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70. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom/1/ Washington, February 26, 1965, 7:58 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 IRAN. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Howison; cleared by Meeker, Lee, Frazier Meade in EUR/BNA, and Officer in Charge of Pakistan-Afghanistan Affairs L. Bruce Laingen; and approved by Jernegan. Repeated to Ankara, Kabul, Karachi, and Tehran. 5386. Embtel 4118./2/ CENTO--Shah's London Visit. /2/In telegram 4118 from London, February 25, Ambassador Bruce reported that the British Foreign Office suspected that if the Shah felt absolutely sure of a U.S. bilateral security guarantee, he might be tempted to jettison CENTO. (Ibid.) 1. US continues regard CENTO alliance as integral part security structure of Middle East area. We would look upon any change not carefully tailored to meet requirements all parties as greatly weakening position of all. 2. We somewhat more sanguine than British appear to be that Shah will continue regard CENTO as vital part of alliance security shield. He has important domestic political investment in CENTO and we believe he is well aware that security of area vis-a-vis Soviets is in large part dependent on atmospherics. No element--whether CENTO or US bilateral guarantee--can be removed from structure constituting posture of determination defend Iran without weakening credibility of entire structure. 3. U.S.-Iranian agreement of 1959 (TIAS 4189; 9 UST 1077) states that "in case of aggression against Iran" USG will, in accordance constitution, "take such appropriate action, including use of armed forces, as may be mutually agreed upon and as is envisaged in Joint Resolution to Promote Peace and Stability in Middle East, in order to assist Govt. of Iran at its request." Shah is aware of falsity of longstanding rumor in Iran that secret codicil to 1959 agreement includes more explicit guarantees to Iran. We are looking into question of whether Bilateral Agreement would continue to be fully operative in event of dissolution of CENTO or change in Iran's relationship thereto. 4. Under these circumstances, British in talks with Shah should not discuss question bilateral U.S.-Iranian arrangements. Aside from inappropriateness such discussion in our absence, to reopen question of U.S. position on defense of Iran might create new problem in our relations with Iran and might exacerbate rather than minimize Iranian tendency to reappraise security relationship with West. Fact these issues again moot would almost certainly become known to Russians, with resultant diminution credibility of our security arrangements even if no structural change in these arrangements had occurred. Rusk
71. Memorandum From the Assistant Legal Adviser for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Wehmeyer) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Talbot)/1/ Washington, March 25, 1965. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15-1 IRAN. Confidential. SUBJECT The Secretary called on Senator McClellan on March 24, accompanied by the Attorney General, Mr. Kearney, and Mr. Rostal of the Department of Justice./2/ The Secretary and the Attorney General outlined the nature of the problem from the standpoint of the two agencies. /2/On March 8 Talbot sent a memorandum to the Secretary suggesting that there was now a good chance that Senator McClellan, if approached carefully on the subject, might be willing to make a public statement to the effect that his investigation of Gudarzian's charges of corruption in U.S. aid to Iran had been completed and the charges found to be false. He noted such an action would be of immense value in meeting the understandable Iranian dismay over the Gudarzian affair and would create a better atmosphere for the Secretary's talks with the Shah and other Iranian officials during the CENTO Ministerial Council meeting in Tehran in April. (Ibid.) Senator McClellan indicated that he recognized that Gudarzian was making false statements regarding the AID program. He indicated that he was disposed to set further hearings on the subject of the Gudarzian allegations and to pose questions to Gudarzian which would result in his either committing perjury or withdrawing the charges. Unfortunately, insofar as timing is concerned, the Senator indicated that his committee has just received additional "documentation" from Gudarzian with respect to certain charges and this material has not been checked out. The Senator indicated that he would like to have someone from the Justice Department and the State Department work with members of his staff in reviewing this material. (Mr. Saridakis (IGA) and Mr. Wehmeyer are meeting with members of the committee staff and a representative of the Department of Justice at 10:00 a.m. Thursday to examine the "new material".)/3/ /3/Presumably April 1. Telegram 888 to Tehran, April 5, informed the Embassy that Senator McClellan had announced in the Senate that day that the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations had made exhaustive inquiries into Gudarzian's allegations that there had been a large-scale diversion of U.S. aid funds intended for Iran and had discovered no evidence substantiating the truthfulness of those charges. On the contrary, the preponderance of the evidence pointed to their deceptiveness and falsity, and a complete transcript of the hearings had been turned over to the Department of Justice for its determination as to whether there had been any violation of Federal law and for appropriate action. (Ibid.)
72. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State/1/ Tehran, April 8, 1965, 6:30 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, E 12 IRAN. Confidential; Priority. Secto 25. Secretary's conversation with Shah--Iranian reforms and general foreign policy./2/ Secretary, accompanied by Talbot and Rockwell, had one and one-half hour audience with Shah last evening which marked by extreme cordiality and frank exchanges of views. This is the first of six messages reporting conversations. Subjects concerned are: 1) Iranian reform program and general foreign policy (including Viet-nam); 2) Iran's military policy; 3) Gudarzian case; 4) Bredin case; 5) Fairhurst problem; 6) Iran-Arab relations. /2/Secretary Rusk was in Tehran April 7-8 attending the 13th CENTO Ministerial Council session. Briefing material for the CENTO meeting is ibid., NEA/IRN Files: Lot 69 D 490, 1965 IRAN, DEF 4-e-1, Papers for CENTO Ministerial Session in Tehran. Secretary began by conveying President's greetings to Shah and stating he knew President would be interested to learn Shah's views concerning progress of reform program in Iran. Shah gave brief expose along lines familiar to Dept, reiterating such points as that White Revolution is supported by nation with exception minor groups such as reactionary mullahs and dispossessed landlords; that revolution had been achieved without bloodshed and without dispossessing landlord group of their wealth other than land; that land being paid for; that partnership between workers and employers had been established; that literacy corps had been a tremendous success; and that Shah was confident White Revolution would continue to succeed. During discussion of Literacy Corps, Secretary conveyed message from Sargent Shriver, saying latter would welcome any comments or suggestions Shah might have regarding operations of Peace Corps in Iran. Shah made very favorable comments on Peace Corps volunteers, noting their dedication to duty and the good reception many of them had achieved in this country. Secretary then took up South Viet-nam, setting forth problems faced by us and factors which made us determined not to be driven out of that country or to abandon its commitments there. Said he believed that maintenance integrity of American commitment to South Viet-nam was important for world peace. Shah said he completely agreed with Secretary and was delighted to receive this reaffirmation of U.S. determination to stand by Viet-nam. He recalled he had told Pres Johnson that if U.S. pulled out of Viet-nam, free world would lose confidence in U.S. policy and promises, that progress of deterioration would begin in other non-Communist countries of Southeast Asia, Shah added: "In Viet-nam you are doing what you should do." Secretary said that he had found Policy Planning Group in the Dept to be extremely valuable. He outlined the advantages of having a group of people who were disconnected from the daily problems and had the time to devote themselves to consideration of long-range issues. He said he would appreciate the privilege of receiving the Shah's views on long-range problems affecting the Middle East. The Shah was clearly very pleased to have been offered this opportunity for consultation and said that he would be delighted to take advantage of it. Discussion then turned to specific Iranian and Middle Eastern topics which are being reported separately./3/ /3/See Documents 73-75. Rusk
73. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State/1/ Tehran, April 8, 1965, 10 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 1 IRAN. Secret; Priority. Repeated to CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA. Secto 26. Secretary's conversation with Shah--Iran's military policy. During Secretary's audience with Shah April 7, Shah said that Iran's military policy was entirely defensive and reflected the determination not to be taken by surprise from any quarter. He said that there was complete agreement between Iran and US as to the menace of Communist aggression from the north. If this occurred, it would provoke international conflict. He added that there might be disagreement between us as to dangers to Iran from other quarters, and he thought the US should welcome a situation wherein it would not be required to become involved militarily in defending Iran in the event of an attack from a country other than the USSR. Iran could not afford to be weak in the face of Arab claims against a part of Iranian territory and in view of the uncertainty as to the future of the Persian Gulf State. Accordingly, Iran had sought and obtained a loan of $200 million for military purchases from the US and it was now time to consider the need for additional such purchases. The Shah then said that the answers to the economic questionnaire which had been prepared by the Embassy were now ready and would soon be turned over. The study which had been undertaken showed that there would be $680 million available to Iran for borrowing in the next 10 years, even after the establishment and maintenance of an eight percent economic growth rate. One of the future sources of foreign exchange income to which the Shah attached particular importance was the establishment of ammonia plants. He made clear that he was confident that Iran would have no trouble in assuming an additional loan burden for the purchase of military equipment. The Secretary said that Iran was right in being sensitive about threats to its territorial integrity. If a firm attitude was taken at the very beginning against aggressive tendencies, the danger of aggression was greatly reduced. Rusk
74. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State/1/ Tehran, April 8, 1965, 10 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15-1 IRAN. Confidential; Priority; Limdis. Secto 27. Secretary's conversation with Shah--Gudarzian case. During his audience with Shah April 7, Secretary discussed Gudarzian case at some length. He told Shah that only other matter which had recently been taking up more of his time than this affair was Viet-nam. He expressed opinion that although it has taken a long time, Gudarzian's days are now numbered. Secretary thought it possible that Gudarzian might flee the country. Shah expressed pleasure with statements in Senate but revealed that he still lacks comprehension of US legal procedures. Secretary mentioned importance of presence and suitable testimony of Iranian witnesses in US, if Gudarzian is to be successfully tried on criminal charges. Shah made no substantive comment but Aram inquired whether all witnesses had to go. He was told only key individuals would be needed. Rusk
75. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State/1/ Tehran, April 8, 1965, 11 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL ARAB-IRAN. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Damascus, Rabat, Tunis, Tripoli, Baghdad, Jidda, Beirut, Amman, London, Tel Aviv, Taiz, Dhahran, Cairo, and Algiers and passed to the White House at 4:20 p.m. Secto 30. Secretary's conversation with Shah--Iranian-Arab relations. Major part of audience which Secretary had with Shah April 7 was concerned with Iranian-Arab relations and developments in Arab world. Shah outlined his well-known concern with subversive and aggressive policies of the UAR, with particular reference to Arab claims on Khuzestan and the danger of Nasser's taking over the Persian Gulf States. Secretary said that US had been very patient with Nasser but that this patience now running out and US relations with UAR now hanging by a very slender thread. Secretary thought it was encouraging, however, that other Arab States had clearly shown unwillingness to submit to Egyptian hegemony. He thought these states would be supported in that attitude. Shah said he entirely agreed and remarked he had been surprised by the determination not to be pushed around by the UAR which President Bourguiba had exhibited during his recent state visit to Iran. Shah said attitude of Saudi Arabia was also very constructive. Relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia had grown extremely close. He hoped, however, that Saudis would not press Iran too hard about Israel. Iran desired good relations with Saudi Arabia, but would not abandon Israel to achieve them. Israel was in existence as a sovereign state and its relations with Iran were good. Besides, there was the saying that "the enemy of my enemy is my friend". Shah asked what US would do if Nasser attacked Saudi Arabia. Secretary replied that Saudi assistance to Yemeni Royalists created difficult problem for US, which had been made clear to Saudis. In Viet-nam US was resisting the infiltration of men and war material across the border, and was itself attempting to stop this by military action in the guilty country. If UAR should attack Saudi Arabia in area other than Yemeni border region where staging of Saudi aid to Royalists taking place, US would support Saudi Arabia. But if border staging area attacked by Egyptians, this would be another matter. Secretary added that US would like to see the Yemenis get their own country back. Secretary asked Shah about Iran's relations with Iraq. Shah reiterated his well-known concern over desires of Iraqi leaders to make Iraq subservient to Nasser. Iran's only policy was that Iraq should be truly independent. There was the problem of the Shatt al Arab between the two countries and also that of subversive activity in Khuzestan originating in Iraq. With regard to the Kurdish problem, the Shah said that, while it was helping them, Iran was not encouraging the Kurds to resume hostilities. At the same time, Iran considered that in its relations with Iraq it held a trump card in the Kurds, which it would not relinquish as long as a "truly national" government was not established in Iraq. The Shah said: "We are not going to let the Iraqi Kurds down until a national government is established in Baghdad". In a discussion of Arab-Israeli relations, Secretary said that Israel seems only matter on which Arabs can achieve any degree of unity. The Palestine issue was valuable to the Arabs for this political purpose, but Secretary did not believe it likely that Arabs would engage in military action against Israel. At the same time, US had made very clear to Israelis that they would receive no US support should they undertake military action against Arab States because of latter's operations to divert Jordan waters. There was, however, danger of Arab or Israeli military action if either side became prey of fear that it was about to be attacked by the other. Therefore, it was important that there not be created an armaments imbalance in the Near East and that was reason why US found itself in the distasteful position of participating in an arms race in the area as result of its efforts to prevent such imbalance. Shah mentioned his forthcoming trip to Morocco and said that while there he would endeavor to persuade King to embark on a reform program. Rusk
