the hands of working people. In addition, our Government was taking steps to retrain people who had been displaced by automation. Mr. Reynolds estimated that some 30,000 to 35,000 jobs per week were being eliminated by automation so that retraining was an important measure to combat further unemployment. He stated that in the United States people were now working an average of 42 to 42 1/2 hours per week, that the Government was opposed to a reduction of work-week hours, but that unless the United States managed to solve the unemployment problem in other ways, it might eventually have to consider a reduction of work-week hours.

Mr. Kosygin pointed out that, while unemployment did not exist and never would exist in the USSR, Soviet workers at the present time were working 7 hours a day for 5 days and 6 hours on Saturday. The work week had been and was now being reduced, indeed some factories had already gone to a 5-day 40 hour week, but this kind of a change involved a loss of 1 hour per week or a total of 52 hours a year. He said that in the Soviet Union wages had not as yet reached a level mentioned by Secretary Reynolds earlier ($2.46 per hour average industrial wage), but that there were many free services and benefits which the Soviet worker received in addition to his wages; for example, extremely low rent (as a matter of fact the Soviet housing industry was being run at a loss, subsidized by the government budget), free medical care, hospitalization, vacations, sanitoriums, etc. Education was completely free regardless of the student's family origin. He pointed to a decree of the Council of Ministers which was being published today permitting pensioners to resume work without losing all of their pension. He stressed that the Soviet trade unions played a most active part in the management and economic and political life of the country. He pointed to the fact that Soviet wages were gradually being increased without a corresponding increase in prices.

Mr. Reynolds stated that for the past several years the United States had maintained a fairly stable economy in a monetary sense; the wholesale price level had risen only .5% since 1957, while the retail price level had been rising at an average rate of .1% per month. Our economy was at an all time high, we had added 100 billion dollars to the national product just in the last three years. As to the social and medical services, Mr. Reynolds pointed out that we consider it to be better for private industry to assume responsibility for workers welfare. There were 60 billion dollars in pension funds which were being used to supplement the Federal Government pensions a retired worker receives. The United States had free and independent trade unions which would this coming summer be involved in negotiations with the automobile industry. The latter had had several very good years, producing 7 million cars last year, and the unions now wanted a larger share of the profits. But no one would benefit if both wages and prices increased proportionately. Therefore the Government was interested in maintaining stability of prices.

Mr. Kosygin stated that Soviet trade unions were even more free and independent, so much so in fact that if he did not do a good job the trade unions would not permit him to take a vacation. He went on to say that the Soviet Union had no intention of producing as many autos as the United States, that in the USSR production would be concentrated on buses and large taxi pools. When Minister Bakayev pointed out that taxis were very cheap in the USSR, Mr. Kosygin laughingly said that just the same Mr. Bakayev did not use taxis but had his own car. He pointed out that in Siberia, for example, the weather of 30-40 degrees below C. in winter presented special problems for automobiles. He had a great deal of respect for the productivity of American industry but had to point out that in some fields of Soviet industry productivity was very high; a specific example was steel: 80 million tons of steel had been produced last year at low cost by a continuous casting process which was being utilized more and more. He said that a group of American businessmen had expressed interest in purchasing the licenses for this process, but apparently nothing had come of it even though such licenses had been sold to other Western countries. He went on to mention the chemical industry, stating that in 1965 the USSR would produce approximately 35 million tons of chemical fertilizer which would be equal to the quantity produced in the United States. As for Soviet agriculture, natural conditions in the Soviet Union were more difficult, making it harder to equal United States agriculture in productivity per man. Chairman Khrushchev had a great deal of admiration for American agriculture and had become something of a specialist in it.

Secretary Martin pointed out that the Delegation included a representative of the United States Department of Agriculture, Mr. Vickery, and that he had a great deal of wheat for sale. To this Mr. Kosygin replied that Mr. Vickery apparently worked with one hand only, selling, but did not use his other hand for buying; he repeated that trade must be a two-way road.

