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120. Letter From the Counselor of Embassy for Political Affairs in Tehran (Herz) to the Director of the Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs (Bracken)/1/ Tehran, February 21, 1966. /1/Source: Department of State, NEA/IRN Files: Lot 70 D 330, Iran 1966, POL 12, Political Parties (general). Secret; Official-Informal. Dear Kay: Your letter of February 4, about obtaining more information on rightist or opposition groups has given us a great deal of trouble./2/ Frankly, the difficulty is that these opposition groups are essentially clandestine, and the national police are hunting for the very kind of information that you are asking us to procure. I know Alan is working on this too, but the Counselor for Political Affairs really has to be very careful not to promise you too much. /2/On February 4 Bracken had written Herz, saying that INR/RNA and GTI were both concerned with the need to obtain more information about the nature and scope of the activities of rightist and conservative opposition groups, including religious groups, in Iran, and their interaction (if any) with each other. This concern had been highlighted by the recent arrests of 55 opponents of the regime. (Ibid.) On the positive side, we do try to keep contacts with various exponents of the religious milieu, but I must confess that in respect to the kind of information that the Department is seeking these contacts are not too productive. We see [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] who is really a government stooge; [2 lines of source text not declassified] a highly vocal religious critic of the regime but not a very useful source of information on particular groups; [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] a religious-oriented right-wing politician, [3 lines of source text not declassified] who is sometimes interesting. In addition, Archie Bolster has developed a fairly productive contact with [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] who seems to know some of the as yet unarrested members of the Islamic Nations Party which was uncovered late last year, but even [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] who are obviously against the regime are exceedingly careful to cover their tracks. Because of the inherent interest of Archie's conversations with [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] I enclose two copies of recent MemCons/3/--even though they do not really answer the question that you have raised. /3/Not printed. You are of course quite right that we learn of the existence of small obscurantist rightist cells or groups only when they find themselves in an "acting" posture, but in this respect it is very difficult for us to be better informed than SAVAK and the National Police who were taken equally unaware by the Mansur assassination, a fact that still rankles with the Shah and has caused him to ride the internal security people rather hard of late. The difficulty of getting really deeply into the rather amorphous clerical opposition stems in part from the fact that a Christian foreigner really has little chance of taking its pulse by meeting just a few mullahs and ayatollahs. Also, since Khomeini was banished in the aftermath of the status bill furor, clerical oppositionists are even less pro-American than before. Direct approaches are sometimes rebuffed and the most glaring case of such a counter-productive effort was provided last year by Bill Clevenger when he tried to sound out Ayatollah Qomi in Meshed. Not only did Qomi rebuff him but the rather innocuous conversation seems to have been tape-recorded by SAVAK. All in all, we will try to do better in the future, but we really cannot be too sure. Incidentally, when the question of the religious opposition was raised at the Consular Conference here last week, I felt that the responses that we got from our consuls were equaled in their inconclusiveness only by the responses to our questions about the Development Corps and the Bakhshdar program. We may be groping in the dark, but I promise you that we will continue to grope and "try harder" to grope a little more effectively in the future. With warm personal regards, Sincerely yours, Martin
121. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State/1/ Tehran, March 2, 1966, 1250Z. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15-1 IRAN. Confidential. Repeated to London, Ankara, Karachi, Baghdad, Kuwait, Jidda, and CINCMEAFSA for POLAD. 1185. "Turmoil Gap" in Iran. Shah's speech to Majlis deputies (Embtel 1181)/2/ brings together number of significant elements of his thinking, and thus of Iranian policy, on which we have recently reported on basis of private conversations (Embtels 789,/3/ 1040,/4/ 1041/5/), but some of these ideas have been sharpened and fact that he is making them public shows extent to which his attitudes are hardening. /2/Dated March 2. (Ibid., FN 16 IRAN) /3/Document 110. /4/Dated January 20. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19-9 U.S.-IRAN) /5/Dated January 20. (Ibid., PET 6 IRAN) 1. Pressure on West. It is clear that there is now concerted campaign to increase oil offtake and obtain wanted military equipment from West, coupled with threat to reorient trade patterns if traditional orientation does not yield desired results. That this is campaign is apparent from number of conversations Shah has had with American visitors recently, and from candid comment we received from one of his subordinates who cited recent reports of U.S. aid to UAR and Turkey to conclude that "apparently the only way to get one's way with the Americans is to be difficult." (Comment: We are of course not rising to this bait and adopting studied attitude of business as usual.) 