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90. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State/1/ Tehran, June 18, 1965, 0930Z. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19-3 U.S.-IRAN. Confidential. Repeated to DOD and CINCSTRIKE. 1450. Annual Econ-Military Review. Re Deptel 1124, June 12./2/ /2/Document 88. General Eckhardt and I had two and three-quarter hr session with Shah 17th formally reviewing econ-military picture pursuant to US-Iran Memorandum of Understanding of July 4. Shah was in good mood, no major problems developed. He went along with our various positions (Deptel 1124) except that he wishes one squadron F-5's equipped with Bullpups. Gen Eckhardt who ably handled discussion military procurement is writing up memo for record/3/ of understandings reached which will be supplied to Shah for his approval prior to his departure for USSR. Details of military aspects will be reported by separate message. /3/Not found. Nearly hr was spent re econ framework. I led off by reiterating econ development is as important as military. Noted Iran has excellent income but also large deficits projected for future. Added Shah's reform programs apt to add to GOI financial burden and cautioned unless rising expectations met frustration of Iran masses could cause real problem. Concluded that while redoubled effort is going to be required in econ filed over long run, prospects for immediate future satisfactory and, therefore, we prepared proceed with second tranche of military program. Shah then expatiated at length. First he expressed his personal cynicism re economists, noting Iran has had sad experiences with experts who claim to know all answers and who disagree among themselves. Happily Iran econ situation has now recovered from handiwork these economists. He particularly pleased by what he considers overwhelmingly favorable impact of his recent attack high cost living thru setting prices for certain basic commodities. He confident his reform programs will greatly improve welfare Iran masses, e.g. by increased production from farms which they now own and by sharing profits from expanding industrial sector. Meanwhile, great strides being made Khuzistan and elsewhere. Thus in general picture good one. From this point, Shah launched into his usual contention that this future prosperity meaningless if Iran not secure. He simply has been able cope with regional threats. Viet Nam is graphic example, according Shah, of what could happen Iran. U.S. despite its might now compelled seek "unconditional discussions," which Shah means negotiating with and making concession to aggressor. He went on to express concern re future of Kuwait, Aden and Bahrain. He believes Nasser frustrated in Yemen and elsewhere bound to launch adventure some where, probably against Libya, much less probably against Israel. Nasserist threat in Gulf area cannot be ignored. Thus his principal foreign policy consideration is safety and security Gulf area where Iran's wealth concentrated. He said no responsible leader facing threat this kind can afford be too cautious. After seeking downplay Nasserist threat, I pointed out threat very likely be more subversive (as in Viet Nam) than open military attack. Thus more attn to counter-insurgency was desirable. Shah recognized this and said that his interest in counter-subversion explains his emphasis on total "positive program." He cited new dams being built in Khuzistan and other efforts toward econ and social improvement. After he had delivered himself of remarks obviously previously planned, Shah agreed my summation that he and his govt are determined accelerate econ progress and that GOI will dedicate its resources to extent necessary to achieve that objective. Meyer
91. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State/1/ Tehran, June 22, 1965, 1130Z. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19-3 US-IRAN. Confidential. Repeated to DOD and CINCSTRIKE. 1470. Personnel Ceiling--Iranian Armed Forces. Emb A-590,/2/ Deptel 1124,/3/ Embtel 1468./4/ In accordance 1962 agreement, personnel of Iranian Armed Forces had to be reduced to 160,000 "within two or three years." This was achieved March 1, 1965. However, events subsequent to 1962 have, in our view, made a higher ceiling necessary. Based on the following considerations, Country Team therefore again recommends that ceiling be established at 172,000 for period of 1964 Memorandum of Understanding. We consider such ceiling necessary to success of modernization program. /2/See footnote 2, Document 88. /3/Document 88. /4/Dated June 22. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19-3 U.S.