The discussion turned to scientific exchanges and to the late President Kennedy's proposal of a possible joint expedition to the moon. Mr. Kosygin said the USSR and United States should not only go to the moon together but also live here on earth together. Mr. Kosygin for a third time repeated his desire to see increased U.S.-U.S.S.R. trade with a long-term trade agreement and credits and stated that it was not enough to say that all political problems must be solved before trade could be increased. Improvement in political matters and in trade should be parallel. In closing the conversation after another exchange of compliments, Secretary Martin repeated his thanks for the cooperation and hospitality which had been shown his Delegation by various Soviet Government officials./3/

/3/On March 12 Kohler reported that Kosygin had made the same points to him on increasing trade with United States during a conversation at the Tunisian Embassy. Kohler commented that the Soviets appeared particularly interested in expanding U.S. purchases of Soviet goods that might allow increased Soviet purchases of U.S. machinery. (Telegram 2847 from Moscow; ibid., FT 1 US-USSR)

15. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, March 6, 1964, 6:42-7 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, USSR, Vol. II. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted and initialed by Kohler on April 7. The time of the meeting is from the President's Daily Diary. (Ibid.)

SUBJECT
U.S.-Soviet Problems

PARTICIPANTS
The President
Foy D. Kohler, American Ambassador to the U.S.S.R.

Having expected an appointment on Saturday morning March 7 I rather tardily learned that the President wished to see me on Friday evening, March 6. I arrived there precisely at 6:00 p.m. and saw the President from 6:20 until 6:50 p.m. The President came out with a visitor, greeted me by first name and invited me into the office. He asked me first about the Soviet attitude toward his administration. I replied that the Soviets had been very reassured by the nature of his public statements after the assassination of President Kennedy, by the first exchange of correspondence between him and Chairman Khrushchev and by the President's talk with Deputy Chairman Mikoyan at the time of the funeral./2/ The impression made by his statements had been reinforced by his moving ahead with current business, notably the sending of FAA Chairman Najeeb Halaby to Moscow to go ahead with the Air Agreement./3/ I said I was sure that Khrushchev had hoped to be able to have a meeting with the President early in his administration. I thought that he and the Russian leadership in general now understood the President's constitutional problem and his unwillingness to absent himself from the United States until after the forthcoming elections. However, I believed that Khrushchev still regarded his relationship with the President as not yet firmly established and would not do so until he had had a chance to talk with him face to face. I was, therefore, sure that the Chairman would be interested in moving toward a meeting within a reasonable period after the elections. I personally hoped that such a meeting would take place some time after the elections, though I realized that this involved problems connected with Allied relationships on which the Secretary would be advising him.

/2/For memoranda of Mikoyan's conversations with Johnson on November 26, 1963, see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. V, Documents 380 and 381.

/3/For a report on Halaby's trip to the Soviet Union, December 8-18, 1963, see ibid., Document 389.

In reply to the President's query I told him that I felt strongly that we should go ahead with the Air Agreement and that the Russians put considerable significance on this as a specific token of our readiness to proceed to practical agreements. However, I understood that there were some doubts and hesitations on this subject in Washington, notably on the part of Assistant Secretary Mann./4/ I said I would be discussing this matter with the Secretary and other officials involved during my consultations in Washington.

/4/Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Mann expressed his doubts in a February 13 memorandum to Rusk, stating that the signing of the U.S.-Soviet Civil Air Agreement would undermine efforts to keep Cuba isolated and make more difficult U.S. efforts to persuade Latin American and African countries to deny landing and overflight rights to bloc aircraft. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, AV 4 US-USSR) In a February 5 memorandum to Rusk, Thompson sought to counter Mann's views by emphasizing the agreement's advantages, the greatest of which he thought was "a psychological one. As a result of their quarrel with the Chinese Communists, their internal economic difficulties, and the growing independence of the Eastern European Communist countries, the Soviet regime will be faced in the next year or two with some major decisions which could basically influence Western relations for many years to come." U.S. willingness to conclude bilateral agreements would help provide an alternative to the Chinese hard line. (Ibid., S/AL Files: Lot 67 D 2, Staff Memos, Ambassador Thompson) Rusk incorporated the views of both men in Document 22.