2. Pride of Accomplishment. Shah pointed to ten percent growth in Iranian year now drawing to close, stable prices, and two and one half percent population growth, contrasting this with lack of progress in neighboring countries. He sees Iran booming, investments picking up, reform program paying off, prices stable, labor satisfied, farmers working harder. All this ascribed to "the inborn Iranian genius" (for which one may read the genius of Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi Arye Mehr). 3. Critics Have Been Proved Wrong. Both in his speech ("We take no orders") and in recent conversations, Shah has lashed out against foreign and domestic critics and pessimists who have been proved wrong by events. Privately, he has zeroed in on "Harvard economists" (to which one may safely add Iranian economists trained in U.S. who are skeptical about growing Iranian commitments) and served blunt notice that determination of what is best for Iran will henceforth be made by Iranians alone. 4. Guns and Butter. Speech was an emphatic reaffirmation that tempo of economic and social developments will not be reduced and that neither will defense measures be slighted. Shah spoke pointedly of national duty to defend Khuzistan and south Iran "Even if there were no single oil well and no commercial ship passed through (Persian Gulf)" and referred to "various affronts to Iran's position, status, dignity and interests" in Gulf area. 5. Non-dependence on Allies. Evidence that experience of Pakistan during last fall's crisis still deeply troubles him was given when Shah said: "There have been developments in world recently which have been an exemplary lesson to U.S., that Iran cannot surrender its destiny to whims of foreigners even if they are very close friends...We cannot subject our destiny entirely to decisions of others who can one day help us and another day not help us. This is not only from national point of view. Internationally also it is not dependable." Comment: We interpret latter point as argument that Iran is really acting in interest of its allies and of world peace by becoming less dependent on West for its defense. He has often pointed out that if U.S. were required to intervene militarily to protect Iran, conflict would be wider and potentialities greater for Communists to create Vietnam type of situation. At same time Shah gave assurance that "Iran still retains the same importance in regard to preservation of regional security which could be interpreted as guarded reaffirmation of CENTO." While speech contains nothing new, tone is getting shriller and sense of self-satisfaction and grievance somewhat stronger. It is apparent that recent resumption of U.S. aid to Nasser despite his postponement of withdrawal from Yemen, and reports of additional U.S. military assistance to Greece and Turkey pursuant to McNaughton's visit to those two countries (and not to Iran) have added to feeling of Shah and his ranking subordinates that Iran is once more being taken for granted by West, that "papa knows best" attitude of Americans toward Iran's military requirements is an affront to national dignity, that Iran has the means to purchase what it needs for its defense, that present U.S. balance of payments policies threaten Iran's remarkable economic progress, and that best way to deal with Uncle Sam is to make a public scene. As Art Buchwald would phrase it, there has been a "turmoil gap" in Iran recently. The Shah is aware of this, and would like to fill it; but we still believe that despite certain threats, for instance that he would resort to Soviets for arms procurement, there are prudent limits to any "reorientation" which he is not likely to transgress under present circumstances. Point of concern is when and whether Shah and Iran become captive to "reorientation" speech-making. Meyer
122. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iran/1/ Washington, March 7, 1966, 3:18 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15-1 IRAN. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Crawford, cleared by Bracken and Komer, and approved by Hare. 903. Following is text of message dated February 26 from Shah to President. Reply in preparation. "Dear Mr. President," "During my short stay in Austria, I had the pleasure of receiving your letter of January 31, 1966 delivered to me by your Ambassador to that country. I gratefully acknowledged it by a letter sent to you through my Ambassador in Washington./2/ /2/Telegram 967 to Vienna, January 30, transmitted a message from the President to the Shah informing him that the U.S. and South Vietnamese Governments were ending the suspension of bombing attacks against North Vietnam. (Ibid., POL 27 VIET S) The Shah's February 2 response is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, Iran--Shah Correspondence, Vol. I." "Some time before that your esteemed and able envoy, Mr. Averell Harriman, whom you had entrusted with the mission to explain the American aims and objectives paid a visit to Tehran and gave me a full account of his mission. We had a long and fruitful exchange of views." "It would be appropriate to observe, Mr. President, that