-IRAN) Principal reason for need to increase ceiling is fact that July 4, 1964 Understanding provides for additional equipment and units which must be manned and supported. In particular additional personnel requirements are necessary for new airborne battalion, Hawk battalion, increased number of aircraft, AC&W equipment, additional tanks and reorganization of 8th Armor Division, new patrol frigates and other equipment. In addition, IIF has undertaken greater responsibilities in connection Literacy, Health and Development Corps and vocational training program. These responsibilities, added to requirements for modernization program, render 1962 personnel ceiling obsolete. ARMISH/MAAG and IIF have completed comprehensive and detailed joint study of manpower requirements, including TOES/TDS. Study encompassed all possibilities reducing non-essential units while instituting modernization program. Starting point of study was IIF estimate of 188,000 for new ceiling. As result of study, this figure reduced to 172,000, and Shah has reluctantly concurred in lower figure. It could be reached by yearly increments through 1969. We do not think further personnel survey necessary. ARMISH/MAAG will continue insure ceiling reflects essential requirements. Stress will be placed on bringing only trained manpower into regular forces and elimination of unfit from present personnel. In conclusion, as stated above and in A-590, we believe ceiling of 172,000 justified and necessary and recommend its approval./5/ /5/Telegram 43 to Tehran, July 16, authorized the Ambassador to exchange notes with the Iranian Government amending the September 19, 1962, and July 4, 1964, Memoranda of Understanding so as to increase the agreed personnel ceiling of the Imperial Iranian Armed Forces to 172,000. (Ibid., DEF 6 IRAN) Meyer
92. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iran/1/ Washington, June 24, 1965, 2:33 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15-1 IRAN. Confidential; Limdis. Drafted by Tiger, cleared by Kearney, and approved by Bracken. 1166. Gudarzian Criminal Case. US Attorney's Office Southern District New York has completed presentation witnesses to Grand Jury and is prepared ask indictment Gudarzian on charge conspiracy to commit fraud by mail. Check forgery aspect not under consideration at this time because of technical difficulty making such case without presence Prince and Princess as principal witnesses. Fraud case would be based obtaining money from various individuals in US by false assertions re construction sports arena in Iran. Prior requesting indictment, however, US Attorney needs to ascertain availability following Iranian witnesses for testimony jury trial, listed alphabetically and not in order importance: Reza Ansari, Ahmad Chafik, Gen. Mohammad Daftari, Dr. Amir K. Diba, Abolhassan Ebtehaj, Mohammad Vali Meshkatti, Ardeshir Zahedi. FYI. Believe you should press hard for appearance all witnesses. Although Ebtehaj probably most important of these, you should not disclose this fact to GOI nor give regime impression case could not be made without him. We know Ebtehaj violently opposed to testifying and believe important for internal political reasons Iran seek avoid having issue develop into open clash between him and regime with possible side effects, important bureaucrats who remain loyal Ebtehaj. End FYI. Therefore unless you perceive objection, we believe best course is simply include his name on list of desired witnesses and await GOI response. We will pouch for your consideration alternative courses of action we might pursue if GOI announces Ebtehaj unavailable and if US Attorney reaches conclusion conviction cannot be obtained without his testimony. Judgment latter respect will depend in part on availability other witnesses above list. Rusk
93. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State/1/ Tehran, July 4, 1965, 1350Z. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 IRAN. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Moscow. 9. Shah's Trip to USSR. During Fourth of July reception today Aram told me briefly that Shah's trip to U.S.S.R. had been extremely interesting and marked by unusual warmth of reception. There were many discussions but no important substantive decisions were taken. Specifically, no final decision was taken about possibility of Soviets constructing steel mill here, although Soviet Ambassador quoted in press this morning as saying U.S.S.R. ready to go ahead if Iran will agree. Aram said this matter would be further explored with Soviets. Aram stated that Shah had explained and defended U.S. policy in Viet-nam "even better than President Johnson." This had made Russians very angry. They had pressed hard to have their point of view on Viet-nam included in final communique, and when Iranians refused, discussion of communique almost terminated. I thanked Aram, and said I was sure President would be very grateful to Shah for what he had done. Aram promised to fill me in later in more detail./2/ /2/Telegram 36 to Tehran, July 14, instructed the Ambassador to ask Aram to inform the Shah of the fact that the President had taken a personal interest in his Soviet visit. The President was particularly heartened by the Shah's strong stand on Vietnam and asked that the Shah be told of his personal pleasure at this further example of the aims shared by their two governments. (Ibid.) Rockwell
94. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iran/1/ Washington, August 25, 1965, 1:38 a.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 15 IRAN-US. Top Secret/Sensitive; [distribution indicator not declassified]. Drafted on August 23 by Spain and Director of INR's Office of Current Intelligence Indications William M. Marvel; cleared by Deputy Director for Coordination William McAfee (INR/DDC), Handley, and Howison; and approved by Hughes. 193. For Ambassador. President has approved unanimous recommendation SecState, SecDef, and DCI that we proceed as matter of urgency to develop alternative facilities for our intelligence installations and activities now in Pakistan. He has asked for a firm recommendation on this as soon as feasible. Intelligence community here now hard at work on this problem. Secretary has expressed desire Department play major role in view important political aspects involved in our relations with several countries. Technical studies have already indicated that preferred alternatives would involve in addition to things elsewhere [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] in Iran: [1 line of source text not declassified]. In eventuality that Pakistan forced withdrawal all our facilities there would be immediate heavy pressure for introduction Iran as much as possible of this burden. Everyone here aware enormous political problems which would be involved and fortunately chances Pakistan's insisting early and complete withdrawal do not now seem great. Nevertheless, possibility exists and in any event there is desire over longer run reduce our present high degree dependence on Pakistan in intelligence field. Department's problem now is to determine politically feasible background within which technical planning for both short and long terms can be done. It may turn out that best approach will be effort to develop embryo installations at technically suitable sites which would be susceptible to expansion should a critical need develop. This could be done in an austere, inconspicuous, and gradual manner. Department keenly aware political liabilities any expansion or additions facilities in Iran and of likelihood relatively short lifespan of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] intelligence installations there as in many other countries. We are determined hold requests for them to minimum absolutely necessary. However, every additional year of coverage counts, and state technology does not provide much hope that other forms collection can relieve burden on [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] facilities your area for next few years. Department would appreciate by August 30, if possible, your best effort help us define political parameters within which we must work in Iran, including time elements involved (i.e., possibilities in six months, possibilities in a year), possible developments in US-Iranian and Soviet-Iranian relations which might affect receptivity, Shah's basic attitudes, potential [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] arrangements, etc. Specifically, what is your estimate prospects for success present proposal [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] which provides for introduction some collection personnel. What is maximum number and kind (military or civilian) personnel which could be introduced in [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]? Is any other relatively large [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] installation feasible elsewhere? What are prospects for modest expansion existing [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] covert activities in [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]? Rusk
95. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State/1/ Washington, August 28, 1965, 11:35 a.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 15 IRAN-US. Top Secret/Sensitive; Roger Channel. 229. Re Deptel 193./2/ While urgency reftel apparent, believe in interests providing more valid response it highly desirable familiarize myself firsthand with on-ground realities of existing facilities and geography of suggested expansions and new sites. This I propose to do in coming days. /2/Document 94. As reftel notes, there no question proposed additional facilities can be political dynamite, particularly after our pyrrhic victory last fall in obtaining legislative approval for immunities for Americans here. Question is how much official American presence can Iran tolerate (it is already one thousand five hundred plus families). Before attempting to provide answers I should among other things like obtain firsthand reading of Shah's present temperature. Accordingly hope Dept will concur in my desire to postpone for fortnight our specific response to reftel. Meyer
96. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State/1/ Tehran, August 31, 1965, 1610Z. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15-1 IRAN. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to Ankara, Kabul, Karachi, Moscow, and London. 244. In nearly two and half hour session thirty-first, Shah told me he has been spending many sleepless hours meditating re orientation Iran's policies. These meditations obviously sparked by his recent visit to Moscow. Highlights of this discussion follow: 1. US friendship. Shah gratified by personal greetings from President and Secretary which I conveyed. He said his pronouncements in support of our Viet Nam policy based on friendship for US and even more on his conviction in principles. 2. Viet Nam and US. Shah pleased by firm U.S. policy re Viet Nam. He convinced situation is taking turn for better. Soviets, he believes, anxious to avoid escalation to major confrontation. He admits, however, that Chinese not peace-minded. 3. Viet Nam and Soviets. When Soviet leaders expressed horror at American bombing attacks in North Viet Nam, Shah pointed out if Viet Nam falls to Chinese, rest of Southeast Asia including Indonesia will also fall under Chinese control. Shah also alluded to Soviet-supported activities by Nasser in Yemen. Soviets, he says, made little effort to defend Chinese or themselves re Yemen. Shah confirms Soviet-Chinese rift is deep. It was particularly evident when he needled Soviets about question their being invited to Algiers Conference. 4. Soviets' southern neighbors. Shah tried to write off current Soviet attention to Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan as "series of coincidences." He contended that Soviet friendliness toward these countries is not something new; they tried in 1965, at which time they asked him to intercede with Turks for better relations. Major Soviet purpose, according to Shah is to have friendly cordon of states around Soviet Union so U.S.S.R. can get ahead with its major task of developing its economy. He added, however, there undoubtedly is added incentive for Soviets of rallying as many non-yellow countries as possible behind Soviets in long-term struggle with ChiComs. 5. Stand-on-own-feet policy. Shah's central theme was that Iran must stand on its own feet, militarily and economically. "Intervention" by outsiders is increasingly outmoded, he said. In maintaining Iran's independence vis-a-vis Soviets no one (not even Americans) could be more "patriotic" than Iranians, he added. 6. "Moribund" CENTO. In most disparaging description he has yet made of CENTO, he described it as "moribund" and as "masquerade" that meets to little effect every six months, although he mused "we better keep it." When Soviets said they did not like CENTO, he told them he would be glad to see it terminated when all other pacts are terminated, e.g. NATO, Warsaw, etc. He said he told Soviets they had little to fear militarily from CENTO. 7. Soviet-Iran non-aggression pact. Shah said Soviets proposed to him an un-registered "non-aggression pact for 200 years." He had turned conversation aside and has "not yet" given Soviets an answer. He wondered whether having such a treaty might not serve Iran's purposes by assuring that Soviets would spare Iran if world-tensions break out in hostilities. When Soviets had made proposal of this kind in 1959, he had turned it down, mostly because U.S. and U.K. urged him to reject it. Note: This is first indication Embassy has had of this proposal. In interests maintaining dialogue with Shah, Embassy hopes there will be no leakage. 8. Regional entente. Commenting that Afghan policy seems to be successful, Shah at one point mentioned possibility Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan getting together in common policy of independence. 9. Grievances vs U.S. During conversation, Shah uncorked whole set of personal grievances against U.S., including: a. Bevan-Byrnes and Molotov in 1944 or 1945 made an agreement pointing to autonomy in Iran for Kurds, Azerbaijan, and Khuzistan. Ambassador Wallace Murray had been commissioned to bring him this unhappy news. Note: This is surprise to me. Wonder if Dept can shed light on this. b. During Azerbaijan crisis of 1946, Ambassador Allen had been instructed to make clear that USG would not support Iranian cause militarily. c. While U.S. economic aid has been deeply appreciated, virtually all of it has been extended only after agonizing wrangling. Specifically, Americans sabotaged British-German steel mill project seven years ago. President Eisenhower spoke to Shah sneeringly of countries insisting on having "damn steel mills." Friendly countries like Iran naturally are bitter when they see American critics like Nasser and India receiving aid on more generous terms and at time when aid to Iran is being curtailed. d. Similarly Shah deeply appreciative of U.S. military aid but there have been many delays and continued resistance even when he is obtaining it through purchase. He said he has only recently realized that loans for military equipment are not on favorable basis. Meanwhile, while Iran has virtually no air defense equipment, even Afghanistan has SAM sites and MIG-21's. e. US steadfastly refused to join CENTO, Lincoln White stating publicly that it was in deference to Arab world (read Nasser) sensitivities. f. Among list of other irritants, Shah particularly bitter about Gudarzian case which in his view has dragged on an unnecessary eighteen months. 