The President asked about relationships between Moscow and Peiping and I repeated the thesis of the Embassy in Moscow as to the national-interest nature of the conflict, in terms of Russian unwillingness to share the wealth with the Chinese Communists or to be led into a confrontation with the U.S. by Chinese initiatives, as well as of the factors of the unsettled boundary between the two countries and of the personal antipathy between Khrushchev and Mao.

The President indicated great interest in Soviet policies toward Cuba and asked whether Khrushchev did not understand that this was politically very difficult for him. I replied that I thought Khrushchev did have some appreciation of the domestic political aspects of this question and said that I was sure the Chairman had cancelled a planned trip to Cuba in December in order not to jeopardize his relationship with the President. I also said that I felt confident that the Soviets had in fact removed all combat troops and that they were moving toward a reduction in their training missions. However, I pointed out that Cuba was practically the only success to which Khrushchev could point in the foreign field for a long period of time. His maintenance of his position in Cuba also had its importance in terms of his world-wide conflict with the Chinese Communists for the allegiance of the communist parties and for influence in the lesser developed countries.

The President asked about Soviet attitudes towards the Republicans, with particular respect to Messrs. Nixon and Goldwater. I said it would be no exaggeration to say that the Soviets regarded and portrayed Mr. Nixon as their U.S. Enemy No. 1 and Senator Goldwater as the Devil Incarnate. I therefore thought that they would try to stay strictly out of anything which might be regarded as interference in U.S. politics, but that they particularly would do nothing which they thought would facilitate the political prospects of either of the gentlemen named.

Shortly before 7:00 the President proposed that we go downstairs to the Mess Room to attend a farewell party being given for Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr.

16. Editorial Note

On March 10, 1964, Soviet aircraft intercepted and shot down a U.S. RB-66 aircraft in East German airspace. President Johnson's reaction to the incident and ensuing discussion in the White House are documented in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume XV, Documents 19 and 20. On March 12 the 303 Committee reviewed the Joint Reconnaissance Center's program and procedures with a view to detecting missions with "an incident potential" but noted "that the RB-66 training flight was not a part of the JRC program nor did this flight come under JRC jurisdiction. However, the question of routine navigation and training flights under local commanders was not considered as a separate entity for purposes of this discussion." (Memorandum for the record; National Security Council, 303 Committee, Minutes 1964)

In its March 11 note protesting the intrusion, the Soviet Government claimed the "plane had penetrated into G.D.R. territory with the special purpose of conducting military reconnaissance." Ambassador at Large Thompson categorically denied the assertion in his oral reply to Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin the next day. For text of the Soviet note and a summary of the U.S. reply, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964, pages 528-531. In a meeting with Dobrynin on March 19, Secretary of State Rusk expressed regret over the incident but insisted the plane was not on any mission in East Germany. Rusk contended that the Soviet military had acted too fast in shooting down the plane and requested prompt return of the fliers. A memorandum of the conversation is in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume XV, Document 21. At a second meeting 2 days later, Dobrynin told Rusk that the Soviet Government viewed with satisfaction his statement of regret and would release the fliers soon. (Memorandum of conversation; Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330) The release took place on March 27.

The March 10 incident followed by only 6 weeks an incident in which a Soviet fighter shot down a U.S. T-39 aircraft in East German airspace (see Document 9). Chairman Khrushchev reviewed both incidents and expressed his displeasure at the intrusions in an April 2 message to President Johnson (Document 21).

17. Intelligence Memorandum/1/

[document number not declassified]

Washington, March 19, 1964.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, USSR, Vol. II. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. Prepared by the Directorate of Intelligence of the Central Intelligence Agency.

THE COMING STRUGGLE FOR POWER IN THE USSR

Introduction and Conclusions

Neither the nature of the Soviet system nor the record of Soviet history suggests that the USSR can undergo orderly dynastic change. There is no statute, no article in the Constitution, which provides for the selection of a single leader of the Soviet party and state. More important, there is no tradition in Soviet politics of a systematic and harmonious succession; there is, rather, a record on conflict over power and--as Stalin and Khrushchev would testify--a pattern of the survival of the fittest. Thus, when the supreme ruler dies, his heirs are likely to fall out, and the USSR may then enter upon an extended period of policy debate and political contention.