the evil of aggression which has plunged South Vietnam into the miseries of a ruinous war, may also engulf other areas of the world, if adequate measures are not taken in good time to forestall it. The developing course of events in this region clearly shows that my predictions of these past years have not been far wide of mark. Let me add, Mr. President, that unfortunately disruptive elements in the Middle East, in utter disregard of morality, principle and human life are constantly on the look out to carry out their destructive activities in order to be able to maintain their position which they could not otherwise do so in a healthy and orderly community. We are at present face to face with dangers coming from directions which, though clearly foreseen by me, we could not for reasons I would not elaborate here, take adequate measures to provide against them." "I need hardly stress, Mr. President, that my cherished aim in this region is the safeguarding of peace and stability--factors so essential to the implementation of our reforms and further enhancing the prosperity of our people. And perhaps, it will be no exaggeration to say that the political and economic stability of Iran, as so far maintained, has proved to be not only to the advantage of our own country but also of great value to the security and continued stability of the whole region." "But we can hardly maintain this situation if we fail to provide ourselves with the necessary facilities and requirements. Recently, however, diminishing United States military assistance coupled with the exchange requirements of our growing population are placing unduly heavy burden on our limited foreign exchange resources, further aggravated by the fact that in comparison with other oil-producing countries of the Middle East, our oil production figures bear no relation to the needs of our greater and growing population." "Faced with this situation and feeling more than ever the grave danger gathering in the direction of our Western and Southern borders, our national interests demand that we lose no time in preparing ourselves to cope with any threat by purchasing our military requirements with our limited foreign exchange at a reasonable price from the United States or look out for other suppliers who are in readiness to offer us better terms and conditions. I earnestly hope that this vital question of our approaches in the United States will receive favourable consideration. I take this opportunity to offer you my heartfelt and sincere wishes for the success and fulfilment of your great task. May God Almighty's blessings be with you in the pursuit of your high ideals and noble work." Sincerely, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi" Rusk
123. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State/1/ Tehran, March 14, 1966, 1420Z. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19 US-IRAN. Confidential. Repeated to CINCSTRIKE. 1244. Iranian Military Program. 1. Security Preoccupation. During course of lengthy discussion 14th Shah bore down heavily re his military needs and his desire maintain collaboration with U.S. 2. President's Response Awaited. Shah said he awaiting reply from President Johnson after which he wishes proceed promptly with additional military procurement. He stressed hope U.S.G. would be responsive, for Iran has every reason to continue in pattern set by long-standing U.S.-Iran military cooperation. He said urgency problem increasing and there no need delay because of annual economic review in June or July. He gratified by expert military advice which is emerging from General Peterson's military survey mission. He confident findings will support his own conviction that Iran does have justifiable additional military needs because of increasing vulnerability of Iran's vital source of wealth, i.e., Persian Gulf region. 3. Shah Determined. Shah said he wanted to make clear that his public as well as private statements re Iran's critical needs and his determination to have them supplied elsewhere if West is unresponsive is not bluff, threat or blackmail. He said UAR receiving SU-9 (Fishpot B) aircraft which superior even to MIG-21's of which Egypt already has goodly supply. Nasser also has 12 destroyers, 9 submarines and number of deadly KOMAR boats, all from Soviets. Iraq recently acquired 20 MIG-21's and now Shah hears they acquiring KOMAR boats. If latter report true Shah said it clearly accentuates Iranian requirements in Gulf area. Urging reasonable terms from USG, Shah said he has heard that price of F4C's is from $3,000,000 to $5,000,000. By contrast, MIG's are available for $600,000. He hopeful US response will be such as to enable him to maintain U.S.-orientation as in past. 4. No Viet-Nam Here. Noting I not aware what President Johnson's response might be, I told Shah he should nevertheless keep in mind US has problems also. We currently carrying thankless burden of stopping aggression in Viet-Nam and American people heavily preoccupied this matter. Congress also leary of U.S.G. military programs following sad experience of Indo-Pak conflict. Shah said it is precisely because he does not want Viet-Nam story repeated here that he is pursuing policy of making Iran self-reliant as far as regional security concerned. He noted U.S. in any case not member of CENTO and its bilateral agreement with Iran is directed exclusively at Communist threat. Shah reiterated complete support for what US doing in Viet-Nam and recounted how he had made this clear to Sov Dep FornMin Kuznetsov during latter's visit here week ago. He reiterated his long-standing view that it is in U.S. interest for Iran be able take care of itself. 