76. Information Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Jernegan) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/ Washington, April 10, 1965. /1/Source: Department of State, NEA/IRN Files: Lot 69 D 489, Iran 1965, POL 23-8, Assassination Attempt--Shah. Secret. Drafted by Mulligan. SUBJECT The most recent reports on the shooting incident which took place at Marble Palace in Tehran on Saturday/2/ morning indicate that a member of the Imperial Guard shot his way into the palace with a submachine gun in an apparent attempt to reach the Shah. Two guards and the assailant are reported killed. In announcing the incident the Government has attributed the shooting to a quarrel between a conscript soldier and a regular member of the palace guard. No mention was made of the location where the shooting took place. Tehran has remained quiet and the Shah, who was apparently in his office throughout the episode, is said to have continued with his regular appointments for the day. /2/April 10. Comment: A [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] report indicates that security records disclosed no prior adverse information regarding the assailant and that it is not yet known whether or not the assassination attempt was a plot. The fact that the assailant had made a trip to Meshed in 1962 would indicate that he had probably made a religious pilgrimage to the Shrine of Imam Reza, which is customary for devout Muslims of Iran's predominantly Shia belief. On the basis of information reported thus far, we do not anticipate any immediately significant political effect or threat to the continued maintenance of internal stability in Iran. We do not discount the possibility however that further investigation may disclose the motive for this attempt at assassination and that it may be found related to the desperate frustration of certain minority elements of the Shah's reform opposition, which led to the recent assassination of Prime Minister Mansur.
77. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson/1/ Washington, April 15, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Iran, Vol. I, Memos & Miscellaneous, 1/64-12/65. Secret. Your meeting with our new Ambassador to Iran/2/ seems to me most important, because it is essential he get a clear sense of what we really want in Iran. You in 1962 and then JFK in 1963 preached reform to the Shah. Now he takes it as his own idea, and wowed his UK hosts recently by a 45-minute peroration on the subject. /2/Armin H. Meyer was appointed Ambassador to Iran on March 18; he presented his credentials on April 27. The President met with Ambassadors Meyer and Holmes from 12:15 p.m. to 12:17 p.m. on April 15. No record of their discussion has been found. But the Shah's palaver is better than his performance. With rapidly rising oil revenues ($750 million last year), he's tempted to spend far too much on fancy military hardware and not enough on meeting his own people's rising expectations. He's got a good land reform program but lags badly on the credit facilities and marketing arrangements to help the peasants out. In a word, he doesn't pay enough attention to his own economy, but loves (now that we've stopped the Soviets for him) to worry about the piddling Arab threat. Given Iran's wealth we've practically disengaged from major aid programs, but are still getting his military purchases through some skillful MAP credit deals. So without aid leverage, keeping the Shah steered right will depend largely on Armin Meyer. I hope you'll tell him: 1. When you visited Iran in 1962 you tried to impress on the Shah that good economics is good politics, and that modernizing their countries was the way for monarchs to keep their thrones. You still feel the same way. 2. Meyer should impress on the Shah that you watch closely the results of his reform program, which we regard as an impressive achievement. 3. Just as we are trying to expand output and purchasing power to provide the resources for all we want to do, so the same principle might hold good for Iran. 4. Meyer should carry your warm best wishes to the Shah and express your pleasure he escaped last week's assassination attempt (we sent a private message in your name/3/ and got a very grateful reply). /3/A copy of the President's April 11 message to the Shah is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence, Iran, Shah Correspondence, Vol. I. 5. Meyer should use all his arts of persuasion to influence the Shah in the right direction. If you can help, just let you know. R.W. Komer
78. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State/1/ Tehran, April 20, 1965, 1215Z. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-1 IRAN. Secret. 1171. Reference: Deptel 957./2/ Basic estimate security situation not significantly altered by recent assassination attempt. That attempt highlighted, however, the fact, which has long been apparent, that stability in Iran is unduly dependent on the life of one man. /2/Dated April 19. (Ibid.) We have had no further information to add to interesting psychological phenomenon reported Embtel 1136,/3/ that after the recent assassination attempt another such attempt is now regarded as more likely. There is no evidence to support belief that another attempt will follow soon, but somehow there is impression that cost of life insurance policy on Shah must have gone up. This phenomenon will bear watching, but cannot be developed further at this time. /3/Dated April 14. (Ibid., POL 15-1 IRAN) There certainly are efforts under way to plug gaps in arrangements for personal security of Shah; otherwise there are no indications at present time that regime is further tightening up after the assassination attempt. It has been keeping tight control of any opposition activities all along. We continue to believe that regime is capable of dealing with any disorders that might be fomented by opposition groups. Assassination by fanatics who are willing to die in the process is another matter, but as Shah will be better protected we do not on balance see any deterioration./4/ /4/In telegram 1203 from Tehran, April 27, Holmes reported that the Shah had repeated to him a statement he had previously made to others, i.e., that the April 10 attempt on his life had been part of a plot inspired by pro-Communist Iranian students centered in London. (Ibid.) Meyer
79. Current Intelligence Memorandum/1/ OCI No. 1109/65 Washington, April 23, 1965. /1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency Files: Job 79-T00472A, OCI Intelligence Memoranda, 1-30 Apr 1965. Secret. Prepared in the Office of Current Intelligence. THE SITUATION IN IRAN 1. Iran, as it has for the last decade, continues to present a picture of relative peace and stability. Ruled by a pro-Western monarch who permits no organized open opposition, the country is making slight but visible progress in all fields without the revolutionary convulsions which have struck much of the Middle East. 2. The basic weakness of the situation has been heavily underscored in the last month, however, by the attempt on the Shah's life by a conscript member of the Imperial Guard. Both supporters and opponents of the Shah expressed great concern at the incident--supporters because to insiders the Shah is indispensable, opponents because the Shah has not permitted the development of persons or institutions capable of continuing an orderly government if he were suddenly removed. The Shah's reaction to the incident has been mild, considering that it came less than six months after the assassination of Prime Minister Mansur. There has been no widespread and indiscriminate crackdown on all opposition elements as would have been the case a few years ago. The Shah appears firm in his belief that he has widespread popular support for his "White Revolution" and that any opposition may be irritating but not dangerous. Coupled with this is his frequently expressed belief that he is under divine protection until he accomplishes his mission. 3. The opposition to the Shah is so disorganized and fragmented as to be powerless. A substantial portion of the Moslem clergy disapproves of his reform program because it involves redistribution of lands they have depended on, and suffrage for women. The clergy are reluctant to force a showdown, however, because the Shah has demonstrated that he is willing to destroy this group as a political force if he is pushed too far. The nationalist opposition--the National Front followers of former Prime Minister Mossadeq--are likewise in disarray. Watched and harried by the security services, there is little they can do that is not known to the government. The leadership has split between the older and more cautious who have advocated waiting until the right time to make a bid for power, and the younger radicals who insist that such an opportunity will never come and the only solution is violence. Nationalist students in the United States contend that an underground movement divorced from the old leadership and devoted to violence is getting under way. 4. There are few major problems between the U.S. and Iran. The American image has held up better in Iran than in most countries in the Middle East. Within recent months, however, this image has been tarnished by a clumsy presentation of the Status of Forces bill to the Iranian parliament, which raised memories of the hated "capitulations" formerly imposed by European powers. In an unfortunate bit of timing, a $200-million U.S. military credit bill was presented to parliament a few days later, giving rise to charges that Washington had bribed the Iranian Government to grant widespread immunities to US personnel. Although the Shah has increased his room for maneuver by a series of friendly gestures toward the Soviet Union, he remains firmly committed to the West. His main external concern is expanded pro-Nasir activities in the Persian Gulf area. This has given rise to greater Iranian activity in the Middle East in the form of providing aid to Kurdish rebels in Iraq, aid to Yemeni royalists, and cooperation with Israel on security matters and in connection with land reform. 5. The Shah's "White Revolution"--distribution of landlord-owned villages to the peasants, the Literacy Corps to educate the villagers, and a medical and development corps to work in the villages--has started a trend that probably can never be reversed. Whether a bureaucracy that is noted for its inefficiency and corruption can maintain sufficient momentum to keep up with the rising expectations of the population is questionable. At this juncture the death of the Shah would probably produce a period of chaos from which a military dictatorship would be likely to arise. [Continue with the next documents] |