10. Therapy. Several times underscoring our impressive record of friendship and help for Iran. I sought to straighten Shah up at various appropriate points including such arguments as: a) since Iran increasingly becoming model for progress in Mideast it would be sad for Iran and for free world if its leadership now tries to follow a route taken by leadership in countries not doing so well; b) since as Dean Acheson once said treaties are mere pieces of paper registering an existing situation there is no assurance that piece of paper would deter Soviets from over-running Iran if they felt impelled to do so; c) masses of Afro-Asia including Iran take their cue from on high and tend to stampede in direction leadership points them and leadership then no longer in control; d) as Dulles once said at SEATO meeting US aid is limited and is not reward for good behavior but is deployed where it can do most good in life-and-death struggle between free world and slave; e) Shah's great strength has been that he is man of principle and this is no time for him to shirk the principles which both our countries uphold. I specifically discouraged any moves toward dismantling CENTO or toward non-aggression pact with USSR. Shah seemed get some lift when I told of how home leave was valuable in reassuring me that American system can outstrip any other, e.g. burgeoning business and industry establishments in Manhattan where Shah also had been amazed by new construction, verdant prairies of central Illinois which producing more food than ever, and Gemini 5 space feat which gives indication that we ready compete with Soviets even when they get head start. Comment. Obviously Shah had prepared himself to pave way for possible shift in his future policy. Also obviously his talks with Soviet leaders have made marked impression. He may be in one of those moods re which Ambassador Holmes talked to me about. Hopefully he can surmount it without going too far toward Soviets. Meanwhile, our attention must be as cordial and cooperative as possible without being panicky. Meyer
97. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State/1/ Tehran, September 9, 1965, 1215Z. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, AID 6 IRAN. Confidential. Repeated to Moscow. 319. Re Embtel 244./2/ In discussion eighth Shah remarked that Soviet economic delegation currently visiting Tehran is manifesting almost unbelievable cordiality. This followed cordiality he (Shah) had experienced during his recent Moscow visit when Soviets offered 200-year non-aggression pact and MIG aircraft. Shah had not responded to these two Soviet offers but he said he could not help wondering whether he should not be more responsive to Soviet offers, particularly since his generally pro-Western orientation seemed to be having less value. He noted Ayub finding CENTO membership useless. As for himself, he had only recently realized when there was an alarm re an air attack by Iraqis that Iran has no early warning or other anti-aircraft equipment. He said Iran's airfields and aircraft could be wiped out in one raid. Current attention, he said, is being given to dispersal of aircraft. /2/Document 96. Referring to well-known Soviet objectives vis-a-vis Iran, I pointed out what Shah had termed "Soviet smiles" were clearly tactical. He should give credit, I said, to CENTO for deterring Soviet bully tactics and compelling Soviets to be more friendly. Comment: Shah's irritation re lack of air-defense equipment is increasing. Meyer
98. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State/1/ Tehran, September 10, 1965. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 15 IRAN-US. Top Secret/Sensitive; Priority; [distribution indicator not declassified]. No time of transmission appears on the source text. 332. Reference: Deptel 193 and Embtel 229./2/ While I have not completed my survey of all our sensitive installations in Iran, I have visited a sufficient number to be tremendously impressed by what is already being accomplished here. I wonder if many authorities in Washington are aware of the extensiveness of our sensitive operations here by [less than 1 line of source text not declassified], Army, Navy, Air Force, etc. (some of them of a duplicating nature). /2/Documents 94 and 95. My conclusion is that there is little being done in Pakistan that is not already being done adequately here. Under these circumstances, piling on an additional [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] Americans atop [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] in Iran (not counting dependents) would in my view be inconsonant with President Johnson's injunctions re economy in government. The importance of the Pak facilities is their geography. They afford an additional bearing on target areas. This advantage cannot be transplanted to Iran where bearings are already being taken. Unless someone can demonstrate otherwise to me, transferred personnel from Pakistan will be able to do very little more than is already being done in Iran. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] communications, I find that both [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] already have first-class installations. Obviously any radio man, and I am one myself, is always dreaming of a more extensive antenna system. But as far as I can see both [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] are handling traffic with maximum speed and effectiveness. For neither system is volume of traffic more than one-third its capacity. General Meyer who visited Tehran last week agrees that proposed site at [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] for [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] is unsuitable for various reasons. He would like to find more favorable location. He concurs that until that day is reached an extension of present [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] site is required. It is adequate, if not ideal. I favor indefinite stay at present location. Foregoing conclusions reached even without political considerations. As recent Embassy telegrams have confirmed, Iran is in process of adjusting its foreign policy so as to avoid image of being "American stooges." Basically Shah and his government will continue to be with U.S.. At same time, from standpoint of keeping them in power, we must understand value of their improving their image. Nationalistic sentiment is virulent in most of Africa and Asia. It is on upswing in Iran, particularly as Pakistan [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] loosen their ties with us. Sensitive U.S. operations here as well as burgeoning US official presence are tailor-made targets for anti-Shah and/or anti-American elements. If such elements were to succeed in stirring up passions against US and Shah remained cooperative with U.S., his own future would be in jeopardy. If he responded to popular sentiment, which he would probably be forced to do, it would mean ouster of great bulk of American presence here, including our existing sensitive operations. Since we already have well established facilities [1 line of source text not declassified], I think it would be most unwise to tempt fate by importing additional hundreds of Americans. Camel's back is already heavy laden, from standpoint of what is politically tolerable here. Why risk destroying extensive facilities already in being for minimal additional product? While recommending against transfer of Pak facilities or any substantial part of them to Iran either now or in foreseeable future. I do not preclude squeezing in an extra technician or so in facilities already established here. I am impressed by present efficiency and compactness of these facilities. My vote goes for keeping them that way. Meyer 99. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iran/1/ Washington, September 11, 1965, 7:04 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL IRAN-U.S. Top Secret; Sensitive; Priority; [distribution indicator not declassified]. Drafted by Spain and Curl; cleared by Talbot, and in substance by Bracken and Komer; and approved by Hughes. 292. For Ambassador. Appreciate deep thought and effort devoted Embtel 330./2/ Keenly aware political problems you point up. Fear however there is misunderstanding nature of situation we now face. Following factors must be accepted as valid and determinative: /2/Reference is to telegram 332, September 10, (Document 98), initially transmitted incorrectly as telegram 330. (1) The highest authority has directed that the U.S.G. proceed as a matter of urgency to develop alternative facilities for those now in Pakistan. The question of economy in government, while always pertinent, is in this case clearly subordinate to the protection of critical U.S. national security interests. (2) Top U.S. intelligence authorities concerned, supported by most competent technical experts in U.S.G., have reviewed requirements and capabilities this field in detail and have concluded that Iran is technically most suitable site for relocation major portion collection activity now in Pakistan. Geographic and other factors related to target areas have been thoroughly taken into account. (3) Same top U.S. intelligence authorities know well nature and scope present sensitive operations in Iran. While uniquely valuable in its own right, Iranian facilities cannot compare with operations in Pakistan. Assumption that there is little being done in Pakistan that is not already adequately being done in Iran is not correct. (4) Question of adequacy existing [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] facilities in Iran in terms US [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] communications needs now under study here but is separate from that with which we now seized except insofar as new [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] facility might [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] intelligence collection personnel. We can assure you that no one here has any desire to burden you with additional problems in Iran. We now face, however, the possibility of exclusion from Pakistan at short notice and even if we weather the present crisis, the future viability of the facilities there is in grave doubt. Our job is to try to determine (A) what could be done in Iran right now should we suddenly be excluded from Pakistan and (B) what can be done in the months ahead to prepare the way for a more gradual transfer of at least some of the activities now carried out in Pakistan to Iran. Department and White House must therefore ask in the most urgent terms your immediate further consideration in the context set forth above of the questions put in Deptel 193,/3/ including the specifics requested in the last two paragraphs of that message. Rusk /3/Document 94. [Continue with the next documents] |