5. Nature of Collaboration. I told Shah I felt U.S. friendship for Iran was well proven. We delighted country is able stand on its own feet, an objective to which we had made substantial contribution. Our cooperative relations in military field were particularly noteworthy. I felt confident that USG will continue to do what it can to be helpful but he should not build false expectations. If what we might do was not enough, Iran is, as he has emphasized an "independent" country, and it would have to make its own decisions re wisdom of reorienting its philosophy. 6. Agreed Program. Specifically, I said Washington demonstrated responsiveness in sending Peterson mission. While mission's findings still not completed, my impression is that there is growing U.S. awareness of increasing vulnerability of Persian Gulf installations, and this is without regard to who possible aggressor might be. Referring to 1962 and 1964 Memoranda of Understanding, I made clear that whatever emerges from Peterson survey would require revision of 1964 memorandum and coordination with annual economic review. I expressed view consideration of revised military program in connection with annual economic review did not necessarily mean delay in efficient and effective defense program in Iran. Shah was a bit taken aback because he apparently hoped to place orders, either with US or elsewhere, in month or two. However, he recognized validity of 1962 and 1964 memoranda and reluctantly agreed to procedure I had outlined. 7. Comment. Shah was in dark mood, particularly at beginning of audience. Again he recounted list of grievances against us, specifically expressing hope that our defense collaboration would not experience same end reached after several years of discussing what he said President Eisenhower called "damn steel mill." He stressed time and again Iran's new policy of "independence" and what an obvious success it is with people of Iran. After my rather frank and strong responses, he mellowed a bit. Upon departing, he expressed appreciation and welcomed further such frank exchanges between "two friends." In speaking as strongly as he did, Shah no doubt was putting on pressure for favorable response from us re things military. Danger is that endeavors of this type can ultimately become national crusade. One of problems here is that few people have courage to speak to Shah except in terms he wants to hear. Thus sitting in his regal isolation he conjures up without restraint various illusions and distortions of reality. Continuing dialogue with US officials is therefore desirable. We continue to hope that Secretary Rusk's plans for visit with Shah during CENTO trip will materialize. Meyer
124. Letter From President Johnson to the Shah of Iran/1/ Washington, March 15, 1966. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 21. No classification marking. The letter was transmitted in telegram 932 to Tehran, March 15. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 15-1 IRAN) Your Imperial Majesty: Your letter of February 26th/2/ shows how clearly you, too, understand the lesson so vividly confirmed in Vietnam--that "a healthy and orderly community" is the best defense against disruptive elements. That is why I am sending my Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare to see how we can speed progress in helping the Government of Vietnam bolster this first line of defense. /2/See Document 122. The military campaign there must go on; yet its ultimate purpose is to enable the Vietnamese leaders to press the war against hunger, disease and ignorance. The problem in Vietnam is that both of these campaigns must be waged at the same time, and there are scarcely enough resources--human or otherwise--to go around. This is the tragic backdrop of so many of our hopes for the security and well-being of free men everywhere. I fully understand your own preoccupation with decisions as to what resources you will allocate to preparing your military forces in case they are needed and your determination that those forces be as effective as you can make them. I myself have been deeply impressed since assuming office with the difficulty, even in a country as bountifully endowed as mine, of making constant choices between programs, all of which are worthwhile. I am coming to believe that the essence of great leadership is the ability to pick from an impressive field the few that are truly crucial. Every leader must make those choices for himself, but I am pleased that you have sufficient confidence in us to seek our opinion as to how we can most effectively work together. Happily, the findings of the military survey team which has just completed its work will be available for discussion with you in the course of the annual military-economic review later this spring. I might say that Secretary McNamara has been my mainstay in developing revolutionary analytical tools for weighing cost factors in the tremendously complicated choices I must make. I hope that our joint military-economic talks will give us an opportunity to bring that kind of analysis to bear on your problems in whatever ways may prove helpful. I am reassured by the knowledge that, for many years, our countries have worked together extensively to safeguard peace and stability in the Middle East. Wherever our discussions lead, we can be certain that our mutual respect and common goals will enable us to move ahead in honorable cooperation. I look forward to continued close consultation with you as we do our utmost to solve those problems which touch the heart and marrow of people everywhere--the preservation of national security and the search for the best possible lives for our countrymen. Sincerely, Lyndon B. Johnson