It is not possible, of course, to predict with precision or certainty the outcome of the next succession crisis in the USSR. But, while neither we nor the Soviets themselves can name the man who will someday succeed Khrushchev, that man is probably at this moment sitting on the Presidium of the CPSU. And, while we cannot identify the policies that this successor will follow after his advent to power, the outline of these policies may already be at least faintly visible in the murk of current Soviet political controversy and in the changing form of Soviet society as a whole. Thus it is possible to speculate about the political climate at the time of Khrushchev's departure and to consider the nature of those who will seek to succeed him.

We have surmised in the essay which follows that, while there are pronounced individual differences between the men now at the top of the Soviet hierarchy, most of them tend to look at the world through the eyes of the party apparatchiki and represent collectively a fairly conservative body of opinion. Some, although loyal followers of Khrushchev, seem to have a hard time keeping up with him, and others, less devoted to Khrushchev, seem at times to resist both his specific reforms and the general direction of his policies. In the aftermath of Khrushchev's death, there may be a tendency for the various contenders to divide into two groups, those who would to one degree or another advocate a continuation of the Khrushchevian status quo, and those who would perhaps disavow Khrushchev's reformism and propose a return to more traditional ways of doing things, both at home and abroad. Such a cleavage is already apparent in Soviet politics and could become of much greater significance during the policy debates likely to occur during a succession crisis.

As was the case after the death of Stalin, the battle for the top probably will be centered on and conducted within the top echelons of the party during its initial stages. The various contenders, however, will have to take account of the interests of other groups in Soviet society (the government apparatus, the military establishment, etc.) and, in time and under certain circumstances, the role of these groups could come to have an important, if indirect, bearing on the outcome of the struggle. Should, for example, the voice of protest of the liberal intellectuals continue to mount in intensity, and should the temper of the people become increasingly receptive to such protest, one or another leader might deem it profitable to champion the popular cause. Other "outside" pressures on the contenders will almost certainly include the policies of the US and Communist China. Although there is probably little that either country can do to determine the course of the succession struggle, the attitudes and intentions of both countries will be a major ingredient of debate, and the political fortunes of the individual leaders and their factions will in part rise and fall on the basis of the successes and failures of their policies, including their foreign policies.

The struggle for succession is discussed in some detail in the paper which follows and is considered under the following headings:

The "Primacy" of Politics over Economics
The Next Succession Crisis--The Men
Party Politics
Non-Party Elements
Policy Issues/2/

/2/None of these sections, comprising 14 pages, nor the 23 pages of biographic data, is printed.

At Tab are biographic data on some of the outstanding figures who may be involved in the struggle for power.

18. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/

Moscow, March 25, 1964, 2 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, USSR, Cables, Vol. II. Confidential.

2979. Approach of Khrushchev's 70th birthday April 17 will presumably give rise to some speculation in West about his possible retirement. In this connection, pundits may well recall statement of February 27, 1963 that we could not go on forever and attempt to rationalize that ideal time for step-down is now.

In Embassy's view there seems little warrant for such speculation. We have never been sure that there was much substance to Khrushchev's "retirement" statement of last year, and if there was, it should be read as reflection Khrushchev's shaky power position in post-Cuba period rather than of indication Khrushchev's own desires. In any case, situation has changed considerably. Even if Khrushchev should want to give up premiership and become, perhaps, Chairman of Presidium of Supreme Soviet (which would still enable him participate in future summit meetings), he could not possibly step down now in face Chinese polemics against him personally.

May be noted that as spring approaches this year Soviets are facing some unusually serious problems apart from China. Winter wheat crop, which they are banking on more than usual, may be possibly quite poor. Soviet youth and labor are restless and food shortage has people disgruntled. Authorities seem edging toward more repressive measures to improve discipline, as perhaps implied in March 19 Izvestiya report of Rudenko speech in Central Committee calling for "further strengthening socialist legality and law and order".

In sum, complex of all these factors make it unlikely that Khrushchev will consider it wise give up any of his present jobs in immediate future.

Stoessel/2/

/2/Kohler was in Washington for consultations.

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