125. National Intelligence Estimate/1/ NIE 34-66 Washington, March 24, 1966. /1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency Files: Job 79-R01012A, ODDI Registry of NIE and SNIE Files. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to a note on the cover sheet, the estimate was submitted by Raborn and concurred in by the U.S. Intelligence Board on March 24. IRAN
The Problem To estimate the main trends in Iranian foreign policy and domestic affairs over the next two to three years. Conclusions A. Iran is adopting a more active and independent foreign policy as a result of the Shah's increased confidence in Iran's economic situation, his declining fear of the USSR, and his increasing anxiety about Nasser and other Arab nationalists. Iran's new international stance will provide opportunities for the USSR to expand its presence in the country and will cause difficulties for the US. However, the Shah is well aware that his domestic position and Iran's security depends heavily on US support. Thus he is unlikely to move deliberately to alter the alliance or reduce US activities in Iran. (Paras. 1-10, 13-15) B. Domestic considerations are unlikely to alter Iran's foreign policy to any great extent over the next two to three years. The Shah will probably remain firmly in control, though the bulk of the educated middle class probably will remain estranged from the regime. (Paras. 16-19) C. Iran's rate of economic growth may be adversely affected by the Shah's ambitious military expansion program. Oil revenues, which are Iran's main source of foreign exchange, are not rising as fast as in the past; the reform program is unlikely to have much effect on the pace of economic development. If, as is likely, the Shah gives priority to his military program, the economic growth rate would probably slow somewhat, accompanied by periods of inflation and recession. (Paras. 21-24) [Here follows the body of the paper.]
126. Letter From the Shah of Iran to President Johnson/1/ Tehran, March 25, 1966. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15-1 IRAN. Secret; Limdis. Attached to a March 28 memorandum from Read to Bromley Smith stating that it had been delivered to the Department under cover of a note from the Iranian Ambassador on March 28. Dear Mr. President, I thank you for your letter of March 16, 1966./2/ /2/Document 124. It is a source of satisfaction to see that both of us hold identical views on the best defense against disruptive elements--which, to the detriment of our peace and security, are not wanting in this part of the world. This region needs nothing more than peace, tranquillity, and a healthy political climate. A favorable atmosphere must prevail in order to bring lasting and fundamental solution to centuries-old problems. This truth has been well recognized in Iran, as it is reflected in the pattern of our comprehensive economic and social reforms. Back in 1963 it was decided that the great reservoir of talents and energies of young men who had finished their secondary school or university education and become eligible for military service should, instead of serving in barracks, be mobilized and effectively employed for economic and social purposes. These young men, upon completion of the first four months of their military training, and initiation in their respective fields, are organized into various corps such as literacy, health and rural development, and sent to the various parts of the country to serve in distant villages and townships. They carry out their allotted duties with great devotion and play a constructive role in the improvement of social and economic conditions of the rural areas. They have proved to be a transmission vehicle for bringing leadership, guidance, and badly needed services and skills to the remotest areas of our land. I take pride in saying that in my estimation no other country in the world, with conditions similar to our own, has been able to achieve this remarkable progress in combating illiteracy and helping provide a better life for its rural citizens. In fact Iran with a population of 25 million has been generally recognized as a pilot country in this field. In the year past, members of the Literacy Corps have built 4649 schools and taught over 320,000 illiterate adults and children. Our ultimate goal is to stamp out illiteracy from our land within the next ten years. Similarly, the Health Corps has had a distinguished record of accomplishment in the course of the past year. The medical units of this corps have risen from 117 to 471. These units are scattered in villages all over the country and their services have reached at least 5 million people of our rural areas. Our country has extraordinary potential for industrialization and for genuine economic and social development. In one of our provinces alone, namely Khouzestan, we are able to bring under cultivation no less than one million hectares of land by utilization and application of modern agricultural methods. The vast land of this province will be irrigated by dams already constructed or in the process of construction. In the same province, plans are under way to produce more than seven million kilowatt-hours of energy. Plans are also under way for the vast development of petrochemical and chemical fertilizer industries whose products are estimated to meet the growing needs of our own economy as well as the needs of great neighbouring markets like the sub-continent of India, and even the continent of Africa. I need hardly refer to the immensity of our oil production potential. In the Consortium zone alone the potential proven reserves would permit us to produce some four million barrels of oil per day over the next 50 years. The increase in oil exports together with the development of our gas and petrochemical industries, no doubt, are bound to expand our foreign exchange earnings by 1970. But evidently the importance we attach to the economic development of the country and the necessity of making utmost use of our foreign exchange resources for this purpose would make it difficult for us to meet all of our security needs from our foreign exchange earnings for the period 1966-70. It is our confident hope that by 1970 our total revenues from the oil consortium agreement, and income accrued from petrochemical and gas industries and other sources would exceed the annual sum of $1,500 million. In the meantime, that is between now and 1970, however, we might experience some difficulty in making our limited foreign exchange meet the growing deffense requirements. We are allocating, at present, 70% of our oil revenues for development purposes. In the course of the past year our economic growth has risen by 10%, while general price stability has been maintained and in some cases the prices have shown a downward trend. In order to keep up this pace of growth and to assure the continuation of our revolutionary programs, we are making every effort to accelerate the economic development of the country. We are strongly determined to stand on our own feet and to undertake the responsibilities of an independent and peace-loving nation with vital interests in the security and stability of this area--a policy which should be welcome to our friends. Thus in the present uncertain conditions and in the face of real dangers in this part of the world we cannot ignore the defense needs of the country. We should be well prepared to cope with any eventuality. If we are strong enough to face these dangers, they may even fail to materialize. It was in consideration of these facts that our Parliament, in addition to the $200 million agreement with you, authorized a further amount of $200 million, and if necessary authorization for additional amounts would be forthcoming. Since we have to decide on the utilization of the amounts authorized by our Parliament, I shall be pleased to receive the findings of the military survey team and to be kindly informed of your readiness in securing the necessary requirements with interesting prices. It is our desire to make our purchases in the United States of America and would like to know the extent to which we can be accommodated. I would also be pleased to have your military experts evaluation report. Upon receipt of the above reports we shall study them and decide on our needs, informing Washington accordingly. We will then await Mr. McNamara to inform us of the quantity of materiel we can purchase with these additional amounts. We are most grateful to you for the generous material and moral assistance you have so far extended to us. Let me say in conclusion that I am in complete agreement with you in that wherever our discussions lead, we can be certain that our mutual respect and common goals will enable us to move ahead in honorable cooperation. Sincerely M.R. Pahlavi
127. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency/1/ Washington, March 30, 1966. /1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DOD/NE Files: Job 80-00105A, IRAN, Historical File for Chief ME (J.R. Critchfield), Book 1. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. THE SHAH OF IRAN'S CURRENT OUTLOOK 1. After twenty-five years on the throne of Iran, the Shah is for the first time acting like an independent monarch. He is fashioning his own image as a modern-minded, progressive ruler, no longer in the shadow of the memory of Reza Shah, his iron-willed and despotic father, founder of the dynasty. 2. Reza Shah abdicated in 1941 in the face of British and Russian invasion of his country. The 22-year-old Mohammad inherited a discredited dynasty, the victim of a shameful defeat, and obviously dependent upon foreign support. There was no national unity. Courtiers and self-seeking politicians confused the frustrated young monarch, and bad advice came from all sides. His first two marriages produced no male heir, a failure which he took as another symbol of his weakness. 3. The showdown with Premier Mossadeq between 1951 and 1953 was a turning point. When Mossadeq fell, the Shah triumphantly returned from brief exile and began taking direct, forceful charge of his country. His confidence has grown constantly since then. There is today no challenge to his throne, the political opposition is in disarray, and his third wife has produced a Crown Prince, now five years old. 4. Economically the country is in good shape, and the Shah is confidently proceeding with what he calls his "White Revolution," a broad program of modernization and reform. Concurrently, he has broken his exclusive reliance on the US and is well on his way toward a more independent position between the US and the USSR. He is convinced that this course will enhance his image both domestically and internationally, but in following it he risks moving further away from the US than he now intends. 5. The Shah's recent acceptance of a Soviet steel mill--a project on which the West had dragged its feet for many years--is a testimony to his new feeling of confidence. But it is also a major breakthrough for the USSR. The mill will be the core of Iran's industrial development program, and will result in the influx of hundreds of Soviet technicians over the next few years. It nonetheless gives substance to the Shah's repeated warnings that, while he does not intend to change his country's pro-Western orientation, he will not hesitate to go elsewhere if the US cannot meet his needs, and has been warmly welcomed by the Iranian public. 6. The Shah acknowledges the danger from the U.S.S.R., but insists on his ability to deal with Moscow without serious risk. In his eyes, the only immediate threat to Iran comes from those Arab states, including Iraq, which he sees as dominated by Nasir. For defense against this threat, he believes Iran needs faster fighter aircraft, better air defense, and a strong-er navy in the Persian Gulf, primarily to protect the vital southern oil regions. The Shah is no longer willing to listen to US arguments that Iran cannot afford such equipment. Oil revenues are increasing, and he is pressing the foreign oil companies for even greater production. He has received a credit authorization from parliament for $200 million to buy arms. 7. For logistical reasons, the Shah prefers to buy U.S. equipment, but will probably turn instead to Western European countries if the U.S. is not forthcoming. He has intimated that as a last resort he might turn to the U.S.S.R. Such a move would represent a turning point in his relations with the West and could, if carried out on a large scale, accomplish a major current Soviet objective, the withdrawal of the U.S. military mission in Iran.
128. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, April 7, 1966, 4:30 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 1, 4/2-5/26/66.Secret. The Shah answered your last letter/2/ almost immediately. He obviously wants to assure you that he is not neglecting his economic revolution in pressing for more arms. He details his achievements--combating illiteracy, improving rural life and public health, bringing new land under modern cultivation, development of a fertilizer industry. Then he explains how growing oil earnings should put Iran on its feet by 1970. Between now and then, however, he will need help in building an effective military while continuing to devote most of his resources to development. /2/Documents 124 and 126. We're walking a tightrope between bowing to his intention to be master in his own house and keeping his military spending within reason. JCS is now reviewing our recent survey of the Shah's military requirements. You will have a crack at the final package (much of it will be credit sale), and we will thrash it out with him in our annual military-economic review. The attached reply, for signature if you approve,/3/ reassures him that we will not dismiss his security needs lightly but it does not prejudice your final decision. Walt /3/An unsigned copy of the letter sent on April 11 is attached; see Document 129.
129. Letter From President Johnson to the Shah of Iran/1/ Washington, April 11, 1966. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, Iran--Shah Correspondence, Volume II. No classification marking. Your Imperial Majesty: Iran's signal progress in education and literacy, in health, in social and economic development, and in agriculture, recounted in your letter of March 25, is most impressive. I sense your pride and I share your pleasure in these accomplishments. I fully understand the importance that you attach to making the necessary defense decisions that will protect and promote Iran's security and progress. To that end my government is earnestly making a careful examination of the defense and security situation as it affects us both--what Iran's needs are and how the United States can help to meet them. The report of the military survey team is now under review by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Department of Defense. One purpose of this review, the necessity for which I am sure Your Majesty can appreciate, is to determine the most favorable prices that can be offered for the equipment recommended by the military survey team. Once this is completed, the report will be forwarded to you to permit thorough study by your government before the Annual Review. Ambassador Meyer has informed me that he expects to receive soon from your government the economic data needed for the Annual Review. Once both military and economic data are in hand and have been analyzed, I believe our two governments should be able to reach a prompt conclusion as to our future military cooperation. Let me assure you, Your Majesty, that the United States Government wishes to promote the dual objectives of economic advance and national security which you have outlined so effectively in your letter. And we mean to do this as expeditiously as possible. Sincerely, Lyndon B. Johnson [Continue with the next documents] |
